User talk:TapperIsTicked

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In the article on Direct tax, you inserted tax protester nonsense. The lower federal courts and the Supreme Court are in complete agreement. And, no, the U.S. federal income tax is not an excise tax on "privileged corporate activity." Not only is that language nonsensical, it's contradicted by the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court AND the lower federal courts.

You can learn nothing about tax law from Aaron Russo's film. This point has been covered OVER AND OVER AND OVER AND OVER AND OVER again here in Wikipedia. Aaron Russo didn't know what he was talking about.

NO FEDERAL COURT HAS EVER HELD THAT THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX IS LIMITED TO "PRIVILEDGED CORPORATE ACTIVITY." I've been studying this subject for over thirty years. I'll be glad to provide details if you're curious. Famspear (talk) 22:58, 29 April 2017 (UTC)

I didn't protest anything. I quoted Brushaber and Stanton. The previous section stated the 16th granted a new power. I don't see that as accurate. I provided the quotes. We can agree to disagree about Russo's movie. I would greatly appreciate anything you have on SCOTUS ruling(s) showing the 16th granted a new taxing power to congress. — Preceding unsigned comment added by TapperIsTicked (talk • contribs)


 * No, the previous section of the article did not, and does not, say that the 16th amendment granted a "new power." The article does not say that at all. The word "new" isn't even found in the article, as far as I can see.


 * No one said that you protested anything. What I said was that you inserted tax protester nonsense, which is what you did.


 * No Federal court has ever ruled that the Federal income tax is limited to, or consists only, of a tax on "privileged corporate activity." Indeed, one of the very cases cited by the late Irwin Schiff for the goofy idea that the income tax could be imposed only on "corporate income" or "corporate gain" was a case where the income that was ruled to be income in that case was NOT corporate income or corporate gain. The income in that case was the income of the estate of a dead person. The estate of a dead person is not a corporation. By the way, Schiff was one of the "stars" in Russo's goofy film.


 * The goofy "privilege" argument is an argument that first appeared (although in another form) in Federal court cases in the 1980s. The argument has taken various forms. Sometimes, it was the argument that the income tax was tied only to "corporate" privileges. Other times, it was "government" privilege. Other times, it was specifically "Federal government" privileges. There is ABSOLUTELY NOTHING in the United States Constitution that says any of this. And there is, as of today, NOT ONE SINGLE FEDERAL COURT CASE where a court ruled that any such argument had any validity at all. In every single case where a "privilege" argument has been presented, it has been rejected by the courts. No exceptions. Famspear (talk) 02:52, 30 April 2017 (UTC)

Here is what the article actually says:


 * In the United States, Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the Constitution requires that direct taxes imposed by the national government be apportioned among the states on the basis of population. After the 1895 Pollock ruling (essentially, that taxes on income from property should be treated as direct taxes), this provision made it difficult for Congress to impose a national income tax that applied to all forms of income until the 16th Amendment was ratified in 1913. After the Sixteenth Amendment, no Federal income taxes are required to be apportioned, regardless of whether they are direct taxes (taxes on income from property) or indirect taxes (all other income taxes)......

Read that last sentence again. It says nothing about a "new" power.

What the Sixteenth Amendment did was remove the requirement that taxes on interest income, dividend income, and rent income be apportioned among the states according to population. In other words, the Amendment overruled the Pollock decision that taxes on those particular kinds of income were required to be apportioned. Under Pollock, it was the SOURCE of the income that was important. If the source of the income was PROPERTY, the tax was required to be apportioned. A tax on dividend, interest or rent income is a tax on income from PROPERTY. If the source of the income was SERVICES, the tax was not required to be apportioned. A tax on compensation received from performing a SERVICE (such as employee compensation) is NOT a tax on property in this sense.

After the ratification of the Amendment, however, the SOURCE of the income is legally irrelevant with respect to the apportionment requirement. After ratification, with respect to apportionment, it does not matter whether a particular income tax is considered to be a direct tax or, alternatively, an excise. If it's a Federal income tax, it is not required to be apportioned.

Congress HAS ALWAYS HAD THE POWER UNDER ARTICLE I TO TAX INCOMES. And THAT is why the 16th Amendment created no NEW power. Congress has always had that power. Famspear (talk) 03:05, 30 April 2017 (UTC)


 * In the earlier years of the modern U.S. Federal income tax, from 1913 into the 1920s, the 1930s, the 1940s, etc., relatively few people actually incurred tax liability, because the exemption amounts (what the law today calls the standard deductions and the personal exemptions) were relatively high. So, the people who ended up paying lots of tax were people with relatively high incomes (as compared to the situation today, after adjusting for inflation).

These were the people who could afford to hire, and did hire, the tax lawyers to fight the tax in the Board of Tax Appeals (now the United States Tax Court), in the U.S. District Courts, and so on.

Yet, from 1913 to 1920, there is not one single case where any of these high income people with the fancy lawyers ever brought any of the goofy "privilege" arguments that surfaced beginning in the 1980s.

From 1921 to 1930, there is not one single case where any of these high income people with the fancy lawyers ever brought any of the goofy "privilege" arguments that surfaced beginning in the 1980s.

From 1931 to 1940, there is not one single case where any of these high income people with the fancy lawyers ever brought any of the goofy "privilege" arguments that surfaced beginning in the 1980s.

From 1941 to 1950, there is not one single case where any of these high income people with the fancy lawyers ever brought any of the goofy "privilege" arguments that surfaced beginning in the 1980s.

From 1951 to 1960, there is not one single case where any of these high income people with the fancy lawyers ever brought any of the goofy "privilege" arguments that surfaced beginning in the 1980s.

From 1961 to 1970, there is not one single case where any of these high income people with the fancy lawyers ever brought any of the goofy "privilege" arguments that surfaced beginning in the 1980s.

And, there is no record of any member of any state legislature of any of the States that ratified the Sixteenth Amendment ever standing up and saying, "Hey, wait, why is the Federal government taxing income that is not tied to an activity involving a corporate privilege???!!!??"

Do you know why?

Because the privilege arguments are goofy arguments cooked up by crooks -- about 50 years or more after the Amendment was ratified. These arguments were cooked up by people who had no ability to analyze legal materials such as the texts of Pollock and Brushaber. Famspear (talk) 03:19, 30 April 2017 (UTC)

The U.S. Supreme Court has also ruled, in a case involving an individual (not a corporation), that the Federal income tax applies to money obtained by that individual by theft -- specifically, by way of embezzlement, for example. An individual is not a "corporation." An individual who realizes income from theft is not exercising a "corporate privilege."

By the way, the receipt of the money is taxable to that individual thief even though he or she is not the rightful owner of the money, and even if he or she is caught and has to return the money to its rightful owner, and even if he or she is not allowed a deduction for returning the money.

Think about that.

In the Obamacare case cited in the article, the Supreme Court also pointed out that a Federal tax does not even have to be tied to an "activity" at all. That rule applies to any Federal tax, not just the income tax. There is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits Congress from taxing inactivity. Famspear (talk) 03:29, 30 April 2017 (UTC)


 * The very first known "privilege argument" case was United States v. Buras. In that case, the argument that the taxpayer can be subject to an excise tax (specifically, the federal income tax) only if he benefits from a "privilege extended by a government agency" was rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. See 633 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980), at . John E. Buras, the protester in that case, continued his tax protester activity, referring to himself as a "Public Minister" in the "World Prayers Answered Ministry." See, e.g., Hawkins v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-168 (2008), at.


 * That was in the year 1980, about sixty-seven years after the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified.


 * The "privileged corporate activity" nonsense came even later. Famspear (talk) 03:33, 30 April 2017 (UTC)

Thanks for taking the time to put this together for me. I'll have to spend some time with it. If I have questions I'd appreciate your insight. — Preceding unsigned comment added by TapperIsTicked (talk • contribs)


 * You're welcome.


 * The "income means only corporate income" or "income means only income from a privileged corporate activity" and other similar arguments are, in large part, based on wildly incorrect mis-interpretations of two U.S. Supreme Court decisions in particular: the Flint case and the Merchants' Loan case. We can get into those later, if you like.


 * By the way, on talk pages here in Wikipedia, you can sign your comments at the end by inserting four "tilde" characters, like this: ~ . When you do that at the end of your comment and then hit the "Save changes" button, your Wikipedia "signature" appears at the end of the comment. You can use your signature on talk pages for articles, and on your own talk page here, and on talk pages for other editors. (Edits or changes made to the articles themselves should not have signatures, though.) Famspear (talk) 14:51, 30 April 2017 (UTC)

I want to make sure I am following this in a logical manner. Let me know if you find my understanding erroneous.

Prior to the 16th Congress could:

…lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises…subject to uniformity... (Art 1, § 8, Clause 1) The second thing Congress did was lay a duty on imports. They had to get those Oaths out of the way first. This was done under Art 1, § 8, Clause 1, commonly known as an indirect tax and can be found in Statutes At Large Number 1. (SAL 001) It is real close to the front.

We are in complete agreement income taxes were assessed prior to 1913. All were under the indirect powers of Article 1 § 8 Clause 1. Direct taxes were also constitutionally assessed during this period outside the purview of Article 1 § 8. (Article 1 § 2 Clause 3, Article 1 § 9, Clause 4) Direct taxes, going back to Hylton, were capitation/poll taxes or on land. Reference is made to Pollock and I agree that case is viable history that should be taught in our school system. Justice White’s dissent is also beneficial/informative. SCOTUS said in Pollock that if you tax the fruit of the land, you are taxing the land, therefor it is direct and must be apportioned. To be more precise as to my understanding, the rental income from the property could not be separated from the property itself. They ruled the statute of ’94 unconstitutional due to this particular and it overturned Stare Decisis going back to Hylton. Justice White, the writer of Brushaber, eloquently elucidates this fact in his dissent.

Congress passed the Corporate Excise Tax on Income in 1909. It was upheld.

Knox said we are good to go in 1913 and registered the states returns as to the 16th being golden. Congress wrote an income tax statute. My question is what taxing authority did congress have the day this hit the books? The article in Wiki that started this communique implies in the last line under the US constitutional law section that Congress can pass a direct tax that does not have to be apportioned.

I consider this a statement of fact: The 16th Amendment was written to tell SCOTUS that the source of the income is irrelevant. If Congress passes an Income Tax Act it is under our Article 1, § 8, Clause 1 Power. It is an indirect tax. This is what Justice White said in his dissent and in the Brushaber opinion in 1916. If I am wrong here please give me a concise path to overcome my ignorance. We can talk about Elihu Root meeting all his friends in jail after I have a better understanding of this sequence of events.

Again, thanks in advance. — Preceding unsigned comment added by TapperIsTicked (talk • contribs)


 * On the day that the Revenue Act of 1913 hit the books, the taxing authority held by Congress -- in this case, the constitutional power to impose an income tax -- was the same as it had always been: the provisions of Article I of the Constitution.


 * Again, the only limitation that had been imposed by the Pollock decision was that to the extent that a particular income tax applied to dividend income, interest income, rent income -- essentially to income from property -- the tax had to be apportioned. To the extent that a particular income tax did not apply to income from property, the tax did not have to be apportioned. What the Sixteenth Amendment did was to overrule Pollock. Under the Sixteenth Amendment, we are back to the situation that had already existed from 1789 to 1895: If it's an income tax, it's not required to be apportioned, no matter what the source of the income may be. It matters not whether a particular kind of income tax is considered to be direct or indirect. The whole "is it a direct tax or not?" blather that tax protesters used to worry about is just that: blather.


 * Yes, Congress can, under the U.S. Constitution, pass a direct tax that does not have to be apportioned -- as long as that tax is an income tax. Again, whether a particular income tax is a direct tax or not is an irrelevant question with respect to apportionment.


 * Just as an aside: In a formal way, the Constitution refers to "taxes, duties, imposts and excises." In that context, "tax" means "direct tax". The terms "indirect tax" and "excise" are commonly used as abbreviations for the complete phrase "duties, imposts and excises."


 * Some courts have referred to the Federal income tax as a direct tax, and others as an excise (an indirect tax). The key point that sails right over the heads of tax protesters is that it does not matter whether you call a Federal income tax a direct tax or an excise and it does not matter which of those terms is "correct". If it's an income tax, Congress has the power to impose that tax without apportionment among the states by population. Famspear (talk) 02:46, 4 May 2017 (UTC)

Are you saying the 16th changed the taxing powers and the Income tax is both a Direct and an Indirect Tax, what it is called is irrelevant and there are no longer Constitutional Classes of taxation? I would appreciate the SCOTUS decision being cited so I can spend some time with it. TapperIsTicked (talk) 20:18, 4 May 2017 (UTC)

Here you go. As I have written in another place:


 * 1. The question of whether a particular income tax is direct or indirect is legally irrelevant to the question of whether the Congress has the power, under the U.S. Constitution as amended by the Sixteenth Amendment, to impose that tax. Congress has the power to impose any income tax, regardless of whether that tax is deemed direct or indirect.


 * 2. The question of whether a particular income tax is direct or indirect is also legally irrelevant to the issue of whether that tax must be apportioned. After the Sixteenth Amendment, no income tax of any kind whatsoever, whether direct or indirect, is required to be apportioned.


 * 3. Under the Constitution as amended, the only important legal relevancy to the question of whether a particular income tax is Constitutionally valid (aside from rules such as the one prohibiting taxes on exports, or rules that revenue measures must originate in the House, etc.) is probably whether that income tax is imposed with what the law refers to as geographical uniformity. That is, an income tax cannot be imposed on, say, just the incomes of people who happen to reside in New York and Montana.

Some tax protesters stumble on the multiple meanings of the word "direct." In Brushaber, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated that the federal income tax is an excise -- an indirect tax. The tax protesters then argue that because the income tax is not a "direct" tax (in the technical sense in which the Brushaber Court was using the term "direct tax"), it must be unconstitutional for the Congress to impose the federal income tax "directly" on the taxpayer -- using the word "directly" not in the Brushaber sense of a "direct tax," but rather in the more every day sense of without intervening persons or conditions. The tax protesters then try to argue that under the Sixteenth Amendment -- as interpreted by the Brushaber Court -- Congress cannot validly impose an unapportioned "direct" income tax on the people (or cannot impose an unapportioned income tax "directly" on the people, or a similar argument). Of course, that is not what the U.S. Supreme Court SAID in Brushaber and, more importantly, that is not what the Court RULED. The tax protesters are simply playing with words (just as they play with words like "voluntary", as in "voluntary tax system," etc.).

In one case, a taxpayer named Alton M. Parker argued that "the IRS and the government in general, including the judiciary, mistakenly interpret the sixteenth amendment as allowing a direct tax on property (wages, salaries, commissions, etc.) without apportionment." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected Parker's argument. The Court stated:


 * As we observed in Lonsdale v. CIR, 661 F.2d 71 (5th Cir. 1981), the sixteenth amendment was enacted for the express purpose of providing for a direct income tax. The thirty words of this amendment are explicit: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." The Supreme Court promptly determined in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 36 S.Ct. 236, 60 L.Ed. 493 (1916), that the sixteenth amendment provided the needed constitutional basis for the imposition of a direct non-apportioned income tax.

--from Parker v. Commissioner, 724 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1984) (bolding added).

From the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:


 * Plaintiffs also contend that the Constitution prohibits imposition of a direct tax without apportionment. They are wrong; it does not. U.S. Const. amend. XVI [ . . . ]

---from Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 517 (7th Cir 1984) (per curiam) (footnote not reproduced; bolding added).

From the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit:


 * [ . . . ] his position [the position of Lowell H. Becraft] can fairly be reduced to one elemental proposition: The Sixteenth Amendment does not authorize a direct non-apportioned income tax on resident United States citizens and thus such citizens are not subject to the federal income tax laws. We hardly need comment on the patent absurdity and frivolity of such a proposition. For over 75 years, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have both implicitly and explicitly recognized the Sixteenth Amendment's authorization of a non-apportioned direct income tax on United States citizens residing in the United States and thus the validity of the federal income tax laws as applied to such citizens.

--from In re Becraft, 885 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1989) (bolding added).

From the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit:


 * Dickstein's argument that the sixteenth amendment does not authorize a direct, non-apportioned tax on United States citizens similarly is devoid of any arguable basis in law. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit recently noted "the patent absurdity and frivolity of such a proposition." In re Becraft, 885 F.2d 547, 548 (9th Cir.1989). For seventy-five years, the Supreme Court has recognized that the sixteenth amendment authorizes a direct nonapportioned tax upon United States citizens throughout the nation, not just in federal enclaves, see Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1, 12-19, 36 S.Ct. 236, 239-42, 60 L.Ed. 493 (1916); efforts to argue otherwise have been sanctioned as frivolous, see, e.g., Becraft, 885 F.2d at 549 (Fed.R.App.P. 38 sanctions for raising frivolous sixteenth amendment argument in petition for rehearing); Lovell v. United States, 755 F.2d 517, 519-20 (7th Cir.1984) (Fed.R.App.P. 38 sanctions imposed on pro se litigants raising frivolous sixteenth amendment contentions).

--from United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1990) (bolding added).

And, from the decision in yet another case before the United States Tax Court:


 * Since the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, it is immaterial with respect to income taxes, whether the tax is a direct or indirect tax. The whole purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment was to relieve all income taxes when imposed from [the requirement of] apportionment and from [the requirement of] a consideration of the source whence the income was derived.

---from Abrams v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 403, CCH Dec. 41,031 (1984).

From the U.S. Tax Court:


 * At the trial, Mr. Wikoff [the taxpayer] also raised the issue of the constitutionality of the Federal income tax. He argues that as a graduated direct tax on income, the Federal income tax statute was not within the intended scope of the 16th Amendment to the Constitution. According to him, the framers of the 16th Amendment envisioned an indirect excise tax on corporations, such as that contained in the Tariff Act of 1909. Since the petitioner is an "individual sovereign citizen" and the Federal income tax is a direct, progressive tax, he claims not to be subject to such tax.


 * It has long been settled that the Federal income tax is within the scope of the 16th Amendment and is constitutional. See, e.g., Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co. [1 USTC ¶ 4], 240 U.S. 1 (1916); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co. [1 USTC ¶ 8], 240 U.S. 103 (1916); Cupp v. Commissioner [Dec. 33,459], 65 T.C. 68 (1975), affd. without published opinion 559 F. 2d 1207 (3d Cir. 1977). The "whole purpose" of the 16th Amendment, as stated by the Supreme Court in Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., supra at 18, was "to relieve all income taxes when imposed from apportionment from a consideration of the source whence the income was derived." Thus, since the ratification of the 16th Amendment, it is immaterial, with respect to Federal income taxes, whether the tax is a direct or an indirect tax. Mr. Wikoff relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), but the effect of that decision has been nullified by the enactment of the 16th Amendment. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., supra.

--from Wikoff v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1539, T.C. Memo. 1978-372 (1978) (bolding added) (footnote omitted).

More from the United States Tax Court:


 * Thus, since the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment it is immaterial, with respect to income taxes, whether the tax is a direct or an indirect tax.

---from Johnson v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 189, T.C. Memo 1978-32 (1978).

And, from the United States Tax Court in another case:


 * Thus, since the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment it is immaterial, with respect to income taxes, whether the tax is a direct or an indirect tax.

---from Sortillon v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1097, T.C. Memo 1979-281, CCH Dec. 36,194(M), Docket No. 2108-79 (July 26, 1979).

Thus, the U.S. Tax Court has stated, in at least four different decisions (Johnson, Sortillon, Abrams, and Wikoff), that with respect to the Federal income tax, it does not matter whether the tax is deemed to be a direct tax or an indirect tax.

Tax lawyer Alan O. Dixler has written:


 * Each year some misguided souls refuse to pay their federal income tax liability on the theory that the 16th Amendment was never properly ratified, or on the theory that the 16th Amendment lacks an enabling clause. Not surprisingly, neither the IRS nor the courts have exhibited much patience for that sort of thing. If, strictly for the purposes of this discussion, the 16th Amendment could be disregarded, the taxpayers making those frivolous claims would still be subject to the income tax. In the first place, income from personal services is taxable without apportionment in the absence of the 16th Amendment. Pollock specifically endorsed Springer's holding that such income could be taxed without apportionment. The second Pollock decision invalidated the entire 1894 income tax act, including its tax on personal services income, due to inseverability; but, unlike the 1894 act, the current code contains a severability provision. Also, given the teaching of Graves [Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939)] -- that the theory that taxing income from a particular source is, in effect, taxing the source itself is untenable -- the holding in Pollock that taxing income from property is the same thing as taxing the property as such cannot be viewed as good law.

--Alan O. Dixler, "Direct Taxes Under the Constitution: A Review of the Precedents," Report to the Committee on Legal History of the Bar Association of the City of New York, Nov. 20, 2006, as republished in Tax History Project, Tax Analysts, Falls Church, Virginia (italics in original; footnotes omitted), at.

The following is from a federal estate tax case, but the principle can be applied to the Federal income tax (and as a clarification of the meaning of the term "direct tax") as well. The United States Supreme Court stated:


 * Even without apportionment, Congress may tax "an excise upon a particular use or enjoyment of property or the shifting from one to another of any power or privilege incidental to the ownership or enjoyment of property. [ . . . . ] A tax imposed upon the exercise of some of the numerous rights of property is clearly distinguishable from a direct tax, which falls upon the owner merely because he is owner, regardless of his use or disposition of the property.

---Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 66 S. Ct. 178, 45-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶10,239 (1945) (bolding added).

In Tilley v. United States, the taxpayer made the argument that the Federal income tax was "unconstitutional, since a tax measured by an individual's so-called income is in the nature of a capitation tax and can only be imposed by apportionment [ . . . . ]". That argument was ruled "frivolous" by the court. The court stated:


 * Several of the Tilleys' claims are frivolous and fail as a matter of law. In one claim, the Tilleys argue that "the taxes were unconstitutional, since a tax measured by an individual's so-called income is in the nature of a capitation tax and can only be imposed by apportionment." (Compl. ¶VI(d)(3)). The Sixteenth Amendment puts such an argument to rest, stating:


 * The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."

---See Tilley v. United States, 270 F. Supp. 2d 731, 2003-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶50,594 (M.D.N.C. 2003).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has indicated that after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913, whether an income tax is a "capitation or other direct tax" or not, the apportionment restriction (the rule that capitations or other direct taxes must be apportioned) simply does not apply if the tax in question is an income tax:


 * The power to tax is conferred on Congress by article I, section 8, clause 1 of the Constitution, but other sections of the Constitution impose certain restrictions upon the manner in which the taxing power of the Federal Government may be exercised. In addition to the general limitations placed upon that power by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, Congress is specifically prohibited from laying any tax on the export of goods; whatever indirect taxes it may enact shall be "uniform throughout the United States"' and it may impose a capitation or direct tax only if apportioned among the states according to population. This last restriction, the only one pertinent to the present case [the federal income tax under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954], has been limited in scope by the Sixteenth Amendment which permits taxes "on incomes, from whatever source derived" without regard to the apportionment requirement.

---Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 160, 165-66, 62-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶9713 (4th Cir. 1962) (emphasis added), at.


 * The Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution grants to Congress "the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration." [ . . . . . ] A direct tax is a capitation tax, a tax upon real estate and upon income derived from real estate and from personal property held for investment, and upon income of personal property. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 158 U. S. 601; 15 S. Ct. 912; 39 L. Ed. 1108. The tax created by the challenged Act [the federal income tax under section 501 of the Revenue Act of 1936] has none of the features of a direct tax, and if a tax, is an income tax, and is therefore, subject only to the rule of geographical uniformity which is synonymous with the expression "to operate generally throughout the United States. [ . . . . ] If [the tax is] an income tax, no apportionment is required as provided in Sections 2 and 9 of Article I of the Constitution.

---Kingan & Company, Inc. v. Smith, 17 F. Supp. 217, 36-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶9551 (S.D. Ind. 1936) (emphasis added), at.

Yours, Famspear (talk) 20:36, 12 May 2017 (UTC)

As you can see, I am not saying that the Sixteenth Amendment "changed the taxing powers" so that "the Income tax is both a Direct and an Indirect Tax." It's the TAX PROTESTERS who are disagreeing among themselves over a legally irrelevant question: whether the Federal income tax is direct or indirect. The courts don't really care, because the courts are simply interpreting the law.

As you can see, if you could think of U.S. constitutional law itself as somehow being a "person", you would say that the law (on apportionment, specifically) doesn't "care" whether a particular Federal income tax is a "direct" tax or an "indirect" tax. That's a distinction that the tax protesters are worried about. The law itself doesn't "care." If the Federal tax in question is not a capitation and is not a tax on property by reason of the ownership of that property, then the tax is not required to be apportioned. The "label" assigned to the tax (direct or indirect) does not matter, in that sense.

Yes, there are still classes of taxation: direct taxes and indirect taxes. The question of whether these classes are still part of the law is a completely different question from the question of whether a particular Federal income tax is required to be apportioned.

You asked about the Supreme Court decision being "cited." The cited Supreme Court cases are some of the same ones you have cited. However, most court cases (tax or otherwise) do not involve the U.S. Supreme Court. That's because the Supreme Court agrees to hear very few cases. The result is that on most U.S. Federal legal issues, the U.S. courts of appeal provide the final word on what the law is.

Here's a summary of some (but not all) possible kinds of Federal taxes.

1. Capitation (example: $100 per person per year", etc.). We don't have any such Federal tax. Category: Direct tax. Apportionment required? Yes. Geographical uniformity required? No.

2. Tax on property by reason of its ownership (this would be a national property tax, which we do not have). Category: Direct tax. Apportionment required? Yes. Geographical uniformity required? No.

3. Income tax. Category: In court cases, sometimes called "direct", other times called "indirect," depending on the how a given tax protester words his pleadings. Apportionment required? No, regardless of whether the tax is called "direct" or "indirect" in the text of a given court decision. The law doesn't "care" and as a result the judges don't care. Geographical uniformity required? Yes.

4. Gift tax. Category: Indirect. Apportionment required? No. Geographical uniformity required? Yes.

5. Estate tax. Category: Indirect. Apportionment required? No. Geographical uniformity required? Yes.

6. Various miscellaneous "excise" taxes of all sorts under Subtitle D and Subtitle E of the Internal Revenue Code. Category: Indirect. Apportionment required? No. Geographical uniformity required? Yes.

Geographical uniformity generally means that the taxing statute cannot say things like: "this tax applies only to people in South Carolina and Montana". Famspear (talk) 21:03, 12 May 2017 (UTC)