User talk:Sarcastic ShockwaveLover/SA-7

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The 9K32M “Strela-2M” (NATO reporting name SA-7b “Grail” Mod 1) was introduced in 1971 and featured a number of improvements, increasing both its range and the size of its warhead. Improvements in the guidance system allowed the missile to engage transport planes and helicopters head-on, unless the aircraft were flying faster than 540 km/h.

Primarily a tail-chase missile system the effectiveness of the SA-7 depends on its ability to lock onto the heat source of low-flying fixed and rotary-wing aircraft. Like many other missiles of the time, the Strela's simple infra-red seeker mechanism is easily overwhelmed by simple countermeasures like flares, and pulsing “hot brick” jammers, and even environmental effects like infra-red reflections from clouds.

The Strela-2 has a small directed-energy blast fragmentation warhead with impact and grazing fuzes. The impact fuze detonates the warhead immediately upon impact, while the grazing fuze reacts to the slightest bending of the missile fuselage. The warhead weighs 1.1 kg, including 370 g HE content in a pre-fragmented casing.

The small warhead had the drawback of low kill probability against jet and especially multi-engine targets; as the missile homed in on the hottest spot, it typically hit only the afterburner nozzles, and due to the small size and instantaneous fuzing was not unusual that it failed to destroy even the engine that was hit. Although the basic warhead design remained the same in all Soviet MANPAD systems from Strela-2/2M through Strela-3 and Igla-1 to the final Igla, the later missiles had much-improved lethality with little extra warhead weight due to better terminal homing aimed at hitting the aircraft fuselage, delayed fusing allowing the missile to penetrate into the target before detonation, and in later variants also a 20 g secondary charge to set off remaining rocket fuel.

Despite its shortcomings in range and lethality the Strela-2 did force enemy pilots to fly higher, into the engagement envelope of more capable air defence systems. In addition, in several cases it has forced enemy pilots to adopt higher altitude bombing tactics, which degraded the accuracy and usefulness of air strikes.

The maximum range and altitude of these missiles were consistently underestimated in the West. For example, although an altitude limit of 1.500 ft was widely quoted, an SA-7 hit an Omani jet (in 1974) at 11,500 feet.

The SA-7, like many other MANPAD systems, leaves a white vapor trail that can betray the location of the launcher.