Wikipedia talk:Requests for mediation/Draza Mihailovic/Archive16

Draft section for review: Activities in Montenegro and Serbia
In early 1942, the Yugoslav Government in exile reorganized and appointed Slobodan Jovanovic as the prime minister, and the cabinet took as a primary goal strengthening Milhailovic's position, seeking unsuccessfully to obtain support from both the Americans and the British. The latter had suspended support in late 1941 following Hudson's reports of the conflict between the Chetniks and Partisans. Milhailovic, infuriated by Hudson's recommendations, denied Hudson radio access and had no contact with the British agent through the first months of 1942. Although Milhailovic was in hiding, by March the Nedic government located him, and a meeting sanctioned by the German occupation took place between him and Acimovic. Following this meeting, General Bader was informed that Mihailovic was willing to put himself at the disposal of the Nedic government in the fight against the Communists, but Bader refused the offer. In April 1942 Mihailović, still hiding in Serbia, resumed contact with British envoy Hudson, who was also able to resume his radio transmission to Allied headquarters in Cairo, using Mihailović's transmitter. In May, the British resumed their help to the Chetniks, although only to a small extent. with a single airdrop on 30 March Mihailović left for Montenegro, arriving there on the first on June. He established his headquarters there and, on June 10, was formally appointed as Chief of staff of the Supreme command of the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland. The Partisans, in the meantime, insisted to the Soviets that Mihailović was a traitor and a collaborator, and should be condemned as such. The Soviets initially saw no need for it, and their propaganda  kept supporting Mihailović. Eventually, on July 6 1942, the station Radio Free Yugoslavia, located in the Comintern building in Moscow, broadcast a resolution from Yugoslav "patriots" in Montenegro and Bosnia labeling Mihailović a collaborator.

In Montenegro, Mihailović had found a complex situation, with local Chetnik leaders Stanišić and Đurišić having reached arrangements with the Italians, and cooperating with them against the communist-led Partisans. At his 1946 trial, he claimed that he had known nothing about the situation before actually arriving in Montenegro, and had had to accept the situation as he found it. While Stanišić and Đurišić recognized Mihailović at least as a moral leader, but pretty much conducted their own policy. Mihailovic later claimed at his trial in 1946 that he was unaware of these arrangements prior to his arrival in Montenegro, and had accept them once he arrived, as Stanišić and Đurišić only acknowledged him as their leader in name only, and would only follow Mihailovic's orders if they supported their interests. Mihailović complained the Italian intelligence was more aware than himself of what his commanders were doing. Mihailovic believed that Italian military intelligence was better informed than he of the activities of his commanders. He tried to make the best of the situation, and accepted the appointment of Blažo Đukanović as the figurehead commander of "nationalist forces" in Montenegro. While Mihailović approved the destruction of communist forces, he aimed to exploit the connections of Chetniks commanders with the Italians to get food, arms and ammunition in the expectation of an Allied landing. On 1 December, Pavle Đurišić organised a "Youth conference" of Chetnik units at Šahovići. At the Chetnik congress, which according to Stevan K.Pavlowitch expressed "extremism and intolerance", nationalist claims were made on parts of Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Italy, while the resolutions posited the restoration of a monarchy with a period of transitional Chetnik dictatorship. Mihailović and Đukanović did not attend the event, which was entirely dominated by Đurišić, but they sent representatives.

In the Independent State of Croatia, Ilija Trifunović-Birčanin, a leader of pre-world war II Chetnik organizations, commanded the Chetniks in Dalmatia, Lika, Bosnia and Herzegovina. He led a "nationalist" resistance against Partisans and Ustaše and aknowledged Mihailović as formal leader, but acted on his own, with his troops being used by the Italians as the local Anti-Communist Volunteer Militia (MVAC). Italian commander Mario Roatta aimed to spare Italian lives, but also to counter Ustaše and Germans, to undermine Mihailović's authority among the Chetniks by playing up local leaders, and to have possible links with Mihailović and the Allies in case the Axis lost the war. Chetniks, led by Dobroslav Jevđević, came from Montenegro to help Bosnia's Serb population against the Ustaše : they murdered and pillaged in Foča until the Italians intervened in August. Help was also asked to the Italians by Chetniks, for protection agains the Ustaše's retributions. On 22 July, Mihailović met with Trifunović-Birčanin, Jevđević, and his newly-appointed delegate in Herzegovina Petar Baćović. The meeting was supposedly secret, but was known to Italian intelligence : Mihailović gave no precise orders but expressed his confidence in both his subordinates, adding, according to Italian reports, that he was waiting for help from the Allies to start a real guerilla campaign, in order to spare Serb lives. Summoned by Roatta upon their return, Trifunović-Birčanin and Jevđević assured the italian commander that Mihailović was merely a "moral head" and that they would not attack Italians, even if he should give such an order.

Having become more and more concerned with domestic enemies and concerned that he be in a position to control Yugoslavia after the Allies defeated the Axis occupation, Mihailović concentrated from Montenegro on directing operations, in the various parts of Yugoslavia, mostly against Partisans, but also against Ustaše and Dimitrije Ljotić's Serbian Volunteer Corps. During the summer and autumn of 1942 at the request of the British Mihailović's organization undertook a series of sabotages against the railway lines used to supply Axis forces in the Western Desert. In September and December, Mihailović's actions damaged the Serbian railway system seriously : the Allies gave him credit for inconveniencing Axis forces and contributing to their successes in Africa. Early in September 1942, Mihailović called through leaflets and clandestine radio transmitters from civil disobedience against the collaborationist Serbian regime of Milan Nedić : fighting resulted between Chetniks and followers of the Nedić regime. The Germans, whom the Serbian administration had called for help against Mihailović, responded to Nedić's request and to the sabotages with mass terror, and attacked the Chetniks in late 1942 and early 1943. Roberts mentions Nedić's request for help as the main reason for German action, and does not mention the sabotage campaign. Pavlowitch, on the other hand, mentions the sabotages as simultaneous with the propaganda actions. Thousands of arrests were made and during December, 1600 Chetnik combatants were killed in German reprisals. This brought to an abrupt end much of the anti-German action Mihailović had been conducting since the summer. Mihailović then In response to these actions, Mihailović abandoned the active resistance to the Germans begun that summer and reverted to his previous strategy of avoiding open conflict and waiting for an Allied landing.

During the summer and fall of 1942, the Allies began to recognize the activities of the Partisans, and doubt as to Mihailović's effectiveness and motivation began to surface. Hudson resumed radio transmissions in June, and requested supplies, but also reported that the Chetnik leaders in Montenegro were collaborating with the Italians. On July 6th, 1942, Radio Free Yugoslavia broadcast, with the approval of the Soviet government, accusations that Mihailović and the Chetniks were collaborating with the Italians, and on November 15, reported that Mihailović had agreed to this policy. In late autumn 1942, the Yugoslav government-in-exile became concerned about the rumors of collaboration and sent a message to Mihailović, who answered that he permitted no co o llaboration with the Italians. Apparently willing to accept arms in the fight against "internal enemies", Mihailović opposed actual agreements with the Italians so as to avoid damaging his association with the Allies.

Mihailović had great difficulties controlling his local commanders, who often did not have radio contacts and relied on couriers to communicate. He was, however, apparently actually aware that many Chetnik groups were committing crimes against civilians. and acts of ethnic cleansing : According to Stevan K.Pavlowitch, Pavle Đurišić proudly reported to Mihailović that he had destroyed muslim villages, in retribution against acts committed by muslim militias. While Mihailović apparently did not order such acts himself, and disapproved of them, he also failed to take any action against them, being dependent on various armed groups whose policy he could neither denounce nor condone. He also hid the situation from the British and the Royal Yugoslav government-in-exile. Many terror acts were committed by Chetnik groups against their various enemies, real or perceived, reaching a peak between October 1942 and February 1943.

Discussion
Please bear in mind that comments should be based on actual changes. You can either make suggested changes in colour or propose them in the "Discussion" section. Would participants be able to make one comment at a time and wait until others (at least two other participants) have responded before commenting a second time? Please focus comments on suggested changes to the text. Sunray (talk) 17:39, 24 September 2010 (UTC)


 * Yes, but why did you ignored my question from September 9th? FkpCascais (talk) 02:12, 25 September 2010 (UTC)
 * Your question deals with the Legacy section. I said I would get back to that and I intend to before we finalize that section. Sunray (talk) 03:23, 27 September 2010 (UTC)


 * First Paragraph--According to Roberts and Tomasevich, M. denied Hudson access to the transmitter following Hudson's request to cairo in the fall of 1941 that aid to the chetniks be cut off (for fear that the supplies would be used in antipartisan efforts) and after hudson returned from his visit to the partisans, thus limiting the information the british had from the area to what M. supplied through the YGE. My thought is we should explicate this aspect. Thoughts? --Nuujinn (talk) 22:15, 30 September 2010 (UTC)

I've make some changes to the first paragraph, adding material. Part of this is to provide context for M.'s renewal of contact with Hudson. I've also added some material covering the meeting in March between M. and Acimovic. --Nuujinn (talk) 16:50, 9 October 2010 (UTC)
 * Just added some references to text already in place. --Nuujinn (talk) 11:15, 14 October 2010 (UTC)
 * I now have a copy of Pavlowitch, and had added some material. I've also altered some text approaching copyvio. --Nuujinn (talk) 16:42, 24 October 2010 (UTC)
 * Great. I've deleted a reference to "ethnic cleansing," as the term was not used in reference to in World War II. Pavlowitch's descriptions of what happened are graphic and leave little doubt as to what happened. Sunray (talk) 01:12, 28 October 2010 (UTC)

Another pass. I've struck some text that was a close paraphrase of Pavlowitch, corrected some small errors, and added material from Roberts and Pavlowitch to try to illuminate the beginning of the shift in support of M. to the partisans. Need to add a bit about the propoganda in the press as well. --Nuujinn (talk) 14:56, 30 October 2010 (UTC)