Wikipedia:Mediation Cabal/Cases/24 October 2011/Battle of Tali-Ihantala/Proposals

This page is for proposals related to the Battle of Tali-Ihantala MedCab case. Users should:
 * Add their proposed wording to a new section
 * Not sign their section with the standard ~
 * Not comment on other sections; this will be done at the discussion page
 * Not change the wording of proposals; they should add a new proposal with the changed wording

Draft 0
(current version) {| style="background:#d9d9d9"
 * On June 22, during Ribbentrop's visit in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and accompanying Soviet conditions. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of capitulation before any conditions could be presented. This created confusion in the Finnish government. Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet conditions, while others outright opposed this. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called; and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Kollontai), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms, the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written:  a demand for unconditional surrender . It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender.  This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional. The Soviet authorities denied this interpretation in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944.  Furthermore, it is also known that Stalin even told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender. However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944.
 * On June 22, during Ribbentrop's visit in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and accompanying Soviet conditions. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of capitulation before any conditions could be presented. This created confusion in the Finnish government. Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet conditions, while others outright opposed this. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called; and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by the Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Kollontai), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms, the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written:  a demand for unconditional surrender . It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender.  This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional. The Soviet authorities denied this interpretation in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944.  Furthermore, it is also known that Stalin even told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender. However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944.

Draft 1
To the Battle of Tali-Ihantala: {| style="background:#AADDFF"
 * On June 21, the Finnish government asked about the peace conditions from Soviet Union. When the Soviet reply demanded surrender without any conditions, Finns decided to continue fight.
 * On June 21, the Finnish government asked about the peace conditions from Soviet Union. When the Soviet reply demanded surrender without any conditions, Finns decided to continue fight.

Draft 2
{| style="background:#FFFF33"
 * On June 22, during Ribbentrop's visit in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and the accompanying Soviet conditions. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of a willingness to capitulate before any conditions could be discussed. This created confusion in the Finnish government. Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet conditions, while others outright opposed this. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called, and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. The Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as a demand for unconditional surrender. It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender.  The Soviet authorities denied this interpretation in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944.  Furthermore, it is also known that Stalin even told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender. However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944.
 * On June 22, during Ribbentrop's visit in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and the accompanying Soviet conditions. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of a willingness to capitulate before any conditions could be discussed. This created confusion in the Finnish government. Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet conditions, while others outright opposed this. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called, and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. The Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as a demand for unconditional surrender. It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender.  The Soviet authorities denied this interpretation in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944.  Furthermore, it is also known that Stalin even told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender. However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944.

Draft 3
{| style="background:#FFD980"
 * On June 22, right before Ribbentrop arrived in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and the accompanying Soviet conditions. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of a willingness to capitulate before any conditions could be discussed. This created confusion in the Finnish government. President Ryti and Tanner, the leader of the Social-Democrats, were willing to continue negotiations with the Soviets, while others, including Marshal Mannerheim and Prime Minister Linkomies, opposed this. The Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as a demand for unconditional surrender.  It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. However, it is known that, after not receiving a response from the Finns, Stalin told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender. However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944.
 * On June 22, right before Ribbentrop arrived in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and the accompanying Soviet conditions. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of a willingness to capitulate before any conditions could be discussed. This created confusion in the Finnish government. President Ryti and Tanner, the leader of the Social-Democrats, were willing to continue negotiations with the Soviets, while others, including Marshal Mannerheim and Prime Minister Linkomies, opposed this. The Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as a demand for unconditional surrender.  It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. However, it is known that, after not receiving a response from the Finns, Stalin told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender. However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944.

Draft 4
{| style="background:#FDDEDB"
 * On June 22, right before Ribbentrop arrived in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and the accompanying Soviet conditions. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of capitulation from the Finnish government without conditions before delegation could be sent to Moscow to hear Soviet terms.  This created confusion in the Finnish government. President Ryti and Tanner, the leader of the Social-Democrats, were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet terms, while others, including Marshal Mannerheim and Prime Minister Linkomies, opposed this. When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by  Mrs. Kollontai), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms,  the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written:  a demand for unconditional surrender . It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional. However, it is known that, after not receiving a response from the Finns, Stalin told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender. However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944.
 * On June 22, right before Ribbentrop arrived in Helsinki, the Finnish government asked about the possibility for peace and the accompanying Soviet conditions. The Soviet response, which arrived the next day, demanded a signed statement of capitulation from the Finnish government without conditions before delegation could be sent to Moscow to hear Soviet terms.  This created confusion in the Finnish government. President Ryti and Tanner, the leader of the Social-Democrats, were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet terms, while others, including Marshal Mannerheim and Prime Minister Linkomies, opposed this. When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by  Mrs. Kollontai), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms,  the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written:  a demand for unconditional surrender . It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional. However, it is known that, after not receiving a response from the Finns, Stalin told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country. In October 1993, a draft document was found in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, which contained detailed conditions of a Finnish surrender extremely close to unconditional surrender. However, this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944.

Draft 5
{| style="background:#DCFFA0"
 * On June 21, the Finnish government decided to ask about the possibility for peace and accompanying Soviet conditions through Swedish Government, and the request was delivered to Finnish ambassador Gripenberg in Stockholm late in the same evening . He delivered it to Swedish secretary of state, Erik Boheman, who forwarded it to Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Kollontai next morning . The Soviet response, which arrived June 23, demanded a signed statement of capitulation before any conditions could be presented . This prompted Boheman to contact Mrs. Kollontai and asked her either to remove this demand or present it in more neutral way . This demand of capitulation was similar like the one presented to Italy which led to signing of Italy's unconditoional surrender at September 29 . When Soviets refused to alter their response, Boheman and Swedish Foreign Minister Christian Günther announced that Sweden withdraws from mediation.
 * On June 21, the Finnish government decided to ask about the possibility for peace and accompanying Soviet conditions through Swedish Government, and the request was delivered to Finnish ambassador Gripenberg in Stockholm late in the same evening . He delivered it to Swedish secretary of state, Erik Boheman, who forwarded it to Soviet ambassador in Stockholm, Mrs. Kollontai next morning . The Soviet response, which arrived June 23, demanded a signed statement of capitulation before any conditions could be presented . This prompted Boheman to contact Mrs. Kollontai and asked her either to remove this demand or present it in more neutral way . This demand of capitulation was similar like the one presented to Italy which led to signing of Italy's unconditoional surrender at September 29 . When Soviets refused to alter their response, Boheman and Swedish Foreign Minister Christian Günther announced that Sweden withdraws from mediation.

The Soviet response created confusion in the Finnish government. Ryti and Tanner were willing to repeat the inquiry about Soviet conditions, while others outright opposed this. During the meeting Marshal Mannerheim was called; and he stated that the Soviet demand constituted an unconditional surrender. When the Finnish government recalled Paasikivi's negotiation trip to Moscow in March 1944 (initiated by Mrs. Kollontai's promises ), which had merely turned out to be the Soviets' dictation of terms so heavily, that even Swedes felt betrayed, the Finnish government decided to interpret the present Soviet response as it was written:  a demand for capitulation, unconditional surrender. It seemed that after Finnish unwillingness to accept the Soviet proposals in April 1944, owing to excessive reparation demands, Finland was to be offered only unconditional surrender. This was in line with Churchill's statement that as an Axis belligerent, Finland's surrender must be unconditional.

After Finnish decline the Soviet authorities denied this interpretation in public in an article published in Pravda on July 2, 1944, and on June 27 Stalin told American ambassador Harriman that US diplomats can try to clarify to the Finns that he had no intend to take over the country.

At October 1993 in the Russian Foreign Ministry archives with a letter dated June 28, 1944, a draft document for unconditional surrender of Finland surfaced. According to Baryshnikov this and similar drafts for the other countries the USSR was at war with existed since 1943, and they were replaced by new ones in the summer of 1944. A comission lead by Marshall Voroshilov had delivered at June 26, 1944 to the Comissariat of the Foreign Affairs a 56-section document for Finnish unconditional surrender.

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