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Semantics of logic

One of the original contributors to this trend is the philosopher Chaim Perelman, who together with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, introduced the French term La nouvelle rhetorique in 1958 to describe an approach to argument which is not reduced to application of formal rules of inference

The idea that logic is best understood in terms of potential dialogs between opposing positions in an argument predates this idea and can be formalised: Lorenzen was the first to do so. See Game semantics for a currently not very polished introduction to the idea. The idea is anti-Tarskian (hence anti- "semantic theory of truth"), but is itself an idea about the semantics of logic ---- Charles Stewart 13:04, 30 Aug 2004 (UTC)

That the idea is ant-tarskian is clear. However, I don't agree that this is the same as game semantics. I'll be a little more detailed later on.CSTAR 13:19, 30 Aug 2004 (UTC)
I didn't claim the idea is the same as game semantics; it is obviously is given in a very different spirit. Instead, I claimed the ideas have a common root, namely the idea that logic is dialectical or adversarial in nature ---- Charles Stewart 13:36, 30 Aug 2004 (UTC)
OK. BTW, I am generally concerned with relating the idea of political argument and economic argument into an article about logical argument. Something needs to said, but I myself am troubled by what I wrote down... to use Wikipedia's terminology, the article does seem POV. But what are the options? The article should say something practical about logical argument and about the structure of argument in general. Merely listing historical facts about theories of argument wouldn't be very helpful. This is a dilemma confronting anybody writing an NPOV article.
Maybe the task is too overwhelming.CSTAR 14:17, 30 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Trying to consolidate and make the articles more fluid --DennisDaniels 19:24, 31 Aug 2004 (UTC)

I'm not sure where you're taking this. Your reference to "states" of an argument is intriguing, although I do not see how an argument can possibly be a stateful object.CSTAR 22:56, 31 August 2004 (UTC)

Stanford Enc. article

Wilfred Hodges has an article Logic and games that will be interesting in the context of this article (and elsewhere). Let me quote two paragraphs:

The links between logic and games go back a long way. If one thinks of a debate as a kind of game, then Aristotle already made the connection; his writings about syllogism are closely intertwined with his study of the aims and rules of debating. Aristotle's viewpoint survived into the common medieval name for logic: dialectics. Ramist logic, which drove out the old School logic in the mid sixteenth century, aimed to provide a set of practical tools for the orator and the debater. That view of logic had faded away by the eighteenth century. But in the mid twentieth century Charles Hamblin revived the link between dialogue and the rules of sound reasoning, soon after Paul Lorenzen had connected dialogue to constructive foundations of logic.
A different strand, not quite so old, is the use of games for teaching logic. This is probably the right way to think of the medieval game of ‘obligationes’, where a debater tries to drive his opponent into an unnecessary contradiction. We have at least two textbooks of logic from the early sixteenth century that present it as a game for an individual student, and Lewis Carroll's The Game of Logic (1887) is a more recent example in the same genre.

Though some parts of argumentative dialogue theory can be formulated in terms of games, this would be unfortunate for several reasons:

  • Note the hypothetical -- if one thinks of debate as a game
  • The goal of logical argument is only in a restricted sense a win-lose game. True if the goal is to prove X to the satisfaction of the interlocutor, then one either fails or succeeds. However in most

practical cases of argument, it isn't easy to test whether this terminal state is achieved.

The game theoretic view is too explicitly stateful and largely ignores argument history (I know, histories can always be represented in state by taking state large enough) "Histories" of dialectical positions taken by individual participants are an essential ingredient of argumentative dialogue. In other words, I am thinking of a argumentative dialogue as being represented by the run of a communication protocol (for some idea of the events principals might engage in in this protocol, see van Eemeren Grootendorst). This approach has other advantages viz-- some of the "timing" issues involved in argument (for instance, delay in response in many instances may be regarded as failing to adequately respond)CSTAR 00:33, 1 Sep 2004 (UTC)

To echo myself, I'm not saying that game semantics are the right way to frame this article, but rather there is a common idea behind them; also there are interesting points of contact between the two. Some points:

  • Note the hypothetical -- if one thinks of debate as a game -- games as they are applied in the semantics of logic are generally intended to capture formally the concept of dialog. The term dialog games is widely used for just this reason.
  • The goal of logical argument is only in a restricted sense a win-lose game. And dialog games are often formalised without a notion of winning; if they are they may be labelled win-lose-draw (naturally corresponding to non-bivalent approaches to logic).
  • The game theoretic view is too explicitly stateful and largely ignores argument history (I know, histories can always be represented in state by taking state large enough) -- its sort of irrelevant, but recently history-free approaches to game semantics have fallen into disfavour, because of technical difficulties they have handling disjunction.
  • I don't see why your idea of dialogues being modelled by a communication protocol should be considered alien to the game semantical tradition.

In the medium term (ie. after a couple of weeks or so), I'm planning on overhauling what I wrote in semantics of logic, and treating proof theoretic and game semantical approaches more thoroughly. I'll draw on Wilfred Hodges article, and I'd like there to be some commonality of ground between this article and what I write elsewhere. This is the reason I posted the above excerpt in the first place ---- Charles Stewart 01:48, 1 Sep 2004 (UTC)

I'm taking a logic class and I'm an English teacher so I'm trying to flesh out articles regarding logic and logical writing. Any help appreciated!--DennisDaniels 03:58, 2 September 2004 (UTC)

Empty section headings

If nobody puts anything in them I will delete them. I'm not sure any of these distinctions are useful anyway. I also strongly object to state of an argument. CSTAR 13:19, 2 Sep 2004 (UTC)

I think "state" of an argument is an idea that is natural to many perspectives when trying to model discourses (should cf. Discourse in linguitics); since one can reasonably say these are artificial and pernicnious ideas imposed on one's understanding by theoretical models, all this is POV. I agree with deleting empty headings if the body's arrival isn't imminent ---- Charles Stewart 19:48, 2 September 2004 (UTC)


Other meanings of Argumentation

There is another strand of 'Argumentation' that is more concerned with it's use as a machine-executable technique for qualitative decision making, and draws on work done by people sung as Dung, Fox, Parsons and McBurney (to name but a few) This is actually fairly different from this page, so I thought it might warrant something different, and should probably go under something more computer-y.

Any thoughts?

Look at the Argument page, these senses fall under possible disambiguations given there, I think. ---- Charles Stewart 10:24, 3 Sep 2004 (UTC)
Postscript -- in fact they don't, I was mixed up, but what you say might better be a page linked to from the disamb page. ---- Charles Stewart 10:28, 3 September 2004 (UTC)


RV 20040302's edit

User:20040302 put as a new first paragraph:

For a logical argument to be true, it must be well-formed, valid, and sound.
Technically, an argument is not true, but statements may be. However, it does begin to summarise the requirements for deriving truth from arguments.

In my view, this is an unacceptable lead paragrph, as it assumes that logical argument must be conducted in a determinate formal language, so I've RV'ed it. ---- Charles Stewart 09:06, 28 October 2004 (UTC)

I added it, because from what I understand regarding argument, the three basic requirements are necessary (regardless of whether or not the argument is formal). I admit that the WFF article link appears to be particularly focused on formal logic, but remind interested parties that a syntactically/semantically incorrect set of statements hold no argumentative power. Moreover, the validity and soundness of an argument are often confused.
In essence, though I seek not to get involved in any edit war regarding this, I wished to introduce logical argument with a sentence that draws together four important concepts for understanding argumentation: truth, well-formedness, validity, and soundness. I consider the statement balanced, fair, relevant, informative and NPOV. I understand that there are differing views. (20040302)


  • Different logicians use different terminology anyway. You'll find some books use 'sound' to describe arguments that other books call 'valid' and so on.

Validity

There is another confusing element in this discussion which I'm afraid I'm responsible for: I'm using validity as a property of assertions and preservation of validity as a property of arguments. Now I've deliberatley (and possibly indiosyncratically) avoided applying truth to assertions and preservation of truth (ordinarily called deductive validity) to arguments. In part, I have been motivated by thinking of moral arguments or political arguments. For example, moral arguments relate sets of moral hypotheses to moral conclusions. Moral assertions may be true or false under particular interpretations of their constituent terms; rather than say an assertion is true under interpretation σ, I prefer to say assertion is valid under σ.CSTAR 06:09, 30 October 2004 (UTC)


Validity and soundness redux

Two attempted fixes to the disputed status have appeared, due to User:Nortexoid and User:Ancheta Wis. I rv'ed Nortexoids edits, and ancheta's usages I tidied up and put back a disputed notice on soundness. This is a just a temporary fix, I'll merge the two articles later today, as I promised Nortexoid last week and provided there are no well-founded objections. ---- Charles Stewart 12:14, 28 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Here is a small counterexample to the attempt to merge validity and soundness: A programmer is assigned the task of displaying the plural of a word. He creates a list of words and their plurals. The users type in a word, hit a key, voila, the plural. The programmer gets a raise. JoeUser asks for the plural of a word which is not in the list. The programmer is fired for raising expectations unreasonably. In other words, the poor programmer has created a valid program which remains unsound. Ancheta Wis 11:56, 2 March 2005 (UTC)

el stupido

Bien primero usted necesita tomar un wumpy regordete.


En el idioma ordinario, las personas se refieren a la lógica de una terminología del argumento o el uso que sugiere que un argumento se basa en reglas de inferencia de la lógica formal. Aunque los argumentos utilizan las inferencias que son indisputablemente puramente lógicas (tal como silogismos)

El contenido [showhide] 1 validez del Argumento

2 El paradigma matemático

3 Teorías de argumentos

4 Diálogo Discutidor

5 Otra La creencia predominante entre autores matemáticos es que los argumentos válidos en matemáticas son ésos que se pueden reconocer están como en el formalizable del principio en el abarcar la teoría formal. Sigue que la teoría de argumentos válidos en matemáticas es reducible a la teoría de inferencias válidas en teorías matemáticas formales. Una teoría de la validez de teorías matemáticas formales postula dos elementos claros: la sintaxis que da las reglas para cuando una fórmula se construye correctamente y semántico que es esencialmente una función de fórmulas a valores de verdad. Una expresión se dice ser válido si la función semántica asigna el valor verdadero a. Una regla de la inferencia es válida si y sólo si es validez-preservar. Un argumento es válido si y sólo si utiliza las reglas válidas de la inferencia. Note que en el caso de matemático semántico, la sintaxis y semántico son objetos matemáticos.

En el uso general, sin embargo, los argumentos son raramente formales o tienen aún el rigor de pruebaes matemáticas.

[redacte] las Teorías de Teorías de argumentos de argumentos son estrechamente relacionadas a teorías de la lógica informal. Idealmente, una teoría del argumento debe proporcionar algún mecanismo para explicar la validez de argumentos.

Un enfoque natural seguiría el paradigma y la tentativa matemáticos para definir la validez en términos de semántico de las afirmaciones en el argumento. Aunque tal enfoque apela en su sencillez, los obstáculos a avanzar esta manera es muy difícil para algo de otra manera que los argumentos puramente lógicos. Entre otros problemas, nosotros necesitamos interpretar las oraciones no sólo enteras, pero también componentes de oraciones, las frases por ejemplo sustantivas tales como El valor actualizado de renta de gobierno para los próximos doce años.

Una dificultad mayor de seguir este enfoque es eso determinando un dominio semántico apropiado no es una tarea fácil, levantando numerosos asuntos ontológicos espinosos. Levanta también la perspectiva desalentadoa de tener que trabajar fuera teorías semánticas aceptables es antes capaz de decir algo útil acerca de la comprensión y evaluar los argumentos. Para esta razón que el enfoque puramente semántico se reemplaza generalmente con otros enfoques que son más fácilmente aplicables al discurso práctico.

Para argumentos con respecto a temas tales como la probabilidad, la economía o la física, parte de los problemas semánticos se puede empujar convenientemente bajo la alfombra si podemos servirnos de un modelo del fenómeno bajo la discusión. En este caso, nosotros podemos establecer una interpretación semántica limitada que utiliza los términos del modelo y la validez del argumento es reducida a que del modelo abstracto. Esta clase de la reducción se utiliza en las ciencias naturales generalmente, y sería especialmente útil en discutir acerca de asuntos sociales si los partidos pueden convenir en un modelo. Desgraciadamente, esto reducción previa rara vez ocurre, con el resultado que argumentos acerca de la política social tienen raramente una resolución satisfactoria.

Otro enfoque deberá desarrollar una teoría del argumento pragmático, por lo menos en ciertos casos donde argumento e interacción social son estrechamente relacionados. Esto es muy útil cuando la meta del argumento lógico deberá establecer una resolución mutuamente satisfactoria de una diferencia de la opinión entre individuos llamas Discutidoras de poopy de diálogo están delicioso

Creo que Ud. se equivocó de idioma.--CSTAR 21:33, 5 April 2005 (UTC)


Abduction and Analogy

The Overview is lead by: "In ordinary, philosophical and scientific argumentation abductive arguments and arguments by analogy are also commonly used." These need to be explored further in the body of this article rather than relying on the reader clicking on links. For example, outside brain-scanning machines abduction is the only way we can ascribe people's actual emotions or intent. Also, in practice analogical arguments are frequently the most compelling. Disallowing these methods because they lack rigor makes most practical argument impossible. -Wfaxon 06:26, 9 July 2006 (UTC)

Multimedia University,Cyberjaya Campus,Malaysia


New introductory sentence

The article begins:-

"In logic, an argument is an attempt to demonstrate the truth of an assertion called a conclusion, based on the truth of a set of assertions called premises."

This is surely better describes an (attempted) proof than an argument. I would write:

"This article is about arguments in logic.

In logic, an argument is a set of statements known as the premises, and another statement known as the conclusion in which it is asserted that the truth of the conclusion follows from (is entailed by) the premisses. A valid argument is one in which the premises cannot be true and the conclusion false. A sound argument is a valid argument with true premises (see also Validity, Soundness, true)"'

This introduces the key concepts of statement, truth, falsity,validity and entailment in one go. We might then add:

"A proof is a demonstration that an argument is valid (see Proof procedure). Note statements are either true or false (not valid or invalid); arguments are valid, invalid sound or unsound (not true or false). "


Views? --Philogo 01:53, 31 January 2007 (UTC)


Agree that a logical argument is a linguistic thing, not merely an attempt at persuasion, hence need emphasis on statements. Also think we need to distinguish deductive logic (where the premises are meant to entail the conclusion, or ensure that the conclusion must be true) from inductive logic and abductive logic etc., where the aim is the more modest one of conferring probability on the conclusion. See edits.

-Bosphor 23:59, 8 March 2007 (UTC) 

 —Preceding unsigned comment added by Philogo (talk • contribs) 23:43, August 29, 2007 (UTC)


The distinction between argument and explanation seems superficial to me. The page seems to imply that any defense of the idea that "the moon causes the tides" is an explanation, precisely because the fact that there are tides is universally accepted. But could I not conjure up appropriate premises, and then make an argument whose conclusion would be "the moon causes the tides"?

Is this really a distinction make by philosophers and/or logicians these days? If so, could we put some references to their names?

If not, perhaps we could eliminate this section, or make it a lot more clear?

--Ryguasu

I agree. This is nonsensical. --The Cunctator

"For example, arguments commonly deal with causality, probability and statistics or even specialized areas such as economics." -matt :? is not a sentance

I have now altered the introductory paragraph and the two following paragraphs, 'Validity' and 'Proof', as discussed above. Is there a good reason why this article is called 'Logical Argument' instead of Argument (Logic) --Philogo 23:50, 29 August 2007 (UTC)

Soundness and validity

New Validity/Soundness Section

The dispute discussed below seems to have ended in late 2004, but just in case someone wishes to revive it:

I agree with Philogo that assigning a fixed, formal meaning to the notion of the 'soundness' of an argument is a recent (i.e. late 20th Century) development. Historically, and colloquially, soundness is probably not distinguished from validity. Charles Stewart is also correct to say that in model theory (or more accurately, in the study of formal logical systems), the notion of 'soundness' is a related but different notion to that being discussed here. Nevertheless, the modern technical use of the word 'sound' in the field of logical arguments is what we should reflect here, and as above references to articles have shown (and any textbook e.g. Hodges, Logic would confirm), the modern usage of 'sound' is to describe a valid argument with true premises. The other uses should be noted in the main article on Soundness as soon as possible.

-Bosphor 00:44, 9 March 2007 (UTC)

Disagreement between Charles Stewart and 20040302

On the basis of Charles Stewart remark, it may be less controversial (but also less informative, IMPOV) to keep the statement, but amended to:
For a logical argument to be true, it must be valid and sound.
The previous comment by CSTAR, I feel, undermines the importance of soundness in an argument. (20040302 09:18, 28 Oct 2004 (UTC))
The current lead paragraph is not ideal; it should be shorter, and I think it should be more informative about what constitutes an argument in formal logic. Informally, an argument cannot be valid unless it is also sound. The current Wikipedia entry for sound holds that an argument cannot be sound unless it is also valid, where validity holds iff the conclusion follows from the premises. In my view, this has the relationship between the two concepts back to front, and the formulation of validity is too strong (many intuitively valid arguments will be counted invalid according to this definition, eg. weakening/thinning). In short,the pages are, like the majority of logic pages, a mess and need sorting out. This page is not bad by the standards of the logic pages... ---- Charles Stewart 10:32, 28 Oct 2004 (UTC)
Not particularly disagreeing with Charles, though I consider finding mess elsewhere does not defend mess here. AFAIK, soundness is concerned with the truth of premisses, whereas validity is concerned with the agreement of the logical structure. For instance, MP and MT are both generally considered to be valid argument forms. But just because a an argument is valid does not make it sound.
If an argument is MT and both its premisses are true, then it is sound.
One or both premises are false.
Therefore, the argument is unsound.
From talk pages on various logic articles, it appears to be clear that the distinctions between soundness and validity are not generally understood. Also, I would agree with the wikipedia entry for soundness; sound arguments are a subset of valid arguments, which themselves are subsets of well-formed arguments. There is an excellent article concerning such issues at http://philosophy.lander.edu/logic/tvs.html (20040302)
OK, you provide a good link that provides partial justification for the way that soundness puts things (ie. a sound argument is a valid argument from true premisses). However, I do not think that this is a generally accepted definition, and the link is non-authoratative. An authoritative source, the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy disagrees with the definitions provided both for soundness and validity Their article on classical logic[1] defines validity to be conservation of truth, and soundness to be a property not of logical argument per so, but of systems purported to capture (some) logical reasoning, that they only express valid arguments. I propose we adopt these definitions. ---- Charles Stewart 13:00, 28 Oct 2004 (UTC)
Postscript: I have put soundness and validity into disputed status, with links here from their talk pages. ---- Charles Stewart 13:06, 28 Oct 2004 (UTC)
I consider the link that you gave to be saying precisely the same as the one at lander.edu. I quote: This pleasant feature, called soundness, entails that no deduction takes one from true premises to a false conclusion. Also see many articles, such as http://www.ukans.edu/~acudd/phil140-s2/ , http://www.iep.utm.edu/v/val-snd.htm , etc. I quote: In short, a deductive argument must be evaluated in two ways. First, one must ask if the premises provide support for the conclusion by examining the form of the argument. If they do, then the argument is valid. Then, one must ask whether the premises are true or false in actuality. Only if an argument passes both these tests is it sound. However, if an argument does not pass these tests, its conclusion may still be true, despite that no support for its truth is given by the argument.
The latter test - (if the premises are true in actuality) is what is sometimes known as semantic validity. However, the common use for the term 'validity' in the context of logical argument, is refering to structural validity, or validity of argumentative form, or deductively valid argument.
Try a google with "soundness validity", and read the first few articles.
It appears, in light of evidence available across the internet, that your understanding actually differs from generally accepted definitions within the philosophical community.
BTW, I don't think going around sticking 'disputed' everywhere is a particularly constructive solution to anything, but that is my opinion. (20040302 14:40, 28 Oct 2004 (UTC))
I consider the link that you gave to be saying precisely the same as the one at lander.edu.
It clearly is not; it does not directly contradict the lander.edu, but it maintains the definition of soundness that I am familiar with, namely that it is a property of systems of inference intended to capture logical argument, and not logical argument per se. The Stanford Encyc. article nowhere upholds the alternative view provided on the links you give. It is quite possible that the Wikipedia article (originally penned by Larry Sanger) is the source for all of the links you provide.
I am astounded that you find it easier to believe that every article concerning validity and soundness on the Internet has referred to Wikipedia, rather than the fact that you may be mistaken. Regardless of origin, it appears that such terms are indeed common usage, and therefore validity and soundness are justified as being defined by all these sites. I certainly agree that if you can find substantive proof (greater than a single link, which IMHO does not concur with you) that there is an common alternative to the issues of soundness and validity, then I agree it is important to note both approaches in the article, on the grounds of NPOV. (20040302 21:04, 28 Oct 2004 (UTC))
I don't think going around sticking 'disputed' everywhere is a particularly constructive solution to anything
I had a simlar criticism made the last time I slapped a a 'disputed' notice on an article. It looks to me a straightforward conflict between the interests of editors in having a quiet life, and the interest of users not having questionable 'facts' passed of on them by would-be authorities. If my edits cause friction, it is possible to request mediation. ---- Charles Stewart 18:53, 28 Oct 2004 (UTC)
As a postscript, have a look at http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/arg/valid1.php

It is very clear on the distinction between validity and soundness. (20040302 14:54, 28 Oct 2004 (UTC))

The clarity of this distinction has never been doubted. It is its tension with the other definition of soundness that originates in model theory that is the problem. ---- Charles Stewart 09:17, 29 Oct 2004 (UTC)

The definition of 'sound argument' as (i) 'valid argument with true premises' as opposed to (ii) 'valid argument' is not universaly accepted, or if it is only recently. Definition (i) I note appear in the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Definition (ii) however appears in e.g. Mates, Elementary Logic, OUP:1972 p4: "An argument is said to be sound (correct, valid) if its conclusion follows from or is a consequnce of its premises; otherwise it is unsound". --Philogo 22:45, 11 February 2007 (UTC)

Resolving the (informal) dispute

I have contacted Kevin Klement, who is the Logic Editor of the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, and who is therefore responsible for one of the pages User:20040302 cited above. I plan on contacting several of the authors of other entries to try and get a picture of the usage of this definition, and perhaps to find a locus solum for it.

This issue is important, since soundness is a fundamental technical term of logic, and the definition we reach here has repercussions for many pages on logic in Wikipedia. It is possible, since the two definitions are not in outright contradiction, to let both definitions be used freely in the logic pages. It would, however, in view of the pronounced tension between the two definitions, be a recipe for confusion for many users of Wikipedia, so I think we should establish a policy. Perhaps it is time to dust of my proposal for a Wikiproject Logic?

Comments sought. ---- Charles Stewart 09:17, 29 Oct 2004 (UTC)

I think that it is possibly a good solution, Charles - as long as one is careful regarding any issues of partisanship though I doubt that we need to worry about that here as we are all, in good faith, attempting to clarify rather than promote a socio-political agenda of any sort. (20040302)

I wasn't aware there was a formal dispute, although I agree that an outside opinion would be useful. And why the reference by 20040302to someone's socio-political agenda? Am I missing something? I thought we agreed that the broader concept of logical argument should be flexible enough to accomodate argumentative dialogue and arguments in the natural and social sciences which use specialized models. Those arguments include social-political ones.

No - I was making a point about the article, not about the subject. Some articles appear to be pushing a particular agenda, rather than remaining NPOV - I was merely commenting that I think it unlikely that any of us are driven by some sort of idealism regarding the article - we all are merely seeking to improve the article according to understanding. (20040302)

As I've tried to argue previously in this Talk page (and I thought Charles Stewart generally agrees with me on that one), argumentative dialogue is more like a communication protocol between principals than a sequence of WFF's in a formal deductive system. How is such an argument -- (i.e. run of a protocol) true? Look at the Chaim Perelman --- Lucie Tyteca-Olbrechts references, cited in the article, where they do consider "truth" as a criterion for judging numerous kinds of arguments and find it inadequate to evaluate most arguments in practice. Concepts such as fairness are completely ignored by strictly semantic theories of truth. This is not to say that some communicating process semantics for such arguments wouldn't be desirable, but as far as I know this idea has only been explored very tentatively.

For example, legal arguments, though not strictly formal logical arguments are arguments nonetheless, with a structure that needs to be accounted for in some way. But how is a legal argument true? Legal arguments are evaluated by other elements in them. Should we suddenly declare, "well these aren't arguments in any recognizable sense" ?CSTAR 14:29, 29 Oct 2004 (UTC) (revised my own earlier comments which were written with numerous mistakes) CSTAR 17:19, 29 Oct 2004 (UTC)


As mentioned above: The definition of 'sound argument' as (i) 'valid argument with true premises' as opposed to (ii) 'valid argument' is not universaly accepted, or if it is only recently. Definition (i) I note appear in the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy. Definition (ii) however appears in e.g. Mates, Elementary Logic, OUP:1972 p4: "An argument is said to be sound (correct, valid) if its conclusion follows from or is a consequnce of its premises; otherwise it is unsound".

I do not think that soundness (as opposed to validity) is a fundamental technical term of logic, --Philogo 22:45, 11 February 2007 (UTC)


Validity, soundness and effectiveness

If This article is about arguments in logic. For other uses, see argument then this paragraph is surely digressive and should be moved to somewhere more appropriate --Philogo (talk) 13:44, 12 February 2008 (UTC) Therefore I have deleted it.--Philogo (talk) 02:32, 14 February 2008 (UTC)

eh no that makes no sesnce it acnt be logic i dont think that it is following a specific structure.==eh?== A valid

argument is one in which a

specific structure is followed. An invalid argument is one in which a specfic structure is NOT folloInsert non-formatted text herewed

 This is surely a really unhelpful sentence. What specific structure? Any specific stucture? Invalid arguments have

specific structures as well, e.g. If p then q; not p therefore not q. --Philogo (talk) 14:09, 31 January 2008 (UTC) Insert non-formatted text here<<nowiki>Insert non-formatted text here/nowiki>

I suspect that whoever wrote the contested sentence had a radically perspective view of argumentation.--CSTAR (talk) 18:15, 31 January 2008 (UTC)

That may be so, but it is IMHO a totally unhelful and confusing statement, in fact just plain wrong. I cannot see how it could be th ---- Insert non-formatted text here---- ought appropriate for an encyclpedia. In act I'm just going to delete it..--Philogo (talk) 00:30, 9 February 2008 (UTC)

New lead paragraphs? New version of article?

I would be happy if tthe entire article were rewritten. Nevertheless, there are several important issues which should be addressed by any version of this article.

  • Logical argument as a term denoting (by abuse of language) general arguments of any kind -- Specifically, when a discussion centers around the logic of an argument, one usually refers (I think) to its structure as opposed to the kind of formal semantics it relies on.
  • Argumentative dialogue
  • Arguments which rely on reduction to mathematical models (e.g. Arguments about Keynesian economics, supply side economics etc could be resolved better this way)

15:48, 28 Oct 2004 (UTC)

I agree. I do not wish to see a complete restriction to the academic or philosophical definitions of a logical argument, yet at the same time, the I consider the distinctions as mentioned relavant to arguments in general. I also think that it is important to discuss the fact that much socio-political argument tends towards validity, but often are unsound by using premises that look good on the face of it, but are hollow or faulty in light of the minimum of analysis. (20040302)
CSTAR: I think there are a lot of articles about logic more deserving of a rewrite than this one. I do think the lead paragraph needs to be reworked, though. One thing the article would benefit from is a proper reconciliation between the notion of validity for informal arguments and the criteria of correctness for formal systems of inference. There is a case for merging the articles on soundness and validty with this one. ---- Charles Stewart 18:58, 28 Oct 2004 (UTC) (typo corrected Charles Stewart 07:49, 29 Oct 2004 (UTC))

New article Argument (Logic) dealing with arguments in deductve logic only--Philogo (talk) 13:19, 14 February 2008 (UTC)

It has been suggested that this article or section be merged with Argument (logic).

Given the name of these two articles, one would be inclined to think they were about the same thing, no? Richard001 (talk) 08:01, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

PS on second thoughts Argument (logic) deals soley with arguments in Deductive Logic while this article, Logical argument, has a much wider remit and aspirations, and therefore they are not on the same subject and I oppose a merge.--Philogo (talk) 13:25, 14 February 2008 (UTC)
  • This argumentation is totally different from the one you gave later at Talk:Logical argument#Argument (logic) (timestamped 13:25, 14 February 2008 (UTC)). Given the titles, this should be the same subject, and we should not have two separate different articles covering the same topic. I do not understand why you created this page as a totally new article while keeping the other one. If there is absolutely nothing to be merged, then Logical argument should simply be replaced by a redirect to this page.
Currently, the disambiguation page Argument refers to (among other things):
The page does currently not refer to Argument (logic).
Possibly, some of the material in Logical argument would be more in its place in other articles, such as Argumentation theory and Informal logic.  --Lambiam 19:14, 14 February 2008 (UTC)
  • I think there should be one article for this one concept. I have created a merged version of the two articles for your consideration. It doesn't make sense for links to go to different articles. Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) 21:09, 14 February 2008 (UTC)
  • The choce of This article is about arguments in logic. rather than This article is about arguments in deductive logic widens the scope so the boudaries are frayed. I think as a result it allows wooly-creep allowing for the inclusion e.g. of the para headed Argumentative dialogue. (For my part, interesting though it may be, this latter is not really to do with Logic: more to do with Rhetoric or Sociology.) I would propose the article Argument (logic)stays strictly focussed on arguments in Deductive Logic, since such an article is needed, and it might provide a link to the other article logical argument which should deal with and only other types of arguments in Logic if there is really a need for same. Or logical argument might provide a link to Argument (logic). We might consider renaming Argument (logic) as Argument (Deductive Logic) then its title would make clear its purpose. I must confess howver that I think that logical argument is a soggy mess and has little to offer that is not in Argument (logic) that would not be better offered elsewhere. Certainly anybody beginning the study of Logic would depart from reading logical argument more confused than enlightened. Therefore I still say, no merge. --Philogo (talk) 14:55, 18 February 2008 (UTC)
  • I support using Pontiff Greg's merged article in place of the two articles in question. I feel it's a good synthesis of both, and the article is stronger for combining them. As for what the article should be named, I'm afraid I'll have to punt. -FrankTobia (talk) 04:35, 24 February 2008 (UTC)
  • No merge. There should of course be only one article per subject, but if it is not known what the subject is then the result will be fudge: hardly appropriate when writing articles in the subject of Logic.. The inability of -FrankTobia (talk) to think of a title for the merged indicates that that is what it is - fudge. Therefore I have renamed Argument (logic) as Argument (deductive logic) and the former redirects to the latter. The article should stay strictly focussed on arguments in Deductive Logic, be a waffle free zone, and not get sidetracked into discussions of the art of perusuasion or a list of subjects in which arguments are made (it would be quicker to make a lsit of subjects in which they are not made. I have put a link in logical argument to Argument (deductive logic) One would think from the title that logical argument is on the subject of valid argument, and that a companion piece illogical argument would be on fallacies; however there is nothing wrong with the standard terms valid argument and fallacy and these are covered elsewhere. Can someone explain the syntax hereL: is logical argument meant to be the same as argument in Logic; I would have thought that in general an Xical Y is NOT the same as a Y in X; physical force does not mean the same as force in physics. Thus a logical argument would not be the same as an argument in Logic. The latters are terms in their subectm but not the formers. Lewis Crrol would have loved this!) If there re any objections to wht I have done, please comment here with reasons before undoing. --Philogo (talk) 05:10, 24 February 2008 (UTC)

post merge discussion

Help someone is trying to edit this article at the same time as me and its going to hell in a hand basket! Hang on whoever it is, pne at a time!--Philogo (talk) 05:37, 24 February 2008 (UTC)

Philogo, I think we all appreciate your focus on deductive logic. However, rather than have two "start" articles which will not be improving, we should be getting this "top" importance topic on the way to GA status. Please take a look at Wikipedia:∫ for some wonderful guidelines on how to create substantial encyclopedic articles of wide usefulness. Disintegrating this material is to scatter it to the wind for no good purpose. If you want to go in depth on the "deductive logic" aspect of it, please by all means create some content under the section of that title. If such a section is as substantial as the "argumentative dialogue" section then it too should be spun out as a supporting article, and replaced with a summary in the main article.
Please, Philogo. We all realize that you created the new article because you consider it significantly different enough to merit one. The truth is that we don't need to disintegrate the wp so that every article has only one academic department concerned with it. We need to work interdisciplinarily in order to get encyclopedic quality. The prevailing view of the discussion is to merge. Please take a look at Wikipedia:WikiProject Integration and see what I am going for with this organization. It really doesn't have to diminish the place of your work the way I see it. Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) 14:40, 24 February 2008 (UTC)
I think we agreed to give reasons for making an edit before doing so, and cerainly before undoing. I have followed this but you have not. It was not my impression that we had reached a concensus to merge. I suggest we edit the merged article on the basis that its subject subject is the term and concept argument in Logic, and I will do so unless someone gives good reasons not to do so. OK?--Philogo (talk) 23:52, 24 February 2008 (UTC)

post merge edits

  • References

Should not the books you have added under references not be under further reading, unless they are texts cited in support of the article? (what is the Wiki convention?

  • Logic and logic. If you agree that the former but not the latter is the subject/discipline , as in You should study Logic only if you enjoy it; you can see the logic in that can't you? then should it not be Argument (Logic) not Argument (logic)?
  • My edits tonight. If you disasgree with any would you give some reasons for reverting before doing so; its much more interesting and proiductive that way. I have given reasons for all my edits.--Philogo (talk) 01:18, 25 February 2008 (UTC)
  • Argumentative dialogue. Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) : why do you think this paragraph has any place in this article? I do not see how it is about Arguments in Logic. If its somehow related why not put a link under further raeding of the like?
  • Theories of arguments I think this is unhelpful waffle and will delete it if nobody disagrees. Better to have a link to proof procedures and/or to article(s) on entailment, validity--Philogo (talk) 01:49, 25 February 2008 (UTC)
  • An unhelpful individual renamed the article from argument(logic) to argument. I have reverted and re-directedted Argument to Argument (disambiguation) so all is as it was —Preceding unsigned comment added by Philogo (talk • contribs) 21:17, 25 February 2008 (UTC) --Philogo (talk) 22:15, 25 February 2008 (UTC)--Philogo (talk) 22:15, 25 February 2008 (UTC)
  • Theories of arguments Nobody diasgreed with my sugestion above so I will delete —Preceding unsigned comment added by Philogo (talk • contribs) 21:22, 25 February 2008 (UTC)
  • Argumentative dialogue No comments received defending inclusion of this paragraph so I will delete —Preceding unsigned comment added by Philogo (talk • contribs) 21:29, 25 February 2008 (UTC) --Philogo (talk) 02:11, 26 February 2008 (UTC)


Please do not move these articles again. There are hundreds of wikilinks to argument and they are all referring to this same concept. This is how we know what is supposed to be where. ONLY you Philogo have this desire to narrow the scope. This article will never get to GA status with a narrow focus. Please join with me and others of various backgrounds in making a comprehensive article. You say I haven't given sufficient reason, however anyone who has read the Wikiproject Integration guidelines knows exactly what I am doing.
Keep your shirt on: I do not know who moevd the article (renamed in argument - I restored it to the name Arumnet (logic) whihc we have agred upon: see above.
The rhetorical aspects of argument belong in the article. Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) 00:21, 26 February 2008 (UTC)
Do you have a reason for saying this? I noted that no comments were made opposing my suggestion to delete, not even from you. To my mind it is mission creep and makes the articel fluffy rather than comprehensive. I think all the sectins I have written are to do with the concept and tem Argumnet in Logic. Do you agree? Pleae give reasons before reverting or deleting a setion, as I do, so others may comment.
I said above I suggest we edit the merged article on the basis that its subject subject is the term and concept argument in Logic, and I will do so unless someone gives good reasons not to do so. OK? Do you not agree?--Philogo (talk) 02:13, 26 February 2008 (UTC)
I know I get the sense of that... You are really harping on the "in logic", "in logic." Critical thinking is a subfield of logic that deals with studying literature and rhetoric from a logical perspective. The rhetorical aspects belong in because (for instance) people in a freshman logic class are studying this term, and this is the type of information that will help them. I was a TA for this subject. I've explained the whole inductive versus deductive distinction about a million-billion times. Comprehesive please. That is the only way this article will ever reach its potential. Please stop narrowing it down to your view, because there is a wider audience to think about. You have zero support for your organizational proposal, and lambiam, richard001 and franktobia all appear to oppose you. Please make your wonderful contributions to a more comprehensive article, and don't worry about mission creep. Please again take a look at Wikipedia:WikiProject Integration. They have the right idea. Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) 02:34, 26 February 2008 (UTC)
I never said that there should not be a more comprehensive article, but that the contents should relate to the article's subject, or the title should be changed to reflect the content. Otherwise we are just using the term comprehensive as a cover up for vagueness. Whether we have inductive arguments and deductive argument, say, as seperate articles or seperate sections of one article makes no difference; we should stick to the point. You mistake my intent: I have no opinion on whether inductive and deductive arguments should be in one article or two; not indeed on whether they should be in a more comprehensive article covering wider aspect of Logic. My only thrust is that an article should relate to its subject and avoid digressions and waffle; and in Logic we should aspire to models of clarity and concission. Do you not agree?--Philogo (talk) 03:03, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

Do you think that the article as it now stands is (a) better or (b) worse than the article logical argument? --Philogo (talk) 03:03, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

First of all I don't really believe in the whole pattern: "In logic, article title is blah blah blah..." If it is true, and logicians study it, then it is supposed to be true for all rational beings. I really would appreciate it if we could portray to people that these argumentative dialogues are really the identical concept argument that we talk about "in logic", only more fleshed out. As it stands the article is not better contentwise than it was because you have removed a great deal of valuable content. You aren't putting it elsewhere where it can be developed, so that is a problem. However, now that it is in the right namespace, it is at least organized well. Why should everywhere in the wikipedia people use the more inconvienient wikilink [[argument (logic)|argument]] for this very basic concept? Take a look at the "what links here" and do some analysis based on that please. You just don't see the rhetorical aspects of argument as a part of logic and I disagree. Why study it at all for crying out loud? You missed my point about my explaining ind/ded arguments millions of times: all I am saying is that I have explained "argument" to people in the process of studying "argument" formally. I'm sure it will shock and amaze you to learn that I would like a section on legal arguments close to the end of this article as well. They sure do attempt to take the form of a logical argument do they not? They are the same concept, and belong in a comprehensive article that has potential to be FA someday. Comprehensive. Interdisciplinary. Please. Be well Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) 04:01, 26 February 2008 (UTC)
Hi Gregbard. I see the article is now called Argument and not just Argument (logic). (I reverted this last time, assuming it vanmdalism, but will not do so again.) The scope of the subject matter has thereby increased beyond logic and that appears to be your intent. Perhasps it canbe merged with other articels referred to at Argument ()disbiguation)? Never mind; if needed a discussion on the terms and concept argument in logic can appear in a logic article. Be happy. --Philogo (talk) 13:34, 26 February 2008 (UTC)

Post merge edits 2

  • re "true" or "false", not as being "valid" or "invalid"; arguments are referred to as being "valid" or "invalid", not as being "true"

or "false".
Should these words not be left in italics as they were and other such follwoing are as per the wiki use/mention distinction and not in double quotes as they have been recently put? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Philogo (talk • contribs) 22:40, 27 February 2008 (UTC)

well noted Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) 23:05, 27 February 2008 (UTC)

latest deleted material

I thought Philogo's latest deletions unfortunate. I think we both agree that a deductive argument is more accurately described with the "necessarily follows" language. However it is true, and helpful to make sure to include what most texts and classrooms use, even if it is not the greatest understanding. Instead, Philogo, perhaps we can find a way to put this in context:

"It is more commonly understood as the type of reasoning that proceeds from general principles or premises to derive particular information."

The reason you give for the other edit was "Careful: the conclusion of a valid argument need not be a necessary truth, (even though it follwos necessarily from the premises))"

The conclusion of a sound deductive argument is not necessarily a "necessary truth" as in "analytic truth", however it is in fact necessarily the truth. I thing the "necessary" language really is needed. Be well, Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) 21:42, 1 April 2008 (UTC)

The present text is:
"It [a deductive argument --L.] is more commonly understood as the type of reasoning that proceeds from general principles or premises to derive particulars, although this is a less precise understanding."
To start, the language is sloppy. If I use seven deductive arguments in an essay, have I then used seven types of reasoning? An argument may use a type of reasoning, but isn't a type of reasoning. Then, the language is fuzzy. It is "more commonly understood" by whom? And if it is more commonly understood, are there also less common understandings? If they exist and are relevant, what are they? If they are not relevant, why use the word more? Why this sentence at all? If we know the "understanding" is less precise, should we present it at all? Why not replace it by an understanding that is more precise? Finally, is the reader who does not yet know what a deductive argument is supposed to understand the meaning of "proceeds from general principles or premises to derive particulars"? I believe that I know what a deductive argument is, but even then I don't understand the quoted text. The reasoning may proceed according to general principles, but to derive particular conclusions you need particular premises.  --Lambiam 16:53, 3 April 2008 (UTC)
Unfortunately many textbooks and freshman logic classes still use the whole "specific to general is inductive, and general to specific is deductive" language. Although we know there is a better way to understand this, we still need to address this language because it is what the audience of this article is going to be looking for. I think replacing reasoning with argument will solve your other concern. Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) 23:55, 5 April 2008 (UTC)
Hello all.

Necessarily follows and necessarily true.
These two terms should be distinguised rather than than confused in an article on Logic. It is the corresponding conditional of a valid argument which is a necessary truth - the conclusion need not be. The conclusion of a valid argument may be but need not be a necessary truth (although it necessarily follows from the premises.) Any argument is valid whose conclusion is a necessary truth, no matter its form or premises. Eg I am a walrus therefore it is true that it is raining or it is false that it is raining. I think it most unhelpful and plainly wrong to define a valid argument as one whose concusion is a necessary truth (although it might be). You might just as well say that the president of the united states is a drunkard (becuase he might be)

"specific to general is inductive, and general to specific is deductive"

Since we are writing an enclopedia article and not a dictionary I see no good reason to perpetrate missussage. I do not know how many "textbooks and freshman logic classes" "use this language" and I do not think we should be bothered. I believe we should give the best possible explanation: concise and to the point.

You don't know how common the problem is, and yet you know it isn't worth explaining. Philogo please. I was a TA for a logic class of 400. I've explained this stuff a million-billion times. YES, the language that we BOTH agree is inadequate is PROLIFIC in the literature, even to this day. We have a duty to address it. We are certainly better served explaining a misperception than ignoring it altogether. I have to wonder what other stuff you are deleting. We are not perpetuating misusage when we qualify the statement as we have as a "less precise understanding." Obviously we are doing exactly the opposite. I agree on the "necessarily true" v. "necessarily follows" issue. Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) 17:26, 8 April 2008 (UTC)
But, assuming this is found in many textbooks, is the reader really served by our parroting an utterly incomprehensible phrase? Can you cite a source that talks about "general premises" in this context? I think this is plainly wrong, and presumably a textbook using this was written by an author who does not understand the concept.  --Lambiam 23:27, 8 April 2008 (UTC)
Lambiam, This may be a shocker, but there is a "real world" of logic out there. That is, that apart from the pure concepts, and the pure language, and the search for the most precise, and concise formulation, there are real people studying this and trying to learn. Our genius understanding of these things is often of ZERO use to a student just learning who has a misunderstanding. We actually need to meet such people halfway.
Obviously the phrase is NOT incomprehensible AT ALL. You are merely using dramatized rhetoric at this point. You are asking for a source for the technical term general premise. There is only one problem: it is not intended, nor is it being used as a technical term -- its merely the word premise with an adjective in front of it!
Strictly speaking you are incorrect in stating that it is "plainly wrong," or the authors do not "understand the concept." That almost sounds like religion on your part. Really all it is is a less convenient understanding for the expert. It is however helpful for the novice. By and large these authors are people who have taught the subject. Please consider that there are pedagogical concerns, and so therefore YES the reader really is better served by addressing them. Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) 16:53, 9 April 2008 (UTC)
Well, I don't understand it. Here are two statements:
  1. Camembert is a French cheese.
  2. Camembert is a substance.
Which of these two is more general, and which is more specific?
And here is an argument:
  1. Camembert is a French cheese.
  2. French cheese is a substance.
  3. Therefore Camembert is a substance.
Have we argued here from the general premise "Camembert is a French cheese" to the specific conclusion "Camembert is a substance"? Then I don't understand the meaning of the words general and specific, maybe because I did not study logic diligently enough.
--Lambiam 14:20, 10 April 2008 (UTC)
Lambiam, I'm sure you studied logic sufficiently. Quit being silly. General principles refers to the principles of logic (which are generally true), particulars include any statement which is a logical consequence of a stated premise (one particular consequence as opposed to the infinity of others that also follow). So you have identified that there are interpretations of this formulation which do not fit the intended use -- we already state that it's a less precise way to formulate it. So I guess that's it for that?!?!?
What was stated to be less precise was the understanding, not the formulation. The current formulation after your latest edit is less objectionable, but I still seriously doubt that it promotes understanding for anyone; rather, I fear that it may cloud the reader's incipient understanding. A deductive argument in standard first-order logic is "GIGO": Generality In, Generality Out.
I'd still like to see a reliable source offering this less felicitous "understanding", something like a textbook with a title like Introduction to Logic, A Primer of Logic, or A First Course in Logic, written by a reputable author, that promotes this "understanding". If indeed more common, as claimed, it should not be a difficult task to supply a citation or two.  --Lambiam 20:34, 11 April 2008 (UTC)
Perhaps you can find a better way to explain why and how terrible it is that Oxford English Dictionary is using this language, but as long as they and untold others are as well, then we really should explain it rather than ignore it. Your new gripe with understanding v formulation really just has grown tiresome frankly. Be well, Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) 21:28, 11 April 2008 (UTC)
This all seems to be getting a little heated, and generating more smoke than light! Gregbard: we listen to you and respect your views: there is no reason to keep reminding us how you were a TA; appeals to authority are rarely sucessful in this domain. It may upset and annoy Lambiam if you accuse him of griping, or his contrubutions as silly or tiresome. I do not find them so. Lets remain calm and reason together; there are too few people concerning themselves with the quality of these articles. Many need need rewriting, because they are sloppy and inexact, and a BOT will not do the job. So if you are all sitting comfortably, shall we discuss this with mutual respect, polite language and co-operation?
We are agreed are we not that the current para is not quite right; I supppose it might be made correct if we define the terms general and particular in the way Gregbasrd suggest, ways which are new to me,but thats even more smoke and less light. I suppse we could make the throy of phlogiston works if we said it meant oxygen, of that the earth is falt if we define it to mean spherical. The para reports a usage which is not techically correct be it ever so common. Thats's not really that unusual is it? Compare, physics, weight and mass are commonly confused; also intertia misunderstood. And in letrature, the terms irony and dramatic. Again acid is thought to mean dangerously corrosive and a tomatoe is though to be vegatable rather than a fruit. Poeple often thsink that Einstein said everything was relative. And so on. Articles in Physics, Litereture and Chemistry might do well to allude to these misconceptions making clear WHY they are misconceptions: and we can do the same for this article. I suggest Lambian and/or I draft a new para below and when we are happy with it seek you comments. Does that sound reasonable? (unsigned by Philogo)
I'm pretty sure this is a complete over reaction on your part Philogo. We have merely discussed something very small at great length. I think Lambiam's contributions and discussion posts are wonderful, and I never said that any of his contributions are silly. The only thing I ever said was silly was the idea that Lambiam hadn't studied logic closely enough. That was a mild way to diffuse any heat or light, etc., Philogo. I'm always quite calm, however I do like to use, you know, em-PHA-sis. I pretty much agree with the whole second half of your post. However, the word necessary is the more appropriate term here. If I lost my keys I might say "They must be in the next room!" However, that really is different then saying "They are necessarily in the next room." So that's actually an important difference. Be well,Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) 15:24, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

politeness

If Lambiam is not offended by "silly", "gripe" and "tiresome" then thats good, but I find such langauge offensive and unhelpful your ideas would be more persuasive if they were not couched in such language.

Well, I tell you what... There are valid gripes and invalid gripes. It is my sincere hope that we we hear all the valid gripes that exist and avoid all of the invalid ones. I happen to think criticism in general is a wonderful thing, so we just see things differently. Criticism is how we improve. So I think your issue is merely with the flavor of the word rather than its intended meaning. As far as silly is concerned, I happen to find that word very useful in bringing a lighter tone to things usually. I have a great deal of respect for both of you so lets all not be silly. Being offended is a choice, and I hope we all choose to take it easy on each other. That is the spirit in which I communicate. Don't take it so hard. Tiresome does seem more harsh than I intended it. So please forgive me, as I often use harsh words, but don't mean them harshly. You are certainly welcome to gripe about it if and when I am too harsh. BTW, rhetoric really should have no effect on persuasiveness, I try to sustain both a pure and logical heart with others as well in that regard. Be well, Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) 23:08, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

Moving rapildy on then: How about a suggestion under General principals and particular claims below, and commenting on my suggestion under A deductive argument is one in which it is intended that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises below.--Philogo (talk) 13:41, 15 April 2008 (UTC)

General principals and particular claims

Lampian and I seem to be in agreement that the sentence It is often – but less precisely – described as the type of argument that proceeds from general principles to derive particular claims. for the reasons given above. Therefore I propose it is deleted until somebody proposes a formulation here which all agree adds value to the article. It is NOT valuable material if it is unhelpful. Such a formultion would have to explain and define (a) general principles (b)particular claims and it would have to explain whether (A) Some Greeks are men therefore some men are Greeks and (B) Some men are mortal therefore not all men are immortal are (on the principle being discussed), valid deductive arguments a fortiori dedcutove arguments, and if so how they are proceeding from general principles to derive particular claims and if they are not valid deductive arguments what they are.

I suspect that the description type of argument that proceeds from general principles to derive particular claims is a lexical description of the vernacular use of the word deduction and not the definition of the term as it appears in reputable text books of Logic (rather than ordinary dictionaries). I would be interested and stand to be corrected to see some citations from reputable text books on Logic or authoritve authors which or who promote this definition. Gregbard says there are thousands; three would suffice. <br />
--Philogo (talk) 22:35, 14 April 2008 (UTC)
 We seem to have more or less the same issue in Deductive reasoningwhere it says: It is more commonly understood as the type of reasoning that proceeds from general principles or premises to derive particulars[1], although this is a less precise understanding.--Philogo (talk) 22:35, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

A deductive argument is one in which it is intended that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises.

I am not happy with this because I think the reader may confuse (a) a conclusion following necessarily from its premsies (b) a conclusion which is a necessarilty truth. There is no point in my editing it, howver, if Gregbard is just going to revert. Therefore I will propose the text below in substitution, and await the consensus.

PROPOSED NEW TEXT:

A valid deductive argument is variously defined as an argument (a) such that the truth of the conclusion is a logical consequence of the premises (b) in which the conclusion is entailed by the premises,(c) such that if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true (d) such that it would be self contradictory to assert the premises and deny the conclusion. (e) such that the premises and the negation of the conclusion are contradictory. These definitions could justly be said to be synonymous. The nature of the relationship between the premises and the conclusion of valid arguments which makes them such is one, if not the, main concern of Logic and the matter cannot be resolved or properly explained by a mere definition; see validity below

The corresponding conditional, of a valid argument is a necessary truth (true in all possible worlds) and so we might say that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, or follows of logical necessity. The conclusion of a valid argument is not necessarily true, it depends on whether the premises are true. The conclusion of a valid argument need not be a necessary truth: if it were so, it would be so independently of the premisses.
By way of examples:
Some Greeks are logicians, therefore some logicans are Greeks: Valid argument; it would be self-contradictory to admit that Some Greeks are logicians but deny that some (any) logicans are Greeks.
All Greeks are human and All humans are mortal therefore All Greeks are mortal. : Valid argument; if the premises are true the concusion must be true.
Some Greeks are logicians and some logician are tiresome therefore some Greeks are tiresome. Invalid argument: the tiresome logicians might all be ones!
Either we are all doomed or we are all saved; we are not all saved therefore we are all doomed. Valid argument; the premises entail the conclusion. (Remember that does not mean the conclusion has to be true, only if the premisses are true, and perhaps they are not, perhaps some people are saved and some people are doomed, and perhaps some neither saved nor doomed!)
END PROPOSED NEW TEXT
--Philogo (talk) 22:17, 14 April 2008 (UTC)

I agree with this sentiment. If we can find a way to clarify that we are talking about something that necessarily follows, rather than something that itself is a necessary truth, then that is a worthy goal. Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) 14:50, 15 April 2008 (UTC)
You do not comment on my propsed new test above. Do you not think the text proposed above is sufficient, i.e. where it says

The corresponding conditional, of a valid argument is a necessary truth (true in all possible worlds) and so we might say that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises, or follows of logical necessity. The conclusion of a valid argument is not necessarily true, it depends on whether the premises are true. The conclusion of a valid argument need not be a necessary truth: if it were so, it would be so independently of the premisses
NB Gregbard: It was to avoid going into this matter that I proposed using "must follow" rather than "necessarily follows" but you reverted it. IF we are going to use "necessrily follows" then we must explain the distinction between (a) being necessarily, e.g a tautology and (b) following necessarily from premises. I have drafted the above paragraoh in an atemt to provide that explanation. Are you content? Does it need polishing? Need a link to article on "necessary truth" I feel. I do not want to copy it into the article if you are going to revert it.--Philogo (talk) 12:34, 16 April 2008 (UTC)

I see you changed to "must" under validity, while keeping "necessarily" under deductive arguments. That is going to be fine, although I think universally that "necessarily" is much better (for reasons given above). Your proposal to clarify this issue with this language is also fine. It's a little technical, but hopefully the wording will evolve to be more accessible to the novice. I don't think it's very needed, however the article is better having fleshed this out a bit. Thank you. Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) 19:57, 16 April 2008 (UTC)
will past it in now--Philogo (talk) 11:58, 17 April 2008 (UTC)
I don't know what to tell you now. Let's just say that you have left things, um, not at 100%. Pontiff Greg Bard (talk) 15:10, 17 April 2008 (UTC)
You agreed with my proposed text above so I pasted it. Have you since edited it?--Philogo (talk) 12:18, 18 April 2008 (UTC)


Arguments in various disciplines

I am afraid I think this material is off topic, and we could well do without it. --Philogo 23:53, 31 October 2008 (UTC)


Confused about 'argumentative dialogue'

The text "Whereas formal arguments are static, such as one might find in a textbook or research article, argumentative dialogue is dynamic. It serves as a published record of justification for an assertion." is ambiguous to me. I see that formal arguments are static so a static medium such as paper is appropriate but argumentative dialogue (AD) is not. In the next sentence "It serves as...",what does "It" refer to because it seems to me it refers to AD and then implies that it should be published - perhaps on paper. I'm certainly no subject expert so I won't try and correct it. --Keith Whittingham (talk) 08:28, 20 March 2009 (UTC)


First Sentence

My roommate and I noticed that the first sentence is really problematic. He's good at copy editing and I think I know what the sentence is trying to say but, between me not really know the best way to say it and him not knowing what was being said, We couldn't make heads or tails of it. I hope someone else can.

Peace
206.192.69.147 (talk) 04:24, 19 April 2010 (UTC)

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