User talk:Jimaction1

DESERT STORM WAR EXPERIENCE By. Thomas Garrett Jr. 1 December 2009

"Many soldiers have other stories that are FAR more interesting than mine. In fact, the majority of this story was written by a more 'published' author who at this time request to remain anonymous until public announcement." - Dictated not read.

Chapter 1.

THE HOUR

As twilight approached on February 23, 1991, U.S. Marine Colonel James A. Fulks was getting desperate. Although the ground campaign of Operation Desert Storm would not begin for more than twelve hours, Colonel Fulks lead nearly twenty-seven hundred U.S. Marines a dozen miles inside of Iraqi-occupied Kuwait and had orders to shoot that way to do with the same for the field that's really where sending in a move that night through the first of the two thick minefields the Iraqi army had planted just to the north. After days of searching, however, his scouts still had not found a path through the mines. Now Fulks was preparing to order a rapid and potentially dangerous effort to clear a way through the deadly obstacle belt. Fulks' marines, designated Task Force - Grizzly, and its brother unit, Task Force - Taro, commanded by Colonel John H. Admire, had marched into Kuwait two days earlier. Alone, with no tanks and few heavy weapons, the fifty-three hundred marines were vulnerable to an attack by any of the five heavily armed Iraqi divisions waiting on the other side of the mines. Colonel Admire recalled that 'We were essentially up there alone.'; Colonels Admire and Fulks had orders from the First Marine Division commander, Major-General. James M. 'Mike' Myatt, to infiltrate through the first minefield well before the start of the ground war. They then were to march farther into Kuwait to shield the breach of those mines by Myatt's two powerful mechanized regiments the next morning. In the midst of the most technologically advanced conflict in history — the so-called Nintendo War — most of the marines in the two task forces marched the twenty miles from the Saudi border to their blocking positions, carrying their gear on their backs or pulling it in crude handcarts. I was one of those Marines that happened to be "In the right place At the right time." A million dollar chance with history and MY defining moment.

Of the 2700 Marines of Task Force Grizley, I was our squad's communications & ammo-bearer in the 81 millimeter Mortar Platoon that covered our Battallion's movement. One of the "Last of the First and First of the Last!" in INFANTRY vernacular. My name is Thomas Garrett Jr and I was a member of Weapons Company 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines of the First Marine Division named Task Force Grizzly. I can still remember the moment 'It' happened just as vivid as if it were a few moments ago. I can still sometimes feel the rattle of the HWMMV and hear the sound of the 81mm ammo I was sitting on in the back vehicle. It seemed as I could see for miles as I watched the sun rise from the east horizon and to our 6 was all clear as black smoke would allow my vision to go with the sun glistening on metal of vehicles behind us in the convoy. Our trail was thin. . . . . which means. . . . . Danger Area. . . . keep it closest to inside the same tracks. Our orders for breaching the primary Iraqi defensive belt was either extremly brave, bold or foolish. Our supporting force was to cross the Kuwait border before G-day and clear enemy resistance from trenches for Task Force Ripper, a mechanized infantry regiment which would conduct the main attack. As the assault element of the division we had been rehearsing our part in the breach for weeks. By G-day, our unit successfully infiltrated on foot through a deadly minefield. We cleared an Iraqi fortified position which threatened the mechanized breaching force, Task Force Ripper, with anti-tank guided missiles was behind us. As the sun began to rise, a light rain started to fall under the skies which was still dark from the smoke of burning oil fires. We were given the order to pause and don protective gear after an alarm warned us of an impending Iraqi chemical attack. Still, as we awaited the breach of the Iraqi defenses by Task Force Ripper, we remained confident. We believed in our gear, our training, and our leaders.

Suddenly, the noise of battle erupted around us with a 50 calibur shot as Task Force Ripper made its assault. Heavy machine-gun and tank rounds cut through the air, impacting us. It took only seconds to realize that the fire was not from the enemy, but from our fellow Marines in Task Force Ripper. Miraculously, only one Marine died before unit leaders brought the misdirected fire under control. Unfortunately, it was one of my best friends, Lance Corporal Christian Jay Porter, who became part of a now well-known statistic: he was only one of the 35 Americans killed by our comrades during Operation Desert Storm. I can still remember seeing the small puff of smoke I saw leave the tank silouette. I remember diving to the radio microphone and saying "We've got incoming, Six-O-Clock, Friendly Fire!" and handing the microphone to Corporal Crawford to send remaining information up to Higher HQ. That was the moment Desert Shield became Desert Storm to me.

Operation Desert Storm had kicked off and I was the first on the radio that historic moment. Years have passed since the end of the Gulf War, yet Americans continue to receive similar, but no less tragic accounts from the media. As we are painfully reminded that the problem of friendly fire continues to be an inseparable part of war, we need to recognize also that the very nature of modern warfare has exacerbated the problem. On today's fast, fluid, and firepower-intensive battlefield, technology and our war-fighting doctrine have increased rather than decreased the risk of friendly fire. Although we can never completely eliminate the chance of fire on friendly forces, many critics have alleged that not enough has been done to minimize its occurrence on the battlefield. Brigadier General P. K. Van Riper, USMC, in an early assessment of lessons learned in the Gulf War observed, "Friendly fire, as in all wars, had tragic results. This is a problem insufficiently studied in the past.  The time has come to devote a significant effort to ensure that we reduce incidents in future conflicts." My experience during Operation Desert Storm reveals that many of the primitive measures used to protect our ground forces reflect neither the nature of modern combat nor the capabilities of our weapons systems. For this reason, the view that friendly fire has been, and always will be, a tragic but inevitable part of the controlled chaos of war which must be questioned, addressed and prevented at all costs in the future.

According to Colonel Fulks, the risky infiltration 'was part of our strategy in the division to be very aggressive.' The idea was to mentally overwhelm the Iraqis, who had shown little ability to respond quickly to changing conditions. The Task Force Grizzly commander, who had conceived the infiltration plan months earlier while he was the division's operations officer, conceded that "Initially, it was not a very popular idea; But it embodied the boldness that enabled two marine divisions to punch through the Iraqi minefields on 'G-day,' February 24, jump-starting the allied ground assault that ended with a crushing VICTORY in ONE HUNDRED HOURS." That attack was the culmination of the largest deployment of U.S. Marines in history, which had started six months earlier, just days after Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein's army over-ran Kuwait on August 2, 1990.