Workers' Party of Korea

The Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) is the sole ruling party of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, commonly known as North Korea. Founded in 1949 from a merger between the Workers' Party of North Korea and the Workers' Party of South Korea, the WPK is the oldest active party in Korea. It also controls the Korean People's Army, North Korea's armed forces. The WPK is the largest party represented in the Supreme People's Assembly and coexists with two other legal parties that are completely subservient to the WPK and must accept the WPK's "leading role" as a condition of their existence. The WPK is banned in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) under the National Security Act and is sanctioned by the United Nations, the European Union, Australia, and the United States.

Officially, the WPK is a communist party guided by Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism, a synthesis of the ideas of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The party is committed to Juche, an ideology attributed to Kim Il Sung which promotes national independence and development through the efforts of the popular masses. Although Juche was originally presented as the Korean interpretation of Marxism–Leninism, the party now presents it as a freestanding philosophy. The WPK recognizes the ruling Kim family as the ultimate source of its political thought. The fourth party conference, held in 2012, amended the party rules to state that Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism was "the only guiding idea of the party". Under Kim Jong Il, who governed as chairman of the National Defence Commission, communism was steadily removed from party and state documents in favor of Songun, or military-first politics. The military, rather than the working class, was established as the base of political power. However, his successor Kim Jong Un reversed this position in 2021, replacing Songun with "people-first politics" as the party's political method and reasserting the party's commitment to communism.

The WPK is organized according to the Monolithic Ideological System, conceived by Kim Yong-ju and Kim Jong Il. The highest body of the WPK is formally the party congress; however, before Kim Jong Un's tenure as party leader, a congress rarely occurred. Between 1980 and 2016, no congresses were held. Although the WPK is organizationally similar to other communist parties, in practice it is far less institutionalized and informal politics plays a larger role than usual. Institutions such as the Central Committee, the Secretariat, the Central Military Commission (CMC), the Politburo and the Politburo's Presidium have much less power than what is formally bestowed on them by the party rules. Kim Jong Un is the current party leader, serving as General Secretary of the WPK.

Founding and early years (1945–1953)
On 13 October 1945, the North Korean Bureau of the Communist Party of Korea (NKB–CPK) was established, with Kim Yong-bom as its first chairman. However, the NKB–CPK remained subordinate to the CPK Central Committee, which was headquartered in Seoul and headed by Pak Hon-yong. Two months later, at the 3rd Plenum of the NKB, Kim Yong-bom was replaced by Kim Il Sung, an event which was probably orchestrated by the Soviet Union. The North Korean Bureau became the Communist Party of North Korea in spring 1946, with Kim Il Sung being elected its chairman. On 22 July 1946, Soviet authorities in North Korea established the United Democratic National Front, a popular front led by the Communist Party of North Korea. The Communist Party of North Korea soon merged with the New People's Party of Korea, a party primarily composed of communists from China. A special commission of the two parties ratified the merger on 28 July 1946, and it became official the following day. One month later (28–30 August 1946), the party held its founding congress, establishing the Workers' Party of North Korea (WPNK). The congress elected the former leader of the New People's Party of Korea Kim Tu-bong as the first WPNK chairman, with Kim Il Sung its appointed deputy chairman. However, despite his formal downgrade in the party's hierarchy, Kim Il Sung remained its leader.



Party control increased throughout the country after the congress. From 27 to 30 March 1948, the WPNK convened its 2nd Congress. While Kim Tu-bong was still the party's formal head, Kim Il Sung presented the main report to the congress. In it he claimed that North Korea was "a base of democracy", in contrast to South Korea, which he believed to be dictatorial. On 28 April 1948 a special session of the Supreme People's Assembly approved the constitution proposed and written by WPNK cadres, which led to the official establishment of an independent North Korea. It did not call for the establishment of an independent North Korea, but for a unified Korea under a communist government; the capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) would be Seoul, not Pyongyang. Kim Il Sung was the appointed head of government of the new state, with Kim Tu-bong heading the legislative branch. A year later on 24 June 1949, the Workers' Party of Korea was created with the merger of the WPNK and the Workers' Party of South Korea.

Kim Il Sung was not the most ardent supporter of a military reunification of Korea; that role was played by the South Korean communists, headed by Pak Hon-yong. After several meetings between Kim Il Sung and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950, thus beginning the Korean War. With American intervention in the war the DPRK nearly collapsed, but it was saved by Chinese intervention in the conflict. The war had the effect of weakening Soviet influence over Kim Il Sung and the WPK. Around this time, the main fault lines in early WPK politics were created. Four factions formed: the domestic faction (WPK cadres who had remained in Korea during Japanese rule), the Soviet faction (Koreans from the Soviet Union), the Yan'an faction (Koreans from China) and the guerrilla faction (Kim Il Sung's personal faction). However, Kim Il Sung would be unable to further strengthen his position until the end of the war.

Kim Il Sung's consolidation of power (1953–1980)


Relations worsened between the WPK and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) when Stalin's successor, Nikita Khrushchev, began pursuing a policy of de-Stalinization. During the Sino–Soviet conflict, an ideological conflict between the CPSU and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Kim Il Sung manoeuvred between the two socialist superpowers; by doing so, he weakened their influence on the WPK. By 1962 Kim Il Sung and the WPK favored the CCP over the CPSU in the ideological struggle, and "for a few years North Korea almost unconditionally supported the Chinese position on all important issues." The primary conflict between the WPK and the CPSU during this period was that Kim Il Sung did not support the denunciation of Stalinism, the creation of a collective leadership, and the theory of peaceful coexistence between the capitalist and socialist worlds. Kim Il Sung believed peaceful coexistence to be synonymous with capitulation and knew that de-Stalinization in North Korea would effectively end his unlimited power over the WPK. The result of the souring of relations between the CPSU and the WPK was that the Soviet Union discontinued aid to North Korea. China was meanwhile unwilling to increase its aid, and, as a result, several industries in North Korea were on the brink of disaster. Mao Zedong began the Cultural Revolution shortly thereafter, an event criticized by the WPK as "left-wing opportunism" and a manifestation of the "Trotskyist theory of a permanent revolution." Relations between the CPSU and the CCP stabilized during the 1960s, with the WPK making it clear it would remain neutral in the Sino–Soviet conflict, thus resulting in the 1966 launch of the Juche program aimed at national self-determination at all levels. This, in turn, strengthened Kim Il Sung's position in the WPK.

Beginning in the 1960s, Kim Il Sung's cult of personality reached new heights. It had been no greater than Stalin's or Mao's until 1972, when his birthday on 15 April became the country's main public holiday and statues of him began to be built nationwide. Kim became known as "Great Leader", the "Sun of the Nation", "The Iron All-Victorious General" and "Marshal of the All-Mighty Republic" in WPK and state publications; official propaganda stated that "burning loyalty to the leader" was one of the main characteristics of any Korean.

Kim Il Sung and his guerilla faction had purged the WPK of its opposing factions during the 1950s and the 1960s, to the dismay of both the CCP and the CPSU. The domestic faction was the first to go (in 1953–55), followed by the Yan'an faction in 1957–58 and the Soviet Koreans (along with anyone else deemed unfaithful to the WPK leadership) in the 1957–62 purge. According to historian Andrei Lankov, "Kim Il Sung had become not only supreme but also the omnipotent ruler of North Korea—no longer merely 'first amongst equals, as had been the case in the late 1940s". After purging his WPK opposition, Kim Il Sung consolidated his power base with nepotism and hereditary succession in the Kim family and the guerilla faction. Beginning in the late 1980s, "a high (and increasing) proportion of North Korean high officials have been sons of high officials." Since the 1960s, Kim Il Sung had appointed family members to positions of power. By the early 1990s, a number of leading national offices were held by people in his family: Kang Song-san (Premier of the Administrative Council and member of the WPK Secretariat), Pak Song-chol (Vice President), Hwang Jang-yop and Kim Chung-rin (members of the WPK Secretariat), Kim Yong-sun (Head of the WPK International Department and member of the WPK Secretariat), Kang Hui-won (Secretary of the WPK Pyongyang Municipal Committee and Deputy Premier of the Administrative Council), Kim Tal-hyon (Minister of Foreign Trade), Kim Chan-ju (Minister of Agriculture and Deputy Chairman of the Administrative Council) and Yang Hyong-sop (President of the Academy of Social Sciences and chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly). These individuals were appointed solely because of their ties to the Kim family, and presumably retain their positions as long as the Kim family controls the WPK and the country. The reason for Kim's support of nepotism (his own and that of the guerrilla faction) can be explained by the fact that he did not want the party bureaucracy to threaten his—and his son's—rule as it did in other socialist states.

It was first generally believed by foreign observers that Kim Il Sung was planning for his brother, Kim Yong-ju, to succeed him. Kim Yong-ju's authority gradually increased, until he became co-chairman of the North-South Coordination Committee. From late 1972 to the 6th WPK Congress, Kim Yong-ju became an increasingly remote figure in the regime. At the 6th Congress, he lost his Politburo and Central Committee seats, and rumours that Kim Il Sung had begun grooming Kim Jong Il in 1966 were confirmed. From 1974 to the 6th Congress, Kim Jong Il (called the "Party centre" by North Korean media) was the second most powerful man in North Korea. His selection was criticized, with his father accused of creating a dynasty or turning North Korea into a feudal state.

Kim Jong Il's rule (1980–2011)


With Kim Jong Il's official appointment as heir apparent at the 6th Congress, power became more centralized in the Kim family. WPK officials began to speak openly about his succession, and beginning in 1981 he began to participate in (and lead) tours. In 1982, he was made a Hero of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and wrote On the Juche Idea. While foreign observers believed that Kim Jong Il's appointment would increase participation by the younger generation, in On the Juche Idea he made it clear that his leadership would not mark the beginning of a new generation of leaders. The WPK could not address the crisis facing Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il's leadership at home and abroad, in part because of the gerontocracy at the highest level of the WPK and the state.



With the death of O Jin-u on 25 February 1995, Kim Jong Il became the sole remaining living member of the Presidium (the highest body of the WPK when the Politburo and the Central Committee are not in session). While no member list of the WPK Central Military Commission (CMC, the highest party organ on military affairs) was published from 1993 to 2010, there were clear signs of movement in the military hierarchy during 1995. For the WPK's 50th anniversary, Kim Jong Il initiated a reshuffling of the CMC (and the military leadership in general) to appease the old guard and younger officials. He did not reshuffle the WPK Central Committee or the government, however, during the 1990s the changes to its membership were caused mostly by its members dying of natural causes.

Beginning in 1995, Kim Jong Il favoured the military over the WPK and the state. Problems began to mount as an economic crisis, coupled with a famine in which at least half a million people died, weakened his control of the country. Instead of recommending structural reforms, Kim began to criticize the WPK's lack of control over the economy, lambasting its local and provincial branches for their inability to implement central-level instructions. At a speech celebrating the 50th anniversary of Kim Il Sung University, he said: "The reason why people are loyal to the instructions of the Central Committee is not because of party organizations and workers, but because of my authority." Kim Jong Il said that his father had told him to avoid economics, claiming that it was better left to experts. After this speech, the WPK's responsibility to control the economy was given to the Administrative Council (the central government). By late 1996, Kim Jong Il concluded that neither the WPK nor the central government could run the country, and began shifting control to the military. A constitutional amendment in 1998 redirected supreme state power in North Korea to the leadership of the military, rather than the WPK.

On 8 July 1997, the three-year mourning period for Kim Il Sung ended. Later that year, on 8 October, Kim Jong Il was appointed to the newly established office of General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea. There was considerable discussion by foreign experts about why Kim Jong Il was appointed General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, instead of succeeding his father as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea. In a clear breach of the WPK rules, Kim Jong Il was appointed WPK General Secretary in a joint announcement by the 6th Central Committee and the CMC rather than elected by a plenum of the Central Committee. Although it was believed that Kim Jong Il would call a congress shortly after his appointment (to elect a new WPK leadership), he did not. The WPK would not be revitalized organizationally until the 3rd Conference in 2010. Until then, Kim Jong Il ruled as an autocrat; only in WPK institutions considered important were new members and leaders appointed to take the place of dying officials. The 10th Supreme People's Assembly convened on 5 September 1998, amended the North Korean constitution. The amended constitution made the National Defense Commission (NDC), previously responsible for supervising the military, the highest state organ. Although the new constitution gave the cabinet and the NDC more independence from WPK officials, it did not weaken the party. Kim Jong Il remained WPK General Secretary, controlling the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) and other institutions. While the central WPK leadership composition was not renewed in a single stroke until 2010, the WPK retained its important role as a mass organization.

On 26 June 2010, the Politburo announced that it was summoning delegates for the 3rd Conference, with its official explanation of the need to "reflect the demands of the revolutionary development of the Party, which is facing critical changes in bringing about the strong and prosperous state and Juche development." The conference met on 28 September, revising the party rules and electing (and dismissing) members of the Central Committee, the Secretariat, the Politburo, the Presidium and other bodies. Kim Jong Un was confirmed as heir apparent; Vice Marshal Ri Yong-ho and General Kim Kyong-hui (Kim Jong Il's sister) were appointed to leading positions in the Korean People's Army and the WPK to help him consolidate power. The following year, on 17 December 2011, Kim Jong Il died.

Kim Jong Un's rule (2011–present)


After Kim Jong Il's death, the North Korean elite consolidated Kim Jong Un's position; he was declared in charge of the country when the official report of his father's death was published on 19 December. On 26 December 2011, the official newspaper Rodong Sinmun hailed him as supreme leader of the party and the state. On 30 December a meeting of the Politburo officially appointed him Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, after he was nominated for the position by Kim Jong Il in October 2011 (the anniversary of Kim Jong Il's becoming general secretary). Despite the fact that he was not a Politburo member, Kim Jong Un was named to the unofficial position of the supreme leader of the Workers' Party of Korea.

After celebrations for Kim Jong Il's 70th birth anniversary, the Politburo announced on 18 February the 4th Party Conference (which was scheduled for mid-April 2012, near the 100th birth anniversary of Kim Il Sung) "to glorify the sacred revolutionary life and feats of Kim Jong Il for all ages and accomplish the Juche cause, the Songun revolutionary cause, rallied close around Kim Jong Un". Kim Jong Un was promoted to the rank of "Marshal of the Republic" in July 2012. At the 4th Party Conference on 11 April, Kim Jong Il was declared Eternal General Secretary and Kim Jong Un was elected to the newly created post of First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and the Presidium. The conference amended the party rules to say Kimilsungism–Kimjongilism "the only guiding idea of the party". In December 2013, the party experienced its first open inner struggle in decades with the purge of Jang Song-thaek.

The party has seen somewhat of a revival under Kim Jong Un, with more frequent meetings. There have been two conferences, after a gap of 44 years, and a congress between 2010 and 2016. After staging a huge military parade in celebration of the party's 70th anniversary on 10 October 2015, the Politburo announced that its 7th Congress will be held on 6 May 2016 after a 36-year hiatus. The congress announced the first Five-Year Plan since the 1980s and gave Kim Jong Un the new title of chairman, which replaced the previous office of First Secretary. In January 2021, the 8th WPK Congress was convened, where Kim Jong Un was given the title of general secretary, replacing the title of chairman. The congress also marked the consolidation of WPK control over the army and a decrease in the army's power, with the number of military delegates in both the congress and the Politburo decreasing. It was reported in June 2021 that the party set up the post of 'First Secretary', with speculation that Jo Yong-won or Kim Tok Hun, the Premier of North Korea would fill the position. Starting from 2021, Kim Jong Un has started reviving communism and communist terminology within the WPK, with the ideology being again written to the party rules. He also increasingly replaced Songun with "people-first politics" in the party rules.

Ideology
The WPK maintains a leftist image, and normally sends a delegation to the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, where it has some support; its 2011 resolution, "Let us jointly commemorate the Birth Centenary of the Great Leader comrade President Kim Il Sung as a Grand Political Festival of the World's Humankind", was signed by 30 of the 79 attending parties. The WPK also sees itself as part of the worldwide leftist and socialist movements; during the Cold War, the WPK and North Korea had a policy of "exporting revolution", aiding leftist guerrillas worldwide. Additionally, its party rules say its ultimate aim is to "realize a communist society in which the people's ideals are fully realized" and further state it upholds "the revolutionary principles of Marxism–Leninism". Brian Reynolds Myers, Jasper Becker, and Dae-Sook Suh argue that the WPK's ideology is xenophobic, racist, and nationalist.

Great Leader
North Korea considers humanity the driving force of history. "Popular masses are placed in the centre of everything, and the leader in the centre of the masses". Traditional Marxism considers class struggle the driving force of historical progress. However, Marxism also sees class struggle as eventually coming to an end, when class distinctions begin to disappear in a communist society. From this point on, humanity can begin to "more and more consciously, make his own history" as human society ceases to be driven by social forces such as class struggle, but instead becomes "the result of his own free actions."

Juche is an anthropocentric ideology in which "man is the master of everything and decides everything". Similar to Marxist–Leninist thought, Juche believes that history is law-governed but only man drives progress: "the popular masses are the drivers of history". From the perspective of Juche, the struggle for humanity as a whole to make their own history is restrained by the ruling classes in class society. Additionally, only the working class can overcome these restraints and achieve a society where humanity can independently and creatively make their own history. Juche is in line with historical materialism, viewing mankind's ability to drive their own history as the culmination of a long-term historical process, whose foundations were laid by capitalism's ushering in of the working class, and thus Juche is unique to the socialist era. However, for the masses to succeed they need a Great Leader. Marxism–Leninism argues that the people will lead, on the basis of their relationship to production. In North Korea a singular Great Leader is considered essential, and this helped Kim Il Sung establish a one-person autocracy.

This theory makes the Great Leader an absolute, supreme leader. The working class thinks not for itself, but through the Great Leader; he is the mastermind of the working class and its only legitimate representative. Class struggle can only be realized through the Great Leader; difficult tasks in general (and revolutionary changes in particular) can only be introduced through—and by—him. Thus, in historical development the Great Leader is the leading force of the working class; he is a flawless, incorruptible human being who never makes mistakes, is always benevolent and rules for the benefit of the masses (working class). For the Great Leader system to function, a unitary ideology must be in place; in North Korea, this is known as the Monolithic Ideological System.

Kim dynasty
The Kim dynasty began with Kim Il Sung, the first leader of the WPK and North Korea. The official ideology is that the North Korean system functions "well" because it was established by Kim Il Sung, whose successors follow his bloodline. Every child is educated in "the revolutionary history of the Great Leader" and "the revolutionary history of the Dear Leader" (Kim Jong Il). Kim Il Sung's first choice as successor was Kim Yong-ju, his brother, but he later decided to appoint his son Kim Jong Il instead; this decision was formalized at the 6th Congress. Kim Jong Il appointed his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, as his successor at the 3rd WPK Conference in 2010, and his son succeeded him in early 2011. Because of the familial succession and the appointment of family members to high office, the Kim family has been called a dynasty and a royal family. Dae-Sook Suh, the author of Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader, notes that "What he [Kim Il Sung] has built in the North, however, resembles more a political system to accommodate his personal rule than a communist or socialist state in Korea. It is not the political system he built that will survive him; it is his son [Kim Jong Il], whom he has designated heir, who will succeed his reign." The ruling Kim family has been described as the head of a de facto absolute monarchy or "hereditary dictatorship".

Monolithic Ideological System
The Ten Principles for the Establishment of a Monolithic Ideological System are a set of ten principles and 65 clauses which establish standards for governance and guide the behaviours of the people of North Korea. The Ten Principles have come to supersede the national constitution or edicts by the Workers' Party, and in practice serve as the supreme law of the country.

Songbun
Songbun is the name given to the caste system established on 30 May 1957 by the WPK Politburo when it adopted the resolution, "On the Transformation of the Struggle with Counter-Revolutionary Elements into an All-People All-Party Movement" (also known as the 30 May Resolution). This led to a purge in North Korean society in which every individual was checked for his or her allegiance to the party and its leader. The purge began in earnest in 1959, when the WPK established a new supervisory body headed by Kim Il Sung's brother, Kim Yong-ju. The people of North Korea were divided into three "forces" (hostile, neutral or friendly), and the force in which a person was classified was hereditary. Hostile forces cannot live near Pyongyang (the country's capital) or other major cities, or near North Korea's border with other countries. Songbun affects access to educational and employment opportunities and, particularly, eligibility to join the WPK. However, its importance has diminished with the fall of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the North Korean economy (and the Public Distribution System) during the 1990s.

Central organization


The Congress is the party's highest body and convenes on an irregular basis. According to the party rules, the Central Committee can convene a congress if it gives the rest of the party at least a six-month notice. The party rules give the Congress seven responsibilities:
 * 1) Electing the Central Committee
 * 2) Electing the Central Auditing Commission
 * 3) Electing the General Secretary
 * 4) Examining the report of the outgoing Central Committee
 * 5) Examining the report of the outgoing Central Auditing Commission
 * 6) Discussing and enacting party policies
 * 7) Revising the party rules and making amendments to these

In between WPK national meetings, the Central Committee is the highest decision-making institution. The Central Auditing Commission is responsible for supervising the party's finances and works separately from the Central Committee. The Central Committee elects the composition of several bodies to carry out its work. The 1st Plenary Session of a newly elected central committee elects the Central Military Commission (CMC), the Secretariat, the Politburo, the Presidium, and the Central Auditing Commission. The Politburo exercises the functions and powers of the Central Committee when a plenum is not in session. The Presidium is the party's highest decision-making organ when the Politburo, the Central Committee, the Conference of Representatives and the Congress are not in session. It was established at the 6th National Congress in 1980. The CMC is the highest decision-making institution on military affairs within the party and controls the operations of the Korean People's Army. The WPK General Secretary is by right Chairman of the CMC. Meanwhile, the Secretariat is the top implementation body and is headed by the WPK General Secretary and consists of several secretaries who normally head Central Committee departments, commissions, publications, and other organizations under it. The Central Auditing Commission resolves disciplinary issues involving party members. Investigative subjects range from graft to anti-party and counter-revolutionary activities, generally encompassing all party rules violations.

A first plenum of the Central Committee also elects the heads of departments, bureaus, and other institutions to pursue its work. The WPK currently has more than 15 Central Committee departments. Through these departments it controls several mass organisations and newspapers, such as Rodong Sinmun for instance. The Korean People's Army (KPA) is, according to the WPK rules, the "revolutionary armed power of the Workers' Party of Korea which inherited revolutionary traditions." The leading organ within the KPA is the General Political Bureau (GPB), which according to the WPK rules is defined "as an executive organ of the KPA Party Committee and is therefore entitled to the same authority as that of the Central Committee in conducting its activities." The GPB controls the party apparatus and every political officer within the KPA.

Lower-level organization


The WPK has local organizations for the three levels of local North Korean government: (1) provinces and province-level municipalities, (2) special city, ordinary cities and urban districts, and (3) rural counties and villages. North Korea has nine provinces, each with a provincial party committee; their composition is decided by the WPK.

The WPK has two types of membership: regular and probationary. Membership is open to those 18 years of age and older and is granted after the submission of an application (endorsed by two parties' members with at least two years in good standing) to a cell. The application is acted on by the cell's plenary session, and an affirmative decision is subject to ratification by a county-level party committee. After an application is approved a mandatory one-year probationary period may be waived under unspecified "special circumstances", allowing the candidate to become a full member. Recruitment is under the direction of the Organization and Guidance Department and its local branches.

The WPK claimed a membership of more than three million in 1988, a significant increase from the two million members announced in 1976; the increase may have resulted from the Three Revolutions Team Movement mobilization drive. At the time, 12 percent of the population held party membership, an abnormally large number for a communist country and a figure only comparable to Romania. Later figures have not been made publicly available, but membership today is estimated at 6.5 million.

North Korean society is divided into three classes: industrial workers, peasants, and samuwon (intelligentsia and petite bourgeoisie). Since 1948, industrial workers have constituted the largest percentage of party members, followed by peasants and samuwon. Beginning in the 1970s, when North Korea's population reached the 50-per cent-urban mark, the composition of the party's groups changed; more people working in state-owned enterprises were party members, and the number of members in agricultural cooperatives decreased.

Symbols
The emblem of the WPK is an adaptation of the communist hammer and sickle, with a traditional Korean calligraphy brush. The symbols represent the three classes in Korean society, as described by the WPK: the industrial workers (hammer), the peasants (sickle), and the samuwon (ink brush). The samuwon class consists of clerks, small traders, bureaucrats, professors, and writers. This class is unique to North Korean class analysis and was conceptualized to increase education and literacy among the country's population.