Wikipedia talk:Requests for mediation/Draza Mihailovic/Archive14

Conflicts with Axis troops and Partisans
Mihailović's popularity soon grew in Serbia, surpassing the Partisans' : yet, he Mihailovic soon realized that his men did not have the means to protect the civilians in Serbia against German reprisals. Possible The prospect of reprisals also fed Chetnik concerns regarding a possible takeover of the Yugoslavia by the Partisans after the war, and they did not wish to engage in actions that might ultimately result in a post-war Serbian minority. Mihailovic's strategy was to bring together the Serbian bands and build an organization capable of seizing power after the occupation forces withdrew or were defeated, rather than engaging in direct confrontation. In contrast to the reluctance of Chetnik leaders to directly engage the Axis forces, the Partisans advocated open resistance, which appealed to those Chetniks desiring to fight the occupation. By September, Mihailovic began losing men such as Pop Vlada Secevic and Lt. Ratko Martinovic, and the Cer Chetniks led by Cap. Dragoslav Racic, to the Partisan.

On September 19, Tito met with Mihailović in order to negotiate an alliance between Partisans and Chetniks, but they failed to reach an agreement as the disparity in the aims of their respective movements were was great enough to preclude any real compromise. Tito was in favor of a joint full-scale offensive, while Mihailović considered a general uprising to be premature and dangerous, as he deemed it would trigger reprisals. For his part, Tito's goal was to prevent an assault from the rear by the Chetniks, as he was convinced that Mihailovic was playing a "double game", maintaining contacts with German forces via the Nedic government. Mihailovic was in contact with Nedic's government, receiving monetary aid via Col Popovic. On the other hand, Mihailovic sought to prevent Tito from assuming the leadership role in the resistance, Further talks were scheduled for October 16th. as his goal was the restoration of the Yugoslavian Monarchy and the establishment of a Greater Serbia

At the end of September, the Germans launched a massive offensive against Partisans and Chetniks. A joint British-Yugoslav intelligence mission, quickly assembled by the Special Operations Executive and led by Captain D. T. Hudson had arrived on the Montenegrin coast on the 22nd of September, whence they had made their way with the help of Montenegrin Partisans to first to their headquarters, and then to Tito's headquarters at Uzice. , arrived in Serbia just as the uprising was beginning to fail, and came first to Mihailovics' headquarters. On October 9th, Hudson was order to proceed to Mihailović's headquarters and arrived on or around October 25th. and then to the Partisans' a month later Hudson reported that earlier promises of supplies made by the British to Mihailovic contributed to the poor relationship between Mihailovic and Tito, as Mihailovic correctly believed that no one outside of Yugoslavia knew about the Partisan movement,  and felt that "the time was ripe for drastic action against the Communists"

Tito and Mihailović met again on October 27 1941 in the town of Brajići near Ravna Gora in a final an attempt to achieve an understanding, but found consensus only on secondary issues. Immediately following the meeting, Mihailovic began preparations for an attack on the Partisans, delaying the attack only for lack of arms. Mihailovic reported to his government in exile that he believed occupation of Uzice was required to prevent strengthening of the Communists. On October 28th, two Chetnik liaison officers approached first Nedic and later that day German officer Josef Matl of the Armed Forces Liaison Office, with an offer of Mihailovic's services in the struggle against the Partisans in exchange for weapons. This offer was relayed to the German General in charge of Serbia, and a meeting was proposed by the German for November 3rd. A few days later, the Chetniks and the Partisans came in open conflict : On November 1, the Chetniks attacked the Partisans' headquarters at Užice, but were beaten back. On November 3 1941 Milhailovic postponed the proposed meeting with the German officers until November 11th citing the "general conflict" in which the Chetniks and Partisans were engaged required his presence at his headquarters. His representatives in Belgrade tried to extract weapons from the Germans to fight the Partisans, informing them that the Colonel was ready to "place himself and his men at their disposal for fighting communism" On November 11, The a meeting, organized through one of Mihailović's representatives in Belgrade, took place between the Chetnik leader and an Abwehr official, al though it remains controversial if the initiative came from the Germans, from Mihailović himself, or from his liaison officer in Belgrade. It appears that Mihailović offered to cease activities in the towns and along the major communication lines, but ultimately no agreement was reached at the time due to German demands for the complete surrender of the Chetniks,  and the German's belief that the Chetniks were likely to attack them despite Mihailovic's offer. After the negotiations, an attempt was made by the Germans to arrest Mihailović. Mihailović 's carefully kept the negotiations with the Germans were carefully kept secret from the Yugoslav government-in-exile, as well as from the British and their representative Captain T.J. Hudson.

Milhailovic's assault on the Partisan headquarters at Uzice and Pozega failed, and the Partisans mounted a rapid counter attack. Within two weeks, the Partisan forces repelled the Chetnik advances and surrounded Mihailovic's headquarters at Ravna Gora. His The loss of troops decimated in Serbia by the due to clashes with both Germans forces and the loss of approximately one thousand troops and considerable equipment in the attack against the Partisans, not receiving sufficient weapons and ammunitions from having received only one small delivery of arms from the British in early November, and having been unsuccessful in convincing the German to provide him with supplies, Mihailović found himself in a desperate situation.

On November 25, the final phase of the German offensive against Chetniks and Partisans began. In mid November, the Germans began an offensive against the Partisans. Unable to quickly overcome the Chetniks forces, faced with reports that the British considered Milhailovic as the leader of the resistance, and under pressure from the German offensive, Tito approached Milhailovic with an offer to negotiate which resulted in talks which led to an armistice between the two groups on November 20th or 21st. Tito and Mihailović had one last phone conversation on November 28th : Tito announced that he would defend his positions, while Mihailović said that he would disperse. On November 30 Milhailovic's unit leaders decided to join the "legalized" Chetniks under General Nedic's command, in order to be able to continue the fight against the Partisans without risk from the Germans and to avoid compromising Mihailovic's relationship with the British. Evidence suggests that Mihailovic did not order this, but rather only sanctioned the decision. About 2-3000 of Mihailović's men actually enlisted as a new kind of auxiliary "legal" Chetniks sanctioned by the in this capacity within the Nedić regime. According to historian Stevan K.Pavlowitch, there is no evidence that Mihailović ordered this personally, but there are some indications that he approved : The legalization allowed his men to have a salary and an alibi provided by the collaborationist administration, while it provided the Nedić regime with more men to fight the communists, although under the control of the Germans Mihailović also considered that he could, using this method, infiltrate the Nedić administration, which was soon fraught with sympathizers of his "Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland". While this arrangement was different than all-out collaboration like Kosta Pećanac's, it caused much confusion over who and what the Chetniks were. Some Other of Mihailović's men crossed to Bosnia to fight the Ustaše, while most abandoned the struggle. Milhailovic closed down his radio transmitter on December 5 in order not to give the Germans hints of his whereabouts.

Mihailović was still considered by the Allies, the Germans and the local population as the main resistance leader in Yugoslavia. As the conflict evolved, Mihailović's organization devoted particular attention to penetrating the Serbian State Guard and ensuring the allegiance of "legalized" Chetniks After concluding operations against the Partisans at Uzice, the Germans begin Operation Mihailovic on December 6-7, seizing control of Ravna Gora. Faced with the impact of the German offensive, Mihailović decided to temporarily disband most of his forces and keep only a small staff. The remnants of his Chetniks retreated to the hills of Ravna Gora, but were under German attack throughout December, Determined to put Mihailović out of the way, the Germans launched Operation Mihailović on December 6 and 7, with the objective of capturing Mihailović and his Ravna Gora headquarters and to disperse the last Chetnik detachments. Mihailović narrowly avoided capture. On December 10, a bounty was put on his head.

Reorganizing the movement
Mihailović himself was on the run. Having finally thrown off his pursuers and reunited with his staff, Mihailovic kept a limited number of men with him self as he retreated in the area of the Rudnik mountain, for the next three months. While he was unable to take action, left without troops under his direct command and pursued by Axis forces, Allied propaganda and the media hailed him as the new resistance hero, and built him up as the leader of a non-existent all-Yugoslav resistance (Allied propaganda around Mihailović in the following months was such that a movie titled Chetniks! The Fighting Guerrillas, starring Philip Dorn as a fictionalized and idealized Mihailović, was released in 1943 in the United States). Additionally, the British put pressure on Milhailovic to engage the Germans in the same manner as the Partisans, threatening to withhold support On December 7, the BBC announced his promotion as Brigade general. Mihailović did not resume radio transmissions with the Allies before January 1942. On January 11, he was promoted as "Minister of the Army, Navy and Air Forces" of the government in exile. Mihailović apparently considered for a time to become "legalized" himself: historian Jozo Tomasevich reports that, while still in hiding, Mihailović met Nedić's interior minister Milan Aćimović in March 1942. Aćimović reported to the Germans that Mihailović had proposed to put himself at the disposal of the Serbian government "for the struggle against the communists", but the Germans flatly refused. Considering Believing that the failure of the premature uprising had proved him right, he sought to go back to his original plan of organizing a network of resistance and wait for an Allied landing. In the spring of 1942, Milhailovic until he went south and eventually to Italian-occupied Montenegro in May 1942 followed by a small number of his officers. He tried to organize the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (as he increasingly avoided to use the term Chetniks), extending his contacts in the Independent State of Croatia to notables of the Croatian Peasant Party and of the muslim community. He In the fall of 1941 Milhailovic had designated a number of regional commanders and appointed delegates, but had little grip over local actors. Moreover, the task of reorganizing an "army", even a secret army, was a formidable one in Yugoslavia's situation. From May 1942, his radio communications were decoded by the Germans. While his organisation infiltrated the Serbian collaborationist administration, it was soon also infiltrated by agents of all sorts. Moreover, most of the Chetnik local commanders behaved like local warlords, with Mihailović, whom they recognized as nominal leader, being only a symbolic authority figure.

In Montenegro, after an initial uprising against the Italian-backed government, the Chetniks had reached by the fall of 1941 a modus vivendi with the Italians, who played up divisions between communist and non-communist Montenegrins. From Serbia Mihailović had no control over the situation, nor on local Chetnik leaders Bajo Stanisic and Pavle Đurišić. In December, an impatient Đurišić tried to meet Mihailović to get instructions. His goal was to extract vengeance, not only against Ustaše and communists, but also against "Turks" (muslims). He could only meet Perinhek, who told him that the uprising had failed and that Mihailović was possibly dead. Đurišić nevertheless came back to his headquarters, claiming to have met Mihailović and to have received a formal appointment. The order had actually been signed by Perinhek, but Đurišić had Mihailović's signature transferred to it. He also came back with a lengthy order allegedly signed by Mihailović, and directing him to eliminate both communists and muslims. The instruction has been attributed to Mihailović himself, but Stevan K. Pavlowitch considers that Đurišić may also have forged this document The order's text included this section : "The mission of our units is: The struggle for the freedom of all of our people under the scepter of His Majesty, the King Peter II; The creation of Greater Yugoslavia, and within it Greater Serbia, ethnically clean within the borders of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Srem, Banat, and Bačka; The struggle for the incorporation into our social structure of those non-liberated Slovenian territories under Italy and Germany (Trieste, Gorizia, Istria, and Kaernten), as well as Bulgaria and Northern Albania with Skadar; The cleansing of all national minorities and anti-state elements from state territory; The creation of direct common borders between Serbia and Montenegro, as well as Serbia and Slovenia by cleansing the Muslim population from Sandžak, and the Muslim and Croat populations from Bosnia and Herzegovina; The punishment of all Ustashas and Muslims who have mercilessly destroyed our people in these tragic days; The settlement of the areas cleansed of national minorities and anti-state elements by Montenegrins (to be considered are poor, nationally patriotic, and honest families). There may be no collaboration with the communists [the Partisans], as they are fighting against the Dynasty and in favor of socialist revolution. Albanians, Muslims, and Ustaše are to be treated in accordance with their merit for the horrendous crimes against our population, i.e., they are to be turned over to the People's Court. The Croats living on the territory under Italian occupation are to be treated based on their disposition at the given moment.".

The Serbian government of Milan Nedić publicly summoned Mihailović and other officers to surrender, then arrested their relatives, including Mihailović's wife. He appointed Miroslav Trifunović as commander in Serbia and headed for Sandžak. He tried to organize the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (as he increasingly avoided to use the term Chetniks), extending his contacts in the Independent State of Croatia to notables of the Croatian Peasant Party and of the muslim community. He designated a number of regional commanders and appointed delegates, but had little grip over local actors. Moreover, the task of reorganizing an "army", even a secret army, was a formidable one in Yugoslavia's situation. From May 1942, his radio communications were decoded by the Germans. While his organisation infiltrated the Serbian collaborationist administration, it was soon also infiltrated by agents of all sorts. Moreover, most of the Chetnik local commanders behaved like local warlords, with Mihailović, whom they recognized as nominal leader, being only a symbolic authority figure.

Comments on World War II - Part II
I've just finished a major overhaul of the first section of, my additions are in green. -- Nuujinn (talk) 20:48, 15 August 2010 (UTC)


 * To start, "protect civilians in Serbia" from JJG text should be changed to simple "civilians".


 * Now Nuujinn´s changes: "Serbian bands" (nice way to describe them...).
 * "Serbian minority" (who could possibly become majority?)
 * "restoration of the Yugoslavian (I supose you mean "Yugoslav") monarchy and the establishment of a Greater Serbia (well, the two are incopatible, they really fought for the re-establishment of monarchic Yugoslavia, the Greater Serbia ideal came later...).
 * "not receiving sufficient weapons and ammunitions from either the British or the Germans" (you are giving the idea he DID receved arms from the Germans, do you have a source for that?)
 * The Germans persecuted to arrest M, and you say next that M kept the negociations secret, hmmmm... illogical in that order.
 * I am specially sad to see that your effort in editinfg about the fighting the Germans is still equal to zero, not even in this chapter.
 * Resumingly, with your edits the text is now unbalanced. FkpCascais (talk) 07:11, 16 August 2010 (UTC)


 * Just to clarify: I don´t mind that negative aspects are written about him. It is just that we have to choose about the size and detail of what we are going to write here. The reason why I support JJG text is because sucintly he describes everything and all in a NPOV manner. What Nuujinn did was to add lot of detail about negative stuff, and in a poor tone towards M and Chetniks (Serbian bands... bands? Should I be glad it is not written "Bandits"?). We can have a shorter text, or a more expanded one, but the expansion of it can´t be donne in only one way... FkpCascais (talk) 08:04, 16 August 2010 (UTC)
 * FkpCascais, If you wish to refute what I've added, bring some sources to the table.
 * "Serbian bands" is the term Milazzo uses. In modern usage the word has nothing to do with bandit, eg. "she's with the band" and "Band of Brothers"--it's not derogatory.
 * The issue of maintaining a Serbian majority is complex, but if you'll recall the German massacres, and refer to documentation on the Ustase, I think you'll see why genocide was a concern.
 * M. advocated a Greater Serbia under the Yugoslav Monarchy, wishing to expand Yugoslavia--the goals are not contradictory. Do you have a source that says otherwise?
 * I'll have to double check but I believe that M. did not receive any arms from the british until a week or so into Nov. It was because he had not received support from the British that he first approached the Germans, and he wanted to keep the meetings secret so the British would support him. Prior to november his primary support was from Nedic's government, and that was primarily monetary. Partisans and Chetniks were disarming each other in the fall of 1941 to obtain weapons.
 * Yes, M. did attempt to keep negotiations with the German a secret from his own forces, his own government, and the British. The Germans he met with knew, of course.
 * As for his efforts in fighting the Germans, honestly, I'm personally astounded, as I have found no evidence that M. advocated or engaged German forces of his own volition in 1941. The sources say that he and his troops defended themselves when attacked, and he allowed some of his subcommanders to collaborate in Partisan missions in order to gain political advantage and booty, and there are some instances where his subcommanders acted on their own, but M. appears, according to the sources I have examined, to have stuck to fighting the partisans and some minor acts of sabotage against the Axis. -- Nuujinn (talk) 12:19, 16 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Regarding "bands" we all know what means, and it can be perfectly chaqnged to something more adequate.
 * Regarding the "minority issue", you certainly while reading it, don´t understand the reason why is said, so some addition to it explaining the fact that Serbs were the most killed would be benefitial.
 * Yugoslavia/Greater Serbia, we´ll come back to this later...
 * I don´t mention British, but German supplies, did they existed? You answer as you missunderstood...
 * Efforts in fighting Germans, well, should I bring the soure from back which says that negociations were cancelled because German soldiers were mutilated by M. Chetniks?
 * Its just a matter of will Nuujin, and you have pleanty to writte about things you want, and none about the one you don´t... FkpCascais (talk) 07:19, 17 August 2010 (UTC)
 * P.S.:I also noteced you replaced one (independent) source by Tomasevic... FkpCascais (talk) 07:35, 17 August 2010 (UTC)

FkpCascais, I note you didn't bring any sources. Until you do, you're just talking. Nuujinn (talk) 11:16, 17 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Actually, you are, in this last comment... Btw, this is not a competition about who brings more sources, isn´t it? I am pleased with JJG version and regarding me, I would move on... If not, I will add sourced info to the text. FkpCascais (talk) 19:35, 19 August 2010 (UTC)
 * FkpCascais, would you be able to suggest the exact changes you would like to see in Nuujinn"s draft and provide sources, where needed? IMO, that will keep things moving so we don't get bogged down in discussion once more. 20:26, 21 August 2010 (UTC)


 * Because of some private reasons I will be able to contribute much more on this issue around 30 August or September 1st on. Perhaps we could move on, see all changes that are meant to be done by the other participants, and then, having a much wider perception of the article itself, we could come back to details. That will also be much easier for me to see and understand if the general tone of the article is correct, or not, and where it could be corrected/completed/sourced better. Would that be a suitable solution? FkpCascais (talk) 20:40, 21 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Are you saying that you won't be able to contribute much until around September 1? It wasn't entirely clear from what you said. If that is so, please bear in mind that whenever we get consensus on a section, it will be difficult to re-open unless concerns raised are well-supported by sources. However, as we will be coming back to the "Legacy" section, we could make sure you are able to participate fully in that. Sunray (talk) 22:09, 21 August 2010 (UTC)

I've just finished another sweep through, I'll make some minor edits later. One thing I did this pass was mark passages that need some references, I'm still looking but haven't found sources so far. I've also tried to adjust the order of the passages to reflect chronological order to the extent that that is feasible, but I'm thinking we need to break out a new subsection for the montenegrins. I realize it's all too long, but I find it's easier to start with too much and trim things down later. -- Nuujinn (talk) 23:09, 25 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Nice work! Let's leave it up for a couple more days to see if other participants have any changes. I may have to ping participants next week to make sure they are aware that this work is ongoing. Thanks for your dedication to the task at hand. Sunray (talk) 07:55, 27 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Hmpf. I notice that Nuujinn (is that him doing that ?) has been persistently deleting sourced material which could make M. appear in a "positive light". He (?) is also adding "citation needed" for similar sourced material. Disorganizing the sourced paragraphs, then adding "citation needed" requests by pretending there are no sources while there originally were is just a tactic to remove said material. Why has the paragraph starting with "The Serbian government of Milan Nedić..." been deleted ? Why would the sentence "As the conflict evolved, Mihailović's organization devoted particular attention to penetrating the Serbian State Guard and ensuring the allegiance of "legalized" Chetniks" be deleted ? These changes are worthless. I have been away from this mediation for a long time, for lack of time and lack of will to be around certain users. Judging from what I see, I consider it more and more a waste of time, and think it should die as quickly as possible. As for Direktor claiming that my version stems from "[my] POV alone", it is beneath contempt. IMHO, the priority should be to destroy the current, hideously biased version which gives wikipedia a very bad name, and not waste our time here. The article can always be improved later. Jean-Jacques Georges (talk) 21:59, 31 August 2010 (UTC)
 * Well, the reason I added the cn templates is that we really need a citation for each sentence. I'm not saying there are not sources for these items, but I don't have access to any that support those statements. This need is largely a function of doing major rewrites--if a reference is sourcing an entire paragraph, and that paragraph gets broken up, we lose the reference. It is not a tactic to remove material, and the alternative was for me to guess which page of Palowitch's work a particular cite is located (since the refs for that work often include more than one range. Also, if you will read through the current version, I think you'll find that much of the material in the last paragraph has been incorporated into prior paragraphs, as I was trying to bring the structure of the paragraphs into chronological order, so it's not been deleted, just moved. If you wish to insert anything I missed feel free. As I've said, I like the idea of us starting with more material and then working together to trim it down. I certainly don't expect you to agree with everything I've done, and I consider this version still very rough, but please do take a second look. --Nuujinn (talk) 00:36, 1 September 2010 (UTC)
 * I'll be returning here tomorrow guys - with a tan! ;) -- DIREKTOR  ( TALK ) 22:16, 3 September 2010 (UTC)
 * @Sunray what happend with earlier direktors edit warring over my edits? FkpCascais (talk) 02:06, 9 September 2010 (UTC)

If there are no other comments or suggestions, I'll archive this chunk with the rest. What section should pursue next? --Nuujinn (talk) 16:11, 18 September 2010 (UTC)