Talk:1975 Australian constitutional crisis/Archive 1

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Field Appointment

This is another area of myth-making. The long-established convention is that a State Government fills a Senate casual vacancy with a member of the same party. There was and is no requirement that this replacement be the nominee of that party and in the case of Queensland there was at least one precedent that a party's nomination could be rejected, as Sir Frank Nicklin did in 1962 when he asked for a list of three names for Parliament to make a choice from. Joh Bjelke-Petersen rejected the State ALP's nomination of Mal Colston, citing in Parliament allegations that he had set fire to the school at which he was a teacher. He asked State Labor for a list of three names and when Labor insisted on Colston, he chose Patrick Field. There is no "nominally" about Field's membership of the ALP. He was a longstanding ALP member with a current membership card and he had recently been re-elected as a union president. He remained a member of the ALP throughout the crisis and was nominated by the ALP as a Senate candidate in the December 1975 election.

The 1977 constitutional amendment does not specify that the replacement Senator should be the nominee of his party, merely that he should be a member of that party. Of course if he ceases to be a party member before taking up his seat, he is ineligible to sit. Even under the 1977 amendment, Patrick Field was eligible to be chosen and to sit as a Senator for the State of Queensland.

He was on leave from the Senate, rather than unable to sit. The reason for this is that his appointment was under challenge in the High Court on the grounds that he may not have resigned from the Queensland public service at the time of his appointment, and he did not wish to be liable to the backdated $200 daily penalty for sitting as a Senator if it was found that he had been ineligible. Hugh Lunn in his 1978 biography of Joh Bjelke-Petersen notes that Field was on standby to vote in October as part of the budget blocking process if required.

If it is enough to nominate any member of the party, this makes a mockery of the process. Any stooge can pick up party membership.--Jack Upland 02:26, 18 November 2005 (UTC)

You say that Patrick Field was a Senate nominee for Queensland of the ALP in the December 1975 election? Really???? What evidence do you have for this absurd statement? Under ALP rules he was automatically expelled from the party upon taking his seat in the Senate earlier in the year, when he was not the official party nominee for the position. He was certainly not a nominee of the ALP.

In fact, Field himself stood again in December 1975, but not as an ALP nominee. He did so, it was widely reported, in order to be able to receive the money paid to Federal Parliamentary incumbents when they nominate to stand again. (In this, he was as venal as his patron, Bjelke-Peterson). Peter, 2006-06-15.

Withdrawing from Vietnam

This is one of those myths that people like to believe. Because Whitlam campaigned long and loudly for Australia to pull out of Vietnam, the myth has sprung up that when he was elected, that this was one of his first actions. Makes sense, doesn't it?

But it's a complete fabrication. The previous government, hand in hand with the USA, had steadily withdrawn forces from Vietnam. When Whitlam was elected, there were no Australian combat troops remaining, merely a few embassy guard units and possibly a handful of training team members. In point of fact, Whitlam increased the Australian presence in Vietnam, albeit he didn't send combat troops and the units were only able to operate for a short time before Saigon fell. There is a chronology of the Vietnam involvement here and the actual units involved and the dates of their withdrawal can be found fairly easily. Perhaps we should draw up a list for the benefit of those who wish to inflate Whitlam greater than the facts allow. Skyring 22:41, 23 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Caption for photograph

The previous caption referred to Whitlam listening to the proclamation of his government's dismissal. This was not the case, as the official notification of the change in government was not proclaimed, and would merely have been noted in the Gazette as a change of ministerial appointments. The document David Smith is reading is the proclamation of the dissolution of both Houses under s57, naming the "trigger" bills. As only the Governor-General has this power it was proclaimed by his official secretary, in the same location and with much the same wording as similar proclamations in 1974 and 1983 (and other years). For the full list and text of these proclamations see http://www.aph.gov.au/library/handbook/elections/dissolutions.htm Skyring 00:17, 18 Dec 2004 (UTC)

"not led to any constitutional changes"

I think this is wrong. There has since been a change in the way Senators are replaced when they resign. If you know some of the more obscure details of the crisis, you can see how this change was inspired by it.

I think you're right in that the procedure for replacing Senators has changed, and it was inspired by 1975 when Sir Joh appointed a stooge to replace a dead Labour Senator. However, this wasn't a constitutional issue, IIRC, it was decided by agreement between the States and the Federal governments and implemented with normal legislation. Correct me if I'm wrong --Robert Merkel

It definatly was a Constitutional amendement that was passed by referendum in 1977 to ensure that States had to appoint people from the same party as that of the retiring/deceased Senator.

I want to make reference to the stories that Kerr was influenced by the United States and, specifically, the CIA, in dismissing Whitlam. Firstly, it seems reasonably well-established that Kerr received a briefing from the Defence Department and knew about American concerns about the future of Pine Gap. Secondly, Kerr had a background in intelligence and spent time with the CIA in the 40s and 50s. Thirdly, there are the claims of Robert Boyce who heard defence contractors closely connected with the CIA referring to "Our Man Kerr", amongst other things. Interesting those things may be, they hardly make a compelling case that Kerr was significantly influenced. Is the above an accurate summary of the evidence or otherwise for this proposition? --Robert Merkel

See the discussion section down below USA government role. Boud 16:03, 11 November 2005 (UTC)

Dear maveric149 & 136.186.1.xxx ,

The paragraph starting "It is notable that although the crisis was accurately described as Australia's most dramatic political crisis" - shows the open "Arguably the most dramatic moment of" as indecisive. Given the title of the page , the phase "Arguably the most dramatic" is also somewhat redundant. That's why I think the article should get straight to the point of what the `crisis' was (esp. as that seems to be mis-understood by some). And then address the background etc. --Anon

Sorry, I don't remember contributing to this article -- I just moved it to a title that conforms to our naming conventions. BTW Be bold in updating pages. Cheers!--maveric149
Good-o ;-) I was just trying to get the other editors to read this page to understand why large sections need updating.

Lets appreciate the event a bit better. The crisis was not because Whitlam was 'fired'; and was not even that supply was blocked. Normally, if supply is blocked then the Lower House would amend the budget and then Upper House would pass it; if no agreement could be reached then the PM could call a snap election and force a resolution one way or another. The crisis was because the Lower House was refussing to amend and PM refussing to resolve the issue. I'm not saying the ALP created the crisis, after all it takes two block-heads to create an impass.

I feel the nature of the crisis should be described as clearly as possible in the first paragraph.

Irrespective of the two new senators, the Liberal party already had control of the Upper House - the extra two senators are often thought of as contributing factors in the Senates confidence/decision to block supply. The Senate certainly has the right and the obligation to block supply if they feel the proposed budget is totally out of reason.

Note: I (RGM) indented this reply to make clear that the paragraphs below are are reply to the ones above. I wrote neither the original nor the reply

Before the breaking of the convention on Senate replacement the numbers in the Senate were equal so motions would have been "recorded as having passed in the negative", in other words they would have been lost and it was only with the breaking of the convention that the Liberals were able to get the numbers to block the supply bills.
As for your claim that Whitlam amending his government's Budget would have "solved" the crisis let me use the words of Reginald Withers the Senate Leader of the Liberal Party:
"We set out on a course - i am not trying to be provocative here - to force an election for the House of Representatives"
I agree totally with the reply, and would add that blocking supply, especially purely for the purposes of forcing an election, is not regarded as normal constitutional practice. 1975 is the only time it has happened since Federation, despite Opposition-controlled or hung Senates for much of that time. Nor has it happened in any of the state Parliaments.
By the way, in hindsight it seems fairly clear that there were *three* main blockheads in the process, along with a lot of contributory wilful stupidity. --Robert Merkel
Rob it did happen in the Victorian State Parliament in 1947 - the State Liberals used the Federal issue of bank nationalisation as a pretext to block supply and forced an election which the Liberals won (like in 1975). Since an Constitutional amendment in 1984, the Victorian upper house cannot block supply for three years out of the four year term that both houses are elected for. -- Paul Melville Austin (i wrote the earlier Withers piece too)
Paul, I have made edits to make the connection with the general issues of Westminster (or Washminster :-) ) Constitutions clearer. Though I understand your point that a convention may exist that supply should not be blocked for purely party polical ends, that leads to difficulties in practice if there is no confession like that of Withers. Who is to decide whether a given decision to block supply is motivated by partisanship? Giving that responsibility to a Supreme Court would surely only make matters worse! If you feel that my changes unbalance the article please add the Withers quote to address this. 193.82.145.202 18:05 Nov 7, 2002 (UTC)

I have to disagree with some of the constitutional interpretation in this article. Having studied cases workwide as part of an international study on heads of state, I think you miss some fundamental points, not least Whitlam's slipshod understanding of the constitutional implications of losing supply. I have added in some additional analysis based on my studies. I know while many constitutional experts worldwide think Sir John Kerr shouldn't have come up with the solution he produced, almost everyone I know who works in the area (from constitutional lawyers to advisors who work for various heads of state) all blame Whitlam far more than this article does. One ex-head of state went so far as to say that if they had to deal with a prime minister so blatently flouting conventions and internationally followed constitutional rules,

The problem is that constitutional law is basically a national issue. Just because it works one way in the UK

doesn't mean that it works another in Australia (or Canada for that matter). In particular the conventions regarding the upper house are just different in Australia than in UK or Canada.

'I'd have given him such a roasting he wouldn't have sat down for a week.' he'd also have given him 24 hours either to get the lower house and upper house to agree, request a general election, or have 'have his resignation on my desk.'

Which was not a solution in this case because the prime minister would have asked and been required to receive the resignation of the Governor General.

JTD 06:30 Dec 17, 2002 (UTC)

Asked for? Very doubtful. Not even Whitlam was that much of a fool: it would have been instant political suicide. Received? Probably yes, eventually. But the Queen would have undoubtedly taken quite some time to act, in the order of a week or two, giving the GG time enough to sack the PM a dozen times over. In any case, the primary goal of the Queen would have been to avoid getting embroiled in an international controversy, and she would have been very reluctant to act without exploring every possible avenue for a more sensible solution. Tannin
In response to JTD: Of course, ex-Heads of State could be expected to take Kerr's side in this! The real constitutional evil in the 1975 Dismissal was that the Governor-General appointed a man (Malcolm Fraser) as Prime Minister who did not, and could not, command a majority in the House of Representatives. The Governor-General persisted with this appointment EVEN AFTER being informed that Mr Fraser had lost a vote of no-confidence in that same House of Representatives. This was a wilful and belligerent denial by the Governor-General of the will of the people, as expressed in a vote in the House. THAT was the real evil here -- a denial of democracy and democratic process, something constitutional lawyers ought to worry about it. Kerr was rightly condemned for it, and booed whenever he appeared in public subsequently. The ironic aspect is, of course, that Queen Elizabeth would have not acted as Kerr did, neither dismissing Whitlam, nor retaining Fraser following a no-confidence motion in the House, because she would have been too worried about the long-term impacts for the House of Windsor. Fear of republicanism would have made her act like a democrat, unlike Kerr. Peter, 2006-06-15.


There is a major problem here. It is important to note that the Senate didn't vote down the budget, it continued to refuse to vote on it, because everyone agreed that had there been a vote then the budget would have passed. Because the Senate refused to vote on the budget and delayed the vote by procedural motions, there wasn't a critical moment in which you could say that the Senate blocked supply and cause the Westminister conventions to kick in.

Labor, led by Whitlam, disagreed with this assumption, a serious and fundamental mis-understanding of constitutional principles applied in parliamentary democracies the world over. For access to exchequer funding is a fundamental requirement of government. Where it is constitutionally denied, whether it is in Canada, the Republic of Ireland, New Zealand or in any other parliamentary democracy, a resignation or immediate election is instantly expected. (When in 1982 in Ireland, for example, then Irish Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald had his budget voted down in the House exclusively entitled to block supply, the lower chamber, he was within an hour in the President of Ireland's residence to seek a parliamentary dissolution.) Where both houses, by accident or design, can block supply, then the duty other option is to find an immediate compromise which both houses can agree to. And if not, then resign or seek a dissolution. Simply waiting for the opposition to 'crack' is considered an abuse of the constitutional procedures.
Instead in Australia Whitlam hoped to force some of the Liberal Senators to crack and vote with the government, thus passing the budget. (While it could perhaps be argued that, had the government through the accidential absence of some of its own members lost the vote, it could try again, it is generally unprecedented in democracies to try again by trying to win over opposition votes!, unless done immediately, with a definitive outcome within as little as 48 hours.) Whitlam, a supposedly ardent believer in the doctrine of responsible government completely ignored the possibility of the use of the unwritten "reserve powers" by which Kerr would later dismiss him, believing such powers were no longer relevant and that Kerr was a weak man who, in any case, was a supporter of Whitlam's actions. It was yet another fundamental mis-understanding of the constitutional principles concerned. It was also a fundamental mis-judgment of a man to whom he had shown little respect (at least in Kerr's eyes!) and who was already unhappy at what he saw as Whitlam's contempt for correct procedures.

As one who has studied constitutional law in Australia, under, I might add, an avowedly conservative lecturer, I must say I think this article goes too far in laying guilt on Whitlam.

Firstly, I think we can't definitively establish that, since the Senate was not explicitly denied power to block supply in the Constitution, it came as an automatic prerogative. Certainly that would not be part of the conventional understanding of the Senate's powers up until 1975. Given that in the process of writing the Constitution, the Senate's powers were somewhat weakened, I think it is a weak assumption that the founders intended the Senate to wield that power against the House of Reps.

Secondly, the article makes use of international precedent etc. to make out that the only possible legitimate response by Whitlam was to immediately call an election. The fact is that all these other situations cited, are, to my knowledge, referring to the *lower* house's blockage of supply. Given that I would dispute the legitimacy of the Senate taking such an action in all but an extreme situation in the first place, I hardly think that to call an election was the only course open to him (remember that the Senate explicitly deferred consideration of the bills until an election was called from both houses - clearly setting its power up in opposition to that of the Representative chamber). At the very least, I think it needs to be made out within the article that Whitlam wasn't *just* being imperious and pig-headed; the government consistently held that the action was constitutionally illegitimate (several Liberal senators seemed to be in partial agreement, and were wavering in their support of the measure).

Running on from that, it can be established that the use of the Senate in this way was a radical *re-interpretation* of its conventional role, rather than the breaking of some "gentleman's agreement".

In honesty, I don't think any of these views are not in accord with the conventional view of events.

Finally, and perhaps least controversially: mention should be made of a key player in the crisis: Sir Garfield Barwick. Barwick advised Kerr on the course of action after Whitlam had explicitly advised Kerr not to seek advice from the Chief Justice (and former Liberal attorney-general). How's that for flouting convention?

Lacrimosus 23:11, 10 Jun 2004 (UTC)

So edit it accordingly! It needs more historians' viewpoints. Also, I'd like to see it on WP:FAC and I'm not a historian - David Gerard 07:05, 30 Jun 2004 (UTC)
This discussion seems to ignore:
(1) 1974 election: Whitlam had already tried to break impasse and if he had won 1975 election surely the Coalition would have continued to block supply.
(2) The blocking of supply was clearly a means to bring down the government, not an expression of opposition to a particular measure. Even without Withers' comment this can be seen in the fact that Fraser passed the budget immediately on being appointed.
(3) If this is a normal constitutional practice, it could have been used to bring down a large number of Australian governments, but wasn't.--Jack Upland 02:41, 18 November 2005 (UTC)

"Kerr" vs "Sir John"

User:Lord Emsworth - Using just the surname is not incorrect on second or subsequent uses. Also, Australian usage is the way it was - he's always referred to as "Kerr"; the "Sir John" throughout version introduces unnecessary confusion. Further, you went through this already on WP:FAC (in the discussion on Sir Ian McKellen), where surname for second or subsequent usage was established to fit style guides and policy. (And WP:FAC is where I'd like to see this article.) - David Gerard 07:05, 30 Jun 2004 (UTC)

The passing of the bills on 11/11

The article currently states that the Labor senators were unaware that Fraser had been appointed PM. My understanding was that they had indeed been informed, but only by the Liberal senators, who they disbelieved. Does anyone have any information on this? Lacrimosus

I'll check what November 1975 has to say about this. I think your version tallies with Kelly's book. --Robert Merkel 11:16, 8 Nov 2004 (UTC)
Pages 267 - 269 are the relevant pages. Kelly's book is widely accepted as the definitive history - Kelly's reputation as a journalist is impeccable and he draws on interviews with all the main players in the story. It appears that news of the dismissal had not broken when the Senate reconvened at 1400, though announcements were being distributed to the Press Gallery boxes upstairs, so the Labor senators were in the dark when they moved into the Senate chamber. Wriedt and McClelland were the ALP leaders in the senate, and they both disbelieved the news when they first heard it, according to their accounts. Labor senators John Button and Don Willesee had both heard rumours and informed Wriedt and McClelland, but were not believed. Very few people on that day, beginning with Gough Whitlam, heard the initial news with any degree of calm. Which is fair enough.
Kelly goes into the timing in some detail, but the end result is that Supply was passed without the ALP senators fully understanding what they were doing. I don't think it matters much - the Government could have passed Supply even without the Opposition senators. Skyring 23:23, 23 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Labour Policy

I deleted the statement "It had been long-standing Labor policy (implemented in Queensland) to abolish upper houses as anti-democratic." I have never heard of such an ALP policy. I won't object to the statement going back in if someone can offer a source.

The abolution of the upper house in Qld (1922) was bipartisan AFAIK, and was at the least apolitical (the Qld upper house was blocking all bills AFAIK). Robertbrockway 06:39, 24 Apr 2005 (UTC)

I don't have a source, but I remember comments from 30 years ago that it was ALP policy to abolish all upper houses, and the only place where the policy was instituted was Queensland. The Labor Party has very rarely had control of both upper and lower houses in any legislative domain to institute such a policy. Obviously this requires some 'policy' research to tidy this question up conclusively.--Takver 07:27, 24 Apr 2005 (UTC)
I just consulted A.L.P. The story of the Labor Party by George Healey (1955) and it states the ALP interstate conference of June 1918, in Perth, resolved as policy that the Commonwealth Constitution be amended so that "The Senate to be abolished..." and for the Commonwealth to be vested with the power "to create any number of provinces as may be necessary for the good local government of the people". I don't have details if the policy has been revoked, but it may have been quietly dropped in the 1980s or 1990s.--Takver 07:59, 24 Apr 2005 (UTC)
It was, in the 80's, but the ALP retains a policy commitment to constitutional reform, which could potentially extend to abolishing the Senate. I don't recall when exactly, I don't think it's in The Light on the Hill.
Its entirely possible that the Problem lay in the Conservative Gerymander in some states that does/did exist. This is playing out in Western Australia where laws are/have been amended to equalise seat sizes in the senate. Offhand I would suspect attempts at abolishing senates would not be recieved well by a populace skeptical of constitutional change - Shayne
You might find it useful to sign your Discussion edits with four tildes (that squiggly things just above the Tab key) in a row. That puts in your name and gives it a timestamp.
The various electoral malapportionments tended to affect lower houses rather than upper. The Bjelkemander was one of the more notorious. Despite Keating's comments about "unrepresentative swill", the Senate is elected using electorates consisting of entire States, is reasonably representative, and is one of the fundamental components of our Federation. Abolishing the Senate would mean passing a Constitutional Amendment Bill, which would probably not get through the Senate, and so would have to be submitted twice before being put to the people. It is difficult to see the voters in the smaller (population-wise) States voting YES to such a proposal, and as four States must support an amendment, the chances of succes are slim. Nowadays it is rare for a Government to likewise control the Senate and so there is not the incentive for reform that there was in the earlier years of federation when results tended to be far more lopsided. Pete 23:09, 22 May 2005 (UTC)
Re: the Legislative Council in Queensland: It wasn't really bipartisan, and it probably wouldn't have stayed abolished if the conservatives had not remained out of office in Queensland for an extended period. Labor governments in the first half of the 20th Cent had enormous troubles with state upper houses, as they tended to be dominated by conservative grandees without fear of electoral scrutiny. Slac speak up! 10:05, 24 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Mind Reading

Some statements in the article are guesses at the motives of the participants. I have corrected them to bring them in line with checkable sources. Sir John Kerr was not feeling immediately insecure in his position. I know from private sources that he knew he had several days before he could be dismissed, that being the time required for written advice to be couriered to the Queen and a withdrawal of Kerr's commission as Governor-General to be couriered back, with the addition of whatever time the Queen felt necessary for consulting with her own advisers. This protocol had been arranged beforehand. Kerr knew that he could not be dismissed with a phone call. The principal characters in the drama have all written their memoirs and Kerr states that he acted so as to keep the Queen out of partisan politics. Unless some other source has turned up since then we must go with Kerr's statement, and anything to the contrary should be clearly labelled as supposition.

Kerr did not covertly seek advice from Sir Garfield Barwick. Barwick's visit to Admiralty House was noted and published in the vice-regal calendar, and printed in the usual newspapers on the morning of 11 November. Furthermore, his advice was not advice in the constitutional sense but from one lawyer to another. Barwick had considered his actions carefully and decided that he could give advice on non-justiciable matters, such as the use of the reserve powers.

Kerr met with Fraser on 6 November with Whitlam's knowledge and approval. There was no question of Fraser going behind the Prime Minister's back, nor of it being a risky move. The Governor-General is entitled to inform himself of the political situation. There is no "allegedly" about Fraser's statements during this meeting. Both Kerr and Fraser have revealed the substance of the conversation.

I urge editors to look through the published accounts of the crisis, both those of the principals, and those of commentators, especially the book written by Paul Kelly "November 1975", which must be regarded as the definitive account. Pete 07:04, 18 May 2005 (UTC)

Just so you know, most of what you call "mind reading" is the direct conclusions made by Kelly in November 1975, particularly in regard to Kerr. Yes, they do need to be sourced, but they are quite accurate in time with what was said in the book. Slac speak up! 23:09, 18 May 2005 (UTC)
I'm using Kelly's book and cannot find anything to support the precise statements I have modified. I specifically checked, but if you have found something I didn't, then I would be glad to see it. Pete 00:23, 19 May 2005 (UTC)

Why didn't Kerr seek a dissolution directly?

In New Zealand the Governor-General has the power to dissolve parliament. Isn't that true in Australia? It seems like a double-dissolution was called for, since without supply a government cannot continue to govern and you can't blame it on only one house. Why did Kerr appoint a new Prime Minister? Ben Arnold 13:12, 7 August 2005 (UTC)

Because Kerr could not have risked unilaterally dissolving the Parliament: he had to be advised to do so. There needed to be a Prime Minister: administering Government departments directly would have eradicated the last shreds of constitutional propriety (and conceivably would have violated the constitutional text, which states that the G-G shall appoint ministers). Slac speak up! 21:27, 7 August 2005 (UTC)

Kerr's Cur/Curr ?

I've only ever seen the spelling "cur", not "curr". I haven't changed the main article, as this may be a specifically Australian spelling, or I may just be wrong (!), but this may be worth checking. WMMartin 10:08, 16 August 2005 (UTC)

It's cur. - Aaron Hill 11:43, August 16, 2005 (UTC)
OK. Edited appropriately. WMMartin 10:09, 18 August 2005 (UTC)

USA government role (CIA)

The first time i heard about this stuff, i thought, well, why haven't i ever heard about it? Is it conspiracy theory or is it NPOVable facts? i've tried to put up what seem to be uncontroversial facts as facts, and less well established statements as claims. But anyone please help with NPOVing.

It seems to me that the claim that Kerr was a member of a CIA front organisation the Australian Association for Cultural Freedom, is not contested by anybody.

The claim that he was a member of its executive board only seems to be stated in John Pilger's citation of William Blum (sources below). The claims that Christopher Boyce says that CIA agents considered Kerr to be our man Kerr are stated in a few different sources.

The importance of Pine Gap to the US seems to be uncontroversial. There is discussion on Whitlam's conflict with the CIA in the Watching Brief interview below. e.g. Meanwhile Whitlam said he would detail the operations of Pine Gap in Parliament on the afternoon of November 11. Boud 16:36, 11 November 2005 (UTC)

Kerr also helped to found Lawasia in 1966, and was its first President to 1970. Lawasia was funded by The Asia Foundation, a notable CIA front of the time, with offices in all major Asian cities. Source is former CIA Agent Victor Marchetti. (Marchetti, Victor and Marks, John D. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. New York: Dell Publishing, 1975)

William Blum devotes several pages to the Dismissal of the Whitlam Government in his book Killing Hope - U.S. Military and CIA interventions since World War II[1] ISBN 1551640961 Black Rose Books, 1998. It uses circumstantial evidence similar and overlapping with The Hidden Australia article (link below), but puts it into the perspective of one of numerous political interventions by the CIA. Former CIA Officer Victor Marchetti had revealed in early 1975 that the CIA had funded both opposition parties since the 1960s. At the beginning of November 1975 it was revealed in the press that a former CIA officer, Richard Lee Stallings, had been channelling funds to Doug Anthony, leader of the Country Party. It was also revealed at the time that the US bases in the hinterland were CIA creations, and that Stallings had been the first head of much of the operations. This coverage spurred Whitlam to investigate the facilities, as well as demanding a full list of CIA operatives in Australia. This spurred the Australian military intelligence community and the CIA into a flurry of activity, which also involved Kerr in several meetings. Whitlam was due to make an announcement on the US Bases and CIA activity on the afternoon of November 11. Coincidence?

The arguments and documents are all circumstantial, but together make a reasonable argument that the CIA played an impotant role in the destabilisation of the Whitlam Government, and through Kerr, effectively dismissed the Government at a time when the security and secrecy of US intelligence operations, bases and operatives were under potential threat. We may find more when classified documents are released from 1975 on the 1st January 2006 by Australian National Archives. --Takver 14:00, 18 November 2005 (UTC)

A timeline of some of the security intelligence events outlined in Killing Time by William Blum --Takver 15:58, 18 November 2005 (UTC)

Early 1975 * Revelations that the CIA had been funding both the Liberal and Country Party since the 1960s
* Heads of ASIO and ASIS dismissed by Whitlam in seperate incidents, the latter over ASIS cooperation with the CIA in East Timor
* Victorian MP, Joan Coxsedge, alledges that during 1975 Whitlam Government correspondence was routinely leaked to the media. "There was an unparalleled campaign of personal vituperation, hinting at incompetence, dissenssion, corruption, and private scandal within the ranks of the government."
Early November revealed in the press that a former CIA officer, Richard Lee Stallings, had been channelling funds to Doug Anthony, leader of the Country Party. It was also revealed at the time that the US bases in the hinterland were CIA creations, and that Stallings had been the first head of much of the operations. This coverage spurred Whitlam to investigate the facilities, as well as demanding a full list of CIA operatives in Australia.
6 November Defence Department Head Arthur Thang met with Kerr. Aftwards remarks that Whitlam is "the greatest risk to our nation's security that there has ever been."
8 November * Senior Defence official meets Kerr re Whitlam jeopardizing security of US bases in Australia
* CIA Washington informs local ASIO station that all intelligence links would be cut off unless a satisfactory explanation was given of Whitlam's behaviour
9 November Kerr received at Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) for a briefing
10 November Telex from ASIO station in Washington, at the request of the CIA, to ASIO HQ: "CIA can not see how this dialogue with continued reference to CIA can do other than blow the lid off these installations"
11 November * Kerr dismisses Whitlam
* Whitlam purportedly due to make announcement on Pine Gap base


I dunno, I think the article gives a reasonably fair account of the evidence and and strength of support for the "CIA told Kerr to do it" theory. --Robert Merkel 00:06, 19 November 2005 (UTC)

I think the amount of space devoted to it is way out of proportion to what most experts would say (which should be the criteria of what's including, NPOV and all that). It's a whole section, that's ridiculous. I propose shortening it to one paragraph with an external link or two. Rocksong 10:29, 13 March 2006 (UTC)

was section: U.S. Involvement

This is a very unlikely cause, and has not been treated seriously by historians and political scientists alike. I have removed it for the time being as it belongs in a "Conspiracy Theories" category. Failing this, it should be reincluded, but without its own subheading, and in a more condensed form. It has previously been given far too much attention and only detracts from the credibility of the article. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by [[User:{{{1}}}|{{{1}}}]] ([[User talk:{{{1}}}|talk]] • [[Special:Contributions/{{{1}}}|contribs]]).

The fact that the USA was opposed to the Whitlam government is hardly conspiracy theory. The fact that Kerr was closely associated with the CIA is an NPOV fact. How strong the role of the USA government was via its various agencies and whether or not it was an important factor are questions which can reasonably be disputed and require external, verifiable references. Boud 14:20, 24 September 2006 (UTC)
I think it should be a separate page, with a single link from the main page, as is the case with 9/11 conspiracy theories. I'm glad you removed it, it was totally out of place in an otherwise good article. p.s. Remember to sign your posts. Rocksong 03:33, 3 July 2006 (UTC). p.s. I've moved this section to the end of the page. Rocksong 03:36, 3 July 2006 (UTC)
It's not a conspiracy theory - it doesn't deny Kerr's role nor the fact of supply being blocked and it's not a question of some special group of people plotting Whitlam's downfall. It's just recognising an aspect of standard history: that the USA and USSR were two superpowers both trying to maximise their political/economic influence around the world. On the other hand, if we get more external references, then of course a bigger individual page on the subject could be started, but it would require more "secondary" research. Boud 14:20, 24 September 2006 (UTC)
By that logic, every article dealing with history between 1950 and 1990 needs a subsection on the interests of the USA and USSR. Wikipedia is to reflect the mainstream, not the lunatic fringe. How much space do the mainstream books (e.g. Paul Kelly's) dedicate to theories of USA involvement? The removal of the section was not arbitary. It was done for a reason and I fully supported it. Rocksong 01:04, 25 September 2006 (UTC)
i think you'll find that many articles dealing with history between 1950 and 1990 do indeed have sections on the role of USA and/or USSR - the two superpowers were involved in destabilising or overthrowing or retaining effective control over their client states: this is mainstream history. Whether one or both did this for good or bad reasons is opinion. But the fact that they did it is rather uncontroversial AFAIK. i also don't understand why you're using the term "lunatic fringe" to describe information that you happened to be unaware of. Wikipedia is not about voting for the most popular opinions. More specifically, it seems to me rather inaccurate to describe 60 Minutes and a member of the Australian Parliament, Peter Staples, as "lunatic fringe". i don't know much about Peter Staples, but you don't get elected to parliament and spend six years as a Minister while being in the lunatic fringe. Boud 01:13, 10 October 2006 (UTC)


arbitrary removal of content by Maximus Meridius

In this edit on 26 June 2006, User:Maximus Meridius arbitrarily removed the USA role section: [2]

So i'm putting it back, i'll try to add a bit more references.

Boud 14:25, 24 September 2006 (UTC)

photo description

I dont think that the description on current pic is correct. Its looks more like a Melb rally held at the time. Far more people are shown than were ever at Canberra and GW is on a high landing, which doesnt exist at Old PH. So could you change it to reflect reality? 128.250.99.135 02:13, 6 December 2005 (UTC)

What is a "french-polisher?"

From here: Bjelke-Petersen refused the Labor Party's candidate as replacement Senator, Mal Colston, in favour of obscure french-polisher Albert Patrick Field, Is a "french polisher" in this context literally someone who polishes furniture, or is this some sort of Australian political slang? --Saforrest 13:15, 10 May 2006 (UTC)

At the Albert Field article there's this external link: [3], which says he was a polisher by trade. So it's not slang, it was his occupation. Rocksong 23:39, 10 May 2006 (UTC)
It's not political slang - it's a genuine occupation. I'm not sure of the definition exactly, but it definitely exists. Ambi 01:00, 11 May 2006 (UTC)
French polish is a particular type of wood varnish based on shellac. A french polisher is a person who applies that varnish to furniture. Slac speak up! 03:08, 11 May 2006 (UTC)
Wikipedia to the rescue yet again! See french polish. JackofOz 05:16, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

French was a union president- not as obscure as Labor partisans like to suggest 203.184.55.172 (talk) 06:52, 7 October 2008 (UTC)

But he worked as a Polish fielder, right?--Jack Upland (talk) 10:00, 14 July 2009 (UTC)

Great article!

Could do with some citations though. - FrancisTyers · 12:26, 25 June 2006 (UTC)


removed this sentence

This would not have prevented Bjelke-Petersen from replacing Milliner with Field, but it would have prevented Lewis from replacing Murphy with Bunton.

In the same situation, the Labor Party's national executive could have stripped Field of his membership, at which point the nomination to the Senate would lapse. But getting into the complexities of what is hypothetically possible under this amendment is beyond the scope of this article, which is about 1975. --Robert Merkel 08:44, 3 July 2006 (UTC)

Australian Collaboration of the Fortnight

Australian constitutional crisis of 1975 has been nominated for Wikipedia:Australian Collaboration of the Fortnight. Vote for it now. Todd661 05:45, 31 July 2006 (UTC)

Introduction is a mess

The introduction is a bit of a mess. We've got a one paragraph summary (just added on 12-Aug), followed by a two paragraph summary. There should be one or the other. Rocksong 01:03, 14 August 2006 (UTC)

Point taken. I'm not so sure though, as it covers all the necessary happenings. Jpe|ob 01:27, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

Had a go at a rewrite, for better or worse. The previous version's last sentence isn't innapropriate, but belongs elsewhere within the article. Hide&Reason 10:27, 19 August 2006 (UTC)

I appreciate your effort, but I think it was a mistake to remove the last sentence. The fact that an election is called was very important. Rocksong 03:23, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

Title: move to The Dismissal ?

Why is this page here? Why not at The Dismissal, which is what everyone calls it? Regards, Ben Aveling 02:15, 22 October 2006 (UTC)

"The Dismissal" is just the name of the tv miniseries based upon the actual events. Renaming historical events after subsequent fictional retellings of them is very poor practice, and certainly not "everyone" calls the former, the latter. One may as well rename the article on D-Day "Saving Private Ryan". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 203.12.97.92 (talk) 14:30, 29 November 2008 (UTC)

I would strongly oppose such a move since the title lacks context. Don't forget that Wikipedia is an international encyclopedia and "The Dismissal" is a colloquial term that has no meaning to anyone unfamiliar with Australian history. The least you could get away with is "The Whitlam Dismissal". --  Netsnipe  ►  09:05, 22 October 2006 (UTC)
But does 'Australian constitutional crisis of 1975' mean anything to anyone? It confused me, and I do like to think of myself as passingly politically literate. The standard rule is to name things as per their name, not as per descriptions of them. Regards, Ben Aveling 11:12, 22 October 2006 (UTC)
Consider the scope of the article: if this were confined solely to the actual dismissal, then something like "the dismissal" (or "Whitlam dismissal", there have been other dismissals) would be appropriate. But this article covers the whole crisis, from the casual vacancies scandals, through the actual vacancies to the aftermath and, to some extent, the impact on the political system itself. Thus the current title is more accurate than simply "the dismissal". Moreover I think this is the correct scope for the article to have. --bainer (talk) 13:28, 22 October 2006 (UTC)
I'm not arguing with the scope, but I would argue that all of those things are part of this thing that's called "the dismissal". When it comes to titles, accuracy is generally less important than common usage. I don't see why the dismissal should be an exception. Regards, Ben Aveling 22:47, 22 October 2006 (UTC)

It wasn't 'common usage' until after the TV show, if then (yet to see any evidence for how 'common' the usage is. At the time, the common vernacular descriptions used terms like "Whitlam's sacking". Why do people who weren't even alive at the time want to rewrite history written by people who were there? Again, this looks like mistaking the TV adaption for the reality.

I don't think you can see e.g. the deferral of Supply as part of the dismissal per se. The dismissal was the culmination of the crisis. The lumping of this all together implied that the dismissal logically followed from the supply crisis, a POV that Whitlam among others would certainly reject. Slac speak up! 01:02, 23 October 2006 (UTC)
And combine that with the fact that supply and Senate vacancies are not merely factual background to the dismissal, but separate constitutional controversies in and of themselves. Collectively these events are the crisis of 1975. --bainer (talk) 02:57, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

The current title is a bit wordy, but certainly accurate. Take out the word "Australian", and what's left ("constitutional crisis of 1975") is more or less what it is often called here in Australia. I think the current title should stay, but I'd have no objection to "The Dismissal" and/or "Whitlam Dismissal" being linked to it. Rocksong 03:20, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

"The Dismissal" is the TV show, and the name dates from then. Calling the actual event after the TV show is wrong, wrong, wrong.

So called Constiution Crisis

Why not wikipedia refer to this sequence of events as the 'so called' constitutional crisis. Acoording to you own encyclopedia a constitutional crisis is a severe breakdown in the smooth operation of government.

Australia did not experience a break down in working government. The point where the federal government could not pay police and public servants and the army had not arrived. The "reserve powers" are there so no "break down" can ever occur in the first place.

58.168.82.184 08:01, 1 November 2006 (UTC)

It may be (and bear in mind that I'm no political scientist, just a historian who takes a keen interest in these things) that "breakdown" is a relative term. Yes, there wasn't a civil war or any of the other nasty consequences of constitutional crises the world over, but I'd argue that "the smooth operation of government" is at least harmed somewhat by the Prime Minister of the day being replaced by a leader of the opposition party. What you seem to be requiring before a constitutional crisis can be declared is (as you say) "a breakdown in working government", which I think is quite a different thing but can most definitely be caused by a breakdown in the smooth operation of government. BigHaz - Schreit mich an 11:12, 11 November 2006 (UTC)

I believe there was no constitutional crisis. The Constitution remained fully operational throughout. Its suspension was never threatened by anyone who has that power (if indeed anyone does). Grassynoel 08:57, 23 May 2007 (UTC)

Actually, if you go on to read the rest of the constitutional crisis opening paragraph, it's pretty clear that this fits the definition quite neatly. Slac speak up! 09:17, 23 May 2007 (UTC)

I would say that the suggestion that this was the most serious constitutional crisis faced by Australia is POV. It was a crisis, but hardly serious.

203.184.55.172 (talk) 06:54, 7 October 2008 (UTC)

The article already has one reference calling it "the greatest political crisis in Australia’s history"[4], and here are three more: "Australia's greatest constitutional and political crisis"[5], "the most dramatic event in the history of the Australian federation"[6], "the most extraordinary political and constitutional crisis in the history of Australia's Federation"[7] Can you suggest an alternative constitutional crisis which was more serious? I'm reverting the article until you can. Peter Ballard (talk) 08:27, 7 October 2008 (UTC)

This was by no means a crisis: it was an example of how the Constitution is crafted in such a way as to ensure the orderly transition of power from one government to another. All rules were obeyed and no one broke the law or acted unconstitutionally. Rather than a constitutional crisis, it showed how robust the Australian Constitution is.--HMGovernment (talk) 04:52, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

The "reserve powers" are hardly an example of how the Constitution is "crafted": they are not even mentioned in the Constitution. It is not and has never been generally accepted that blocking supply or dismissing a legitimate government is constitutionally correct. The peaceful outcome only occurred because Whitlam, firstly, accept another election, and, secondly, lost. Who knows what would have happened if these two conditions hadn't been met. That's what makes it a crisis!--Jack Upland (talk) 08:57, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

Constitutional Conventions

Should it be noted the array of constitutional conventions that were broken during this time? There were a large number of them, and i think a section on it would be appropriate - what does everyone else think? Twenty Years 15:02, 4 April 2007 (UTC)

Senate Numbers

(p.s. I've already asked this at Talk:Australian general election, 1974 without success). About the Senate numbers: after the Australian federal election, 1974 the Senate numbers were Coalition 29, Labor 29, Independent 1, LM 1. The LM member sided with Labor on the supply bills, but in February 1975 the independent, Michael Townley, joined the Liberals.[8]. So that gave the Coalition 30 seats. My question: since bills are rejected on a tied vote, didn't the Liberals already have the numbers (30 out of 60) to block supply? In other words, how did Joh's appointment of Albert Field - widely touted as the reason Fraser could block supply - make any difference? Peter Ballard 02:23, 14 June 2007 (UTC)

Answering my own question, I found this link at the Albert Field page: Parliamentary Library paper Candidates, Members and the Constitution (see section The Field Affair). It says in part:
"Prior to Field's appointment the numbers in the Senate had been 30 Coalition, 27 ALP and two Independents both of whom were prepared to support the Government in passing the Supply Bills. Field's appointment was crucial because it gave the Opposition the tactical option of voting to defer consideration of Supply rather than having to vote against it outright."
I think this point should be worked into the article. Peter Ballard 06:39, 14 June 2007 (UTC)
Mind you, I don't see how the difference is "crucial". I suspect it's to do with the subtleties of parliamentary procedure, which I don't know enough about. Can anyone add light to this? Peter Ballard 00:28, 15 June 2007 (UTC)
One of the key points in much of this is that the Senate didn't actually reject the supply bills but instead they deferred consideration. The former requires an outright vote, which on a 30:30 split would have defeated the bill. The latter would be a procedural motion (or whatever term is used) that would require an actual majority to pass - a 30:30 split would have defeated deferral and forced the Senate to vote on Supply itself. I'm not to clear why the Opposition didn't go for an outright defeat, although given the reported uncertainties amongst some Liberal senators it may be that the leadership didn't want to risk an outright vote that could have some of their own side abstaining or voting in favour. Timrollpickering 11:15, 28 June 2007 (UTC)
Exactly. Whitlam has always asserted - based on sound evidence, in Kelly's view - that the Opposition did not have the numbers to reject the supply bills, as a number of Coalition senators would have crossed the floor against such a move. The reason for their nervousness is fairly easy to understand - rejection of the supply bills would have given Whitlam very clear constitutional grounds for action - cf. the House of Lords in 1911. To split this hair meant that Fraser had a (shaky) basis for asserting that it was Whitlam, rather than the Senate, that was withholding government funds. The implication was that the Senate was happy to pass the supply bills - but only after an election had been called. Gaming the system in this way was reassurance enough for Fraser that he was not in fact ignoring the constitutional authority of the lower house. Slac speak up! 06:02, 23 July 2007 (UTC)

Who's dismissing who?

From the article: "if the Governor-General did not act decisively then the Prime Minister could without notice dismiss the Governor-General and maintain the deadlock indefinitely." But my understanding was that, while the G-G could dismiss the PM, the PM could only suggest to the queen that she dismiss the G-G. The sentence I quoted seems to indicate that either official could dismiss the other, and there could conceivably have been a race to see who would do it first. Is that sentence incorrect? --Motley Fool 20:25, 16 August 2007 (UTC)

Yes it's the PM who advises the Queen to dismiss the Governor General. However ever more constitutional conventions start evaporating if the Queen declines to act on the advice of her Prime Minister (and it really would inflame republicanism!).
The obscure bit is just how long it would take to dismiss the Governor General - even in this day and age of faxes and emails, the Queen may still have to sign the letter of dismissal and have that, not a copy, given to them. And if I've got the time zones right, then during most of the events of November 11th the Queen would have been asleep. I somehow doubt she would be woken at, say, 03:30 in the morning her time by a call from someone who may or may not still be the Prime Minister and immediately dial up the Governor General to sack him. (And if the GG can be dismissed by royal phone call, what happens if the PM advises the Queen to sack the GG, then whilst the Queen is getting the phonebook out, the GG sacks the PM, but then the Queen makes the call and immediately sacks the GG before an alternative PM can make it to the GG's mansion?!) Timrollpickering 20:50, 16 August 2007 (UTC)
The Prime Minister advises the Queen, who would take her own time in withdrawing the Governor-General's commission, though of course she could not delay more than a few days. Unless the protocol has been changed in the years since, a written instrument from the PM would need to be couriered, and the Queen would likewise issue a written instrument to the G-G, withdrawing his commission. Kerr talks of Whitlam saying, after being advised that Kerr intended dismissing him, that he must contact the Palace and looking wildly around for a telephone, and Kerr then acted immediately, turning over the second letter.
Kerr was not afraid of Whitlam advising the Queen over the phone, because the protocol outlined above was in place, but rather of involving the Queen at all, which would be embarrassing. --Pete 00:12, 25 August 2007 (UTC)
Not just embarrassing—unAustralian! In the first place, why would a proud republican like Whitlam (who habitually publicly rejected and 'put down' the Palace) wish to demean himself by crawling to HM? Would that not undermine the already traditional succession of Australian 'heads of state', including the (presumed pro-ALP) one he himself had just appointed—Kerr? Secondly, the Queen had already (correctly) made up her mind that any solution to the Australian parliamentary deadlock was a matter for the Australian nation to come up with. (I later wrote to the Palace and had this confirmed in the reply.) Cheers Bjenks 01:05, 25 August 2007 (UTC)
Was Whitlam already a republican in 1975? I've read somewhere that he asserts it was the events of 1975 that made him so. But politicians in moments of such crisis often drop principles and will look anywhere for an expedient route - during the King-Byng Affair affair William Lyon Mackenzie King tried to demand that the Canadian Governor General communicate with London on the matter, something totally anathema to King's professed nationalism but entirely in line with a politician who plays fast and loose with the rules seeking to remain in power by whatever means. King subsequently made much of the imperial issue and sought a redefinition of the Governor General's role in public, yet in both that affair and this the Governor General exercised powers that would have equally resided in a president of an independent state acting as an umpire. (Indeed in a republic there would be the additional factor that the President could claim some form of democratic or parliamentary appointed legitimacy to take a controversial step towards resolution.) Timrollpickering 02:37, 25 August 2007 (UTC)

A lot of mythology has grown up around this minor crisis, fostered by republicans with an agenda. The Governor-General may be technically the Queen's representative, but no one could use that as an argument for a republic. The same situation could have arisen in a republic.

203.184.55.172 (talk) 06:58, 7 October 2008 (UTC)

Was the double dissolution ever disputed?

On one of the radio programmes from the day archived at The Whitlam Dismissal one professor suggested that the grounds for a double dissolution (the bills passed by the House and rejected by the Senate) might not have been valid (as Fraser was hardly seeking to get these bills passed over the head of an obstructive Senate). Whilst the constitutional text quoted at Australian electoral system#Double Dissolutions seems to me to give the Governor General the power even if the government has no intention of getting the bills through, was there any major debate about this point at the time or since? Timrollpickering 11:41, 29 August 2007 (UTC)

Sir David Smith's book notes that Sir John Kerr wanted to make sure that if Whitlam won the election, he would be able to pass all of the bills denied by the Senate, just as he had the previous year in a joint sitting. Of course Fraser wasn't interested in passing the bills, but Kerr didn't prejudge the voters' decision. He was being fair to Whitlam. --Pete 17:27, 29 August 2007 (UTC)
Is Smith a terribly neutral source? He's been a rather staunch defender of Kerr and a fearsome critic of Whitlam. But in any case not even the Governonr General can just double dissolve when he feels like it - there has to be a conflict for him to be advised to resolve (and by the time he double dissolved supply had been resolved) and a new Prime Minister advising a double dissolution on the legal fiction of bills that the previous government couldn't get through & so should the people should decide does strike me as a bit dubious. But if this is a point that's not been argued about then it isn't necessary for the article. Timrollpickering 17:53, 29 August 2007 (UTC)
There are some news reports and speeches from the time at http://www.whitlam.org/ which might help you to gauge this. In particular, there is a speech by Whitlam the next day (12-Nov-1975) at http://www.whitlam.org/collection/1975/19751112_Rally_Parliament/ . From quick scan of it, it seems that Whitlam accepted that the double dissolution had happened, and was getting on with campaigning. (Which is also my recollection of the event, young as I was). So in short, I don't think anyone attempted to legally dispute it at the time. Peter Ballard 05:32, 30 August 2007 (UTC)
Or since. If there had ever been the slightest doubt about the constitutional validity of the DD, it would have been raised long, long ago. The crisis was that the government couldn't get its appropriation bills through the Senate. These were the budget bills for financial year 1975-76, and they had nothing to do with the other bills that the Senate had twice stalled. These other bills, which were the triggers for the double dissolution, were not passed on 11 November just because the prime ministership had changed hands. Also, the point about the government not having any intention of getting the bills through is not relevant. Even when a bill is passed by both houses and receives Royal Assent, and is now law, it still doesn't necessarily come into effect straight away (or ever). Many acts contain clauses that deem the acts (or parts of them) to come into effect only when the G-G (advised by the government) issues a proclamation that says when they will come into effect. So, a government can often delay the practical effect of an act until it suits them. But even if they intend to delay the proclamation of an act indefinitely, they can still use the Senate's obstruction of the relevant bill as a trigger for a DD, and the G-G has no say in this. Further, the appropriation bills were never the trigger for the double dissolution because they had never been rejected by the Senate. All the Senate did was defer consideration of them. They never put them to the vote and formally rejected them. It might amount to the same thing as far as the voters are concerned, but legally there's a clear difference. -- JackofOz 05:53, 30 August 2007 (UTC)

Which reminds me that our article doesn't mention the bills that were the triggers for the 75 DD. They're as follows (quote from Odgers' Australian Senate Practice)

The bills forming the basis for the simultaneous dissolutions of the Senate and the House of Representatives were, as cited in the Proclamation of 11 November 1975 :

  • Health Insurance Levy Bill 1974
  • Health Insurance Levy Assessment Bill 1974
  • Income Tax (International Agreements) Bill 1974
  • Minerals (Submerged Lands) Bill 1974
  • Minerals (Submerged Lands) (Royalty) Bill 1974
  • National Health Bill 1974
  • Conciliation and Arbitration Bill 1974
  • Conciliation and Arbitration Bill (No. 2) 1974
  • National Investment Fund Bill 1974
  • Electoral Laws Amendment Bill 1974
  • Electoral Bill 1975
  • Privy Council Appeals Abolition Bill 1975
  • Superior Court of Australia Bill 1974
  • Electoral Re-distribution (New South Wales) Bill 1975
  • Electoral Re-distribution (Queensland) Bill 1975
  • Electoral Re-distribution (South Australia) Bill 1975
  • Electoral Re-distribution (Tasmania) Bill 1975
  • Electoral Re-distribution (Victoria) Bill 1975
  • Broadcasting and Television Bill (No. 2) 1974
  • Television Stations Licence Fees Bill 1974
  • Broadcasting Stations Licence Fees Bill 1974.

Any thoughts on how we should present this material in the article? In my view, it should be presented, because many, many people confuse the Appropriation Bills (which were passed on 11 November) with the DD triggers (which weren't). -- JackofOz 06:28, 30 August 2007 (UTC)

As a follow up on the original point, Antony Green's blog has recently run a number of posts about the likelihood, possibility and constitutional hurdles that the Rudd government would have to go through to get a double dissolution and from then I think I can see what the original issue might have been. One point that stands out is that the courts can't undo a double dissolution or the election after the event but can rule the legislation unconstitutional if it's been advanced to the statute books via a double dissolution plus a joint sitting if it's found the procedures were not fully followed.

It's completely academic for 1975 because the bills never got anywhere. However it did hit one piece of legislation in 1974 which hadn't had the required 3 month wait. It can also raise potential problems if the legislation is found to need amending only after the original bill fails to get through the Senate - this killed the Australia Card in 1987. (The possibility of a government engineering a double dissolution by using its own Senators to block a bill was raised in the comments on one post but is likely to get batted down as unconstitutional either by the GG or the courts ruling the GG had incorrectly applied the powers. A DD is supposed to be for resolving conflicts between the houses, not for allowing a government the chance to choose whichever type of election is politically advantageous.) Timrollpickering (talk) 14:52, 12 October 2009 (UTC)

Opposition members?

I've reverted a whole bunch of edits that are of dubious correctness and lousy spelling. It is simply wrong to say that opposition members were appointed to the Senate, for example. --Pete 16:53, 2 September 2007 (UTC)

Opposition members don't necessarily need to be part of the other major party to be considered so. Both the independent and ex-ALP given the posts were more or less against the government's legislative agenda - in effect making them part of the opposition, not the govt. Yawn. Timeshift 23:41, 2 September 2007 (UTC)
Interesting view, but confusing to those readers more used to a conventional definition. --Pete 00:11, 3 September 2007 (UTC)
Interesting view? So voting against the government doesn't make them part of the opposition? Timeshift 00:18, 3 September 2007 (UTC)

Whitlam, model PM?

The article currently portrays Whitlam as a demigod:

The Whitlam government, which was elected in 1972 after 23 years of conservative rule, had introduced several social reforms immediately after gaining office. These included the creation of the Medibank universal health care system (later renamed Medicare), the introduction of no-fault divorce legislation, and the abolition of fees for tertiary education. On the other hand, many people were confused by what seemed to be a breakneck pace of reform, and what was seen as Whitlam's "crash through or crash" style of governance, especially after the long period of very staid, conservative policies that had preceded it.[citation needed] These concerns were amplified by concerted anti-Whitlam pressure from increasingly hostile mass media, and by the tendency of inexperienced and idealistic Ministers to "shoot themselves in the foot". Relations with bodies such as the public service (particularly the Treasury) and the trade union movement were often tense. The economy was beset by stagflation and other problems. Many of these problems had their origins in the time of the previous government, or with the 1973 oil crisis, and continued unabated after the Whitlam government fell, but were successfully associated in many people's minds with alleged "Labor mismanagement".

The reality is that Whitlam's government(s) had many problems, the biggest of which was incompetence. He lost public support, not because people hated Medicare or free uni education, or the media turned against him, but because his government was beset by a series of crises and the economy dived. This Whitylam whitewash needs rewriting to be less partisan. --Pete 17:11, 2 September 2007 (UTC)

Does anyone still take you seriously skyring? Timeshift 23:39, 2 September 2007 (UTC)
That ad-hominem stuff is an unhelpful indulgence, surely. We should 'take seriously' any commentator on Whitlam who was around at the time of his government and whose views are open to fair comment and criticism. Cheers Bjenks 04:26, 3 September 2007 (UTC)

Chronological order of dismissal section

In my opinion the section on the dismissal is hard to follow and needs to be re-written citing dates of particular events. I fail to understand whether the double dissolution happened before or after the blocking of supply. Also are these event in 1974 or in the same year as the dismissal 1975. MichaelPaulson 06:51, 23 September 2007 (UTC)

There was a double dissolution election in 1974, which Whitlam called, in order to try and get some legislation through. It didn't work, so Whitlam called Australia's only joint parliamentary sitting (so far) and used that to get the Labor Government's legislation through. There was another double dissolution election in 1975 - which occurred after the blocking of supply - it was called by Fraser. Hope this clears it up. LudBob 10:04, 8 November 2007 (UTC)

Double dissolution

Did Kerr insist on a double dissolution per se, or merely on calling an election for both houses? Normally, an election is for the Reps and half the Senate. Is that all that Kerr wanted, or did Fraser go the extra mile and put the whole parliament up for election? -- JackofOz 10:09, 3 December 2007 (UTC)

If you know where the electrion results are you can find out based on the numbers who were elected. I believe the entire senate is dissolved. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 155.144.40.31 (talk) 01:44, 3 September 2008 (UTC)
Oh dear. Apparently my question was not clear. I know exactly what a double dissolution is, and it's well known that there was in fact a DD. What I'm trying to establish is this: Would Kerr have been happy for an ordinary election (Reps + 1/2 Senate) to be called, or was it specifically a DD that he required? The article says:
... Kerr asked Fraser whether, if commissioned as Prime Minister, he would 1) pass the budget; 2) advise a double dissolution election (in which both the House and Senate would be up for election) and 3) enact no new policies, make no appointments and initiate no inquiries into Whitlam's government pending the election. When Fraser answered "yes" to all questions, Kerr commissioned him as as the caretaker Prime Minister of Australia.
Gavin Souter's Acts of Parliament says (p. 545):
The Governor-General asked Fraser if he could obtain Supply if he were commissioned to form a caretaker government, and Fraser said that he could. He agreed not to initiate any new policies or hold any enquiries into the activities of the previous government before an election, and undertook to advise a double dissolution if he was unable, as he surely would be, to get the confidence of the lower house.
My reading of that is that Kerr wanted Supply to happen; that was his first priority. Then, there was the question of whether Fraser could survive as Prime Minister - certainly not. The spectre of Fraser losing a no-confidence motion and having to advise Kerr to re-commisssion Whitlam, probably that very afternoon, was unthinkable for Kerr. So an election had to be called. If, in some strange hypothetical circumstance, Fraser had somehow survived a no-confidence motion in the Reps, no election would have been necessary; but if Fraser did call one anyway, then all he would have had to do to satisfy Kerr was to call an ordinary Reps + 1/2 Senate election. But of course, that was never going to happen. And once he had lost a no-confidence motion, he certainly would have been in no position to advise any sort of election. So, the only way that Fraser could call an election at all was to use the triggers for a DD that, courtesy of him, already existed. Souter's wording suggests that Kerr didn't necessarily want a double dissolution in principle, as his sort of line in the sand. Any election would do. But he knew that since Fraser was not going to be in a position to be able to advise any other sort of election, he know a DD was the only way out, and this is why he mentioned the DD in his discussion with Fraser. In the event, once Fraser announced to the Reps that he'd been sworn in as PM, at 2:48 pm Whitlam introduced a motion of no-confidence in Fraser and requesting the Speaker to advise the GG to call on Whitlam to form a government. In Souter's words, "The new PM (Fraser) did not bother to vote in a division he could not possibly win. He had more important things to do outside the House". The motion was passed, and Speaker Scholes went off to inform the Governor-General of this development. The session was suspended at 3:15 pm to allow this to occur. In the meantime, Fraser was busy preparing the documents to formally advise Kerr to call a double dissolution. A member of the House staff arrived at Government House at 3:50 pm with the passed Appropriation Bills for Kerr's royal assent. By the time Scholes got to see Kerr at 4:45 pm, the Appropriation bills were now law, both houses had been dissolved and the election had been called. The suspended Reps session was never resumed. Depending on the timing of which event happened when, it's possible that Kerr was being advised by a Prime Minister who no longer had the confidence of the House, but we'll probably never know now, and it's an academic question anyway. This probably answers my own question, but any other comments would be welcome. -- JackofOz (talk) 03:01, 3 September 2008 (UTC)
My understanding of it is that Whitlam went to Kerr to request a half-senate election, however when Whitlam arrived, Kerr immediately asked him if he was prepared to hold a general election. Whitlam refused, resulting in Kerr advising of his termination as PM, with the temporary installation of Fraser to take place until a double dissolution election could be held. Timeshift (talk) 03:06, 3 September 2008 (UTC)
The whole affair was very complex. Whitlam's intention to call a half-senate election would probably have broken the impasse, which Kerr must have realised. He would also have realised that had Whitlam been given the opportunity to request it, he (Kerr) would have been constitutionally bound to grant it. So one could be forgiven for supposing that other motives were going through Kerr's mind. He cannot have been unaware that Fraser would lose the confidence of the House that afternoon, and the immediate request for DD could not have been seen, whatever the motives, in terms other than conspiracy. So perhaps he wanted a DD to minimalise the possibility of Whitlam regaining control of Parliament. But the dead cannot defend themselves, and I posit this only.--Gazzster (talk) 04:09, 3 September 2008 (UTC)
Kerr specifically rejected a half-senate election alone.[9] A half-senate election alone would only have broken the impasse if Labor gained a majority, but if the Liberals had kept their majority the gridlock would've remained. In answer to JackofOz's original question, the ref above seems to make it clear that Kerr asked Fraser to request a DD. Peter Ballard (talk) 04:38, 3 September 2008 (UTC)
I think a big part of the problem is that elections, whether for half a Senate or a double dissolution, take time to organise and enact (and when would the new Senate have taken office after a half-Senate election?) and Supply would have run out in the meantime. (This is not a unique problem for Australia. In 1979 in the UK the Labour government lost a motion of confidence and by widespread agreement a new election was held. However the no-confidence vote was just before the Budget was due to be voted on. Arrangements were made between the Government and Opposition to get the Budget passed in the last few days of the old Commons.) And if I remember correctly when the two Houses are in dispute isn't there something like a three month minimum period before a double dissolution can be invoked? If so then a double dissolution called on November 11 could not include the supply bills and thus they wouldn't have been eligible for a post-election joint sitting. I've read that Whitlam has since advocated a constitutional change that would allow supply disputes to be resolved by a joint sitting of the current parliament which would at least resolve the time element.
Strictly speaking the double dissolution election was unnecessary to revolve the supply crisis *but* given the existing deadlock between the two houses and the large number of other bills that had piled up a double dissolution may have been the only way to give them a viable chance of getting into law, quite apart from the political logic of a DD being a natural solution to a wider deadlock. (Would Bunton and Field's seats have been up in a half-Senate election anyway?) It also looks like an attempt at compromise - Labor's demand for a Senate election, the Coalition's demand for a House election so give them both!
As for no-confidence motions and the ability of a PM in the Westminster system to advise on a dissolution (of whatever) when he's lost the confidence of the lower house there is endless debate on this point. With the exception of half of the Canadian King-Byng affair most of the contentious examples tend to be around the granting of a dissolution rather than a refusal to do so. List of prime ministers defeated by votes of no confidence shows only Scullin and Fadden previously losing a vote of confidence in Australia. The former led to an election, presumably clarifying that a Australian PM can still advise in such circumstances, but the latter led to an immediate change of government. In general the principle that a Prime Minister who has not yet lost the confidence of the House can request a dissolution whenever they wish has taken effect (and King-Byng is a useful clarifier) and that if they lose a confidence vote after some time in office they can still request a dissolution (e.g. Scullin or the UK's Callaghan in 1979). However the right of a newly appointed Prime Minister to request a dissolution, especially if they lost the first confidence vote in Parliament, is much more uncertain. In the UK the February 1974 general election produced a hung parliament and there was a question over whether the new Labour government of Harold Wilson would survive the first vote. The government (and opposition) discretely obtained confirmation from the Palace that if defeated on the Queen's Speech then Wilson could successfully request a dissolution rather than having to resign immediately. As a result of this no vote was forced on the Queen's Speech and the government was confirmed in office. (This is a complicated as a precedent though as the Conservative leader, Edward Heath, had not resigned as PM until four days after the election and in the meantime unsuccessfully tried to put together a coalition. So one could argue that a dissolution request would only have been valid as both main parties would have declared it impossible to govern in that parliament.)
Whitlam moved what was effectively a constructive vote of no confidence, a German innovation (also used in Spain and Hungary) whereby a government can only be voted out of office by the Bundestag when an alternative Chancellor is specified in the motion. However such a concept is alien to the Westminster system where a government can be voted out of office by parliament without a successor clarified and where the sovereign or governor general retains the right to select the Prime Minister. (Obviously in the era of majority governments and parties selecting their leader in a formal process this choice is limited but in either an emergency - say Rudd and Gillard were killed in the same accident and someone needed to be in charge until Labor could elect a new leader - or if the party system fractures and produces a House with no clear majority for any single party or coalition then someone will have to decide who's in charge.) So it's not entirely clear whether the timing made any difference to the matter. Timrollpickering (talk) 12:28, 6 September 2008 (UTC)

Kelly states that Kerr indicated that he would have accepted Fraser's advice had it been for a half-Senate and a House of Representatives election, it did not have to be a double dissolution. The key part was the House of Representatives, after all a Senate election had to be held because the terms of the short term senators were due to expire 1 July. Bunton's and Field's seats were up regardless of whether they had replaced a long term senator or not, that was the whole problem with Murphy leaving, he was a long term senator and his departure was going to cost Labor a seat (as they thought at the election, it turned out to be sooner although Bunton joined the ALP on all key votes during the crisis). The current article explains what would have had to happen for Labor to get a Senate majority at the election, it was a longshot even though Freudenberg and Whitlam both write that it wasn't. They would have had to take 3 out of 4 of the territorial seats, or 2 if Gorton has been elected for the ACT (he had broken with the Liberals).--Wehwalt (talk) 12:45, 30 May 2010 (UTC)

Quarter senate election?

The following text was removed today under an edit labeled "minor tweaks" "tweak":

which would most probably been a quarter senate election, as the premiers of the four non-Labor states would almost certainly have advised their Governors not to issue writs[citation needed])

I agree with the removal (uncited speculation), but I think the edit summary should have been clearer. I thought I'd drop it in here in case anyone wants to research it some time in the future. Peter Ballard (talk) 23:50, 8 October 2008 (UTC)

Request for Royal Intervention by H O R Speaker

I held as fact and have read on the Australia section of the "Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom" wikipedia page that the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Gordon Scholes, requested on behalf of the house for the Queen to intervene and reverse Kerr's decision.

"Gordon Scholes, then Speaker of the House of Representatives, appealed on behalf of the house to the Queen for her to reverse Kerr's decision, on the basis that Whitlam's Labor Party still enjoyed the confidence of the house. Elizabeth declined to intervene, however, saying that it was not appropriate for her to intercede in affairs that are reserved for the Governor-General alone by the Australian constitution"

If this is true it should be added to the article (and possibly the article on Kerr and the article on Whitlam and the article on Smith) and also elaborated and fruther developed. If this is not true it should be removed from the "Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom" article.

Thank you.

124.171.216.226 (talk) 08:39, 15 October 2008 (UTC)

I can't be bothered incorporating it right now, but the cite is here: http://whitlamdismissal.com/documents/letter-from-queen.shtml Peter Ballard (talk) 11:37, 15 October 2008 (UTC)
I've now included it in the article. -- JackofOz (talk) 03:09, 20 May 2009 (UTC)

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two canadian constitutional crises in see also?

Just because they are similar in substance, it doesn't mean they are related and should be in the see also section. Do we add Stephen Harper as a see also to Kevin Rudd's page? They are both prime ministers after all! Timeshift (talk) 09:25, 5 December 2008 (UTC)

From my quick reading of the situation, the Canadian situation (2008 Canadian parliamentary dispute) is not similar. Harper has lost his majority and is refusing to resign, pure and simple. It's more like Tasmanian state election, 1989, where the party with the plurality refused (or pretended to refuse) to accept that the other parties in coalition formed a majority. Or the South Australian state election, 2002, where the Liberals lost their majority to a Labor-Independent coalition but waited a month to test it on the floor of parliament. And I'm sure there are other examples around the world. The Australian 1975 situation was much more ambiguous because a different party controlled each house. Peter Ballard (talk) 09:37, 5 December 2008 (UTC)
A government staying in office until parliament meets and the alternative combination can formally prove it has the numbers isn't that unusual (and it's also a political tactic that can encourage division in the new combination as representatives have longer to consider the details of the deal and also have to face angry voters saying "we didn't vote for you to put them in power!"). What is similar between Australia in 1975 and Canada now is that there are some constitutional rules & conventions that directly contradict each other without an obvious workable solution built in (Australia: governments are decided by the lower house vs governments need to get supply to live; Canada: the Commons can bring down the PM but the PM can prorogue the Commons and even dissolve it) with a very tense confrontational political atmosphere thrown in, and both sides are waiting for the other to crack with appeals to the Governor General to take the "right" course of action based on one side or the other's interpretation of the correct constitutional outcome. Timrollpickering (talk) 11:48, 5 December 2008 (UTC)
The interesting point of comparison is surely the potential role of the governor-general, especially if the impasse were to lead to the possibility of an exercise of those 'reserve powers' :) Admittedly this is unlikely because Harper has now given proper formal advice and had it duly accepted (to prorogue). (A major problem for Kerr was the delivery by the attorney-general of unsigned and questionable 'advice' documentation on which the word 'draft' was hastily handwritten.) Bjenks (talk) 15:35, 5 December 2008 (UTC)
And Kerr did not seek the advice of his prime minister, nor Whitlam explicitly tender advice. 1975 was a matter of the constitutional conventions in place not working as they ought. In Canada 2008, it seems that the proper constitutional course has been followed. It's not really a constitutional crisis, but rather a political one.--Gazzster (talk) 12:35, 6 December 2008 (UTC)

Back to the issue, should the see alsos be removed? Timeshift (talk) 12:55, 6 December 2008 (UTC)

Mais oui--Gazzster (talk) 13:12, 6 December 2008 (UTC)
In agreement. In the 40th Canadian Parliament upheaval, nothing unconstitutional has occured. GoodDay (talk) 17:15, 6 December 2008 (UTC)

Those inconsistent cap initials

Hurrah, JackofOz, for giving us some sensible lower-case usage! This article is a mass of unnecessary cap. initials and inconsistent forms. How about we rationalise the lot? But, first, some explanations. Shall we say that the Prime Minister (cp inits) is Kevin Rudd, MP, not just any old past prime minister (or prime-ministerial has-been). Just as the Queen is not just any old queen. Likewise governors-general, surely. As for 'government', the 2005 New Oxford Dictionary for Writers and Editors specifically prescribes "lower case, even in ref. to the particular people in office". So there!--and opposition must naturally get the same treatment. OK, I will make the changes so that we can see them. Will any knee-bender rise up to revert? :) Bjenks (talk) 04:40, 18 December 2008 (UTC) --As you were. . . Not having done that very well, I'll revisit it when I have more time. Bjenks (talk) 05:59, 18 December 2008 (UTC)

Thanks, but I think I only changed one word. I agree, though, that many caps should go. Generic references such as "Labor senators", "Constitutional precedent had long established that the governor-general was expected to take no action except upon 'advice'", etc, should be in lower case. But where a specific office-holder is being referred to, it's upper case ("Kerr dismissed Whitlam and installed Fraser as Prime Minister", "The Speaker, Gordon Scholes, said ..."). I'll make some changes along these lines when I come back from a Wiki-Xmas-break next week, unless some conscientious person has done so in the meantime. -- JackofOz (talk) 07:34, 22 December 2008 (UTC)
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