Talk:Battle of Kursk/Archive 1

Old talk

This talk page is becoming very hard to read. I take the liberty of rearranging and providing some headlines.--itpastorn 15:15, 2 August 2005 (UTC)

General comments

There is a huge ambiguity in the info box under casualties

Contradictory Statements

I believe the following italicized statments under the titles of German Plans and Soviet Plans contradict each other. Whilst I cannot conclusively say which statement is correct, at the very least in my opinion, both need to be sourced or one of them removed.

         German plans

Contrary to his recent behavior, Hitler gave the General Staff considerable control over the planning of the operation

         Soviet plans

Set in the larger vista of the war on the Eastern Front, Kursk is significant because it demonstrated the Soviet high command and staff now worked more effectively than OKH—largely due to Stalin finally being prepared to act on the advice of his professional intelligence and staff officers, while Hitler was systematically ignoring his[citation needed]

203.214.151.44 (talk) 22:25, 21 January 2009 (UTC)

Irrelevant

The allied invasion of Sicily does not belong into the article about the Kursk battle. Much less deserves it a paragraph of it's own just before the outcome of Kursk, as if it were some contributing phase of the Kursk battle, vital for the Soviet victory. This practice of subtle selling irrelevant sideshow skirmishes outside of the Eastern front as "descisive battles" is regrettable. Therefore I've edited the article to that effect. Cheers. - curious reader

A FEW UNWELCOME BUT ILLUMINATING INSIGHTS.       

as for german casualties, I again emphasize that the absurdly low figures provided by both Glantz and that hapless swedish gruesome twosome-frankson and Zetterling, less than 50,000 are inherently false. both are based on losses reports submitted by german army and army-group commands. such reports were ivariably mendacious, deflating the losses since german commanders were loath to admit heavy losses, especialy from the "subhuman" soviet opponent, as these were taken as proof of professional ineptitude. real losses can only be deduced from subsequent requests for replacements. kursk is a case in point. when hitler first recieved the casualties reports he was pleased, thinking that a major tactical victory had been won. when he recieved the susequent requests for replacements he was horrified, as he realised that a disaster had befallen his army. accordingly when discussing german casualties, let us not consider contemporary german casualties reports, submitted immediatly after the battles, or sources based on them, only requests for replacements submitted shortly after the battle, or subsequent casualties estimates compiled by higher headquarters-O.K.W and O.K.H-this is of course frustrating, and cannot provide a precise ascription of losses to specific battles or periods but there is no intelectually acceptable alternative, insupport of this argument Irefer to the work of Rudiger Overmans and others.

Nice choice. You can't go wrong with Glantz.

Very nice article, very readable Ping 05:14 6 Jul 2003 (UTC)

Good work, folks. The article is better than it was the last time I visited it. I remember it back then presenting the Allied assault in Italy as the chief reason of German withdrawal. This point contradicted even the article itself, but the headlines made it look so.

Now, the article has reached such a level of impartiality that I, a non-chauvinistic and only mildly patriotic Russian, can agree with it.

--Mzabaluev 16:01, 10 Oct 2004 (UTC)

what about Decisive Soviet Victory vs. just a Soviet Victory

Can I get enough people on board about changing that?

Decisive Soviet Victory seems fine to me. With respect, Ko Soi IX 06:04, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

When the week of combat around Kursk had ended, the perceived infallibility of blitzkrieg was destroyed, along with the future hopes of the German Army for victory or even stalemate in the east....Kursk stands like an object lesson to those who would stand in awe and fear of current offensive threats. Kursk announced to the world that for every offensive theory, there is a suitable defensive one available to those who devote the requisite thought necessary to develop it.

Glantz, Colonel David M. "Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk, July 1943". U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Soviet Army Studies Office Combined Arms Center Combat Studies Institute (CSI Report No. 11). {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)68.60.68.203 13:06, 27 March 2007 (UTC)

Decisive?

I believe the battle was a Decisive Soviet Victory, because from that moment on the Germans couldnt not mount another large scale offensive and they lost the cream of their eastern front panzer armies. This is just my opinion

I agree. Operation Citadel, for all intended purposes, was Germany's final attempt to recapture strategic initiative on the Eastern Front. It failed, and it cost Germany dearly in terms of resources. After Kursk, instead of conducting the war on their terms, the Germans were forced to take increasingly reactive measures against Soviet advances, until it could do nothing to stop the on-slaught of the Soviet juggernaut.

--Agreed, Kursk is where the full power of Russia's new industrial might was seen in full, and following so close after Stalingrad, Russia maintained the initiative for the rest of the war in the Eastern front. Krupkaa2

Shoddy work

The article overestimates Soviet casualties, underestimates German ones, and inaccurately labels the battle as "indecisive". The use of the term "Soviet propaganda" is also inappropriate. I edited the article but someone edited it back. Kazak

Nonsense. There were huge amounts of propagande concerning the battle of Kursk coming from Stalin's staff, especially when it comes to Prokhorovka. For more than half a century the world - through this very propaganda - was led to believe that it was an even battle. Just as some people did believe, and some still do, that there was a german super-sniper named Heinz Thorvald (aka Koenig) in Stalingrad. His scope was even on display in a museum! Face it, Stalin was a liar!itpastorn

Bigger liar than Hitler according to you? You just seem like a Germanic nationalist... 74.92.98.73 (talk) —Preceding comment was added at 19:29, 2 May 2008 (UTC)

Guderian-Hitler conversation

• Can someone provide a citation to a reliable source concerning the conversation quoted at length between Hitler and Guderian concerning the wisdom of pushing for Kursk?

no such citation exists. the only source reporting it is Guderian himself(in his memoires titled "Panzer Leader")and he was repeatedly untruthful in his account.

Can you give some examples of proven untruths in Panzer Leader that would put doubt on his account with regards to Kursk? 1337n00blar 22:27, 20 February 2007 (UTC)

Significance of the battle

And had the Germans commited XXIV pz. koprs in the south, they would have won Kursk, and saved themselves ALOT of trouble in the future. Possibly war winning.(Stan)

I do not agree with Stan that there could have been any outcome of the battle of Kursk that could have turned the table altogether. Had the Germans won it would merely have prolonged the war. Just like if the Japanese had won at Midway or Guadalcanal. No amount of bravery or strategic expertise could for ever postpone the axis defeat in a war of attrition - as it had become - over the combined resources of Russia and USA.itpastorn

itpastorn, surely you must mean resources of The Soviet Union, not Russia? Thought so. (Dynamok)

Listen to this "stan". He travelled to the past, changed the scenario and documented the outcomes. Go home stan.

-G

Result

Yes, Kursk was indeed a indecisive battle.

Consider that Nazis did not even come close to their goals (which is taking Kursk, enveloping and destroying Soviet Armies), they also lost Kharkov, Belgorod, and Orel as a direct result of the Battle. No matter what this cost to the Soviets, it was a decisive strategic loss by Nazis. (Igny 23:03, 18 May 2005 (UTC))

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How can the outcome of a battle between two forces be a clear defeat to one side, yet not a clear victory for the other? Give credit where it's due.

Actually, that's a pretty good summary. Both sides suffered heavily, but the Germans were fast running out of men and (to a lesser extent) quality equipment. For the Germans, Kursk was a loss they simply could not afford. Even if they had won, their loss-replacement situation was such that it still might have counted as a strategic loss. The Soviets, on the other hand, could afford to take it on the chin and just keep coming: they were bringing more and more soldiers into action with each passing month; their industrial production was turning out massive numbers of modern, effective aircraft, artillery, and tanks; and they were growing in both confidence and tactical skills.

For the Soviets, Kursk was not a decisive victory. But it weakened the Germans substantially and thus prepared the ground for the series of decisive Soviet victories that followed. Tannin

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Right now the battlebox says that kursk was a "Strategic German loss". I think that sums it up well.

• Whatever the reason, the German advance was halted and Kursk was never turned into a sack, as Hitler had hoped. That saved a bundle of Red Army lives.
• Even if the Germans had mounted a stronger attack than the Red Amy had expected and they had to reallocate soldiers to the defense that had originally been kept in reserve for the counteroffensive, they still had enough of them to make that offensive really successful, taking most of Ukraine in the months that followed.
• The German losses were considerably lower than the Soviet ones. But the ratio was nowhere near as high as it needed to be. The allies outproduced the Axis something like 3.5:1 in 1943 (according to P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers). In 1944 that discrepancy would increase further.

On the less important tactical level it was not a clear German loss. They had inflicted more damage than they had taken. Mansteins gains in the south against a well dug-in and fortified enemy who knew what was coming can be seen as remarkable achievement. But on a larger scale, so what?--itpastorn 15:15, 2 August 2005 (UTC)

Perhaps it should be edited to a Phyrric Soviet victory? After all the USSR did lose more men and materials than the Nazis but won the battle at any rate, such a loss however would have been extremely difficult to compensate for. BritBoy 00:19, 5 August 2006 (UTC)

It's 'pyrric' and no, the Germans got their clocks cleaned. The measure of tactical success is whether the mission was accomplished. No major German unit accomplished their mission. The achievement of the Red Army in stopping an Army Group-level German armored attack and counterattacking decisively was a first in WW2. DMorpheus 04:14, 5 August 2006 (UTC)

I agree with DMorpheus. The Soviets decisively stopped the Germans from taking the Kursk salient, while suffering losses that they could easily bear.Nick227 19:05, 6 March 2007 (UTC)

Fantasy

Bobby D. Bryant, to say that Kursk may have been an indecisive battle is "someone's fantasy" is disrespectful and unhelpful--it's a common opinion when viewing the battle as simply involving the German offensive. You say it is a decisive Soviet victory because the German Army permanently lost the initiative, but that discrepancy just comes from including the Soviet counteroffensives or not. Personally I wish battleboxes would dissapear; if casualties and results of battles are being changed on a whim, it's a more complex topic than that box and it's one-liners can accommodate. 119 08:05, 2 Apr 2005 (UTC)

Kursk was made to be a deliberate defensive battle by the Soviet STAVKA, to say that the battle can be explained as a indecisive defeat for the Germans is wrong, not only due to their huge losses but also because the Soviets were in control of the battle, they fought on their own terms and even with mistakes that might have been made during the battle/predeployment they achieved a decisive victory.

  My opinion on effect of Battle of Kursk by looking at Battle of the Dnieper

1) It make Hitler create Panther-Wotan line .When the order was signed for its construction on 11 August 1943, the German armies held positions hundreds of kilometers to the east, generally along the Donets River in the south and along a line roughly from Smolensk to Lenningrad in the north. Retreating to the line would give up considerable Russian territory, including major cities such as Smolensk and Kharkov, which had only recently been recaptured in the Third Battle of Kharkov, as well as smaller cities including Kholm, Novgorod, Orel and Bryansk. In addition, the siege of Leningrad would have to be abandoned. That mean after battle German have a plane to retreat .

2) Battle of Kursk make German lake of men .If we look at German and their ally men in Barbarossa they have ~3.6 million men. But in Battle of the Dnieper they have only 1,250,000 men (This is not they all troop in Eastern front but is almost of their all troop becauce Battle of the Dnieper inflict about 5 in 7 of their border .)

3) The battle help German in tank ratio but slicely. They destroy more tank.But Soviet control the battle field .Many lost tank of both Soviet and German side were not completely destroy but just immobile . Soviet can repair and use.

4) Aircraft lost ratio help German largely .

5) In artillery soviet have large benefit. When German retreat they have to retreat fast .And it very hard to retreat with artillery.So many of them left to Soviet . In Battle of the Dnieper Soviet have 4 on 1 in guns ratio.And this is key factor for Battle of the Dnieper.

 Kursk make German lost large area in Ukrain in about two month after German end their offensive.

Anyway this is just my opinion so debateable.

Factual errors or inconsistencies

The Kursk article was horrible. Its reference at the bottom of the page said Glantz and House's book on Kursk. This is supposed to be were they got their information.

However, it is not. I have the Glantz Kursk book, and what the article says and what the book says are VERY different. Here are the major ones:

"In total they assembled some 2,700 tanks and assault guns, 1,800 aircraft and 900,000 men."

Glantz does not use these same personnel figures of 900,000. Pg. 338 shows clearly in a chart that the German forces taking in part in Citadell only had 780,000 men.

"By this point overall German casualties may have been as high as 500,000 killed or wounded."

Again, in the appendix, pg. 338, Glants has a chart on German army losses from the offensive, and total casualties are only 49,822. The number above was used by Red Army commanders to make them look big to Stalin, pure Soviet propaganda. Glantz even agrees with 49,822 total casualties himself in the conclusion sections.

"The Soviet casualty figures were not released until the end of the communist regime, and comprised 250,000 killed and 600,000 wounded."

What is being referred to here is the official numbers by Krivosheev, who led a group that investigated through loads of Red Army papers to find out casualties. In it, they say at Kursk, the Soviets lost 70,330 irrevocables, 107,517 wounded for a total of 177,847 casualties.

Those are only a few areas where this article is clearly wrong. Overral, this article is horrible sourced, should not be read, and it appears the author did not read the source he/she uses.

And had the Germans commited XXIV pz. koprs in the south, they would have won Kursk, and saved themselves ALOT of trouble in the future. Possibly war winning.

Feel free to fix the article! I added the Glantz ref recently as a bread crumb so that someone could go back and cross-check the existing material - I don't know where it comes from, but old sources are likely to be wrong. Since you're clearly up on the details, you're the best person to turn this into a correct article - if it requires discarding the whole thing and starting over, that's certainly acceptable. Stan 02:34 13 Jul 2003 (UTC)

Casualties

A good old anti-Soviet propaganda at work here: German casualties are given for the battle, but Soviet ones "plus months of the subsequent offensive". Fixing, according to all the above discussion at this page to more reasonable numbers. Mikkalai 04:45, 24 Mar 2005 (UTC)

I put the tank losses for both sides at 300, but this only takes the Prokhorovka battle into account. Kazak

Se above (under the heading "Shoddy work") for a refute of this nonsense.

Casualty figures are a mess

There's large discrepencies against the figures expressed here, and they are routinely being changed without referenceable cites. A recent change quadrupled German casualties from 56,000 to 210,000. Other online resources that do not refer to Wikipedia have a wide disparity. Somebody needs to confirm the potential range of casualties from reputable, citable sources and fix this article with cites to those references. As it stands now, I doubt anyone can put a firm finger on what the casualty figures really are for both sides. Until someone does the above suggested work, this article will continue to suffer from changes and reverts to these figures with no adequate concensus on the actual figures. --Durin 19:51, 24 May 2005 (UTC)

It depends on one's sympathies, I suppose. A fan of the Wehrmacht will naturally lower the German losses. Kazak 02:37, 24 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Yet again, nonsense. I am a swede and definately no "fan of the Wehrmacht". Nor are the two Swedes Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson who has studied this scholarly. The problem is how the Red Army reported enemy casualties. A "hit" was reported as a "kill", even if it probably was not. Fearful of repercussions most commanders tended to add some with every level the report traveled. When it finally reached the propaganda people they often added even more. Thus, what was reported as facts in Soviet press and books has been proven to be - thats right - exaggerated propaganda. Soviet sources for German losses simply can not be trusted. On the other hand, the Wehrmacht punished commanders who exaggerated enemy casualties. They were not nice people, but they had a better system for reporting what happened on the battlefield.--itpastorn 12:42, 16 July 2005 (UTC)

Just as importantly, the Nazi's also punished commanders who reported unfavourable loss ratios against the Soviets. So a man without an arm would be considered 'healthy' and a tank without a turret considered 'operational' even if the officer would request for replacements of both. So, even if citing Soviet estimates is a mistake since they were 'propaganda' ... citing reports of casualties by German officers as the more realistic alternative is just as much out of the question and herein lies the dilemma. For example, there were single points in the battle where multiple German commanders reported less then 20% of their tanks operational after a days fighting, were forced to retreat, leaving equipment behind and yet the lower totals of German tank losses for the entire battle pale in comparison with these kinds of 'losses'.--Senor Freebie (talk) 12:52, 28 May 2009 (UTC)

the wehrmacht may have had its professional strongpoints but accurate rporting of losses was practicaly never practised by its officers,at all levels, especially on the so-called eastern front. estimates of enemy casualties as well strenghes, , were astronomically inflated,with comically paradoxical results, while, and here it becomes curious, own losses were grossly deflated in order to aggrandise one's performance, even though this undermined requests for reinforcements. vanity overrode the priority of survival. personnel losses lighter than fatalities and invalidities were rarely counted,making it often an insurmountable difficulty for commanders requesting replacements to explain where have all their men gone, whereas tanks and planes damaged but not destroyed were merly recorded as undergoing running repairs. leaving an overly credulous future reader of the records with the impression that the wehrmacht's maintainance was the worst since the extinction of the neanderthals. the soviet system was disgraceful in so many ways but the red army's wartime reporting of enemy losses was much better than that of the allies' and certainly much better than that of the wehrmacht, though the latter is to say less than nothing. they had learned its importance the hard way! as for soviet reports of own losses. sadly perhaps heavy losses did not always prove a source of shame as long strong enemy resistence could be proven and the obgective achieved consequentially it tended to be accurate.

I have changed soviet losses figure to: personnel-177,847 tanks-1641 aeroplanes-459. these include losses of all types( killed,captured,wounded andsick for personnel and damaged or destroyed for equipment).my source is G.F. Krivosheev's figures as cited in "When Titans Clashed" my personal intuition is that this figures are slightly on the high side but they are generally acknoledged as the most reliable. before any revertions take place please examine your sources carefuly and critically

Sorry, guys but I have to tell that russian main archive sources give us following figures of Soviet losses during the battle: 863000 KIA, MIA and wounded (from which 254000 KIA and MIA), 6064 tanks, 5244 guns, 1637 combat aircrafts during the period between 5 of July and 23 of August. (Гриф секретности снят. М., 1993.) And german tanks number is not 2700 at the beginning of the battle: ~2150 tanks and self-propelled guns (Мюллер-Гиллебранд. Сухопутная армия Германии. М., 2003. This is only a russian translation of originally German work, so you can read German version in order to ensure in these figures.) Manchjurshi.

Boundaries

There is a real need of defining what are the boundaries of this single battle. Geographically and chronologically. Unfortunately I have not a copy of Niklas Zetterling's and Anders Frankson's book of my own. It should probably be the best source of information however.

Prokorovka

Well written article, but it suffers from the same misinterpretation of the 12 July Battle of Prokorovka as many earlier pieces. Research in the past few years looking at original records of the German and Soviet units clearly shows that 12 July was, at the tactical level, a massive Soviet disaster. They lost over 350 tanks destroyed (nearly 50% of 5th Tank Army's strength) while the Germans lost around 50. Personnel casualties in the three SS divisions were considerably less than in each of the first three days of the Kursk offensive when they were attacking through prepared defenses.

At the tactical level, II SS Panzer Korps' defensive achievement on 12 July was nothing short of astonishing. They were tired after a solid week of hard fighting, their units somewhat understrength from the past week of combat, were about to renew their own attack (and were thus not in prepared defensive positions), and were then struck unexpectedly by a totally fresh, full strength, Soviet Tank Army with some 850 tanks.

They totally defeated the Soviet attack, killing tanks at a rate of at least 6-to-1. In terms of personnel, recent data shows that the Soviets fighting Army Group South suffered about 19,000 casualties (dead, wounded, missing) on 12 July (the overwhelming majority around Prokorovka), whereas the Germans suffered about 2,000. Tactically, it was a massive Soviet defeat.

At the operational level, however, that battle helped finally break the momentum of the German offensive. That was very important. Whether the committment of Manstein's reserves (23rd Panzer Division and the SS Wiking Division) would have then turned the tables will never be known, of course.

The point is that too many people who write about Kursk in general, and Prokorovka in particular, still have considerable misconceptions about what happened.

John Gordon

Unfortunately, most data about casualties is strongly distorted by either Germans or Russians. I do not think that any information about one side suffering 10 times more casualties than the other is credible.

Agreed. The article now states that the 5th Guards Tank Army (5GTA) lost 822 tanks, which contradicts other sources. Since 5GTA entered the battle with about 850 tanks that seems just a wee bit high. It should also be stated that half their tanks were T-70s. DMorpheus 20:43, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

Also, many of the Soviet tanks were taken out by 'anti tank ditches' and the Luftwaffe, not the Wermacht.--Senor Freebie (talk) 12:57, 28 May 2009 (UTC)

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I have started making some changes using a well-researched swedish book as my source. So far the text concerning battle of Prokhorovka has been altered.itpastorn (long time ago...)

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I have updated the text on Prokhorovka once again. To claim that a battle is a "draw" when one loses 5 times more men and equipment then the enemy, nor holds the ground evenly by the end of the day is absurd. It was a decisice German tactical victory.

It was not a Strategical victory either for the Soviets, as that kind of evaluation belongs to the intermediate level, the "operative" one.

I have also changed the wordins about the German reserves. There never was an option to have any reserves at this point in the battle. If they had spared som divisions earlier on they'd never have reached the point of an eventual breakthrough in the first place.

--itpastorn 11:34, 28 September 2005 (UTC)

I may have to change my mind about the reserves. According to this article [1] Manstein had actually held reserves that he was not allowed to commit. The article is a bit speculative as to the German ability to actually win though.

--itpastorn 11:21, 18 October 2005 (UTC)

http://historynet.com/wwii/blkursk/index.html

Contrary to claims above the Soviet did not and indeed could not have lost anything like 450 tanks in Prokhorovka since contrary to their own post-war Prokhorovka mythology they commited fewer than 450 tanks (according to Glantz at least) to the defense of Prokhorovka proper, while the majority of the 5th Guard Tank army was employed elsewhere. After kursk for whatever prpagandistic purpose. Stalin's government saw fit to inflate Prokhorovka, a rather modest battle into the cataclysmic "Clash of Armour" of legend and song for which purpose they not only inflated German strengh and losses but inflated their own even more. the figure of over 450 tanks lost covers 5GTA losses during the whole battle of Kursk, not in Prokhorovka alone. Soz101 (talk) 04:22, 2 September 2008 (UTC) —Preceding unsigned comment added by Soz101 (talk • contribs) 03:26, 2 September 2008 (UTC)

An IP suggested moving Prokhorovka to the defensive part of the operation, however the "battle" was in fact an attempted operational manoeuvre to commence the counter-offensive, and only the need to reorganise the tank forces following it, and await further confirmation that Germans stalled delayed the commencement of the general counter-offensives at the bulge as a whole. In terms of operational continuity it seem to me therefore that it belongs in the counter-offensive part rather than the defensive part, but other views are welcome--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 23:33, 4 October 2008 (UTC)

individual issues

Großdeutschland Division or Regiment?

...At the same time the Großdeutschland Panzer Grenadier Regiment attacked Butovo in torrential rain...

Any reason why the Großdeutschland is listed as a regiment rather than a division? The Grossdeutschland article says it was a division. --kudz75 01:17, 22 Oct 2004 (UTC)

It was established as a motorized infantry regiment in 1939, increased to a division in April 1942, and re-designated a panzergrenadier division in June 1943. Its establishment strength was far greater than that of regular divisions, and was closer to a panzer corps in size and strength. --ArminTamzarian 01:16, 18 Nov 2004 (UTC)

I just now clarified that in the Grossdeutschland article, and in fact took the liberty of using your words above as the basis for the text. — B.Bryant 22:28, 18 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Significance of Lend-lease?

Right now the section on "After the battle" reads:

..as well as the substantial aid from the American lend-lease programme, including jeeps and trucks that were of significant help during the counter-offensive at Kursk. The Germans never regained the initiative after Kursk.

Aren't words like "substansial" and "significant" too strong? I'm sure the jeeps and trucks came in handy, but (comparred to the size and numbers involved in this battle), were they really of that significant help?

I'm not an expert on this battle, but reading the othervise very good article, that section just looked to me like something an American sometime had inserted to emphesise that the US helped on the eastern front, too. Which they did, but AFAIK not in that high numbers to make a significant effect. Shanes 13:53, 4 May 2005 (UTC)

I found this section suspect too, so I request either more references or toning down of the influence American help. Thanks. Andries 13:46, 16 July 2005 (UTC)

The assesment that the lend-lease materials was a requirement for the counter offensive comes from Anthony Beevor. One can look at pages like http://www.o5m6.de/ and http://www.wargamer.com/articles/lldocefx.asp for numbers (for the war in total). One can also read http://vn.vladnews.ru/Arch/2005/ISS462/News/upd13_1.HTM as well as do some usenet searches on Google.

--itpastorn 15:09, 16 July 2005 (UTC)

I read that the effect of the lend and lease act only became signicant in 1944.Source the book Barborassa by Alan Clark 1965 ISBN 030435864. (I have to re-check, incl. the page nr.) Besides, the most significant aid were trucks and because the distances in this battle were not big and because the Soviets were dug in in their prepared defenses, I suspect that the Soviets needed only few trucks and that the lend and lease act was not important in this battle, at least not in the part where the Soviets were on the defense. Andries 17:43, 15 October 2005 (UTC)

Which is what I said: "during the counter-offensive..."

We probably need more detailed statistics for the lend-lease article as such.

--itpastorn 11:28, 17 October 2005 (UTC)

I think you should consider the fact that the Soviets were able to build up their forces within the Kursk salient faster than the germans, and the 500.000 US trucks could here have proved valuable. Secondly lots of the Lend Lease were supplies, such as food etc. Not to mention all the tech. gear such as radios with more.

By July 1943 the Red Army had received about 183,000 US trucks (this figure includes jeeps). This was about 25% of their total truck strength at the time. Needless to say they were also by far the *best* 25% of their trucks. There's no way to calculate the actual contribution of these trucks but it had to have been considerable. Think of all the mines, towed guns and construction material that had to be moved into the defensive zones. DMorpheus 20:49, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

Forget the trucks, how many Churchills (was it churchills?) actually participated in Kursk and how did they fare? Anyone know?--Senor Freebie (talk) 13:00, 28 May 2009 (UTC)

Change of objective: sentence removed

I took out the sentence

[The Germans has good knowledge of the extensive Soviet defense measures] "Why they did not then switch targets remains a mystery."

It is not a mystery, according to Alan Clark's it had to do with stupidity, personal ambition, and internal politics in OKH, and OKW. But I need time to write this down in a good, accurate way. Andries 08:38, 17 July 2005 (UTC)

It maybe so according to Alan Clark, but there is another plausible explanation. With the new German armour the Axis achieved a technological edge and altered their tactics somewhat. The Soviets at that time had few weapons that could efficiently counter the new German tanks and assault guns. Thus if the Germans managed to break thru, it would be better for them to have more Russians defending. With respect, Ko Soi IX 06:16, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

Using the word "propaganda" is not POV

All nations who fought in WW2 had their own propaganda. Some propaganda involves lying, some propagande involves using only those facts that support ones case while ignoring others, some forms of propaganda has more to do with creating an atmosphere. Case in point: In the movie Pearl Harbour the american who volonteer to fight the Battle of britain is hailed with the words "If there are more like you we pity the nations who make war against you" (or something like that. In the sceene where general Doolittle inspects his personel before the raid he praises the men, claiming that the war will be won because of men like theese.

This is of course not the truth. It is perhaps not state-run propaganda, but deceitful propaganda it is. America had its heroes, as did all participants, but won because of one thing: Industrial strength. The allies simply outproduced the Germans and the Japanese. That is the not so sexy single most important factor of how the war was won. (See table on my talk page.)

However, in an article about Kursk american propagande is not that much of an issue. Soviet propaganda is. To a very large extent the traditional view of the battle has been taken from communist-era Soviet sources. Prokhorovka being the foremost example. But why are some people so afraid of admitting that the traditional view is propaganda. It is actually very informative to say so. It is a valuable lesson for the history student. --itpastorn 10:57, 9 August 2005 (UTC)

All nations who fought in WW2 also had the history books. Claiming that historians are liars without actualy proving that is strongly POVed. Wikipedia has to neutrally describe all cases without ignoring others, but calling one of the views "propaganda" without supporting the claim is a POV. The fact that all nations had propaganda does not mean "everything and every little detail in their history books" was propaganda. If you have examples (like Prohorovka) you should look into sources and find the actual facts contradicting the traditional view. Sentences like "this article is proven to be propaganda" is not acceptable in wikipedia. Igny 03:12, 11 August 2005 (UTC)

German tactical victory

The battle was German tactical victory, just as the Battle of Jutland (ect) during First World War was. Germans failed to achieve their objective during both battles, but caused much greater casualties to their opponent during both battles.

This is not clear yet. The casualties for Soviets include both the defence and the counteroffensive, while the German losses are for their attack on Kursk only. In battle of Jutland, both sides claimed victory as that was a matter of their pride and prestige (and both were right for different reasons). I haven't actually heard that Germans claimed victory for Kursk, or did they?. As I see it, it is clearly a subjective interpretation of the statistics, which may be skewed to prove any point (Igny 14:38, 31 August 2005 (UTC)).

Losses have nothing to do with the evaluation of the outcome, unless these losses are so significant as to influence the final outcome of the war, which was clearly not the case. mikka (t) 15:47, 31 August 2005 (UTC)

"Tactical Victory"? What semantical meatgrinder do you put your thought through?

At Kursk, the Germans: 1. Attacked a heavily defended region with enormous force 2. Suffered enormous losses which they could not replace while dispensing somewhat higher losses on the enemy. 3. Were unable to take the objective territory. 4. Were thrown back in disarray by the counterattack. 5. Were never able to mount another significant offensive again in the theatre.

Please tell us what victory, defeat and tactical mean. I guess I'm all confused by common words.

(BTW Jutland was more or less a draw, but it did convince the Kriegsmarine not to risk open battle for the rest of the war.) - Petrol

Here is Guderian's take on it: "We had suffered a decisive defeat". DMorpheus 21:14, 9 January 2006 (UTC)

Erm, Jutland was a German defeat. They were chased off the seas because had their fleet would have been destroyed by the British Dreadnoughts had the battle continued, while the British losses could be made good. The Germans lost because they did not achieve their objectives. The Soviets won because they achieved theirs. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 140.109.140.134 (talk) 09:16, 17 September 2008 (UTC)

..........

[quote]Suffered enormous losses which they could not replace[/quote]

Germans did not produce 500 tanks and 200 planes after Kursk?

[quote]while dispensing somewhat higher losses on the enemy.[/quote]

Somewhat?

[quote]Were never able to mount another significant offensive again in the theatre.[/quote]

Incorrect.

[quote]Kriegsmarine[/quote]

....

There was no "Kriegsmarine" during First World War. German Navy was named Kaiserliche Marine.

---

Casaulty figures are ridiculous! An OUTNUMBERED army charged over an OPEN field into a MULTI-LINED and ENTRENCHED defence manned by an army COMPARATIVELY equipped and trained (see the articles on Tiger and Panther tanks describing how undertrained their crews were for this battle!) whose commanders KNEW about the attack in advance and yet mannages a 7:2.5 kill ratio in men and 3:1 in tanks (despite the fact the Soviets held the ground and were able to repair their damaged tanks whereas Germans had to leave theirs to be captured. A pro Soviet-book "Kurska bitka" (Battle of Kursk in Serbian) written by Yugoslav author Branko Kitanovich in 70-ies (using mostly Soviet sources) I read states that the Germans lost half a million soldiers (KIA, WIA, POW), and that Soviet casaulties were "lower". While you may express doubt in this (I dont consider theese figures completely accurate either) they are still certainly closer to real figures than those numbers stated here.

Veljko Stevanovich

Propaganda

An OUTNUMBERED army

Being outnumbered doesnt nessecarily mean anything. Germans, whos number was 500000 caused nearly one million casualties to Soviets at Kiev in 1941, while their casualties were 100000. Or are these numbered also ridiculous?

they are still certainly closer to real figures than those numbers stated here.

You consider a pro-Soviet book made in 1970s using Soviet sources to be reliable source?

The Soviets claimed that the Germans sufferred more than 500,000 casualties . This again has proven mere Soviet propaganda. The official Soviet casualty figures did not emerge until after the end of the communist regime.

Battle of Kiev (1941) was a poor argument. In Kiev, 1941 the Germans actually managed to encircle Soviet Armies (which had the order to hold and never retreat). In Kursk Germans managed to advance some 30 km (at the best). Did they kill at the rate of 30000 per kilometer? (Igny 15:43, 3 September 2005 (UTC))

I agree 100% that Battle of Kiev was a bad example. It should be also noted that the dispairity in battle experiance was then much greater. I already stated that I do not consider the 70-ies book compleatly accurate! It strikes me, however, that many people think that it was only the Soviets who engaged in propaganda. Western authors (especially in works written during the Cold war) were as happy to exeggerate the Soviet casaulties, as the Soviets were happy to conceal them, because the Soviets were then a real enemy that should be discredited. Also I should note that I don`t find any statements of declassified WESTERN (British or US) figures, so what makes their authors an unquestionably reliable source? Everyone writes history the way it sutis him. And so far I saw the "reliability" of many casaulty figures just to be a matter of whom you belive. But theese are the facts: Kursk was a major Soviet victory, the Germans never again mounted a major offensive on the east and all that A YEAR before the D-Day! If those casaulty figures were correct the Germans would be STRONGER (relative to the strength of the Red Army)THAN THEY WERE BEFORE THE BATTLE: roughly the strength ratio of armies was 2:1 favouring the Soviets, and the casaulty ratio: 3,5:1!!! If you explain me why was the Wehrmacht constantly on retreat after Kursk from such a badly mauled army and why it did not succeed to stop it even beheind such a fine defensive obstacle as the river Dnepr I`ll beleve theese figures. If not, please do find accurate numbers and correct that mistake!

Veljko Stevanovich

To Veljko et al.

Why is it so hard to admit that Stalin was a liar sitting on top of a regime of propaganda? We know that casualty figures were badly skewed to keep morale up. Real figures emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union. The archives were to a large extent opened and the lies were exposed. Besides, this wiki is not about original research. Go by yourself a copy of "Kursk 1943 : a statistical analysis" by Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson (2000) ISBN 0714650528 It is not written during the cold war and it is not written by someone from a NATO country.

--itpastorn 16:43, 27 September 2005 (UTC)

"Zetterling and Frankson" does not sound like someone from Warsaw Pact either. I don't have the book, so my question is where they got the "real numbers". Did they cite and quote Soviet archives (supposedly open after the fall of Soviet Union)? I tried to search internet for Soviet archive documents, but failed. All Russian sources (dated after 1990) had information quite different from what Wikipedia says and not a single one of them called Kursk battle "German tactical vistory". Probably, by "real numbers emerge" you meant "numbers skewed by 'notorious liar', Stalin, were skewed back in opposite direction". You may ask why? Because this tactics is very popular among revanchists, who rewrite the history to further their nationalist agenda. Needless to say, it is very far from NPOV. (Igny 19:15, 3 October 2005 (UTC))

"Zetterling and Frankson" are Swedes. They have had access to a both German and Soviet archives. And if going 5:1 in losses and holding the ground by the end of the day is not a tactical victory, what is? It was an operative loss though, because the intention had not been to throw back an enemy attack (which the Wehrmacht did), but to advance (which they did not). --itpastorn 19:11, 4 October 2005 (UTC)

itpastorn
Being outnumbered doesnt nessecarily mean anything. Germans, whos number was 500000 caused nearly one million casualties to Soviets at Kiev in 1941, while their casualties were 100000. Or are these numbered also ridiculous?
I love all those zeroes there...
Why is it so hard to admit that Stalin was a liar sitting on top of a regime of propaganda?
Why? Because that is your biased opinion, which has no place in an encyclopedia. From what you say you are obviously not neutral. Therefore, you should probably not be editing this article at all. I'm sure there are plenty of political forums out there where you can condemn Stalin, the Red Army, or Russia as a whole all you want. Why must you do it here?
Kazak 03:16, 5 October 2005 (UTC)

Kazak, you're in the wrong place. Hurry over to the article on Stalin because there people describe how he developed a cult of personality, sent people to Gulag, initiated mass arrests and executions, deported people en masse, persecuted christians, etc. Obviously the whole article has been written by people who use nothing but their "own biased opinions", otherwise such nonsense would never have entered the article, right? He probably never waged war against Finland and Poland in 1939 either? And the communists mostly from the Swedish town of Kiruna who emigrated east to the Soviet union in search of the true communistic paradise really found it. Not one of then got executed or sent to a labour camp. And while we are at it we should probably stop blaming Custer and Sheridan for their alleged injustice to the indians, and Genghis Khan for his alleged brutality as well. And all those German nursery rhymes concerning Swedish murderers in the Thirty Year's War came into being because all people in Germany had an irrational hatred for Swedes. NOT!

Seriously, what is the issue? Yes, this is an Encyclopedia, and it's articles should present facts and reasonable deductions from these facts. The talk pages OTOH may permit more opinions. What edits have I made that are POV? My edits are based upon well researched sources, but some facts are not in line with what the Soviet regime told it's people and they are not in line with some forms of Russian nationalism today. Too bad. --itpastorn 16:04, 5 October 2005 (UTC)

So, according to your logic, everything the Soviet government said between 1929 and 1953 was a lie? Kazak

No, according to my logic it was a lie, when it differed from the truth! And unfortunately that happened a lot. Some events were altered (such as Prokorovka being a melée), other things were withheld or very rarely spoken of (such as there were large numbers of people from the Soviet Union, including russians, actually figthting against the communist regime or that the Communist regime brutally invaded Finland and Poland in 1939) and some things are just made up (such as the duel between Zaitsev and a German super sniper in Stalingrad). If ones only source is Soviet official communiqués then there is good reason for doubt. If a communiqué is confirmed by other indipendent sources there is good reason to believe it might be true. If the sources differ, they must be evaluated. OTOH it seems to me that you and a few other people seem to believe that the mere mention of Sicily is an insult or that well researched numbers by neutral historians, such as Zetterling and Frankson, can be dismissed as anti-russian bias. --itpastorn 11:40, 10 October 2005 (UTC)

When exactly does the estimate stops being "propaganda" and become "neutral"? What worries me is the trend when higher soviet and lower german casualties means more neutral or better informed or less biased or just better. With this trend, the number of soviet casualties in Kursk will climb into millions easily, and "the neutral historians" would justify that by claiming "we are just fixing the soviet propaganda!". Zetterling and Frankson were not neutral by any means. (Igny 15:38, 10 October 2005 (UTC))

Please provide proof that they have distorted the material found in archives. Please provide proof that they are biased. --itpastorn 10:23, 12 October 2005 (UTC)

This discussion is very old, still, can't resist quoting from Z&F (using Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2000 edition - quotes courtesy of Neolexx from Russian Wikipedia):

• (p. 103) When the Zitadelle offensive started, the II SS-Panzer Corps had 494 tanks and assault guns available ...
• (p. 108) The II SS-Panzer Corps lost 36 tanks and assault guns between 5 and 23 July of which at least 19 were destroyed before Prokhorovka
• (p. 103) Thus, on the evening before 12 July the II SS-Panzer Corps had 294 tanks and assault guns operational

Note how the arithmetic makes completely no sense: either German losses were 5 times higher before Prokhorovka or German strength at Prokhorovka was 2 times higher than Z&F appear to state. I think it is the former, and Z&F are playing with the meaning of the word "loss". Dimawik (talk) 01:56, 14 March 2009 (UTC)

I did not say they distorted the truth. I actually meant they did not know the truth. What they provided in their book was an estimate and the estimate is not the truth. The estimates may be lowered (for example for propaganda purposes), but they may be too high also. I think Zetterling's estimates were too high, and the actual number will be somewhere in between. The estimate is very much prone to errors, faults in assumtpions, wrong data. Base the estimate on average size of Soviet battalion, for example, and you would easily get an error of +-30%. Get wrong number of formed divisions, and the error would only rise. I don't trust any statistics, but if I were forced to believe different assumptions made by a Swedish or Russian historian about Soviet Army structure, I would choose the Russian.

I would suggest changing Soviet losses (currently 860370, a ridiculous number) to, say, 500000-900000(estimates vary), and I am being generous to both sides here. Same applies to the Germal losses. (Igny 14:35, 12 October 2005 (UTC))

From facts to insult

Itpastorn, please resist for a moment the natural impulse to stand with your Germanic brothers. Think logically: the Wehrmacht, outnumbered, was attacking a well-entrenched enemy that knew the time of the attack to the hour. And yet, here you are assuming that the Red Army suffered a 2/3 casualty rate - including reserves - while the Germans lost only a fourth of their force. Pray tell, why then did the Germans lose? Did they simply become weary of slaughtering those silly human-waving Russians and go home to drink some good beer and record their accomplishments on Wikipedia? Because if we are to believe you, by the end of the battle the Germans actually outnumbered the Soviets. Of course, it is entirely possible that the noble Wehrmacht saw the errors of the ways of its Nazi leaders and decided to lose Germany the war so freedom could ring from sea to shining sea, isn't it? Or maybe, just maybe, you're full of nonsense? No. You're right. Let's just go all out and put the Soviet losses at 300 million, because Stalin probably sacrificed every Soviet man, woman, and child in the battle and then lied about it - for propaganda purposes, of course. Kazak 02:28, 12 October 2005 (UTC)

Kazak seems to belive that I have some kind of bond with all "Germanic brothers". I take that as an insult. I have a long history of anti-racism, anti-fascism and anti-communism. In fact I am pro democracy, pro freedom of speach, pro religious liberties and pro truth. I resent being described as having a "natural impulse" towards some kind of ethnic group whatsoever. I have in other places repeatedly spoken against even Sweden when we have behaved badly. I have harboured political and religious refugees from Latin-America and Asia, to keep them from being sent back into prison or being subjected to torture in their homeland. I have repeatedly defended arabs, jews, blacks, turks and slavs(!) from slander and other forms of depreciation.

As for the facts: Wikipedia rules state that no original resarch is supposed to happen here. We should base our articles on the best sources available. The best sources indicate that during most battles the Wehrmacht performed much better on the tactical level, basically because they had a much more flexible and decentralised command structure. This has been studied extensively after the war and is a well established fact. So why did they loose the war. Well, according to my opinion because:

1. They were outnumbered.
2. They were outprodiced, because:
   1. They went into "total war" too late (1943).
   2. They refused to use women in factories.
   3. They had a shortage of natural resources (it takes 10 times more people produce synthetic gas than regular gas)
   4. They got bombed quite a lot! If not for the bombings they would have been able to crank up volume more than a few notches. (AAA also tied up perhaps 90 % of all 88mm guns!)
   5. Their tanks and planes were too complicated, too many parts, too many hours to build.
3. They had a very small percentage of mechanized forces.
4. They were led by Hitler, the worst strategist of all time.
   1. They constantly neglected logistics throughout the war.
   2. The were given impossible and stupid orders repeatedly.
   3. Hitler often cut a division in half and thought that "now I have two", etc.
   4. Significant transporting capacity were used for "the total solution", which apart from being the worst crime ever committed reduced their military capacity.
5. They could not stop the convoys in the Atlantic or the Pacific.
6. They lost the spy-war totally. The only spies they thought worked were in fact misleading them. The Soviet Union had the best spies, no doubt.
7. They lost the crypto-war totally. The English read their enigma-transcripts just as fast as they did themselves.
8. They lost all good-will that they had in Ukraine, because they behaved like evil bastards. Had they treated the people of Ukraine as equals they'd might have won the war?! (But then there probably never had been a war...)

And perhaps because: The Nazi regime was the most evil in the entire history of mankind and all evil sooner or later gets destroyed.

However, this does not alter the fact that German losses were rather low at Prokorovka. OTOH I would not believe German propaganda on how many tanks the Red Army lost in 1944-45 either.

--itpastorn 10:23, 12 October 2005 (UTC)

That was very detailed, but Hitler's overall incompetence does not explain how the Germans could, all at once:

1. Attack the Red Army whilst being outnumbered 2:1
2. Inflict four times (!) as many casualties as they sustained
3. Destroy thousands of Soviet tanks while losing only a few hundred themselves (and, we must not forget, the battleground at Prokhorovka was gained by the Soviets, making extraction and repair of German vehicles impossible)
4. By the end of the battle outnumber the Red Army by a significial margin

AND YET

1. Lose all gained ground
2. Lose several key cities around the salient
3. Never be able to launch a major offensive in the East again
4. Lose strategic initiative in the war as a whole

Can you explain? Because, if we are to believe you, that is exactly what happened. And here, to prove my general point, is a nice little Pentagon report on the Battle of Kursk. (It's authentic - check stormingmedia for it.) Go to "General Conclusions" for casualty information.
Mine and Countermine Operations in the Battle of Kursk

Kazak 01:05, 13 October 2005 (UTC)

Numbers from Frankson and Zetterling

1. At Prokhorovka the Red Army lost fewer than 400 tanks - not thousands.
2. During the period 22 june 1941 to 31 may 1943 Soviet losses were 25 million ded, wounded and MIA. German losses were 4 million. German allies (Italians, Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians, etc) would probably make that number go up by 50-100 %
3. On the 4th of July 1944 the Germans had 330 000 men and 1500 tanks on the southern sector of the battle. The Red Army had 625 000 and 1700 tanks. During the battle they got reinforced by 300 000 men and 2900 tanks.
4. On the northern flank the Germans did not achieve the same kill ratio as in the south, nor did they take as much ground.
5. The kill ratio for Prokhorovka was indeed 5:1 in tanks, less in infantry. That was however not the kill ratio for the entire battle of Kursk.
6. During the Soviet counteroffensive the Red Army still had not learned the art of combined forces. Tanks operated on their own causing a high losses.

What was the main tactical advantage of the Wehrmacht. One word: Initiative. They had a very different way of commanding their forces. Initiative was in the hands of the platoon leader or even the individual soldier. When Hitler micro-managed they lost badly. When he did not, they really did have sensational tactical results - which is true, but not something I would wish for. I am GLAD they lost!

--itpastorn 08:05, 13 October 2005 (UTC)

During the period 22 june 1941 to 31 may 1943 Soviet losses were 25 million ded, wounded and MIA. German losses were 4 million. German allies (Italians, Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians, etc) would probably make that number go up by 50-100 %
Soviet losses were 8668000 dead and MIA, and another 15 million wounded to various degrees. The Germans lost 4 million dead and MIA, with about 8 million or so wounded (check Feldgrau if you don't believe me). You're right about the other Axis countries - I think they lost about 2 million dead and MIA. Plus, we must not forget that 80% of Soviet POWS died in German camps, whereas the mortality rate in Soviet camps was about 15% (since deceased POWS are included in dead/MIA statistics). Thus we can assume that the losses overall were almost equal, with a small discrepancy in the Axis' favor caused by the disasters of 1941. Kazak 23:40, 13 October 2005 (UTC)

kazak and itpastorn are both wrong: A) the german did not suffer 4,000,000 LIA and MIA. they suffered nearly 4M KIA,alone, and additionaly, nearly 3M in MIA that is POW. these add up to nearly 7M B) while the figure of 500,000 german casualties is plainly absurd, far exceeding the soviets's own estimate. frankenson and zetterling's figure of some 47,000 casualties along with glantz's similiar number, much trumpeted by itpastron, are equally incorrect. they are taken from the initial german casualties repots, which if remotely true would have indeed made Kursk a wehrmacht tactical victory. they certainly delighted Hitler who, by then, should have known better. it was only over the coming days and weeks as german forces reported crushing shortages in both men,tanks and planes that poor hitler realised that he had been had again. that losses, as too often, had been enormously heavier than initially rported. wehrmacht officers at all levels hated to report heavy losses as this were taken as proof of professional inadequacy. they would deflate losses, then astonish both hitler and the OKH, by requesting huge amounts of replacements. exact german losses cannot be accurately established. german casualties reports are next to useless. they can only aproximated throuh suspicious crosscomparison of engagements and needed replacements figures. it can be reasonably estimated that in kursk they were somewhat, but not very much, lower than the initial soviet estimate

OK, we are discussing facts

Kazak linked to Feldgrau, which is a new page to me but seems worth reading.

However I found the following numbers there:

German KIA, Eastern Front 1941 - 11.30.44:  	1,419,728
German MIA, Eastern Front 1941 - 11.30.44: 	997.056
German WIA, Eastern Front 1941 - 11.30.44: 	3,498,060

The total sum of casualties on the eastern front is 6 million for the period 1941 to (and including most of) 1944. Frankson and Zetterling says 4 million from 1941 to 31 may 1943. So these sources do not seem to contradict each other. 2 million lost during the rest of 1943, including Kursk and being driven out of Ukraine and during 1944 including Bagration actually seem a bit low to me!

Moving on to 1943 specific numbers we get the following from Feldgrau:

'''KIA/MIA 1943'''
January 1943 	37,000 	| 127,596
February 1943 	42,000 	| 15,500
March 1943 	38,115 	| 5,208
April 1943 	15,300 	| 3,500
May 1943 	16,200 	| 74,500
June 1943 	13,400 	| 1,300
July 1943 	57,800 	| 18,300
August 1943 	58,000 	| 26,400
September 1943 	48,788 	| 21,923
October 1943 	47,036 	| 16,783
November 1943 	40,167 	| 17,886
December 1943 	35,290 	| 14,712

These are the German losses (excluding wounded) on all fronts. According to these numbers May (the surrender of the Africa corps) was worse than July. August was also worse. January was the worst (Stalingrad). What's notable is that Kursk barely registers. July is just a little bit above the average. The operational pause (on all fronts) in June is also striking of course. If one would believe that the Germans lost at least a few thousand troops on Sicily between 10 July and 17 August as well as a couple of thousands on other parts on the eastern front, German KIA and MIA during Kursk must have been no more than 100,000 going on mathematics alone.

In closing: I can't see that Feldgrau is contradicting Frankson and Zetterling at all.

Soviet losses, OTOH, admittedly is a tricky subject. Who was a civilian and who was not. Should jews be included or counted in a separate column? Ukrainians and people from the Baltic states who fought on the German side, either as gerilla or as auxilliary troops for the Wehrmacht, in what column should they go? They fought against the Soviet union, but they were (at least the Ukrainians) from it. Some Ukrainians also fought against both Hitler and Stalin! So definition plays a part as well, not only the actual number of dead people. One entire division of Ukrainians fought in Normandy in 1944 (on the German side), how do we count them?

Kazak also previoulse linked to Mine and Countermine Operations in the Battle of Kursk. I quote:

"Losses on both sides during the battle were enormous. A German historian has put the total losses of the two German army groups involved in the battle at 3,300 killed and 17,400 wounded and missing. Losses were especially heavy among officers and infantrymen. --- Soviet losses were even higher. Recent Russian historians with access to the military records state that the three Fronts involved in the Battle of Kursk lost a total of 70,330 men in irrecoverable losses and 107,517 in sick and wounded, as well as 1,614 tanks and self-propelled guns."

Can't see that this contradicts Frankson and Zetterling either. Total losses are stated as 1:8. Considering that the Wehrmach suffered it's worst losses the first days (5th to 10th of July) when they attacked through the minefields and the fortifications makes my take on Prokhorovka (1:5 kill ratio) seem even more reasonable. Especialliy when one is considering that it was a battle not against dug in Soviet forces but a mobile battle, where the Germans excelled.

One should note that these numbers do not seem to include anything but the actual "battle of Kursk" and therefore do not include the Soviet counteroffensive and the battle of Kharkov. This Wikipedia article however includes all fighting until August 22.

--itpastorn 14:24, 14 October 2005 (UTC)

1. The Axis' permanent casualties at Kursk were around 100,000, just like the Soviet ones. That's what we're getting at here. German losses were less, but not by that much. There's little question as to the German losses - it's the Soviet one's that need to be established. Kazak

I've continued this discussion under the heading Casualties.--itpastorn 11:57, 17 October 2005 (UTC)

Examples of propaganda

Examples of misinformation that persist even today.

Quoting http://www.vor.ru/55/Monument/Mon_eng.html:

[quot]On July 12, 1943, near Prokhorovka more that 1,200 tanks and self-propelled guns on both sides engaged in a tank battle, the greatest in history. Soviet tankers destroyed nearly 400 enemy tanks and won the battle.[/quot]

In an earlier version of the article I attempted to use the Belgorod Diorama as an example of propaganda. One can look at parts of it at this address: http://www.angelfire.com/nm/duga/duga.htm Notice how the battle is depicted as a melee!

From http://newsfromrussia.com/science/2003/08/23/49504.html

[quot]But, in a nearly two-month operation the Soviet army routed 30 German divisions. It was the decisive victory for effecting a drastic turning-point in the war and finally sealing the strategic initiative for the Soviet army.[/quot]

And in the longer version the Wehrmacht lost "jets" (sic!). N.B: German losses are inflated in this article dated 2003 and Soviet losses are not mentioned at all! http://english.pravda.ru/science/2003/08/19/49398.html Also notice that the article gives an impression that most German soldiers fought with the latest equipment, when it has been proved they did not. (Other Soviet sources I've seen repeatedly exaggerates the amount of new equipment, such as T-34/85, in their own ranks.)

--itpastorn 18:54, 2 October 2005 (UTC)

Intel

The stuff about the Soviet spy network "Lucy" needs to be downgraded. The real source of intel was from the British, using Ultra intercepts. This was the source where Stalin was convinced about German plans at Kursk. Also, Soviet Military planners studied and planned for operations near the Kursk salient as early as March. --Pelladon 00:56, 10 September 2005 (UTC)

Casualties

An anon added the following piece in the irrelevant "Sicily" section. Also, his data somewhat mismatch the article. Please experts make use of this.

German losses in the 2 weeks battle for Kursk were about 2.000-3.500 men per division (about 30 were involved)(Stephen Newton, David Glantz). These losses were among the combat troops of the divisions, which is quite high for only 2 weeks of battle. The total losses were about 80.000 and includes the KIA, MIA and WIA. German losses in tanks were about 500 total losses. Almost all of the many Panthers stricken in the minefields had to be blown up. Only a dozen Tiger I's were lost (Thomas Jentz). The German "Panzerwaffe" was at his highest level in WW2 and on average knocked out 10 times their number when they got their chance. The big loosers in the battle of Kursk were in fact the Russian tanks which were totally shot up in many tank battles.

Soviet losses were about THREE TIMES AS HIGH: 240.000 and about 2.000 tanks (final total losses after recovery). mikka (t) 20:35, 1 October 2005 (UTC)

Proposed casualties information

See above in several places for discussions concerning casualties. I am trying to put it all together.

We have at least four ways of defining the "battle":

1. Operation Citadelle (4 July - 12 July).
2. Operation Citadelle and Soviet counteroffensive near Kursk.
3. The above plus the last battle of Kharkov.
4. (Pseudo-definition) Prokhorovka

As an example. The related Soviet attack west-northwest from Kirov on 22 August, should it be included or not?

My proposal is as follows:

1. We summarize Prokhorovka in the text and leave the details to it's own article.
2. We include all casualties for the entire period 4 July - 23 August in the sidebar, as well as in the article text, for both sides.
3. We count the following casualties:
   1. Soldiers KIA, MIA and WIA.
   2. Tanks and other armourde vehicles that had gun, excluding self-propelled howitzers, destroyed (beyond repair if possible) or captured.
   3. Planes shot down or destroyed on the ground.

--itpastorn 11:55, 17 October 2005 (UTC)

Not to kick a dead horse, but David M. Glantz, one of the listed references, puts total Soviet personnel strength at 1,910,361. 1,426,352 were actual combat personnel. He also states that there were a total of 27,663 combat guns and mortars, as well as 4,938 combat tanks and SP Guns. Of this, he states Red Army Personnel Losses were at 70,330 irrevocable, and 107,517 medical, coming to a total of 177,847 - not the 800,000 argued to be by the battlebox. I'm sorry to say, but those casualties are over the line. The battle box implied that the Soviets suffered 61% casualties. Furthermore, he puts German strength at a total of 780,900, with 2928 tanks and assault guns. Fo this 4,759 were killed, 23,356 were wounded, 987 were missing, thus coming to a total of 49,822. In terms of Red Army Tank Losses he puts them at 213, with 138 as irrecoverable. He then offers figures for the Orel Offensive (10 July), which I will provide because they are relevant to the 'Soviet Counteroffensive'. He puts total strength for that at 927,494 combat personnel, with 112,529 irrevocable losses, for a total of 429,890 losses. The Germans had a grand total of 475,000 personnel, and Glantz states that German losses are unavailable. In his summary table for the 'Kursk Operation' he puts total Soviet strength at 2,500,000 committed, not 1,300,000, and 863,303 lost (including WIA), while 7,360 tanks were committed with 6,064 lost. In terms of believability I won't glorify David M. Glantz, but he is one of the few authors which can prove that he does hold most available sources into account, and he undisputably makes the most out of recently declassified information in Moscow. Just my two cents. Catalan 06:56, 28 December 2005 (UTC)

General Krivosheev (with access to archives) gives the Soviet losses as follows:

Kursk Strategic Defensive Operation: 70,330 killed | 107,517 wounded
Orel Strategic Offensive Operation: 112,529 killed | 317,361 wounded
Total (July 5 - August 18):         182,859 killed | 424,878 wounded

These are the Soviet archival figures. Now we need the German casualties for each Soviet operation (not by dates, because the two operations overlapped). Failing at that, someone needs to bring by total German losses for July 5-August 18 but only for the Kursk-Orel area. I also propose that we remove the tank/aircraft strengths and losses altogether, as they make everything far to confusing. Kazak 00:11, 1 January 2006 (UTC)

I cannot for the life of me fathom why my introduction of material losses was met with such furious opposition,given their great significance to both sides, but let it be so. if some deranged souls are put into an amok of deletionism by their appearence, I shell forebear not to have them indicated, untill SUCH fragile psyches adapt to the idea. however I insist that soviet casualtis figure remain the one provided by Krivosheev, namely, 177,847!!!

Dunn's Kursk: Hitler's Gamble

I would like to quote review of Dunn jr., Walter S. Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997 ([[2]]).

Of even more interest is Dunn's interpretation of the famed tank engagement at Prokorovka. Most previous historians have treated this rather like the ride of the Valkyries, and almost all use the same terms for the 12 July action: "a head-on collision of armor." Robin Cross describes "a confused free-for-all...like knights on a fifteenth-century battlefield." John Erickson speaks of a melee "at point blank range" where "burning Soviet tanks rammed the Tigers." Alan Clark calls it "the Death Ride of 4th Panzer Army" and describes the "clouds of dust" at Prokorovka. Actually, Dunn tells us, the facts were a little different. In the first place the day was damp and rainy. The engagement was not so compressed as usually cited: "It was not a battle with tanks charging on one huge field, but rather a series of attacks and counterattacks across a stretch of countryside ranging in an arc about 20 km wide south and west of Prokorovka, from the village of Ivanovka on the south to the south bank of the Psel River on the north." He estimates there were rather fewer AFVs on each side than usually reported. In addition, most of the earlier historians of the battle have passed along estimates of losses from unreliable sources. In particular, German losses were not as great at Prokorovka as generally reported and in fact were considerably lighter in the mobile fighting than in the grinding battles at the prepared positions.

In his conclusions, Dunn quantifies how the iron laws of time and space dictated from the first day of the offensive that the Germans could not win. The time required to chew through each Soviet position was simply more than the attackers could afford, providing ample opportunity for the Soviets to deploy strong reserves in new positions behind threatened sectors. The preponderance of Stalin's manpower and material was more than Hitler could realize or admit,

Why do we attribute this to "iron laws of space and time" rather than better planning and execution on the Soviet side? No one would, for example, state that the "iron law of space and time" caused the British losses at the Somme...I have always thought that lousy British tactics and strong German defenses had something to do with it.

Wouldn't it be equally accurate to state the same facts thusly: "The depth and strength of the Soviet defensive positions atritted the German assault units to such an extent that they called off the offensive." ? DMorpheus 22:22, 22 December 2005 (UTC)

and Manstein's assertion that he could still win a battle of attrition seems wildly naive in light of what Dunn reveals about the depth of the Soviet position and the availability of fresh men and machines. Dunn also downplays the effect of the Allied landings in Sicily on 10 July upon Hitler's decision to halt the attack, pointing out the much greater threat of the newly unleashed Soviet offensives. Perhaps the most important outcome of Kursk was what must have been for Josef Stalin the highly gratifying proof that his Red Army was now a sufficiently potent weapon to defeat Germany even without assistance from the Western Allies.

I don't have the book, but it seems to me that adding information from that book will bring Battle of Kursk closer to NPOV. (Igny 19:48, 3 October 2005 (UTC))

I am one who says that Sicily should be mentioned, not because it was decisive, but because it affected the chain of events. The mere mention of Sicily is not an insult to the Red Army. The fact that "iron laws" made a Soviet victory inevitable has been one of the things I've been trying to say all along. The Red ARmy would have won the war sooner or later even if Hitler had taken Moscow in 1941 or stopped operation Uranus in 1942. In 1943 there definately was only one possible outcome left. I do note that we seem to reach some agreement on Prokorovka, though.--itpastorn 19:05, 4 October 2005 (UTC)

I strongly agree that Sicily should be mentioned. I have read Sicily several times in the descriptions of the decisions by Hitler with regards to the battle, though I forgot where. Andries 19:02, 18 October 2005 (UTC)

"Myths" of Kursk?

I reverted the following edit on Feb 11 2006: "Myths of Kursk There is a significant amount of false claims about the Battle of Kursk (some of that information included within this very article, in fact). This is largely due to the fact that most of the information the general public knows about the battle comes from Soviet propaganda. The fact of the matter is, Kursk was not the largest tank battle in history, with the total number of operating vehiclese coming closer to 500 in all. More information regarding the myths surrounding Kursk can be found here. http://www.uni.edu/~licari/citadel.htm" Could the editor who inserted this kindly explain why this was deemed appropriate? If we're questioning the number of tanks involved, surely we should discuss it here first. There are plenty of sources that will show that the number of tanks in this battle was far greater than 500. One Soviet unit, the Fifth Guards Tank Army, had over 800, and they weren't even committed to the battle until the 7th day. But that's not even my main issue with this edit. Placing a statement in the main article that questions the rest of the article doesn't seem appropriate to me. DMorpheus 02:13, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

I took a look at the web site you referenced. First, it's largely arguing a straw man. That is, Martin Caidin's work does not, as far as I can tell, form the basis for any part of this article. I agree with the site's author that his book on Kursk is garbage. But that is a pointless argument anyway. The rest of the article is using many of the same sources as here. But it's claim that "everyone" is learning from "soviet propaganda" is just silly. DMorpheus 02:19, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

The 500 tanks operating should be exclusively referred to the Battle of Prokhorovka in any case, at least according to Glantz, who this article refers to. In any case, care to share what tank battle operated more tanks? IIRC, there are none, regardless of the sizeable decrease of vehicles that actually operated at any one time during the zenith of Kursk. That said, the only tank battles that are known that operated large amounts of tanks were during the wars in the Middle East, between Israeli and Arab armour, and they never exceeded this number. That said, Kursk would still be the largest tank battle in history. JonCatalan 06:57, 12 February 2006 (UTC)

I want to add a part but I dont know where to put it

This is what I want to add

Much of the German equipment was new and untested, with undertrained crews. The new tank hunter units, though sporting a highly effective 88 cannon, had no hull mounted machine gun to protect against infantry, and were quickly targeted by the Soviet anti tank guns, which were positioned in hemispherical concave bulges, forming semicircles of high velocity crossfire. Moreover, these positions were protected by small two-man foxholes armed with limpet tank mines, machine gun nests, and mortar fire, ensuring than the Wehrmacht infantry could not effectively defend the tanks.

But I am not completely certain where it belongs, so some direction would be appreciated (Deng 14:39, 7 April 2006 (UTC))

My suggestion is, don't put that paragraph anywhere. It's not particularly accurate, as we have discussed on other pages.

1. *Most* of the German equipment was not new.

2. *Most* of the Panzerjager units (which were not themselves new) were equipped with vehicles other than the Ferdinand. There were lots of Marders, which were not new. There were only about 90 Ferdinands. If you want to link to the Ferdinand page that might be a good idea. The Ferdinands did not operate alone, so the lack of a hull MG, while it is a factor, is not itself the reason why so many were knocked out.

3. How exactly did the Soviet infantry employ naval limpet mines?

4. How were small two-man foxholes "armed with" mortar fire?

It might be more productive to toss that paragraph aside and write a few new ones about low-level tactics at Kursk if that is the content you want in the article. As part of that you might want to add that the Soviet artillery was the main way the German infantry was suppressed.DMorpheus 15:13, 7 April 2006 (UTC)

Change most to some, how exactly they were employed -- dont know ask the original poster. 2/3 of ALL german casulties on the eastern front were because of artillery so it is given that artillery was the main way the german infantry was suppressed.(Deng 08:28, 11 April 2006 (UTC))

German and Soviet Casualties

I changed the German casualties figure to 49,822. The 500.000 figure is greatly suspicious especially when considered in relation to the Soviet losses. From what I can see this was the consensus a few months ago although I am not certain how the numbers balooned again (becasue no such account exists in the discussion page). TSO1D 00:17, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

Wrong, there was never a consensus on the German casualties in this discussion. (Igny 02:44, 12 April 2006 (UTC))

So now it appears we have an edit war going on with back-and-forth edits of this number. Maybe everyone could agree to sincerely discuss the next edit here rather than just revert each other?

For what it's worth, Glantz and House (The Battle of Kursk, 1999) provide the following.

Soviet losses: 70,330 'irrevocable', 107,517 'medical' total 177,847. They work from Krivosheev's figures.

German losses: 49,822 KIA, WIA and missing.

Even if they are off by a bit, it's a long way from these figures to a half-million.DMorpheus 02:53, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

I absolutely agree with you. TSO1D 02:54, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

Upon consideration, I think you are right. The fight was just a push (~30km) and withdrawal lasting a few weeks, and 500k losses (~30k each day??) is likely an overestimate. And I agree that this variation by an order of magnitude in the reverts can not be acceptable for Wikipedia. Still I would be happier if Wikipedia provided several estimates from different reliable sources, not just Glantz, with analysis of different stages of the battle. (Igny 13:02, 12 April 2006 (UTC))

Agree, so let's see some other reputable estimates. DMorpheus 00:05, 13 April 2006 (UTC)

The sources given by the original creators are creditable and if you read the article you can see why the numbers are so high. The numbers are most likey from early july to late agust and the numbers that are refered to a few lines up most likely cover a smaller time frame. That said if someone can give multiple creditable sources that show losses for both sides during the same time period then any change based on those sources would be acceptable. (Deng 19:21, 15 April 2006 (UTC))

So what source actually exists that places German casualties at 500k? If none is provided the 49k datafrom the Glantz source should be used. TSO1D 02:36, 24 April 2006 (UTC)

Go here and you will see that the 50k are only for the first 10 days http://www.kansaspress.ku.edu/glabat.html and if you scroll up some on this wiki discussion page you will see this "When Hitler first recieved the casualties report he was pleased, thinking that a major tactical victory had been won. When he recieved the susequent requests for replacements he was horrified, as he realised that a disaster has befallen his army." (Deng 03:10, 24 April 2006 (UTC))

I think the confusion here has to do with lack of clarity of what the battle of Kursk actually was. The Germans narrowly restrict it to Zitadelle. The Soviets saw Zitadelle as the defensive phase, followed by Operation Kutuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev as an offensive phase. I seriously doubt that German losses to 22 August were only 50k KIA/WIA/MIA, but am willing to consider data provided on this. What clearly should not happen is a comparison of losses for all phases of Kursk for the Soviet side with just the losses of Zitadelle for the Germans. Either you take losses for the narrow definition for both sides, or for the wide definition for both sides. Until someone has the German losses for the post July 15 phase, I suggest going with the narrow for both, using the figures user:DMorpheus has posted above.Andreas 07:50, 24 April 2006 (UTC)

But we do have the figures for the wide definition. 500/607 (Deng 13:35, 24 April 2006 (UTC))

It depends on what this article should be - a discussion of the Battle of Kursk as the Germans saw it, or a discussion of the Battle of Kursk as the Soviets saw it? I would tend to go to the latter, and make Rumyantsev and Kutuzov sub-articles to show how things hang together. Then losses could be ID'd by phase. All of this would mean major re-writing though. Andreas 14:06, 24 April 2006 (UTC)

I strongly agree with you, and frankly, including the Soviet counteroffensives makes much more sense on several levels. One, the 'backhand' approach was the basis for Stavka's strategic planning for the summer of 1943 anyway. Two, it is hard/impossible to understand the outcome of "Citadel" without reference to these operations. Three, the Soviets won. Finally, for what its worth, I have several French-language publications that do exactly as you suggest, treating the campaign as three phases. So at least the Soviets and some French authors already take the perspective you suggest. The re-write would be a lot of work, but that's why we are here. We needn't throw out very much of what is already done. DMorpheus 14:56, 24 April 2006 (UTC)

Great minds obviously do think alike. :-) If you have more detailed information on Operation Kutuzov, that might really help. Andreas 15:09, 24 April 2006 (UTC)

I can start working on that in a week or so - I have other committments till then. I see the article is a mere stub at the moment. One approach could be to work up the three articles to a high standard (Kursk is already pretty good IMO) and also do an overview article to tie the three together. Hopefully, if we can pull together data from the three phases, the 'summary' casualty figures, strategic effects etc. can go in the overview article. Agreed? DMorpheus 18:14, 24 April 2006 (UTC)

I wanted to get a bit more work on it done, but that failed because the books are currently in storage. So I focused on other things during the last week. I agree that once the basic articles Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev, Operation Kutuzov, Battle of Kursk (with sub-article Battle of Prokhorovka) are in better shape, they could be developed into an article describing the whole summer fighting. Andreas 18:23, 24 April 2006 (UTC)

Where are the casualty numbers coming from? Specially for the Germans. Usually the numbers in literacy are around 100 000. For that 500 000 the Germans would have lost all the attacking divisions to the last man and then some more.Turska 09:47, 4 October 2006 (UTC)

Tanks, Planes, and Material Are Not REPEAT Not Casualites

Please consult a dictionary.

Philippsbourg

I agree the term should be losses but the template was created that way and I did not want to either change the template or completely delete losses of planes and tanks. TSO1D 20:08, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

Aircraft losses: where are the figures from?

To me it seems highly unlikely that the Germans would have achieved 5:1 kill ratio. In 1943 the Soviets fielded excellent La-5 and Yak-9 fighters that were quite competitive with bf-109s and fw-190s on low to medium altitudes (common on the Eastern front). And as far as I know VVS pilots of the time were not the late 1944 Japanese-style novices. Stormoviks were also known for their strong armor. So where are theese (obviously very rounded) figures from?

On a separate issue, I really enjoyed the picture I found amoung those Kursk pictures from the Soviet perspective: a cannon with its crew sitting on it is being tractor towed over a snow-covered field (?!) The battle was in July, right? :-)

Veljko Stevanovich 30. 4. 2006. 23:25 UTC+1

Propably the Axis losses are only from what the Germans saw kursk as which they narrowly restricted to Zitadelle. The Soviets saw Zitadelle as the defensive phase, followed by Operation Kutuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev as an offensive phase.

So most likely the axis losses are only from Zitadelle and Soviet losses are from Zitadelle + Operation Kutuzov + Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev. We hade the same problem when it came to humans casulties but there it has been fixed. Scroll up some and you will see a similar discussion (Deng 03:16, 1 May 2006 (UTC))

Preliminary Actions

I know it's nitpicking but:

The article currently says 90 were at Kursk.

However the page for the Elefant says "All but one of the available Ferdinands were put to use in the Battle of Kursk, the first combat the Ferdinand saw. " (As only 90 were ever made, that would make the number deployed at Kursk 89, not 90).

Also, as the Ferdinand was named Elefant in February 1944, shouldn't the article refer to the name that it went under at the time of the battle?

Finally, that section of the article is disingenuous when describing the makup on the German Armoured forces. Focus is put on the '200 Panthers', '90 Elefants' and '270 Tigers', as well as 'late-model' Mark IVs. This gives a total well short of that stated of 2,700 tanks and assault guns.

The effect is to give the impression of a modern and cutting edge force, while glossing over the the mathematical implication that the vast majority of German armour at Kursk had to be of much older models. The article makes it sound like Kursk was to be a demonstration of the latest military technology Germany had to offer - in reality the numbers were the result of them scraping together everything they could, both old and new. - James

The total number is correct what you are refering to is just a mention of SOME of the tanks and SP-guns not ALL, if you want more details on ALL tanks and SP-guns then go buy/borrow some books ;) (Deng 04:37, 2 May 2006 (UTC))

I didn't make myself clear; the article focuses on the numbers of newer tanks, but glosses over the fact that they were not representative of the German forces as a whole. A casual reader could be forgiven for thinking that the Germans deliberately picked the best and newest for the Kursk offensive. The article needs to reflect the fact that the armoured numbers are the result of the Germans gathering *everything* possible for this one operation.

As it stands that part of the article is phrased to overstate the strength of the German armour by mentioning only the best and newest. It gives the impression of a shiny new army instead of a combination of some new and the vast majority old - James

While you have a point, your last para is overstating it. The numbers of completely outdated tanks present was small, just above 15-16% of the total force (these would be anything with a 75L24 gun, Panzer III 50L48, and Panzer 38(t) or Panzer II). That leaves the vast majority of the force with 50L60 armed Panzer III, Panzer IV lang, both of these types uparmoured, and the listed number of modern vehicles (e.g. 25% of the Panzers were Tiger and Panther models; almost 20% of the assault guns were Elefant). The attacking force was by no means composed completely of the most modern, but it was not a scraped together force fielding any outdated AFV on the eastern front to make up the numbers either. The numbers are e.g. in the appendix of Töppel's thesis, my guess is you'll find them in Newton or Zetterling too. Andreas 13:46, 2 May 2006 (UTC)

Preliminary Actions

Changed "...from their espionage organization Red Orchestra [not chapel] with sources including..." to "...from their Red Orchestra [Rote Kapelle] espionage organization, which had sources including... " as I assumed that this is what the author actually meant. The remainder of the sentence is still very awkward: "including officers in the Nazi administration, among others in Goering's aviation ministry..." - does "officers in the Nazi administration" mean military officers who worked in in the Party hierarchy, or who were attached to the civil administration, or who perhaps were, as would be assumed, in the MILITARY apparatus or Defence Ministry?... My point being that, to me, the terminology seems a bit confused and needs clarification.Hi There 12:36, 23 July 2006 (UTC)

Battle Ends

Put a POV-section tag at the top of the Battle Ends section because of the bolded text:

"Field Marshal v. Manstein believed the outcome of the offensive phase of Kursk to be much more grey than black and white. For although the Germans were forced to withdraw, the Germans "managed to, at least, partly destroy the mobile units of the enemy's operational reserves". This view is short-sighted and too narrow however, since it fails to mention that despite the losses suffered in the defensive phase of the battle of Kursk, the Red Army managed to go over to a very successful offensive within two weeks, pushing the Germans back to the Dniepr and towards western Ukraine." dreddnott 21:40, 25 September 2006 (UTC)

yupp Battle of the Dnieper Markewew 11:25, 26 September 2006 (UTC)

The language used, especially in the bolded portion of the referenced paragraph, is informal and entirely inappropriate to an encyclopedia. There is currently a POV dispute right here on the Talk page for Battle of Kursk, because I allege that at LEAST this particular section does not adhere to NPOV requirements. Please do not revert my edits. dreddnott 07:26, 27 September 2006 (UTC)

Removing POV about expected success of offensive

The paragraph I removed read "Simply put, Operation Citadel embodied a limited plan. However, there was no reason to doubt whether it would be successful. Until Kursk, no major WW2 German offensive had ever been defeated. It is only in retrospect that the outcome seems preordained; at the time, most leaders on both sides expected that the German attack would probably succeed, at least in the breakthrough stage." The above simply does not make sense. Among the German offensives that had been defeated till Kursk we can count the attempts to take Moscow, Leningrad, the Caucasus oil fields, Stalingrad and the attempt to relieve Stalingrad. To say that "leaders on both sides expected that the German attack would probably succeed" is definitely POV.

No SUMMER attack had faild and no Attack had Faild only after a few days, earlier faliures had come after some time. Weedro 22:34, 3 October 2006 (UTC)

The text made a blanket statement "no major WW2 German offensive", no clarification about whether summer or not. Anyway, you have to establish why summer is important. Also why is "only after a few days" relevant? Battles may not always be decided in a "few days". Also what is the "breakthrough stage"? Is that referring to encirclement? A few citations showing that "most leaders on both sides expected that the German attack would probably succeed" would be helpful. The Soviets knew the attack was coming and had created multiple layers of defense. I seriously doubt that their leaders thought that "the German attack would probably succeed". Jayanta Sen 23:18, 3 October 2006 (UTC)

Try Glantz, The Battle of Kursk. That's where much of that paragraph is taken from - not all of it but most of it. I agree some of the wording is far less precise than it should be. What it should say, to be consistent with Glantz, is that no major German offensive had failed to achieve a tactical breakthrough. The breakthrough stage is the effort to penetrate the enemy tactical zone - that is, those areas defended by divisions or lower formations. Typically that's 10-15km of depth, although obviously it varies quite a bit. Most German offensives had broken into the enemy's operational depths. Glantz doesn't say anything about 'a few days'. His point (which I think is very important in this article) is that German confidence was not misplaced. It is only in retrospect that we all write things like "the plan was poor' or the 'attack was impossible'. Clearly, based on WW2 events up to july 3 1943 there was every reason to expect/fear german success *in the breakthrough stage*. Central Front's success in stopping the tactical breakthrough was thus quite an achievement. Whether you agree or not with this assessment it is what Glantz wrote. DMorpheus 18:11, 22 November 2006 (UTC)

Hello Morpheus and thanks for the clarification. I am not quite able to follow Glantz's line of thought. If we go by the definition "penetrate the enemy tactical zone", it seems this fits Operation Winter Storm (which was prior to Kursk). I would think repeated German attempts to break the defenses in front of Moscow would qualify too. I seriously doubt that after Stalingrad the Soviets were lacking confidence. Also Hitler is reported to have said his stomach turned when he thought of the impending battle, hardly the words of a man sure of success. As you say, it is up to us whether to agree or disagree with Glantz. Regards, JS 20:56, 27 December 2006 (UTC)

wording re: definition of a defensive attack

I wonder whether

The defensive counter attacks retook Oryol (August 5), Belgorod (August 5) and Kharkov (August 23), pushing back the Germans across a broad front, the first successful major Soviet offensive during the summer since 1941.

is worded correctly. It seems to me that a defensive attack would not re-take ground the les allemande had seized. Would that not be a defense and subsequent offense? ... aa:talk 16:49, 22 November 2006 (UTC)

I agree, that was a long-planned major counteroffensive. Calling it a 'defensive counterattack' smells like POV to me. DMorpheus 18:15, 22 November 2006 (UTC)

I removed "defensive." ... aa:talk 21:41, 22 November 2006 (UTC)

July 12

I'm a sloppy reader, so frogive me if it's mentioned anywhere in the text. July 12 was the day of long-planned counteroffensive, yet the Soviets had (or chose) to commit the Steppe Front head-on against II SS Pz Corps etc. instead of executing any flanking or pincer maneuvers. Somewhere it is blamed on Stalin who was afraid of letting the Germans loose. It was mainly this decision (and the costly ordeal at Prokhorovka) that made the Fronts on the Southern face wait and recuperate until August 3 (that's a lot of time, Vatutin's front was very weak, and 5th GTA was decimated).

Also, it should be mentioned that US Army conducted a KOSAVE study (with the help of Russian officers) and quantified losses casualties etc. 62.118.129.104 19:11, 13 December 2006 (UTC) Dietmar

Duration and Casualties

It seems to me that this article is confused because of a failure to accurately define exactly what is the "Battle of Kursk" as opposed to the course of the general German-Soviet operations in this region. That leads to overlap with other Wiki articles and considerably confusion about casualties and loss rates.

The Battle of Kursk proper commences on 5 July and ceases on 20 July when the German forces cease offensive operations. Significant German forces were then withdrawn to deal with the Soviet offensive on the Mius River and the Allied invasion of Sicily.

The Battle is to be distinguished from the follow-up Soviet counteroffensives Operation Kutuzov to the North towards Orel and later in August, Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev towards Kharkov. While the Orel attack overlaps in time with the end of the Battle of Kursk it occurred further to the north and was between different Soviet and German units to those which had participated in the Kursk battler. Wikipedia quite properly has separate articles for each of these major Soviet operations which historians do not consider to be part of the Battle of Kursk itself, though they are part of the overall operations on the south-centre part of the Eastern Front. Thus while its proper to mention them as follow-up events to the successful Soviet defence which caused a halt to German offensive operations, they are not part of the Battle itself and deserve their own articles.

I have amended the date range for the Battle to correspond with what is the Battle of Kursk proper and included casualty figures for the Battle with citations to reliable historical works.

Armourhistorian 03:06, 12 January 2007 (UTC)

This article has had a lot of rancor and dispute over it for a long time. I'd suggest trying to build a consensus here for your proposed changes before making them. That's why Alex and I both reverted changes made by you or an IP which made edits similar to yours. --Woohookitty^Woohoo! 12:26, 12 January 2007 (UTC)

Before you mass delete changes that are backed up by numerous citations to authority, the lack of which has been a constant complaint with respect to this article (eg the current casualty figures have NO citations whatsoever), let alone go deleting things such as a reference to the most authorative modern Soviet authority on casualties, whose work is cited by every leading historian of the battle, I suggest you examine those changes and only delete those you believe, with reason, to be inaccurate.

Neither you nor Alex have ownership of this article and if you wish to delete changes you must have some proper basis to do so. The rancor may be because previous claims were made in a vacuum without citation, adding further information that is backed by citations to leading works is an IMPROVEMENT of the article.

Armourhistorian 15:15, 12 January 2007 (UTC)

I have now edited the casualties section to include page number references for the citations, and added a fourth work as a reference, Mawdsley's recent book on the Eastern Front. I have added that book to the references list.

If we examine the "massive changes" I have made they consist of:

- defining the battle in the same way as it is defined by professional historians - from the start to the cessation of German offensive action in the Kursk salient, this makes the article consistent with the wiki articles on those counteroffensives which correctly treat them as separate Soviet operations and removes the ambiguity in the current article as to whether the counteroffensives are part of the battle or not

- included links to those wiki articles so that readers can follow up on the counteroffensives

- replaced the current casualty figures which are wholly uncited with figures from four different works and made it clear that they are for the period 5 to 20 July, even if you disagree on the duration of the battle the figures are accurate for the period defined and have been qualified that way in the text

- added two more references to works on the battle, including the leading Soviet publication on WW2 casualties

If you have a reasoned basis for considering some or all of these amendments to be wrong I am all ears.

Armourhistorian 15:40, 12 January 2007 (UTC)

I don't think you are seeing the point here. Neither Alex or myself are making any kind of judgement about your facts. The point is that this article has gone through many a battle, including extensive sockpuppet use, edit wars, etc, etc. We are trying to prevent this from happening again. Massive changes without consensus are not considered to be a good thing on Wikipedia when it comes to controversial articles because it leads to edit wars. Neither Alex or myself have a "side" so we cannot really be taking "ownership" of the article. We are both neutral admins attempting to curtail future difficulties. Honestly, I haven't even read all of what you've posted on the article. What you've posted is not the point. The fact that it's being posted without consensus is. --Woohookitty^Woohoo! 10:41, 13 January 2007 (UTC)

In April 06 there was actually the beginning of a thoughtful discussion of this very issue - see talk above. I hope we can get consensus on it. For my part I believe much of the contention surrounding both casualties and the strategic outcome is based on underlying disagreement about the extent of the campaign. DMorpheus 16:03, 12 January 2007 (UTC)

I completely agree, most of the confusion about casualty numbers is because people are talking about two different things - one is what might generically be called the Kursk Campaign (ie the actual Battle in the Kursk Salient from 5 to 20 July plus the two Soviet counteroffensives aimed at Orel (12 July to 18 August) and Belgorod (3 August onwards, but usually taken to end with the recapture of Kharkov on 24 August)) and the second is the Battle of Kursk itself which forms part of the overall campaign. That confusion is reflected in the first line of the article which assumes that the Campaign and the Battle are the same thing.

Those counteroffensives were extremely large battles in their own right - just look at the scale of Soviet casualties - according to Glantz the Soviets suffered about 180,000 casualties in the German offensive, but then 430,000 in the Orel counteroffensive and 255,000 in the Belgorod counteroffensive. Or to put it another way, of the total 865,000 Soviet casualties in the entire Kursk Campaign only 21% were suffered in the actual Battle itself. At the moment wiki has separate articles for those two counteroffensives but they are only stubs.

Ideally there should be an overall Kursk Campaign article that covers the entire fighting from 5 July to the end of August and then has under that umbrella three separate sub-articles covering the Battle and the Orel and Belgorod operations. Armourhistorian 11:10, 17 January 2007 (UTC)

As for German casualties, its this same issue that is causing the confusion between 50,000 (correct for the Battle itself) and much larger figures that include German losses during the counteroffensives. Glantz notes that German losses for the counteroffensives aren't available as separate figures but there are loss figures for the entire Eastern Front available on a month by month basis. Armourhistorian 11:14, 17 January 2007 (UTC)

Anyway, the current status of the article is bogus. If that is not corrected, I will set a neutrality tag within the next days. According to the numbers presented, the German side lost 500000 (out of 800000 soldiers participating) in Soviet Kursk, and 450000 were lost in less than a month after the end of German Kursk. All this happens without quoting any reliable source. It just took some months of gifted editing to keep a Wikipedia article in this state. -- Zz 14:34, 17 January 2007 (UTC)

January 23 2007 edits

I just reverted a bunch of edits...and I'll apologize for doing so since I hate to roll back a single editor like this, but I reverted for three reasons:

a) These edits were unsourced, significant changes to strength and casualty figures, as well as to some of the artillery usage numbers.

b) All of these are contentious subjects and deserve some discussion before making these major edits.

c) Some of the edits strain credulity. For example, the number of Soviet artillery tubes in the 4 July preemptive barrage was 3,000 (from Glantz and House) and was changed to 13,000. The 'debut' of the SU-122 was not at Kursk but some months prior to that, probably around Nov 1942 (Zaloga and Grandsen); the SU-122 was not a tank but a mechanized gun. The Red Army did not plant a "half million" mines in the defensive phase; the number is quoted elsewhere at nearly one million and is sourced to Red Army engineering reports. The number of "Infantry" exceeds the number of "troops" which is impossible.

If we can discuss some of these other points we might make some progress. DMorpheus 19:45, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

Casualties, again

The current casualty format needs to be redone, I can't make heads or tails of it. It seems to have something to do with how each side reported the casualties, but this needs some explaining, it is not clear in the least. 24.222.119.44 23:27, 23 January 2007 (UTC)

It may be because some casualty figures include wounded (along with killed, missing and POW) and some do not - I have seen figures done on both bases (ie with or without wounded) from this time period Armourhistorian 14:04, 24 January 2007 (UTC)

Good work on the casualty figures Armourhistorian. Now they make much more sense as the Citadel offensive was only small part of a few huge battles. Altough the article is still kind of hanging on the "myths" of the battle. As the battle for Prokhorovka it wasnt that important part of the big picture as it was doomed to failure because of a more important actions earlier on both sides of the 2nd SS Korps wich failed by XLVIII.Panzerkorps and Kempfs Panzer Korps. Also for sources instead of using When Titans clashed by Glantz. I very highly recommend The Battle of Kursk by David M. Glantz and Jonathan M House. Easily the best book about the Kursk i have ever read. Turska 09:32, 25 January 2007 (UTC)

Disputed - casualties

According to the numbers given, the German losses at German Kursk were 50,000, and at Soviet Kursk, they were 500,000. 450,000 losses in four weeks are nonsense. Even if we assume that there were other battles starting from July the 4th, a number ten times the amount of German Kursk is patent nonsense again.

The German army kept quite exact number of their losses, and it is typical that they have not been consulted. Instead we see stubborn editing and unsourced claims.

It has gone for too long anyway. The factual accuracy is disputed. Back to the sources, and reliable sources at that. Definitions must be cleared which battles exactly are referred to by Soviet Kursk. -- Zz 11:36, 25 January 2007 (UTC)

I don't know Zickzack, 450,000 casualties in four weeks does not sound like nonsense to me. We are talking here about THE major Sovjet summer offensive of 1943, which threw the Germans back many miles west, and casualties of half a million seem not unreasonable for being halfway overrun. thestor 08:36, 27 February 2007 (UTC)

German Casualties...again

The figures for total German casualties (killed, died of wounds, wounded, captured and missing) for the Battle of Kursk portion of the campaign are reasonably clear - 57,000 is the figure calculated by Zetterling and Franklin, 49,822 by Glantz and House.

What's not clear is how many casualties the Germans suffered in the succeeding portions of the campaign, Glantz notes in his book that no separate figures are available. Which makes me wonder where the figure of 450,000 in the article can come from (ie 500,000 minus the 50,000 suffered during the actual battle). However, there are German casualty figures available for the entire Eastern Front for each of the months of July and August 1943, Mawdsley cites a study by Overmans which gives figures of 71,000 and 59,000 for the number of deaths in each of those months. However death figures are not comparable with total casualty figures.

The rule of thumb applied by Mawdsley (and it seems reasonable looking at other figures) is that about 25% of casualties are deaths - which would imply that during the months of July and August 1943 the Germans suffered a total of about (71,000 + 59,000) x 4 = 520,000 casualties on the entire Eastern Front.

The problem is of course that you can't simply apply those casualty figures to the Kursk Campaign, because that campaign was not the only action going on on the Eastern Front in those months. Aside from the usual attrition constantly going on, during those months there were also major Soviet offensives against other sectors of the German Front:

- Soviet Southwestern and Southern Army Groups launched three offensives against the German positions on the Mius and Donbass

- Soviet Leningrad and Volkhov Army Groups launched an offensive towards Mga

- Soviet Western Army Group launched an offensive against Army Group Centre in August 1943 (Operation Suvorov)

The falsity of the unsourced figure of 500,000 for the Kursk Campaign is that it ascribes all 500,000 German casualties on the entire Eastern Front to that campaign alone, ignoring the fact that the Germans were suffering heavy losses on other sectors. As another illustration - in July 1943 the Germans suffered 71,000 deaths on the entire front, but only about 15,000 of those were at Kursk, deaths on other sectors in that month amounted to 79% of all losses.

Unless some figures can be obtained for German losses in the Soviet counteroffensives it may never be possible to say what they were, but they certainly weren't anywhere near 500,000. If you try to estimate loss rates as a fraction of the entire Eastern Front I suspect a figure closer to 200,000 would be more accurate.

Armourhistorian 02:38, 27 January 2007 (UTC)

You have no right to change the numbers to what feels right for you

German numbers are impossible to find out without an enormous effort because they always hide or misplaced or changed their numbers for example take the whole of the war, for a very long time the numbers of 1955 were the quoted one with 3.5 million military dead and 3.5 million dead, not until the year 2000 did someone point out that those were the 1937 border numbers and did not include 900k Austrians and ethnic Germans in annexed territory. That the Volkstrum had been counted as civilian casualties and that 400K non Jewish Germans killed by the Nazis them selves had been counted into the civilian death rates. The real number being 5.5 million military dead out of which 4.3 million in the east. All the numbers can be seen on the ww2 casualties page And do not forget about the Axis allies such as Hungary, Italy and Romania plus Waffen SS where are their losses during Kursk. The most interesting part is losses over the war years Total Soviet losses is about 10 million and total German about 4.3 million in the east now the soviets lost 3 million dead and 3 million captured during 1941 and almost all of the captured during 41 died in camps. That leaves 4 million to die in 42-45 the Germans on the other hand lost a few 100k during 41 which leaves 4 million to die 42-45 and some 300-400k Nazis died in camps compared to the 3-4 million Soviets. So if the Germans did suffer less during Kursk then they must have suffered more during other battles because they did lose about the same amount of men as the Soviets during 42-45. The German numbers are extremely hard to find but what is interesting to note is that when Hitler found out about how many reinforcements his generals demanded compared to the losses they had stated he exploded in anger, so the only way to come close to real German losses is to see how many reinforcements the generals demanded. And what about the Soviet numbers are they not a bit to high why is there on this like so many ww2 articles a bias towards that for every 1 German casualty there must be at least 10 Soviet ones. Which was right during 1941 but not 42-45 and certainly not Kursk 43 and it is possible that everyone who has given German numbers have given the 1937 border numbers which excluded some ss and ethnic Germans in annexed territories and Austrians

86.67.181.77 01:46, 29 January 2007 (UTC)

There are just some facts nobody seems to acknowledge:

1.) Each German mother or wife got a letter if her son or husband went KIA or MIA. The soviets did not have any system like that. As a registered member of the Wehrmacht or Waffen-SS each soldier possessed a “Soldbuch” and several files where opened on him. This was necessary just to ensure payment and so on. In this context it didn’t matter weather the soldier had lived inside German borders of 1937 or outside nor (for the SS) if he was German at all. Just for this reason it is obvious that the German military did not have much of a choice than handling obvious numbers when it came to their own casualties.

2.) In comparison to the Red Army the Wehrmacht’s soldiers (at least until end of 1944) where quite skilled and well trained. To overcome this disadvantage Soviet troops often attacked en masse, misusing their human resources as canon fodder. An overall kill-ratio on the “eastern front” of 1:4 has therefore never been doubted by any serious historian.

3.) Hitler exploding in anger because of his generals does not mean anybody could draw conclusions out of this. As commander in chief and with the development of the war resting mostly in his own responsibility he was in desperate need for scape goats at almost all times. Not to mention his procedures of splitting one division into two and then thinking “now I have two divisions”.Of course each of the “new divisions” demanded reinforcements to become at least something like a division in such a situation: Destruction of shiny illusions always made Hitler furious (even when he had been a boy).

4.) Russian soldiers fallen into German hands have mostly to be counted as casualties. Even if those poor guys survived their times as POWs Stalin had most of them killed after the war because of “cowardice”.

5.)This brings us to an estimated 15.000.000 Soviet military personal dead during WWII. I’d like to mention those 25.000.000 civilian casualties as well (not part of the-kill ratio but includes also partisans!!). KIA Wehrmacht + SS “eastern front” 1941: 176.015; 1942: 506.815; 1943: 700.653; 1944: 1.232.946; 1945: not exactly known: ~ 550.000.↑ Milton Leitenberg: Death in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th Century [[3]] ↑ Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv Freiburg (Official military archives of German military forces (Frederal Republik of Germany and therefor free of propaganda and updated frequently, because Germany still does research on some individual MIA-Files but consideres most of them KIA or killed as POW anyway) [[4]]

5.1.) For “Unternehmen Zitadelle” German casualties KIA and MIA can be fixed as about 60.000 and 130.000 WIA(proven insufficient “allied” forces had not been drawn into this difficult and risky operation, which was opposed by many major German generals anyway). Soviet Casualties are only to be estimated because of communist propaganda and inefficient handling of archives. It has just occurred that some Russian boy-scouts undertook an archaeological digging on the battle field of Kursk. They found a mass grave of Red Army’s soldiers with somewhat dog tags on them: 30% of them had never been registered on files with the Soviet department of defence even when still alive! So many historians estimate Soviet casualties at least 800.000 KIA, MIA and WIA. But this number may be much higher in fact.Due to a more or not less not existing medical treatment for wounded soldiers in the Red Army WIA and KIA can not be separated as for the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS. Too often there was not much of a difference in between in the outcome.

Dionysos 04:36, 29 January 2007 (UTC)

The dude above you told you the numbers for the whole war so it is mathematically impossible to have the 4:1 ration is total German casualties were 4.3 in the east and total Soviet were 10 million he also told you were to go http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties and like he I must add that Germany had many allies who lost about 1 million men so the total ratio for the whole war would be 2:1. And I am certain that any serious historian knows how to add, subtracted, multiply and divide, also if you look at what the dude said about 6 million dead in 41 and 4 million for the rest of the war that means they could not have used cannon fodder tactics. I think you are basing your facts on outdated information do not forget that the war is very young take ww1 only in 2002 were the 1922 figures updated. 87.122.4.246 15:05, 29 January 2007 (UTC)

Yupp those German numbers are the 1937 border numbers that made by western Germans in 1956 that never said one bad thing about Hitler. You can read more about it on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II_casualties and in the footnotes you can read how in 2000 those numbers were changed, in this footnote I ctrl c ctrl v

Dr. Rűdiger Overmans of the German Military History Office in Postdam has provided a reassessment of German military war dead based on a statistical analysis of German military personnel records. Overmans concluded that these losses were 5.3 Million rather the previous balance 4.6 million. Total German losses did not change, 360,000 were previously listed as civilian losses in eastern Europe and 230,000 as paramilitary, Volksstrum or police forces fighting with the regular forces. Overmans lists the following losses- Africa 16,066; the Balkans 103,693; Northern Europe 30,165; Western Europe until 12/31/44- 339,957; Italy 150,660; against the U.S.S.R until 12/31/44- 2,742,909; final battles in Germany during 1945-1,230,045; other ( including air war in Germany & at sea ) 245,561; POWs 459,475- Grand Total 5.318 million. Overmans lists losses of 4,450,000 from pre-war Germany, 261,000 from Austria, 530,000 ethnic Germans from eastern Europe, 30,0000 French and 30,000 volunteers from western Europe. Included in the total of 5.3 Million war dead are 2.0 Million men listed as missing in action or unaccounted for after the war. For a critical analysis of the statistical methodology of Overmans see http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/overmans.pdf. In addition to these losses the Wehermacht reported the losses of Soviet citizens serving in the German military separately, these losses were not included in the Overmans analysis of German casualties. A Russian source, G. I. Krivosheev reported these losses as 215,000. In this schedule they are included with German military war dead.

And this link here form the casualty page shows that the 1937 numbers of Wehrmacht dead only involved the 1937 borders and only people who died directly on the field and where someone saw them die not those who died on the way back to get aid or those who died in hospitals or that were listed as missing but really had died etc. http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/overmans.pdf

And 15 million military dead and 25 million civilian for a grand total of 40, I have never seen such a high number ever. And the ww2 casualty page which has updated and modern numbers shows 10 million of each for a grand total of around 23 and I am certain that the people running the ww2 casualty page know what they are talking about, if you have any questions then talk with them. 88.74.40.215 10:18, 30 January 2007 (UTC)

"And do not forget about the Axis allies such as Hungary, Italy and Romania plus Waffen SS where are their losses during Kursk."

Waffen SS losses are included in German losses. Anyone with a passing familiarity with the campaign can tell you that there were no Hungarian, Italian or Romanian troops committed to the Kursk Campaign. Its interesting to discuss total German losses of WW2 but some sources for German losses during the Kursk campaign would be more relevant to the article. Armourhistorian 12:28, 31 January 2007 (UTC)

The assumption that "Russian soldiers fallen into German hands have mostly to be counted as casualties. Even if those poor guys survived their times as POWs Stalin had most of them killed after the war because of “cowardice”." is a myth. According to Krivosheev, out of 1836562 that returned from captivity 339 thousand were repressed, while the rest were not punished (http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter5_13_08.html). A sixth of a number hardly constitutes most of a number. With respect, Ko Soi IX 11:49, 4 February 2007 (UTC)

How many went to the Gulag, according to Krivosheev? -- Zz 15:42, 13 February 2007 (UTC)

All of the 339 thousand. With respect, Ko Soi IX 19:17, 3 March 2007 (UTC)

Just a small comment: If Germans numbers were to be right - that means that at the end of the battle they still had 750,000 infantry against 1,120,000 Russian troops - why then they stopped fighting if these numbers are not far away from those in the beginning (800,000 and 1,300,000)? Probably, their numbers are just propaganda and rubbish. However, if Russian numbers were to be right - then we would have 300,000 Germans against 700,000 Russians - which could explain Germans' defeat.

German Kursk is operation Zitadelle, while Soviet Kursk encompases the Kursk strategic defensive operation, in which the Russians suffered 177 847 killed, missing and wounded and the two subsequent Soviet counter-offensives, the Orel strategic offensive operation "Kutuzov" (429 890 Russian casualties) and the Belgorod-Kharkov strategic offensive operation "Rumyantsev" (255 566 Russian casualties). Total: 863 303 Russian casualties, not 607 737 given, which clearly doesn't take "Rumyantsev" into consideration. With respect, Ko Soi IX 14:59, 4 August 2007 (UTC)

Endless Arguments about Casualties

It appears that arguments about casualties of WWII battles began as soon as the articles were written, and will continue endlessly. Editors on both sides present "evidence" that they want everyone else to accept as "fact". A closer look at most evidence shows that they are usually based on someone's subjective opinion, or based on some facts that have been extrapolated beyond the sensible.

These arguments are merely a reflection of the biases that exist in the world outside Wikipedia, and thus there is really no hope that there will be any sort of consensus. It is as if the editors are fighting the battles all over again, with victory supposedly going to the one who can show his side to have suffered fewer casualties, until of course the next editor comes along and changes the numbers.

So is there any hope that the endless waste of energy on endless revisions can cease? A couple of suggestions: 1) Casualties be downgraded, put at the end of the article with disclaimers about the unreliability of sources. 2) The numbers "favoring" both sides be presented, for example: German estimates of casualties... and Soviet estimates of casualties.

The war is long over, tens of millions died, in reality no one won. Though the Soviets took Berlin I am sure they would have traded that victory for the lives of the 25 million Soviet dead. We should be able to stop fighting about what was really a tragedy for all concerned.

JS 20:06, 31 January 2007 (UTC)

We should also keep in mind that the purpose of wikipedia is not to engage in original research (see Wikipedia:No original research). The simple – and proper – solution is to state that there are conflicting reports/figures, listing some/all with the appropriate references (see Wikipedia:Citing sources).

Can I also ask that editors register as users (gives you more tools) and follow some basic guidelines on format guidelines for talk pages w.r.t. indentation, headings, signatures (see Wikipedia:Talk pages and Wikipedia:Talk page guidelines). Deon Steyn 11:45, 1 February 2007 (UTC)

I agree with Deon, thanks. NN 19:46, 1 February 2007 (UTC)

I do believe that it is incredibly important to have these numbers accurate. I find it very disapointing to see casualty numbers changed based on personal belief or opionion. I can for a FACT tell you that the War-tme German Casualty records were very well kept, and that Soviet records were incredibly poor. The "Overman claim" is completely unreliable, yet I find people changing casualty numbers to his estimated figures. I have read many credible reliable sources on the casualties of every major battle during WWII, and have done research on population changes during that period of time. I find these estimations to be accurate.

deaths x 1,000,000

German Military: 3.8 to 4.0 dead (Both German and Austrian soldiers combined) German Civilian: 1.5 to 3.8 dead (Includes Volksturm and Hitler Youth deaths)

Soviet Military: 10.0 to 13.0 dead Soviet Civilian: 12.0 to 17.0 dead (Includes Civilian Guards and Partisans)

Looking at the overal casualties during the war, it is clear that the Germans inflicted roughly 3 times the casualties than their own suffered.

-Tyler Feb 2nd. 2007

While in turn, I can for a FACT tell you that Soviet records from 1943-1945, under Krivosheev's assessment, are reliable. 1941-1942 period's records are less reliable. However, 10 to 13 million Soviet military dead is an exaggeration. Also, as far as I know, original research is not welcome here. With respect, Ko Soi IX 11:55, 4 February 2007 (UTC)

---

I apologize for the confusion. I did not clearly state that all my information provided on the subject were from reliable sources, and not of my personal investigations. In his book "Soviet Casualties & Combat Losses", G. Krivosheev states that 9 million Soviet soldiers and 18 million Soviet civillians were killed during the war. Krivosheev, an emeritus Red army colonel-general and historian, is the general editor of the opus, that he has written with a team of six researchers. Surely there could be no exaggeration in these figures.

-Tyler Feb. 4th 2007

Additionally, it would be wrong to use the average casualty ratio of the whole war for each of the battles since, as we all know, the Germans inflicted some 4 milion casualties to the Russians to the loss of 500.000 of their own (I think) in 1941. That means that the loss ratio of the reminder of the war is more favourable to the Soviets then the ratio of the whole war. But I would REEEALY like some references for the aircraft losses.

Veljko Stevanovich 8. Feb. 2007. 12:30 UTC+1

One more thing Tyler, comparing German and Soviet casualties on the Eastern Front to find the ratios is incomplete, as it leaves out other Axis participants. With respect, Ko Soi IX 19:20, 3 March 2007 (UTC)

Germany

As stated previously on other pages, the official name of the country during WWII was Deutschland (Germany), or Deutsches Reich (German Reich), or in speeches Großdeutschland (Greater Germany) or Drittes Reich (Third Reich). Germany was governed from 1933-1945 by the Nazi party in dictatorial fashion; the Soviet Union was run by the Communist party from 1922-1991 in the same tyrannical way, yet that country is not labeled on this page as the Communist Soviet Union. The Swastika flag clearly identifies the Germany of 1933-1945.--Gamahler 21:45, 3 February 2007 (UTC)

It is referred to repeatedly as the Soviet Union, USSR and Soviet Russia. Of these 3 titles, only 1 is its official title.--Senor Freebie (talk) 13:19, 28 May 2009 (UTC)

battle of kursk

It's ironic that some analists belive that the battle of kursk ended without a clear result.The germans never recover after the battle.They enjoy overwhelming tehnical superiority in the form of the new generation of tanks such as tiger 1 and panther tanks wich were vastly superior to the soviet tanks t34 or kv1.The germans loses where far more important than the soviet loses because they were irreplaceable.In no other battle of the war the germans didn't enjoy so much technical superiority. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 89.137.115.186 (talk) 14:56, 8 March 2007 (UTC).

See my post about this below -- Mannstein actually did see this as a decisive defeat, according to at least one source. Jewish-wargamer 20:50, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

The Germans fought the battle with mostly older panzer models: PzIII and PzIV. Panthers were rushed to the battle from factories and they still had many teething problems wich werent fixed until later. Also the "Panther Brigade" spent initial phases of the German attack as stuck in to muddy minefield. Technical superiority aint really right description for the battle. Turska 12:37, 13 March 2007 (UTC) The germans tanks tiger and panther were by far the most performant weapons in the world in 1943 some 20 years more advance then the soviet tanks.The germans possessed large numbers of this weapons in the battle of kursk(100 tigers and 100 panthers).

Yeah but as was already explained the Panthers mostly malfunctioned, having been rushed to the front too early. The Tigers performed very well, but they had to protect all the largely obsolete German armour that made up the balance of the panzer forces. Turska is right. Jewish-wargamer 20:50, 9 April 2007 (UTC)

It took four months before the Germans felt ready, by which time they had collected 200 of the new Panther tanks (only 40 available at the beginning of the battle due to technical problems with the new type), 90 Elefant Panzerjägers and every flyable Henschel Hs 129 ground attack aircraft, as well as 270 Tigers, late model Panzer Mark-IVs and even a number of captured T-34s. In total they assembled some 2,700 tanks and assault guns, 1,800 aircraft and 800,000 men. It formed one of the greatest concentrations of German fighting power ever put together. Even so, Hitler expressed doubts about its adequacy.

German produce weapon with excellent in every detail. So even they control almost of all Europe and every nation they control support their military production .Their weapon productivity cant compare with Russia .(another factor is russia people contribute more) .So good thing about Panther is Russia have to use 4 tanks of T34 to take one of them. Bad thing is every 1 Panther German produce Russia can produce 4 tanks of T34.And Tiger should count as 10. In that time late model of Panzer Mark-IVs was Panzer IV Ausf. F2 they have the KwK 40 L/43 and L/48 the tank carried 87 rounds. The standard Panzergranate 39 APCBC shell weighed 6.8 kg, had a muzzle velocity of 750 m/s and could penetrate 85 mm of rolled homogeneous armor plate at 60 degrees from horizontal at 1,000 m. that can destroy T34 in 1000 m. And they also have 50+30 mm homogeneous steel armor .So I think German have more advantage in tank factor even they have fewer of them .And also with aircraft .German have best aircraft and best pilot .But Soviet Union have advantage in defensive terrain infantry and cannon .

German article

Does anyone know why the english article gives the number of the german troops as 800 000, while the german article gives the number of the german troops as 969 000? With respect, Ko Soi IX 00:58, 5 April 2007 (UTC)

Mannstein on the Kursk outcome

Kathryn Barbier in her book Kursk 1943 says that Mannstein considered the battle to be, without question, a decisive defeat. Yet the wiki article says that he considered the battle's result to be more grey than black and white. Can someone provide a cite to indicate that Mannstein thought the battle was not a decisive defeat? The Barbier citation:

Relevance of Sicily?

Today I removed the following text from this page which was added on april 8th and which I consider vandalism, as it is neither neutral nor relevant:

Western propaganda

There is an allegation that the Western Allied invasion of Sicily caused Hitler to call off Zitadelle, much within the mainstream western attempt of presenting irrelevant sideshows as "decisive battles".

Opposing these attempts is the blunt fact that the eastern front had been the main theatre of operations for the Germans during WWII. Moreover, the German offensive had already failed and further attempts to break through were likely to incur very high casualties. The northern pincer had been stopped cold, and Red Army units were already breaking through in their own counteroffensive. In the south, the maximum efforts of the most elite German units had failed to achieve a breakthrough into the Soviet rear despite some tactical success. If victory was close they would not have abandoned it due to an Allied invasion of Sicily. In the end, only one German division, Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, departed for Italy, leaving all their equipment behind for their sister units.

As it is now the invasion of Sicily is not mentioned in this article. Personally I don't think it's relevant and should not be mentioned because even if it did have any impact on the decisions made by OKH the battle of Kursk had simply progressed beyond the point where those decisions would have mattered. 87.211.25.128 16:07, 11 April 2007 (UTC)

Barbier, Kathryn. Kursk 1943: The Greatest Tank Battle Ever Fought. 2002, Zenith Press. Page 168.

I was going to ask the same question. Why do West nations try to take credit for Victory that is not theirs! Back off fatass yankees! You didn't win this war, we did! And Sicily is in Italy, and Kursk is in Russia, so they are not even close! Idiots! CCCP

1 300 000 infantry?

Is this a mistake? Since the total Soviet forces in the battle numbered about 1.3 million men, the actual number of "infantry" was considerably lower. Also, this leads me to believe that, while the 800 000 number for the German infantry may be correct, the actual number of German personel was higher (the German article says 969 000), and the infobox is comparing two different things. With respect, Ko Soi IX 05:02, 19 April 2007 (UTC)

Actually all in all, number of soldiers in the Red Army was no less then 5 million. In some cities every man was conscripted. CCCP

Intro/assessment editing

I've taken the liberty of rewording the introduction, which was very clumsily worded IMO. If noone objects, I might move the military analysis of the Soviet defensive preparations, which seems pretty self-contained and specific, into a separate "Assessment" section, along with the longer-term consequences of the battle. -- Hongooi 14:42, 22 June 2007 (UTC)

Sicily section

I've done a rewrite of this because of the one-sided and not terribly clear existing text. I'm a little concerned though that the phrase "other scholars" might be a little weak. I'm not up with the latest scholarship on Kursk, if someone can persuade me that modern scholarship is inclined to the view that Kursk was already a lost battle before the Hitler decision, then I'm happy to have the "other scholars" bit changed to "modern scholarship" and a generally more forceful denial made (so long as it's not overdone). Can anyone shed a little light on this issue? Thanks, Gatoclass 04:52, 27 June 2007 (UTC)

Mistakes in the article must be corrected

1. The introduction of the article is wrong saying it was the last German blitzkrieg offensive. Blitzktieg failed in 1941, everything after was not "Blitzkrieg" by definition.

"Blitzkrieg" had a goal to celebrate the New Years Eve on December 31, 1941 in Moscow and Leningrad. Hitler signed personal invitations to his reception at the Astoria Hotel in Leningrad. Those Hitler's invitations are now at museums and every school kid in Russia is aware of that failure. After that failure "Blitzkrieg" was finished. The long war started instead. 2,5 years lasted the Siege of Leningrad alone - that is half of the entire WWII!

2. Please make corrections to the casualty table. The table makes confusing impression with duplicate words, inaccurate numbers are presented in a very conflicting manner. The dead, the wounded and the prisoners can not be mixed, such a mix is immoral.

The Soviet record for Battle of Kursk has total number of dead at 254 thousand, that was military and civilian deaths combined. German side has 165 thousand documented deaths, even if that was propaganda, in reality there could not be much more Germans at that area at that time, they were seriously overstretched all over Eastern Europe, from Leningrad, Baltics and Moscow to Rostov, Odessa, Kiev, and also all over other nations. Total deaths number can not be even close to half a million with both sides combined. Speculations are just wrong. You can not squeese more people even into three thousand burned tanks.

There was not enough time to kill so many people sitting in tanks in one month with gun shots and land mines. The role of infantry was much smaller here than it was at LONGER battles of Stalingrad or Leningrad or Moscow. Infantry was always behind tanks. Operation ended in about a month and a half, where the actual Battle of Kursk was less than 20 days, mainly artillery agaist tanks in open fields. Compare this to 2,5 years in Leningrad where 4 million people with suburbs were surrounded by the Nazis - that's a completely different scale. Even Stalingrad with under half a million people was not completely surrounded, and still much bigger than Kursk.

Those cities, Kursk Orel and Belgorod, were way smaller than Stalingrad (half a million with suburbs) or Leningrad (four million with suburbs). Kursk city had total number of killed at 3,000 (three thousand) and about 10,000 were taken to various Nazi camps during the war. By 1950 the city of Kursk was completely rebuilt.

Compare this to Leningrad where the magnitude of destruction is still visible, many suburbs still have ruins of buildings since the Nazi siege. Many palaces and mansions can never be restored.

Please do not use wrong numbers of the dead in the Battle of Kursk. It was the fourth largest battle by human deaths after the Battles of Stalingrad, Leningrad, and Moscow. It was also the shortest of the big battles, as was admitted even by the Nazis, they only had enough resources for one last operation Zitadelle in the Eastern Front. And it was more than a year after the "Blitzkrieg" had ended in failure.

3. Let's just make those facts carefully corrected and presented clearly, for the memory of the dead. We do not need more dead than there were. Regards, Steveshelokhonov 05:11, 27 August 2007 (UTC)

Separate article for Operation Citadel?

The Soviet counter-attacks each have their own articles, shouldn't Citadel have its own, with this article as the parent to all of them? Oberiko 20:49, 27 October 2007 (UTC)

Ambiguity in the Info Box under Casualties

I echo the comment at the top of this page: there IS a huge ambiguity in the info box under casualties. In the Nazi column does "German Kursk" mean "German Estimates of German Casualties" and "Soviet Kursk" mean "Soviet Estimates of German Casualties"? If so, then the heading should be changed to eliminate the ambiguity. I don't want to do it because I'd be guessing.

I think this ambiguity issue is separate from the issue of correctness of the casualty figures.

Joconnor 02:41, 16 November 2007 (UTC)

My understanding is that they show losses for both operation Citadel (German Kursk) and for operation Citadel+the two subseqent soviet counter-offensives (Soviet Kursk). However, it is not too clear as it is right now. With respect, Ko Soi IX 14:01, 16 November 2007 (UTC)

Ju 87G-1

Just to clarify the Junkers Ju 87G-1 did indeed partake in the July battles. Hans-Ulrich Rudels experiment was adopted and the Ju 87G saw action in the decisive air offensive over the Orel bulge, helping defeat the armour of the 11th Guards Army, and saving the 2 Panzerarmy and the German 9 Army from being cut off. These actions occurred 16 - 31 July. Dapi89 (talk) 13:24, 7 February 2008 (UTC)

Actually there was only the one experimental aircraft Rudel was flying (for a day, and claiming 12 "kills" which can not be confirmed) that was joined (possibly) by 8 others after the start of the Soviet counter-offensives. The more substantial deliveries of the G-1s begun only in August. The only anti-tank units during the Citadel were four (possibly five) squadrons of Hs-129s for a total of 68 aircraft. This subject was discussed in a forum years ago and I saved the discussion. If you don't trust me, you can have a look yourself (search on Ju-87 + Kursk) or I can post the extracts here (since it is a long discussion).--mrg3105mrg3105 If you're not taking any flack, you're not over the target. 14:03, 7 February 2008 (UTC)

Actually this was not so. Six units of the Hs 129 are listed on the Luftwaffe's ordered of battle, of which 88/approx.100 were serviceable. Over 30 converted Ju 87Ds operated over the Kursk as Ju 87Gs In July 1943 (and I would be keen to see this past discussion). I agree it was experimental and these changes occurred "in the field", but this was nevertheless a significant force. It halted (along with the other potent tank killer, the Hs 129) the Soviet offensives aimed at destroying the 2 Panzerarmy and 9.Army, the Soviets lost 135 tanks to these aircraft. As for Rudel, in fact the author points out that this action took place on 12 July, (he points out 5 July is misquoted allot!!) The Ju 87G is justifiably included. Dapi89 (talk) 16:51, 7 February 2008 (UTC)

Have a read of the forum I posted on my talk page and I will do further research. Ju-87 G-1s were not that effective as any compromising solution usually is not. Ju-87 was a dive-bomber design from the 30s, and retrofitting two 37mm cannon on the aircraft is not like strapping bombs on it. Its effectiveness is usually grossly overstated. However that is not the subject of the discussion at this stage--mrg3105mrg3105 If you're not taking any flack, you're not over the target. 22:13, 7 February 2008 (UTC)

You have a point there. Stuka pilots were presented with a problem. The D-3 and D-5 were upgraded with the 37mm gunpods (I changed the text to read that most were altered Ju 87Ds and not Gs) and found the Soviet tanks impossible to knock out from the front, even from an elevated angle. However from behind it was a different story. The Soviet also carried allot of fuel tanks on the back of their armour which usually engulfed the tank after a hit - enough to destroy it. It became potent enough, as Stuka pilots observed Soviet tank crews, when caught in the open, fled if they could. Dapi89 (talk) 23:22, 7 February 2008 (UTC)

I am not to the stage of getting into arguments over aircraft performance. Strapping two 37mm cannons onto the Ju-87 made for a very difficult aircraft to fly. In order to KO a tank from the air one first has to be able to aim the weapons, and this was by no means easy to do, particularly during Citadel. Eventually I will add the details of the PVO operations over Citadel and you will see that this was not an area Rudel could take his time over, KOing Soviet tanks. Aside from that the fuel tanks were only used during march and staging and not in combat. You will not find any images of Soviet tanks in combat with fuel tanks. As a matter of fact all tank crews ran when seeing attacking aircraft. You can have a read about the experience of German tank crews on the Western Front in 1944-45. Quite a few German tanks were captured by the US Army intact (in one case with the engine running) following an air attack that actually achieve no hits on the tanks. Il-2s were built in numbers because Soviets were fairly scientific about it and realised there was a purely statistical relationship between quantity of attacking aircraft and destroyed targets.--mrg3105mrg3105 If you're not taking any flack, you're not over the target. 00:46, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

Indeed. But I'm really not arguing with you here. I am aware that the Kursk skies were a dangerous place for Ju 87s, hostile skies always were so, even when air superiority (as oppossed to supremacy) was achieved. The statistics show that Kursk was very costly for the Stuka crews (8 Knights Cross holders were lost alone) as the Germans only gained initial air superiority in the first few days, and over specific points of the Orel flank between 16 July and 31 July. Bergstrom I think has produced an extremely detailed work on the Kursk ai war - easily the best yet, I think you should buy it. I am more than aware of the shody manouvreability of the Junkers, the 37mm gunpods did little to enhance this or it's speed. But it was a stable gun platform and all but the experienced pilots could knock out most Soviet tanks. Although its interesting to note Rudels wingman shot down a Yak in a turning battle during Kursk. I didn't mean to say it was just Soviet tank crews that fled during these attacks, German crews did as well, as the Il-2 was devesatingly effective against armour. At Falaise the German did indeed abandon tanks in the fact of the RAF Typhoon Squadrons. It was just an example of the Ju 87s eastern front impact. All round the Il2 was a much more suitable aircraft in all resect; armour; speed; numbers. Dapi89 (talk) 12:00, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

Well, I won't be buying Bergstrom at this stage. I'm about 5-6 books behind in my reading, and at last $250 over my book budget as it is.

The funny thing about air attacks is that the more seasoned tank crews knew they had a fairly good chance of surviving an air attack if they stayed in the tank, and did so.

Sure, a Stuka can in some circumstances take on a fighter. Il-2s were very manoeuvrable at lower levels (usually flew low) so on occasion they were turning into an inexperienced fighter pilot, and they had the ordnance to make the average fighter full of holes, something Ju-87 G-1s had a problem with BTW (you probably know this). In any case, I look forward to your editing.--mrg3105mrg3105 If you're not taking any flack, you're not over the target. 12:44, 8 February 2008 (UTC)

Civility

Mrg3105, please observe WP:CIVILITY. No one "owns" an article in Wikipedia. Student7 (talk) 14:58, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

Axes

The word "axes" is ambiguous in English. Germany was one of the "Axis" powers. The word axe can connote an instrument used for chopping. Which could be appropriate here I suppose, but not one the editor was intending. I had seen the word misspelled as "axiis" in English but could find no authoritative basis for its use. So I changed it to something else that might not have been appropriate either, but at least was unambiguous. It was reverted with no grammatical explanation. Student7 (talk) 17:27, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

Axes is the plural of axis. In this particular operation there were multiple operational axes as opposed to a single axis. What is ambiguous about that? No one uses "prongs" to describe strategic or operational directions in offensives--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 21:51, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

There is nothing ambiguous about the word. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 18:12, 1 April 2008 (UTC)

Guderian

I'm new to this article. I'm sure that there is a real good reason why Heinz Guderian is briefly mentioned and not listed as a commander though he is debited with the loss elsewhere. See [5]. Must be in the field?

Also, I have trouble understanding the listing of the Kursk casualties broken down by Soviet Kursk and German Kursk on both sides of the ledger. Again, I'm sure there's a great reason but a little obscure to someone just visiting the site who doesn't understand the battle to start with and is looking for a quick summary. Student7 (talk) 20:36, 17 March 2008 (UTC)

The reason why the casualties are broken down on both sides is because Soviet and German historiography don't agree on what the battle of Kursk is (ie. the Germans limit it to Citadelle only, while the Soviets include the two subsequent offensives). With respect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 02:40, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

Its a bit confusing because someone had removed the Kursk OOB which would have made it readily apparent that Guderian was not there. If you read the Heinz Guderian article, you will see he was the Inspector-General of the Armoured Troops at the time, and is noted for questioning the readiness of the Panzer Troops for the operation.--mrg3105 (comms) ♠♥♦♣ 22:07, 29 March 2008 (UTC)

Soviet casualties, again

Since the Soviet Kursk contains three strategic offensives, showing casualties just for two (Kursk strategic defensive operation (aka Citadel) and Kutuzov) seems inadequate. Rumyantsev adds a further 255,566 casualties, making the total 863,303 - Россия и СССР в войнах ХХ века - Потери вооруженных сил (http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter5_10_1.html#5_10_23). Overall "Soviet" Kursk cost the RKKA 254,470 killed and missing, 608,833 wounded and sick. With respect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 14:12, 24 May 2008 (UTC)

The problem here is that those are numbers for more operations whilst there is only shown Axis numbers for less operations, so the comparison would be for several Soviet operations and only for a few Axis ones and not during the same time frame Joincomesfor (talk) 04:36, 27 May 2008 (UTC)

So because we don't have German casualties for corresponding operations, we have to omit a Soviet offensive from "Soviet" Kursk? How about just making a note that the German casualties are for a shorter period of time? For the "Soviet" Kursk cosists of three strategic operations, and giving casualties just for two is misinforming. With respect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 13:35, 27 May 2008 (UTC)

What you could do is create small articles about each battle and list the figures there. What is misinforming will be to compare several Soviet operations during a longer time frame with less German operations during a shorter time frame. What you could do is create small articles about each battle and list the figures there, otherwise we will get as so often is the case here on wikipedia, that we compare several soviet operations covering a much larger geographical area and longer time frame, vs one German operation in a much smaller geographical area covering a much smaller time frame. Also what is worth noting is that the Soviets listed sick and wounded in one category the Axis never ever listed sick, so already there we are just adding extra casualties for the Soviets, and the article only list German casualties not Axis so there we also already have another case of misinformation Joincomesfor (talk) 01:11, 28 May 2008 (UTC)

Fair or unfair, but the article is about the Battle of Kursk, which, as is noted, containts three strategic operations. Listing casualties for just two of them is wrong, since it implies lower losses for all of "Soviet" Kursk. As for German losses (how many non-German Axis soldiers were there at Kursk?), if they are indeed from shorter time, they ought to have a note beside them saying this. Also, "wounded" and "wounded and sick" in the casualties box pretty much does the job. With respect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 09:57, 28 May 2008 (UTC)

I changed overall Soviet losses to include the omitted Rumyantsev, using the source from which the previous number originated (Russia and USSR in battles of the XX century - http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter5_10_1.html#5_10_23 (Kursk), http://www.soldat.ru/doc/casualties/book/chapter5_13_09.html (material), it's in Russian). I have also changed the Soviet losses in tanks (from 1500 to 6064) and aircraft (from 1000 to 1626), as per the same source. Those are the "official numbers", and the losses are unlikely to be dramatically lower than those that came from archival research (esp. 4 times, as in case with tanks). With respect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 02:14, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

You are not comparing the same thing

You are using more operations for the Soviets and less operations for the Germans by adding this extra operation for the Soviets and not adding the number for the Germans you are giving false numbers and a fake comparison Crashmany00 (talk) 21:21, 22 June 2008 (UTC)

You can not list 3 operations for the Germans and 4 for the Soviets and compare the losses of the 3 vs the 4 next to each other, that is misleading

You can not compare operations from 5 July to the 25th of July for Axis losses and compare those numbers with Soviet losses from July going into September next to each other, that is misleading Crashmany00 (talk) 21:33, 22 June 2008 (UTC)

I suspect we will find user Crashmany00 is in fact a sockpuppet of banned user Superdeng. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 16:14, 23 June 2008 (UTC)

Hmm, and that user was banned for a good reason? With respect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 05:27, 24 June 2008 (UTC)

If it's misleading, Crashmany, why don't you find better sources for German losses, as opposed to engaging in questionable revisionism and original research by trimming down OFFICIAL SOVIET CASUALTY FIGURES for the BATTLE OF KURSK. With respect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 05:29, 24 June 2008 (UTC)

Compare the same thing, you can't compare some battles for one side and the pile on more and more battles for the other without adding the corresponding numbersJoincomesfor (talk) 08:36, 3 July 2008 (UTC)

How about just calling it the "Battle of Kursk" and use the numbers which we have, 500k and 600k. Then at the bottom of the page we will write that during the German part it was X many. And up to the point where figures for both sides are available there are 500k and 600k and then for an additional time period there were Y many soviet losses and an unknown amount of Axis losses, would this be satisfactory? Joincomesfor (talk) 09:22, 3 July 2008 (UTC)

The thing is, we are comparing the same thing when we have the 500k (Soviet number for German losses in the Battle of Kursk, not Zitadelle) and 863k (Soviet archival research on Soviet losses in the same battle). The 600k number for the Soviets cannot be used, as it encompasses about 2/3 of Kursk; the tank loss figures (1500) come out of thin air, as the losses in the first two operations were 4200 for the Soviets (heck, in Zitadelle alone, which roughly corresponds to the Kursk defensive operation, Soviet tank losses ammounted to 1614 tanks). Thus, the answer is, no, it's not satisfactory. With respect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 16:39, 3 July 2008 (UTC)

Soviet aircraft losses are wrong. Bergstrom uses the TsAMO, f.370, op. 6476, d.102, ll.6, 41, docs from the Russian Military Archive in Podolsk. Amended. Dapi89 (talk) 13:46, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

Soviet Records are also incomplete, I have added a footnote section for this. And for other notes. Dapi89 (talk) 14:16, 16 July 2008 (UTC)

Infobox strength

The numbers there are clearly from "German Kursk", for both sides. However, that is not stated. The battle was rather long, both sides recived reinforcements - but that is not mentioned. I haven't found a sufficient source or two for this one, but I think it would be a fine addition to this article's infobox. With respect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 02:21, 3 June 2008 (UTC)

Changes to the introduction

I have removed a large amount of material from the introduction, in accordance with the guideline Wikipedia:Lead section:

The lead should be able to stand alone as a concise overview of the article. It should establish context, summarize the most important points, explain why the subject is interesting or notable, and briefly describe its notable controversies, if there are any.

The first paragraph, and the long list after it, where heavily focused on the precise details of which operations were part of the battle and according to whom. This material is not the most vital information about the battle, it does not explain its importance, and it will hinder reading by non-experts (like me). I moved all this material to a separate section lower in the article, although I'm by no means wedded to the exact location and details of the section.

I then added the approximate dates of the Battle of Kursk (July and August of 1943), and a key detail of its importance that I thought deserved to be in the first paragraph: the result. I'm no expert, as I said, so my efforts at summary may be imprecise—but please recognize we must have summaries of some type, because weighing down the lead with details of nomenclature instead of the important points defeats the purpose of having an introduction in the first place. -- SCZenz (talk) 10:33, 12 July 2008 (UTC)

Inaccurate translation?

I question the following edit: "The Germans also noted a fundamental flaw in the Tiger tank. Although excellent against the T-34, and any Soviet tank at long to medium range, they lacked effective secondary armament and became vulnerable when entering Soviet slit trenches. Guderian noted in his diary:

Once they had broken through into the enemy's infantry zone they literally had to go quail shooting with cannons. They did not manage to neutralise, let alone destroy, the enemy's rifle and machine guns, so that our own infantry was unable to follow up behind them. By the time they reached the Soviet artillery they were on their own

"

Tiger tanks were equipped with two machineguns. No tank can enter a slit trench (that's why they're called "slit" trenches - they are very narrow). The quote has to refer to the Ferdinand SP gun, which had no MGs. Guderian is of course a reliable source but he's either been mistranslated or he made a mistake. I suspect the former. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 16:09, 18 July 2008 (UTC)

I assume Guderian meant, passing over, or ploughing through. And yes, he was refering to Elefant. Clarke mixed up the two types in a strange bit of text, and somehow I missed the note, but I will separate them. But with regard to the changes in the section title about the Luftwaffe, this needs to be there, for it was truely decisive in preventing two German Armies from being wiped out - this would have lead to disastrous results for the Germans, and the Soviet advance throughout the autumn/winter of '43 would have been much more extensive. Dapi89 (talk) 01:04, 19 July 2008 (UTC)

Actually the Ferdinand is the vehicle being referenced; there were no Elefants at Kursk. I strongly disagree with the POV-ish title regarding the German air force and have reverted. I believe NPOV requires us to do this. If a source says it was decisive (which is hard to credit given how thoroughly the germans were beaten, but it is possible....) let the text and sources show that. I believe there is some risk of air operations getting undue weight in this article, when, after all, both air forces operated in support of ground forces. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 22:09, 21 July 2008 (UTC)

Well, I won't contest the title in that case. But I must protest at a "dubious" claim against cited material, from a historian who has produced some of the best works on Eastern Front operations, with a neutral stance. He uses Russian and German primary sources, so this claim is not difficult to believe. RAF pilots during the Battle of Britain and German pilots during the last stages of the Defence of the Reich campaign in 1945 had as little as 7-8 hours. I'm not sure how much you knew about aviation, but this is definitely possible when the situation is desperate. If I may say so, it is an accusation that would not be made by someone with a thorough background knowledge on air operations, in the same way the mistakes I have made demonstrate a limited expertise in armour, and its operations. Dapi89 (talk) 22:38, 21 July 2008 (UTC)

I believe the article needs lengthening, and more putting in about ground battles. The background and intel' sections could be added and expanded, then the article would be more balanced. Dapi89 (talk) 22:40, 21 July 2008 (UTC)

There is no "accusation" here; the 'dubious' tag is a request for discussion and elaboration of what seems a remarkable and, yes, difficult-to-believe claim. There is no conflict between a citation and a dubious tag - ridiculous content can be found in lots of published sources.

There is a huge difference between having 18 hours of pilot training and having 18 hours of training *on type*. The text I question seems to say that you can take a guy off the street (or presumably out of some basic non-pilot training) and in 18 hours have him flying a high-performance fighter or strike aircraft. I suggest we find another source to back this up or contradict it. I do not believe RAF BoB pilots had 7-8 hours total flight training time. I do believe that guys who had been flying trainers or other types of aricraft transitioned to Hurricans and Spitfires in 7-8 hours. If that's what is meant, that's what should be written. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 17:55, 22 July 2008 (UTC)

Hours given is total training (and I'm talking about hands on flight training) time - done "on type". Believe it or not in 1942-43 the VVs had few training aircraft, as most were forced into military use because of losses and suffered heavy losses themselves. As you should know, Soviet doctrine was quantity, not quality. The RAF was slightly different, they did receive a limited amount of training on training aircraft before moving onto frontline machines. I was using this as an example of sorts. Bergstrom consorts heavily with Russian sources and historians in his works. "Red Star, Black Cross" is written with Andrey Mikhailov, and this information, I believe, will be in there too. I have ordered a copy. Believe me when I say, what is meant is written. Dapi89 (talk) 19:17, 22 July 2008 (UTC)

I would like to add, that during Barbarossa, only four pilots had been trained to fly the newer versions of MiG 3 and LaGG 3 (with those 13-15 hours), yet Soviet pilots were sent into battle anyway. Dapi89 (talk) 19:22, 22 July 2008 (UTC)

Sorry, I can't understand what you mean. You seem to be saying *both* that the hours are total flight training and training on type. Am I reading you wrong? DMorpheus (talk) 13:48, 23 July 2008 (UTC)

No. You are reading me right. There were not many Training aircraft available, as the Soviets switched to all out production of their most modern types. Insane as it may seem, training was done in these machines, as they were more numerous (The Soviet lost 21,200 aircraft captured and destroyed in '41 and about 16,000 destroyed alone in '42). Of course, some units that had both could train pilots more thoroughly. After Kursk, all of this changed, and Soviet pilot training became more and more thorough. By the end of the war is was quite extensive (campared to '41 and '42) and they produced fine aviators, like the Red Banner Units. Dapi89 (talk) 14:01, 23 July 2008 (UTC)

Sorry to be pedantic but I am trying hard to understand your point: you are saying that frontline Soviet air units at Kursk were staffed with pilots who had 15-18 hours total flight training time, and most or all of it was in aircraft of the same type as those they flew operationally? Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 15:19, 23 July 2008 (UTC)

I'm not saying it, Bergstrom and Mikhailov are. But note, it was 13-15 hours for fighter pilots. 15-18 hours for bomber/ ground attack aircraft. This kind of speedy training was needed because of appalling loss rates, pre-Kursk, which were caused by rushed and abysmal training in the first place. The Soviets finally earned their lesson at Kursk. Dapi89 (talk) 17:26, 23 July 2008 (UTC)

Prokorovka: German tank strength

We have a conflict between this article and the Prokorovka article. This article now makes the (IMO dubious) claim that the II SS Panzer Corps deployed 600 tanks at Prokorovka. The Prokorovka article is a bt ambiguous but seems to say 200-300 - which seems much more likely for two-three panzer divisions (max) that have been in heavy combat for a week. I suggets we resolve the descrepancy or, if we cannot, give both sets of figures with some statement to the effect that historians disagree. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 15:16, 23 July 2008 (UTC)

This has been cleared up. It was the strength of the 4 Panzer Army not the SS Panzerkorps. Having read it again it sounded like the claim was made for just the II SS'. Dapi89 (talk) 17:32, 23 July 2008 (UTC)

Thanks, but now it still says that the Germans deployed 600 tanks at Prokorovka, regardless of which units we're identifying. I think that's about double the actual strength in the engagement. DMorpheus (talk) 17:40, 23 July 2008 (UTC)

Oh, I see. Clark definitely says 600. Perhaps this should be revised.Dapi89 (talk) 17:46, 23 July 2008 (UTC)

I think Clark may have meant assault guns too. I have found another cite for "300 Tanks" and 600 tanks and assault guns. Dapi89 (talk) 22:32, 23 July 2008 (UTC)

I think you'll find Clark is not a great source for this level of detail. DMorpheus (talk) 19:59, 24 July 2008 (UTC)

The 600 tanks and SPGs is simply not credible when compared to more authoritative sources. Recall we're talking about fewer than three divisions and they'd been in heavy combat for a week by the time Prokorovka started. DMorpheus (talk) 17:53, 28 July 2008 (UTC)

That sounds credible, but like what? Do you have any? Dapi89 (talk) 15:31, 29 July 2008 (UTC)

Try the II SS Panzer Korps strength reports cited in the Battle of Prokhorovka article. You can't get any better than the primary source. By the way, those same reports will show that there were no Panthers at Prokorovka. All Panthers at Kursk were assigned to two Army units; the SS didn't have any at this point. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 16:59, 29 July 2008 (UTC)

I can't see them. The article does not have any primary citations in the article for strength returns. Did Toppel use archive sources, or second hand ones? Dapi89 (talk) 17:52, 29 July 2008 (UTC)

The German usage of captured T-34s in the SS divs is well-documented so no worries there. DMorpheus (talk) 18:13, 29 July 2008 (UTC)

Work is going on on Russia Wikipedia (Battle of Prokhorovka article). The correct count seems to be between 400 and 450 tanks for the German side. The exact numbers might be impossible to obtain, as few reports are missing. Dimawik (talk) 22:35, 28 May 2009 (UTC)

Plans

Why don't you think German deception preparations belong in the "German plans" section?! Dapi89 (talk) 15:27, 29 July 2008 (UTC)

Because it is very poorly written; perhaps a rewrite might do the trick. It should also be noted their deception operation was completely ineffective. DMorpheus (talk) 00:12, 30 July 2008 (UTC)

I don't think so. Besides, a three line summation is not supposed to be a masterpiece. Dapi89 (talk) 10:08, 30 July 2008 (UTC)

Note label to group nb

There were two notes listed that did not have tags in the text on 19-09-2008 when I converted {{note label}} to <ref group=nb>

• {{note label|Note6|f|f}}Hans-Ulrich Rudel of StG 2 Immelmann had used the Ju 87 equppied with two 37 mm cannon over the Kuban front in the Spring of 1943. The Geschwaders Stukas were equipped with them on the very first day of the Kursk offensive. Rudel destroyed 12 Soviet tanks on 5 July (Bergström 2007, p. 79-81; 102; 106; 114; 118).
• {{note label|Note10|j|j}} German tank strength is estimated at 300, with a further 300 assault guns.

Someone else can make the decision on whether to list all the notes in the battle box under the general ref group=nb or the secondary group=nb.b listed inside the battle box. At the moment just as before I made the recent changes most are in the general list but two are listed in the notes section of the battle box.--Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 11:29, 19 September 2008 (UTC)

Verification needed

I have separated out the "Bibliography" into "References" and "Further reading". The Reference now contains an alphebetical list those books and journals used in the article and Further reading contains the rest.

During this process I noticed that there were some discreprencies between the short note citation style and the Reference list. I have flagged those short citations with {{Verify source}}

• Glantz, Soviet Military Deception, pp.149-159 -- There is no full listing for this book or journal entry.
• V.M Kulish & A.J.P Taylor -- There is no full listing for this book
• Clark 1995, -- there is a listing for a book by Clark but the publication date is given as 1966
• Glantz (1990) -- there are books listed for Glantz but none have a publication date of 1990

--Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 11:29, 19 September 2008 (UTC)

Further reading

As this article is larger than the recommended size I suggest that the Further reading section is removed, or at least culled down to 10% of its current size as that will shave 3 kilobytes of the length of the article. --Philip Baird Shearer (talk) 11:29, 19 September 2008 (UTC)

Casualties unclear

I have tried to make sense of the number of casualties mentioned in the infobox. Twice is mentioned "German Kursk" and twice "Soviet Kursk". What is meant by that? And in the infobox it says that the Battle of Kursk was a decisive Soviet strategic victory but when reading the number of casualties fallen, I very much doubt that. Can someone explain to me what is really meant in the infobox? Wereldburger758 (talk) 06:16, 24 October 2008 (UTC)

IIRC the "German Kursk" and "Soviet Kursk" usage was an attempt to compromise around the issue of how one defines this campaign. The narrower approach is to use the German 'Operation Citadel' as a synonym for the entire Kursk campaign. The broader approach is to include the Soviet counteroffensives at Orel and in the south as part of the campaign. My personal view is that the latter is more productive but that's just me.

There's no question the battle was a Soviet strategic victory. There's ample research on that. The number of casualties is not the most important measure of the outcome of this campaign. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 14:28, 24 October 2008 (UTC)

Thanks for answering DMorpheus. After reading the infobox and your answer again and again, I have figured it out. But something is wrong here. The infobox is created to provide a summary of the article so that the reader can get a quick grasp of what the article is about. Now it spreads confusion. A note should be added to the infobox with an explanation why "German Kursk" and "Soviet Kursk" are mentioned twice. Wereldburger758 (talk) 05:24, 25 October 2008 (UTC)

Frankly the whole thing smacks of OR but it was the consensus reached after a contentious discussion some time ago. I would rather change it than explain it, but it's an argument I haven't the time for. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 06:07, 27 October 2008 (UTC)

Okay, DMorpheus, but that doesn't change a thing. I think about making the change myself. Wereldburger758 (talk) 06:36, 29 October 2008 (UTC)

Germans plans were to envelop Soviet troops at the Kursk salient, therefore, according to the Germans the battle ended with Zitadelle's failure. By contrast, for the Soviets the defensive phase was just the first part of their own operation.
During the previous discussion elsevere we came to a conclusion that if two sides use different names for the same battle, the name used by the victorious side, or the side holding an initiative is more appropriate. During the battle of Kursk both sides held an initiative (the German first, the Soviets later). Moreover, the Soviet decision to go to defensive was a part of their offensive plans. Therefore, although we speak about Fall Blau, and then about Uranus, separately, we cannot do the same in that case. In fall 1942 the Soviets had no plans of encirclement of the Germans near Stalingrad. However, at Kursk they, from they very beginning prepared for offensive and accumulated strategic reserves both for the defensive and offensive phases. Therefore it would be impossible and absolutely incorrect to use only German definition, although a use of the Soviet defitinion alone would be incorrect either.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:57, 13 February 2009 (UTC)

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aircraft "downed"

3000 german aircraft downed !!! in russian kursk. The source are the soviet claims ^^ . When i change this it will be changed again. 3000 aircraft downed while 1200 russian aircraft downed ( the source : incomplete!!! russian archives LoL ). who writes 1200 in the infobox when he knows that are not all ???? absurd.... now the infobox shows 3000 german aircraft downed and 1200 russians , i guess about +600 ( not sure ) where reported on german site and figures for russian aircraft losses go up to 4500. when i change someone else changes again with the source : soviet claims from 43!!! ^^ ridicolous ... —Preceding unsigned comment added by HROThomas (talk • contribs) 02:55, 13 February 2009 (UTC)

Thomas, this has been explained to you, you don't understand the lay out. The Soviets overclaimed. The information box information included what the Germans and Soviets both claim, that is why there is a German Kursk and a Soviet one. The Soviet claims are clearly inflated against that of the German loss reports and is explained in the article. I would advise you to think this over. Dapi89 (talk) 00:01, 16 February 2009 (UTC)

I have clarified the titles so you understand what is being explained. I hope this helps. Dapi89 (talk) 00:07, 16 February 2009 (UTC)

Dapi, i understand what u try to show. for me the difference between german and soviet kursk is the time frame. there is no reason to write soviet figures when they overclaimed 5:1. And before your change its was more cryptical —Preceding unsigned comment added by HROThomas (talk • contribs) 02:44, 16 February 2009 (UTC)

Infobox is a disaster

I am not an expert, but the infobox is a disaster. Taken at face value, it reads that Red Army itself put their losses at 6,000 tanks out of 3,600 available. Also - by supposedly its own count - Red Army lost 60% of men involved to much more reasonable 6% self-reported German losses. If these statements were anywhere close to truth, Soviets would have been finished (almost two times over in tanks). Yet, as we all know, Germans did not march on Moscow in the aftermath of Kursk; on the contrary, history shows that they were bled to the point of being unable to mount any strategic offensive for the rest of the war. 'Information' like this in the infobox makes whole article to look like a joke, as all subsequent statements are not trusted by the reader. My suggestion is to remove all these clearly suspect (and mostly wrong) numbers from the infobox, leaving just a statement that these are disputed. You can then dedicate a section to the casualty numbers. At least, within a section it might be possible to explain the glaring discrepancies. Dimawik (talk) 19:02, 18 February 2009 (UTC)

I totally agree Wereldburger758 (talk) 07:28, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

The infobox is really confusing, although the numbers seem correct. The major reason behind that is that German and Soviet definitions of the "Battle of Kursk" differ. For the Germans, the words "Battle of Kursk" and Zitadelle are synonyms, whereas in the Soviet and Russian historiography Zitadelle was only a first phase of their own strategic operation. During their operation, the Soviet planned to exhaust German offensive potential and then to launch their own offensive (that they kept in mind from the very beginning). Since both sides held an initiative during different phases of the battle and for both of them planned the operation as a major strategic offensive, it is impossible to choose between German and Soviet definitions of the Battle of Kursk, so both of them should be used.
According to the German definition, the Battle of Kursk ended for the Germans when their offensive was stopped, so they do not attribute their losses during the subsequent Soviet offensive to the Battle of Kursk. By contrast, the Soviets do, because for them the operations Kutuzov and Rumyantsev are the part of the Battle of Kursk. That is why according to the Soviet sources both Soviet and German losses were higher.
As regards to tanks, the problem is probably in the difference in the Soviet and German definition of the word lost. According to the German definition, the tank is lost when it is irrecoverably damaged or captured. The tank delivered to repair shops wasn't considered as lost. Taking into account that the German were moving forward during Zitadelle almost all even heavily damaged tanks were being delivered to the repair shops. However, many of them appeared to be irrecoverable, or were captured during subsequent Soviet offensive (not a part of the Battle of Kursk, according to the German point of view). In addition, the Soviets and the Germans strategies of the use of tanks were different. The Soviets decided to produce wast amount of chip and easily repairable T-34 (although more vulnerable ones), whereas the Germans made a stress on limited amount of expensive Tigers and Panthers. As a result, the Germans payed enormous attention to fast and efficient repair of their tanks, whereas for the Soviets it was sometimes easier to produce new tanks instead.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:52, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

I like your explanation - perhaps, you should consider to start a new section - "Losses" - with it? Since the story you have written cannot be possibly fit into the infobox, and without these explanations the infobox currently reads like a hoax, my suggestion is to write something noncommittal in the infobox itself, like "due to different definitions of the scope of the battle by the two sides there is no compact way to describe the losses, see section "Losses" for details". —Preceding unsigned comment added by Dimawik (talk • contribs) 19:44, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

Thank you. I'll think about that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:32, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

Again, I agree. Wereldburger758 (talk) 18:57, 24 February 2009 (UTC)

I don't, it is clear, and says exactly what it means. Dapi89 (talk) 18:12, 28 February 2009 (UTC)

I am sorry, but have to repeat: infobox plainly states that according to Soviet own data, they lost 6,064 tanks our of 3,600. To me this is ridiculous and to any uninitiated person such an obvious contradiction within few lines reads like a hoax. Note that this cannot be written off as a mismatch of definitions of operations by the Soviet and German sides, or attributed to propaganda as both numbers are supposedly obtained from Soviet archives. Again, assuming the text in infobox is correct, Soviets lost 60% of their men vs. 5% for the German side but with their armies thus destroyed (and with the newfound German numerical superiority of 850,000 to 437,000) Soviets had miraculously achieved the "decisive victory". Dimawik (talk) 06:44, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

The mistake that you make comparing those numbers is that you don't take reinforcements into account - the 3,600 number refers to tanks available at the beginning of the operation, not the total amount of tanks participating. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.119.243.211 (talk) 00:50, 20 March 2009 (UTC)

These extra tanks and their crews could not have materialized out of the thin air, so they should be included in the force count somehow: main forces, reserves, you name it. 3000 extra tanks (and actually many more, assuming that the loss numbers are correct and considering the ultimate result of the Kursk battle) should constitute about 12 Soviet tank corps. Nobody seems to bother to list these extra units. Did they exist? Dimawik (talk) 11:43, 20 March 2009 (UTC)

No Blitzkrieg here

Sorry I had to take out the statement that this battle was a "Blitzkrieg" operation - this would have been:

• These operations were dependent on surprise penetrations ..., general enemy unpreparedness and an inability to react swiftly enough to the attacker's offensive operations.

Reading this article makes very clear that the Kursk situation was different and thus the Blitzkrieg notion is misplaced here. --Bernd vdB (talk) 13:01, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

Absolutely correct. --Paul Siebert (talk) 14:43, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

Absolutely correct? Absolutely incorrect. No it isn't misplaced. It was intended as a Blitzkrieg operation. It was a Kesselschlacht or Cauldron battle meant to encircle the enemy. I'll re-add with citation. Dapi89 (talk) 14:42, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

I would disagree. Not every Kesselschlacht is Blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg operations were dependent on surprise penetrations, general enemy unpreparedness and an inability to react swiftly enough to the attacker's offensive operations. It was generally an attack on communications that paralyzed the enemy's troops. Moreover, initially the German blitzkrieg assumed that no tank battles would occur. In addition, the blitzkrieg strategy was based on the blitzkrieg economy that differed dramatically from the total war economy.
It is quite obvious that the bitzkrieg strategy was abandoned after the Germans were stopped in 1941. (see, for instance: The End of the Blitzkrieg. Author(s): A. S. Milward Source: The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1964), pp. 499-518). By the moment the battle of Kursk started, the Germans:

• Converted their economy into the total war economy;
• Prepared for heavy tank battles. Tigers and Panthers were designed to engage Soviet T-34's and KV-2's, and Ferdinands (aka Elephants) were specially designed for the battle of Kursk;
• Expected (correctly) that the Soviets knew about their strategic goals. They definitely knew that the Soviets "turned the salient into one of the most heavily defended points on Earth."
  I think all said above demonstrates that the battle of Kursk was definitely not a bitzkrieg. --Paul Siebert (talk) 17:23, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

That couldn't more incorrect. You can file your case all you like but most of the Eastern Front experts disagree. Furthermore I think you miss the point. There is an enormous debate over the correct definition of Blitzkrieg, so you cannot rely on one author. Milward's assertion is ridiculous considering the Fall Blau operation of 1942 was a Blitzkrieg strike! David Glantz in Soviet Operational Art; In pursuit of Deep Battle states Kursk was the first time a Blitzkrieg attack was defeated before in achieved a breakthrough. Robert M. Citino in his The German Way of War refers to it as such. What it turned out to be is irrelevant. The Germans intended it to conform to a massive concentration stike to achieve a strategic encirclement via encirlcement battle as rapidly as possible - you're putting to much emphasis on the "suprise element".

• The German Economy most certainly did not "abandon" Blitzkrieg after 1941. I suggest you read Richard Overy's War and Economy in the Third Reich - production was not "shifted into a total war" - an absolute false conclusion. This gradual shift did not start until the winter of 1942/43, and then did not reach fruition until the late summer of 1944.

• The German heavy tanks were produced in response to the tatical threat posed by exceptional Soviet armour, not because they forsaw a war of attrition. It was a tactical solution to a tactical problem. This does not demonstrate a change in strategic thinking at all.

• The Germans produced heavier armoured tnaks due to the threat posed by the Soviet models.

• I'd also appreciate it if you wouldn't link things like "total war" -I'm well aware of what it means, perhaps to a greater degree than you (with respect).

So all in all, you havn't proved anything. Dapi89 (talk) 13:43, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

I nearly forgot, there is no such thing as Blitzkrieg economy. Good god man! The Blitzkrieg economy is a myth. The Germans were preparing for a total war.

• First phase of rearmament = an armed force capable of defeating their immediate neighbours.
• Once Poland, Austria and Czechoslovakia had been absorbed into the Reich, the Nazis could then prepare for the "War of annihilation" as Hitler called it.

But Hitler's foreign policy pushed Germany into war before that second phase of rearmament could be reached. So the Blitzkrieg "economy" is a myth, as demonstrated by Richard Overy, Citino, Bellamy and even Corum.

The German economy was not deliberately streamlined to support a Blitzkrieg doctrine. Dapi89 (talk) 13:50, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

Using your own statements, it is easy to prove that the word "Blitzkrieg" should be avoided in that case. As you correctly stated: "there is an enormous debate over the correct definition of Blitzkrieg", therefore, since there is no consensus on that account, WP cannot tell about the Blitzkrieg nature of the Battle of Kursk as if it was a well established fact. With regards to other your arguments, let me remind you that:

• Although Overy criticised Milward, he refers to his views as "traditional explanations" of the war time German economy phenomenon. In that sense, the Blitzkrieg economy is not a myth, but one of existing points of view. You cannot simply reject it based on the Overy's statements.
• With regards to tanks, you didn't address my major argument. The USSR had as many T-34's and KV's in 1941 as Germany had Tigers and Panthers in 1943. The tactical superiority of T-34s over Pz-IIIs and old versions of Pz-IVs was similar to the superiority of Tigers and Panthers over T-34s and KVs. Nevertheless, in 1941 the Blitzkrieg strategy was overwhelmingly successful whereas during the 1943 battles the Germans were unable to win. The reason of fantastic German success in 1940-41 was a development of the revolutionary concept of the armoured division, the unit that initially combined 2 tank regiments, mechanised regiment, artillery regiment, reconnaissance battalion, and axiliary units (sappers, etc). It was an autonomous unit capable to penetrate deeply into the enemy's positions and to act absolutely independently. As a result, the German were able to cut French and Soviet communications, causing severe problems with logistic. In addition, they were generally able to avoid direct tank battles, so most formidable Soviet tanks were lost during long marches as a result of the lack of fuel or mechanical damages (early Soviet T-34 and KV had very unreliable transmission). Interestingly, although the German faced "exceptional Soviet" tanks in the very beginning of the war, they appeared to be quite able to neutralise them. They started to complain on the "terrible Soviet tanks" only in autumn 1941, when the Soviets were able to re-organize their defense and when the German offensive potential was essentially exhausted.
  Therefore, my conclusion in that pure Blitzkrieg strategy assumed tank battle to play no significant role. By that criterion, Kursk was definitely not a Blitzkrieg.
• One more important consequence of the deep penetration strategy is that the opponent appears to be unable to mobilise its troops completely. In other words, blitzkrieg strategy implies strategical unpreparedness of the opponent. It definitely was not the case at Kursk.

Everything said above doesn't mean that the Germans didn't try to apply some elements of their Blitzkrieg tactics during the battle of Kursk. I fully agree with that. However, you have to agree that there is a big difference between the words, "Blitzkrieg strategy" and "some elements of Blitzkrieg tactics".
--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:32, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

I believe you have made yourself clearer, but I still oppose your points of view.

• I did not and do not reject the existence of a Blitzkrieg economy based on Overy alone. The indepth research and interrogation of many of the senior industrialists indicate that the German war effort was to be all-out from the beginning. The Blitzkrieg economy refers to the myth that a steamlined economy existed that was designed to support Blitzkrieg operations during war - there wasn't any such planning, nor was this put into practice as an after thought. Milward obviously hasn't done his reasearch and has bought into all the myths surrounding the German armed forces. Believe me, if you made that argument to any faculty they would be spitting blood.

• Your analysis of the "revolutionary" use of armour is way off. There was nothing new about combined arms, i.e Inantry-tank co-operation. The First World War and all the wars prior used combined arms (at least to the extent that the technology permitted at those times). Blitzkrieg is not new! Using "revolution" in military affairs is a bad idea, they are very difficult to prove. (BTW, I know exactly what a PD is and does).

• With regard to your main point. I believe I did. You were suggesting that the upgraded firepower and armour of new tanks, such as the Tiger and Panther demonstrates a shift in strategic thinking that led away from the Blitzkrieg operations into one of a more attritional war, therefore Kursk was one such battle. I do not share this opinion.

• In fact, I think you will find that there were quite a few tank-battles in 1940 and 1941. A strategy of avoidance was certainly not on the agenda. Blitzkrieg sought a battle after encircling the enemy- after all Blitzkrieg is a doctrine of decisive battle. Still, the Battle of Hannut and the battles of Army Group North during Barbarossa involved a few pitched tank-battles. I don't accept that Blitzkrieg sought to avoid an all-out conforntation in tank vs tank combat. In fact, quite the opposite. It sought confrontation under favoured circumstances. Kursk was a prime example of a German tank force attacking a "weak" flank in ordered to conduct an all-out tank engagement under conditions of overwhelming operational advantage. The Germans most certainly did not seek a pitch all-out battle at the ouset when attacking the enemy flank, but by definition, they sought a decisive pitched tank battle in the salient itself.

• With regard to your last point: There is no such thing as Blitzkrieg tactics. Once again, you are trying to define something that doesn't exist. It is very difficult to separate tactics, operations and strategy where Blitzkrieg is concerned. In fact it is debatable whether a Blitzkrieg strategy exists - as proved by Overy and Adam Tooze - The Wagers of Destruction -Economy of the Third Reich. When considering Blitzkrieg one could call it an operational doctrine that pretends to be strategy. Dealing with the tactical element, what constitutes Blitzkrieg tactics? Concentration? - done before. Schwerpunkt? - done before. Flanking? - done before. Surprise? - done before.

The problem is you are searching for a specific definition of what Blitzkrieg is and isn't in order to justify saying that Kursk was not a Blitzkrieg operation. You use the word "implies or implication" - this is not how to evaluate something like this. Who says Blitzkrieg relys on unpreparedness for victory? Was the attack in 1940 a strategic surprise? No. The Allies could and should have seen it coming. At Kursk strategic surprise was lost as well, yet the operation was ordered regardless, using what you call "blitzkrieg tatics". Dapi89 (talk) 19:33, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

I think its best if we call it a day now, I am sure we would prefer to be doing other things rather than trying to pursuade each other that one or the other is right. I don't think we are going to agree. I was going to add Glantz to the article - given he carries more weight than you or me. Dapi89 (talk) 19:55, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

I don't think it is so crucial disagreement. However, try to think about the following. During the battle of Kursk armoured divisions supported by artillery stormed well fortified (or extremely well fortified) positions of well prepared enemy that was perfectly aware of their intentions. If we forget about air forces, it resembles a battle of Somme, not 1940-42 battles.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:25, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

True. This would be the same for the Second battle of El Alamien. Most WW2 battles were WW1 battles with upgraded technology. But the question I would pose to that is; what did the Germans intend, and what methodology did they use to obtain the goals at Kursk? Does it mirror previous so-called blitz' campaigns? Did the Battle of Kursk differ to the offensive plan that led to say, the Battle of Kiev in 1941, or perhaps Fall Gelb? The intent was the same, and the formula was too. I'm not arguing or debating what type of battle the Soviets were trying to fight, or what battle it became overall. I'm just pointing out that the Germans intended it be the same kind of offensive they fought in 39-42, that's all I'm saying. Dapi89 (talk) 21:27, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

Wonderful. You almost literally anticipated my own next argument. Absolutely true. In the case of Zitadelle's success the Germans would be able to launch something that would resemble their previous blitzkrieg operations. In that sense, Kursk was just an unsuccessful prelude to something that would become a blitzkrieg type warfare. Therefore, the term blitzkrieg can be applied to the German global plans, not to the battle itself....--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:57, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

Oh dear, we are going backwards! The "prelude" as you call it was the Schwerpunkt phase of Blitzkrieg! So the term Blitzkrieg can be applied to the battle itself, not just the potential exploitation of the breakthrough. :) Dapi89 (talk) 22:49, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

I really don't care personally whether or not some people choose to regard Kursk as a lightning war operation, I don't particularly think it fits, but anyawy, but I do object to it being described as the first time Blitzkrieg failed. That happened a couple of years earlier in the western desert at a small town in Libya when an unknown Australian held up the high-priest of lightning war, Erwin Rommel, and denied him his objective several times.KhProd1 (talk) 08:44, 19 October 2009 (UTC)

Here in Wikipedia we are simply expressing the positions of the WP:Sources, not our opinion. Therefore, if reliable sources say this was the first time blitzkrieg was stopped, we might want to reflect this. If some other reliable sources say the opposite, we might want to reflect both points of view. What we cannot do is engage in our own research. So in order for this discussion to progress, it makes sense to quote actual sources. Dimawik (talk) 20:11, 19 October 2009 (UTC)

Yep, and over at the Siege of Tobruk page it states that that battle, in 1941, was the first time Blitzkrieg was defeated on the battlefield. So, if both articles have published sources for their info then surely it becomes a case of is 1941 the first time or 1943 the first time Blitzkrieg was defeated on the battlefield, no?KhProd1 (talk) 06:27, 20 October 2009 (UTC)

You seem to confuse two things: a defeat of German offensive and a defeat of Blitzkrieg strategy. Battle of Kursk was the first time when Wehrmacht's offensive was halted before operational goals were achieved. Before Kursk, Germans always achieved their primary goals: they broke through Soviet defense in 1941 and 1942, they besieged Tobruk and achieved El-Alamein, their defeats in 1941-42 were a result of post Blitzkrieg hostilities (sieges of Moscow, Stalingrad, Tobruk, ets). By contrast, at Kursk they failed at the very first step: Soviet defense appeared to be impermeable for Wehrmacht.
And, finally, it is simply not modest to compare the battle where not more than 35,000 troops fought from each side with Eastern front battles.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:37, 20 October 2009 (UTC)

We cannot use in Wikipedia arguments along the lines, "source A says Kursk was the first Blitzkrieg failure, source B says Tobruck, so Kursk was not the first". If both A and B are considered reliable, we need to either quote both, or use form "A states that ..." Dimawik (talk) 18:28, 20 October 2009 (UTC)

"Modest"? Are you shittin' me? I'm going to assume from your use of that word that English isn't your primary tongue. "Modesty", or lack of it, has no place here, facts do and your other interpretation of them still doesn't satisfy the wording I took issue with. They besieged Tobruk, yes, that would be why it's called "the siege of Tobruk", but they failed to break through defensive lines (on several occasions), they failed to take the objective (that would be the city of Tobruk). That would by any reasonable interpretation be a failure of Blitzkrieg on the Germans' behalf and a victory against blitzkrieg in battle on the Allies' behalf. I am not confusing anything. Before Kursk the Germans did not achieve their primary goal of taking Tobruk. Besiegeing Tobruk WAS NOT their primary goal. Therefore the first failure of Blitzkrieg was at Tobruk and not at Kursk. Kursk may have been the first time that Blitzkrief failed ENTIRELY by achieving NONE of its objectives, but Tobruk was the first time Blitzkrieg failed in achieving ANY of its objectives and thus is the first time Blitzkrieg was defeated in battle. The point is that the article said Kursk was the first time Blitzkrieg had been defeated, and that is simply not true. Blitzkrieg's first failure was at Tobruk. If the article made the distinction that you are making I wouldn't have made my point. To which, Dima, I basically agree and that there should be a note of the conflicting views and a hyperlink to Tobruk.

And on a personal note, I shall continue to be incredibly "immodest" by honoring the Australians who gave the Germans their first defeat in battle on land in WW2 and the Japanese their first defeat in battle on land in WW2, regardless of how few of them were there to do it. You do understand how stupid your point appears, don't you, Paul? "The Australians are immodest for celebrating the fact that a single division of them could defeat Blitzkrieg in 1941 when millions of Soviet troops couldn't."KhProd1 (talk) 06:12, 21 October 2009 (UTC)

Reference to Töppel's work

Folks on the Russian Wikipedia started to dig, and it seems that Töppel's work cited in the article was not published in 2002. It is actually an MA thesis written in 2001 with a different name. The German Wikipedia quotes a correct title, Roman Töppel: Die Offensive gegen Kursk 1943 - Legenden, Mythen, Propaganda. Magisterarbeit, Dresden 2001

Since this is not a book, I will change the cite book pattern.

Dimawik (talk) 21:07, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

Note also that it seems that the only reviewed publication on the subject by Töppel seems to be an article in "Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift" #2 for the year 2002 under a completely different title, "Legendenbildung in der Geschichtsschreibung - Die Schlacht bei Kursk", loose translation "Creation of historical legends: the Kursk battle". Dimawik (talk) 17:16, 6 March 2009 (UTC)

Infobox

Perhaps we ought to finally do something about the infobox? Clearly using official data is important, but there must be a way we can list the same information and still make it comprehensible. As it stands now, the infobox is a disaster of epic proportions. Is anyone surprised everyone keeps asking about it?

First of all, we need to add a footnote to the dates in the infobox. What the heck does "Soviet Kursk" and "German Kursk" mean? Nothing to someone who isn't aware that there is disagreement as to when the battle ended. All that needs to be said in the notes section of the infobox (not the bottom of the article) is something to this effect "Soviet and German sources differ as to when the battle concluded; German sources do not include numerous Soviet counteroffensives after July 20. The casualties noted use their respective Soviet and German dates." I think these two simple sentences go a long way in clearing up the confusion, at least it's more effective than what we have now. Thoughts anyone?--98.232.98.144 (talk) 09:28, 1 April 2009 (UTC)

Tanks for your help

What's up with the infobox figure of 6064 tanks damaged or destroyed? This doesn't jibe well with the 3600 the Soviets started with. Does this have to do with different definitions of what constituted the battle? Clarityfiend (talk) 22:01, 29 April 2009 (UTC)

The 3600 tanks is the number that was available at the start of the battle, while the 6064 is the number of losses during the entire battle (the Soviets recieved reinforcements during the battle). With respect, Ko Soi IX (talk) 01:53, 30 April 2009 (UTC)

Wow! Now that's a battle. Thanks. Clarityfiend (talk) 02:53, 30 April 2009 (UTC)

"Red Army counteroffensives" section

Robin Cross in 'The Battle of Kursk' points out that Manstein more or less correctly assessed the damage caused to Soviet forces, and reckoned on a significant post-battle lull that would allow time for repairs and reorganisation. However the Soviets surprised the Germans by putting together enough troops and tanks, using patched up tanks and hastily organised units. This was unusual for the Soviets, and risky as it was conducted with weakened forces and without the usual logistical preparation.
It was this bold and risky move, he contends, that crowned the Soviet victory. German tank repair shops were overrun and recovering forces were caught badly off balance.
OK to add something like this? --Chrisw zeroenmity (talk) 08:33, 11 July 2009 (UTC)

The Soviets kept a whole Steppe Front as a reserve that was not involved in the defensive phase of the battle. AFAIK, the Germans were unaware of that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:28, 12 July 2009 (UTC)

Agreed, Cross seems very wide of the mark with his assessment. The reserve units that launched the Orel operation (when began before the german offensive stopped in the south) were coming from strategic reserves and were not 'hastily patched together'. DMorpheus (talk) 14:38, 13 July 2009 (UTC)

Prokhorovka

This part is ridiculous. Leibstandarte + Das Reich had 4 Tanks MORE!! operational on 13 juli. in this phase of zitadelle the both divisions had not more than 40 tanks in repair at any time. delete the complete text its full of ( sorry ) Bullshit. —Preceding unsigned comment added by HROThomas (talk • contribs) 12:56, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

The work on Prokhorovka is going on in the Russian Wikipedia. It is a bit slow now, you are welcome to join. Note that the Germans originally planned to take Prokhorovka, yet did not - so some details must be amiss in the version of history with 4 extra tanks. Dimawik (talk) 23:15, 29 August 2009 (UTC)

what can there miss? 186 tanks and STUG operational on 12 july and 190 on 13 july. all 3 SS divisions ( II panzer corps) lost 33 tanks in the operation zitadelle. personnel losses 522 german casualties and 3563 russian casualties. in my opnion the text is gabbage. for example

• "What is generally not disputed though is that the Red Army did enough, at very high cost, to stop any German breakthrough here. In that sense this remains a crucial turning point of the battle and indeed of the Great Patriotic War: here the blitzkrieg was ground to a halt, albeit at a huge cost." a crucial turning point??????????? what? this bullshit in wiki...
• "On the morning of 12 July, Hoth, determined to push for a breakthrough, scraped together the available reserves of the 4th Panzer Army and advanced on Prokhorovka at the same time that the 5th Guards Tank Army launched a series of attacks as part of multi-front counteroffensive scheduled for 12 July and in an attempt to catch the Germans off balance. The SS and Guards units collided west of Prokhorovka in open country punctuated by farms, rolling hills and gullies. What happened next is open to debate with the release of new information from archives."

Proven wrong, it was planned that totenkopf attack on this day after this, it was planned to group the corps for another attack.

• "The German units had 494 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces in the attack, with 90% operational" , how can the two SS division have 494 tanks?^^ it were 186
• "However the Soviet 31 Guard Tank Corps, and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps fought the II SS Totenkopf to a standstill, employing the tactic of getting in close to German armour and attacking the vulnerable sides of the Tigers" totenkopf advanced relativ deep . the "tactic" is myth bullshit, the totenkopf only lost on tiger for the whole operation .
• "60 to 70 German tanks are thought to have been total losses" only 33 losses for the corps within zitadelle :-)
• "The battle can best be described as a very costly tactical loss, but an operational draw for the Red Army. Neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished their missions that day."

tactical is was a desaster!!! operational they plannend to destroy the LSSAH!! strategic is was a defeat because the 5th tanks was planned for the counterattack but could not be used then!!

the text is bullshit... -- HROThomas (talk) 04:53, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

If you have reliable sources giving a different assessment, by all means provide them. Calling the current version "bullshit" is both unhelpful and insulting to the volunteers who wrote it. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 14:39, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

The (incomplete) work going on in the Russian article on Prokhorovka had found three SS divisions having 410 tanks and self-propelled armored guns, almost entirely based on German field strength reports (link to photocopies of these reports and other documents can be found in the discussion). You can pick up any of the two divisions but you will not be able to get anywhere close to the 186 number :-) which is thus suspicious. Just remember that Russians, unlike Germans, counted self-propelled armored guns together with tanks, and the numbers in the article suddenly start making much more sense :-) Dimawik (talk) 21:43, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

ok i checked the russian discuss page and found the numbers. the numbers for the II SS panzercorps are nearly the same like their strength on 4 july , how is this possible? its not. the numbers include the Totenkopf , the tanks of totenkopf didnt parcipate in this battle because they were in the bridghead over the psel and the main battle was against the LSSAH maybe u read your numbers again and check... -- HROThomas (talk) 21:12, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

my english is not good enough to write a complete new text. the text now includes many propaganamyths. i said whats proven wrong. i can provide sources for it but what is then ? nobody will change it... -- HROThomas (talk) 15:37, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

i can try to write a new text, but then i need somebody who will check gramma . -- HROThomas (talk) 15:42, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

Please don't contribute if you expect others to clean up after you. Thanks. DMorpheus (talk) 16:45, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

I think WP's main objective is factual accuracy, not style. Accordingly, the editor that uses more reliable sources and tries to present the facts in more accurate way is definitely preferred over those with good English and poor factual accuracy. (Of course, calling the contribution of others a "bullshit" is not acceptable under no circumstances).--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:07, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

ok then the only thing i can do is, to say that the text now is ridicoulus propagandabullshit which is a disgrace for wikipedia. cheers morpheus.-- HROThomas (talk) 17:06, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

It is not clear from the article text where the numbers were taken from. However, Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson in their book "Kursk 1943: a statistical analysis" Routledge, 2000 (ISBN 0714650528, 9780714650524), p. 109, conclude that the German lost at most 54 tanks during the Prokhorovka battle, and the Soviets lost at least 334. Try to put your draft here (on that talk page), and then we will see if we can help.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:16, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg Band 8. Karl-Heinz Frieser ordered by Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt. Page 130 . No panzer of the II SS corps was destroyed. there were many damaged and tanks which were not able to maneuver. only 3 tanks were not recovered. the rest was recovered an repaired. so for this day 3 write offs. the whole corps ( LSSAH, Das Reich and Totenkopf ) lost only 33 tanks in the whole campaign. frieser says the damaged are hard to estimate, at 12 july there were 41 tanks in long time repair, but this includes tanks which got damaged before 12 july. many german tanks were light damaged so they got repaired within hours. for example problems with the antenna. so 3 total tanks losses an maybe 40 damaged. he gives 334 tank losses of the 5th GTA for 12 july to 16July and over 300 damaged. german personnel losses are 522 with 97 dead or missed. -- HROThomas (talk) 17:46, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

You probably noticed that the article mentions a difference in the Soviet and German approaches to calculate tank losses. The German "destroyed" meant destroyed completely, i.e. completely irrecoverable. A tank in a repair shop was not considered "destroyed", only "damaged". BTW, many of those "damaged" tanks were subsequently captured by the Red Army after Operation Kutuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev started, so, de facto they were lost. By contrast, much less expensive Soviet tanks were sometimes easier to write off then to repair.
That, in my opinion, partially explains the difference in the Soviet and German tank losses. By "partially" I mean that, of course, other factors, namely, a thicker armour of Tigers and Panthers, their better guns, new projectiles that better penetrated T34's tilted armour, better optics in German tanks, better training of the German elite tank division's personnel, etc., played very significant role.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:17, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

"A tank in a repair shop was not considered "destroyed", only "damaged". BTW, many of those "damaged" tanks were subsequently captured by the Red Army after Operation Kutuzov and Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev started, so, de facto they were lost. By contrast, much less expensive Soviet tanks were sometimes easier to write off then to repair." and? 3 total tank write off for 12 july . and 33 for the whole operation. and by the way the russian tanks were totally destroyed . THEY BURNT , german tanks were !damaged! . the counter offensive at the southern sector was launched on 3 AUTUMN that are 3 weeks after this battle. i dont think that many of the damaged tanks of the battle were still in repair. So 3! tank losses. the rest is blabla. all articles uses numbers of krivoshev which are at least discussable but if we have perfect numbers of tank losses because they were only 33 tanks short after zitadelle than the russian start to discuss about damaged or not blabla. 80 tank losses are NOT possible. enough books were written about the russian propaganda of this battle but russian people who try to "improve" the eastern front articles often do bad research. -- HROThomas (talk) 18:49, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

The overall proportion of tank losses is easy to establish: Soviets produced approximately 3,000 tanks a month, Germans 1,100. Since the quantity of tanks in both armies did not increase appreciably in 1943, these numbers give a good approximation of real (non-paper) losses, with USSR losing about 3 tanks for each German. It is highly unlikely that during Kursk battle Germans lost less tanks per day than for the rest of the year. Therefore any German losses below 1,100 tanks in July and another 1,100 tanks in August are definitely wrong from the common sense point of view, unless you are ready to first challenge the numbers in the article German armored fighting vehicle production during World War II. Dimawik (talk) 21:16, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

in addition. the battle of Prokhorovka was mainly fought by Panzer IV ( some upgunned) . not sure but not many tigers were involded and NO panthers. -- HROThomas (talk) 18:57, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

About tanks without guns: the Prokhorovka discussion in Russian Wikipedia has dealt with this information and found it to be a false rumor: all SS tanks at the time had guns alright. You might want to look at the discussion page for German docs and the serial number of a (single) chassis that could have been without a gun :-). You are absolutely correct about Panthers. Dimawik (talk) 21:16, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

u misunderstand me. upgunned mean they got thicker amor plates and longer guns -- HROThomas (talk) 21:46, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

Sorry, I indeed misunderstood you. The texts that talk about no German losses at Prokhorovka also typically mention the mysterious tanks without guns, this is why I made a mistake. Dimawik (talk) 01:18, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

An overall attempt to characterize Prokhorovka as a resounding German victory faces an obstacle in a simple indisputable fact: Germans planned to take Prokhorovka, and were not able to. If all they had were lossless victories you think they had, why weren't they able to march on Prokhorovka as planned? Dimawik (talk) 21:16, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

ok for me it seems that your knowledge about the battle of kursk is "incomplete". at 12 july ( day of battle) hitler told manstein that he want to end the operation. manstein made a new plan because the northern pincer attack failed. he created Operation Roland. operation roland planned to stop the advance and turn west to create a smaller cauldron. he wanted to walk along side the psel. after the 12 july porkohrovka became irrelevant. hitler canceled the operation and the pincer attack failed and manstein turned his view to the west. thats why... . be honest, u know this? i guess no.... -- HROThomas (talk) 21:44, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

The orders for Roland came only on the eve of 13th AFAIK; your calendar seems to be a bit off :-) Dimawik (talk) 01:18, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

u asked me why the german didnt advance to prokorovka,and i told u ... -- HROThomas (talk) 14:13, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

its off topic but ok . u think 3 russian tanks for 1 german ? can u imagine how much german tanks were abandonned due to lack of oil and ammunition. german armor fought in poland in france in africa in italy again in france in western germany. u really think the russians lost only 3 tanks to 1 german ?????? -- HROThomas (talk) 21:51, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

It is pointless to argue with numbers; I gave you tank production numbers which are, I think, correct, and they for 1943 are 3:1 Soviet:German. We can only trust the tank loss numbers (on all fronts) for July and August that are same or higher than these numbers. Hint: the German way of counting total losses does not add up to a small fraction of 2,200 tanks during the Kursk battle, so the German accounting must have been funny, otherwise we would have seen many more German armored divisions by the end of 1943. Dimawik (talk) 01:18, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

no logic reason for this. why should german units gave lower numbers? why? than they get less reinforcements. there is no logic reason to support this opinion. the numbers are numbers which were made after the battles, propaganda had no influence . the numbers are correct. i hope u notice that german armor was not only used at the eastern front . i have numbers of wolfgang schneider how estimated germans lost about 25000 tanks and assaultguns against russia. for 1943 he gaves 6.332 the official numbers for the losses of july and autumn in the east are 1.331 . Thats fits perfect. The number for this months are higher than for the rest because of the intense fighting but not to high because of the period of big qualtity difference. -- HROThomas (talk) 14:11, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

Germans, of course, did not lie on their reports. It just seems that everything they were able to tow from the battlefield was not considered a total loss. Judging by the final numbers, a lot of these "damaged" tanks were in the end never repaired - German officers at the time understood that, but their modern apologists try to just add the "total loss" numbers. This approach always results in bizarre conclusions once compared against the production numbers. For example, in order for the 6,332 number to be correct, one must assume that the remainder of the 13,000+ tanks produced in 1943 were demolished on other fronts (as the number of tanks in the German army and SS remained roughly the same throughout the year). Considering that Normandy did not even start, and Italy went on for just half a year (with very few German tanks involved, AFAIK), this leaves us with - Africa - to explain half of the German losses? Dimawik (talk) 20:10, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

what are u talking about ? even when damaged tanks were lost later then they were in the statistics . u think when german produce 13.000 tanks in one year they must lose them immediatly? whats your point i brought sources for less german tank losses, where are your sources? please provide them now -- HROThomas (talk) 20:48, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

Guys, I think the exchange with your opinions without providing reliable sources is senseless. The source I found (see above) tells about at most 54 German tanks lost during the Prokhorovka battle vs at least 334 Soviet ones. AFAIK, no sources exist that provide exact numbers, probably, because they are impossible to determine now. The only thing we can do is to provide 2-3 sources that show the most reliable data.
Re: 1 to 3. It is only my opinion, but the battle of Kursk took place at the period of the war when the Germans had already responded on the Soviet challenge and produced a considerable number of highly efficient tanks and self-propelled guns, that made Soviet T-34's and KV's obsolete. The upgrade of T-34 to T-34-85 (de facto, a quite new tank) and the start of production of IS-2 and new anti-tank self-propelled guns took place after Kursk. As a result, I can agree that during Kursk the ratio was higher than earlier or later.
However, it is not too important, because, as a rule, the Germa armour's opponents were mostly Soviet artillery, infantry and fortifications.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:20, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

Paul, the reason for me arguing is not to convince HRO or be convinced myself; the goal is to expose the sources he quotes as not reliable, so the numbers from these sources do not make it into the article. I just tried to show that one cannot just add the "total loss" numbers on the German side, since this quickly contradicts the common sense once taken beyond the corps level. Any work that does just that at the small scale (where the overall problem is hidden) is just as unreliable. Dimawik (talk) 20:21, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

dear dimawik are u from russia? -- HROThomas (talk) 20:39, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

It should not matter, and it is not considered polite to ask about this in Wikipedia :-\ Still, for the record: no, I do not live in Russia. Dimawik (talk) 21:23, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

provide sources for your claims or we use my figures i have many sources for them -- HROThomas (talk) 20:56, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

your 54 includes damaged? the SS corps was only 33 tanks short after the operation. how can they lost 54 in one day? how? i provided a source already!!! 54 must include damaged. -- HROThomas (talk) 23:33, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

Re: "the goal is to expose the sources he quotes as not reliable" Unfortunately, our own conclusions cannot be used as sources for WP. If you believe the sources HROThomas uses are not reliable then some more reliable sources have to exist that question the numbers HROThomas referes to. Could you please show us these sources?

Re: "dear dimawik are u from russia?". Let me point out that such an attack is strictly prohibited by WP policy and, if you will do it again you may be banned indefinitely.

Re: "the numbers are correct" We discuss not the numbers themselves, but the way you interpreted them.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:21, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Paul, re: Unfortunately, our own conclusions cannot be used as sources for WP. Yes, we cannot quote our own numbers. However, it is perfectly within the rules of Wikipedia for me to point that the numbers from the source used contradict the common sense. After all, it is our job to select the sources. Once again, the German tank production in 1943 was more than 1,100 tanks a month. Since by the end of the year German army had roughly the same amount of tanks as at the beginning, the losses should have been about the same, at 1,100 per month. Any source that state that during the 2 months of Kursk Germans lost significantly less than 2,000 tanks must be wrong, as they essentially state that Kursk was better for Germans than 1943 on average. Dimawik (talk) 06:48, 4 October 2009 (UTC)

Paul i asked you a simple question. include the figure of 54, damaged tanks? if not i search for an explantion how the can lost more tanks than they were short after the end of the operation -- HROThomas (talk) 16:42, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Sorry, sometimes it is not too easy to understand what do you mean. I presented the source that gives an upper limit of German tank losses at Prokhorovka. If you have ant idea how to include this number into the article, feel free to do that.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:49, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

my question: includes your number damaged or are this only destroyed tanks. 54 destroyed tanks at this day seems to be impossible so i guess this are total losses and damaged . does the author of your book say something specific to his number "54". -- HROThomas (talk) 18:19, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Infobox , casualties section

i made a new casualtie section. why?

• the numbers were mixed up. german losses according to german sources: tanks and aircraf for zitadelle , number of casualties for whole battle.
• same problem with german tanks to russian sources. russian sources mean whole battle but for tanks they gave only 900 tanks whats the russian number for zitadelle
• russian numbers for aircraft are totally useless
• russian numbers to german losses are fantasy numbers , no historian from western world will dispute.
• i guess the reader was not able to understand the timeframe problem
• generally i think the numbers now are more accurate
• provided different sources like glantz , solokov , krivosheev, frieser and official russian numbers + official german numbers.

-- HROThomas (talk) 21:01, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

i dont know how to use source multiple times. anybody how can help? -- HROThomas (talk) 21:25, 31 August 2009 (UTC)

New casualties section is no longer ridiculous, it is now bizarre. According to the infobox, Red Army lost practically all the men it thrust into the battle (including all non-fighting personnel!) and almost all tanks, while German losses were high, but quite reasonable. For some reason after such a brilliant victory Germans not only retreated, but were obviously bled to the point of being unable to mount any major offensive again. Is this the best NPOV we can produce? Dimawik (talk) 06:57, 4 October 2009 (UTC)

southern sector

i wrote the porkorovka part new . later i will write new the part "end in the south". the text now is uncited and untrue. -- HROThomas (talk) 05:45, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

i deleted the example of the großdeutschland division. the example was intended to show the defensiv efforts of the russians. BUT the G.D division got enormous problems with new panthers. nearly all was damaged due to mechanical problems. to use this as example for good defence is bullshit. user morpheus wants that the text inculdes this example. i explained now why is nonsensical -- HROThomas (talk) 19:02, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

major edits in prokorovhka part

i wrote a text with many sources. user morpheus deleted it maybe he can explain why . -- HROThomas (talk) 18:59, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

the text starts with blabla . the battle is controversy because it one of the biggest example for russian propaganda, nothing else. the articel should start with the situation and the plans ... -- HROThomas (talk) 19:05, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

The writing was so bad it was unreadable. Even if the old version has errors, at least it was understandable. (By the way, I am not saying the old version had errors, merely acknowledging your contention.) I urge you to take up the suggestion offered by others to post your drafts here first and let us all discuss it before making the article worse.

It also seemed lack credibility, but I will withdraw that comment since I am not confident I understand what it is you are writing. Again, posting a draft here may be very helpful.

DMorpheus (talk) 19:07, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

by the way its completly unimportant if u think its credible i got my information out of one of the most reliable source about this war. if u think its not credible then u look less capable. i added mass sources. i know the russian propaganda sources and i recognise them. the article is full of this propaganda shit. how can they fall in a antitank ditch when both armies were clashing while pushing forward , HOW ??? its proven as lie a propaganda myth. a article over such important battle includes russian propaganda and u are not abl to see this. my write stil is bet, but the article now is waste. maybe someone can take my bad english and improve it. -- HROThomas (talk) 19:24, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

If it is as clear as you claim then it will be easy to source and easy to find support amongst other editors. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 19:30, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

u deleted about 20 sources of me^^ -- HROThomas (talk) 19:32, 1 September 2009 (UTC)

in addition is not clear because particulary the russians read the propaganda books, then they come to wiki and write this articles. maybe its not their false when they read the wrong books but if someone like me comes with a collection of 10 Books which were ordered by the german office for military study and written by over 20 historians as a complet work about the second world war with more than 1000 books as sources than this russian sources have eventually to disappear. the book about kursk and other battles was published in 2007 so it used most actual sources. -- HROThomas (talk) 19:40, 1 September 2009 (UTC)