User talk:Vandolin25

Nice work!
Posted automatically via sandbox guided tour. Vandolin25 (talk) 20:22, 22 January 2015 (UTC)

Hello Vandolin25 (talk) 20:28, 3 March 2015 (UTC)

Some baklava for you!
Proposed Bibliography:

'''Rousseau project research log: Bold text'''

'''Research: 3/17/15 ‘The Beginning that never was’:'''

Deals with idea of ‘Mediation’ between self and self, and self and external forces: This is moment when man evolved from the proto-humans that Rousseau idealized, but also when man became aware of each other and the environment…? Leo Strauss’ idea: Rousseau idealizes the state of immediacy that nature provides so that natural freedom remains the model for civil freedom. Arthur Meltzer: Rousseau directed towards regaining man’s natural unity or conditions of immediacy through either extreme individualism or collectivism Rousseau’s narratives seem to show layered and complex synchronicities instead of developmental trajectory where lines between before and after can be found Impossible to find when perfectibility is found/activated, instead refers to effects of when perfectibility (supposedly) comes later.

For Rousseau, political and moral theory stuck between nature on one hand, and society etc. on the other Navigation of life’s ambiguity is necessary for living well at the personal and political level Prudence and integrity compatible in form of ‘tolerable compromises, acceptable lies, and ‘beneficial manipulations’ Rousseau’s ideas are loaded with ambiguity in a manner that mediation is a central category of Rousseau’s thought. A necessary presence of developmental genealogies from the beginning “Especially in the fluctuating nature of objects ‘outside’ the self, troubling the possibility of self-love, pity, or independence in any unmediated ways

Development of morality depends on the ongoing management of the external world so it can be experienced in a stable orderly way (Even as the power to make this happen must be hidden from view) Independence for Rousseau never ‘immediate’ dependence of ‘things’ doesn’t alleviate the instability and fluidity as consequence of mediation. Independence depends on managing dependence, so it’s experienced with certainty as beneficial and necessary. The role played by mediation in Rousseau’s developmental stories Second Discourse: Rousseau tries to go back to the ‘before’ time to see what’s the difference between the ‘natural’ and the ‘developed/acquired’ traits of humanity as a way of finding the ‘developed/acquired’ flaws that make up human nature and should be changed. Though finding the difference is difficult to the reader, because the natural/original traits in people (pitie amour de soi) aren’t there the entire time, though it seems that perfectibility is there the whole time. Individualism: a process where one becomes aware of themselves as an individual person. This requires Conditions of mediation. I.e. one is only made aware of themselves this way through comparison and reflection through other such creatures. Here, individuation needs mediating between self and self, i.e. looking at oneself through an outside lens/perspective, showing that they are similar, but different from other individuals. This presents the problem though; how can this be accomplished while retaining immediacy? In Rousseau’s ‘Emile’ ‘He must be an I, in he must become aware of himself as an individual before he can encounter another as an individual, yet consciousness of one’s identity requires an experience of another, or at least of oneself as an other. (Important about paradox of natural vs. innate): How can Rousseau’s humans ever have been able to relate if they’ve never been able to reflect and compare? Which implies that perfectibility had already been set in motion. Idea that proto-humans did have choice, differentiating them from animals, but what choices could they make if any ability to reason didn’t develop until later? Idea that self-awareness implicates more complete faculties: consciousness of any sensation is a proposition, a judgement, when one compares one sensation with another, one reasons, judging and reasoning the same. Though such judgements would be more than mere reactions to stimuli, suggesting the proto-man already thrust from his former state of immediacy in nature. Assumption that mediation develops from immediacy undermined by the idea that in state of nature, humans lack instincts. Idea that instincts are manufactured and appropriated from animals, though this would need reflection and imagination, comparison, which doesn’t come along until later, when man develops sense of individuality. Rousseau also notes that the proto-man fills surroundings with similar beings, suggesting active imagination. (Beings capable of sensing and willing) Again, man imagination inevitably thrusts man out of himself, disrupting the immediacy of the ‘original’ condition. Another problem of mediation, seen through differentiation, -instability of the outside world; is always relative, assuming man will always experience the world (As well as themselves) indirectly or through different mediating devices. (Is this a suggestion that imagination developed through Rousseau’s proto-humans would cause have lost any concrete sense of existence?) (Unimportant thought) Process of individuation as one leaves the state of nature isn’t merely transformation of experience of immediacy to experience of living with things between. Comparison unhinges them from the timelessness, immediacy, and immanence noted in Rousseau’s state of nature. Pity—discussed as being a ‘natural’ trait, though not mentioned until after other things come about, such as comparison, free agency, Discussed in a nonlinear, circular manner. Rousseau complicates this claim that pity precedes reflection with example of imprisoned man watching a child being attacked by a wild beast. ‘What horrible agitation this man must feel for an event that he takes no personal interest in…’ ‘Such is the pure movement of nature prior to all reflection.’ --Here reflection ratiocination or conscious reasoning, not the ‘mechanical prudence’ seen elsewhere. Experiencing pity shouldn’t require reflection in this manner. Though pity cannot be an immediate or automatic sentiment based on the ideas of individuation and mediation. Pity requires one experience, an event as an individual being with an active imagination, also one must be able to identify another like oneself, but different from oneself at the same time (position outside oneself) Pity, therefore, cannot be an immediate sentiment that exists ‘outside all reflection.’ It requires several steps between seeing the suffering, and identifying with the pain. Pity not coterminous with empathy; one feels uncomfortable with the pain they see, they do not feel the pain that they see. Experiencing pity ‘the first sentiment’ (E222) is thus a manifestation of amour-propre with all that it entails. “being able to access our natural sensitivity presumes that we have already become moral beings, possessing souls, free will, moral agency, and some elementary faculty of reason, pity cannot at once be immediate and the source of morality. However, the difference between active and passive pity are similar to Rousseau’s ideas of Amour-propre and amour de soi. Amour de soi is passive, leading towards self-preservation, but acts as a source of humanity and virtue. While Amour-Propre is self-love in comparing oneself to others. If Rousseau’s proto-humans are always individuated beings for whom mediation (including amour-propre) mediation would seem to be rooted in mediation as well. Propensity to compare potentially more intrinsically human than ‘natural sensitivity’ Or self-love and comparison can only exist together if individualism has always already begun. Significant connection between development of conscience and need to stabilize experience with external world seen in Emile. The tutor makes the world seem benevolent, not cruel so Emile doesn’t become cruel. (Emile 98-99) Vicar says that conscience is important in providing a sense of stability, but since it’s experienced as certainty, the mediation necessary to produce it must be hidden from view. Suggestion that transformation of self-love into conscience through layers of mediation act as strategy for combating the limits of the human condition, not evidence of human goodness. I.e. willful denial of the Vicar to experience the use of stability For Rousseau, morality can’t develop out of the immediate experience of pitie, or any pure self-love untouched by amour-propre. But instead requires negotiation of aspects of mediation w/impurity and complexity that it implies.

More research: '''4/17/15 ‘Can you hear me now J-J Rousseau On listening education: Megan J. Laverty:''' Main argument that Rousseau’s concept of humane communication and teaching leads us to have implications on the role of listening in education, to move into Rousseau’s philosophy in relation to amour de proper and amour de soi Rousseau’s distinction between the two: both central part of human psyche that influence speaking and listening (Emile or On Education) p.92 Amour de soi refers to humans desire to live and sustain itself, (E. 212-213) ‘Thus it’s contented when true needs are satisfied, food, shelter, company, meaningful activity, etc. Susceptible to corruption by amour-propre-stimulates those unquenchable desires people develop by causing a person to compare themselves to others and never feel content, that they’re not being loved adequately. Inherent in this impossible desire that others prefer the individual to themselves (Emile, 214). Amoure-propre convinces the individual that that their survival is at the expense of another, betraying the very real common interests from becoming part of the individuals motivational structure. (Then goes on to suggest that significant source of this problem is the ideas instilled into children by adults especially the idea of future-based anxieties and instilling these into children at a young age (Also mentioned in Emile.))

Taken from English translation of Emile: ‘Let us lay it down as an incontrovertible rule that the first impulses of nature are always right; there is no original sin in the human heart, the how and why of the entrance of every vice can be traced. The only natural passion is self-love or selfishness taken in a wider sense. This selfishness is good in itself and in relation to ourselves; and as the child has no necessary relations to other people he is naturally indifferent to them; his self-love only becomes good or bad by the use made of it and the relations established by its means. Until the time is ripe for the appearance of reason, that guide of selfishness, the main thing is that the child shall do nothing because you are watching him or listening to him; in a word, nothing because of other people, but only what nature asks of him; then he will never do wrong. I do not mean to say that he will never do any mischief, never hurt himself, never break a costly ornament if you leave it within his reach. He might do much damage without doing wrong, since wrong-doing depends on the harmful intention which will never be his. If once he meant to do harm, his whole education would be ruined; he would be almost hopelessly bad. Greed considers some things wrong which are not wrong in the eyes of reason. When you leave free scope to a child's heedlessness, you must put anything he could spoil out of his way, and leave nothing fragile or costly within his reach. Let the room be furnished with plain and solid furniture; no mirrors, china, or useless ornaments. My pupil Emile, who is brought up in the country, shall have a room just like a peasant's. Why take such pains to adorn it when he will be so little in it? I am mistaken, however; he will ornament it for himself, and we shall soon see how.’