User talk:Mindaur/Archive 1

Your GA nomination of Soviet economic blockade of Lithuania
The article Soviet economic blockade of Lithuania you nominated as a good article has been placed on hold. The article is close to meeting the good article criteria, but there are some minor changes or clarifications needing to be addressed. If these are fixed within 7 days, the article will pass; otherwise it may fail. See Talk:Soviet economic blockade of Lithuania for issues which need to be addressed. Message delivered by Legobot, on behalf of NoonIcarus -- NoonIcarus (talk) 15:21, 20 June 2021 (UTC)

Your GA nomination of Soviet economic blockade of Lithuania
The article Soviet economic blockade of Lithuania you nominated as a good article has passed ; see Talk:Soviet economic blockade of Lithuania for comments about the article. Well done! If the article has not already appeared on the main page as a "Did you know" item, or as a bold link under "In the News" or in the "On This Day" prose section, you can nominate it within the next seven days to appear in DYK. Bolded names with dates listed at the bottom of the "On This Day" column do not affect DYK eligibility.

Congratulations! NoonIcarus (talk) 11:35, 27 June 2021 (UTC)

DYK nomination: Soviet economic blockade of Lithuania
Hello! Your submission of Soviet economic blockade of Lithuania at the Did You Know nominations page has been reviewed, and some issues with it may need to be clarified. Please review the comment(s) at your nomination's entry and respond there as soon as possible. Thank you for contributing to Did You Know! Szmenderowiecki (talk) 00:00, 30 June 2021 (UTC)

DYK for Soviet economic blockade of Lithuania
Cwmhiraeth (talk) 12:02, 17 July 2021 (UTC)

WikiProject Lithuania
-- Po  fk  a  (talk) 20:43, 5 August 2021 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for October 17
An automated process has detected that when you recently edited Rail transport in Lithuania, you added links pointing to the disambiguation pages Greenfield and M62.

(Opt-out instructions.) --DPL bot (talk) 05:58, 17 October 2021 (UTC)

Incomplete DYK nomination
Hello! Your submission of Template:Did you know nominations/Rail transport in Lithuania at the Did You Know nominations page is not complete; if you would like to continue, please link the nomination to the nominations page as described in step 3 of the nomination procedure. If you do not want to continue with the nomination, tag the nomination page with db-g7, or ask a DYK admin. Thank you. DYKHousekeepingBot (talk) 00:39, 20 October 2021 (UTC)

Non-free rationale for File:Latvian Patria 6x6 prototype, 26 May 2021.jpg
Thanks for uploading or contributing to File:Latvian Patria 6x6 prototype, 26 May 2021.jpg. I notice the file page specifies that the file is being used under non-free content criteria, but there is not a suitable explanation or rationale as to why each specific use in Wikipedia is acceptable. Please go to the file description page, and edit it to include a non-free rationale.

If you have uploaded other non-free media, consider checking that you have specified the non-free rationale on those pages too. You can find a list of 'file' pages you have edited by clicking on the "my contributions" link (it is located at the very top of any Wikipedia page when you are logged in), and then selecting "File" from the dropdown box. Note that any non-free media lacking such an explanation will be deleted one week after they have been tagged, as described in section F6 of the criteria for speedy deletion. If the file is already gone, you can still make a request for undeletion and ask for a chance to fix the problem. If you have any questions, please ask them at the Media copyright questions page. Thank you. Stefan2 (talk) 21:20, 24 October 2021 (UTC)

Replaceable fair use File:Latvian Patria 6x6 prototype, 26 May 2021.jpg
Thanks for uploading File:Latvian Patria 6x6 prototype, 26 May 2021.jpg. I noticed that this file is being used under a claim of fair use. However, I think that the way it is being used fails the first non-free content criterion. This criterion states that files used under claims of fair use may have no free equivalent; in other words, if the file could be adequately covered by a freely-licensed file or by text alone, then it may not be used on Wikipedia. If you believe this file is not replaceable, please:


 * 1) Go to the file description page and add the text  below the original replaceable fair use template, replacing   with a short explanation of why the file is not replaceable.
 * 2) On the file discussion page, write a full explanation of why you believe the file is not replaceable.

Alternatively, you can also choose to replace this non-free media item by finding freely licensed media of the same subject, requesting that the copyright holder release this (or similar) media under a free license, or by creating new media yourself (for example, by taking your own photograph of the subject).

If you have uploaded other non-free media, consider checking that you have specified how these media fully satisfy our non-free content criteria. You can find a list of description pages you have edited by clicking on [ this link]. Note that even if you follow steps 1 and 2 above, non-free media which could be replaced by freely licensed alternatives will be deleted 2 days after this notification, per the non-free content policy. If you have any questions, please ask them at the Media copyright questions page. Thank you. Stefan2 (talk) 19:15, 25 October 2021 (UTC)

DYK for Rail transport in Lithuania
Cas Liber (talk · contribs) 00:03, 5 November 2021 (UTC)

Split discussion and closure
Regarding : closure of a discussion should be by an uninvolved editor per WP:CLOSE. Repeatedly discounting someone's opinion as "late" when the split discussion was closed early by someone involved (and wasn't itself really even a split discussion, but the idea of having one) is unhelpful. VQuakr (talk) 19:02, 23 February 2022 (UTC)
 * Yes, heated debates with unclear results get closed; this was never the case for straightforward discussions, though; we followed WP:DISCUSSCONSENSUS and WP was never meant to be bureaucratic, unless necessary.
 * A user who didn't make a single contribution to the article up to that point stormed in and overruled (by a revert) the consensus reached by editors who have been actively contributing to the article. It's fine to make a late objection and new contributors are more than welcome, but it would be a common courtesy to first join the discussion saying "look, it seems you have agreed on this, but I think this is wrong and here are the arguments why; can I suggest to revert while we resolve this?". --Mindaur (talk) 20:24, 23 February 2022 (UTC)
 * There was, unequivocally, no consensus to "revert" even about future actions, let alone an actual split discussion (which, again, hasn't even been started). There have not been (and could not possibly be) "late" objections at this point. You are too close to the discussion to be making a judgement about whether consensus exists or whether enough time has passed, and your expectations about what the other editor should have done are not reasonable. VQuakr (talk) 21:12, 23 February 2022 (UTC)

RE:
WP:OVERKILL. Curbon7 (talk) 20:51, 2 April 2022 (UTC)


 * Fair, but I was primarily unbreaking the references (as the removed ones were used later in the text); also, it's a kind of a way to make a point with WP:BOLD edit, as some were still wondering whether the battle is indeed over. We can certainly inline those references in the relevant sections and reduce in the infobox. Mindaur (talk) 20:58, 2 April 2022 (UTC)

Thanks!
Than you for good refs. Ultimately, one need to look at the big picture, i.e. what is happening during many years. Putin was preparing for this war since 2012 and was actually conducting it on a low-scale. He sees the independent Ukraine as an existential threat for his regime, see here. He might possibly "change the regime" by the means less dramatic than the total occupation of the country (as many analysts think), but this would be very complicated (i.e. leaving a part of the Ukrainian territory free for NATO to exploit - according to his logic), and he does consider NATO mortal enemy and therefore needs this territory for his military forces. If he were to succeed in establishing the puppet government in Ukraine, the key would be placing large Russian military bases there. Or at least that is my understanding of comments by Russian analysts. My very best wishes (talk) 16:51, 15 February 2022 (UTC)


 * I am very well aware of that. The first tremor was actually the Orange Revolution in 2004. It surprised, if not shocked, the Russian political leadership and led to a profound shift in their thinking about Ukraine. There are various other events which played a part and influenced Kremlin thinking in that era, but military-intelligence work probably began as early as that. Serious military preparation and comprehensive plans began after major reforms in the Russian armed forces following the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, so your suggested date of 2012 sounds about right. Then there was Euromaidan and the rest is history.
 * Kremlin views Ukraine as vital for its political, economic and security interests; it is much more about Ukraine's sovereignty than NATO. The regime change would be the most cost-effective option for Moscow, whether it is achieved by coup d'état, subversion or other means (some call it active measures). Russia has been trying all of that, including the covert military intervention (as War in Donbas is orchestrated from Moscow) with the pressure to implement the Russian interpretation of the Minsk Protocol. It is basically a "constitutional Trojan Horse" which would give the veto power to Russia on the policies of Ukraine. Long story short, none of these efforts were successful.
 * Kremlin failed to change the course of Ukraine; meanwhile, Ukraine has been strengthening its defenses and economic relations with the West. Zelensky's administration did not budge to any Russian pressure; moreover, it actually began systematic reduction of the Russian influence and means of subversion (something previous administrations failed to do), while keeping the reconciliatory tone in public. This source discusses it in detail, explaining why Russia is now looking for other options to coerce Ukraine.
 * As I pointed out before: incompetence is not specific to Zelensky's administration. The country has been been mismanaged since 1990s; by now, corruption is deeply rooted in the society and institutions are plagued by poor governance as well as incompetence. None of the previous governments have done much about it nor it is something what could be fixed in one term or even two, after the decades of neglect. My impression is that Zelensky is perhaps the first president who is at least trying (and that is part of the reason why Moscow is keen to remove him); however, the cabinet and the parliament plays even a bigger role in making reforms happen. Unfortunately, it is the current state of the country which allows Kremlin to deeply penetrate the Ukrainian politics and governmental institutions. See this analysis: . Russia is set to escalate and try every path. Ultimately, the degree of unity of the Ukrainian people and their will to resist will determine whether or where Russia will be stopped. --Mindaur (talk) 16:05, 18 February 2022 (UTC)
 * Thank you! I agree with everything, except that I would count the most recent Russian military expansionism period from Second Chechen War. Great sources! I can see they now consider also a possibility of strike from Brest to Lviv (that is what I thought after seeing Russian forces in the area of Brest). What troubles me most, however, is the apparent inaction by Zelensky administration (no mobilization or distributing weapons to people so far). Especially, after knowing this story, which according to many political commentators including Ukrainian ones , , implicates some of the highest members of the Ukrainian administration, such as Andriy Yermak, more or less as Russian agents. My very best wishes (talk) 21:22, 18 February 2022 (UTC)
 * First source describes several scenario that are hardly realistic. Here is why. Main purpose of the Russian operation has little to do with NATO or military. They just want to suppress (kill or put in jail) all politically active and democratically minded people in Ukraine, those who made the Revolution of Dignity. This is not an accident that Shoigu has recently defined such people as "nonhumans". To accomplish that objective they need to create their own political police, similar the currently existing system in Russia and Belorussia. That's why they need a truly puppet government and the political police they control. Can they achieve this without occupying most of the country? I doubt. My very best wishes (talk) 03:41, 19 February 2022 (UTC)


 * I do not believe Russia will go deep into the Western Ukraine. The population there will be very hostile towards the Russian occupation force or its puppets; there is also an undesirable proximity to Poland. Every military campaign is about achieving political objectives, feasibility and sustainability. They can put a puppet regime, but it will not achieve the political objective if the new regime will not be stable. If Ukrainians will pursue all forms of resistance, from organized military defense to insurgency and civil disobedience, and will remain loyal to their governance, or perhaps will even retain effective command and control (visible leadership, underground movement, government-in-exile, etc) -- then any enemy will have a very tough time.
 * Of course, these are just our perceptions and it is debatable how much they match the reality. It is possible that Kremlin genuinely believes its own lies that the Revolution of Dignity was a coup d'etat and it's a matter of merely changing the regime. However, I would think that their intelligence and military planners have a more realistic assessment. On the other hand, perhaps we overestimate the will (and organization) of the Ukrainians; perhaps many oligarchs will just align with whoever has an upper hand at the time and/or many local people will be passive and complacent; I think there is certainly some element of that, especially in some parts of eastern Ukraine (and given a considerable Russian infiltration, that's part of the reason why "just handing out weapons to the people" might not be that simple). We can try to reason about this, but we cannot know; even the greatest intelligence agencies made gross miscalculations on this subject.
 * If there will be an invasion, then I think an offensive on Kyiv is likely, perhaps with some occupation of the territories in the east (under the pretext of "peacekeeping" or whatever). Moscow has pretty much ran out of other options to (attempt to) achieve its ultimate political objective (just extra land grabs in the east won't do; it's just kicking the can down the road, but with more consequences). However, it would still be challenging and with an uncertain outcome; I don't think they have numbers to hold the entire Ukraine.
 * Personally, I think Putin has cornered himself with bad and very bad options. --Mindaur (talk) 20:14, 20 February 2022 (UTC)
 * While making previous comment, I did not know about this, which is basically a common practice during all Soviet-style occupations. They can not leave Western Ukraine unoccupied precisely because it will be used as a base of insurgency against them, with support by the West. To disable resistance and make new regime stable, they will rely on disinformation and propaganda that were very much successful in modern Russia and at the occupied Ukrainian territories, despite all the widely available information. Well, in fact, the outright lies were very much successful even in the USA, thanks to Donald Trump and his supporters. My very best wishes (talk) 20:30, 20 February 2022 (UTC)
 * Not only the senior officials. If you read my second source thoroughly, it describes (page 10) how the Russian intelligence shifted its activities to identification of local/regional figures and politicians who have sentiments towards Russia and, at the same time, who are pro-Ukrainian. So they could eliminate the latter and install their pro-Russian "assets". This is a serious problem if the society is divided. However, my point was that it works both ways: Russia would struggle to maintain the new regime if their puppets would end up having a very high mortality rate. --Mindaur (talk) 21:02, 20 February 2022 (UTC)
 * Sure, the scale of the terror will be huge. The Soviet NKVD and SMERSH succeeded in doing just that in the entire Eastern Europe. The current Kremlin administration hopes to achieve the same in Ukraine. The Belorussia is already "done" by Lukashenko.My very best wishes (talk) 21:11, 20 February 2022 (UTC)
 * The current regimes in Russia and Belorussia are very much stable due to a number of reasons. A few years ago, I visited a presentation by Yuri Felshtinsky. He said that given the stability of the regime, it can only be destroyed by the means of a war, and that is exactly what Putin does right not. So, ultimately, I think you are right, but it might be not this war, but the next. My very best wishes (talk) 20:56, 20 February 2022 (UTC)
 * I watched if NATO would try creating a no-fly zone in Ukraine. That might prevent the occupation, and be relatively "cheap", but apparently the threat of nuclear confrontation (pointedly emphasized by Putin) has prevailed. But it will cost more, even in terms of economic sanctions. And it will be even worse in the future when Latvia or another member of NATO will be attacked, not mentioning the catastrophic consequences for Ukrainian people right now. My very best wishes (talk) 23:28, 20 February 2022 (UTC)
 * Hello thank you for your edits to improve the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine however I think it is more likely to be the M777 as that is the current 155mm artillery piece used by the US the only other possible option that it maybe is the M198 which was the predecessor to the M777 but it has been completely phased out by the USA. Conservative cheese ball (talk) 12:44, 16 April 2022 (UTC)
 * I don't disagree with your reasoning, but that is WP:RUMOUR. Even if it is well reasoned and likely, one of the fundamental principles in Wikipedia is to write the content based on reliable sources (as per WP:RS). In this case, it is better to just wait until the artillery system gets confirmed or, at the very least, just write "Unspecified" in the model column for now. "List of equipment of the Ukrainian Ground Forces" should generally be cleaned up, because it does not follow couple other Wikipedia policies: please see WP:NOTNEWS and WP:INDISCRIMINATE. Mindaur (talk) 16:40, 16 April 2022 (UTC)
 * Is finding footage of one of the pieces mentioned being used in Ukraine a reliable source to prove which one was sent? Conservative cheese ball (talk) 17:25, 16 April 2022 (UTC)
 * Generally no, see the WP:USERG part of the policy. However, if some news website publishes an article based on that footage, then it might be considered sufficient. Generally, we should try to verify information and get enough confidence before publishing / listing something. Mindaur (talk) 17:35, 16 April 2022 (UTC)

help
Hey, thank you for your contributions to the articles related with Russian invasiono of Ukraine and particularly the last article I created. I would like to ask you to contribute to this page: Russian fascism (ideology) as it appears to be quite tough for many users to make it nice and neat. It has been also softly deleted (redirected) and I think it need more experienced users to be involded. Maybe you could find Lithuanian sources to make the article look more encyclopedic and neutral. Best --IgorTurzh (talk) 10:56, 5 April 2022 (UTC)
 * There are increasingly more sources on this subject. I do not have enough free time to conduct a decent research and work on this in the current period, but I would suggest to create a draft (or you can use your "Sandbox" area) article called "Fascism in Russia" and invite more editors. I could help you to gather more WP:RS and prepare the article according to the Wikipedia standards. --Mindaur (talk) 11:43, 5 April 2022 (UTC)
 * In fact, somebody already created Draft:Fascism in Russia, so there are editors working on it. Having Russian fascism (ideology) -- as a distinct ideology -- can be challenging if there are not enough WP:RS backing it up.. but in the light of what's happening, I think scholars will soon be writing more about it. Mindaur (talk) 12:43, 5 April 2022 (UTC)
 * That would be my suggestion. The subject of the page is not Fascism in Russia in general (and not Neo-Nazism in Russia), but the more narrow or different subject of alleged fascism of the entire modern-day Russian state and society (as described in articles by Motyl and others). My very best wishes (talk) 04:02, 6 April 2022 (UTC)

min-width
The other editor did not complain about min-width. The problem is that the notes column can not always be made wide enough to fit comfortably on a small screen, so the users will have to scroll, and this is the solution. I told the other editor that where a min-width was too wide for small devices, it should be made smaller (not removed like you did), most tables should not have this problem. Trigenibinion (talk) 13:21, 6 May 2022 (UTC)


 * The page was distorted on a laptop screen, hence the revert. Generally, min-width and nowraps should not be needed. If you have a specific issue, please explain it and discuss in the article's talk page. Mindaur (talk) 13:26, 6 May 2022 (UTC)

Oryx
Hello, Do you not see Oryx as a reliable source of information? Basedosaurus (talk) 14:44, 31 May 2022 (UTC)


 * If you refer to the article on the Ukrainian military equipment, then the problem is WP:INDISCRIMINATE / WP:NOTNEWS. Oryx is a good source on losses (some of their data on Western supplies has been based on assumptions though), but there is no need to track every tank loss/capture/recapture/etc. Such numbers are difficult to reconcile, they constantly change, and therefore don't provide a coherent picture. Eventually, there will be some WP:RS which will give an overview/update on the overall state. -- Mindaur (talk) 14:53, 31 May 2022 (UTC)
 * @Mindaur I think it would be reasonable to atleast include estimates on Ukrainian captures,IE total estimated T72 captures for example. Basedosaurus (talk) 14:58, 31 May 2022 (UTC)
 * Oryx has been use multiple times by very reliable news sources such as forbes,the guardian and BBC etc which is where they are getting there statistics from in alot of cause. Basedosaurus (talk) 15:00, 31 May 2022 (UTC)
 * I am aware and track Oryx myself. However, those numbers don't reconcile meaningfully at this point. Perhaps we can add a footnote or a separate field with the current estimate of losses (without providing totals which are not known), but generally the article is already too excessive with trivia and I would rather focus on cleaning up the current mess. P.S. Please discuss this in the article's talk page. -- Mindaur (talk) 15:16, 31 May 2022 (UTC)
 * On another note,I think its reasonable only to have multiple images of different variants if those variants are substantially different. Basedosaurus (talk) 15:50, 31 May 2022 (UTC)

Ukrainian lend lease
Since you know this subject better than me... I am reading and listening on YouTube such claims (and the man who claimed it seems to be a good expert). It says: "According to some reports, the first ships are already unmoored..." Do you know what reports they are talking about and what is in these "reports"? Google search finds nothing. My very best wishes (talk) 01:14, 8 June 2022 (UTC)


 * I think Arestovych mentioned this yesterday too. I actively monitor deliveries and various sources on this subject, but currently there is no information about it. Pentagon seems to be very quiet and I have not seen any "reliable rumours" (from correspondents who hang out a lot in the corridors of Pentagon). From $40bn already approved by the US Congress in mid-May, around $15bn is for the weapons to be delivered to Ukraine. So, there is A LOT to ship if this sum will be used. If you want my speculation:
 * You can airlift M777 and M142 HIMARS as they are light and built with that in mind; however, M109 and M270 are more heavyweight and it might be more practical to ship them, especially in greater quantities; so I would expect these to be the likely immediate follow up deliveries, after the announcement of the initial MLRS supplies last week.
 * Some of the shipping might facilitate swaps with other countries which are still being negotiated, see . There are also some inspiring rumours, see . Keep in mind that the lend-lease is more of a framework to reduce the red tape and streamline equipment from the US military stocks.
 * Deliveries are painfully slow, but they are flowing. We will have to just wait for the good news to be announced. -- Mindaur (talk) 11:27, 8 June 2022 (UTC)
 * OK, thank you! Ukrainian analysts are painting very rosy picture. But in fact, Ukraine is loosing right now . Obviously, what they had to do was a delivery of many hundred MLRS and other artillery units, along with big drones, etc., but I do not see it at all. My very best wishes (talk) 11:57, 8 June 2022 (UTC)
 * It is certainly not rosy, but I don't think Ukraine is loosing at strategic level. Unfortunately, Ukrainians are suffering heavy losses, but so does the enemy. It's a phase of grinding fight and artillery duels. The weapons being sent by the West, though, are exactly for fighting such artillery duels. However, I totally agree that they should have been sent much earlier and in greater quantities.
 * Significant attrition in the east and slow delivery of weapons does complicate the situation in some ways. Russians can maintain concentrated force in the east and fortify the positions in the occupied territories. They have high casualties (which they don't care about), but they are slowly succeeding in denying the Ukrainian counter-offensive, which gives them more time to subdue the local population and otherwise consolidate the conquest (with the possibility of annexation of the occupied territories). I guess that might be the main Russian goal right now. It is highly unlikely that they will be able to make any further major advances.
 * Russian offensive in the east has stalled significantly, their force is reaching exhaustion and will likely culminate soon. Militarily, the situation is difficult in the short term, but still favours Ukraine in the medium to long term. -- Mindaur (talk) 13:05, 8 June 2022 (UTC)
 * OK, let's see how this will play out. Everyone understands (and even Ukrainian analysts agree) that Ukrainian forces will not be able to reclaim their territory without several hundred MLRS systems (so far, they will have only 7 according to reports), hundreds more other artillery pieces, large number of tanks and a significantly stronger aviation + air defense. That is unless Russian Army will just collapse, as had happened after WWI.My very best wishes (talk) 15:10, 8 June 2022 (UTC)
 * P.S. I just saw this. So, Yuri Shvets is saying there will be no lend lease until October. That was probably just a dream by Zhdanov and Arestovich that the ships with lend lease were loaded somewhere right after signing the act. In a couple of weeks, they will only have 4 HIMARS with munitions for one day. Speaking Russian, Naebali ("We are fucked"). My very best wishes (talk) 22:35, 9 June 2022 (UTC)
 * Just to remind you: previously, the US first announced the supply of 18 howitzers, but in a few weeks the number was ramped up to 108. Ukraine now has over 150 units of 155 mm (NATO calibre) howitzers. This is not including the order of ~60 modern AHS Krab from Poland. Some pledged howitzers are yet to be delivered and it's likely that the supplies will continue.
 * It is pretty clear that there will be further deliveries of MLRS. Whether it will reach >50 or just, let's say, ~25 systems remains to be seen. The former number is perhaps the quantity needed to make a significant impact, while the latter would have a limited impact but would still considerably degrade the enemy's capabilities. However, it does take a while to train how to use and, especially, maintain these weapons -- M270 is not a Javelin. Even if Ukraine would get these weapons in large batches, it would take a while to field them.
 * Of course Ukrainians want the war to end as soon as possible and one can sense a mix of impatience, exasperation and despair. Unfortunately, this is most likely going to be a protracted war and it's something to come to terms with psychologically, not only militarily. -- Mindaur (talk) 13:28, 10 June 2022 (UTC)
 * Yes, indeed. But the question here is simple. Did Ukraine already ordered and will soon receive anything (not necessarily MLRS!) through the lend lease program, simultaneously with using other sources? Zhdanov say "yes", Shvets say "no", that will be only after October, i.e. in new fiscal year. My very best wishes (talk) 17:02, 10 June 2022 (UTC)
 * I think you are looking at this from a wrong angle. A lot of people overstated the significance of Lend-Lease (due to its WW2 legacy). It allows the US to send equipment from its Armed Forces (otherwise, there are significant legal obstacles for doing anything what degrades the capability of your own military). So, it's just an instrument to streamline the process where applicable. However, Ukraine is financially not able to order a lot. The entire Ukrainian state budget was something around $37bn in 2021. This year it will, obviously, fall dramatically. Ultimately, it is the donor countries which decide what to give and how much to finance and it doesn't matter under what route or framework it happens.
 * The already approved $15bn fund for weapons is already enough for very significant deliveries. The main question is why the weapon supplies and training are not being scaled up and expedited. We are specifically talking about the artillery and long-range MLRS (M142 and M270) as Ukraine needs these yesterday (because these have a greatest impact in the current phase of war).
 * I have not seen clear explanations why the pace is they way it is. Perhaps the reasons are really technical and logistical, e.g. some equipment is mothballed, needs to be taken out of storage, repaired or otherwise reconfigured, some sensitive components stripped, then the whole thing lifted, shipped, trained on, then actually delivered, etc. I think the next decisions/announcements after the delivery of the initial batch from the US and UK will be telling. -- Mindaur (talk) 21:37, 12 June 2022 (UTC)
 * The Ukrainian budget is irrelevant. As described in news (e.g. ), the entire point of lend-lease (both during the WWII and the current legislation) is that the country recipient should not pay anything at all at the time of getting the equipment. It only rents the equipment, free of charge, but then should return it back, after the war. It should not return it back or pay anything if the equipment was destroyed during the war. This is a different thing from current assistance, which is free, but limited by the amount of the allocated funds (just as for the assistance by USA to other countries). But of course the Biden administration would need to approve the equipment provided through lend lease program. My very best wishes (talk) 23:20, 12 June 2022 (UTC)
 * P.S. BTW, I just listened Yuri Felshtinsky, and he paints a terrible picture: Putin will probably use every tool at his disposal, including engagement of Belarus into the war, occupation of Moldova, gradual mobilization of the entire Russian population (this is a tremendous resource; he can do this for a long time), nuclear blackmail, and finally, nuclear war if nothing else helps him to subdue Ukraine. This is nothing new per se, but it is important how Felshtisky justifies such prognosis and many other things. All of that seems a lot more convincing to me than views by Ukrainian bloggers. He is publishing a book about it . My very best wishes (talk) 23:36, 12 June 2022 (UTC)
 * Well, nothing is said about the case if it's destroyed. From your article: Under the measure, Ukraine can request streamlined transfers of U.S. weapons and other security assistance. The U.S. will get guarantees that the country will replace or reimburse the assets at a later date. Moreover, you can find the legislation text in Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022. However, I think we are in agreement that the Ukrainian budget is irrelevant, just from a very different angle. A lot of observers assumed that Lend-Lease will open the flood gates and allow Ukraine to get whatever it wants, but the legislation doesn't oblige the US to take such action nor gives Ukraine an exclusive right to the equipment it wants. It merely allows and facilitates streamlining, but the decisions still fully lie with the US administration.
 * More generally on your postscript messages: there are a lot of political analysts/observers/experts. While I have seen some good insights, I have also seen a lot of rubbish. As things moved into the military domain, I have been paying much more attention to the military experts. The delusional dictator can have wet dreams about the empire, but the actual military capability is very far away from that. The risk of Russia using the tactical nuclear weapons is a separate topic; basically, the West would have to respond ; we can be pretty sure that Pentagon has the contingency plans. -- Mindaur (talk) 10:56, 13 June 2022 (UTC)
 * Thank you! Yes, that all seem to depend on one person. Joe Biden said US will provide weapons that Ukraine needs. Let's see if he will keep his word. As about the contingency plans by Pentagon, yes, perhaps we will see them in the future (I hope not), but the point by Felshinsky was different. He argued that Pentagon must act more decisively right now, before the strike had already happened and to prevent it from happening. My very best wishes (talk) 19:43, 13 June 2022 (UTC)
 * Some comments I hear are that Ukraine had logistics problems with the recently delivered equipment. Keep in mind that it can be relatively quick to train how to operate some equipment (as in, how to "shoot from the thing"), but the much greater difficulty is how to maintain it. All equipment breaks in the military, no matter how good it is. However, the good militaries have well established maintenance procedures and logistics chains to keep things running. If you don't, then you won't be able to keep your guns in the battlefield for long. So, the speculation is that the Americans want to do more training to remedy some of the issues.
 * P.S. Keep an eye on the news after the Ramstein meeting tomorrow and on the movements next week, when the MLRS training will complete. They will be good indicators. -- Mindaur (talk) 10:27, 14 June 2022 (UTC)
 * Yes, of course. I am sure they realize that Ukraine needs at least a hundred MLRS and a couple hundred more artillery pieces with lots of munitions, only to stop Putin. The offensive operation would require a lot more. BTW, I just saw an interview with Gennady Gudkov; he has a lot of insider insight about Putin and things in Kremlin. Last 5 minutes here ("If the wounded Putin is left in his lair, he will do only one thing - to produce weapons. And the new war will definitely be nuclear.") My very best wishes (talk) 02:48, 15 June 2022 (UTC)
 * So, they got only 18 more artillery pieces. That means two things. First, Ukraine will not be able to take anything back (maybe only a part of Kherson region). Second, the war will continue for as long as Ukraine is either transformed to wasteland or capitulate. Russia wins by conducting a war of annihilation on the territory of another state.My very best wishes (talk) 13:20, 16 June 2022 (UTC)
 * The US announcement was underwhelming, but there are more countries contributing and details are yet to be known. Canada, Poland and Netherlands were named . Also, the following was mentioned in the press conference: In terms of the numbers, just from today's conference, pledges of almost 100 additional tubes were being made . If the overall batch will indeed be additional 100 tubes, then it's substantial.
 * 10 advanced GMLRS will help Ukrainians to mop up some sectors (they are much more superior to Soviet/Russian MLRS), but Ukraine needs more of them (at least 20). Unfortunately, no follow up deliveries were announced this time. I still expect another tranche in the near future, but here is a good overview why logistics can be more complex than we think:.
 * The numbers of required equipment reported by the Ukrainian media are neither realistic nor necessary at this stage. I suspect they are primarily a part of the public communication strategy. Having said that, I concur with the view that the current flow of supplies is not sufficient, but the point here is that it's not as bleak as many people think and it's going to be a long-term effort . The liberation of Kherson and the south should be the priority, while liberating Donbas would be an entirely different phase of war. -- Mindaur (talk) 13:29, 16 June 2022 (UTC)
 * Also, regarding the nuclear escalation:
 * Kremlin will keep repeating the N-word if the West will twitch every time it's said; it should not undermine the Ukrainian will to fight or the determination of the West to militarily support Ukraine.
 * (Tactical) nuclear escalation would most likely raise the conflict to a direct (yet likely limited) USA/NATO-Russia conflict and would have global consequences.
 * Neither Ukraine nor the West can prevent it, but the West can deter it; the best way to do it is by demonstrating a political will to respond militarily (the contingency plans are there, but it is the will to activate them that matters).
 * There is no point to further escalate the subject and help Kremlin to instigate fears. -- Mindaur (talk) 13:46, 16 June 2022 (UTC)
 * Thank you! Yes, this is all instructive, but I think statements by US military were telling. For example, [I know, this is not what you need], but "you still can hit a lot of targets with equipment we gave", or "you sustain great losses for a great objective" (not exact quotes). They know very well that just hitting a lot of targets and especially sustaining such losses is not something they would plan in a military operation. My very best wishes (talk) 13:37, 17 June 2022 (UTC)

Disambiguation link notification for June 29
An automated process has detected that when you recently edited Lithuania–Russia border, you added a link pointing to the disambiguation page Nida.

(Opt-out instructions.) --DPL bot (talk) 09:17, 29 June 2022 (UTC)

Articles for ATGM ?
Not everything is supposed to be for your preferrings. Information is about weapon itself ,if you want special article for it ,you can make it yourself. Talk before undoing sourced revisions. IR-TheFirstSoldier (talk) 15:43, 29 August 2022 (UTC)

Lithuanian SSR
From what I've noticed you're removing references to the Lithuanian SSR from biographical articles in spite of it being the political entity into which the individuals in question were born. Regardless of opinion on the USSR or on its forceful annexation of the Baltic states, the existence of the Lithuanian SSR (or of the USSR itself) is an established fact and to pretend otherwise is to engage in revisionism (and wishful hypotheticals). Ostalgia (talk) 18:23, 18 October 2022 (UTC)


 * This was discussed ad nauseam. Please familiarize with the previous WP discussions on the topic. Please stop WP:EDITWARs with other editors. If you will continue disruptive editing, you will be reported to the administrators' noticeboard. -- Mindaur (talk) 18:30, 18 October 2022 (UTC)
 * By all means report me at ANI, I was actually intending to do the same if you proved unwilling to discuss the issue. You need not alert me on my talk page, I consider myself informed of the report and I'll drop by at ANI later. Cheers. Ostalgia (talk) 18:33, 18 October 2022 (UTC)

ArbCom 2022 Elections voter message
 Hello! Voting in the 2022 Arbitration Committee elections is now open until 23:59 (UTC) on. All eligible users are allowed to vote. Users with alternate accounts may only vote once.

The Arbitration Committee is the panel of editors responsible for conducting the Wikipedia arbitration process. It has the authority to impose binding solutions to disputes between editors, primarily for serious conduct disputes the community has been unable to resolve. This includes the authority to impose site bans, topic bans, editing restrictions, and other measures needed to maintain our editing environment. The arbitration policy describes the Committee's roles and responsibilities in greater detail.

If you wish to participate in the 2022 election, please review the candidates and submit your choices on the voting page. If you no longer wish to receive these messages, you may add to your user talk page. MediaWiki message delivery (talk) 01:34, 29 November 2022 (UTC)