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Saturday December 16 2006

Behind the public face of Lo Tak-shing Prev Next

Kevin Sinclair's obituary on solicitor, politician and chief executive aspirant Lo Tak-shing was a reasonably balanced summation of this unique character's public life ('The man who tried, and failed, to be chief', December 12). What it failed to convey was how warm, good-humoured and open-minded Lo could be in private.

I was the managing editor of his political magazine Window for four years in the 1990s, and I remember him fondly as one of the most lively, entertaining and unpretentious - albeit sometimes quirky - people I have worked for. As the obituary reported, he may indeed have always thought he was right. Who doesn't? However, he always enjoyed a well-reasoned debate, and was willing to change his position if you could argue him round.

Like any good newsman, he relished a great story above all else. Unlike some other media owners, when he folded Window he ensured that employees were well treated and paid their due, even keeping the office open for a few weeks so that former staff had a base from which to chase new jobs.

Lo was a large man - physically, intellectually and in spirit. Whether, as has been argued, he felt a sense of entitlement to a lead role in Hong Kong based on his family connections, it was always my impression that he deeply loved the city, and genuinely believed he was acting with its best interests at heart. He tended to say what he thought, regardless of the consequences - one of his charms, but not a recipe for success in politics. Never a populist, and a pragmatist to the end, once it was clear his ambitions would not prevail, he folded his tent and abandoned politics - arguably a sane response.

Hong Kong could use more characters like Lo. He was, in my experience, a civilised and honourable man. May he rest in peace.

DAVID PORTER, Kennedy Town

Thursday December 14 2006

Corrections & clarifications Prev Next

The report 'Thwarted chief executive hopeful Lo Tak-shing dies' on the front page of the South China Morning Post on Tuesday quoted a long-time friend of Lo and a fellow co-founder of the New Hong Kong Alliance, whose name should have read Wai Kee-shun, and not Wai Kee-shum. We apologise for the error.

Tuesday December 12 2006

The man who tried, and failed, to be chief Prev Next

Kevin Sinclair looks back at the life and times of Lo Tak-shing, who set his sights on leading post-1997 HK

Wealthy solicitor Lo Tak-shing, who died yesterday, set out in the mid-1980s to become the first chief executive of post-British Hong Kong. It was a position he thought he deserved. It was one he failed to achieve.

The man who sometimes described himself as 'a member of one of Hong Kong's most aristocratic families' was spurned by the public and abandoned by political forces he expected to support him.

Lo Tak-shing's claim to spring from a family that felt it had the right to rule was understandable in the context of his times. His personal and professional background placed him for many years at the core of the city's rich and powerful.

He failed to parley that position of influence into becoming the first chief executive. After losing badly in the 1996 race to head Hong Kong after the handover, Lo faded from the public scene in which he had shone for years. From 1997, he was largely absent.

Lo's prominence was based on membership of one of the most famous families of Hong Kong. His father, Sir Man-kam Lo, served as an executive councillor. An uncle who was widely popular in sporting and legal circles, Lo Man-wai, sat on Legco from 1950 to 1959.

The family were related to the vast and powerful Hotung clan.

Like a million other people, the Lo family left Hong Kong in early 1942 after the Japanese military government's grip on daily life began to tighten. Lo Tak-shing, then aged seven, went to Lingnan Primary School in Guangzhou and later, when the family returned to Hong Kong after the war, to Lingnan College.

He studied at Taunton University in Somerset, England, and then at Wadham College, Oxford.

Coming home, he joined the family legal firm of Lo and Lo, where his father was senior partner.

By 1974, Lo Tak-shing was sufficiently mature to be appointed to the Legislative Council, a body on which his family had served over the decades.

Six years later, governor Sir Murray MacLehose named him to the Executive Council.

He sat on both bodies until February 12, 1985. Then, in an intemperate move that reflected his often-short temper and flamboyant personality, he publicly quit both bodies with a blistering attack on Britain.

What some saw as anger was perceived by others as a carefully calculated political ploy.

Many observers saw the dual resignation as Lo's first carefully orchestrated move to grasp the leadership mantle 12 years later when Hong Kong would return to Chinese sovereignty. Others believed it was the burly lawyer's typical blunt speaking.

Saying he was 'throwing in the towel with disgust', Lo called on Hong Kong people to spend less time on politics and concentrate more on business, which was helpful to China.

Moves towards a more representative government were neither necessary nor viable, he said, statements which even then were against the rising tide of public opinion.

It was about that time that Lo began a long-term strategic move to position himself for his move to lead Hong Kong after the handover.

He carefully allied himself with nascent pro-Beijing and pro-business groupings. He started to be critical of the Hong Kong administration he had served so long, on everything from the Public Service Commission to the Transport Advisory Board to the Hong Kong Playground Association.

Lo founded an unabashedly pro-China weekly news magazine, Window, in 1992. But with the hiring of some top journalists who knew Hong Kong and its problems, the publication built up a solid reputation, although it constantly lost money. When his bid for chief executive failed, Lo promptly folded Window.

One of the planks of his campaign to become chief executive was a widely criticised promise to raise top civil service salaries to the levels of senior executives of major companies. He cited IBM as an example.

A vice-chairman of the Basic Law consultative committee, as 1997 approached, he began nurturing closer links with Beijing.

He pursued his bid for the position with passion. But many of his efforts seemed to backfire.

In December 1995, Lo shocked the community when it was revealed that he was granted a Chinese passport by the Guangdong Public Security Bureau, a move the Foreign Ministry said was a response to an application filed several years ago.

Lo, then a member of the now defunct preliminary working committee, held a British passport.

Window, in which Lo dictated style and content, branded the legislature on which he had served so long as 'an electoral travesty put in place by the British administration'.

This and other statements and incidents, combined with what was widely perceived to be Lo's arrogance and disregard for public opinion, led to the formation of the Concern Group on Lo Tak-shing becoming the chief executive.

For a key period when there was behind-the-scenes manoeuvring in the contest for chief executive, this group handed in petitions and questions about Lo's intentions and capabilities.

A vice-director of the now disbanded Basic Law consultative committee, Mr Lo then suggested that a two-chamber system be instituted for the post-1997 lawmaking body for additional constraints on the people's representatives in the lower house.

The system, advocated shortly after the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989, stipulated that the passage of motions would require a majority vote of each of the two groups of members sitting in two chambers: members returned by functional constituencies and those returned by geographical constituencies through the Election Committee and by direct elections. Despite the critical reception from the community, the model was later on adopted in the Basic Law to determine the way motions were vetted.

In the memoir of the former Xinhua director Xu Jiatun, the late shipping magnate Sir Yue-kong Pao was quoted as lamenting: 'Lo Tak-shing has never been a popular figure in the community, how come the proposal was put forward by him?'

Such was the mistrust and concern about Lo's mercurial temperament and his dominating personality, not to mention his erratic political style, that many senior civil servants let it be widely but quietly known that if he gained acceptance to lead Hong Kong after July 1, 1997, they would resign.

In October, 1996, Lo abandoned his bid. Speaking after weeks of silence as his popularity in opinion polls kept plummeting, he finally admitted the obvious; he had no hope of beating frontrunner Tung Chee-hwa.

He also disbanded the New Hong Kong Alliance, a political movement set up a decade earlier mainly to boost his stature.

To many who knew him well over the year, Lo was a vastly talented man with a quick intellect but a flawed personality.

'He thought he was always right,' said one lawyer who had been long associated with him. 'He could be intolerably rude and short tempered with staff and those whom he thought were his social inferiors who upset him.

'But on the other hand, he could be hugely jovial company.'

Like his uncle Lo Man-wai, who was still playing tennis into his eighth decade, Lo Tak-shing was an enthusiastic and competitive tennis player; there was a full-size court at one of the family houses near Stanley. He was also a fiercely aggressive bridge player, sufficiently skilled to win the Far East championship in 1975.

Lo is survived by his wife, Wendy, and children Deidre, Bevin, James and Jane.

Tuesday December 12 2006

Thwarted chief executive hopeful Lo Tak-shing dies Prev Next

Ambrose Leung and Denise Hung

Veteran politician Lo Tak-shing, a one-time hopeful to become Hong Kong's first chief executive, died of heart disease at Queen Mary Hospital last night. He was 71.

Lo had been in hospital for more than a month, during which time he was in and out of the intensive care unit, according to a close friend who did not want to be named.

The former executive councillor and vice-chairman of the Basic Law Consultative Committee largely disappeared from the political scene after he was asked by Beijing not to pursue his bid for the top job in 1996 because of the strong opposition to his candidacy in Hong Kong's political circles.

In one of his last public appearance, he refused to comment on the question of electoral reform. 'I really don't know and don't care. Hong Kong politics? It's not for me,' he said on receiving an honorary doctor's degree from Lingnan University in December last year.

Wai Kee-shum, a long-time friend of Lo and a fellow co-founder of the New Hong Kong Alliance, said: 'He made a contribution to the community through his advisory roles to the British and Chinese authorities.'

Lo was an executive councillor in the early 1980s and vice-chairman of the Basic Law Consultative Committee. He also served on the Preliminary Working Committee and later on the Preparatory Committee appointed by Beijing to prepare for Hong Kong's handover.

Lo was awarded the Grand Bauhinia Medal in 1997.

Democratic Party legislator Martin Lee Chu-ming, who was a Basic Law drafter, said Lo had tried very hard to gain Beijing's acceptance throughout his political career.

'He was a very clever and ambitious person but he never managed to realise his political wishes or achieve what he wanted,' Mr Lee said. 'I feel very sad that he did not used his faculties to advance Hong Kong's democracy.'

Mr Lee said Lo was behind the setting of the Basic Law's requirement for separate voting by legislators in Legco's functional and geographical constituencies - a measure designed to curb Legco's power after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown.

'Although I admire him as a very good bridge player, his political philosophy was very different from mine,' Mr Lee said.

National People's Congress deputy Allen Lee Peng-fei said: 'Lo gradually faded from the political scene after knowing he had no chance of becoming Hong Kong's first chief executive.'

Chief Executive Donald Tsang Yam-kuen said he was saddened to learn of Lo's death and expressed the government's condolences to his family.

1996
Friday November 29 1996

Window closes on pro-China magazine

GREN MANUEL

The pro-Beijing weekly news magazine founded by solicitor Lo Tak-shing, Window, is suspending publication after four years of losses.

A statement in this week's issue says that despite strong readership its losses can be sustained no longer and publication is suspended until further notice.

The magazine, which branded the current Legco as 'an electoral travesty put in place by the British administration in contravention of the Basic Law', is to make about 50 staff redundant.

Managing editor David Porter said he did not know when, if ever, Mr Lo would restart publication.

'Perhaps we failed to market it well. I think we created a good editorial product which failed to reach the advertisers,' he added.

Staff believe Mr Lo kept the magazine open only while he was a contender for the post of chief executive, a bid that collapsed in September due to negligible support.

He then kept it open a few more weeks while his ally Simon Li Fook-sean was a candidate, staff said. Mr Li fell out of the race on November 15.

Each 64-page issue had only two or three pages of advertisements, usually from firms linked either to Beijing or to Mr Lo.

The print run was about 25,000, Mr Porter said. However, many copies were distributed free to airlines and hotels in China.

Mr Lo was not available for comment yesterday.

Sunday November 17 1996

Listen to the people, Mr Tung

No chief executive candidate can ignore the public, even though they have no

Before the first round of nomination votes for chief executive on Friday, a line of thinking had emerged in some quarters of the Selection Committee: help David by voting against Goliath.

Translated into the voting decisions, it meant supporters of the stronger candidates should split their votes to help the weaker contenders. That way the so-called big four could pass the 50-mark hurdle and head on to the final test.

It is hard to say whether this mentality swung votes in favour of hopefuls such as Peter Woo Kwong-ching, or how prevalent this line of thought was among the 400 members.

But now that Tung Chee-hwa has virtually clinched the chief executive's job, some are convinced, while others are worried, that the mentality of 'go with the winner' may determine how the 400 will vote on December 11.

Barring scandals or a disastrous gaffe in the next few weeks, the shipping tycoon is almost certain to be chosen. He just needs to make sure the 206 who nominated him on Friday do the same in the final round of balloting.

It is possible in theory that a dozen of Mr Tung's nominators may change their minds and that supporters of his rivals could join forces to back one candidate. But few believe that will happen.

It is true that Mr Tung's rivals were pushed into the ring by those who don't want the tycoon to get the job, but the fact they could not reach a compromise on one candidate during the pre-nomination period speaks for itself.

This will remain the case.

In view of their diverse personalities and backgrounds, it is practically impossible for Yang Ti Liang, Peter Woo Kwong-ching and Simon Li Fook-sean, not to mention their respective supporters, to agree on a single challenger to take on Mr Tung.

Such a scenario would only be possible if there were a strong consensus that Mr Tung was a common enemy, totally unacceptable to the different factions.

The question would then be; who's going to take on Mr Tung? Mr Yang or Mr Woo? While they may feel their chances are slim, it would be difficult for them to justify a decision to pull out and call on their supporters to combine behind the other man. So, if the next phase of selection is only about who is going to win, that is already a foregone conclusion.

But there is far more to be achieved, however, from the historic process of choosing the leader. It gives the people of Hong Kong the chance to speak through all possible channels about their aspirations for the Chief Executive, their fears and worries as well as their priorities for the future.

Pro-democracy activists should be encouraged to explain why they want to demonstrate every June 4, journalists should continue to argue that there is no need to distinguish between 'objective reporting' and 'advocacy writing' and businessmen should be urged to give their thoughts on the economy.

People from all walks of life should set their own parameters to measure whether the CE hopefuls are up to the job. Those who give up by arguing that it is just a matter for the 400 Selection Committee members are simply being defeatist.

Even though the people of Hong Kong may not find the winner is their ideal choice, they can at least influence the agenda of the successful chief executive.

The withdrawal of solicitor Lo Tak-shing and the elimination of retired Appeal Court judge Simon Li Fook-sean from the final round showed that public opinion does play a part in the selection process.

It would be politically unviable for Beijing and the Selection Committee to impose any unpopular choice on the people of Hong Kong. Their voices were heard when members went to the ballot.

More than half of Mr Li's friends who had promised their support, according to Mr Li himself, did not vote for him.

This is why 'going with the winner' should be discouraged.

As Mr Woo's high-profile campaigning showed, the existence of competition prompted the candidates to be more accountable to the public. This, in turn, has made the public feel they have not been ignored.

The existence of competitors also allows the public to compare the rivals and judge who is the best when it comes to leading Hong Kong.

Mr Tung should understand well that the emergence of his two rivals - Mr Yang and Mr Woo - can be attributed to his two major weaknesses.

That Mr Yang is on top of the popularity polls and commands strong support particularly among the non-business bloc within the Selection Committee shows the depth of anxiety over so-called 'black money politics' and 'businessmen ruling Hong Kong'.

His close links with tycoons Li Ka-shing and Henry Fok Ying-tung who helped rescue his shipping empire in the mid-1980s deepened fears of manipulation by business giants if he became head of the SAR.

Mr Woo, with his more aggressive and liberal-minded image, makes a striking contrast to Mr Tung who has made plain his conservative thoughts and prudent work style. Supporters of Mr Yang and Mr Woo and a considerable section of the community prefer either one of them to Mr Tung for a variety of reasons.

Their supporters will destroy the purpose of a genuine election if they swing their votes to 'go with the winner' or show their loyalty to the future leader.

A genuine election allows representatives of different ideas and interests to face their electors and the community at large.

The winner with a majority represents the majority of the voters.

The division of votes is a clear indication of the level of support for their ideas and of their personal standing in the society.

Supporters of Mr Yang and Mr Woo should only shift their support to Mr Tung if they find the tycoon is the best candidate after all.

Votes for Mr Yang and Mr Woo may be futile at the end of the day. But that is not important. The important thing is that it is a vote that conveys a message to Mr Tung for him to do more. This is the challenge that Mr Tung faces in the remaining weeks of campaigning.

With a clear majority support from the Selection Committee, he has yet to win an equal share of public endorsement in the opinion polls. There he is far behind Mr Yang. Restrained by the limited franchise within the Selection Committee, Mr Tung will face persistent challenges to his legitimacy and authority even if he wins a bigger majority on December 11.

It is for him, through the selection process, to take a closer look at the sentiments and aspirations of the people of Hong Kong and the challenge that lies ahead. It is for him, through the selection process, to develop a consensus with people from all walks of life over the governance and road map for Hong Kong after the handover.

Mr Tung, or any winner on December 11, will only be a real leader if he is able to convince us that he speaks for us all, stands up for our interests and can rule with both a consensus and a mandate.

Saturday November 16 1996

Public opinion a factor in Li defeat

CHRIS YEUNG

If opinion polls have any relevance to the chief executive race, the defeat of Simon Li Fook-sean in the qualifying vote was illuminating.

Mr Li, who joined the contest following the withdrawal of Lo Tak-shing, was the victim of a popularity disaster. A candidate whose popularity rating is barely above one per cent was always a non-starter.

Despite the fact that the choice of chief executive is a matter for the 400 members of the Selection Committee, they simply cannot ignore public opinion.

Another fatal mistake of the Li camp was the failure to dissociate itself, at least at the outset, from Mr Lo and his supporters whose blessing may have become a kiss of death.

Both Mr Li and Mr Lo emerged as the big losers from the process so far while, against all the negative forecasts, Peter Woo Kwong-ching is a winner regardless of the final voting on December 11.

Although he remained at the lower end of polls, Mr Woo has already succeeded in changing the rules of the game in what would otherwise have been a 'small circle election'.

With no visible bloc of support, he managed to win votes by prompting early backers of his rivals to change their minds.

The contrasting fates of Mr Woo and Mr Li showed there is room, albeit limited, for candidates to make a difference. Mr Woo shattered the myth that the contest would be dominated by factions within the committee.

But there must have been a little disappointment for Yang Ti Liang, who scored a lacklustre 82 - just about 40 per cent of Mr Tung's vote.

This may seems at odds with Mr Yang's growing support in opinion polls released this week. But one of the major reasons for the contrasting showing of the former chief justice lies in the structural bias of the Selection Committee towards candidates from the business community.

More than 80 per cent of the body - 320 members in all - are from business circles. Mr Tung's impressive win demonstrated the strength of these circles.

Now that even the combined strength of Mr Yang, Mr Woo and Mr Li is below that of Mr Tung, chances are high more committee members will back him.

The result may not please everyone, but China will certainly be happy to see the first chief executive elected with an overwhelming majority.

Sunday October 20 1996

Lesson for the hardliners

Chris Yeung

To many, the announcement by Lo Tak-shing on Thursday that he was pulling out of the chief executive race was enough. Now they really do not care who among the three leading contestants gets the top post.

As long as Mr Lo, a former Exco member, was on the campaign trail, no one could rule out the possibility of this astute politician getting elected. And that would have been the worst scenario for many in Lower Albert Road and business and political circles.

They were not questioning the ability of the Western-trained lawyer. Rather, some senior government officials privately admit that Mr Lo was well qualified for the job, given his ability, background and experience.

In spite of his poor ratings in popularity polls, his ability to turn the tide had never been doubted, either. Friends say Mr Lo is a man of strong character and determination.More importantly, Mr Lo would have been the first choice for hardliners in Zhongnanhai if they wanted a hardline leader of the SAR.

Mr Lo was also right, to some extent, to argue that the selection was not a 'popularity contest'. Opinion polls giving him only a few per cent of overall support meant nothing to him.

It is the 400 Selection Committee members who are empowered to choose from among the candidates. And analysts believed that it would not have been difficult for Mr Lo to canvass enough support to have stood a chance.

Thursday's announcement of his withdrawal, however, was a tacit admission of his failure to boost his popularity since he announced his intention to enter the contest in May.

Reports that some senior officials would not have been willing to work with him if he was selected also dealt him a devastating blow. Recent open criticism by him from Preparatory Committee member Louis Cha served as a clear indicator that Mr Lo was on the way out of the race. Mr Cha, the prominent novelist and former newspaperman, certainly knows which way the wind is blowing.

Mr Lo's withdrawal has cleared the way for another legal heavyweight, Simon Li Fook-sean, to join the fray. Mr Li, a former appeal court judge, earlier indicated his support for Mr Lo and said that he would not compete if Mr Lo remained a contender for the top post.

It will be no surprise if Mr Lo now throws his weight behind Mr Li's candidature.

He may have been deserted by the public and some of his supporters, but many believe it is too early to rule him out as an influential player in the power game.

Mr Lo's decision to make an early exit has helped clear the way for Mr Li and his supporters to make their preparations.

The tacit recognition of the importance of popularity in the CE race will also give credence to China's repeated assurance that the future chief executive should be widely acceptable here.

To Chinese leaders, Mr Lo did more good than harm by putting himself forward in May.

His candidature encouraged his opponents to step up their campaigns.

By stepping down in a decent way, he will probably win praise within the Preparatory Committee and in Beijing.

This will be translated into political clout and could advance his fortunes.

There are mountains foir him to climb, however, if he is to make another comeback.

One lesson to be learned from the fate of Mr Lo's candidature is that the room for the kind of hardline political views associated with him in the territory is limited.

Whoever aspires to remain in politics has to pass the popularity test. He or she may not necessarily have to have high scores in the polls. But poor popularity ratings will be a severe handicap to anyone who wants to have a role in the future political establishment of Hong Kong.

There may be short-cuts or back doors to power and influence in Beijing. But the future chief executive will face the same popularity criteria in making his choices to fill vital posts in Exco and the Government.

He will run the risk of being accused of political favouritism if posts are given to those who are totally unacceptable to the public.

Friday October 18 1996

Lo quits race for leadership

OUR POLITICAL DESK

Solicitor Lo Tak-shing yesterday abandoned his bid to be chief executive, paving the way for another contender, Simon Li Fook-sean, to enter the contest.

After weeks of silence amid falling popularity, Mr Lo said: 'When I first signalled my interest earlier this year, I made it clear I would only enter the election if there were no other candidates who could carry out the responsibilities of the position.

'Now, with the entry of a number of suitably qualified contenders, I see no further need to put myself forward.' Mr Lo, 61, said he had no regrets and denied he quit because he did not have a chance.

'The central Government is very clever. It will not show its preference. Nor does it need to do so,' he said.

His decision leaves three principal candidates - Tung Chee-hwa, Peter Woo Kwong-ching and Sir Ti Liang Yang. Former Appeal Court judge Mr Li said he was considering a bid and would make an announcement next week.

Mr Woo yesterday became the first of the leading contenders to obtain an application form for the post from the Preparatory Committee's office in Central.

Speaking after a meeting with Central and Western District Board members, he said he respected Mr Lo's decision.

'It is his choice. He must have thought it over,' he said.

Mr Tung is today expected to issue a statement confirming his candidature, and to obtain an application form.

He said Mr Lo's withdrawal was not surprising, but was a pity since it meant the Selection Committee had one choice less.

However, he would not say if the loss of Mr Lo would boost his support within the Selection Committee.

Sir Ti Liang said he had 'no specific feeling' about the withdrawal and would not say whether Mr Lo's exit would boost his support within the legal community.

'I do not know where his votes would have come from,' he said.