User talk:Lord Milner/sandbox/Who United the Western Front During World War I

Author Contradictions
During the Doullens Conference, when General Petain spoke, author Neillands says the general spoke of plans to deploy a screening force to protect Paris. However, his book is not supported by footnotes. Lord Milner (talk) 00:49, 10 June 2023 (UTC)

Credible sources say General Foch "never said a word" at the Doullens Conference (Milner), or he went unmentioned (Mordacq). It is possible he said his famous words that morning in the courtyard, or the evening before, at Compiegne. Others writers, like Clemenceau, give him credit, but are not consistent on when the words were said. This article credits him at the Doullens table, because it seems most likely to have occurred there. However, the debate continues.

There are three theories on what happened next (1. Petain spoke last, 2. Haig spoke last, and 3. Foch spoke last):

1) Lord Milner: says after General Petain talked, "None of his listeners seemed very happy or convinced." "At this juncture I asked whether I might have a word with Clemenceau alone" (pg. iv of "The News Statesman").

General Foch: says nothing of the courtyard, that in the conference everyone agreed on the need to save Amiens, that General Petain spoke, and then "Lord Milner had a private interview with M. Clemenceau, in the course of which he proposed that I should be entrusted with the conduct of operations. Foch agrees with Milner.

2) General Mordacq: says Haig talked about no reserves left, followed by a noticeable lull in the room, broken by Clemenceau making a sign to Lord Milner, and leading him into a corner" (pg. 63 of "Unity of Command: How it was achieved", english version).

Prime Minister Clemenceau is with Mordacq: gives credit to Foch saying his famous words in the courtyard or inside (pgs. 38 & 39, or at Compiegne, pg. 42 of "Grandeur and Misery of Victory). With the conference, he used General Mordacq's words from ""Le Commandement Unique" (1929), saying he, Petain, and Haig spoke, ending with "no men left capable of going into the line immediately," followed by "a chill", before "M Clemenceau signaled to Lord Milner, and taking him in a corner...(pgs. 41-42 of same book). Clemenceau praises Lord Milner in his book, as always a friend of France, and he annexed his "Memorandum to the War Cabinet" to his autobiography.

Louis Loucher is with Mordacq: says Foch added some simple words & Haig answered with "If General Foch consented to give me his advice, I would gladly follow them." "Clemenceau nods to Lord Milner and leads me with him to a corner of the room" (pgs. 59-61 of "Carnets Secrets").

General Edmonds (who wrote the official history of the war for the English): is with Mordacq, saying Haig talked, Wilson disagreed, Petain talked, at the mention of his name Foch rose and said some simple words, Haig asked for his advice, then came silence, followed by Clemenceau taking Lord Milner into a corner. (Edmunds, vol. VII, pgs. 540-542).

President Poincaré: glossed over the meeting, writing just half a page (pg. 89 of "In Service of France, vol. X"). (keep with Mordacq)

3) General Weygand: says Haig, Petain, & Poincaré spoke, and then, when the President asked Foch to speak, he gave "a few energetic words that he has said over and over again". "On a corner of the table, M Clemenceau writes a piece of paper, he then takes by the arm in turn General Pétain and Sir Douglass Haig and leads them in private conversation in the corner of the room" (pgs. 481-482 of "Memoires, vol. I").

Other
On March 28th, General Pershing visited General Foch. In the presence of Prime Minister Clemenceau, General's Foch & Petain, and Louis Loucher, he declared, "I come to tell you that the American people would hold it a great honour if our troops were engaged in the present battle. I ask you this in my name and in theirs.  At this moment there is nothing to be thought of but combat.  Infantry, artillery, aviation - all that we have is yours.  Use them as you will.  There are more to come - as many more as shall be needed.  I am here solely to say to you that the American people will be proud to be engaged in the greatest and most glorious battle in history."

The defeat of the Allies was certain if General's Pétain and Haig acted on the retreat orders they issued on March 24th and 25th. Reserves, which should have been present and decisive at the start of the battle, but which order was ignored by both generals and Prime Minister Clemenceau, were in the completely wrong place. For General Haig, the size of the B.E.F. in 1918 was three times larger than that of 1940, and being "thrown into the sea" meant either a fight at the beaches and mass surrender, or suicide (his orders were quite clear, he was not allowed to surrender). For the French, the outcome would not have been much different, given these new conditions and General Pétain's unwillingness to take the lead.

Lord Milner's "Memo to the War Cabinet" was published in 1921, (immediately upon his retirement from government in The Telegraph newspaper on February 7th & 8th, The New York Times on March 13th, the magazine, The New Statesman on April 23rd, the French journal Collection of Foreign Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 14th), in 1925 (upon his death in The Times), in 1930 (in Georges Clemenceau's autobiography), and in 1933 (in the french book, La Conférence De Doullens written by authors Paul Carpentier and Paul Rudet), but it did not receive widespread support due to the conclusion of the war and the public's attention being turned to more mundane matters.