Wikipedia:Reference desk/Archives/Humanities/2007 August 10

= August 10 =

Cuban Missile Crisis
On the wikipedia page Cuban Missile Crisis, it says: "Aftermath - The compromise satisfied no one[citation needed]." Is there such a citation and is this phrase correct? Thanks. --AlexSuricata 05:19, 10 August 2007 (UTC)
 * The citation that would make that go away would be to any of the histories of the crisis who say the same thing. However, it's such an undisputed fact that I think the tag should be removed.  Some people get slap happy with those "cite" tags.  Citations should be used where a statement is controversial or betrays a point of view.  In that case, everyone, pretty much, says that the compromise pleased no one.  Yes, the radar bases in Turkey were removed, and that was at least something for Kurchev, and the missiles left Cuba, so that was something for Kennedy, and the US may have promised not to invade, but what each party really wanted was not given by the others.  Cuba didn't feel safe, the Soviet Union didn't feel safe, and the US didn't feel safe.  Geogre 11:55, 10 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Yes - that conclusion is pretty much the standard historical interpretation - I don't see any need for the cite tag.87.102.35.197 12:01, 10 August 2007 (UTC)


 * The Cuban missile crisis put the militarized countries in the face-off on the brink of nuclear attack on each other, which would have devastated the U.S. and the Soviet Union, with all major cities in the belligerant countries devastated and perhaps half the populations of the belligerant countries dead, with the possibility of a protracted and widening war similar to World War 1 and World War 2. Instead, the ships turned around, the Cuban missiles were removed, and the U.S. military did not invade Cuba or sink Russian ships. The Doctor Strangeloves who wanted to see their armageddon strategies carried out, the jingoists, and militarists with itchy trigger fingers were disappointed. The half of the population in the belligerant countries who got to live out their lives because of the compromise were extremely satisfied with the culmination. Take a look at sermons, news magazine articles and newspaper editorials, and U.S. network news broadcasts after the crisis and you can find numerous expressions of satisfaction. The most totally unsatified group was probably the anti-Castro exile paramilitary, who tried to oust him in the Bay of Pigs invasion, and who after the October 1962 missile crisis were prevented from more hit and run attacks on the Castro government from US bases, per Time magazine, "That Month" Friday, Apr. 26, 1963 Edison 12:18, 10 August 2007 (UTC)
 * Great post! Curtis LeMay famously ranted that the US had "lost" the crisis; it's nausea-inducing to think about what the US' place in history would be if we had "won" (in his view).  --Sean 14:48, 10 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Actually, the US got a rather good deal. The USSR had a great place to put missiles close to the US, but lost it. The US only lost the missiles in Turkey, but those were outdated anyway it seems (I suppose losing the base was the biggest deal). And they kept their bases elsewhere in Europe, thus having bases closer to the USSR than the USSR had to the US, when it could have been the other way around. On top of that that deal was kept quiet (the Turkey base was dismantled only a year or so later), so the US came out looking as the great winner. They bluffed (with immensely high stakes, as already pointed out) and the USSR backed down (fortunately) and in the eyes of the world they simply looked chicken because the attacks on the USSR ships were also kept a secret. People knew there was a dangerous situation going on, but they didn't even know the worst part of it - that only came out decades later.
 * I suppose Cuba got the best deal because the US had to honour their promise not to invade - an invasion would have made them look really bad in the eyes of the world.
 * So I'd say a citation would be required. But there will also be sources that point out what I just did, so both will then have to be mentioned. DirkvdM 19:15, 10 August 2007 (UTC)
 * Im not at all sure it was a bluff. It was more of a non-negotiable demand, backed up by authorization to sink Russian ships or shoot down Russian planes which did not comply with instructions. Dean Rusk famously said "We were eyeball to eyeball with the Russians, and they blinked." The U.S. had a sufficient force to successfully invade Cuba. And the naval quarantine was not at all a secret. It was highly publicized. Russian subs were shadowed, Russian warships were stopped, the milssile carrying ships were turned around, and ships with food or oil were allowed through. Castro was disappointed, war hawks in the US were disappointed, the Dr. Strangeloves were disappointed, Khruschev was disappointed. If the missiles had gone operational, they could have hit numerous US strategic targets in 15 minutes. The balance of world power would have shifted. The Soviets, with the nuclear dagger on the throat of the US, could have possible taken Berlin, forr starters. As it was, a significant number of nuclear bomb equipped B52s were kept in the air, and other bombers were dispersed to remote strips. The launch command was made more of a hair trigger proposition, with a greater likelihood of inadvertent nuclear holocaust. Edison 00:26, 11 August 2007 (UTC)


 * I didn't mean the blockade was kept secret, but the way things had escalated. US ships were 'attacking' Soviet vessels. not full-out but by creating situations to which they had to respond, such as forcing subs to the surface (not sure how that can be done, though). A rather iffy thing to do in international waters and most probably a violation of International Law, which is probably why it was kept secret. Btw, the blockade itself was a violation of International Law, which is why it was called a quarantine instead - see quarantine. Something that also came out much later was that the Soviet subs were armed with nuclear weapons. With the technology of the time they could not keep contact with headquarters and the captains were responsible for the decision to launch or not. Making those people nervous was extremely risky, although possibly the US didn't know (for sure) they had nuclear armament. But they could have guessed, which made it a huge gamble.
 * And it was a big bluff too. The essence of cold war is that you raise the stakes so high that no-one dare do anything. But then the US did start to do something. Luckily the other guy didn't blink but kept his head cool and did the sensible thing, despite losing face. If the USSR would have reacted the same way the US did, the above-mentioned atrocities would have taken place. DirkvdM 07:27, 11 August 2007 (UTC)


 * The Soviets "did things" too — overt espionage and "regime-change" efforts. The straightjacket of the Cold War was that you could do all sorts of "small" things because nobody wanted to start "the big thing" rolling. The question was, how many "small" things until becomes a "big" thing? Fortunately we never found out, but it became clear pretty quick that nobody wanted to be the first one to start a nuclear war... ---24.147.86.187 00:49, 14 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Yeah, the attacks on the subs were an example of such a seemingly 'small' thing that wasn't so small, as later turned out, the reason being that the US didn't know (or guess) that the subs had nuclear armament. Which points out a major flaw in the cold-war philosophy. DirkvdM 07:08, 14 August 2007 (UTC)


 * As an unverifiable aside, I had a dream last night that I had lunch with Khruschev. I asked him, "If you had a chance now, would you have done anything differently in the Cuban Missile Crisis?" To which he responded by making an unpleasant face, and then turned into Edward Teller. It was a weird dream. --24.147.86.187 00:49, 14 August 2007 (UTC)

pebbles for The Rose
While in Munich recently I saw this memorial to Die weiße Rose. However, the top was covered in small smooth pebbles. I assume these are left by people as a tribute? If this is true, how did this tradition start and who leaves them? Thanks! --S.dedalus 06:31, 10 August 2007 (UTC)
 * I'm pretty sure it's a reference to the Jewish tradition of placing pebbles on gravestones, honoring the Weiße Rose's cause. I did't find a lot under Bereavement in Judaism, but Rabbi Tom Louchheim offers some thoughts on the tradition's origins here. ---Sluzzelin talk  06:54, 10 August 2007 (UTC)
 * I've expanded the section in our article and removed some mild OR. --Dweller 13:06, 10 August 2007 (UTC)


 * For what it's worth, I recall that the final scene of the film Schindler's List contained this very tradition. Actors from the film (and the real-life people that the actors portrayed in the film) placed pebbles on a grave.  I believe it might have been (the real-life) Schindler's grave?  (Joseph A. Spadaro 03:44, 11 August 2007 (UTC))


 * Thanks for your help! --S.dedalus 05:38, 13 August 2007 (UTC)

Shaftesbury and the Popish Plot
Can any defence be made of his actions at this time? He who must be obeyed 11:47, 10 August 2007 (UTC)
 * Yes. Any political agitation, even extremism can always be defended, even if such a defence is fairly unreasonable. --Dweller 13:09, 10 August 2007 (UTC)
 * Further. Our article on the Popish Plot is one of the worst I've ever seen in Wikipedia. I can't quite believe it. Let's assume that the worst accusations against Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 1st Earl of Shaftesbury are all true and that he was one of a cabal (yes, there was a Cabal! Shaftesbury="Ashley") that deliberated fomented anti-Catholic feeling. His defence would be fairly simple. The memory of the religious unrest in England was still fairly fresh. This would be reinforced in the succession crisis that culminated in the Glorious Revolution. 16th century England had been plagued with counter-swinging religious persecutions. The reign of Charles I and the interregnum, and the war with Scotland had all had at least undercurrents of religious elements to them. Anti-Catholic feeling was certainly strong, at least below the surface, especially since the Gunpowder Plot. So, he could argue he was helping protect his country from the unwanted and dangerous influence of Catholics. That's a defence, even if one finds it ethically or legally deficient. btw, he could also mount a defence that the Plot was real / he was no instigator, merely a responder. And if I've mangled any of that from dusty memory, I await the Muse's intervention. --Dweller 13:12, 10 August 2007 (UTC)
 * Wikipedia DOES NOT give legal advice. Sorry, I just really wanted to say that. Eran of Arcadia 18:48, 10 August 2007 (UTC)


 * This Popish Plot has often been called the Shaftesbury Plot. Shaftesbury himself may or may not have been one of the plotters, and the consensus is that the rascal Oates was the main confabulator of the bogus story sold to parliament. But Shaftesbury can't have been such a fool that he thought Oates was wholly credible. The Whigs used the supposed plot to kill Charles II and several others (including even Oates's ally Israel Tonge!) in an hysterical and unprincipled way. Perhaps it's human nature (and especially that of politicians) to believe that the ends justify the means, but shouldn't we expect better of our statesmen? So my verdict is that Shaftesbury's defence as outlined for him by Dweller (acting perhaps as Devil's advocate) won't do.


 * For anyone who has the inclination to work on the Popish Plot article, here are links to two good online resources. Xn4 21:44, 10 August 2007 (UTC)


 * The second parliament of Charles II Eighteenth session at british-history.ac.uk
 * Oates's Plot at the Catholic Encyclopedia online


 * P.S. Of course, He who must be obeyed's question was not whether Shaftesbury was a bad lot, but whether any defence can be made of his actions, and on that who can disagree with Dweller? Bormann, Göring and Kaltenbrunner had arguable defences at Nuremberg. Xn4 22:55, 10 August 2007 (UTC)

My goodness, Shaftesbury; 'little sincerity', the 'Dorsetshire eel' himself! I have lived with this man for so long that I feel that I have a closer understanding of him and his motives than I could ever wish. Who can possible forget John Dryden's sketch of the restless little nobleman in Absalom and Achitophel;

Of these false Achitophel was first;

A name to all suceeding ages curst:

For close designs, and crooked counsels fit;

Sagacious, bold and turbulent of wit;

Restless, unfixed in principles or place;

In power unpleased, impatient if disgrace;

A fiery soul, which, worked out its way,

Fretted the pygmy-body to decay,

And o'er-informed the tenement of clay.

A daring pilot in extremity,

Pleased with the danger, when the waves went high,

He sought the storms; but, for the calm unfit,

Would steer to nigh the sands, to boast his wit.

Great wits are to madness near allied,

And thin partitions do their bonds divide...

In friendship false, implacable in hate,

Resolved to ruin, or to rule the state.

Sad to say, it is almost impossible to provide a counter-blance to all this hostility, to see the world through Shaftesbury's eyes; for, fearful of prosecution by the government of Charles II, he destroyed most of his papers prior to his exile and death in 1683. Even Whig historians like Gilbert Burnet and T. B. Macaulay could think of few good things to say about him. For Macaulay he was "first a member of the most corrupt administration, then the leader of the most violent opposition of the century."

Can any defence be made of him? Well, yes, it can. He was extraordinarily able, dedicated, single-minded and hard-working. These qualities can be seen both in his work as a government minister and in his conduct throughout the Exclusion Crisis. He was also to be the first true 'party' leader in English history, the man who virtually called the Whigs into being. It was he, in this regard, who might be said to have turned politics away from the practice of elites into the arena of public debate. Yes, he was unscrupulous; yes, he was prepared to use disreputable methods and rely on disreputable people, like the truly loathsome Titus Oates. But, you see, Shaftesbury believed that England was faced with a terrible threat, and that desperate times demanded desperate remedies. For him Catholicism was a political rather than a religious danger; a faith that rested in the forms of despotism practiced on the Continent by the likes of Louis XIV. If he was unscrupulous he had learned the technique from the Stuarts; from Charles II, a king who effectively 'sold' England in the secret Treaty of Dover, and James his Catholic brother and designated successor, rigid and doctrinaire to a quite unacceptable degree. Shaftesbury's anger was born of just frustration: that the People, that Parliament itself, had no effective say over the supreme governance of the realm. His Whigs were violent, but their violence was born of political and constitutional imbalance.

So, what is Shaftesbury's case, his final defence? It's the defence of history, the defence, it might even be said, of liberty itself; that there should be an effective challenge to absolutism; that the people have a right to decide on their forms of government; that all power should not be concentrated by sacred and received right alone; that politics is a public act, not a private conspiracy. His best epitaph was that penned by John Locke, his friend and associate. For him Shaftesbury was a "Vigorous and indefatigable champion of civil and ecclesiastical liberty." And who can say better than that? Clio the Muse 03:20, 11 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Not Guilty, M'Lud, Not Guilty!!! Clio the Muse, you can defend me any day.He who must be obeyed 11:06, 11 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Dweller's defence boils down to (1) Shaftesbury could argue that he was helping protect his country from the unwanted and dangerous influence of Catholics; and (2) he could mount a defence that the Plot was real. The first of these demonizes Catholics and (if we are holding the trial now) will call for days of evidence and submissions to build up the case that the influence of Catholics was so unwanted and dangerous that the vilest methods were justified in stamping it out. In my view, the second defence won't run, as nothing credible has ever come to light to substantiate the existence of the Plot.


 * What Clio says is informed and pragmatic. She's so steeped in this period that I may be wrong to say any more about the matter, being undoubtedly less well informed, but I do think Clio may have allowed the rhetoric of advocacy to run away with itself. Her case rests on -


 * (1) the defence of history
 * (2) the defence of liberty itself
 * (3) that there should be an effective challenge to absolutism
 * (4) that the people have a right to decide on their forms of government
 * (5) that all power should not be concentrated by sacred and received right alone; and
 * (6) that politics is a public act, not a private conspiracy.


 * On (1), I'm puzzled. The defence He who must be obeyed asked for was specifically to do with Shaftesbury's actions at the time of the Popish Plot, and it doesn't seem to me that history has vindicated Shaftesbury, Oates and the others in that connection.
 * (2) I'll come to this last.
 * (3) But were Shaftesbury's actions at the time of the Plot an effective challenge to absolutism? when the Plot unravelled, weren't they counter-productive?
 * (4) But which people? Clearly not the population at large, which overwhelmingly had no vote and which (so far as I'm aware) Shaftesbury never aimed to enfranchise. Nor even the whole body of the English gentry, yeomen and burgesses of the boroughs: Shaftesbury's aim was to exclude their Catholic elements from all public life, and he succeeded brilliantly in the Second Test Act of 1678. However you perceive that, it does nothing to enhance parliamentary democracy.
 * (5) Certainly, the received rights of Lord Arundel of Wardour, the Earl of Powis, the Blessed Lord Stafford, Lord Petre, and Lord Bellasyse were interfered with by their impeachment on false charges of high treason! No doubt the more serious point is to do with the 'sacred and received rights' of the crown, and although the Glorious Revolution later made the crown a gift of parliament, can the Popish Plot and its fallout claim any of the credit for that?
 * (6) It's uncertain how much of Shaftesbury's actions in the affair of the Plot were conspiratorial, and we can only judge him on his actions as a public man. While the proposal that politics is a public act, not a private conspiracy, may be part of Shaftesbury's long term policy, did that policy really shine brightly in the years of the Plot?


 * (2) This leaves us with 'the defence of liberty', and there Clio may have a good pragmatic point: "Shaftesbury believed that England was faced with a terrible threat". It seems trite to say that the Plot led directly to the execution of sixteen innocent men, and indirectly to the deaths of more. A much wider liberty is intended. The great problem with the pursuit of liberty as a general defence of political dishonesty (the notion of the end justifying the means) is that it can lead you anywhere and everywhere: to Watergate, to invasion aimed at regime-change in Iraq. Maybe here we get into philosphical questions more than historical ones.


 * I hope the above isn't disrespectful, given that this is Clio's field and not mine! Xn4 16:12, 11 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Disrespectful, Xn4? Clio is not the oracle and not yet the elderly professor of history!


 * Thank you for that sober, intelligent and thoughtful response. I do not, in essence, disagree with anything you have written, and in another guise may very well have taken this position myself.  But you must surely be conscious of the task I have set myself here, as well as the forms of advocacy developed in mastery of the brief?  Anyway, enough of this; let's look a little more closely at some of the historical issues.


 * History's judgement on Shaftesbury has not been kind, that much is true, though I would urge anyone interested in a more balanced and objective view to have a look at The First Earl of Shaftesbury by K. H. D. Halley, still (she says) the best biography on the Whig leader. One thing should be made absolutely plain: the Popish Plot was indeed a groundless conspiracy, during which innocent people lost their lives.  For men like Oates it was no more than an opportunity to seek recognition and riches by defaming and maligning Catholics.  Shaftesbury stands guilty by association, and by the use he made of Oates and his slanders.  But it is crucially important to understand that Shaftesbury's hostility to Catholicism was first and foremost political not confessional in nature.  Earlier in his career he had advised Charles to stand by the Declaration of Indulgence of 1672 because it extended freedom of conscience to Protestant dissenters, even though it was criticised in Parliament for its supposed sympathy for Catholics.  His hostility towards Catholicism grew in intensity as it was perceived more and more as a political threat to the English constitution, a threat to the liberty of Parliament that Shaftesbury valued most highly.  I can find no better clue to Shaftesbury's whole attitude at the time of the Popish Plot than the observation of one MP who said "Papists are enemies not because they are erroneous in religion but because their principles are destructive to the government."


 * You see, Xn4, there is a well-established tendency to look at this whole period of English history as merely one of hysteria and anti-Catholic bigotry. There is, however, quite another dimension which is almost completely overlooked.  Forget Oates and his ghastly associates; look more closely at the Parliamentary debates.  It is there you will discover some of the real substance.  I went through all of the exchanges made during the Exclusion Crisis point by point, line by line.  In one session on 27 April 1679 Sir Henry Capel observed "From Popery came the notion of a standing army and arbitrary power...Formerly the crown of Spain, and now France supports this root of popery among us; but lay popery flat, and there's an end of arbitrary government and power.  It is a mere chimera or notion without popery."  The long-term danger, as Shaftesbury and his party believed, came from the France of Louis XIV.  But even at home he was mindful of the misuse of power in parts of the United Kingdon; for Britain had its very own Louis in the person of John Maitland, Duke of Lauderdale, Charles's Secretary of State for Scotland, who ruled the northern kingdom with powers akin to that of a Roman proconsul.  Here is part of Shaftesbury's speech from the debate of March 1679;


 * Popery and slavery, like two sisters, go hand in hand; sometimes one goes first, and sometimes the other, in a door; but the other is always following close at hand. In England popery was to have brought in slavery; in Scotland, slavery before and popery to follow...Scotland has outdone all the eastern and southern countries, in having their lives, liberties and estates sequestered to the will and pleasure of those that govern.


 * So, you see, for him the greatest risk was to liberty, from whatever direction it came. Yes, his understanding of liberty is far narrower than our own; and yes again, he was not a democrat, in the sense that we understand the term.  He was, rather, a great Parliamentarian, one of the greatest in English history, and as such stands comparison with John Pym and John Hampden, and I have chosen these parallels with care.  Many of Shaftesbury's contemporaries satirised him as 'Lord Shiftsbury' because he changed political clothes so often: first a supporter of Charles I during the English Civil War and then a supporter of Parliament; a supporter of Cromwell, and then an opponent; a supporter of Charles II and then an opponent.  Yet there is a consistent thread through all of these shifts and changes: a steadfast support for parliamentary process and constituional liberty.  He never attached himself to any regime that that set itself against frequent parliaments.  He only moved into permanent opposition after York, a man he never had any time for, was known to have converted to Catholicism.  He may have feared Catholic absolutism; he feared James even more: "...heady, violent and bloody, who easily believes the rashest and worst councils to be the most sincere and hearty."  And those familiar with James as king will recognise how accurate this assessment was to be.


 * No democrat, then, but a party leader; one who was prepared to extend the debate on the future of the constitution into the public arena, using all the means at his disposal. He did so because he was ever more aware of the impotence of Parliament in isolation from the people.  Petitions, pamphlets, parades, electioneering; simple messages for even simpler people; it was all part of the process of engagement. It was the beginning, in essence, of the modern political world, in all of its good and bad forms.  His success here must surely be measured by the fact that the Tories, his great rivals, began to adopt the same methods.  It was indeed a high risk strategy: in the end he lost everything, dying as an outcast and an exile.  But he had fought with single-minded determination for what he believed to be the highest principles of all.  And as for his place in history, I think there is a good argument for rooting the Glorious Revolution in the Exclusion debates.  Moreover, there is at least one modern historian who has argued that Locke's dissertations on government were first written, not as a retrospective justification of the events of 1688, but as Exclusionist tracts in defence of Shaftesbury.


 * I am conscious, Xn4, that I am in danger of turning this discussion into a dissertation in its own right; so stop I must, and stop I will. Let me just say that you can be William Jennings Bryant to my Clarence Darrow anytime you wish!  Clio the Muse 00:20, 12 August 2007 (UTC)

I would like to extend my particular thanks to Clio and Xn4 for this fascinating debate. I have managed to get far more from my little question than I ever expected. Oh Brave new world that has such people in it! He who must be obeyed 11:29, 12 August 2007 (UTC)

What a shame that a) this debate's been largely going on while I'm off-wiki and b) my knowledge of the period is so very rusty. As a general, unlearned point, I'd throw into the mix that judging historical characters by the standards of today is usually a futile exercise. People are shaped by their own eras. If contemporary thinking of all of a person's teachers, peers, role-models etc was influenced by ideas we might today find distasteful or flatly wrong, it nonetheless influenced that person at that time. Hence the Bible describes Noah as "righteous in his generation", the implication being that surrounded by wicked people, he was amazing, but in another generation, his standards may have been unremarkable. The historical context of 17th century England gives ample evidence that fear of Catholics was a) widespread b) influenced many notable historical episodes (not just the Popish Plot) and c) not entirely without basis.

btw I'll add to the contextual gumpf I presented above the Spanish Armada and perhaps more importantly the Rising of the North both of which were defeated, but were certainly shocking, and which were significantly supported by Papal excommunication of Elizabeth. I've enjoyed reading the debate through. We're fortunate to have such contributors. --Dweller 11:59, 12 August 2007 (UTC)

I didn't raise my boy to be a soldier
The song by this title is attibuted to Alfred Bryan and the 78 version by the Peerless Quartet (Dec 1914) is available on the web. Wiki correctly gives a redirect to Alfred Bryan when a search is done for the song. However, I beleive the etymology of the poetry of the song was borrowed by Bryan and dates back to the civil war, if not the revolutionary war. Note the verse Who dares to lay a musket on his shoulder. This is a vague recollection rather than a hunch. I thought the original poem would be a worthwhile entry if anyone could trace it to the prior source. Kevinpedia 13:43, 10 August 2007 (UTC)

London-Doncaster
How long it takes to get do Doncaster by bus from London?


 * National Express says it ranges from 3 hours 55 minutes to 4 hours 35 minutes. -- LarryMac  | Talk  18:04, 10 August 2007 (UTC)

More questions about Lausanne treaty and Kurds in Turkey
Hello, I have some more questions, can anyone clear this up for me?

- I understand that the Lausanne Treaty included some sort of population exchange between Greece and Turkey. But I recently had a dispute with someone else who claimed that they were forced to move. Is this true? I thought that they were only formally denaturalized?

- If I am correct, what nationality did those people who happened to live in the "wrong" country get? Or did they become stateless?

- I understand that religion, and not language, was the criterion? But suppose you had a village in Anatolia with lots of "assimilated" Armenians and Greeks, but who were christian? Would they all have been classified as "Greek"?

- People often talk about the Kurds striving for an independent Kurdestan, now part of Turkey. But what borders have been proposed? Someone told me that that would be pretty hard, because it's very likely that even in that new country, Kurds would in fact still be a minority. Thanks!Evilbu 15:55, 10 August 2007 (UTC)
 * The exchange was official voluntary. People were allowed to stay in either country if they desired. Many Turks decided to stay in Greece just as many Greeks decided to stay in Turkey.
 * The people staying in either country got that countries nationality (citizenship). In other words Greeks in Turkey had Turkish citizenship just as Turks in Greece had Greek citizenship.
 * I do not believe this can be answered like this. I believe it was processed on a case by case basis. I do not believe either side made it difficult to people who wanted to move to their territory. Though this is a guess.
 * Kurdish people were not mentioned in Lausanne. They were hence never recognized as a minority during that era. An independent Kurdistan would involve at least 4 countries loosing territory. A map of a Kurdistan is as valid as the last person drawing it. There are no clear numbers on the number of Kurdish people and their composition with the local population. This issue is quite complicated and controversial.
 * -- Cat chi? 16:15, 10 August 2007 (UTC)


 * 2. I don't get it then, if they were not forced to move, and not disadvantaged by not having the nationality at all, why do we still about an "exchange" then? Millions of people did move, so what is going on? On paper, it looks like nothing more than an "immigration campaign"?Evilbu 16:29, 10 August 2007 (UTC)
 * Some Greeks didn't want to be under Turkish rule and some Turks didn't want to live under Greek rule as a minority. Some didn't care. The minority in Greece is defined as a "Muslim minority" not as a "Turkish minority" in Lausanne I believe. -- Cat chi? 16:33, 10 August 2007 (UTC)

Hey, guys, there seems to be a little bit of confusion here over the exact implications of the the Treaty of Lausanne and, more important, the outcome of the Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922). I would suggest, Evilbu and Cat, that you might wish to look at Population exchange between Greece and Turkey. For most of the people affected 'repatriation' was most certainly not voluntary in any degree. The Greek exodus was, in fact, underway well before Lausanne gave retrospective legality to the whole process. In the end some 1.25 million people were uprooted. Ernest Hemingway, a reporter at the time, saw part of the Greek trek through Thrace, "The carts were jammed for thirty miles alaong the Karagatch road...No end and no beginning. Just carts loaded with everything they owned.  The old men and  women, soaked through, walked along keeping the cattle moving."

The problem was made worse by the fact there was no 'equivalent' in the process of exchange. In other words, far fewer Turks were forced out of Greece than Greeks out of the new Republic of Turkey. Housing amd lands thus vacated by the Turks came nowhere near the needs of the refugees. For decades after there was still a clear distinction between 'old' and 'new' Greeks. The whole process was known in Greece as the 'Asia Minor Catastrophe', which gives some measure of its impact on national consciousness. Lausanne did exempt the Greek community of Istanbul and the Turkish community of Western Thrace from forced exchange. However, because of discriminatory legislation in Turkey the remaining Greek population declined steadily. The Istanbul Pogrom of 1955 accelerated this process. The Greek community of Istanbul, standing at some 200,000 in 1924, now amounts to about 5000 people in all.

It is quite wrong to say that the Kurds were not 'recognized as a minority during that era.' There was a Kurdish presence in Paris during the peace talks, and the Treaty of Sevres did allow for an independent Kurdistan, mostly located within Turkish territory. The whole thing was, of course, nullified by the victory of Kemal Ataturk in the Turkish War of Independence. Even so, the British continued to offer some encouragement to Kurdish nationalism, later supporting the short-lived Republic of Ararat. Anyway, I hope this makes things just a little bit clearer. Clio the Muse 00:40, 11 August 2007 (UTC)
 * I was trying to simplify the issues. I do not believe there are any standing treaty that diplomatically recognizes Kurdish people as a minority in Turkey. That of course means diplomatic recognition. -- Cat chi? 08:54, 11 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Ah, but you see, Cat, you were not 'simplifying' the issues; you were confusing them through what I take to be a basic misunderstanding. Please forgive me for being so blunt, and I am quite sure there was no ill-intent on your part; but you were still misleading the questioner, and, what is worse, likely to mislead any casual reader coming across this discussion.  The suggestion that the population exchange was based on a 'stay or go as you like' approach is no more than a corruption of the facts; I cannot make the position any simpler than that.  And as for the Kurds, well they were certainly recognised as an entity in the Treaty of Sevres.  Clio the Muse 22:22, 11 August 2007 (UTC)

Burial Traditions
What is the traditional burial site for a second husband? First husband deceased, only plot available is left of first husband, would this be proper? Cmlarew 16:18, 10 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Hardly. It's just my opinion, but that seems very distasteful ... to say the least.  Honestly.  (Joseph A. Spadaro 17:44, 10 August 2007 (UTC))


 * Normally, they would flank the common wife, if the second husband is to be buried with her at all. That, of course, depends upon how long the marriage was, the wishes of the husband, the wishes of the wife (she may wish to be buried with her husband's family), but setting the two husbands next to each other would be unusual.  Now me, I reckon I won't much mind where I am after I no longer have sense or sensation (given previous forays into drunkenness, I have reason to believe that my scruples will vanish), but burial plots are for the remaining family more than for the deceased.
 * As the famous riddle goes, "The man who makes it doesn't need it. The man who needs it doesn't want it.  The man who uses it doesn't know it."  (The answer is "a coffin," but it could as easily be "a grave.")  Geogre 17:50, 10 August 2007 (UTC)

Consistency in law within a nation
Two people I know drank and drove. One had much more severe alcoholism than the other and crashed and wrote off their car. The other only swerved which was noticed by the police, leading to their arrest. The more severely alcoholic had his license revoked, while the other had a driving ban _and_ may face a prison sentence. The incidents occured in two separate adjacent counties of England. I want to know what can cause such variation since I thought this sought of thing (Law) was controlled nationaly, in order to preserve consistency. --212.204.150.105 17:25, 10 August 2007 (UTC)


 * I am speaking from a USA point of view, but I would imagine that England is not much different. There are many, many, many factors that go into the equation of what punishment is administered to an individual for his/her criminal conduct.  One, the specific facts and details of the case (which may be highly different from one case to another).  Two, the past criminal record / behavior (or lack thereof) of the defendant (which may be highly different from one person to another).  Three, the defense representation (let's face it -- like anything else, some lawyers are simply better than others at their job).  In other words, there are so many variables in any given situtaion.  And, because of all these variables, you cannot make a simple equation like: "OK, drinking and driving always equals x, y, z punishment for everybody who does it."  So, the law provides general guidelines / framework / boundaries with which to approach the issue (i.e., a range of acceptable punishments for any given crime) ... and the judge / prosecutor has wide latitude / discretion within those guidelines and boundaries.  This is the simple answer to your question.  (Joseph A. Spadaro 17:53, 10 August 2007 (UTC))


 * Ignoring a couple of byelaws, none of which cover drink driving, law is consistent throughout England (hence English Law). Laws may not however be entirely consistent between England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland etc. Judges have also been encouraged to be stricter on drink-drivers, so if the two incidents were widely spaced time-wise, the judge may have been far less lenient in the second case. There are various ombudsmen and appeals courts designed to increase consistency within a legal system. Laïka  20:29, 10 August 2007 (UTC)


 * There are, indeed, national sentencing guidelines for the UK, see here and here. Joseph A. Spadaro's comments are very to the point. In the UK, I believe the greatest causes of apparent discrepancies in sentencing for similar drunk driving offences are (1) the question of the offender's previous convictions and (2) the blood alcohol level. If all the other facts of two prosecutions were exactly the same, a serial drunk driver three times over the limit would be more likely to get a sentence at the upper end of the court's discretion than a first time offender only slightly over the limit. On the cases you mention, I think by alcoholism you may mean blood alcohol level, but if not then of course alcoholism is not in itself an offence. A defendant facing a criminal charge is tried for an offence he may have committed, not for his lifestyle. Xn4 02:21, 11 August 2007 (UTC)

"Mrs. Jane Barker"
Anyone know where, online, you could turn up some of her novels? I've already found (and have been reading) "Exilius", but can't turn up her other "entertaining novels". Any help? Thanx, 68.39.174.238 18:50, 10 August 2007 (UTC)
 * Did you try Google Books? You may have to try a paper library, which could be quite enjoyable.  Plasticup   T / C  20:00, 10 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Try this abebooks search for "The Galesia Trilogy". Corvus cornix 19:56, 11 August 2007 (UTC)


 * Never mind, "Exilius" WAS her "entertaining novels", including the one I was after, "Piso". 68.39.174.238 23:19, 13 August 2007 (UTC)

Was Stalin's Foreign Policy a Failure?
I hope this is not too ambitious but I would like some insight into the operation of Soviet foreign policy under Stalin, whether it can be considered a failure or not. My thanks. S. J. Blair
 * People asking questions on the desk are asked to 'not start debates' - clearly you recognise that the answer will be debateable to say the least, in respect to the success of the policy... That said good luck with obtaining an answer.87.102.74.130 21:13, 10 August 2007 (UTC)

This is a question that can, I think, be tackled on a purely empirical level, proceeding by example and analysis.

Stalin was in many ways a superb tactician; cool, rational, intelligent and utterly ruthless. However, his grasp of international relations was never the strongest of his talents. On occasions his miscalculations had disastrous implications, both for the immediate and long-term security of the Soviet Union. To begin with the problem was one of ideological rigidity. That is to say, once a policy was adopted by the Third International it was followed without deviation, regardless of local circumstances and changing political conditions. In the 1920s the United Front strategy favoured by Stalin, and held to throughout angry debates with Trotsky and the United Opposition, lead to major setback in China, where the local Communist party was all but destroyed by the nationalist Kuomintang, at a time when Chiang Kai-shek was an honorary member of the Comintern!

Having learned nothing by the China debacle Soviet and Comintern policy was then piloted by Stalin into the even more disastrous Third Period, an ultra-left switch based on the contention that all Social Democratic Parties, no matter what their policies, were forms of Social fascism. By this understanding all Communist parties were instructed to concentrate their efforts on defeating their rivals in the labour movement, thus ignoring the threat presented by real Fascism. The implications for Russian security in this strategy were quite profound; for it divided the German left in the face of Hitler, and led to the destruction of the KPD in 1933, and the creation of a new and dangerous threat to the Soviet Union. There is, of course, no guarantee that a united front strategy in Germany would have stopped Hitler; but the divisions among his enemies made things considerably easier for him.

Stalin then sought to check the further development of Fascism, and the threat posed by Germany, by a new emphasis on political unity in Popular Fronts, paralleled by an attempt to advance notions of collective security through the League of Nations. When this was perceived to have failed he then reached an understanding with Hitler, turning the political and diplomatic world upside down in the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, an important preamble to the Second World War. Looked at in strictly rational terms the Pact was perfectly understandable from Stalin's point of view; what was not understandable was the continuing trust he placed in Hitler, which led to near disaster in 1941.

So, by the first and most important standard of all, that an adequate foreign policy has to be premised on national security, safeguarding the country from attack, Stalin's must, in my estimation, be judged a serious failure. What of the post-war period? Well here Stalin's actions in eastern Europe, and his failure to come to terms with the United States were crucial factors in the onset of the Cold War, the formation of NATO and the acceleration of the arms race. What might be termed the 'Politics of Force' were to place an intolerable burden on the Soviet economy, without measurably increasing national security. It was a burden that, in the end, the system could not stand, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union was perhaps Stalin's final legacy. Clio the Muse 01:55, 11 August 2007 (UTC)


 * My apologies for not responding sooner Clio, but I have been away for the weekend. Once again I thank you for coming through for me.  I would also like to express my admiration for your almost intuitive understanding of international relations of the early twentieth century. S. J. Blair 18:26, 12 August 2007 (UTC)