Wikipedia:Reference desk/Archives/Humanities/2012 July 7

= July 7 =

Is $900 USD, a lot to Middle Class Indians?
Is $900 (United States Dollar)., a lot of money to Indians in India? Can an average middle class Indian make $900(USD) in one year? 99.244.236.73 (talk) 02:34, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * According to the CIA factbook, the per capita GDP in India (per capita purchasing power) in 2011 was US$3700. StuRat (talk) 02:49, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * In the bigger cities like mumbai that would be the salary of a domestic servant who has worked for 5+ years at the same place. Chauffeurs for private individuals and not companies would make slightly more to start with. theyre hardly considered middle class (though they often live/have families in rural villages where that wouldl go much further)Lihaas (talk) 04:50, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Which figure do you refer to, $900, or $3700 (as your indentation seems to show) ? StuRat (talk) 04:58, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * 900. The latter would be considered more middle class (and rising to updatrds of 10,000)Lihaas (talk) 08:50, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * OK, in that case, if you were responding to the OP and not me, it's customary to indent one tab from them, not me (so one leading colon less, in this case). StuRat (talk) 16:45, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Perhaps we should have this unwritten rule laid out at the top of each reference desk? I see quite a few editors unclear about this rule.A8875 (talk) 21:56, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * What "unwritten rule"? It's most definitely written, and it's covered in at least 4 places.  Back to the future time, all the way back to January 2011, the last time I can remember this topic being seriously debated on the Ref Desk - see Wikipedia talk:Reference desk/Archive 81, where those 4 links are provided, and a most interesting and genial debate as well.  --  ♬  Jack of Oz  ♬  [your turn]  22:39, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Note that the indentation rules for a thread aren't specific to Wikipedia, they've existed since online bulletin boards. StuRat (talk) 01:33, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Also a middle class Indian -accountant, teacher, programmer - earns $900 each month? Is that before or after taxes? 88.8.64.154 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 22:50, 7 July 2012 (UTC)

Giving a warning before an atrocity
Some friends and I were talking about the dropping of bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and one person mentioned that the people of these cities were warned beforehand about the bomb through leaflets delivered by US planes. This evoked the question of whether any "great evil", by which I mean a state held by history to have been extremely violent, wicked, etc. (eg Nazis), did something similar. Thanks 65.92.7.168 (talk) 04:15, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I don't believe there were any such leaflets. Here are articles from the New York Times and Los Angeles Times calling the leaflet story a fiction. There are less reputable web sites claiming the opposite, such as this one, but the names Hiroshima (広島) and Nagasaki (長崎) do not appear in the list of cities on the leaflet shown there (larger image here), so it obviously is not what they think it is. -- BenRG (talk) 05:19, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * The CIA hosted sourced linked below appears to suggest that leaflet was supposed to tell people about the destruction of Hiroshima but I don't really understand how it does that from either the picture or the text that's supposed to be on the reverse site. Either way, I presume this or whatever leaflet was used to inform of the destruction of Hiroshima is the same one mentioned which was dropped on Nagasaki a day after the bombing. (I don't know why, perhaps it had already been planned and no one thought of cancelling it when the bombing was brought forward.) Nil Einne (talk) 05:45, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Examine your first two links very carefully again. They are not actually written by editors from NY times or L.A. times; They are submitted by outside writers as opinion pieces. Opinion pieces aren't held at the same editorial standard as the rest of the publication.
 * Here are some primary sources for the leaflets . Note that the leaflets were dropped on August 6, 1945, the same day as the first atomic attack. Technically speaking, the Japanese were given a 3 day "warning" to the next atomic attack, but the leaflets' purpose is mostly psychological devastation instead of goodwill. A8875 (talk) 15:34, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Note though that Lifton and Mitchell are real, well-respected historians, not just bums off the street. (Their book is pretty good.) Ditto Bird and Sherwin, who won the Pulitzer Prize for their excellent Oppenheimer biography. I don't know why you'd think that staff writers at the NYT or LAT would be better than these four on this issue; these guys actually do have books where they cite their sources. --Mr.98 (talk) 18:59, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I couldn't care less about their credentials. If someone is wrong, they are wrong; having written a millions books doesn't make them right somehow. "The fact is that atomic bomb warning leaflets were dropped on Japanese cities, but only after Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been destroyed." is false because the leaflets were dropped August on 6, 1945, 3 days before Nagasaki was destroyed.A8875 (talk) 19:25, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * You haven't actually demonstrated that this is the case. I see a PBS site which does not indicate exactly when they were dropped ("c." means "circa" or "around"). The Truman Library site does not say when the leaflets were dropped. The historians assert they were not dropped before the second bomb. I'm not sure on what authority you are thinking you have evidence that trumps the historians — if you have it, you haven't posted it. If you read the PBS leaflet, you'll see it references the Soviet declaration of war against the Japanese, which happened late on August 8. So it's impossible that the leaflet was dropped on August 6; it's highly unlikely it was dropped on Nagasaki before the bomb was, given that timing. --Mr.98 (talk) 15:30, 8 July 2012 (UTC)
 * (EC) Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki says there were leaflets but they targeted 35 cities including Hiroshima and Nagasaki which isn't exactly surprising if any leaflet drops did happen (targeting the specific cities would seem to give way too much info away). This CIA hosted source we use make it clear the leaflets weren't only intended to warn but were also intended as part of a psychological warfare campaign. While the text of the warning isn't clear, I'm pretty sure it wasn't made clear how destructive a bomb would be used. (Obviously once the first bomb was used people would have started to learn what was possible although I believe given the level of information flow at the time, there were still many in Nagasaki likely unaware of quite how bad the bomb used in Hiroshima was.) Nil Einne (talk) 05:38, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * And even if they had a clear understanding of the level of destruction, it would not have been significantly more horrifying than what they were already familiar with; people tend to forget how many more people died in the weeks previous to Japanese surrender from the conventional bombing campaign that led up to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even the most populous, modern and massive Japanese cities at the time were constructed primarily of wood and the Japanese had instilled (relatively) little air defense over the course of the war as their defensive strategy had been to control as much territory as possible in the pacific and mainland Asia and aggresively destroy foreward enemy air bases, this keeping bombers out of effective range (basically, an approach of the best defense is a good offense).   As the war moved towards a close and the Japanese resisted surrender, U.S. force began to exploit these two facts, developing new incendiary bombing tactics, which they knew the Japanese cities were highly susceptible to: in fact, the Japanese urban centers were refereed to as "matchstick cities".  This air campaign effectively gutted many Japanese cities and not only killed hundreds of thousands of civilians but also displaced millions and devastated essential infrastructure; for these reasons the campaign is considered to be as morally questionable as the the dropping of the atomic bombs themselves.   These actions were taken not so much to damage the Japanese capability to continue to wage war, since the nation's offensive capabilities had already been decimated by this point, but rather were focused more on damaging Japanese moral and forcing once and for all the surrender which Japanese hardliners were determined to prevent at all costs (up to and including utter decimation).   Bringing this back to the OP's point, the firebombing campaign did involve a massive propaganda effort with tens of millions of leaflets dropped in the lead-ups to air raids.  Though I have seen no evidence of leaflets specifically referring to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I would not be surprised if such a campaign took place.  It would have been a win-win scenario for the U.S. forces, since it would A) further demoralize the Japanese and further pressure on the Emperor to surrender, B) Would be something they could point to show that they had tried to minimize civilian causalities if the morality of their actions was ever called into question, and C) involved relatively small risk since the Japanese defenses had already proven woefully inadequate and stopping American raids at this juncture in the war.  All of that being said, I'm speculating here and I've never seen specific reference to leaflets dropped in advance of those particular attacks.  Now, as to the OP's original question, I suppose it's a matter of perspective and defining just what constitutes an "evil" nation.  Certainly in pre-modern times there have been instances of nations which were extremely expansionist or otherwise aggressive who nonetheless gave their enemies a diplomatic solution or other "out" or showed unanticipated mercy in the light of a great victory, but these are mostly the exceptions, not the rule; war can bring out the best in some but the overall trend runs rather strongly in the other direction Snow (talk) 07:22, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * There seems to be a logic error where you said "These actions were taken not so much to damage the Japanese capability to continue to wage war, since the nation's offensive capabilities had already been decimated by this point...". The ability to continue to wage war included their defensive capability, where they had recently shown the capacity to inflict massive Allied casualties on forces attempting to invade their home islands.  If you're thinking that the Allies could have just agreed to a truce, instead, leaving the militaristic Japanese government in place, they might have then soon acquired nuclear weapons, and attacked again to regain their lost territory.  So, destroying Japanese defensive capabilities was also critical to any successful end to the war, by which I mean one that would make future Japanese invasions impossible.  And, unfortunately, since they were training civilians to attack soldiers, destroying their defensive military capability did mean total war.  Also note that the Japanese did not hesitate to engage in total war themselves, and even to massacre civilians which posed no threat to them at all. StuRat (talk) 17:00, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Why are you whispering at length? It really wasn't until the 20th century that nations started to feel that the only way to end a war was by totally taking over or eliminating the enemy state government. One could have imagined a US-Japanese treaty that did pretty much everything except for get rid of the Emperor. In fact, that's what Japan was pushing for. In fact, that's what the US ultimately agreed to, in the end. So it's not far-fetched. I also think you're sliding into the total war mindset too quickly — it was a deliberate decision to bomb civilians directly, one that was controversial even at the time. It is not a logical outcome of anything; it was a choice that was made. --Mr.98 (talk) 18:57, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Was whispering because it's an aside, not an answer to the OP's question. Note that the decision to drop the bomb wasn't at all controversial among the US public, and there was very little opposition to it abroad, either. StuRat (talk) 20:06, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * You're plain wrong, I'm afraid. From day one the dropping of the bomb was controversial both in the USA and amongst the broader international public. A good overview of the shifting attitudes on the bomb (which was always controversial, even if the majority supported it), see Lifton and Mitchell, Hiroshima in America. It's more complicated than you seem to be aware of. --Mr.98 (talk) 20:33, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Now this I do disagree with; the bombings were in fact vehemently condemned by many even in the U.S. (though, if memory serves, 75-80% of the population that was polled believed the action was ultimately justified - though more modern polls have shown that this acceptance has slid down to near 50-50).  Outside the U.S., most of the world felt more than a little uneasy about this world-changing event and there was wide-spread condemnation of the act in many countries, even America's closest allies, especially as the effects of nuclear fallout upon the survivors of the initial blasts became known.  Regardless, the popularity for a military action does not equate to justification or the veracity of facts presented or arguments made for why a particular action was the correct, practical or morale course to take -- though, again, it was never my purpose to engage in commenting upon the justification or morality of these decisions. Snow (talk) 20:33, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I certainly wouldn't describe an action with 75-80% support as "controversial". If you do, most laws must also be "controversial", since they frequently have less support than that.  Can either of you provide links to mass protests, at the time, or to official diplomatic rebukes ? StuRat (talk) 01:11, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki gives a good overview. I'm happy to provide further sources (though there are scores in that article's reflist) and discuss the matter at length, but if you wish to can I suggest we perhaps move this to userspace? I think we've exceeded our mandate here by a mile. :) Snow (talk) 12:45, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I don't know about those poll numbers. But a careful look at this history easily reveals that there was considerable angst about the decision, and considerable trepidation that the atomic age had been opened in such a bloody way. If you have any interest, the first chapter of Paul Boyer's By the Bomb's Early Light is posted online and reveals quite a lot about this matter. It's not a matter of simple "approving" or "disapproving" — there were a lot of contrary emotions, and the bomb held public concern like no other topic at the time (Time magazine found that not since public opinion polling had begun had a single topic held such "prolonged and intense public concern"). It wasn't greeted with a simple cheer or acceptance; it was a complicated and controversial issue, even in 1945. There were also considerable controversy regarding the role of radiation (the gov't tried to play it down), there was also Hersey's Hiroshima, and so on. It isn't a simple thing. Boyer's chapter is a good one; please feel free to read it (it's not long) before commenting further on history you're ignorant of. I'm not trying to be a pain here, but you're wrong on this, and the actual facts are much more interesting than the assumptions you're making about them. --Mr.98 (talk) 15:25, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Before calling anyone else ignorant, you'd do well to improve your own reading comprehension skills. I've just spent the last two hours reading through chapter 1 (or at least the 21 pages included at your link), and it doesn't support your claim, at all, that "From day one the dropping of the bomb was controversial both in the USA and amongst the broader international public".  What it does say is that the bombs brought about a general anxiety of a future world in which the US could be targeted by nuclear weapons.  Are you unable to see how the US public could both support dropping the bombs on Japan and yet fear having them dropped on themselves ?  If so, it is you who are both ignorant of the facts and lacking basic reading skills. StuRat (talk) 18:55, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Guys, we're turning this thread into a forum, with all the attendant bad will they sometimes engender over initially small disagreements.  We're pretty far from the OP's central question and we've supplied more than enough wikilinks and outside sources that the various sides of the various issues being debated here can research them at length and become enriched on the issue, whether they are "right" or "wrong" on any one point.   Perhaps we should leave it at that.  If anyone is interested in further sources or discussion, my userspace is always open, and may be a better medium than here, since we're making the Refdesk twice as long as normal! Snow (talk) 21:14, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Agreed, and pursuant to my point number 1 near the end of this thread, if Mr. 98 refrains from insulting me on the Ref Desk, I will gladly do the same. StuRat (talk) 21:33, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Well, my wording was not meant to imply that defensive assets do not contribute to war-making capability, only that that the primary purpose of the bombing campaign was to force a surrender. Obviously defensive capability was still a factor or else the Allies would not have waited for a surrender and would simply have invaded - the bombing campaign was an effort to leverage a solution that would not include the great loss of life that such an invasion would necessitate (including especially the casualties of Allied soldiers that would occur).  There's no doubt that the Japanese continued to demonstrate a refusal to accept defeat even in the final months of the war - even once the emperor finally capitulated to the inevitable and began to consider surrender, there was an attempt by military hardliners to seize control and prevent this from happening.   But, let's face it, the Japanese were beaten at this point -- surrounded on all sides, almost depleted of military manpower (and especially of experienced personnel), low on raw resources, its civilian population beginning to starve, its infrastructure increasingly broken, its naval and air power decimated, the territory in their control reduced mostly to japan's constituent islands (and they didn't even control all of those), their allies defeated, and trade non-existent.   Honestly, I don't think the Japanese had much of any realistic chance of a springing back here, not even if the Allies had inexplicably decided to hold position and simply contain them for years.  That being said, my original comments were not meant to be a moral argument for or against total war, only a reference to the fact that Allied motive in the firebombing and the dropping of Fat Man and Little Boy was to force as early a surrender as possible. Snow (talk) 20:21, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * They did not have a chance of springing back, but they did have a chance of making invasion seem so unpalatable as to lead to a negotiated peace as opposed to a total capitulation. There's a big difference there. --Mr.98 (talk) 20:33, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I agree, and tried to represent that sentiment in my above posts; this is clearly the motivation which drove the air raid policy. Snow (talk) 20:39, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * The civilian population was a huge resource from which to draw addition "soldiers", in that they were willing to use "kamikaze" old men, women, and children. Estimates of the amount of time to conquer Japan were many years, and number of Americans that could be killed in the process were in the hundreds of thousands.  So, Japan was far from defeated, in this sense. StuRat (talk) 01:23, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Infrastructure was not even sufficient to feed the civilian populace at this point, let alone organize, train, arm, and field them. Even if they could, they'd soon be out of munitions, since the firebombing campaign had already destroyed a significant portion of the factories where they were produced.  And this is all assuming the civilian population would fight a clearly hopeless war.  In any event, the logistics of an invasion would have been largely academic, because senior U.S. leadership knew Japan was about to sue for peace, as confirmed by investigations after the war.   Japan's transmission cyphers had been recently broken and the Allies were intercepting their messages, which reflected their willingness to surrender.  They also knew that several Japanese ambassadors had been instructed to discuss peace measures with the Allies.   Military intelligence on both sides had seen the writing on the wall.  Why the U.S. leadership chose to drop the bombs anyway is a bit of a mystery though.  It could be the old allegorical sounding story that Truman decided to use them at last because he felt their terrible reality had to be demonstrated before more than one nation had them is true.  A more likely explanation, and one held by a large number of historians, is that the answer is Russia.  Russia had previously made an agreement that they would join the war against Japan exactly 90 days after the end of the European war.  That meant they were due to begin hostilities on August 8.  If that were to happen, America would lose sole control of an occupied Japan and it's easy to see why the U.S. leadership was determined to not allow that to happen.  And then too, the use of the bombs themselves was seen as a strong message to the Russians in its own right.  In this way, some historians have suggested these actions to be the first warning shots in the building tension that was soon to become the Cold War, taken before World War II had even finished.  Which is the true motivation, any of the three listed above, the official position that the action was taken merely to save lives over the long-run, or some other reason entirely is a bit muddled, but I dare say it was a combination of many factors.  One thing is for sure though - Japan wasn't staging a come-back and everybody knew it. Snow (talk) 14:54, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Regarding "Infrastructure was not even sufficient to feed the civilian populace at this point, let alone organize, train, arm, and field them", they were being trained to stab soldiers with wooden spears, which they could make themselves (I saw a video of this training). No organization or transportation was required, they could simply wait in their homes for Americans to enter.  Yes, this method would be rather ineffective, but even if only 1 in 100 civilians was able to kill an American, and virtually the entire Japanese population participated, this would mean the deaths of 700,00 soldiers (and far more Japanese civilians).  One other option, short of invasion or using nuclear weapons, was to continue firebombing and wait for starvation to wipe out the Japanese population.  This approach, of course, would have killed millions more Japanese civilians, and could rightly be called genocide.  I believe Japanese civilians would fight, in part because they were taught that to surrender was worse than death, and also to expect to be raped and murdered if they did surrender (recall the cliff-diving suicides of Japanese civilians as Americans invaded previously).  And they did want a cease-fire at that point, but not unconditional surrender.  This would leave them the ability to rebuild their military.  When you say "Japan wasn't staging a come-back and everybody knew it", what time frame do you mean ?  If you are talking about the next year or two, then I'd agree.  However, a decade or so would provide ample opportunity to rebuild, as they did, but without the military component, as a result of the "unconditional surrender" and US occupation.  StuRat (talk) 19:29, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * There were proposals to warn or demonstrate the bomb to the Japanese before dropping it on an inhabited city, but it didn't occur — the scientists and the politicians on the Interim Committee dismissed this approach as infeasible (in part because they had very few atomic bombs). Truman did issue a vague "rain of ruin" statement, and there were blanket warnings about the bombings of lots of cities that contained military facilities. Neither of these should be construed as being identical as forewarning of an atomic bomb attack.
 * As for the general statement, there have been armies in history that issue warnings/threats as to what would be done, atrocity-wise, before they did them. Genghis Khan famously made it quite clear exactly what would happen if cities resisted him, and he followed up on his threats. I don't see that as being especially humane. --Mr.98 (talk) 14:12, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I've always thought that the US should have had the Japan ambassador to the United States present (or, failing that, Japanese POWs) at the Trinity test. He would, of course, report the effectiveness of the bomb back to Japan.  It might have ended the war earlier (perhaps between Hiroshima and Nagasaki, since the first strike was needed to demonstrate US ability and willingness to use the bomb in combat).  But, even if it didn't end the war early, it would have provided some international PR cover, in that "they were warned specifically what to expect if they did not surrender". StuRat (talk) 17:32, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * That would have had the awkward effect of making it easier for the USSR to know about US nuclear weaponry; thanks to traitors, they did anyway, but that wasn't known in Washington until later. Nyttend (talk) 18:36, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I'm not sure I follow on that. Just witnessing a test doesn't tell you too much. The USSR was allowed to send observers to Operation Crossroads in 1946. Arguably the USSR should have had a representative at Trinity — they shouldn't have been only told about the bomb after the fact. As it was, they already knew about it anyway, but then also knew that the USA didn't think they could trust them with that information. Even when Truman told Stalin about the bomb, he didn't really tell him about it — he just hinted they had a new weapon. I'm not saying the Cold War would have gone differently if the US had been closer to the USSR on this matter, but it certainly wasn't going to go well under those conditions. --Mr.98 (talk) 18:53, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * What do you mean by the Cold War "going better"? The Cold War was inevitable, because the organizing principle of the Soviet Union was incompatible with the ideals of the liberal world.  The Soviet Union had to be defeated.  Just not right then. --Trovatore (talk) 20:16, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * There are many ways the Cold War could have turned out; it didn't necessarily have to be one where Truman and Stalin essentially stopped communicating with one another after WWII. Imagine a postwar with FDR and you can imagine a very different direction for the early Cold War — one without as much proxy warfare, as a basic example. The main reason for the USSR's outlook was not that its "organizing principle" was different (it was, but that's beside the point), it was because they (correctly) felt threatened by the USA and had no reason to trust them on any matters. Roosevelt's, and later Truman's, secrecy on the bomb matter wasn't the sole cause of this; but it didn't help it. --Mr.98 (talk) 20:33, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * See my reply on Snow's talk page: User:Snow_Rise/Overflow_channel:_Japan%27s_surrender. StuRat (talk) 17:51, 9 July 2012 (UTC)


 * They did discuss doing this. The reason they were opposed to it is because the entire point of the atomic bomb was to "shock" Japan into surrender. 90% of the secrecy at the end of the war was to keep Japan from knowing what was coming, because they wanted it to be seen as impossible to confront (even though it was more or less just an expedient way to set cities on fire, which they were already pretty good at doing). Arguably they were correct about it having that effect.
 * But let's also point out that they didn't know how big the Trinity test was going to be. Even enthusiastic supporters thought it would be about 4kt. Edward Teller hoped for 50kt, I.I. Rabi guessed (correctly) 18kt, and lots of people guessed lower, even down to zero. There also wasn't a guarantee that it would work at all, and not be a "dud." They actually discussed what they would do with a Japanese observer if it was a dud — someone joked they could always just shoot him. Anyway, it would have been logistically quite difficult if not impossible, and, again, this went completely against any strategy that they were hoping to get out of the bomb. --Mr.98 (talk) 18:53, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Not sure what harm witnessing a dud would have done. Once the bomb was perfected, and a real one was dropped, why would the Japanese care that we once had a dud ?  Or, if it never was made to work, why would they care that we once demonstrated a dud ? StuRat (talk) 20:02, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * They thought that a dud would have basically hardened Japanese opposition, which would have been the least-desired outcome. Remember that for the Allied strategists — and this isn't actually a bad understanding of what really was going on in Japan — all that really mattered was the psychological state of the top Japanese military and government, because they were in charge of everything else. The atomic bomb was a massive psychological attack against these people in particular, with the goal to make them capitulate to forces greater than they were. It was more about that than it was about the military importance of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. --Mr.98 (talk) 20:26, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Well, speaking of atrocities, I doubt very much that the Japanese dropped leaflets before they attacked Pearl Harbor. ←Baseball Bugs What's up, Doc? carrots→ 11:55, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Doesn't matter; two wrongs don't make a right, and ethics are not determined by the worst offending party. (If that's the case, then you don't have ethics.) Anyway, Pearl Harbor actually was as nearly a perfect military strike as you can get (a grand total of 57 civilian deaths). It was a surprise attack, to be sure, but it's not in the same class as purposefully obliterating entire cities no matter how you dice it up. I'm not dismissing Pearl Harbor, but it is quite irrelevant to the ethics of using the bomb. --Mr.98 (talk) 13:44, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * There are arguments that war conduct should be reciprocal:


 * 1) The fear that you will do to them whatever they do to you will prevent the worst atrocities. This is similar to Mutual Assured Destruction.  There does seem to be evidence that it works, such as the lack of nuclear wars since WW2, and Nazi's treating American POW's, in general, humanely, certainly not out of any moral obligation, but because they wanted their own prisoners to be well-treated, in return.  If it was made clear to them that German POWs would be treated humanely even if they massacred American POWs, then, I expect that's exactly what would have happened.


 * 2) You can't win "with one hand tied behind your back". With approximately evenly matched opponents, if one side felt the need to feed prisoners, provide them with medical care, guard them, etc., while the other used them as slave labor until they died, this might be enough of an advantage to the "immoral" side to allow them to win.  (In the case of the war with Japan during WW2, they were vastly outclassed by the US and Allied military, so this wasn't enough to let them win.) StuRat (talk) 19:50, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Then there is also the "end justifies the means" argument, that by killing civilians you save the lives of far more. The Japanese couldn't make this argument, of course, because they committed massive genocide in areas they controlled, such as the Rape of Nanking.  So, if they developed and used nuclear weapons against the US to win  an unconditional surrender, presumably that wouldn't have brought peace, but just a repeat of their earlier genocide.  StuRat (talk) 19:57, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Not one of those points makes any connection between Pearl Harbor and the use of the bombs, ethically speaking. The only way in which such conduct could be conceivably reciprocal is if the conducts were actually connected — e.g., if the savagery at the Rape of Nanking had anything to do with American bombing policy towards Japanese cities. There is no connection, though. (There are connections between Japanese military behavior and American military behavior on a smaller scale. But not with city bombing.) Separately, "ends justify the means" is one of the most problematic and not-straightforward ethical arguments — because it can be used to justify any atrocity if you decide that the "ends" are important enough. Nations that pretend to be ethical generally take a far more balanced notion of it; the means do matter. --Mr.98 (talk) 15:05, 10 July 2012 (UTC)


 * "The ends justifies the means" certainly shouldn't be taken as "any ends justifies any means". Only if the ends are more "morally important" than the means, does the justification exist.  In this case, we are balancing the lives of the people killed in the bombings versus the much higher (100x ?) number of casualties expected if the war continued, both among the Japanese and Allies.  And I don't think Pearl Harbor alone is much of a justification, but, when combined with their behavior both before (China) and after (US POWs, etc.), it's easy to see why they hadn't earned much claim that they should be well-treated under a reciprocal policy.  The fact that the US didn't do what the Japanese did, and massacre civilians once they surrendered, is about as much as they could hope for. StuRat (talk) 21:18, 10 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Yes. Dropping the bombs on Japan ended the war. The critics of that action have never come up with a viable alternative action. ←Baseball Bugs What's up, Doc? carrots→ 22:56, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I wonder what would have happened if they dropped a "warning" bomb to ground-burst at the top of Mount Fuji. That peak is about two miles wide, very iconic, with only a fraction under snow cover - if the bomb had been able to visibly blast away some part of the summit and melt the snow on much of the surrounding slope, after creating a blinding impact visible for many miles in all directions, would it have had a meaningful demoralizing impact? Wnt (talk) 23:38, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Or we could have detonated one in the sea, thus devastating Japan indirectly, by awakening Godzilla. :-) StuRat (talk) 23:58, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * That's the alternative that had the best chance of working. ←Baseball Bugs What's up, Doc? carrots→ 00:28, 9 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Bugs, that's just not true. There are plenty of alternative scenarios that have been proposed, plenty that are "viable alternatives." We can't know if any of them would have worked. But that's not the same thing as saying there were no alternatives. There were multiple alternatives proposed even at the time.


 * A better way of phrasing the surrender of Japan would be to say, "the combination of at least one atomic bomb — we don't know if the second was necessary — and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, allowed those in the Japanese high council who were pushing for peace to overcome a stalemate." Which is a bit more complicated (and puts the nuances in the right place — we don't really know what would have happened if they hadn't dropped one on Nagasaki, for example), and a bit more careful as to the agency involved (the bombs themselves didn't end anything; it was up to the Japanese as to whether the war would end). --Mr.98 (talk) 15:05, 10 July 2012 (UTC)


 * That's precisely the point: We don't know what would have happened. We had a pretty good idea what would happen by obliterating a couple of their cities - and it did: The enemy surrendered. ←Baseball Bugs What's up, Doc? carrots→ 18:28, 10 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Why was 2 the magic number? Was it always going to be a maximum of 2 cities to be destroyed?  What if the Japanese had still held out after Nagasaki?  Would the Americans have just continued bombing other cities until they got the result they wanted?  --  ♬  Jack of Oz  ♬  [your turn]  19:48, 10 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Two things needed to be demonstrated, that the US had this bomb, and that they were willing to use it on Japan. A single bomb didn't prove that the US had such a bomb, as it could be written off as some type of natural disaster, like the Tunguska event.  However, 2 in a row pretty much demonstrated both points, although I think one of them could have been a non-lethal demonstration detonation (such as my suggestion to have Japanese POWs at the Trinity test to report the results back to Japan).  Some Japanese also assumed that world opinion would prevent the US from dropping a 2nd bomb, but they failed to understand the widespread hatred for them, as a result of attacking so many nations, and massacring their civilians.  One option considered, if Japan did not surrender, was to continue conventional fire-bombing while building up a stock of atomic bombs, and, if Japan hadn't given up by then, drop them all at once to try to achieve the shock value needed to get them to surrender. StuRat (talk) 20:56, 10 July 2012 (UTC)

To all interested parties, I have created a page in my userspace for continuing discussion on the contentious issues being debated above in this thread. Any wishing to take part either to continue to forward arguments that are too lengthy or otherwise inappropriate here, to edify, to be become more informed, to discuss Wikipedia's content on these matters, or for any other reason whatsoever are encouraged to do so. Ta! Snow (talk) 11:50, 9 July 2012 (UTC)

Eisenhower Farewell Speech
Eisenhower warned about four major wars, three of which ninvolved the USA. Which was he talking about? WW I/II, but not sure of the rest. Perhaps the Bolsheviks and Spanish icivil war were one of the othes. I was thinking Spanish-American but that was prior to 1900.Lihaas (talk) 04:47, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I expect that the Korean War was the third war with US involvement. It seems like a smaller war, now, but recency bias would have made it seem more important.  As for the 4th war, not involving the US, you have some good suggestions, but, again allowing for the recency bias, perhaps the 1948 Arab–Israeli War or the Suez Crisis between UK/France/Israel and Egypt over the Suez Canal ? StuRat (talk) 05:09, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Looking down List of wars by death toll, I would guess that other possibilities are the Second Sino-Japanese War (if you consider it to be distinct from the Second World War), the First Indochina War, and the Chinese Civil War. This wikianswers answer asserts that the four are the two world wars, the Korean War, and the Chinese Civil War, which I guess would make sense, but it doesn't give a source or explanation. 81.98.43.107 (talk) 12:28, 7 July 2012 (UTC)
 * The Chinese Civil War had an incredible death toll but it wasn't a war between great powers. The full line is "four major wars among great nations". --Mr.98 (talk) 14:06, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I might hazard the Russo-Japanese war as a possibility. The death toll wasn't large (compared to WWI and WWII, anyway) but then and now it was considered important in establishing Japan as a "great power". It was (and is) considered one of the major 20th century wars. --Mr.98 (talk) 14:02, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Well there is plenty to choose from, Russian Civil War, Polish–Soviet War, Indo-Pakistani War of 1947, Italo-Turkish War and First Balkan War. The first three depend on when Russia, India and Pakistan were considered major powers. CambridgeBayWeather (talk) 16:29, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Russia has been considered a major power since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. However, India and Pakistan were probably not at the time as they had just gained independence from Great Britain. - Presidentman talk · contribs Random Picture of the Day (Talkback) 17:22, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Pakistan would not have been considered a "great nation" by Eisenhower in 1961. It was considered a backwards agricultural area, a third-world nation. I don't think he would have been impressed with either India or even China up until the Korean War period. I don't think he would have considered Poland a "great nation" either (it was barely a nation at that point). I don't think the Russian Civil War counts as a war between great nations, even though multiple countries participated in it — it was primarily a civil war. I don't know what he had in mind, but in my view, the Russo-Japanese war is the one that an educated General would have picked at the time. It was, and is, considered the war which established Japan as the great power in the East at that point. It is still taught as one of the great wars of the 20th century, the one which signaled the rising militarism and prowess of the Japanese. (This guy agrees with me, whatever that is worth.) --Mr.98 (talk) 18:37, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Read in the context that the Cold War was in full flight in 1961, an oblique reference to the Russo-Japanese War would also be a way of Ike reminding the American people, however symbolically, that Russia (= the Soviet Union) was not invincible. To its great shock and surprise Russia was beaten before, and it can happen again.  And they're not just dealing with Japan now.  --  ♬  Jack of Oz  ♬  [your turn]  20:22, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * But that would only work if the American people knew which wars he was talking about. I'm a bit skeptical that they knew much about that one. StuRat (talk) 00:42, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I did say it was an oblique reference. Educated Americans would have been aware that only 2 of Eisenhower's predecessors had ever won the Nobel Peace Prize as sitting presidents, the first of whom was Teddy Roosevelt for his efforts in negotiating the end of the Russo-Japanese War.  --  ♬  Jack of Oz  ♬  [your turn]  01:27, 8 July 2012 (UTC)

List of Japanese ambassadors to the US needs completion.
Where can I find a comprehensive list ? StuRat (talk) 17:48, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Hello, Stu, can't you get Google in America anymore? Sorry, wrong direction. Google tells me this site has a complete list.  KägeTorä - (影虎)  ( TALK )  17:56, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I tried a Google search, but didn't find that page. What search terms did you use ? StuRat (talk) 18:34, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I used "japanese ambassadors to the us".  KägeTorä - (影虎)  ( TALK )  18:42, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I used the same search, but with "ambassador" instead of "ambassadors", and found nothing useful. StuRat (talk) 19:05, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I'm confused, but I think it's just chronology here: the second page Kage Tora gave (compiled by the U.S. State Department from diplomatic lists beginning in November 1893) seems to fit the query. —— Shakescene (talk) 19:58, 7 July 2012 (UTC)

Did both US and Japan ignore diplomatic immunity during WW2 ?
If so, why ? Who violated immunity first ? StuRat (talk) 17:59, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * According to the site linked to above, the embassies were closed from the declaration of war, and not re-opened until sometime much later.  KägeTorä - (影虎)  ( TALK )  18:03, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Thanks, but wouldn't they normally expel the ambassadors when the embassy was closed, rather than imprison them, as apparently was done here ? StuRat (talk) 18:51, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Why would you think they did? I haven't found anything to make me think that this was the case. --Mr.98 (talk) 18:35, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I think rather than expulsion or imprisonment, they would be ordered by their respective governments to return home. After all, they have done nothing contrary to international law and have not taken part in military activities.  KägeTorä - (影虎)  ( TALK )  18:56, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * From Saburō Kurusu, who was special envoy to the US at the time: "After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Kurusu was interned in the United States at Hot Springs, Virginia, until the United States and Japan negotiated an exchange of their diplomatic personnel and citizens. In June 1942, Kurusu sailed to Mozambique on board the ocean liner MS Gripsholm, which then brought back American ambassador to Japan Joseph Grew and other Americans who had been interned in Japan.". Had immunity been respected, I'd expect them to have been expelled to a neutral nation immediately when the embassies were closed. StuRat (talk) 18:58, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * But repatriating an ambassador or other diplomat does not count as ignoring diplomatic immunity.  KägeTorä - (影虎)  ( TALK )  19:02, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * But having them forcibly interned does. StuRat (talk) 19:06, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * [edit conflict] Given the vast distance between Japan and the USA and the fact that there weren't any neutral nations in the middle, it wouldn't have been easy. I suppose the Japanese embassy staff could have been sent to Mexico, but every country in East Asia was involved in the war and thus not really suitable for the American embassy personnel; the USSR said that it was neutral between Japan and the USA when some of the Doolittle Raiders landed in its territory, but it could hardly be said to be entirely neutral when both it and the USA were at war with Germany.  Nyttend (talk) 19:10, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * In this situation, what else could they have done? Nyttend (talk) 19:12, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Like what you suggested, "sent to Mexico"?A8875 (talk) 19:18, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * And for the US officials, they could been sent to the free portions of China, via the Japanese puppet states there. StuRat (talk) 19:26, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * They were considering how to exchange diplomatic personnel safely from the outset. First news story I could dig up, but the press was reporting a suggestion to use Argentina as an intermediary to facilitate the exchange of diplomats on December 9th link. Consider the eventual means of transporting the diplomats from both sides, which involved leasing the MS Gripsholm (1925) from neutral Sweden, which then sailed under the auspices of the Red Cross to Mozambique and Goa, which were under neutral Portuguese control, while ensuring that the ship was going to be safe from attack from German raiders or anyone else while on the voyage, and you can see that a lot of negotiations would have to take place. It was certainly implicit, if not explicitly stated under international law, that both sides had to guarantee safe passage back to the country of origin, with the emphasis on the safe part. Dropping American diplomats in China (in particular), or Japanese diplomats in Mexico or South America without providing a safe way to return home would have been against the spirit of the law. Taking six months to arrange everything during a World War doesn't seem excessive, to be honest FlowerpotmaN &middot;( t ) 21:47, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I suspect something else was going on here, that one or both sides didn't trust the other to honor their obligations, so felt the need to hold the other nation's diplomats hostage, until a face-to-face exchanged in a neutral country could be arranged. StuRat (talk) 00:39, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * If I was the Japanese ambassador to the US during WW2, I'd have been happy to cool my heels on the beach in Mexico until the war ended, rather than be imprisoned for 6 months and then sent to Japan, hoping I don't get killed on the way there. StuRat (talk) 00:39, 8 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Definitely Japan. They were interning and killing diplomatic personnel from opposing nations posted to territories they occupied long before the US entered the war. --PalaceGuard008 (Talk) 09:36, 9 July 2012 (UTC)

All the details on the exchange, including the rationale for many decisions: Japanese-American Civilian Prisoner Exchanges and Detention Camps, 1941-45, By Bruce Elleman. -- Vmenkov (talk) 16:40, 10 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Thanks, but in the age of the Internet, I was hoping to get an answer without having to buy a book. StuRat (talk) 18:19, 10 July 2012 (UTC)

Sui iuris in Catholic law
Just read sui iuris for the first time. The Catholic parish on Saint Helena is a mission sui iuris; does this mean that the local priest has no ecclesiastical superior except for the Pope? Or is there some sort of Vatican office that oversees such tiny little missions? Nyttend (talk) 18:39, 7 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Going by this, while the mission itself is immediately subject to the Pope, it seems that the ecclesiastical superior for priests on St Helena (and Ascension and Tristan da Cunha) is the Apostolic Prefect of the Falklands. FlowerpotmaN &middot;( t ) 22:27, 7 July 2012 (UTC)
 * (PS) and this seems to confirm that. FlowerpotmaN &middot;( t ) 22:30, 7 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Oops, I missed the external link in the article; thanks for linking it. Nyttend (talk) 20:36, 9 July 2012 (UTC)
 * (cough) So did I :). I did a Google from here and I didn't realize that link was in the article.  FlowerpotmaN &middot;( t ) 21:34, 9 July 2012 (UTC)

19th century fashion magazines
What are the names of some high fashion magazines that a wealthy American woman of the 1880s and 1890s might have read to learn about the latest fashions? Are any of them online? I'm looking for text as much as pictures. Would a woman in London or Paris have read different magazines from an American woman? 69.62.243.48 (talk) 18:58, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * For American women, Harper's Bazar and Ladies Home Journal  come to mind.  For others, see: .  And yes, French and British women would read different fashion magazines. StuRat (talk) 19:13, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * One of the longest running and most popular British fashion and society mags was The Queen, the Ladies' Newspaper. In France, Le Petit Courrier des Dames seems to have been a leader. Alansplodge (talk) 00:46, 8 July 2012 (UTC)

Backed currency ?
What currencies, if any, are currently backed by gold, silver, or some other commodity ? StuRat (talk) 21:01, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Gold_standard indicates a Malaysian currency introduced in 2001. Not clear if it still technically exists. SemanticMantis (talk) 21:10, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * The currency was proposed actually for just one state in Malaysia and I don't think it ever got off the ground, though it was pushed for hard by advocates in the middle of the last decade. Snow (talk) 21:32, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I don't believe that any nation currently uses the gold or silver standard (though of course many still posses large stockpiles of each).  As to some other commodity, nothing jumps to mind but I hesitate to say as this is a bit broader of a category and I could be missing something obvious.  If you mean specifically another rare metal or similar pure substance, I don't believe any nation employs such a standard at present.  If you're researching this matter for an article, I found this, which does not directly address your question but does include some of the most recent details of the debate on the plausibility of the return to the gold standard. Snow (talk) 21:18, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * The Krugerrand is implicitly backed by gold, as it actually is made of it. Joepnl (talk) 21:45, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * It may be legal tender, but it's not a currency. The American Gold Eagle and the Canadian Gold Maple Leaf are also legal tender and made of gold, but they are not considered a currency.A8875 (talk) 21:59, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Then something must be wrong here. In economics, currency is a generally accepted medium of exchange. (ok, may be not generally enough in this case) Joepnl (talk) 22:14, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * You got it. If I try to buy a hamburger with a Gold Eagle I guarantee you the police will be involved and I will lose the entire afternoon. There are many many horror stories out there about using the $2 bill . I imagine a shiny gold coin will be even worst.A8875 (talk) 23:25, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Yeah, but these stories are legends. Indeed, if people tried to pay with silver or gold the recipient would only wonder whether it's real gold and silver and whether the amount is right or not. OsmanRF34 (talk) 12:31, 9 July 2012 (UTC)
 * ... which they can't really determine themselves. A restaurant won't take kindly if you insist on paying for your meal with a gold ingot or bar, as they don't have the facilities on-hand to gauge its value (or that it's real gold). &mdash;  The Hand That Feeds You :Bite 18:31, 10 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Do you want a national currency? Then probably none, the ability to fiat money (aka make money) is essential in a sovereign state. The Euro is a proof of what happens when national states cannot devalue/re-value their currencies as needed. Otherwise check alternative currency for currencies of all kinds, including backed by gold and silver. 88.8.64.154 (talk) 22:42, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * So any state that didn't issue fiat currency wasn't really sovereign? —Tamfang (talk) 21:37, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * I suppose it's better to say: in a modern independent state. Many countries were pegged to the gold standard until recently and many are pegged to a stronger currency (which also has its problems). If pegged, you might get a more stable currency, which is sometimes a step forward for high inflation countries. OsmanRF34 (talk) 12:17, 9 July 2012 (UTC)


 * There are quite a few currencies that are backed by another currency, if you count that. For example, the Lithuanian litas is pegged to the Euro, the Venezuelan bolivar to the US Dollar, and the Namibian dollar to the South African rand. 81.98.43.107 (talk) 23:21, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Numerous currencies are backed by the US dollar, perhaps most importantly the Chinese Renminbi. It was pegged to the dollar officially until 2005, and since then it has been pegged de facto -- the Chinese central bank maintains a constant exchange rate and enforces it using their vast dollar reserves. Looie496 (talk) 01:59, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * The CFA franc, used by 14 west African countries, formerly had a fixed RoE of 100 to the French Franc, but is now pegged to the Euro at the rate of 1 euro = 655.957 CFA francs. The UK supports the British Overseas Territories in a similar fashion - for example the Gibraltar pound and the Falkland Islands pound are both pegged to Sterling at par. The Luxembourg franc used to be pegged to the Belgian franc. Alansplodge (talk) 16:47, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * They couldn't round to 656 GFA Francs = 1 € ? Sounds like Spock set the exchange rate. StuRat (talk) 17:59, 8 July 2012 (UTC)
 * During the introduction of the euro, the outgoing currencies were pegged to the euro at the current exchange rates (it was at midnight on the 1st of January 1999 to be specific - see History of the euro). So the value of the French franc was fixed at 6.55957 francs per euro.  I suppose the CFA could have been devalued slightly, but I doubt that would really have achieved anything. 81.98.43.107 (talk) 20:56, 8 July 2012 (UTC)
 * isn't the Renminbi actually 'pegged' to a basket of currencies of which the US dollar is a big but not the only or possibly even majority component (I don't think the precise composition is publily knwn and I don't know if is still likely to be lose to modern realities) Nil Einne (talk) 17:20, 9 July 2012 (UTC)
 * The renminbi floats in a narrow margin around a fixed base rate determined with reference to a basket of world currencies. DOR (HK) (talk) 07:44, 10 July 2012 (UTC)

Jean Valjean's ticket of leave
Under the law of the time, how long was Jean Valjean required to carry his ticket of leave upon release from prison? Was it permanent? 69.62.243.48 (talk) 21:22, 7 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Jean Valjean is a fictional character, and Les Miserables was written some 50 years after it was set, so it's not necessarily historically accurate. In reality, organised systems of parole were developed around the middle of the 19th century in the very controlled atmosphere of the Australian penal colonies.  I'm willing to be contradicted, but I personally doubt systematically keeping track of released petty criminals would have been possible, or foremost in anyone's mind, in the chaos of France in 1815. FiggyBee (talk) 14:03, 8 July 2012 (UTC)

the flute in the beseiged castle in Kagemusha
in the Kurosawa movie, a flute plays every night from the castle under siege by Lord Shingen; the generals of the attacking army believe if the flute ceases playing, the castle will fall. Is this based on a historical incident, or is it an invention by Kurosawa? thanks Adambrowne666 (talk) 23:55, 7 July 2012 (UTC)
 * That's two - not that anyone's keeping count. ;) Snow (talk) 00:26, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Thanks again, Snow - I think in future I'll just cut out the middleman and pose my questions directly to you... Adambrowne666 (talk) 05:58, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * Heh, NP - happy to be of help. And yes, you're always welcome to inquire on my talk page if you think it's a matter that's within my wheelhouse, even if you've already inquired here. Snow (talk) 06:25, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * This brief biography says; "In 1573, Shingen made a personal visit to the battlefield. In the evening and under cover of darkness, Shingen approached the fortress wall to listen to the enemy flute music. Somehow, the presence of Shingen’s entourage attracted the attention of the castle defenders. A sniper’s bullet mortally wounded Shingen and he died within a few days." However, see Takeda Shingen; "The film Kagemusha, by director Akira Kurosawa, loosely depicts a well-known version of his death in which a single sniper shot him at night. The other aspects of his death depicted in the film were artistic liberties taken by the director." A rather more dignified fate than his rival Uesugi Kenshin who is said by one story to have been stabbed with a spear up his bottom, by a ninja hiding in his latrine pit (but more prosaically succumbed to bowel cancer). Alansplodge (talk) 00:32, 8 July 2012 (UTC)


 * fantastic detail, thanks, Alan Adambrowne666 (talk) 05:57, 8 July 2012 (UTC)