User talk:Prioryman/Battle of Vukovar


 * Fear, death, and resistance: an ethnography of war : Croatia, 1991-1992


 * Mass killing and genocide in Croatia


 * Blood and honey: a Balkan war journal


 * Twilight of Impunity: The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milosevic


 * Framing war and genocide: British policy and news media reaction to the war in Bosnia


 * The Journal of Slavic Military Studies; Volume 10, Issue 2, 1997; Cigar: Croatia's war of independence: The parameters of war termination


 * Blood and belonging: journeys into the new nationalism [p31-]

The JNA initially relied on massing armoured spearheads supported by a few companies of infantry. They would advance along a street in a column, followed by the infantry. The defenders responded by opening fire at close range – often as short as 20m – to destroy the lead and rear vehicles, trapping the rest of the column where it could be systematically put out of action. However, the defenders tried to avoid completely destroying enemy armour, as they The defenders used a strategy of "active defence", carrying out hit-and-run attacks to keep the JNA forces off balance. Anti-tank and anti-personnel mines were used to hinder JNA manoeuvres. Unconventional tactics were employed to undermine enemy morale, such as firing weather rockets at the infantry and sabotaging JNA tanks while they were parked at night.