User talk:Xyl 54/Sandbox 6

Some remarks: It begins to look like this might need its own sub-page... TREKphiler  any time you're ready, Uhura  18:00, 21 January 2012 (UTC)
 * 1) Use of the likes of "leapt" is too strong. Not sure if it's POV, but it does seem a bit unencyclopedic. It would have to be a sudden, sharp increase, & AFAIK, construction didn't change in that way, ever.
 * 2) "four out of the first 27 months" I'd like to know which four (but wouldn't demand it).
 * 3) "ship-building capacity of Britain, the US and the other Allies" I find that a very awkward phrasing. I have a sense of this wanting to include Canada & Australia, or South Africa, or wherever; the contribution to merchant building is pretty small, at least in Canada's case. Not trivial, but... How about "Allied capacity, primarily the U.S. & Britain"? "Principally"? ("Overwhelmingly" might be too much, but it's close.)
 * 4) "after May 1943" I'd prefer to point out that was effectively after the U-boat had been defeated.
 * 5) On the tonnage war generally, it bears mentioning something often overlooked: more Allied tonnage was lost, but the average loss per U-boat & per war patrol steadily declined. (This is in line with "after Black May", but was true throughout the war.)
 * 6) I wonder if comparison to the Pacific is warranted.
 * 7) My pet peeve, RAF didn't base any VLRs (Stirlings or Liberators) in Newfoundland til so damn late. I'd very, very much like a mention of how much sinkings changed when they were.
 * 8) In that vein, I'd also very much like mention of just how much ASV radar impacted sinkings of U-boats, & how much it reduced merchant losses.
 * 9) I think you've canvassed the Allied innovations well ("fruit tactics"? I don't recall ever hearing it before.) I'd add blimps, Victory ships, sonobuoys, & shipboard HF/DF.
 * 10) In response, I'd want to see German innovations & tactical changes, not least FAT, Type XIV, & snorkel.
 * 11) I'd be wary of the order you mention them. By saying it first, do you mean RDF/radar was more important than Huff Duff? It wasn't, tho Dönitz thought so. (That may've been due to being unaware the Allies used it, or did so much, because Germany didn't have gear comparable to the automatic scanners the Allies used: in essence, the Germans didn't know it could be done.)
 * 12) I'd also like mention of delay in introducing the MAC ship (converted bulk grain carrier or tanker to CV), which sat on the shelf more than a year.
 * 13) I'd also want to de-emphasize the importance of Ultra (often very overplayed). It had a role, but it wasn't essential to read the signals: just knowing where U-boats were would often do it, & HF/DF gave that. (So Dönitz's dismal comm technique needs mention.) So, too, B-Dienst benefitted heavily from terrible Admiralty merchant cyphers (BAMS), which deserves mention. (Here, again, mention PTO & the parallel? USN lost access to the maru code before the war started, & it cost them dearly until broken again 1/43...) So, too, development of "squirt" transmission gear (again, too late, for either resistance by Dönitz, or ignorance of the need, or whatever it was).
 * 14) "unable to maintain a similar state of improvement" Definitely needs mention. And, if possible, attribute cause. I've seen Dönitz blamed as (not quite) technophobic. RN & RCN senior officers were dimwits where technology was concerned, but the Brits had the best way of joining scientists & officers; the Germans, one of the worst. (IJN, probably the worst officers & worst system I've ever heard of...)
 * 15) "Nor was the achievement of the U-boat Arm particularly unusual" USN boats in PTO sank about 5300 for about 4.5 million tons (see Blair). Which brings up the bad exploders of Germany, Britain, & the U.S....
 * 16) "Reason for the myth" Also "can't see the forest" & not used to dealing with statistics. Did the OR guys know how low convoyed ship losses were? Since they had trouble persuading on the counterintutive thing: larger convoys are safer...
 * 17) I'd also like a mention of RCN being in a terrible position: escorting more than half the convoys for the duration, with the least-experienced crews in the slowest ships, but covering the slowest convoys, meaning they were under greatest threat for longest...because they had neither the destroyers nor trained crews to take over the fast convoys. Then getting blamed by RN for taking too many losses....
 * 18) "WWI had sunk over 5,000 in 4 years" I'd want explicit mention of lack of convoys for most of WW1 (PTO WW2, too, actually). Convoys made it harder to find targets, so sinking 6000 ships despite standard convoys from Day One is a much more significant accomplishment.
 * 19) "still using Type VII" And why. Dönitz did want boats in service, & Type IXs would take longer to build; the tactical & strategic flexibility they'd give him might have made it worthwhile to stop building Type VIIs. That gets into issues of materials: Could Dönitz get enough steel? Would Hitler give it to him...? Did Hitler understand it was worthwhile? (I doubt it.)
 * 20) On Type IXs & flexibility, might also mention basing issues. Hitler AFAIK never pressed Vichy for access to Dakar, which would've been seriously bad news for the Allies. Nor was co-operation with Japan anything but cursory.
 * 21) That also gets to Dönitz's "strategy" (if it can be called that). He knew he had to sink 300K tons/mo average, & moved his boats to where the defenses were weakest. What he didn't do was target crucial supplies, in particular oil. (It took Nimitz & English {or Lockwood} too long to figure it out, too...) Focus on oil out of Venezuela & Texas, Dönitz could have crashed Britain's economy in months. Make tankers #1 priority, same effect. This was the biggest impact of the East Coast "Happy Time": it produced an oil supply crisis, & a tanker crisis, which forced a change in shipments to Bengal, which led to a famine.... I can't source this for Britain, but it's pretty obvious Dönitz could've done what the Pac Fleet Sub Force did to Japan: immobilize the RN & stop Bomber Command flying, for lack of fuel (or lack of tankers).
 * 22) On priorities, what do you say to mention Dönitz didn't order his boats to shoot the escorts? With perpetual shortages, it would have paid enormous benefits. Pac Fleet boats didn't get orders to, either, but the effect would be the same: more unescorted ships...


 * Thanks for the remarks; I can’t really disagree with any of them.
 * Though to take the last point first, if this is to be a section of the BotA article which is already … long then it may need trimming rather than expanding. It was a bit of mind-dump when I wrote it I’m not sure its all usable. As for a sub-page, yes, maybe; but what would be the title? “Myths of the BotA” seems a bit POV.


 * A couple of points (to clarify, really)
 * 1 “leapt”: what I had in mind there was the difference the US entry into the war meant/made. On 6 Dec 41 D’s main enemy was the Brits (with a 21 million GRT merchant fleet and a ship –building capacity of ( I think) 120,000 GRT per month, while his U-boats were sinking (eg Nov 41) about 70,0000 per month. By 12 Dec his problem had essentially doubled.
 * 2 The article could do with a month by month table, but the only four on-target months for the UbW were June 1940 (375,000GRT),Oct 40  (363), May 41 (362) and june41 (325)


 * 3 Britain, the US and the other Allies”: yes, I was thinking/mindful not to ignore the Canadian contribution (which brings in point 17) Dan v d Vat was keen to give Canada due credit for her contribution to the BotA, which I’m all in favour of. He also refered to Canada as “a small nation in a large country” which I thought was apposite; her ship-building capacity wasn’t huge, but we know the value of the widows mite…
 * The other country which gets ignored is Norway; she had ( I think) the 3rd or 4th largest merchant marine ( about 5 million GRT), and a fair chunk of that sailed with the Allies. Which also has a bearing on the tonnage war calculation; 300,000 GRT per month was require to dent Britain’s capacity; add Norway’s and that figure needed to go up a bit.


 * 5 I agree the steady fall in ships lost per U-boat was a measure of the increasing effectiveness of Allied counter-measures. The break-even point (1 U-boat sunk for every ship lost) was (I think) in mid 43; by the end of the war it was 2 U-boats per ship lost


 * 6 Yes mentioning the Pacific is a bit out of place in the BotA article (though that has a bearing on 15 and 18 )


 * 8-12 the technology section needs quite a bit of work;


 * 14 Levin made a comment about the Battle of britain “those that knew the most were worried the least”; I’m pretty sure the same applied to the BotA


 * 15 I mentioned the war of 1812 because its the only one I could find figures for; I presume other wars involving privateers showed similar depredations. The myth aspect is just using/when the fig are used/ the stark 6000/21 million figure to suggest something extra-ordinary (OTOH completely, v d Vat refers to the BotA as “a story of waste on a numbing scale”; its too easy to miss the human and material costs involved here)


 * 16 I agree convoys were always the safest option, even in March 43. OTOH it’s easy to miss/ lose sight of the very real concerns planners had about convoying and the down-side to operating them. The main factor seems to be the delays they imposed.; Bernard Edwards quotes the loss of carrying capacity as about a third, which for Britain equates to a loss of about 7 million GRT. I don’t know how that translates into an equivalent number of ships sunk, but it would seem that unless a considerable number of ships were being saved by convoying then introducing a convoy system would be a significant own goal.
 * Churchill grasped the nettle very early in introducing a comprehensive scheme, but had to loosen it (by allowing faster ships to sail independently) to offset the disadvantages. And it was them that constituted the majority of casualties for much of the campaign. v d Vat refers to it ( I can’t remember the details); the thing that reduced the losses was raising the speed thresh-hold, but it didn’t happen until surprisingly late.
 * Also the fear in WWI (and presumably later) was that a convoy collects up a whole load of targets in to one place. If a pack of say 30 U-boats had got its act together and sunk one ship each, and could successfully intercept one convoy after another ( which is what they feared was happening in March 43) you could sympathize with the notion they’d be no worse off ( and possibly better) with independent sailing. Roskill (who was a staunch advocate of convoying) reported that there was a serous suggestion to abandon convoying in the Indian Ocean, and that losses of ( I think he said) 300, 000 GRT would be “acceptable” compared to the advantage of independent sailing.


 * 21 Again, fair comment. I was sort of aiming at that with the first couple of sentences; the German approach was nothing like a full blockade (which it is sometimes claimed to be) and a tonnage war is a poor second to targeting the most valuable cargoes. My impression is that they didn’t do that because they couldn’t; there were a number of times when patrol lines looking for east-bound convoys didn’t find them but hit west-bound convoys instead. And the only tanker convoy from S America hit ( I think) was TM 1, which was more by luck than judgement. Another difference between the Atlantic and the Pacific theatres; the USN seemed to have no major difficulty in focusing on the most important shipping.
 * 22 Following on from that, it does make sense to target convoy escorts, (which is easier said than done!) I’m assuming the Germans didn’t because they couldn’t (until Sept 43 at least) and because they never developed group tactics beyond all showing up at the same time (the only example I’ve found is with the attack on OB 293, which didn’t go that well). Another difference from the USN! Xyl 54 (talk) 22:53, 22 January 2012 (UTC)


 * "a bit POV" It is, & wouldn't account for the true bits. "Assessment of BotA"? Weak, but...
 * "leaped" It's less the fact of it than the choice of word. The simple mention of the change in available tonnage, & especially building capacity, would be better IMO, in particular given the Libertys. That leaves it to the reader to be informed or startled, depending on prior knowledge. ;p
 * I've always liked month-by-month tabulation of losses. I'd include U-boat construction & losses & a tonnage/boat & tonnage/patrol table. Tons/patrol & built/sunk I'd integrate with sinkings: show the month-to-month change. I've seen this kind of thing graphed, too, which might make following it easier: that is, rather than a table of numbers, a bar graph with each value. Actually, given the choice, I'd want the actual figures tabulated for my use & graphed for ease of understanding by the casual reader. (Am I greedy? ;p )
 * I wager it was in van der Vat I first saw the RCN given due credit. (Certainly didn't learn it in school. :( :. You're entirely right, Norway should get mentioned. (And I'm embarassed to have forgotten about that. : Of tonnage added, IIRC, vdV put Norway #1. I also seem to recall there was French tonnage. In the context, tho, it'd be construction, not existing fleets, that would be at issue, & offhand, IDK if any country except the U.S. & Britain added more than a few % to the sealift. Canadian corvette building wasn't trivial, but that's another issue, & even that was comparatively small numbers.
 * "those that knew the most were worried the least” I'd agree with that. I do wonder if it was less a military issue than a grand strategic one. If things got bad enough, Stalin could change his mind, or Parliament could get antsy. Votes of no confidence weren't impossible, & Winston survived two, IIRC, as it was; he wouldn't have wanted another.
 * Yeah, the raw numbers don't begin to tell the story, & all too often, that's as far as it goes. :(
 * Convoys do effectively mean a loss of shipping, & that's also a point to mention. It is a variety of own goal: you're denying yourself lift just as effectively & permanently as if the ships were sunk, with the objective of reducing future losses. It works, but it takes all the slack out until construction catches up, & with war losses, that's going to be a long time... As I read it (no idea where anymore... :, in WW1, there was disbelief steamers could even be convoyed. There was also no study done of losses or movements.
 * Losses of 300K a month acceptable? Wow. I haven't seen that before. (Tho I confess, I haven't read Roskill. :( :. It does give a sense of the scale of "sunk cost" in convoying. It makes me wonder when it was: after the Libertys made it clear building would outpace losses? In light of what happened OTL with food shipments, was that a calculation to say "screw India"? Also, how long a time was contemplated? There was a period of reassignment; I'd believe accepting losses for a time made sense, until new CM arrived.
 * On tonnage war versus blockade, you make a good point. Drawing the distinction would be good IMO. And offhand, I can't recall any tanker convoy specifically targetted. I'd disagree with the proposition the Sub Force had no problem: Nimitz had them scattered everywhere on close surveillance of bases, MacArthur got supply runs to the P.I., & basing boats in Oz meant divided command & the most lucrative patrol area was off-limits for risk of fratricide.
 * On shooting escrots, I'm afraid you're wrong. It wasn't technical, it was training & doctrine. It was possible even with the lousy Mk 14 to sink DDs & smaller escorts (as small as 500t, tho IMO that's pretty small for a torpedo; I wouldn't waste one on a merchant that small). Sam Dealey got 3 in a single patrol (as confirmed by the notoriously unreliable JANAC, anyhow), after the Mk14 problems were cured. The Germans could readily have sunk DDs & DEs wth the standard G7s. They certainly had guys with the nerve for it: Kretchmer comes immediately to mind, & Prien, & Schepke, & if I actually knew more about the BotA,:( :( I could probably name others. It needed a realization of the value of doing it more than anything IMO. I won't say easy, exactly, but presuming the escorts are the first ships to go, not out of the question. Even hitting them after they decide to attack, at around 1000yd, isn't impossible, as Dealey proved. (He actually left the 'scope up as bait. 8o ) The magnetic feature would have been a help with shallow-draft targets like DDs...
 * One thing about wolfpacks. They're far less co-ordinated than usually believed, so "show up at the same place & around the same time" was about all they could achieve. AFAIK, there were never comm drills or methods developed (in-pack brevity codes, like Beach describes, frex), or exercises where the U-boats actually communicated after making contact, which I find deeply peculiar, since most attacks were IIIRC night surfaced ops ideally suited to it. Commsec wouldn't be an issue, either, after contact...  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  00:26, 23 January 2012 (UTC)


 * About the Indian Ocean thing, it was a while ago I read it, so you’re dealing with an aging memory, here, but IIRC he was describing an upsurge of sinkings in the Indian Ocean in 1944. the Admiralty felt didn’t have enough escorts for a convoy system, so were considering independent sailing and patrolling as an  alternative (one comment, from someone on the scene or Roskill himself, wondered if their lordships had any idea how big the Indian Ocean was) the 300,000 tons loss was, I think, a global amount, rather than losses just in the IO; the number of ships being lost there was nowhere near that total. (Losses in the Atlantic were averaging 30,000 in 1944, but in the Indian Ocean they were higher, some months. But the totals were still under 100,000 per month)
 * I don’t know about “screw India” (that’s very cynical of you! I’m shocked!!) They were certainly considering screwing the Merchant Navy, with this.
 * On attacking the escorts, I’m probably being too dismissive; I had it in mind that the UbW itself wasn’t up to it. I just couldn’t see a U-boat skipper pulling off a “down the throat” attack (or even considering trying it); I suppose it was the tonnage fixation and the whole competitive angle they had. But you’re right, on reflection. U-boat skippers did attack escorts (Albrecht Brandi came to mind when I sat down to it) and escorts did get sunk. I even remembered an account from John Dalison where he described being hit by a “down the throat” shot (even to the “flashing the periscope as bait” trick) but I’ve not been able to corroborate it.
 * OTOH they really weren’t up to staging co-operative attacks once they’d closed on a convoy; (see here, and here) which is why Donitz took up micromanaging the battle from Kerneval. ( I got it wrong, above BTW; the time when they did try local co-ordination was the attack on convoy OB 318, not OB 293.
 * As for the blockade, I think that is part of the myth story too. What we are given is tales of gallant U-boat men, successful aces, tonnage scores, convoy “massacres”; what gets left out is the other side of the story. In September 1939 Germany had  a substantial merchant fleet (about 5 million tons, around that of France and Italy, a bit smaller than Norway) By the end of the year it had been swept from the seas, and they were reduced to blockade running. Two years later they were using cargo submarines. It’s a huge success story we just don’t hear about. Instead we get competitive lists of Allied submarine “aces”, which are inevitably shorter, and less “successful”.
 * Anyway, just a few loose ends... Xyl 54 (talk) 23:05, 23 January 2012 (UTC)


 * ♠"Indian Ocean" Based on the timing, it appears to coincide with the tanker crisis. (Very vague recall in play, here. :.
 * ♠"300,000" Given that was a fairly bad (if fairly average) month for the Atlantic, I have to wonder why the Admiralty thought it was acceptable anywhere. Whence "screw India": was it OK for India or Burma to suffer such deprivation, but not The Mother Country? 8o IDK if that was the attitude, or if there was an underlying reason, like low threat in IO. Either way, losses like that should not have been OK.
 * ♠"screwing the Merchant Navy" Absoutely. Tho that should not be a surprise... They didn't get decorations, & were, in the U.S., expressly excluded from the G.I. Bill, at the request (IIRC) of King. *mad*
 * ♠On escort sniping, the fact most attacks were on singletons, & the convoy escorts were damned weak, made it pretty well unnecessary in the ATO anyhow. (Japanese convoys, such as they were, were comparatively much tougher targets: as few as 3-4 ships with 2-3 gunboats, even tincans, sometimes.) It would have paid big dividends for BdU, but that needed a realization escorts could be sunk without it being suicidal. Nearest case I can think of is Kretchmer, ordering U-99 stay surfaced, knowing the escorts can't see or catch him.
 * ♠"Donitz took up micromanaging" So the interwar exercises didn't accomplish nearly enough, on co-ordination nor the realization sonar wasn't fatal. (Same overestimation of sonar inhibited the USN boats. They learned. Of course, IJN ASW was a joke... And I say that knowing full well they sank 42 {?} boats; they claimed, IIRC, 368. 8o )
 * ♠"5 million tons" I have never heard about it. I'm ashamed of my ignorance... :( :( It's definitely something that needs telling, & deserves it.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  04:06, 24 January 2012 (UTC)


 * Sorry for not responding; I've been a bit distracted. I needed to get this trimmed down to a workable section. It would have been useful to know what Levin actually said, but my library doesn't have a copy, and google books is a bit truncated. Still, I've given it a go... Xyl 54 (talk) 02:04, 27 January 2012 (UTC)
 * No worries. I looked at it, like it in the main. :) One or two comments there, & a request for sourcing of the claims I added. (You've got them handy, & I don't. : Beyond still needing the broader issues we've discussed to be addressed, which is going to take more work, it looks good.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  02:11, 27 January 2012 (UTC)