Talk:German invasion of the Netherlands/Archive 1

Nov 2005 comments

Nice article Sandertje! I'll try to give more background and detail.--MWAK 16:19, 13 November 2005 (UTC)

I did my best, but I did it in about 2 hours or so (scanning of pictures included) so it might need some 'fine tuning' ;) -- sandertje 14 Nov

I'll try to give it just that :o). However those pictures pose a future problem. You scanned them from De Bange Meidagen van Mei '40 ? I fear that means they're not in the public domain and therefore sooner or later will be removed.

Another point. You removed my remark Partly this was caused by a wish not to antagonise Germany, as the Dutch economy was strongly dependent on that of its larger neighbour; partly it was made inevitable by a policy of strict budgetary limits with which the conservative Dutch governments in vain tried to fight the Great Depression, which hit Dutch society particularly hard and replaced with it the hypothesis that the Dutch governments didn't take the threat seriously. Now it's indeed very true many individual Dutch politicians deceived themselves and the public at large; the records clearly show however all successive governments were greatly worried by the threat the new Germany posed; in fact that very fear made them do their utmost not to angry Hitler, to the end they even suppressed anti-Nazi propaganda. You might charitably want to call it a prevailing of a pacifist attitude; but the simple truth is they didn't want to provoke Hitler. And they couldn't afford to: bad relations with Germany would have spelled economic ruin; their "monetary" solution to the Depression made it impossible anyway. Time and again the ministers of defence would demand a much larger budget; each time they were refused as after all the general policy was one of lowering spending.--MWAK 19:50, 14 November 2005 (UTC)

I indeed scanned them from De Bange Meidagen van Mei '40 but no worries , the pictures I've used are all part of the NIOD (Dutch instutution for war documentation) archive and are totally public domain :-)

About the removal of the economy bit;

'Although Dutch economy depended on Germany at the time, Germany tried to keep money inside Germany (see the enormous building projects) as it's economy was still weak. The Dutch didn't depended on Germany so much as they do now, because of the colonies (mainly indonesia) they had back then,whom provided an abundance of rescources.

'I agree they that the main policy was not to irritate Hitler but the political arguments overruled the economical ones.

'Btw; Are you Dutch? --Sander 14 Nov

Why, of course :o). I'm still feeling a bit uneasy about the pictures. Does the fact the pictures are preserved at the archive mean the original holder has lost his copyright?

I agree the economic dependency on Germany is a complicated matter. Would the sentence be acceptable to you if it was changed to:

Partly this was caused by a wish not to antagonise Germany; partly it was made inevitable by a policy of strict budgetary limits with which the conservative Dutch governments in vain tried to fight the Great Depression, which hit Dutch society particularly hard ?--MWAK 22:38, 14 November 2005 (UTC)

' I agree with that sentence.Don't worry about the pictures 'da zit wel goe' I'm curious though, did you add the bit about the tankettes?' --Sander 15 NOV

I did :o). It's a little known fact the Dutch army possessed five Carden-Loyd Mk.IV Tankette's (well, they really were Mark VI (b)'s) with the names Poema, Jaguar, Panter, Luipaard and Lynx. They served and perished at Waalhaven.--MWAK 20:13, 15 November 2005 (UTC)

'Okay then, uhm, could you do something? The article only shows up when you type 'Battle of the Netherlands' (With capital letters) all others show up blank. Is there a way to fix that?'

Yes, you could make redirects of all possible combinations. So you can create the pages battle of the netherlands, Battle of The Netherlands, Battle of the netherlands, Fall of Holland and all make them direct to this article. I would strongly advise against it though: this practice overloads the system, has the danger of creating loops and is completely unnecessary anyway as you can use the Search option which will immediately point out the right article. And battle of the Netherlands already does this automatically, so it's mainly useful for people who aren't courteous enough to write our country's name with a capital ;o)--MWAK 20:49, 15 November 2005 (UTC)

'Okay then :-) ' -- Sander 16 NOV

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'What's this satelite map all about?! I that actually true? :-/ ' Sander 22 Nov'05

Well it's true map of the relevant area :o). The landings were of course very extensive: simultaneously paratroopers attacked the three airfields around The Hague and Waalhaven; but also landed on both sides of the Dordrecht and Moerdijk bridges. We could perhaps enlarge the map and focus more on the landing sites themselves; but this would make it much more difficult for most viewers — who typically wouldn't have any knowledge of Dutch geography — to locate them or understand their strategic importance.--MWAK 09:53, 23 November 2005 (UTC)

' I'm sure that there are actual purpose maps of the landing zones. (ie the German attack plan) ' Sander 23Nov'05

I know it for a fact :o). But free from copyright?--MWAK 09:59, 24 November 2005 (UTC)

Inclusion in World War II series?

Should this article be included in the World War II series? It could use Template:Warbox, as in Battle of France or Battle of Dunkirk, and it should be linked in Western Front (World War II). GhePeU 16:46, 7 December 2005 (UTC)

In principle I have no objections of course; but it is part of the Battle of France, so linking it in Western front seems unnecessary.--MWAK 09:42, 10 December 2005 (UTC)

I've linked the article in the Template:Campaignbox Western Front (World War II), because it contains other conflicts that are part of Battle of France, such as Battle of Dunkirk. GhePeU 11:55, 6 January 2006 (UTC)

THE PICTURES!!!!

The pictures HAVE GOT a licence.

It falls within Dutch citation/copy rights which also allows foreign citations/copies withinb limits.The limits are met.

Sandertje 17:41, 9 JAN 2006 (UTC)

Upload them again. GhePeU 23:37, 9 January 2006 (UTC)

Done. MWAK, could you cut them the way you did last time (those were beautiful) Sandertje 17:05, 11 January 2006 (UTC)

As you can see, someone was kind enough to replace the map under dispute by a superior one of his own making. This will solve at least one problem :o). I think the basic point is that it is not sufficient that the Dutch legal conditions for the allowance of citation are met: if something appears in Wikipedia, it is in principle supposed to be available for anyone for any further use, commercial or otherwise. This has obviously to be explicitely permitted by the copyright holder.

By the way, it wasn't me who adjusted the pictures, so I can't take any credit for that! :o)--MWAK 13:42, 12 January 2006 (UTC)

God, I wonder how to make such things...

Sandertje 16:43, 12 January 2006 (UTC)

Informal Peer Review

Here are my peer review comments. Overall impression, lots of good detail about overall stragety, forces employed, and 10 May actions. Very little on the battle between 11 May and 17 May. Clearly this aspect needs enhancement. Wendell 18:49, 17 January 2006 (UTC) 18:33, 17 January 2006 (UTC)

Specific comments:

1. Lead paragraph says subsequent decision of the Dutch military to surrender. Did the Dutch military or Dutch government surrender?
2. I count six uses of Entente. Usually I think of this as a WWI reference; which the link confirms. The article uses it as 5 references to the WWII allies of France and Britain; with only 1 clear reference to the WWI powers and stragety. Is there a better link?
3. Of all operations of Fall Gelb this one most purely embodied the concept of a Blitzkrieg as the term was then understood: a Strategischer Überfall or strategic assault. And like Fall Gelb as a whole it was a gigantic gamble. The gamble would fail, but the Dutch would pay the price. What about the gamble failed? Fall Gelb says For the Germans, the campaign was a spectacular victory.
4. The last paragraph under the 10 May heading leaves me hanging, and was never mentioned again. Did this Light Division ever attack, cross the river, or do something?
   1. The Light Division, based at Vught, was the only mobile reserve the Dutch Army possessed. It was decided to let it counterattack the German airborne landing on IJsselmonde. Its regiments thus biked over the Maas and Waal bridges and then turned left through the Alblasserwaard, to reach the Noord, the river separating this polder from IJsselmonde, in the evening. There they discovered that the only bridge, built in 1939, was left unguarded by the paratroopers, as the Germans because of outdated maps simply didn't know of its existence. It was however decided to postpone a crossing-attempt till the next day, when the artillery would be ready to support it. Not even a bridgehead was established.
5. Though there were small Dutch successes, the Germans pushed forward with great speed. Can this be expanded? This reads like a sentence from the Battle of France. In that article, that one line sentence would be acceptable, since the Battle of Netherlands was a mere side show to the German plan. However this is an article about the Battle of Netherlands, so what happened? Any details available?
   1. Note: The sub-section call The situation on the ground in the Bombing of Rotterdam article gives some details about the 13 May statemate.
6. In the section labeled The End, it says An ultimatum was delivered to the Dutch defenders of Rotterdam shortly after. After what? What time or day was this ultimatum delivered? When was Rotterdam bombed?
7. When the Dutch officer returned from signing the surrender, suddenly a massive group of bombers appeared; though red flash bullets were shot to warn the planes not to bomb Rotterdam, and one group returned to their base, the other larger group flew on and bombed Rotterdam. DId this officer surrender Rottendam, or all of the Netherlands?
8. Seems like an aftermath section is needed. Did any units not get the surrender order (except for Zeeland area)? Did the Germans bring in additional occupation troops, or move the invading troops directly into France? After this battle, where there any Dutch resistance elements in 1940? (no reason for this article to focus on the active resistance in 43/44 timeframe)

Wendell 18:49, 17 January 2006 (UTC)

Good questions! I'll try to answer them.

1. Indeed the Dutch High Command surrendered. The government had fled to London. Technically the surrender was the capitulation of certain army units, not that of the entire empire. This will be made explicit later in the article.
2. "Entente" was in 1940 still the usual contemporary term for the relation between Britain and France, as it had been through the Interbellum. The use of "Allied" would be the anachronism. It would also create the false impression it was some make-shift coalition, necessitated by the war emergency. Using "Entente" emphasises it was in fact a long-standing power block.
3. The gamble that failed would be the Blitzkrieg operation against The Netherlands, not of course Fall Gelb as a whole :o). The text, read correctly, doesn't suggest the latter.
4. Now it becomes painful. You have become the victim of a premature peer review request by Sandertje. The article is indeed simply not finished yet...
5. This will be expanded.
6. This also.
7. He surrendered Rotterdam; but this should be obvious from both context and the following sentences.
8. An in-depth analysis of all related issues will follow.

So, sorry for the misunderstanding and thanks for your attention and effort!--MWAK 08:55, 22 January 2006 (UTC)

Too much information

Some of this text seems more appropriate for a general history of the Netherlands rather than this particular battle. Other portions may be more appropriate for a new article, or the same details already exist in the current links. Finally, some of it is not internally consistent, referring to different amounts of the same equipment or to pictures which no longer exist.

I removed the excess text to reduce the size to the suggested length, while preserving some of the additional details. I think the remainder is more appropriate for a book listed in the (new) reference section.

StephenMacmanus 08:05, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

You removed almost everything in the article! Maybe there is too much verbosity but there is no need to delete so much material. Battle of France, Battle of Normandy and most of the other WWII-related articles are longer, and nobody butchered them. GhePeU 12:56, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

Being the man who wrote most of the article — and even intends to enlarge it :o) — allow me to defend its future length:

Firstly, within Wikipedia there is no such thing as "too much information". Als long as that information has a minimal notability, we have a duty to provide it. An entirely different question is in what way this information should be organised. Some things should be separate, others should be presented together. The criterion by which to decide this question is the degree to which the information forms an integrated whole. It would be dysfunctional to divide an article into separate parts if these parts cannot stand alone. If StephenMacmanus has taken the trouble of spending five minutes to really read the article he will have noticed that the level of integration is in fact very high, in that it forms a coherent whole. Also the separate sections have no value at themselves: there is no need for a Dutch strategy of 1940. So a splitting seems not to be indicated. Of course its length has the disadvantage of preventing to absorb the main points at a single glance. This I hope to remedy by increasing the length, by giving a longer lead section. The lack of it has been in fact one of the main criticism of the article.

To this StephenMacmanus might retort: "But there is also such a thing as a maximum practical length. It's an encyclopedic lemma, not a book". Very true. However, the simple fact that there are lemmata longer than this one, makes it fall within the apparent conventions. Also, while in general an encyclopedia reflects existing literature and can therefore afford to be a good deal shorter than the publications it refers to, here we have the special situation that all serious literature is in Dutch. There is not a single special technical treatment of the subject in the English language. So, while disclosing for the first time to the world at large a serious account of these events of 65 years ago, I felt that a certain level of detail wouldn't be amiss. This might also explain why StehenMacmanus had the impression of an undue detailing: he compared it to those books about the Battle of France known to him, which have at best a small chapter dedicated to the subject. However there is not a section in the article that isn't the condensation of over a dozen books in Dutch as the campaign is richly documented in every possible detail.

Finally, as regards the more specific objections: the short introduction about the political situation in the Thirties provides simply the minimal historical context without which Dutch military planning cannot be understood. I thought I had removed all equipment inconsistencies, but I'll check again :o). The picture issue might yet be solved. I find it ironic that the person who complains about redundancies with other articles, while there is in fact very little redundancy present, then replaces most of it with a section that simply repeats the information on Battle of France :o). By the way, it were repeated complaints about that article negelecting the events in the Low Countries themselves, that induced me to write this one.--MWAK 19:53, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

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What you did with our (If that isn't a too big assault on your ego MWAK :o) - grapje! - ) is simply unacceptable.Like MWAK said, there is never too much information.And as long as the amount of information doesn't cause the article to fall into disarray (which is so far hasn't) the article will remain as it is now (except for expansions of course).

Sandertje 20:08, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

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As I mentioned in a private message to Sandertje, limiting the length of the article isn't just my personal opinion: it is raised automatically whenever the article is edited.

While there may not be "too much information" in a general sense, the style of an encylopedia article does anticipate a particular type of organization. The information ought to be focused relatively narrowly on a particular topic, so readers know what to expect. For instance, why is there no need for a "Dutch strategy of 1940" topic? I think finding some of this information there would be more appropriate than its current location. Other facts, like the attitudes and events of the twenty year period between the First and Second World War probably fit better in the history section of the existing article on the Netherlands, or in a new article about that topic.

I think other facts are really only desirable for a book-length treatment or some other format. For instance, what does the German troops buying chocolate have to do with the outcome of the battle?

In a third case, the details are clearly on topic, but the larger picture is not provided. For example, the current article describes the capture of the bridges near Rotterdam on the first day, but doesn't mention the significance of this event for the battle: that it would allow the German troops to bypass the Water Line defenses. The encylopedic style typically provides a high-level overview of an incident, with references to sources for those who want more specific information. It is not meant to provide an exhaustive account of events, even if one is missing in English.

StephenMacmanus 03:54, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

I'll try to clarify these issues:

1. The mention of the 32 kb limit really refers to an old technical problem that today is of very little importance as such. I would emphatically not see it as an adhortation to solve it in a any particular case :o). It was arbitrarily linked to the larger question of desired article length because some indication was needed. Try to see it within an order of magnitudes: 3 kb is a bit meagre, at about 30 kb most subjects reach their optimal size, 300 kb is usually way too much.
2. You are absolutely right in stating that the organisation of an article should make it increase its focus on the subject matter. But I would claim that the article under consideration is pretty well focused. The attitudes and events of the Interbellum are only mentioned to the extent they bear on the war, to explain why the Dutch were neutral and badly equipped. Surely this is quite relevant? We do not need a separate Dutch strategy in 1940 article for the same reason we can do without a Front side of elephant lemma: just as the elephant's front side is hard to understand without the back one, so the Dutch strategy in 1940 makes little sense without the war it is the strategy of. The behavior of the German soldiers is relevant because it shows it was not campaign of plunder and rapine, like in 1914, it emphasises the good relations between the two peoples up to that moment and it explains the lack of a flood of refugees clogging the roads.
3. Well, the relevance of the bridges is mentioned in the German Strategy chapter — which therefore should also not become a separate article :o) — but I hope to make it clearer still. The entire article is still under construction. Why is humankind always so impatient? :o)
4. Far from being an exhaustive description of the subject, the present article provides but the scantiest outline of all available information. As the Dutch books written about the German invasion number in the thousands, this account is indeed an overview — and one in which 99,995% of detail has been lost. But I have tried to make it an adequate outline, that gives the reader the opportunity to understand the battle. We have on Wikipedia produced a host of Weasel Articles about wars, describing mainly troop movements, of which the particulars are explained by parroting myth and distortion. When saying that the Dutch army was "poorly equipped and trained", we also have to make clear what that means in the context of 1940. When we state that this description might also fit the German 18th Army, that might cause some surprise to people used to the myth of German superiority, so we had better give the exact data. It is simply this minimal adequacy that I strived for.--MWAK 15:56, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

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Just to be clear, I'm not talking about the old technical limitation, but the readability and organization of the article. I recognize this consideration is to a certain extent a matter of opinion, but I do think some information from the background section should move elsewhere.

It seems to me that our disagreement grows from different conceptions of this article's purpose. You are covering many of the broader events "that bear on the war", including relations between the Dutch and Germans, characteristics of the Netherland's population and industry, etc., etc. I am considering this article within the context of all the other Wikipedia material involving the military aspects of the war. From that perspective, a shorter time scale for the background and a narrower focus seems more appropriate. I think this article should mainly describe troop movements -- though certainly without myth and distortion ;-) -- and the overview of the inter-war period and the social and political treatment should go to the existing History of the Netherlands article, which already links here. Perhaps I'll try some rearranging in a couple of days after I finish some other things and get some feedback. In the meantime, I await your reply.

StephenMacmanus 21:45, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

A battle/event like this needs context.Therefore contruary to decreasing it's size. It will probably be expanded.

Sandertje 22:36, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

You're right: I will reply :o):

1. The background section has only a few paragraphs about (military) subjects before 1939, such as the explanation of the low defence budget and the generally pro-German attitude. The rest is about the Dutch mobilisation and preparation and the Entente plans, that should be mentioned in any case. Removing the few lines at the beginning would hardly improve readability and have only an indifferent effect on article length.
2. Yes, I do refer to the Dutch population and industry. But not to describe their quaint habit of eating raw herring or the manufacture of clogs. I merely refer to them to indicate the Dutch war potential. It is the war industry I talk about. Very relevant to the subject — provided of course that you think the Dutch war effort merits any attention.
3. I'm well aware that at this point many readers will say: "That's just it, isn't it? Dutch mobilisation, Dutch preparations, Dutch strategy, Dutch this, Dutch that...Since when is any of this of interest? What "Dutch war effort"? That oddball dwarf nation was doomed to be defeated whatever it did, so who cares what was done? Of course there are no English books about it and how dare you to suggest this implies some failure on our part? The important actions during the conflict were those executed by the only serious party involved, the German Army, whose troop movements are therefore the only legitimate content of the article. Please do remove the remainder to some place far away where we can safely ignore it!".
4. I feel certain that this is not your attitude. After all you apparently care for military history in general and no one who does that, can pass the opportunity to indulge in the obscure details of some arcane battle. But you must agree with the avarage reader in that you correctly perceived that the present article is lopsided. It gives you all the necessary information to understand the battle — and then the battle itself is nearly absent. To put it in the words of someone who commented on Operation Barbarossa that has the same flaw: "Where's the beef?". Now the reason there is not any beef, is simply that the article isn't finished yet. It's like the portrait of a man in which the painter has already filled in the background, but the face is still missing. Seeing it in that condition the understandable comment would be: "It would be better the other way around". True, but it would be even better to finish the complete picture. Which I intend to do in the near future.
5. When finished, it will become clear what all that background was needed for in the first place. It will be shown that the German 18th Army campaign was in its two main efforts a complete failure, that could only be saved by the threat of strategic bombardment. It will also become obvious that had the relative armaments level of Belgium and The Netherlands been as high as that of France, Fall Gelb in its entirety was unlikely to have been executed as it in fact was, if it had been attempted at all. So surprisingly the (lack of) Dutch war effort really did matter. But this conclusion has to be substantiated and that's why I gave the necessary facts. I beg forgiveness for my tardiness. And I beg your patience.
6. Should you however feel the understandable urge to immediately create a crisp and concise account of the battle, an excellent place to put it would be in a May 1940 Campaign chapter of German Eighteenth Army, which article — also seriously lacking in beef :o) — is the natural place to describe the conflict from mainly the German side.

--MWAK 20:10, 5 February 2006 (UTC)

Redirects

I've created a number of redirects, varying from 'battle of Holland' till 'slag om nederland'.

Sandertje 10:32, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

No more 'red links'

As of now, all 'links' have been connected to either 'stubs' or articles.

There was really no need for that. Red links simply show that the article discloses new potential :o)--MWAK 15:56, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

Sandertje 10:58, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

Stubs are never a good thing. I'll try to "unstub" them :o)--MWAK 15:56, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

You're a guardian angel MWAK! Sandertje 16:33, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

Future plans 2006

First Let me just thank everybody who has edit/adjusted this article.

The comparison between my humble beginnings and the current state of the article is pretty much comparable to the evolution of man from ape to human!

The future plans are the following:

• MWAK, will make sure the article is equiped with the newest information after he compares the article with a new book he is expecting.
• I propose that after this, the article will have a new peer review, and after that we'll try to get it to be a featured article'.

The time for these tasks is currently undetermined.

Let's keep up the good work everybody!

Sandertje 16:31, 3 February 2006 (UTC)

FAC and revert games

I notice that a number of people are doing a to-and-fro regarding the inclusion of the Dutch name of this battle. Might I suggest you let that issue die (preferrably with the Dutch name included since it doesn't hurt the article and provides more context for all readers - Dutch-speaking or not). Because the article is undergoing review for Featured Article status I think you all might consider using your energies for more pressing concerns, such as the less-than-Featured Article writing style and problems of clarity, etc. Pinkville 02:02, 30 March 2006 (UTC)

The deletion of the Dutch name (with explanation) coupled with the retention of the German name Fall Gelb (without explanation) makes no sense to me. - Biederman 05:14, 30 March 2006 (UTC)

Furthermore, isn't "Fall Gelb" the name of the German military plan for the conquest of the Netherlands and Belgium? If so, it isn't an alternate name for the Battle of the Netherlands, which is an event, not a plan, i.e. it is something that actually happened, regardless of any plan(s) (it's like calling Christmas Dinner, "menu for Christmas Dinner"). Pinkville 15:08, 28 April 2006 (UTC)

Writing quality

Some weeks ago this article first went up as a Featured Article Candidate. At the time I objected based on a number of issues, and I see that in the time since none of these have been addressed. Once again, I'd like to suggest that instead of using your time to make minor changes (like changing the perfectly acceptable English spelling of Goering to Göring) those of you who are most involved with editing this article should concentrate on more fundamental issues: this article is very confusingly written, is missing key dates and other information to provide a context for the events, and the names of places and people are inconsistent (and too often rendered in either Dutch or German, without translation). Here are the objections that haven't been addressed:

"Needs some careful copy-editing and rewriting for clarity, more formal language, etc. Some examples of problems:

The first paragraph gives no years: "The battle lasted from 10 May until 17 May during..." and "The battle ended after the devastating bombing of Rotterdam...", i.e. bombing of Rotterdam in what year?

Passages such as: "The Netherlands had been neutral during World War I but — mainly because of the Boer Wars — at the time sympathies were clearly more on the German side, although the Dutch were shocked by the atrocities committed against the Belgian civilian population and sheltered more than a million refugees. In fact at the end of the war, when the German Kaiser Wilhelm II fled, he was given a castle called Huis ter Doorn in the Netherlands where he lived until his death in 1941." are unclear, with apparent non-sequiturs.

And phrases like: "The governments just didn't see it as 'such a big deal'" and "The Dutch equipment shortages were so bad it actually limited the number" are too informal, agrammatical and confusing ("governments" ? how many did the Netherlands have?). If these sorts of problems are fixed up it will be easier to judge what otherwise seems like a promising article."

Good luck. Pinkville 11:53, 28 April 2006 (UTC)

Some of your criticism is certainly founded. I'll soon rework and complete the article, including a better lead section, and I hope to remove many syntactical errors. But claiming that the passage you cited contains a non-sequitur is a little harsh. I'm confident the avarage reader will make the correct logical connections, precisely because otherwise the text would make no sense.--MWAK 06:18, 29 April 2006 (UTC)

Sandertje, I noticed you hastily made an effort to remedy. But you shouldn't allow yourself to be made insecure by the above comments. If we explain everything, someone else is bound to complain about "excessive verbosity". You simply can't please them all :o). And you must resist the temptation to presume that the outcome of the battle was predetermined by German superiority in either numbers, training or firepower, the common mistake popular books make.--MWAK 07:36, 29 April 2006 (UTC)

But already the article looks better. And the new version of the paragraph I quoted is much easier to follow. I wasn't being harsh, by the way - I know the history fairly well and yet I coudn't make sense out of that passage because it introduced new subjects even within sentences (e.g. Dutch neutrality in WWI, the Boer War, Dutch sympathies with Germany, atrocities against Belgians, and Beligian refugees - too much for a single sentence to carry, and something to watch out for in other places). But as Sandertje has shown, it is possible to clarify this and other passages while remaining concise. Well done. Pinkville 11:55, 29 April 2006 (UTC)

The part of Dutch sympathy for the German side during the conflict needs a citation. I'm not saying it wasn't so (though I can't remember hearing about it in history class) but it's a bold statement that needs backing up. Larswiki —Preceding unsigned comment added by Larswiki (talk • contribs) 10:11, 7 September 2007 (UTC)

Just to highlight a specific problem with the Background section: "the Netherlands gave asylum to German Emperor Wilhelm II and refused to release him into Allied custody, instead giving him a castle, Huis Doorn," It certainly pays to read the linked articles on Wikipedia, because the Huis Doorn article says he purchased this manor house. So, he was only given asylum, not a castle, and Huis Doorn is not a castle.--Rfsmit (talk) 18:57, 21 October 2008 (UTC)

Failed GA

The article needs a lot of references also the image in the info box maybe available but the license tag says its PD because the author died over 100years ago for that to be correct this cant be used until 2040. I had only got through the cursory check of images and references to find these issues further reading may reveal more. I'll read further and leave more suggestions here but these are sufficient to fail the article. Gnangarra 08:19, 24 May 2006 (UTC)

Armament

What where those 'bolt-action rifles made before the Great War' ? Were they license-built Mauser Gewehr 98's, or 'home-made'rifles?

The type was mainly Repetiergewehr M95, I believe, from Steyr Mannlicher, an Austrian firm, but licence made in The Netherlands, the caliber changed to 6.5 mm. See: http://www.tumke.nl/M95/M95_2.htm --MWAK 06:05, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

Thanks! --

For a superrabbit I do anything ;o).--MWAK 19:22, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

I added a lint to the Steyr-Mannlicher M1895 rifle and I have a question. Were the rifles the Dutch used in 1940 actually made prior to 1914 or did the design just date back to the time before WW1? In that latter case the sentence "infantry armed with Steyr-Mannlicher M1895 bolt-action rifles made before the Great War." should be changed, because almost all bolt-action rifels in use at that time were designed before WW1 broke out and were equally obsolete. Markus Becker02 13:22, 14 August 2006 (UTC)

Some were bought in Austria, some made in The Netherlands before 1914; the vast majority, some 400,000 exemplars, was produced between 1915 and 1918. The point of the sentence was not to make a contradistinction to other bolt-action rifles but to make a contrast with automatic weapons. It should be emphasized though that the Dutch rifles mostly hadn't been modernised since 1918, still using e.g. bullets with a hemispherical tip.--MWAK 14:22, 14 August 2006 (UTC)

I see. So the problem is rather the ammo and not the rifles. Perhabs that part of the sentence should be left out. The disadvantage caused by the obsolete rifle ammo is rather small compared to the significant lack of light machine guns.Markus Becker02 16:24, 14 August 2006 (UTC)

That's very true but the sentence correctly suggests that the Dutch army relied on obsolescent technology. And of course a calibre of 6.5 mm had insufficient stopping power. A commission advised to bring it to 7.9 mm but as always no money was made available.--MWAK 16:51, 14 August 2006 (UTC)

Ok, bullets with a round tip loose velocity much faster, than the ones with a pointed tip, but are you sure about the insufficient man stopping power? The Mannlicher 6.5*54 had a kinetic energy of 2,700 Joules, the German 7.92*57 had at least 3,600, but the ammo of the Stgw44(7,92*33) had just 1.400 Joules and that was and is still considered fine.

The Italian and the Japanese 6.5mm rounds are usually criticized for being affected by wind drift, insufficient range and penetration, but I think the two latter disadvantages only affect machine guns. In combat rifles were fired at targets 400, maybe up to 600 meters away. Even considering the fact that a bullet with a round tip slows down quickly I can´t imagine it being that bad.

Markus Becker02 23:05, 14 August 2006 (UTC)

Well, the problem was not a lack of KE; rather the 6.5 mm bullet punched a nice hole right through the hapless soldier it hit, but without inflicting much of a flesh wound. I guess this was even compensated somewhat by the round tip. What matters is not penetrating power but the amount of KE tranferred to the flesh. This increases for a given value of KE when the surface hit is larger. The 6.5 mm had only a 68% cross-section compared to the 7.9 mm.--MWAK 05:55, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

Acccording tho Tony Williams it was largly a matter of bullet design, not so much a question of caliber. Turns out the round nose made things even worse: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=106208&sid=60a6462fe7715618469c0c5a164d7c25 Markus Becker02 16:24, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

This point escaped me :o).--MWAK 07:45, 9 September 2006 (UTC)

German strategy and forces

It says four of the seven divisions were regular infantry divisions, but than it goes on to say six of them were Landwehr units. That is a contradiction in itself. The difference in quality is so great a unit is either a regular one(1st rate) or belongs to the Landwehr(3rd rate). Markus Becker02 23:28, 15 August 2006 (UTC)

Well, operationally, they were regular divisions in that they weren't operational reserve divisions. Precisely because any other interpretation of "regular" in this context causes a contradiction, the intended meaning should be obvious when the end of the section is reached. And they weren't Landwehr units as such but, as the article indicates, raised from them. Certainly the difference in training between them and the units of the prewar standing army was very great, as again emphasized by the article. I deliberately wrote it down this way, so that the reader would first assume a clear distinction between regular and reserve units, only to be surprised by the information that the units considered fit enough to be immediately committed to be battle, would also often be half-trained. :o)--MWAK 08:31, 16 August 2006 (UTC)

Not Just Information

A good article doesn't only have NPOVing and well-cited sources, in addition to being well organized, but also good mechanics. This is all I changed in the first half of the article in case you were wondering (e.g. simply strengthened the English mechanics, grammar, and spelling). Colonel Marksman 02:23, 6 September 2006 (UTC)

I appreciate your effort, but I fear your knowledge of proper spelling is, if possible, even worse than mine. :o) It should not be "1 tank", but "one tank"; "materiel" is not the same as "material" — why you call yourself a Colonel, if you have no knowledge of military terminology? Besides what you call POV-statements are mainly sentences simply reflecting informed consensus on the subject. And those contractions are today so common in normal texts that it seems overly formal to remove them all.--MWAK 07:17, 6 September 2006 (UTC)

• My bad on the materiel. I always thought that was simply a British spelling.

• As for "one" vs" "1", the reason being is because when you are comparing something to something else, you can't say: "They have 100 men, but they have fifty". It must be all numbers or all letters.

• The way you determine that is this: Numbers that would end up to be more than three words are written in numerals. Exceptions include: lists of numbers (I don't recall how many have to be in the list, in which case, it is all numerals), and if it begins a sentence, it MUST be written out. That is not spelling sir, that is grammar. Colonel Marksman 04:29, 12 September 2006 (UTC)

Regarding MWAK's comment: "And those contractions are today so common in normal texts that it seems overly formal to remove them all." Contractions are common in spoken English and in e-mails and other ephemeral texts but never appear in formal (i.e. encyclopedic) written English. Any contractions in the article should be converted to their full form. Pinkville 15:15, 12 September 2006 (UTC)

• Thank you for mentioning. I don't have to say that after all. The term is "informal" and "formal". Colonel Marksman 16:53, 12 September 2006 (UTC)

• As for the sentences I'm calling "POV", it's not really healthy for the article to say, "Holland's armed forces were poor." That is unnecessary filler and only your opinion (it is an opinion.) Consider the Conintenal Army of the United States fighting the British empire or the United States facing Japan in the early years of the war. Our (America's) technology was not too different from Holland's ground forces as our sea forces in comparision. The odds were, quite possibly, worse than between Nazi Germany and the Netherlands. (In fact, after Pearl Harbor, the United States had next to no protection of our homeland. The bombers could've well resupplied and bombed San Franciso.) But we can sit here all day and say how much an army stinks or we can simply give out the numbers (As the article already did). Those sentences do not help the article, do not help the reader, and could be left out and still make sense. Colonel Marksman 17:01, 12 September 2006 (UTC)

"I appreciate your effort, but I fear your knowledge of proper spelling is, if possible, even worse than mine. :o)"

• Be glad I'm very tollerable towards such judging insults. Go ahead, please challenge my 800-pages of college English textbooks and handbooks. Colonel Marksman 17:06, 12 September 2006 (UTC)

After looking at why the article failed nomination, it was because it was not formal enough, lacked citations/sources, and those very problems I tried to fix. Do you want this article re-nominated or not? Colonel Marksman 17:10, 12 September 2006 (UTC)

September 2006: restored background sentence (again) for broader context

This background was removed with the comment that it was not consistent with Hitler's plans in 1939. However, the conquest of living space in the East was a fixed goal of his plans long before war began, and avoiding a two-front war was a typical German goal throughout the 20th century, at least. These general aims hardly amount to a specific plan, but without this information Germany's invasion of the Netherlands isn't fully explained. Its absence will allow uninformed readers to assume any number of incorrect conclusions, such as a non-existent desire for revenge or something, which certainly doesn't apply.

Yes, but the sentence is too much conforming to the still very popular, but scientifically utterly refuted, idea that Hitler had some Master Plan for World Conquest. First the West, then the East. The real goal of Fall Gelb however, as is abundantly clear from Weisung No. 6, was simply to occupy the Low Countries as a base for air and sea attacks against the UK and to prevent the Entente from doing the same as a base for attacking the Ruhr Area. All this in the context of an expected long and bloody war against France, protracted well into 1942. Of course secretly Hitler was dreaming of quick victories against all possible enemies and in some of his utterings before the war these vague intentions become explicit. But only when, against all expectations, and to the utter surprise of Hitler himself, bold and daring armoured strategic penetrations ("Blitzkrieg") caused a quick and total defeat of France and offered the hope of easy victories wherever the new tactic would be applied, Hitler dared seriously to consider an attack on Stalin — and it is of course far from certain that, had the UK made peace and allowed Hitler access to the oil and raw materials he desired, he would have started a new and very impopular war to gain Lebensraum that wasn't really needed. So, ascribing clear intentions to him in this respect before the Fall of France is an anachronism. But you are of course right that some explanation of his direct motives is in order, to avoid a possible misunderstanding. And when we limit ourselves to his immediate concerns, this has the added advantage of giving near certain information, while avoiding statements that have a strong speculative content and are potentially even more misleading than remaining silent. I'll try to show you what I have in mind.--MWAK 07:43, 9 September 2006 (UTC)

rotterdam bombing backgound

a scientific research of that topic was made in 2003 by the german military historic institute in potsdam. the study came to the conclusion that the reason why the second bomber wing attacked rotterdam AND DID NOT NOT TUREND BACH TO germany ( like the first bommber wing) was that they used a so called schlepp-antenna. short before the final run for the bombing started they pulled these antennas back in the aircraft.the only possibilty to stop the attack from then on was to shut red signal bulltes over the target area by the german ground forces in rotterdam. the german ground forces shot these red signal bullets. the first wing stopped the attack and turned back to german without bombing the target. the commander of the second wing could not see these signals, because of heavy fog comning from a burning crudeoil-tanker in the rotterdam harbour.

Sure ... the question remains though, why attack a bridge with heavy bombers when you have stukas at your disposal?

Rex 09:47, 14 October 2006 (UTC)

well, the goal was not to destroy the bridge. the goal was to burn down the area around the bridge (dutch army resistance pokets around the bridgehead) to take these strategic bridge undestroyed.Insert non-formatted text here --131.173.252.9 18:29, 22 October 2006 (UTC)

Excuse me, but I find it extremely curious that the fact of the Margerine Plant's Burning, which started the conflagaration which burned Rotterdam, is not even mentioned anywhere. This fact has quite an important effect on the discussion of "whose fault" the bombing of Rotterdam was.

The Dutch love to paint it was a willful terror bombing. They believe the intent of the Luftwaffe was to fire bomb Rotterdam to force the commander to surrender or face further murders.

However the Luftwaffe's intent was not the fire bombing of Rotterdam and its civilian population, but to the attack a precise area with AP bombs, not incidiaries. This area was the ACTIVELY defended building blocks near that bridge, occupied by the Dutch Army. Unfortunately, there was a Margerine factory in that area, and its oils subsequent burning was the source of the conflagaration that burned the old city and caused so much devastation.

A historian who has highlighted this small but important fact-

Len Deighton, "Blood Tears and Folly"

however a much more in depth review is available with

James Corum, "The Luftwaffe -Creating the Operation Air Arm"

Furthermore, I find the state of the article to be amazingly one-sided. It is peculiar considering that the German Fallshirmjaegers, who participated in the attack, hardly consider this battle the tough, grinding, "almost defeat" the Dutch Military Officers in Holland would like to present here. They seem to highlight the instances where an entire Flieger Division is dropped and things go badly. There were large german successes that are quickly glossed over. Perhaps enlisting the services of the German Bundesarchiv in the opposing view would help put the article on even keel?

regards Jan Doernte jdoernte@hotmail.com

Allow me to comment:

1. That a margerine plant was the main cause of destruction is a notorious myth created shortly after the events by German propaganda.
2. The area targeted was neither small nor limited to the direct frontline; it encompassed the entire old city. The intent was clearly to cause destruction on a very major scale; indeed the ultimatum threatened with complete destruction of the city if it wouldn't surrender. Incendiary bombs were indeed not used, but those of the HE-type, very suited for mass destruction — and of course no AP-bombs. An area of 250 hectares was destroyed, inhabited by about 80,000 people. And this despite the fact the second squadron broke off its attack.
3. There was no pressing tactical necessity for a bombardment of such scale, nor had the forces in the field asked for an action of this scope. The only military valid reason for it to happen could have been the strategic goal of causing an immediate collapse of Dutch resistance as a nation. The intiative to make it of a strategic nature came from Goering himself, who pushed through the bombardment against the objections of Kesselring. This was within a general context of an order by Hitler to speedily break Dutch resistance by air attacks. Oberstleutnant Dietrich von Choltitz declared just after the events he was glad the Dutch had immediately capitulated or otherwise Amsterdam, The Hague, Utrecht and Haarlem would have shared the fate of Rotterdam. Obviously there is a certain ambiguity involved: maybe no terror bombardments as such were intended but just tactical operations with the deplorable side-effect of causing much civilian misery. Then again, as massive "collateral damage" would have been both inevitable and have ensured a speedy Dutch surrender, the hypocrisy inherent in the choice for strong air support is readily apparent. Worse, the Germans employed that ambiguity in their ultimata, which strongly suggested terror bombardments would follow any refusal to capitulate. If a criminal points a gun to your face and you give him your wallet, can he then validly defend himself in court claiming that he had in fact not the slightest intention to shoot?
4. It's perhaps true Goering's motive, which he has never fully revealed, was not to break some deadlock, of which he was probably only vaguely aware. One obvious explanation might be his, explicitly expressed, desire to speed the relief of the surrounded paratroopers: as the failed attack on The Hague was a separate action by the Luftwaffe, limiting the damage was clearly in his interest. Another consideration might have been the wish to aggrandise himself by bringing an entire country to its knees. This would certainly have been most typical of the man. Most interestingly a second bombardment had been planned for 14 May, with explicit orders by Goering to be carried out, even when the city had already capitulated, if German troops had not yet entered the area.
5. To gain further insight into this problem, it is most informative to consider the case of the bombardment of Middelburg on 17 May. When Walcheren continued to resist, the Germans threatened to destroy its cities if it wouldn't surrender; indeed the capital Middelburg was bombed; a third of the inner city destroyed — and it was a completely undefended city. So on the one occasion when the Germans could unequivocally show what their real intentions were, they failed the test.--MWAK 16:29, 22 July 2007 (UTC)

Well, both Len Deighton, and James Corum, which are to me, very respected historians on the subject disagree with your interpretation. They both are of the idea, that the bombing of Rotterdam was NOT a terror bombing, not even a "strategic" bombing as practiced by the RAF and later the USAAF against German cities, it in fact it was a clear example of tactical bombing i.e. the using of level bombers against an entrenched enemy using the city buildings for defense.

The big emotional point here is that surrender negotiations were going on. The Dutch were clearly stalling for time, and this stalling paid its price. The Luftwaffe commander had practically given up hope for a peaceful solution, but the FJ commander on the ground had not. I'm sure once the first FJ fell in combat to entrenched troops from Rotterdam, most Germans involved saw it an the perfect excuse to raze the city in revenge. The point being they had that excuse.

The "what ifs" and "could haves" regarding the Hague, Amsterdam, Utrecht are an interesting side discussion, but they have no bearing on the fact that the bombing of Rotterdam was not a terror attack but a tactical bombing.

I'll try to make my line of reasoning more clear:

1. The bombing attack was not directed against known Dutch positions (which by the way could hardly be described as "entrenched"). It was directed at levelling the entire old city.
2. Now there could have been a valid "tactical" reason for doing this, for if the city were destroyed, it would have become impossible for the defenders to slowly fight a delaying battle. This would have limited losses for 9PD. However the massive carpetbombing could also have been motivated by considerations of a strategic level: to create a gap that could have been quickly exploited by 9 PD in order to bring about a quick collapse of the Dutch national defence.
3. From the general context and the specific orders given, it is abundantly clear that Hitler and the German High Command in this matter were primarily motivated by strategic reasons.
4. Within that context the simple fact couldn't have escaped them that a large bombardment would probably cause the Dutch to capitulate by itself. And this again means the tactical nature of the bombing could have been a mere pretext. And if it were a pretext the tactical bombing would have been a terror bombardment also; the one does not exclude the other.
5. That this certainly seems to have been the case for Goering (who had some personal motivations of his own) is shown by the timing of the first bomardment. Far from having given up hope for a peaceful solution, Goering clearly wasn't interested by such a solution in the first place, otherwise he wouldn't have ordered the second bombardment to be carried out even after a capitulation. And therefore he insisted on the first bombardment to be set into motion even before the ultimatum had expired, knowing full well what could be the consequences.
6. That it was a pretext is made even more likely by the events on 17 May, when a pure terror bombardment was carried out.--MWAK 12:15, 23 July 2007 (UTC)

Dec. 28th, 2007 In the paragraph "The Oster Affair", I changed the incorrect "Entente" (WWI alliance) to "Allies", and changed "deliberate lie" to "claim". Allied military planners had wanted to position troops in Belgium and the Netherlands since September 1939. See Ernest May, "Strange Victory". New York: Hill and Wang, 2004, ch. 21, quoting French Military Chief Gamelin and the work "Relations militaires Franco-belges de mars 1936 au 10 mai 1940". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 64.191.179.149 (talk) 15:02, 28 December 2007 (UTC)

"Entente" was in May 1940 still the usual term for the Anglo-French alliance; only afterwards it became normal to associate it purely with WWI. Using the term has the advantage of being able to make an elegant distinction between the Anglo-French planning and that of other possible allies. Certainly the Entente had in mind to occupy the Low Countries and even violate their neutrality if needed — but German command knew perfectly well no such occupation or reinforcement was in progress on 10 May 1940, so it was a deliberate disinformation.--MWAK (talk) 19:28, 28 December 2007 (UTC)

"Burning bridges"

My father had a story about escaping Holland after completing Marineschool. He described people rolling expensive cars and other belongings into the canals or rivers (don't know which), in his words "so the Jerries couldn't get their hands on them". The way he described it, it sounded widespread, but I don't know. Was this widespread? Is there any documentary evidence of this, or will it remain "original research", therefore "unencyclopaedic"?--Rfsmit (talk) 19:07, 21 October 2008 (UTC)

The Dutch army destroyed vehicles and other matériel on a large scale just after the surrender, indeed often by driving them or throwing it into the ubiquitous waterways. This is described in the literature and could be mentioned in the article. I can't remember reading that civilians disposed of their property in this way — and it would not be in line with the national character :o).--MWAK (talk) 07:32, 22 October 2008 (UTC)

General review

I appreciate the efforts made by the authors, some of which are well-known in the wiki trade. I am afraid that again the page shows the dark side of wiki practise. The page is packed with factual flaws, inaccurate information and straight baloney. Obviously those imperfecties were not created on purpose. But yet mis-inform visitors. I am not one of those wiki authors who immediately starts editting the live page. So therefore underneath first my comments. Reflections by the current authors are most welcome. Please allow me some time to gather my comments, because there is so much to add .... Grebbegoos (talk) 13:17, 1 March 2009 (UTC)

Ah, we meet again :o). Yes, the present article has many shortcomings. I wrote it late 2005, most of it purely from memory and never came to finish it. Recently I've been trying to end the work and source it, using Amersfoort (not your favourite author, I know ;o). I'll try and comment your comments. As there are so many of them, I'll add my remarks to the end of each section.--MWAK (talk) 08:43, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

- First of all the introduction is not accurate. The battle of the Netherlands lasted from 10 May 1940 until 17 May 1940, with a modest appendix in the south of the province Zeeland where the last bit of Dutch soil was evacuated by the Allies on the 27th of May. Technically the main battle lasted from 10-15 May, the Zeeland [Walcheren] battle from 14-17 May and the appendix in the far southwest until 27 May 1940.

- The battle ended after the CIC of the Dutch army had received notice that the city of Utrecht was threatened to share in the fate of Rotterdam, that had been heavily raided in the early afternoon of the 14th of May 1940. The reference to 'cities' is not accurate. That was an addition that only popped up after the capitulation and came from Rotterdam sources. Never were they genuinely substantiated. The only city verifiably threatened was Utrecht.

Yes, the entire lead section is inaccurate and needs to be rewritten.

Background

- The French did launch an optimistic ground offensive in the Elzas area during the Phoney War. It stalled completely.

Indeed "major" should be added to "ground operations".

- Should the author decide to apply the wording 'Entente' - which I would concur in relation to the prelude of WWII when 'the Allies' were not actually referred to as such - it should be explained in a WWII context. In fact the wording refers to WWI only.

Today this is indeed common — then it was not. In a purely operational context Allies will do.

- The ill suggestion is made that the 9 October 1939 invasion plans incorporated the occupation of Holland. Which was not the case (with exception of the province of Limburg]. Holland, especially the major lump north of the Meuze, was only incorporated in the plans in January 1940.

In Weisung N°6 of 9 October Hitler ordered as much as possible to be occupied. Later actual plans varied.

- Holland had not started rearming 'much more slowly than other nations'. In fact, Holland probably made the largest leaps in rearmement of all smaller nations. Holland had a huge back-log though. That prevented it from a massive modernisation.

"Other nations" should be read in context as: France, UK, Belgium. These all began to modernise around 1930-1931. And precisely because of this belated Dutch reaction there were such arrears and the relative increase in the end was strong. France invested much in its army all along. Belgium invested only much in new fortifications, not the army itself. Norway, Poland, Denmark, etc started later or at the same time.

All is true, but does not contradict the fact that the modernisation effort started much later than in the relevant nations.

- It is straight baloney that successive Dutch Governments avoided earmarking nazi-Germany as a threat. When Hitler rose to power, his first acts seemed quite promising. Soon enough though the evil side of the nationalistic nazi's occured, amongst other things causing the Dutch Ministry of Defence to present an ambitious modernisation plan in 1935, for which the first steps had been taken halfway 1934. It is hard to defend that 'several Governments' had occupied the House in between January 1933 and end of 1934. The fact that the Dutch chose neutrality as their mode of survival and as such chose not to antagonise their Eastern neighbours cannot be linked to reluctance to rearm. That is a factual flaw in the text.

That modernisation plan was only "ambitious" compared to the minimal spending earlier. But the text is indeed very imperfect. On a military planning level, obviously the threat was well understood and reacted upon. But there was no "moral mobilisation" of the Dutch people against Germany, justifying a very major defence effort. The "armed neutrality" never really became a "well-armed neutrality". Tell me, which of the invaded countries did have this moral mobilisation? Have you studied for example the struggle Churchill went through to convince his comrades in parliament? was it not Chamberlain claiming peace in our time? You select just like Amersfoort, with prejudice.

- There cannot - in any way - be spoken of Dutch-German wars prior to 1870. There had been plenty of wars between the Dutch and several German states. But that was before the unification of Germany and irrelevant. More relevant was the strong trade band, the German origin of the Dutch Royal House, the folk band between the closely related peoples in the border regions and the cultural ties.

So it is correct to state that Germany was not a traditional enemy as France and England had once been? The last point is certainly true. (BTW, I can recall only the events of 1666, 1672/3 and 1787 as regards "German" - Dutch conflicts between 1579 and 1870 that involved Dutch territory)You may have forgotten that we were allies of France and fought the Prussians until 1813 when we turned coats once again

- The additional 'large sums were at last made available to re-equip the forces' is untrue and moreover wrong in a wider range. The increased defence budgets since 1936 had not even been spent yet. The dramatic increase of budgets had not been followed-up by equivalent spending due to stalling import of weapons as well as slow procurement decision making.

The last is a very good point. But was there no equipment budget increase after 1 September 1939? Another increase to fund the ambitious fleet plan and the Betonplan - massive reinforcements in the existing trench lines

OK. I have adapted the text accordingly.

- It is untrue that much of the new purchases had been made in Germany. Basically only the last year some purchases had indeed been made in Germany but with the conviction that delivery of the orders was rather unlikely. The sealed markets elsewhere had forced the Dutch army purchasers to flee to this last resort. Up to 1939 only one order for 120 howitzers, Do-24X Flying Boats and a NEI army order for MP-38's had been placed in Germany, as well as plenty of orders for gear and pots and pans. The latter were virtually all delivered; the howitzers (with exception of 8 off) and a part of the Do-24X order were not delivered. In the last year orders for 3,7 cm FLAK and Do-217 were added. Except for three 3,7 cm guns no delivery was made. Transit orders (deliveries from countries requiring transit via German controlled area) were virtually all delivered too.

Yes...but what percentage of the budget was destined for purchases in Germany? A low percentage up until winter 39/40, when options slipped

In any case I've adapted the text. We still really need exact numbers.

- The strategic status of Belgian and Holland was substantially different. The Belgian Government claimed neutrality but did have the Allied assistance incorporated in its defence strategy. The Dyle line was reserved for the French and British forces adjecent to the bulk of the Belgian field army. The Dutch refused any form of pre-war adjustment of plans though.

Very true. This indeed needs to be elaborated.

- The 'Hypothese Hollande' was much more extended than just the isolated assault by Germany on Holland. It incorporated any scenario where Holland was invaded. It was later transformed into the 'hypothese Breda' as an extension to the main defence plan known as 'Hypothese Dyle'.

True again; my wording was inadvertently inaccurate.

The Dutch forces

- I disagree to the listing of 'objective' possitive defence conditions. I wonder who came up with this listing. The indigenous defence industry was very modest and not at all 'not-inconsiderable'.

The last qualification is indeed somewhat vague. But the Dutch had two military aircraft producers, some armoured car production capacity and made light artillery and machine-guns. I do not think the list is on any point incorrect otherwise but of course somewhat biased towards the view the Dutch war effort was substandard. It will not have escaped you that recently a congress was held in Breda on this very subject ;o). Perhaps we should cite some of the results?

- The baloney of the one Dutch tank pops up again. Strike that crap. There was not a single tank. The FT-17 tank had been scuttled by May 10.

Well, the text states that there was one FT 17 present that was inoperational. And you state the very same. Mentioning the one tank is useful as otherwise people might think the subject was forgotten to be included by mistake. Of course, depending on what "scuttled" means here exactly, we could reword. It had already gone to the scrapheap? The one scuttled tank should not be part of this elaboration. It should simply state that we possessed no tanks whatsoever.

I've changed the text in a way that might meet your objections and still makes reference to the tank — which should be in, because it is mentioned in many sources. Does "scuttled" refer to the story it was abandoned in a bog when they failed to get it out? I've always wondered whether it was authentic :o).

- The matter of the submachine gun being a factor in the German superiority is baloney too. It mattered little and only on a modest tactical scale. Not worth mentioning.

True.

- Also the devaluation of the Steyr rifle is a classic error. The Steyr rifle was an excellent rifle. It was highly reliable, accurate and precise. It was a design of 1895 and of the same generation as the German standard rifle G/K-98. Both were bolt action rifles. The Steyr was not inferior to the Mauser K-98. Not at all. What did matter was the considerable lower stoppinng-power of the Dutch full metal jacket bullet. Not the calibre but the round execution mattered. It conveyed little KE onto the hit target causing little local damage and as such the average stopping power of the bullet was low.

Agreed.

- The Dutch army had 700 pieces of artillery (excluding the obsolete 8-staal guns). That was an arsenal that compared to the Belgian, British and German army saw to an infantry-men-gun ratio of 1:400. It is baloney that the Dutch artillery arsenal only facilitated the forming of nine divisions. The author has shown little knowledge of the organisation. The Field Army was formed by ten divisions, three independant Brigades and Corps troops. The balance of the army was organised in independant regiments and infantry battalions. The total strength of the Dutch army was around 18 divisions plus a contingent of independant smaller outfits, depots and specialized units.

Yes, the equivalence was about eighteen divisions. But there were only nine operational divisional units present — the so-called "Peeldivision" was a division in name only. The point made here is that even if the Dutch had better trained and fully organised more men, they still could not not have formed more large units for lack of artillery. Your ratio of infantry to gun ratio is incorrect because you incorrectly assume that the organic strength to full manpower base ratio is the same for all armies. Semantics. By downgrading the number of divisions one creates odd comparison. The first 24 Dutch regiments were organised in divisions. The others in regiments or brigades/groups/detachments. These high regiments were supervised by regional staffs and usually reporting to the staffs of one of the four sectors of Fortress Holland. The Dutch army strength was simply 18 divisions equivalent. No less.

I don't object to the number of 18, but the "odd comparison" reflects precisely the point to be made here: of that eighteen division equivalent, only half was in units that actually were of division strength and much of the remainder had no organic artillery. Or to compare it with Belgium: 30/22 is not the same ratio as 18/9.

- The Dutch made use of reinforced trench-line defences, usually behind water barriers like rivers or minor floods. One fortress was constructed at the Aflsuitdijk in the north. Large fortress as main defensive points had been considered void by Dutch strategists and right they were. The trenched defence lines indeed lacked much depth.

Well, calling the Kornwederzand position a "fortress" rather stretches the meaning of the word. But I agree it should be mentioned as an exception — and as a modern fortification. In any case it should be mentioned that no large fortresses were present (though having had a few in the right places would have been quite useful even should we consider it an inefficient use of funds).I don't object to state that no large fortresses were present. As long as it is not suggested that this mattered. The era of fortress was well passed. The Belgian fortress were voided in no time by the modern German war machine

I've rewritten it in a way that is more neutral — though I can't agree with your assessment.

- The Belgian army produced much more than 22 divisions. Its army counted 630,000 men from an almost equal basis as the Dutch. The Dutch had an army of about 240,000 men (plus 40,000 in other branches).

Yes, in pure manpower equivalence, not as actual units. That's what I referred to above. The Dutch had an awful lot of independent small units that could have been combined, were it not for lack of artillery (and staff officers etc., etc.). The so called lack of artillery is pure fiction in your head. The 10 divisions required 360 guns. We had another 332 available. I refer to my earlier statement. The organisation of the Dutch army should not prevent you from stating that it had a 18 divisions equivalent. The Belgian army had an equivalent of somewhat 30 divisions

But those other pieces were part of the Corps troops! Furthermore, a 36 organic strength was well below contemporary standards: e.g. 48 for German divisions and 60 for French divisions. Also the Dutch Army itself was of the same opinion, as related in Vuur in Beweging.

- The Dutch army had filed its desires for armour in 1936 and 1937; not in 1939. Please refer to notes to the Ministre by Reynders in 1937.

Well, the cited text (Amersfoort) mentions 1939 on this point. In 1939 those tanks were still considered necessary in that number. It is quite simple. Reynders filed a report requesting tanks, AT guns, armoured vehicles and artillery in 1937.

I've changed the wording.

- It is highly questionnable whether lack of armour was the most valuable missing asset in the Dutch army. First of all the Dutch landscape hardly invited for larger tank warfare. Its dikes and sub-sea level country side made it hard to deploy tank forces. Secondly a Dutch tank force would have stood not a fraction of chance against the Luftwaffe tactical air force. Thirdly the events unfolding during the May war showed that the French tank formations with their poor tactics were simply blown off the map.

In general, the equipment shortages are best illustrated by the lack of armour modernisation. Remember that the Dutch main lines were mostly not in open polder landscape. The effectiveness of air attacks against armour is debatable and the effectiveness of French armour has been debated by many :o). Not all will agree with your description! In any case, a few infantry tank battalions would have come very handy, if committed on the right moment. the effect of air strikes versus armour debatable? Please, don't make me laugh. Holland is one of the worst environments for tanks. The narrow streets and causeways, the swampy land and the wide open space where hiding is often far off. As an old tanker myself I know quite a bit about what we tankers desire and its not enemy airplanes overhead or swampy open country with narrow causeways.

Well, Holland is, but the Dutch Army intended to fight in Utrecht and North-Brabant ;o). Part of a debate would be that in May/June 1940 German air attacks equally affected the supply trains of all units but that it was very hard to actually disable a tank with the means then available (which at the time did not include "tankbusters" or rockets). In any case I've again changed the wording in a more neutral sense.

- The M-39 DAF armoured cars were all delivered. Six were in service and did indeed see action around the Hague and Rotterdam. Six others were unavailable due to several indeficiencies. The five Universal Carriers were not in use with the artillery but in use as infantry support units. Two of those saw action at Waalhaven AFB. Three others never saw action.

Good improvements.

- The remark 'Many of these could only fire black powder shells, that could not really detonate' should be striken as complete and utter baloney. All artillery pieces were fitted with HE shells. The author perhaps wanted to refer to the use of older powder compounds in the shells for the 12 and 15 cm Krupp fortress guns [12-lang-staal and 15-lang-staal]. This contingent only comprised about 180 guns out of 692. The balance was equipped with modern ammunitions.

I had this from some source but I can't remember which (shows the value of citing immediately). But is 190 out of 692 not many? And what about the 8-Staal and 6-Veld pieces? None of the Dutch pieces used the old black powder. The old steel guns (8, 12, 15) used pre WWI compounds. The 6-veld had modern ammunitions including AT ammo. The 8-staal was a 84 mm cal.

OK

- 368 (or so) highly modern Böhler AT guns 47 mm as well as a mere 70 HIH/AI AT-guns of equal calibre were available. Both weapons were able to penetrate the heaviest German tank armour in May 1940.

The last is obvious to me, but probably not to the reader and should indeed be mentioned. I must admit my previous ignorance as to the other 47 mm guns. Very good improvement.

- 8-staal guns - 108 off - were re-introduced in order to strengthen the AT stripped outer defence lines and in order to form three artillery battalions in the southeast of the country as a modest compensation for removed modern artillery units. The 6-veld guns (57 mm) were obsolete infantry guns. Although of some practical use indeed overtaken by time.

There you are! Lack of artillery! ;o) BTW, what was the calibre of the 8-Staal? I always forget. 84 mm

I'll try to remember :o).

- The Schwarzlose main MG was not of calibre 6,5 mm but 7,92 mm c/w a pointed bullet. The addition 'Because many of these had to be fitted in the pillboxes, each battalion had a heavy machine gun company of twelve for its automatic weapons' should be striken. 100% baloney. The Dutch military organisation saw battalions comprising three rifle-men companies and one MG-company. Moreover, regiments had an additional MG company. This organisation template had nothing to do with the fact that MG companies often sheltered some (or all) of their weapons in pillboxes.

Agreed. The line of reasoning had got confused; I already intended to rewrite the section completely.

- An organic l-MG? A Dutch infantry-platoon had three or four squads. Each squad [8-11 men] had one light MG, Lewis 6,5 mm. This division of light MG's was identical to the German one. One MG per squad. The German units were larger though. That was the main reason for their superior number of light MG's.

Brongers mentions that in some units, such as Brigade A and B, not all squads had an organic light machine-gun. Sure, some squads shall have had pieces in maintenance. Like the Germans lacked weapons here and there

Well, he describes it as a reduced allotment.

- The Dutch battalion fire power was not considerably lower than the German equivalent. The number of support weapons like heavy/medium and light machineguns was (ration-wise) comparable. As said before it was the German army's larger unit sizes that had them dominate. In respect to 8 cm mortars the Germans were much more superior indeed. It is an undefendable hypothesis to state that the ill weapon statistics was the MAIN cause for poor fighting performance of the Dutch infantry. It is a conclusion that should not be mentioned on a wiki page and moreover, hard to maintain.

Well, could you give the exact number of machine-guns per Dutch division? Then we could really compare. Brongers makes much of the equipment balance on the tactical level. But I agree that training was probably a more decisive factor. Battalion-wise (Dutch lowest 24 regiments): infantry company (G: 13, D: 12), heavy machine gun company (G:12, D:12), battalion staff (G:3 li.MG, D:0). Battalion wise G: 42 light and 12 heavy MG, D: 36 light and 12 heavy. The German battalion had also 6 mortars 8 cm, 9 mortars 5 cm and 9 At rifles. The Dutch had only one section of two mortars available.

I stand corrected.

- The quote 'Before the war only a minority of eligible young men had actually been conscripted — and often the least fit as it was easy to be exempted unless you were unemployed' should be striken. Once again, pure nonsense. The Dutch system that service could be bought off was long since been abolished. There was no system that led to selecting the least fit, nor were employed people spared from the levy. One could get a postponement from study occupation. The training was indeed poor though.

Are you sure that people working in some vital economic sectors were not spared? In practice conscription systems always show a strong J-curve distribution, the "burden" being carried by the lower classes; and this effect gets stronger when less people are drafted. Needs more research for this particular case though. Young men in economical vital positions were relieved of levies in all nations. It matters little. Plenty of men to fill the gaps and intellect matters little when catching bullets. Are you aware that the average Belgian reserve officer was as poorly trained as his Dutch equivalent, that the French levies as off 1918 were called into active service and that they had 1st lieutenants in their fifties? Are you aware that the Landwehr of which you spoke were old reservists, often much older than the eldest Dutch reservist? So what is the point in listing these kinds of criteria if you fail to put them into the right perspective?

I've removed the passage.

- It is one of those well preserved phantasies that Hitler and his Generals considered the Dutch army so weak that a victory in one day was expected. Clearly, should the author have studied the preparations of the 18th Army or the Heeresgruppe B in any detail, he would not have added this well preserved baloney. The German guestimates lay between 3 and 5 days. There was only one mentioning of 'capitulation in a day' and that was if and when the surprise attack at the Hague would have worked out and the Government could have been forced into instant yielding.

Am I glad I wasn't the author! :o) The poor young man writing it, in all probability had not studied the German operational plans. I at the time simply did not dare to change it outright...

Dutch defensive strategy

- Many details on this elaboration of the Water Line are inaccurate, but I leave it as it is.

Please don't. What is wrong? Please refer to the numerous sources on this one.

I've removed the main problems. I hope.

- The Light Division in the rear of the Peel-Raamline was no mobile reserve but the dynamic force responsible for guarding and defending the entire southern gap between the southern extremity of the Peel-Raamline at Weert and the city of Tilburg.

The last is true and should be mentioned. Obviously this means it would function as a mobile reserve if necessary.No. The Light Division had been assigned a strict duty. It could be used as a mobile reserve if required. But in the rear of the PR line it was assigned the protection of the wide open stretch between Weert and Tilburg. An ambitious assignement....

- The reasons for General Reynders to withdraw from his command are wrongly indicated. Reynders did not intend to regress to a strategy to withdraw on the Fortress Holland, but strived for a prolonged forward defence in Grebbeline and Peel-Raamline. Reynders insisted on maintaining the Peel-Raamline as a main defence line, leaving one-third of the Field Army south of the main rivers. Also the Grebbeline had to be defended as a main defence line but - and that was the tricky bit - before it would yield it had to be evacuated onto the Eastfront Fortress Holland. That would suggest taking two entire army corpses back under pressure of the enemy as well as the fact that two defence lines (Grebbeline and Eastfront Fortress Holland) would have to be reinforced. The Ministre of Defence - previously staff officer under Reynders - had a strong dislike of his former chief and tackled Reynders over the details of the retreat of two Army Corpses. It mattered little to the Ministre that the next CIC opted for exactly the seem strategy, although the Peel-Raam defence was decreased dramatically.

Yes, the present account is still simplistic.

- The Belgian refusal to man the Belgian portion of the Zuid-Willemsvaart (connecting the Peel-Raamline to the Belgian Albert Canal line) came from the Dutch refusal to reinforce the Limburg defences. The Dutch refused the Belgian desire, and as a consequence the Belgian CIC refused to connect to the Weert defences in Holland. The Gamelin desire to incorporate the Dutch in his plans was 90% a political goal. More importantly, the 'Hypothese Breda' posed the French the option to pincher the Belgian main force {both left and right of the main force of the Belgian Field Army in the KW line] and as such force the Belgian CIC in a more cohesive and coordinated strategy benefitting the French goal to keep the Germans away from the north of France (in anticipation of a Von Schlieffen repition obviously).

I admit Gamelin's political motive but it should be emphasized its purported dominance is derived from his memoires written after the events. At the time his stated reasons were predominantly operational. After the war it was not deemed prudent to emphasize the French offensive intentions for 1941 :o). They were not operational, mainly political, perhaps even strategic. Once you've studied the works by Giraud and Georges you would be introduced to the fact that operationally the strongly opposed the plan. But Gamelin persisted because he desired to commit the Belgian CIC to the French strategy all along.

- The Germans did not use large airborne units during Weserübung and more importantly the airborne operations were hardly noted in the west. It were the air-landing operations that received much attention, in particular due to the fact that a KLM pilot was present during the largest of those operations near Oslo.

A more precise choice of words should indeed have been applied.

- It is inaccurate to state that only six armoured cars were included in the AFB defences. At Ypenburg and Schiphol AFB both six cars - two platoons - were stationed. More importantly, all main AFB's got a full battalion of infantry, the auxilary bases at least one company. Moreover, roads were blocked and additional AAA was assigned.

Good improvements.

German strategy and forces

- It was only in January 1940 that an occupation north of the Meuze was incorporated in the Falle Gelb plan. More extensive plans for Holland, including air landings around Rotterdam, were only studied in November and December 1939.

The situation was more complex. See above. No, it was not. Only in January the occupation of the entire Dutch soil was incoporated. Before only instructions for studies had been filed with different agencies, amongst whom Kurt Student.

Yes, it should be made more clear what was official and what a mere study. However, it should not be forgotten that even in a limited offensive, all territory east of the Vesting Holland would also be occupied, i.e. by far the larger part of the area north of the Meuse

- Dritte Welle divisions were not at all Landwehr divisions. Dritte Welle divisions comprised 12% first reservists, 46% second reservists and 42% Landwehr. Virtually all divisions applied at the Dutch front were Dritte Welle divisions, of which some had Poland experience.

Not all Dritte Welle divisions were Landwehr, but I believe all those committed in the Netherlands were. Dritte Welle divisions were only 42% Landwehr. Period. Please refer to the excellent work of Haupt on this

I shall :o). I was really referring to the unit ancestry, but have to admit this is basically irrelevant.

- The German SS VT regiments were much larger than regular army regiments. They comprised each about 5,500 men.

Yes. Still about a third of a division, which I feel the present text will already suggest to the reader. Could be made more precise though. No, the present text suggests regiments which automatically refers to regular Heer regiments which counted a mere 3,000 men. The SS regiments were more like brigades, self sustaining and with motorised elements. The four SS regiments in Holland comprised - including SS AR, SS AA and SS Sturmpioniere, over 24,000 men.

I've reworded it, using division equivalence.

- The southern airlanding plan is presented falsly. First of all it was a plan that was paramount over the The Hague Putsch. It was not designed to have a mechanized force relief the landed airbornes, but to safeguard a wedge in the inpregnable Fortress Holland for strong mechanized forces. In other words, the airbornes and airlanding troops were a tactical component of a large scale mechanized ground force operation. The strength of the 7.FD was about 4,500 men, that of the 22(LL).ID around 9,000 men.

It's true 18th Army considered the breach as the primary objective. I already intended to make this more clear. Nevertheless a relief element was obviously present. The numbers should certainly be mentioned.

- 9.PD had over 150 tanks and was not the weakest German Panzer Division. She was one of four light divisions transformed into a tank division in the last six months before Fall Gelb. These four divisions had but one tank regiment, whereas the other six had two tank regiments. Besides, 9.PD had relatively many Pz.III and Pz.IV's. Also the division had a vast support pool of artillery.

In pure tank numbers, 9.PD was by far the weakest. It is true it had a very strong infantry and artillery component — in fact, aside from the tanks, it in essence formed a powerful motorised infantry division. Nevertheless we should avoid any suggestion a vast mechanised force was deployed. Again no. 9.PD was not the weakest. There were four German tankdivisions with but one tankregiment and 9.PD was one of them. Moreover the four divisions had relatively more Pz.II, III and IV than the larger divisions, that had the main bulk of Pz.I, T-35 and T-38. Moreover the four smaller divisions had larger AA's, comprising about 50 armoured cars in comparison with the large tankdivisions which had only 24 armoured cars in their AA. Besides, 9.PD was heavily reinforced with an MG Bat, additional artillery and additional support troops.

But 9.PD was the only with just two tank battalions and had a mere 141 combat tanks. The other ex-LKDs had 209 (6.PD), 217 (7.PD) and 197 (8.PD) combat tanks. These last divisions were the ones equipped with the Czech tanks; 9.PD was thus much inferior to them in the number of 37 mm gun AFVs and indeed only 4.PD had a (slightly: 40) lower number of these. It is true 9.PD had the highest PzKpfw. III per battalion ratio of any division, but having just two battalions instead of four as 1-5 and 10.PD had, offset this. It also still had 30 PzKpfw. Is (whereas 6.PD and 8.PD did without). Again, I do not deny it was as such an powerful division.

- I challange the author to present any proof of a German 'holding offensive' against the Grebbeline! The official German instruction to X.AK (that had to take the Grebbeline) instructed it to breach the Grebbeline on the first day of the invasion. Next the X.AK had to take the Eastfront Fortress Holland on the third day of the invasion. This was no holding offensive at all.

We've been over this before. I can only repeat my earlier arguments which I hold to be in complete agreement with all serious sources: the attack from the south was the Schwerpunkt, the attack from the east secondary. Certainly it was hoped, and even expected, X. AK would push back the main force of the Dutch Field Army, but its basic function in the operation was to engage and bind as many Dutch forces as possible, thereby allowing XXVI. AK to deliver the fatal blow from "behind". Therefore any successes of X. AK, however gratifying to the Germans, were basically immaterial and as a result this minor theatre of operations was rather neglected by the higher German command levels.Yes, I call them stubborn. The X.AK had instructions to penetrate the Grebbeline at D-Day and commence the assault on the Eastfront Fortress Holland on D-Day + 1. If you call that holding orders, suit yourself. But it should not be mentioned in the text. X.Ak had orders to occupy Fortress Holland north of Utrecht, XXIX.AK had to take the Rotterdam - the Hague - Gouda triangle. Nicely divided into two equals bits ... I challenge you to show me exactly the holding bit in the directives X.AK received. I bet you, you cannot come up with those.

Well, if the term "holding offensive" should be considered too interpretative (though it neatly sums up the situation) it can be circumscribed. The subsidiary nature of the X. AK attack is also explicitly referred to by De Jong. It should be remembered that the dividing occupation lines were made on the assumption of a swift Dutch operational collapse and perhaps immediate surrender. When business became serious Bock changed them to the extent that XXVI. AK would cut off any Dutch retreat to the north, exactly in line with the Schwerpunkt character of its attack. Also the Grebbe Line was not seen by the Germans as the Dutch Main Defence Line.

- The entire airborne and airlanding operation was a Luftwaffe operation. Not just the the Hague component. How would the author translate his thoughts to Generalleutnant Kurt Student being the CIC of the airlanding operation and reporting to the OKH for the Rotterdam theatre and to the ObdL for the Hague theatre? Fact is that the entire operation was a Luftwaffe operation and that even when XXXIX.AK under General Schmidt entered the theatre of operations, Göring remained in control. Perhaps that the author should again study the chain of command during the large Rotterdam raid on May 14 to convince himself.

Yes, the air landing/airborne troops remained under Luftwaffe command. Nevertheless the general operational handling of the Rotterdam component was formally in Army hands; this did not become relevant until the Army arrived. Surely you don't argue that Goering was in control of the Army divisions? The whole operation was a Luftwaffe operation. Only when XXIX.Ak arrived, Army took over operational command. Yet Göring and Kesselring superseded. Please refer to Halder and Schmitt their thoughts about that and you shall galantly agree after all.

I'll remove any suggestion the Army handled the air landings at Rotterdam

- The attack on Holland was not exemplary for the Blitzkrieg concept at all. A strategic surprise is not a Blitzkrieg feature. The German strategy in Holland was surprising from the airlanding angle, but that had nothing to do with Blitzkrieg. Blitzkrieg let itself define by concentration of force, geometry of battle tactics, unrelentless pushing forward and shifting aside the adversory whilst bashing through preventing the defeated forces from recovery. That was not at all necessary in the Dutch theatre and did not occur. If any component of Fall Gelb approach the true Blitzkrieg concept, it was the Panzergruppe Kleist operation from Sedan into the French north. But in fact, the momentum was taken out of that operation on two occasions and the logistics and follow-up forces were hampered to such large extend that the actual Blitzkrieg execution never truly occured. But that was as close as the Germans got. Holland was apart from the airlanding component a classic operation. Not at all a Blitzkrieg. May I refer to Karl-Heinz Frieslers little book ['Blitzkrieg Legende'] on that?

Well, it was not exemplary for the Blitzkrieg concept understood as "mechanised manoeuvre warfare". It in some ways resembles True Blitzkrieg (i.e. strategic use of mechanised forces). However that is not the point the text wanted to make. In May 1940 the word "Blitzkrieg" was not used for either of the above concepts but merely for strategic surprise assault. I agree that in general tactics and the operational handling of forces the operation was quite classic, but the use of airlanding/airborne troops to allow a vital advance by a mechanised force into Fortress Holland was far from classic. Of course within your, rather idiosyncratic, interpretation of the battle as a "pincer" this element is seen as minor but that is the minority view ;o). Nevertheless, this section needs considerable clarification and elaboration, especially as it would be simplistic to describe the The Hague and the Rotterdam components in equal terms. KH Frieser has written a nice bit about this. I recommend it to you.

I shall continue my reflections later. Grebbegoos (talk) 16:54, 1 March 2009 (UTC)

I'll await them eagerly!--MWAK (talk) 08:43, 2 March 2009 (UTC)Grebbegoos (talk) 11:41, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 12:47, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

- Oster informed many of his counter parts. Also the vatican and the Belgian attache had been informed by him. The Belgian and French military were informed by their own channels. It is wrong to state that the Dutch Government informed the Allies. The Allies often shared the intelligence information. On May 9, Winkelman received information from at least two more sources. 'Tomorrow at down' was not Oster stating this, but Sas calling GS-III in the Hague.

Agreed.

10 May the battle

- During the entire war, Hitler presented not a single nation a declaration of war. The current text suggests that France did get a declaration. I realize that the author suggests the knowledge to be present that France and Germany were already in war, but then I would rephrase.

Yes, this could be confusing.

- The Luftwaffe travers of Dutch airspace was only partially executed as such. Large formations simply entered the Dutch airspace and went straight for their targets. The only formation that did traverse was the one of KG.4

Good improvement.

- many aircrafts were destroyed on the ground ... A well preserved hoax. In fact only a handful was destroyed on the ground. It applies only for AFB Bergen at Alkmaar, where in total five G-1 cruisers and a few bi-planes were destroyed on the ground. Some were damaged but repaired. At the AFB's Waalhaven, Ypenburg and Schiphol all squadrons scrambled in time. At Waalhaven (2), Ypenburg (1) and Schiphol (1) only few planes were destroyed on the ground.

Well, relative to the size of the Dutch airforce such losses were not inconsiderable. But exact numbers are always better.

- Alone 3rd JaVA of Waalhaven AFB already downed 13 planes. The JaVA's en BOMVA had many more air victories to claim than the thirteen mentioned.

I'd like to add exact numbers. What source do you recommend? Try Molenaar

- Many Dutch planes were lost due to unavailability of landing space. With exception of the D8 squadron that was largely shot out of the sky, the majority of Dutch aircraft losses were caused by either emergency landings (due to lacking AFB's in Dutch hands) or landing of planes on German occupied terrain.

Ditto. Try Molenaar

OK

- Airbornes landed generally between 0430 and 0500 hrs. The landings in the southfront area was executed around 0500 hrs, those around The Hague about 30 minutes earlier.

That should be added.

- The phrasing around the Ju-52 losses is chaotic and unclear. Should be rewritten. Majority of Ju-52 was detsroyed on the ground. Around 250 were total or temporary losses at 10 May 2400 hrs.

The wording should indeed be improved. But again we then need a good source to replace or supplement Hooton. How about the Jacobsen study, the Dr Weiss study or the May 11 report of Luftflotte 2

- The operation around The Hague was an operational failure but not a strategic failure. It is wrong to speak of 'utter failure' for it was not. The German troops tied the entire 1st Corps, much of the AAA and a considerable portion of available airforce sorties.

Then "operationally" should be added.

- Not 'most occupants' of the first two waves were killed. That is a Brongers tale. Losses were heavy, but most occupants suggests that more than half got killed. That is untrue.

Well, we can't have those, can we ;o). But how high were losses approximately? The first two waves comprised 18 Ju/52, containing appr. 320 men. In total Ypenburg had a KIA rate amongst the Germans of 119 men, LL, Luftwaffe and airbornes. Beyond Ypenburg AFB another 39 men KIA. Those KIA rates include the entire battle. Clear enough that not ´most occupants´ got killed

- Ockenburg AFB was not still under construction. It was operational but in use as auxilary field. The planes that landed did not sink away. Author has mixed up the arguements for Valkenburg AFB.

Very true. I had already realised I had the two mixed up.

- The airbornes temporarily in control of Ypenburg AFB were not counter attacked immediately. On the contrary. During the first phase they managed to expand their bridgehead to the Rijswijk and Voorburg area. There they took positions along the Vliet (flood). Only hours later the Dutch managed to gradually run the airbornes off out of the Vliet zone, little later followed by a counter attack on the AFB itself. There was no 'entire regiment of infantry' nearby the field.

Well, not nearby for Dutch standards :o). I agree "within hours" is ambiguous; I meant to indicate the duration of the initial German resistance.

- Valkenburg AFB was the pitch that had not been prepared yet and had about 50 Ju-52 sank away in the swampy top soil.

True.

- The HS-59 seaplanes shuttled in about 80-90 men. Not 120. Also a well preserved tale. The force that was airlanded comprised two platoons of 11./IR16, four pioneers and three men company troop.

Good improvements.

- Own names - like the Willemsbrug - should not be translated into Willems Bridge. Preferrably it remains Willemsbrug, but should one desire to translate (which causes reference loss ...) than it would have been Williams Bridge.

This is tricky; we must avoid referring to a "Willemsbrug bridge". But it can be done. The idiom as such is correct English however. Don´t refer to it as the Willemsbrug bridge but as the Willemsbrug.

- The German airlanding party conquered four bridges [Willemsbrug, spoorbrug, hefbrug and Koninginnebrug] of which the Willemsbrug was but one. Also they occupied one bridgehead accross the Meuze, not the plural form (heads).

Agreed.

- 'Then the military airfield of Waalhaven ... was attacked'. No, simulteneously Waalhaven AFB was attacked.

I see.

- The infantry battalion [Rifle men] was not stationed 'so close to the airfield that the airbornes landed right in their midst'. The battalion had been dispersed in a very unwise manner by its commander. One company face north preventing subversive actions from Rotterdam, one company face northwest preventing a maritime action, one company on the pitch facing south and the MG company facing the pitch. Most disadvantageous was a large fence - originally constructed to prevent spying activities - that ran along the entire northern and eastern side of the AFB. It caused the two companies on the field not to be able to spray the main landing zone of the Germans (east of the AFB) and had the company facing north cut off from the field.

Well, in the midst of their positions nicely conforms to your account? No, that is inaccurate. The airbornes landed well east of the AFB and south of the AFB. A fraction landed on the west side. At no point they landed in the midst of the defence.

OK

- The Ju landings on Waalhaven suffered only four losses.

So "irrespective of losses" is too suggestive. Good point.

- Which 'two other vital bridges' is referred to? Dordrecht/Zwijndrecht? I suppose. Bad coverage. Moving of German troops into Zwijndrecht from the Waalhaven region only occured during the first war night. Prior the first airlanded battalion [III./IR16] moved into Rotterdam. The second wave assembled at Hordijk and devided later along the northern, eastern and central part of Ysselmonde. Only in the late evening a battalion was sent to Zwijndrecht to relief the airborens of I./Fjr1.

No I meant Dordrecht and Moerdijk :o). Indeed horribly vague. Indeed. Moreover, with exception of a handful of pioneers the Moerdijk end received only a platoon of PAK on the 11th. So the wording is inaccurate all along

- HrMs Flores and HrMs JMH did not sail onto the Nieuwe Waterweg. They were still in transit when HrMs van Galen was sunk by Stuka doing, thus warning the Navy Staff not to jeopardize larger surface units on the narrow canal. That resulted into the cancellation of the marching orders for the two aforementioned vessels. Besides the Z5 and TM51 were not involved in shelling Waalhaven AFB but raided the Willemsbrug. Z5 did this twice.

Very good improvements.

- The alleged warcrime in Moerdijk is probably a made up story by Dutch personnel. There is no proof whatsoever of this event. The Dutch reports dating from June 1940 mention nothing about it. Only the after war reports suddenly mention it. This event should be left out. It is not significant and all but proven.

Another Brongers tale I'm afraid :o). And one that for once Amersfoort agrees on too - as being not likely true that is

- Infiltrations of Brandenburger began at 10 May, with two exceptions where proof has been found of border crossings at the 9th. I am most curious about a proof of 8 May border crossings. Anyway, the far majority of crossings took place overnight (9/10 May). The suggestion that speaks from the text is false and inaccurate. Moreover, there is mentioning of one specific stealth modus, whereas there were many. Often the teams had been disguised as Dutch workers in stead of Dutch military.

The last can be added. But did the 9 May incursions not take place in the night of 8-9 May? Incursions started at 9 May evening for some parties, like at Nieuwe Schans and Maastricht

- At Gennep both an armoured train and an armoured personnel train crossed the Mill position. The latter unloaded a battalion of infantry, the first only contained a signal team.

Good point.

- 'but placing itself in a position in which it could have no further influence on the battle, a quarter of the field army had effectively rendered itself impotent'. That is knowledge after the war. Should be stricken. The formation completed the occupation of the main defence area. Or should we also mention IV.Corps rendering itself impotent by occupying the largely unharmed northern Grebbeline?

Well, the last case is hardly comparable. The point is not to blame somebody; this essential aspect cannot remain unmentioned for the sole reason that only with hindsight we know it to have been vital. Hardly comparable? Like it is nonsense to state that III.Corps 'placed itself' in a position where it had hardly influence on the battle. They occupied the entire southeastern front of the Fortress. Positions that had to be taken. Like all troops combined formed a disposition according to the strategic plan. Like IV.Corps, III Corps was not in an area of German assault. Why then had IV. Corps not placed itself out of position and III.Corps too? You should simply suffice by stating that III.Corps took positions along the southeastern front of Fortress Holland. No judgements please!

Perhaps we can easily solve this by referring to the fact that General Reijnders later severely criticized the decision. The reader then can decide for himself whether he agrees. The lack of comparability stems from the simple given that a slight change of direction would have sufficed to pass III Corps if IV Corps hadn't manned the adjoining sector, whereas an attack on the Waal-Linge position would have required a major change of axis and the need to cross two broad rivers extra.

- The Alblasserdam bridge was not unguarded by German airbornes. The Germans had discovered the bridge in the late afternoon of the 10th. It was quickly occupied by a platoon of 6./IR.16 reinforced with a PAK gun. The Light Division only arrived in the area - with its first battalion - around 2100 hrs at the 10th. Overnight the Germans reinforced their occupation.

True. "Weakly guarded" would be more accurate. No, guarded would be the only accurate wording. Due to those guards the LD commander decided to postpone action to daylight

I've made it "weakly occupied sector".

- At 10 May there were no Dutch-French contacts on higher level. A French GRDI party arrived at Breda overnight and got into contact with the Dutch in the morning of the 11th. Only hours later Schmidt and Colonel Dario came in contact and adjusted a joint strategy. That was at the 11th though.

But the text does not say otherwise. The text refers to 10 May

I've rewritten it in the hope of removing any ambiguity.

- The Mill cronicle is terrible! 1) there was no plan to await the next day for an assault, 2) the battalion in the rear of the Dutch line was not successful in any stage of the battle. It awaited the main push of its regiment and only sat passively aside, 3) their was a Ju-88 raid on the entire northern Peel-Raam sector in both the 254.ID and 256.ID sector, which was not accidental but deliberate. It had been requested by XXVI.AK. Due to flawing communications the regiment commander at Mill had not been informed though. In the end it came as a surprise to the regiment operating at Mill, but was no raid by mistake, 4) the Dutch were not routed prior to the attack. They only evacuated a small sector immediately west of the village Mill. That sector was not only raided by the bombers but also by an artillery battery. Schmidt only ordered the central and northern Peel-Raamline to evacuate. The southern leg was still part of the revised defence plan that incorporated the Zuid-Willemsvaart. Auch, what a bad coverage this is!

Ah. 1: Amersfoort states there was such a plan. What source exactly contradicts him? 2: So the account that it temporarily occupied some Front Line sector is incorrect? 3: "mistake" was indeed a bad choice of words. 4. How small is "small"? Is "evacuated" a euphemism for "abandoned"? I've wondered about the artillery bombardment. If we go by Amersfoort's account there was no substantive artillery present. We should perhaps point out the sector west of the Zuid-Willemsvaart was not evacuated. 1) KTB 256: "Obstl Weber entschloss sich auf die durch Maj v Bornstedt vorgetragene Frage des Generals - bitte, Ihren Entschluss? - nach kürzer Überlegung mit Maj v Bornstedt, den Batko vom IR.481 und dem Kommandeur vom IR456 zum sofortigen Angriff auf das Festungskampffeld." This decision fell at 1800 hrs Dutch time. The KTB and the excellent works on 256.ID by B. Sels mentions nothing about perceptions that should have lived to postpone to the next day. 254.ID did, not 256.ID, 2) the 3rd Battalion that had worked its way to the canal and had indeed occupied a narrow sector of the Dutch front-line, held still after it had been cornered by a Dutch infantry squad and the Motorbike Hussar assault in the afternoon. 4) the small perimeter that the Dutch evacuated during the airraid and the barrage by one battery of 105 howitzers was tight. Elements that were routed during the first phase of the bombing raid were quickly reassembled by adequate cadre. Nevertheless the forest area west of Mill was only thinly occupied after the raid. But don't speak of routed troops for its inadequate. There was but one battery 105's available all day long.

I've rewritten it trying to reflect your remarks on point 4. Point 1 would be one of those cases secondary sources rule :o).

- The most important destruction of the Maastricht bridges should be added. That caused the Germans to lose no less than one full day back-log on their schedule to have 4.PD reach the east bank of the Albert Canal.

I've tried to find a good German source for this. A source for what? Take any German source and conclude with me that battle plans provided for Btl zbV 100 and FLAK and pioneer units together with point forces of 4.PD had to reach Albertcanal noon D-Day. The first tanks only managed to cross the canal noon on D-Day + 1

OK

- Missing issue: The German progress in the central sector. Meuze line was breached and in the evening the southern component of X.AK positioned itself opposite the southern Grebbeline.

I considered putting it in, but it is implicit anyway. Perhaps for good order we should mention it. If you find one scuttled tank important enough to mention, but not the fact that SS DF arrived Wageningen at the 10th of May, you make funny selections ...

Well, it is (now also) mentioned under 11 May.

11 May

- Wrong assessment over Winkelmans priorities. Two priorities: 1) closing the Waalhaven door, 2) mobbing up of the airlanded troops around The Hague and preventing chances of successful renewed airlandings. Moerdijk had been left to the French after the 10 May telecon between Gamelin and Winkelman.

As Amersfoort describes it, Winkelman this day felt already rather secure about the Überfall aspects of the landings. That the French had to execute the attack on the Moerdijk does not mean the situation in North Brabant somehow was less important. Please, please. Forget Amersfoort for once. Please study the actual sources, like the Winkelman biography, the Committee hearings, the instructions to the Commander Fortress Holland. Winkelman left Moerdijk and Brabant to the French, which caused him to take much heat after the war. He emphazised his own focus on cutting the umbilical string at Waalhaven, where troops continued pouring in. Please convey me one directive from the Hague for retaking Moerdijk. You cannot. And then compare it to the instructions the Light Division and Group Kil received. They were instructed to retake Waalhaven, the British begged for flattening the place and the navy asked to shell it as well as our scarce bombers to bomb it too. Rotterdam and Waalhaven were the main concern to Winkelman. He considered Brabant safely in the hands of the strong 7th French. Amersfoort has his own truth, but HIS truth. The facts and figures disagree with him

Well, I've put the entire Vesting Holland concern into one point and the North-Brabant situation into another. I hope this will meet your objections.

- Alblasserdam bridge was defended by German airlanding troops, not airbornes.

OK

- The LD had already shipped one battalion to Dordrecht in the early hours of the 11th. LD was not ordered to break off the attack on Alblasserdam but claimed itself it was not capable to crack the nut.

Yes, and then it was ordered to break off? No, it was not ordered to break off. Vd Bijl simply said it couldn't be done. That is a different angle. If you state it was ordered to break off it suggests that the high command counter instructed. It did not. High Command yielded to the suggested better battle awareness of the local command

OK

- The attack of the 3rd Border Infantry Battalion overnight (at Goidschalxoord) was not incorporating a storming of the Alblasserdam bridge. That only occured later.

You mean not on the 11th? Yes it did too. But later. I mean to say there were three attempts.

I've tried to reflect this better.

- The battalion of 28.RI that crossed the Kil, did this on the 10th and moved into Amstelwijk early evening. It did not lack artillery support (two batteries of 23.RA were at its disposal). The forward company of the battalion was taken by surprise in the morning of the 11th, when it was still preparing for an assault. Only a second clash with the German airbornes caused the capture of a large portion of the officers that were caught by surprise nad tricked into surrender. Afterwards the battalion remnants suffered from both German and friendly fire.

Yes, this has to be elaborated.

- It was not simply a reconnaissance unit of the 1.DLM that attacked Moerdijk in the AFTERNOON of the 11th. It was 12.GRDI reinforced by some light tanks, commanded by Major Michon. It incorporated a few squadrons of Panhard AMD-178 armoured cars and a platoon of AMR-35 light tanks. It than merged with a taskforce of 5.GRDI carrying Général Mittelhauser, liaison of Gamelin, who needed transport to the Hague. All in all the French force was quite substantial, incoporating numerous armoured cars, motorbike hussars and supporting troops. They sealed of the entire region between Breda and Etten, guarding all bridges and crossings. A task force of two platoons accompanied by hussars tried to work its way through Zevenbergschen Hoek, when the long warned Luftwaffe appeared overhead and raided the entire region between Moerdijk, Breda and Etten, bombing away any illusions the French had had. It had taken the French no less than 8 hrs to arrive in the area and get ready for action....

The presence of AMR 35s is very interesting. What is the source for this? I agree and already had planned to give the exact details about the French troops, which indeed were not particularly weak. Source is the battle report by Commandant d'Eskadron Michon

This perhaps shows the danger of relying on primary sources. What we normally refer to as Hotchkiss H35 tanks were called AMRs within Cavalry units.

- The Dutch did everything they could to get rid of the German stronghold on the northern bank of the Meuze in Rotterdam. In fact the Dutch had managed to push the Germans back into one building only, but since that building was unapproachable and impossible to pound by indirect artillery fire, the Germans were able to hold out.

Still, no all-out attack was made. I am afraid you lack the insight or knowledge to assess this. I suggest that you either study this case or leave out the judgements. Why do you think the Germans considered the Verzekeringsgebouw hell on earth? Because they felt only tickled? The building was situated such that in order to approach it Dutch formations would have to expose themselves in the wide open. Numereous attempts were made to flatten the building with mortars and even artillery. But in vain. Simply storming the building would have exposed the troops on their flanks to fierce German fire. Perhaps you are aware that the Boompjes and Bolwerk were controlled by German MG and mortar fire from the Noordereiland. Please refrain from this kind of conclusion without the proper awareness of the scene!

Well, it's the Amersfoort conclusion. He also states that Winkelman was dissatisfied about the results of the 11th and perhaps we can rephrase it that way. I do not deny the very difficult local conditions.

- Von Choltitz had not been ORDERED to withdraw from the northern bridgehead but had received concurrence to do so when he thought fit.

True.

- It is wrong to speak of the German paratroopers in Rotterdam. With exception of one platoon of 11./Fjr1 that had been dropped at the Feyenoord stadium at invasion time, there were no German airbornes involved in the Noordereiland battle. It were the men of III./IR16 that occupied the island. In the notorious building of the Verzekeringsbank - the only object held on the northern bank - a mixed formation of few airbornes and members of three companies of IR.16 were present.

"Paratroopers" is indeed inaccurate.

- The sector near Heeswijk was not intended to remain undefended but turned out to be empty due to the fact that the quite unstable new defence plan by Schmidt had envisaged the Mill sector formations to take that sector. Obviously those units had mainly been lost during the Mill siege.

Indeed so; but the article does not say otherwise. The article suggests otherwise

I've rewritten it to remove any ambiguity.

- The Winkelman request to the British - especially linked with the Dutch-French battle plan in Noord-Brabant - is a mystery to me!

Amersfoort mentions it.Ah, then it must be accurate ...

Perhaps he has read a primary source you didn't ;o).

- General-Major Harberts cannot be blamed for 'ignorance' of a present motorised regiment. That is aft-war knowledge.

No "blame" is intended — he was no less ignorant fore it. Yes, you are so right. But it is judgement on your behalf and not required on a wiki page. You should simply state the facts and leave conclusions to the readers. I strongly advise to leave your judgement out

I' ve rewritten it.

- The Wonsline was not reached on the evening of the 11th. That only happened on the 12th.

Amersfoort suggests otherwise. Yes, and the KTB of 1.KD suggests that the units were still considerably far off. Perhaps you can answer me this: why attack the Wonsline at noon when you are ready to do so more than twelve hours before?

Yes, on the map he also gives, the advance limit for that day is at Sneek.

May 12

- The 9.PD had not crossed the Meuze overnight 10/11 May. It only left Germany in the early morning of the 11th.

So after 06:00 AM? At 0200 hrs Dutch time the orders to prepare for march from the German rally points (around Kleeve) were given. At 0750 hrs the Dutch border was crossed.

OK

- The fact that the French forces had not occupied the sector north of Breda, was not deliberate but caused by slow French doing. It was the French strategy to maintain a strong defence from Keizersveer (Geertruidenberg) southwards to Turnhout. Would this have been executed accordingly the 9.PD would have met the French on their northern route as well.

Amersfoort states it was deliberate.It was not. Please refer to the French battle reports. The unit that had to occupy the zone delayed its manoeuvre because it would first safeguard its retreat route. That took so much time - during which it was air raided too - that it was only half way when the Germans had already reached Lage Zwaluwe and Moerdijk

This is very interesting. Which unit exactly had to occupy the Geertruidenberg sector? And at what date and time?

- The limited actions against airlanded forces around The Hague was not caused by local commanders limiting themselves, but being under orders by Commander Fortress Holland to limit countering measures to sub battalion level. That measure only saw relief in the late evening of May 13.

Yes, but they still were not overly active within their freedom of action.Why don't you proof that to me. Because it is straight nonsense. You judge too much without knowing the facts

Then we'll mention the order..

- At the Grebbeberg it were not two battalions SS concentrating their attack on 800 m wide Dutch defences. It was one battalion attacking at the Hoornwerk and one attacking 1,500 m to the north.

Yes.

- 'Due to Major-General Harberts' failure the previous day to understand that the German main assault was imminent however, these reserves would mostly not arrive in time to intervene in the fight for the defence zone between the two trench systems'. This is straight out baloney! Firts of all, all Dutch commanders agreed that there had been no sign of the German main force on the 11th. Air recce had over the approach sector had only caused the observers to determine minor German presence. Artillery appliance had been modest, only increasing on the 12th. Observations from the Grebbeberg had at no occasion shown larger formations. As such, it is simply 'after war knowledge' to state that Harberts failed to establish the odds correctly. More importantly, the reserve matter was utterly out of control of Harberts. His reserves had been taken away by the Field Army command, promising to be replenished after the Brigade B would have shifted into the rear of the southern Grebbeline. That had NOTHING to do with Harberts alleged 'failure'.

Harberts was only mentioned to give some continuity with the earlier narrative. We had beter reword it then.

- Winkelman did receive notification of passing armour in the Langstraat but he and his staff did not appreciate the intel as genuine. As such he did not start to appreciate the overall German strategy, which is a matter that he should be held accountable for.

This is not at all how Amersfoort suggests it. What is your source exactly? Try the memoires and the Committee reports

But we can agree that after the radio Bremen broadcast he understood his mistake?

The last days

- Why for heaven sake are 13 and 14 May left out????

Wikipedia is in a constant state of improvement ;o). I had just added 12 May. All sections after "12 May" still need to be completely rewritten. You took your time then ...

- 14 May: the Dutch situation seemed to have improved? Absurd. It was genuinly appreciated on the 13th already that all was lost. Thats why Government conveyed to the CIC and the Queen left the country. When the German tanks crossed onto Ysselmonde, it was clear that Holland was holding by the finger nails. Moreover, the Grebbeline had been evacuated. Absurd to state that the general situation had improved! It was one minute to twelve!

- Hitler had not planned the attack on Holland with von Manstein! Who wrote this baloney althogether!? My God, this is why wikipedia is such a questionable source. Total nitwits can simply rewrite history.

They always have done ;o). Indeed, but I hope that you did not write this bit. Von Manstein had nothing to do with it. Hitler imported his own idea of the Residence scoop, the airlanding ops were planned by Student, the ground components by the Heeres staff in close coop with Heeresgruppe B.

The end

- The Rotterdam raid and its prelude are described far to comprised and incomplete.

- There was never an ultimatum threatening the destruction of the Hague and Amsterdam.

- The Zanddijk line was not centered around a canal, but set up east of the canal. The canal had poor defence characteristics due the fact that the eastern bank was higer than the west bank. As such an enemy would remain out of sight. Thats why the defence line had been constructed well to the east of the canal. Notwithstanding the aforementioned huge disadvantage of a higher east bank dike, the French 271.IR did take positions along the west side of the canal. They would pay darely for their foolishness and lose packs of men in the following fights around the canal and the village Kapelle.

- Walcheren did not 'fall' due to Luftwaffe raids on Middelburg, but because the French General Deslaurens ordered the general retreat to Zeeuws-Vlaanderen after the French-Dutch forces had failed to keep the Germans east of the Sloedam. The destruction of Middelburg was executed irrespective of the already retreated French formations.

- The battle of Zeeland was not an Allied success at all. Its intention had been to gain and hold control over the Antwerp waterways. That failed dramatically. Besides the battle caused two French divisions to be battered hard and take numerous losses, whereas the German formation (one SS Regiment) only lost a modest 300 men KIA and WIA. Moreover it had cornered both French divisions in such a way that they were soon after taken out by German actions around Antwerp. The battle of Zeeland was an operational and tactical disaster. Should the French have aimed at evacuating Zeeland, they could have done so on the 14th already. It is therefore straight rubbish to refer to the battle of Zeeland as a Allied success.

Grebbegoos (talk) 14:25, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

I will make the changes on which we have agreement and hope for your added information and argumentation, Greetings, --MWAK (talk) 21:14, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 00:28, 3 March 2009 (UTC) Let me say I appreciate you making half your daily job out of wiki editting, but I must say I have to object to some nasty shows of tough stubborness. I have three cupboards bulking from first class sources, and you seem to base 90% of your intel on Amersfoort. I can substantiate every detail I add or suggest for imporvement, yet somehow you sort of claim to have the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth until proven otherwise. I embrace proving claims, but I have some difficulties in you asking for proof time and again when your own story is - forgive me my wording - extremely poor and actually wiki unworthy. I would appreciate a mild glimpse of modesty here and there ...

In bold my replies to yours, where applicable. Grebbegoos (talk) 00:28, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

I fully concede that your factual knowledge vastly exceeds mine — indeed it is quite possible that it is second to none. And much of it was acquired in the best possible way: by avidly absorbing the information from the primary sources in great detail. However, precisely therein probably resides the fundamental cause of our disagreement. Knowing so much and having formed your opinion during many years of reflecting on that knowledge, you naturally feel confident that you have become an authority by yourself and that your word is both worthy to be expressed and sufficient to decide any question that may be raised. You have, so to say, become a secondary source on your own. But Wikipedia is not a secondary source — it is a tertiary source. Humble Wikipedians like myself (see: there is that mild glimpse of modesty ;o), may in principle only base themselves on secondary, not primary sources. That is not merely because those humble Wikipedians are basically ignorant of the facts, but because it is in the nature of an encyclopedia to be no less than three steps removed from reality. An encyclopedia must describe reality by indicating the primary sources, via citing the secondary sources. And if a subject is rather complex — and you surely know as no other that the events of May 1940 are — it should again use a general secondary source to order the information from the other secondary sources.

Now it so happens that the only recent general secondary source available is the work by Amersfoort e.a. And that source should be considered reputable by us because it was written by those that are institutionally authoritative: professional historians appointed by the Dutch government to produce a standard work on the subject. So I feel no shame to base the text for 90% on Amersfoort: it should be so by Wikipedia standards. Of course the present text is still unfinished and very imperfect, some parts are very poor by any criterion and there is ample room for improvement in every aspect. But the end result should still be 90% Amersfoort. We may add detail, give a wider context, highlight certain aspects, increase coherence, reorder the information to the specific needs of a encyclopedic article, improve obvious mistakes by using other secondary sources — yet still Amersfoort should be the basic authority. Even if you think to know he was wrong, you may not cite a primary source to proof this: that would be Original Research. And it is safer so: perhaps he had read a better source you did not; perhaps you have made a mistake in interpretation; perhaps he was more wise in judging its value. Who is to say? We may not — and therefore only humbly reflect his authority. Amersfoort locutus, causa finita!

This however, should not keep you from contributing from your vast store of knowledge the many detailed facts that an encyclopedia should provide and guiding a poor ignorant soul like myself along the many pitfalls the ground to be covered offers. You will find me as modest as desired to accomplish this!--MWAK (talk) 17:00, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 20:24, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

Well ... allow me some applause for such eloquence!

Secondary sources rule, even if primary sources are available.

Let me explain a thing or two about 'amersfoort'. First of all, Amersfoort was only co-author of the book you seem to accept as well reputed and solid material. Authors like Piet Kamphuis, Jan and Cees Schulten, Wim van den Doel and de Koster contributed the rest. The reason for this joint authorship - or if you wish co-authorship - is that these people have each their own special skill and knowledge. Amersfoort is not an authority on WWII matters, not at all. He has focussed on some aspects being deputy director of the Military Historian Section, which he left a few years ago. Amersfoort's specialty is the late Middle Ages. In his quality as dep-dir he co-authored both works. He wouldn't have risen above his own length if it hadn't been for a court case and massive public protests against Amersfoorts curious perceptions about a thing or two. Amersfoort (co)wrote chapters 1, 5 and 11. Not incidently all three general prescriptions of his rather thin and much disputed analysis of the events. Not at all in-depth analysis of specific events. Amersfoort did produce some material worth reading, but the authority you give him goes well beyond reason. I very much object to your self-proclaimed virtual monopoly of Amersfoort being the leading source to the May War in Holland, 1940.

I have said this before. You somehow claim to be the authority mastering the rules of the lemma's you decided to contribute to. If you don't agree to a certain modification or improvement, your opinion rules. People seem to have to convince YOU prior to any modification being made. I disapprove of this practise. What is your authority on this terrain, who are you, what is your reference? I very much would like to know before I continue any further contribution to this lemma. Because I am hardly impressed by your contributions. You may be cheered for determination, stamina and time investment but this medium is about quality of information. To be frank, you don't have what it takes to serve that regarding this topic.

The odd conclusion that secondary sources rule I totally reject. That may be your conviction. I have no problem with that as long as it doesn't rule here. For I am of the conviction that primary sources rule, when they can be verified and substantiated. I can lead you along at least 100 factual errors in the book that you base your entire lemma on. I refuse to use that source as the basis of this lemma. So rethink your strategy I'd say! Grebbegoos (talk) 20:24, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

Thank you for the applause! ;o)

Now to the main point: that "secondary sources rule" (excellent motto!) is not "my conviction" nor an "odd conclusion", it is one of the most fundamental Wikipedia policies. I refer to Wikipedia:No original research and especially to this section:

Wikipedia articles should rely mainly on published reliable secondary sources and, to a lesser extent, on tertiary sources. All interpretive claims, analyses, or synthetic claims about primary sources must be referenced to a secondary source, rather than original analysis of the primary-source material by Wikipedia editors

This principle is basic to what it means to be Wiki encyclopedia. Indeed I had never even read the section when I wrote it about it to you, it's so obvious. You, in your capacity of researcher, may have gained an excellent insight into the primary sources, but we can't take that for granted or rely on your authority. Wikipedia is a mirror; it cannot directly access the facts as indicated by the primary sources, only reflect the analysis by published secondary sources.

Accordingly, I myself do not claim to be an authority; indeed it would be utterly irrelevant if I did or really were one: I cannot use any erudition, education, rank or title as valid arguments. I can only, within a collective and cooperative effort, offer my careful reading, my logic and my common sense in determining what would be a fair and balanced summation of what the secondary sources tell us. And this usually works out quite well: did you not a year ago vastly improve the nl: article on the Grebbeberg battle — with my cooperation? We could do it again here.

Now as regards "Amersfoort": that is short for the book itself, not the man! His purported shortcomings or virtues are again irrelevant: It is the only recent general secondary source and should therefore form the basis for the article.--MWAK (talk) 09:18, 4 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 11:23, 4 March 2009 (UTC) First of all. I owe you a genuine apology, MWAK, for I stand corrected in respect to the modus operandi of wikipedia. Even so, it shows me why wiki pages are so often poor sources themselves. But I shouldn't have addressed you for that and I - being a researcher - should be ashamed of myself not to have studied the guidelines prior to my lecture. My cheeks are glowing from embarrassment ...

Nevertheless I feel that even with secondary sources we should have plenty of room to improve much of the Kamphuis/Amersfoort products. I have over 200 books, many of which of reputed authors, on this very topic or incorporating the topic. I feel that we cannot write an article on wiki based on one secondary source only, which is virtually the case.

Amersfoort (to cling on to your single reference to this collection of authors) has written a rather classic copy/paste book on May 1940. Especially in relation to strategy, German and French contributions, the book is quite worthless. Let us agree on that. Plenty of alternatives for that. In relation to airforce matters I would suggest - secondary sources in mind - to apply Molenaar's series on the Air Defences. Navy matters should be related to Bezemer and Bosscher as well as the navy staff works. Army matters should at least be benchmarked with the Staff Works (Nierstrasz), de Jong and Brongers. I say upfront that on these three sources one could critically reflect, but as you may have guessed, that applies for Amersfoort too. International sources should be the Gamelin memoires, the Student and Halder memoires, perhaps even Kesselring. Besides the excellent piece of work by Karl-Heinz Golla on the airlandings together with the Beekman/Kurowksi product. Finally I would suggest KH Frieser's work on the Blitzkrieg Legende. In relation to the Rotterdam raid I would like to add the quite informative work of vd Pauw. Werner Haupt is an internationally reputed author on German army organisation matters. Luc de Vos and Peter Taghon seem appropriate secondary sources on the Belgian theatre.

One last thing on the Amersfoort works. This is NOT a standard work. Clearly indicated by the preamble. Literaly the authors claim in the second edition that (translated) 'it was intended as a critical publications in response to existing interpretations and perceptions as well as an opportunity to bring in new matters worth publishing about.' That is nothing more or less than one step in a scientific research process. Not a standard work. The authors don't claim it to be a standard work. Let us have clarity on that too!

Again - I emphasize - I have wronged you in respect to my conceited lecture on your alleged rejection of primary sources. I shouldn't have and therefore cannot stress enough to have been wrong. Hopefully we can agree on introducing a far wider angle of secundary sources to contribute to this lemma. It shall not shape a lemma of the standard I'd desire, but at least improve mto quite some extend. Grebbegoos (talk) 11:23, 4 March 2009 (UTC)

Apologies accepted! I can hardly hold against you what you honestly didn't know about...

I admit that "standard work" is not the best description for Amersfoort: it is certainly no academic standard work. Then again: there is none. As a general overview there is no real alternative. Nierstrasz is very useful and would be my preferred source for any details (sadly I don't have any in my personal possession), but the works are very dated. De Jong is dated too and even less technical than Amersfoort. Brongers is better on that point, but the usefulness of his books is impaired by their apologetic nature. So this "classic copy/paste book" will have to suffice in providing a general framework. And Wikipedia is in essence a copy/paste encyclopedia anyway :o).

The authors on navy, airforce and related foreign subjects are all excellent and I fully agree such information, and citations of course, should be incorporated. I am looking forward to our further cooperation. We'll make this a Featured Article yet ;o). BTW, do you know of any Dutch pictures on this subject that are free from copyright, e.g. from some archive that is public domain?--MWAK (talk) 13:08, 4 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 14:18, 4 March 2009 (UTC) All army sources indeed have their pro's and con's, exactly my point all along. But the Nierstrasz works, which I do have in my possession (except for one of the 18 parts), are in many instances still rather reliable. Brongers work, especially the series about Southfront and Rotterdam, is rather excellent stuff. The Rotterdam works is rather unbiased compared to some other products he wrote. But like Amersfoort he indeed selected a pre determined angle. On both authors one could shoot one's clips empty in relation to details or prejudices. But I am positive that much of those areas can be easily avoided. Moreover - see also some of my remarks related to the current content - I find much of the currently embedded conclusions not necessary. And it are typically those that give the most agony.

I have hundreds of original photographs myself. So pictures shouldn't be too much of a problem. You may know of our websites www.grebbeberg.nl, www.dordtopenstad.nl, www.zuidfront-holland1940.nl and www.waroverholland.nl. If you wish you can preselect pictures and let me know. Grebbegoos (talk) 14:18, 4 March 2009 (UTC)

Yes, I can understand your uneasiness about such conclusions. However, the need to draw them again follows from the tertiary nature of an encyclopedia. Being a summing-up of what the secondary sources say, it cannot well avoid the conclusions they themselves make. But we can keep a certain distance by phrasing these in the form "It has been argued that..." combined with the citation indicating which author argued what.

Your offer about the pictures is very generous (but keep in mind that putting them on Wikipedia means that anyone may legally use them in the future! Hence the generosity...). The problem is however that your being the legal owner of the photographs or even the negatives, does not make you the copyright holder! So pictures you took yourself, e.g. at the historic locations, can be used but historic pictures cannot, unless the maker has deceased over 70 years ago (which is rather unlikely for those pictures made in 1940 :o).--MWAK (talk) 07:44, 5 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 11:32, 5 March 2009 (UTC) The context of IP law and order is unclear. Basically it is save to say that once you own an original print or negative and the maker is untraceable, you have liberty to publish. But I don't really care about pictures anyhow, at least not on wikipedia. Our societies de Greb and Kennispunt have over 10,000 pictures. We publish all of them when we feel fit. Moreover, many pictures have been printed in propaganda series. They are open for publishing anyway.

Emphazise should now lay on balancing the story. That means the wider scope of sources, just like the banner on the article states. I am little short on time now, but we shall have to add references to my comments. I shall do so in due time. Grebbegoos (talk) 11:32, 5 March 2009 (UTC)

OK, Meanwhile I'll change those parts we've reached concensus on!--MWAK (talk) 11:51, 5 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 16:30, 5 March 2009 (UTC) Right.

Grebbegoos (talk) 16:12, 12 March 2009 (UTC)MWAK, pardon me for asking. I am not a wizz with this medium (yet). Would it be possible to gather the 'still in debate' matters and copy/paste them underneath? That gives better traceability and perhaps we can agree on using our hard initials in front of every comment. I kind of start losing track otherwise, let alone others. Perhaps you know of a gooed format? Grebbegoos (talk) 16:12, 12 March 2009 (UTC)

Battle Boxes

I was pointed by someone to the info box on the right top corner of the page. That shocked me. The commanders box as well as the Strength box are almost entirely inaccurate.

The referred German strength should be the 18 Armee with some elements of 6. Armee. That would give a total of no more than about 350,000 men. In fact it was even less. That is a matter that Brongers managed to overrate and overdo in his books.

Onlu 159 tanks were on the 9.PD role for end of April 1940. The tanks of the 4.PD were hardly applied although point formations did bump into the Limburg defences. But 759 tanks should in any case not be mentioned. And, as said before, our 1 scuttled tank should be left out too ...

The number of aircraft on Dutch side was 137 (Molenaar) and on the German side around 1,500 (Illusies en Incidenten). The exact number I have to look up. My own inventory even accumulates to around 1,800 planes that were assigned at least once.

Our army had 685 artillery pieces, excluding 6-veld, PAG and 8-staal, but including two pieces 10.5 lang 30 and eight howitzers 12 lang 12. The number of German pieces I have to look up, but was definetly well below 1,000 pieces.

Grebbegoos (talk) 16:30, 5 March 2009 (UTC)

Yes, battle boxes are rarely accurate, often because they attract many editors which tends to diminish their quality. I always try to leave them alone; all these "box" things are quite infantile in my opinion :o). In this case the best solution would perhaps be to give 18th Army strength only (and of course clearly indicate this). As regards the aircraft: counting all German planes with missions in the Netherlands is tricky; then we should mention the British planes too.--MWAK (talk) 19:41, 5 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 01:14, 6 March 2009 (UTC) You kind of lost me on the last remark. Why would we have to incorporate RAF flights when we incorporate all the German missions over Holland? Where lays your marker?

I agree that battle boxes are kind of tricky but I'd say you either make them accurate or lose them all along. By the way, are you also involved in the editting of the lemma about the battle of Rotterdam? Grebbegoos (talk) 01:14, 6 March 2009 (UTC)

Well, you're supposed to list all forces involved, irrespective of nationality. Much will have to be changed in the box before any serious level of accuracy is reached :o).

There have been a large number of subarticles created about more local events of the battle, but I've largely left them alone. Many are written in dismal English and incorporate large chunks of text directly stolen from your website. You have every right to propose them for immediate deletion on grounds of this blatant copyright violation, should you so desire!--MWAK (talk) 08:03, 6 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 16:01, 6 March 2009 (UTC) If only they were copy/pasted from my website! But they refer to it but are hardly ever in line! Grebbegoos (talk) 16:01, 6 March 2009 (UTC)

Life ain't fair :o). BTW, I've added some remarks above on points of contention that remain between us.--MWAK (talk) 07:26, 10 March 2009 (UTC)

Remaining points

As Grebbegoos requested, I'll copy our remaining main points of contention to this section here below, for a better oversight.

Rearmament

- Holland had not started rearming 'much more slowly than other nations'. In fact, Holland probably made the largest leaps in rearmement of all smaller nations. Holland had a huge back-log though. That prevented it from a massive modernisation.

"Other nations" should be read in context as: France, UK, Belgium. These all began to modernise around 1930-1931. And precisely because of this belated Dutch reaction there were such arrears and the relative increase in the end was strong. France invested much in its army all along. Belgium invested only much in new fortifications, not the army itself. Norway, Poland, Denmark, etc started later or at the same time.

All is true, but does not contradict the fact that the modernisation effort started much later than in the relevant nations.

AMAG: I am sorry, but that is untrue. Compared to the small(er) nations like Norway, Denmark and Belgium our defence did not show a considerable back-log or lacking modernisation. With exception of a few tanks - against which we had modern armoured cars which the Belgian army lacked - the Belgian army was more robuust in size. That's all. Norway and Denmark had even less modern armies than the Dutch. I know that amongst questionable authorities like Amersfoort and Kamphuis this kind of rubbish is popular, but it's untrue. Best proof would be the surge on the international defense market starting in 1938, not before. Grebbegoos (talk) 09:05, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

MWAK: We clearly need some exact numbers to solve this issue. I'll try to find them — but perhaps you are able to provide some statistics regarding the respective equipment budgets? Belgium, UK and France will suffice :o).--MWAK (talk) 14:23, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 00:56, 16 March 2009 (UTC) The thing is that figures say little. Poland for instance was one of the worst investors money-wise, but yet had a considerable army, lots of armour and airplanes. Today financial figures are much more reliable in comparison for reasons of monetarial equivalents, in the thirties that was quite different. It mattered a lot for instance whether a country invested much in its indigeneous industry or on the other hand depended much on imports or expensive licences. Moreover, many budgets were not quite so transparant as one would think. Our fortresses at the Enclosure Dike were paid for by the Ministry of 'Verkeer en Waterstaat', and the Peel-Raamline divided over several budgets too. Our Ministry of Colonies had its own budget for defense and navy. And so on. Then counts what a country invested in. Belgium and France invested vast sums in passive defence. Belgium for example more than 50% of its budget in the overhaul of the fortress along the Meuze and the Reduit Nationale. When the Germans reclaimed the Rhineland, the Belgian defence had to shift odds and again invest a lot in new defensive structures. That implies plenty of investments with little defence-points turn over. Therefore these kinds of comparisons purely based on figures are very dangerous and basically say little. Should we however focus on the defence market, we see an increase in 1936, a well developing market in 1937 and a true flourishing market in 1938. As off end of 1938, beginning of 1939 we see an overload. That is the best indication that countries all around were making the most of efforts only starting end of 1937 and beginning of 1938 resulting in the overloads in 1938. The only two true exceptions are France and Germany, who started in 1934 and 1935. The UK for instance did little to nothing until it was almost too late. Even in 1939 the debates in Parliament were tough and the Chamberlain government blocked many of the parliamental requests for a surge of reinvestments. It is fair to say that given the back-log in the Dutch armed forces a genuine acceleration would have been required, but in fact as off 1936 funds were not even consumed due to bulky and over-ambitious defence committees. In the end tens of millions (a fortune in those days) remained un-spent due to stalling processes. But is that a reason to state that the Dutch investments were too low in comparison with other smaller nations? I think not. Compare the strength of the Dutch army with that of nations like Denmark and Norway and it becomes clear that we were not the archaic army that authors often like it to be. Although it has always helped to consume the fast defeat. Since we do not have the reliable benchmarks (take the benchmarks published in time, one quickly sees the much differentiating results with different publishers!) it is only fair to state that the Dutch and other smaller nations never exceeded investing vast sums of money in defence. That's it. Grebbegoos (talk) 00:56, 16 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 13:17, 17 March 2009 (UTC)MWAK. I have again studied my extended dossiers on the Belgian and French armies in particular and I have concluded that indeed the Belgian army already started reinvesting in the lines in 1934, two years ahead of the Dutch. So it is fair to say that the Netherlands found itself in a small selection of countries (Norway, Denmark) being late with its new investments in the army.Grebbegoos (talk) 13:17, 17 March 2009 (UTC)

MWAK: I can agree with this conclusion. I'll also add some numbers from De Jong. Imperfect, but they should do for the time being.--MWAK (talk) 15:40, 17 March 2009 (UTC)

Force comparisons

- The Dutch army had 700 pieces of artillery (excluding the obsolete 8-staal guns). That was an arsenal that compared to the Belgian, British and German army saw to an infantry-men-gun ratio of 1:400. It is baloney that the Dutch artillery arsenal only facilitated the forming of nine divisions. The author has shown little knowledge of the organisation. The Field Army was formed by ten divisions, three independant Brigades and Corps troops. The balance of the army was organised in independant regiments and infantry battalions. The total strength of the Dutch army was around 18 divisions plus a contingent of independant smaller outfits, depots and specialized units.

Yes, the equivalence was about eighteen divisions. But there were only nine operational divisional units present — the so-called "Peeldivision" was a division in name only. The point made here is that even if the Dutch had better trained and fully organised more men, they still could not not have formed more large units for lack of artillery. Your ratio of infantry to gun ratio is incorrect because you incorrectly assume that the organic strength to full manpower base ratio is the same for all armies. Semantics. By downgrading the number of divisions one creates odd comparison. The first 24 Dutch regiments were organised in divisions. The others in regiments or brigades/groups/detachments. These high regiments were supervised by regional staffs and usually reporting to the staffs of one of the four sectors of Fortress Holland. The Dutch army strength was simply 18 divisions equivalent. No less.

I don't object to the number of 18, but the "odd comparison" reflects precisely the point to be made here: of that eighteen division equivalent, only half was in units that actually were of division strength and much of the remainder had no organic artillery. Or to compare it with Belgium: 30/22 is not the same ratio as 18/9.

- The Belgian army produced much more than 22 divisions. Its army counted 630,000 men from an almost equal basis as the Dutch. The Dutch had an army of about 240,000 men (plus 40,000 in other branches).

AMAG: I am very much against comparison by divisions, exactly for this reason of mal-comparison. Comparisons should be made by number of men actually under arms. The organisation of the Dutch army was such that out of a 240,000 men land army only 9 divisions were formed, referred to as such. And those only comprised about 85,000 men. Would that be the comparison standard that would leave 155,000 out 240,000 men excluded. Moreover the complexity of different divisional sizes all around. Comparison should be either 'division equivalents' or 'manpower in general'. I prefer the latter

Yes, in pure manpower equivalence, not as actual units. That's what I referred to above. The Dutch had an awful lot of independent small units that could have been combined, were it not for lack of artillery (and staff officers etc., etc.). The so called lack of artillery is pure fiction in your head. The 10 divisions required 360 guns. We had another 332 available. I refer to my earlier statement. The organisation of the Dutch army should not prevent you from stating that it had a 18 divisions equivalent. The Belgian army had an equivalent of somewhat 30 divisions

But those other pieces were part of the Corps troops! Furthermore, a 36 organic strength was well below contemporary standards: e.g. 48 for German divisions and 60 for French divisions. Also the Dutch Army itself was of the same opinion, as related in Vuur in Beweging.

AMAG: Artillery was divided on divisional, corps or location level. In all armies. The fact is that the Dutch division method and organisation of artillery was identical to that of Belgian and French standards, simply because we applied the same system. 48 Artillery pieces for a German division of 17,900 men is less in comparison to the 36 pieces of the Dutch division of 9,750 men. You see my point? That is why ratio's are more reliable than comparisons by units when those have not been equalized. And they have not. Grebbegoos (talk) 09:06, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

MWAK: That would be a good point if the German divisions had had a higher number of combat subunits. Then we could say that e.g. the artillery/regiment ratio was the same if more regiments had been present. However, the higher manpower strength was caused by a higher squad strength and more support troops. So the Dutch division had to perform the same tasks, but with less artillery support. This was of course not somehow "compensated" by the fact it also had undermanned squads!--MWAK (talk) 14:31, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 01:14, 16 March 2009 (UTC) Where do you get the benchmark that a German division had the same operation box as the Dutch division had? I am ever so curious! Moreover, the German army had 7,500 artillery pieces, the French almost 15,000. How does that make your comparison 48 respectively 60 per division worth while. I keep on saying, you defend benchmarks which are quite worthless and only satisfy what you appear to be predetermined to defend. The problem you call off over yourself is that you have to give the full story, e.g. include Corps-artillery and Group-Artillery, in the French case Fortress artillery, etc. The root of this discussion is that you state that the Dutch had a mere nine divisions due to lack of artillery. That is simply untrue. Simply state that there were 280,000 men, 690 artillery pieces and that's it. You could add that the Dutch army had 48 regiments of infantry as well as 22 battalions infantry for strategic border defences. That gives the reader some additional information. Grebbegoos (talk) 01:14, 16 March 2009 (UTC)

MWAK: Yes, but that only seems to compound the error: certainly it was unwise to assign to a Dutch division many tasks that a German division could perform, but this was not the result of some deliberate decision to create a unit that was smaller yet qualitatively equal. Its very lack of operational capability has to be explained — and a shortage of artillery is part of that explanation.

However, I'd already rewritten the section: it now begins with the sources statement that the Dutch forces could not be easily expanded, partly because of a lack of equipment and then mentions the artillery limitations, for which I will give a citation from Vuur in beweging. The regiment and battalion equivalence would be useful extra information.--MWAK (talk) 16:02, 17 March 2009 (UTC)

Strength of 9. Panzerdivision

- 9.PD had over 150 tanks and was not the weakest German Panzer Division. She was one of four light divisions transformed into a tank division in the last six months before Fall Gelb. These four divisions had but one tank regiment, whereas the other six had two tank regiments. Besides, 9.PD had relatively many Pz.III and Pz.IV's. Also the division had a vast support pool of artillery.

In pure tank numbers, 9.PD was by far the weakest. It is true it had a very strong infantry and artillery component — in fact, aside from the tanks, it in essence formed a powerful motorised infantry division. Nevertheless we should avoid any suggestion a vast mechanised force was deployed. Again no. 9.PD was not the weakest. There were four German tankdivisions with but one tankregiment and 9.PD was one of them. Moreover the four divisions had relatively more Pz.II, III and IV than the larger divisions, that had the main bulk of Pz.I, T-35 and T-38. Moreover the four smaller divisions had larger AA's, comprising about 50 armoured cars in comparison with the large tankdivisions which had only 24 armoured cars in their AA. Besides, 9.PD was heavily reinforced with an MG Bat, additional artillery and additional support troops.

But 9.PD was the only with just two tank battalions and had a mere 141 combat tanks. The other ex-LKDs had 209 (6.PD), 217 (7.PD) and 197 (8.PD) combat tanks. These last divisions were the ones equipped with the Czech tanks; 9.PD was thus much inferior to them in the number of 37 mm gun AFVs and indeed only 4.PD had a (slightly: 40) lower number of these. It is true 9.PD had the highest PzKpfw. III per battalion ratio of any division, but having just two battalions instead of four as 1-5 and 10.PD had, offset this. It also still had 30 PzKpfw. Is (whereas 6.PD and 8.PD did without). Again, I do not deny it was as such a powerful division.

AMAG: Right, as you compare the divisions very tightly in tank numbers 9.PD was the smallest, but like I said before 9.PD was equipped with relatively many Pz.III and Pz.IV. If one should require to call it the weakest division, one should add 'in numbers, not in fire power'. To me the best way - as I do it myself in publications - is simply stating that 9.PD belonged to the batch of four divisions with only one tankregiment. No qualifications. Because these qualifications sollicit for equalizing the several types. Grebbegoos (talk) 09:07, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

MWAK: I agree that calling it the "weakest division" is imprecise: its infantry strength was considerable, so we simply have to give that fact and abstain from the qualification. On the other hand, while it is good to indicate it was one of the four LKDs turned into PDs with one tank regiment, certainly also the very relevant fact that this tank regiment exceptionally was not yet on full strength and lacked one of its three tank battalions, should be mentioned, especially because we have to relate the future split of these: as I believe, only one of the two tank battalions was directed to the Vesting Holland?--MWAK (talk) 14:41, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 01:34, 16 March 2009 (UTC) 9.PD had an organic tank formation of 177 tanks, 42 Pz-I, 59 Pz-II, 52 Pz-III and 24 Pz-IV. According to the last known registered count at 17 April 1940 it had 159 tanks operation [42, 55, 46, 16]. I trust neither of these figures for the operational facts and figures do not compare with this. At least the tank companies appeared to be bigger and of a different type composition that would be retrieved from the official April 1940 papers. These papers say that PR.33 comprised two tank battalions with each a staf company with 8 tanks, three tank companies of 22 tanks each and additional troops including a few tanks.

The 9.AA was the largest Auflarungsabteiling of all PD's, with two battalions and over 50 armoured cars in six companies [Schwadron]. Both tankbattalions went into the Fortress, only the reinforced AA stayed in the south and occupied the Willemstad - Zevenbergen sector. I have only vague indications that one tank company of each battalion stayed south of Moerdijk. The KTB says nothing about that, which is peculiar.

Basically one tankbattalion started operations on the Island of Dordrecht, the second battalion went straight forward to Ysselmonde. The assault-plan on the 14th (from room Rotterdam) involved one tank company of both tank battalions, each in another task force. I have done quite some study on this 'Flying Dutchman' division lately. End of this month again into Freiburg. Unfortunately the 9.PD Kamaradschaft no longer exist in Austria. But lost about this division and its exact moves remains a mystery up until today. It was special in all sorts of ways with its odd Gliederung. Grebbegoos (talk) 01:34, 16 March 2009 (UTC)

MWAK: I took the number of 141 (excluding twelve Befehlspanzer) from Jentz's Panzertruppen that gives 10 May strengths allegedly deduced from the daily combat readiness reports. The information about the split details is very interesting — and a happy voyage to Freiburg!--MWAK (talk) 16:15, 17 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 15:08, 8 May 2009 (UTC) Well - I have been able to trace the exact figures on 9.PD, MWAK. The 17 April IST Stärke gives 159 tanks (SOLL 177), the Kriegsgliederung of 1 May 1940 indicates an almost identical IST strength (150). In numbers per type IST (SOLL) 37 (42)Pz.I, 57 (59) Pz.II, 40 (52) Pz.III en 16 (24) Pz.IV on 1 may 1940. Comparing such with 7.PD in particular - that had slightly more tanks - but all of the light types [Pz.I, II, T-35 en T-38], dan than it doesn't seem appropriate to identify 9.PD as the weakest tank division. 7.PD was clearly weaker with its nine light companies. 6.PD and 8.PD, also with only one regiment, were slightly stronger than 9.PD indeed. Obviously this is quite an academic matter though. But I figured our exchange would only be closed out when the actual numbers of the 9.PD were added. Sources are the 17 April 1940 inspection list (Anlage KTB 9.PD) and the Kriegsgliederung in the files of AOK 18 dated 1 May 1940 (registered BA/MA W.357300). Grebbegoos (talk) 15:08, 8 May 2009 (UTC)

MWAK: Very interesting data! If we compare them with the numbers by Jentz for 10 May (how he is able to provide numbers for that exact date is not clear to me, but they are claimed to be exactly that), the differences are small: he has three PzKpfw. II less and one PzKpfw. III more, except for the Panzer I numbers (30) — but your total includes the Panzer I Befehlspanzer, I presume? Jentz also makes a distinction between I. Abteilung and II. Abteilung: the first battalion, being derived from the Panzerlehrabteilung, would have had a full complement of heavier tanks, but the latter still would have to be brought on strength.

I had already removed the statement that 9. PD was the weakest. However, I can't quite concur with the conclusion that 7. PD would be: the PzKpfw. 38 (t) might formally — and indeed in weight — be a "light" tank, the Germans used it as a medium tank. It was in essence no worse armed than a Pzkpf. III and frontally only slightly less armoured, its main drawback being that it just had a two-men turret.

Talking about 9. PD anyway: would there be any way to determine the number of tanks in that division still operational (Einsatzbereit) on 13 or 14 May?--MWAK (talk) 06:26, 9 May 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 00:10, 11 May 2009 (UTC) If I am correct Jentz took 140 tanks in both Abteilungen and 13 Befehlswagen. He came to 153 tanks. But that is written down in my notes. Unfortunately my Jentz trilogy is with an associate researcher of mine and probably gone for another few weeks. So I cannot verify at this point but will come back on that.

I can give you the numbers Pz.III and IV per Abteilung. Abt I had 34 off Pz.III and 11 off Pz.IV. Abt II had 4 x Pz.III and 5 x Pz.IV. Two more Pz.III in Stab units. I know for certain - from a battle report in my possession - that the Pz.III Befehlspanzers were both fitted with their main-gun, whereas sometimes this main gun failed. Apart from the count (e.g. 153 or 159 tanks) the division had 9 spare undercarriages. Unfortunately the Qu Abt source does not mention which types but taken from the company allocations it must have been 2 Pz.III undercarriages and 7 Pz.II undercarriages. According to the Quartiermeister report the 1 Mai 1940 report gives IST strengths, but obviously that differs from the operation strength. The KTB gives zero defects for 10 and 11 May, but in the days after a handful of tanks is reported with mechanical failure (undercarriage and twice gun problems, one Pz.II, one Pz.IV).

The T-38 had a 20 mil front armour. That was 50% less than the Pz.III and IV with 30 mm. I consider that quite a difference in those days. Nevertheless I don't want to get into cherry-picking. Numbers wise 9.PD was the weakest division, quality wise she was together with 7.PD the weakest.

The weakness of 9.PD was no matter of significance. But, if things would have been slightly different, and she would have bumped into 1.DLM with its nearly 90 S-35's and 40 H-39, it could have turned out disastreous. All the more for the 9th was split up into three independant columns, not capable of merging easily in case of emergency. Notwithstanding the fact that 9.PD was well reinforced with 8,8 guns from two FLAK units, she would have seriously jeopardized severe losses if 1.DLM would have raided her in her flank. So, the way things turned out her weakness didn't matter, but theoretically Heeresgruppe B took a huge risk to leave 9.PD all isolated in the north. She got away though and that is what we should focus on. I therefore conclude that addressing 9.PD as the weakest (or one of the two weakest) Panzerdivisionen is after all basically accurate.

Talk about Einsatzbereit at 14 May, the KTB differs in several Anlagen. But it comes back on 20 tanks lost during the five days. First losses at Tilburg and Breda (4), afterwards at the Island of Dordrecht (12) and Barendrecht (4). Five Pz.I, six Pz.II, three Pz.III and five Pz.IV as well as one Pz.III Befehlspanzer. Some tanks were damaged too, but no accurate numbers on that. But at least three in the city of Dordrecht. Neither are there numbers given on lost armoured cars [Panzerspäh], although it is 100% certain that a few got lost at the Zuid-Willemsvaart, Tilburg, Breda and the Island of Dordt. Grebbegoos (talk) 00:10, 11 May 2009 (UTC)

These are again very interesting data! I had not expected such high losses on 13 May. Often I have wondered whether the decision to bomb Rotterdam so heavily had not been primarily motivated by a certain lack of confidence on the German side in the capability of the limited number of tanks to survive the heavy and prolonged street fighting they expected to take place. Could the armoured cars lost not have been those of the reconnaissance platoons of the Infantry divisions and Adolf Hitler?

I fully agree that any serious encounter with 1 DLM would have been most unpleasant, to say the least, especially if 9. PD would have wanted to press an attack. It is also interesting to learn that neither of the two divisions moved in a concentrated battle formation.--MWAK (talk) 12:57, 11 May 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 15:49, 11 May 2009 (UTC) Well, 1.Abtl first charged elms of the Dutch Light Division along the narrow causeways crossing the Island of Dordrecht. Although generally successful in crushing the Dutch formations the tanks were opposed by both AT and 7-veld guns with AP ammo. Afterwards one of the medium tankcompanies of 1.Abtl raided the innercity of Dordrecht, where the lost quite some tanks. The first two Pz.II sent in - as recce party - were destroyed in no time by AT guns. Afterwards another bunch of tanks were either crippled or destroyed. At the Vriesebrug one Pz.II and at de Markt two Pz.III or IV. The Staffplatoon of 1.Abtl raided the Barendrecht brug, with three Pz.II and one Pz.III. All four were destroyed by a single AT gun.

Indeed the armoured cars lost were partially from other units than AufklRgt.9. Yet at least two were of this regiment. One was destroyed along the main road Moerdijk - Dordrecht (and stood there until well after the capitulation) and the other one probably by French opposition in Brabant.

1.DLM was poorly used by the Fr 7th Army as were all 7th Army units. In stead of having 1.DLM move in, it was used to shield the northern (left) flank of 2.DLM and 3.DLM. But in stead of either raiding the left flank of 9.PD or the right flank of 3.PD the formidable unit stayed idle. A missed opportunity. 1.DLM could have easily hurt 9.PD bad, very bad. Its main formations being north of Turnhout, even some tank formations north of the Dutch border, makes clear that they had opportunities but chose to avoid battle. 9.PD must have been aware of 1.DLM being about, but did nothing to safeguard its left flank. In fact its main tankformation was taking a more northern route.

The decision to raid Rotterdam with a tactical strike prior to any offensive momevement of the XXXIX.AK into the northend of the Meuze, was indeed given in by the losses inflicted on the 1st Abt. Moreover it was known that the Dutch had AT guns and even armoured cars (in fact only one M.39 was seen by the Germans on the Noordereiland). The narrow passages north of the bridges must have worried GM Hubicki. In fact there are statements from all commands involved that the C-9.PD didn't fancy an offensive without proper arty and Luftwaffe support, softening the defences. Grebbegoos (talk) 15:49, 11 May 2009 (UTC)

I'll try inserting all the information! Indeed the potential of 1 DLM, the strongest Allied division, was largely wasted. No doubt 9. PD tried to avoid French armour. I've simulated an encounter with 1 DLM several times, using Steel Panthers and upwards, and every time 9. PD suffered crippling losses unless fighting a delaying battle in retreat.

A related question you could no doubt provide the answer to: what major Dutch units were present in Rotterdam on 14 May?--MWAK (talk) 07:18, 12 May 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 13:37, 12 May 2009 (UTC) Well I am certain that you needed no battle game simulations to have 9.PD suffer terribly. Significant though was the presence of one 8,8 AT Kp in the PzJgAbt. That was a terribly Panzer Knacker, that helped save the day for plenty of German armour in France little later on. Feeding that info into the simulation (if you had not) shall change the outcome cosiderably. Nevertheless we agree on the fact that 1.DLM could have made a gigantic difference, wether applied north of Hannut or south of Tilburg. In either way it would have been costly to the German side, ad Hannut even decisively changed the outcome of the battle (early penetration of the Dyle by a 4.PD recon outfit).

On 14 May in Rotterdam were the 9.PD with its 1st Abtl, 2nd was overnight 13/14 May at the island Ysselmonde. Besides the remnants of III./IR 16 (22.ID), and parts of SS Leibstandarte. On the island of Ysselmonde the balance of 9.PD (with exception of the AufklReg and some minor support), a part of SS Leidstandarte, one third of the divisional troops of 22.ID, a platoon of 7./IR.65, I./IR.16, 1./Pi.22, two platoons of 13./IR.16, 14./IR.16, three platoons of 13./IR.47, four companies of IR.72, two companies Fallschirmjäger as well as some Fallschirmjäger divisional units. Obviously a few minor formations too. Also some support units of XXXIX.AK. The 254.ID was kept south of Moerdijk and scheduled to start progressing to Rotterdam in the evening of the 14th.

Assault plan for 14 May: Left - SSLAH plus remnants 22.ID, centre - 9.PD (1st Btl in front), right [crossing east of Rotterdam of the Maas by pioneer boats]: Reinforced I./IR.16 with Fallschirmjäger and remnants of stray units 22.ID. IR.72 [4 Kp's] left as occupational force together with smaller units of 7.FD and 22.ID. Grebbegoos (talk) 13:37, 12 May 2009 (UTC)

I just read Hitler's Gedenkschrift of October 1939 and it is interesting to observe that he himself proposes the massed deployment of 88 mm guns to defeat French armour — apparently to take away some misgivings by his generals about the armour imbalance :o). The numbers about the German strength are very useful. What Dutch units were there to oppose them in Rotterdam? Am I right in concluding that Winkelman did not order any counter-concentration to defeat a crossing attempt?--MWAK (talk) 06:39, 14 May 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 23:42, 14 May 2009 (UTC)

Pardon me for my mistake. I specified the German troops in stead of the Dutch! Well the Dutch list is much extended. Apart from a mere 6,000 men of the original garisson (of which 1,200 com's and balance non-com's; minus two companies of III-39.RI, of which one was at Pernis, one was captured on 10 May, minus one company intendants captured on 10 May) the main bulk comprised men of Staff of 11.RI, I-11.RI, 11 C.Mr and 11 C.PAG, section of C.PAG 20, 1-III-11.RI, IV-10.RI, IV-15.RI, III-21.RI, II-25.RI, II-32.RI, II-RJ, some remnants of III-RJ, and obviously AA platoons as well as I-10.RA.

Counter concentrations were in fact in place before 14 May. But hard to maintain obviously, due to the dense city structure. The north shore of the Meuze across the east of Rotterdam was only lightly occupied though. At the main points facing the Meuze bridges there was a quite strong concentration of Dutch formations including most of the AT guns. But the Rotterdam resources were also used to seal off the city in the east, west and north. Quite a stretch. But crossing attempts with conventional means would have stood little change. That was established by the Germans too. They considered a crossing without extended Stuka raids pointless. Grebbegoos (talk) 23:42, 14 May 2009 (UTC)

The nature of the attack by X. AK

- I challange the author to present any proof of a German 'holding offensive' against the Grebbeline! The official German instruction to X.AK (that had to take the Grebbeline) instructed it to breach the Grebbeline on the first day of the invasion. Next the X.AK had to take the Eastfront Fortress Holland on the third day of the invasion. This was no holding offensive at all.

We've been over this before. I can only repeat my earlier arguments which I hold to be in complete agreement with all serious sources: the attack from the south was the Schwerpunkt, the attack from the east secondary. Certainly it was hoped, and even expected, X. AK would push back the main force of the Dutch Field Army, but its basic function in the operation was to engage and bind as many Dutch forces as possible, thereby allowing XXVI. AK to deliver the fatal blow from "behind". Therefore any successes of X. AK, however gratifying to the Germans, were basically immaterial and as a result this minor theatre of operations was rather neglected by the higher German command levels.Yes, I call them stubborn. The X.AK had instructions to penetrate the Grebbeline at D-Day and commence the assault on the Eastfront Fortress Holland on D-Day + 1. If you call that holding orders, suit yourself. But it should not be mentioned in the text. X.Ak had orders to occupy Fortress Holland north of Utrecht, XXIX.AK had to take the Rotterdam - the Hague - Gouda triangle. Nicely divided into two equals bits ... I challenge you to show me exactly the holding bit in the directives X.AK received. I bet you, you cannot come up with those.

Well, if the term "holding offensive" should be considered too interpretative (though it neatly sums up the situation) it can be circumscribed. The subsidiary nature of the X. AK attack is also explicitly referred to by De Jong. It should be remembered that the dividing occupation lines were made on the assumption of a swift Dutch operational collapse and perhaps immediate surrender. When business became serious Bock changed them to the extent that XXVI. AK would cut off any Dutch retreat to the north, exactly in line with the Schwerpunkt character of its attack. Also the Grebbe Line was not seen by the Germans as the Dutch Main Defence Line.

AMAG: As I requested you before, show me a German marching order that proofs X.AK to be a holding site. You cannot. The marching orders for X.AK for May 10 were: 'seize the Ysselline and penetrate the Grebbeline'. Orders for D-Day+1: 'Penetrate the Eastfront Festung Holland'. Is that the nature of a holding offensive? I have often told you this before. We certainly would meet eachother if we would agree on the X.AK operation to be subsidiary to the XXIX.AK ops. X.AK had to take care of the central front, binding the main bulk of the Dutch Field Army and focussing on the northern sector of the Dutch Festung. But it was under orders to penetrate the Festung at the second day of the war. Holding orders would have shown less progressive ambitions and moreover no Waffen SS Stosstruppe to achieve just that fast penetration.

Mind you, poor intelligence had failed staff X.AK to be aware that the Dutch main defence had shifted in April 1940 from the Eastfront to the Grebbeline Grebbegoos (talk) 09:08, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

MWAK: I can concur with "binding the main bulk of the Dutch Field Army" and will forego the "holding offensive" :o). The other details are very useful too!--MWAK (talk) 14:48, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

Moving III LK

- 'but placing itself in a position in which it could have no further influence on the battle, a quarter of the field army had effectively rendered itself impotent'. That is knowledge after the war. Should be stricken. The formation completed the occupation of the main defence area. Or should we also mention IV.Corps rendering itself impotent by occupying the largely unharmed northern Grebbeline?

Well, the last case is hardly comparable. The point is not to blame somebody; this essential aspect cannot remain unmentioned for the sole reason that only with hindsight we know it to have been vital. Hardly comparable? Like it is nonsense to state that III.Corps 'placed itself' in a position where it had hardly influence on the battle. They occupied the entire southeastern front of the Fortress. Positions that had to be taken. Like all troops combined formed a disposition according to the strategic plan. Like IV.Corps, III Corps was not in an area of German assault. Why then had IV. Corps not placed itself out of position and III.Corps too? You should simply suffice by stating that III.Corps took positions along the southeastern front of Fortress Holland. No judgements please!

Perhaps we can easily solve this by referring to the fact that General Reijnders later severely criticized the decision. The reader then can decide for himself whether he agrees. The lack of comparability stems from the simple given that a slight change of direction would have sufficed to pass III Corps if IV Corps hadn't manned the adjoining sector, whereas an attack on the Waal-Linge position would have required a major change of axis and the need to cross two broad rivers extra.

AMAG: No, lets agree on the facts and leave out opinions. 3rd Corps moved into the southeastern leg of the Vesting, simply because that area was to be defended too. Mind you, if the Moerdijk bridges had been blown by the Allies of Dutch, 3rd Corps might have well been the main force to repel an alternative German penetration route into the Fortress. Moreover, Reynders his 'brochure' was a cheap blow in the ashtrayal. If Reynders would have been CIC in May 1940, he would have sacrificed the 3rd Corps and been wiped off of the map with 3.PD and 4.PD appearing on his right flank on 11 and 12 May and 30.ID already probing the undefended Zuid-Willemsvaart on Belgian soil in the very morning of the 11th. I am very much opposed to give qualifications to the 3rd Corps move. That are matters for true specialists and should not be incorporated here. It was not a blunder that was paid darely and as such pure speculation. I kindly insist to leave any speculation out and leave it at a simple notification that 3.rd Corps moved away into the Southeast defences of the Fortress. Grebbegoos (talk) 09:09, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

MWAK: Well, relating such controversies is precisely the task of Wikipedia. That's what the NPOV-policy is all about! We could of course treat the subject in a separate section after the account of the battle itself. BTW, other outcomes than the worst case scenario you envisage are quite plausible. Would the Germans have redirected their main axis, if they had had the chance to pursue 7th Army? If 7th Army had held, would they still have been able to shift? Would III LK even have been doomed to collapse, given that 3 and 4 PD were destined for the Gembloux Gap? Many alternate timelines are posssible :o)--MWAK (talk) 15:17, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 01:56, 16 March 2009 (UTC) I personally believe that should Moerdijk have been lost, that XXVI.AK (which it than still was) would have dropped the Fall Festung scenario and shifted front towards Antwerp, possibly leaving one of its divisions to X.AK. I am even quite possitive that von Küchler would have loved that scenario to unfold on the 12th or 13th for he feared his week disposition during those days. And on paper he was weak, for XXVI.AK/XXIX.AK to my strong opion were the luckiest bastards of the Westfeldzug. Basically their strategic position was louzy on the 12th. They had 1.DLM, 2.DLM, 3.DLM and 6.DLM in their flanks. If it wouldn't have been for the relentless push of 3.PD and 4.PD, the flanks of XXVI.AK would have been exposed beyond healty proportions. Von Küchler already realized that during the Kriegsspiele testing the fifth Halder version of the invasion. That had only gained him SS Leibstandarte to be shifted to his southern force once he would have successfully penetrated the east of Brabant. I personally think that an alternative push via Gorinchem would never have been developed in more than a secundary operation, most likely to be executed by the Waffen SS components. That could only have occurred in the Keizersveer sector due to the width of the Hollands Diep which prevented large scale ambhibious ops. Another scenario could have been a Kriegsmarine operation which would enter a shuttle service. Kriegsmarine flotillas were available. But information about those proves hard to get hold of. All in all I strongly believe that the XXVI.AK would have turned south and awaited the Panzergruppe Kleist gain on the eastside of the Meuze bank. In fact, the XXVI.AK did this in its constellation on 14 May when its divisions basically halted around Breda - Roosendaal - Bergen op Zoom after having chased off the scary Frenchies. So, to be frank from my perspective I don't think that 3rd Corps would have been in the hot spot. But this matter, which has never been carefully researched, requires much more investigation by myself before I can assure that the Germans wouldn't have challenged 3.Corps. Alternatively - where would 3rd Corps have had to go? One could have stated into the rear of the Grebbeline. But that would have meant that other formations would have had to be swopped around. The massive operation of 10 and 11 May made a lot of sense. The disposition of the southern formations was well planned and succeeded. Why, because it was kept simple. Brigade B moved into the rear of the southern Grebbeline, Brigade A into the rear of the Betuweline, 3rd Corps into the southwestern defences and the Light Division was applied as a strategic reserve into the burning sector at Dordrecht. Operational-wise that all made perfect sense. Mind you, swopping formations around under the open Luftwaffe superiorized sky was a challenge in itself. It is so easy to play the General after the war, but basically the huge operation of moving one third of the Field Army around on the first two days, was a perfect operation under the circumstances and should not - in a leisure remark - be filed here as putting 3rd Corps into a dead end. Given the fact that it was envisaged that three weeks of sustained defence was within grasp of the capacity of the Dutch forces, a reshuffle could always take place afterwards, according to the developments on the battlefield. But four days of war is not a window where an Army Staff requires itself to be only faced with the challenges of swopping the Field Army dislocations all the time. Grebbegoos (talk) 01:56, 16 March 2009 (UTC)

MWAK: Then we'll remove the remark and mention the Reijnders controversy in a later section. And you give a sound analysis of the situation of the German Corps'!--MWAK (talk) 16:22, 17 March 2009 (UTC)

AMR 35s present?

- It was not simply a reconnaissance unit of the 1.DLM that attacked Moerdijk in the AFTERNOON of the 11th. It was 12.GRDI reinforced by some light tanks, commanded by Major Michon. It incorporated a few squadrons of Panhard AMD-178 armoured cars and a platoon of AMR-35 light tanks. It than merged with a taskforce of 5.GRDI carrying Général Mittelhauser, liaison of Gamelin, who needed transport to the Hague. All in all the French force was quite substantial, incoporating numerous armoured cars, motorbike hussars and supporting troops. They sealed of the entire region between Breda and Etten, guarding all bridges and crossings. A task force of two platoons accompanied by hussars tried to work its way through Zevenbergschen Hoek, when the long warned Luftwaffe appeared overhead and raided the entire region between Moerdijk, Breda and Etten, bombing away any illusions the French had had. It had taken the French no less than 8 hrs to arrive in the area and get ready for action....

The presence of AMR 35s is very interesting. What is the source for this? I agree and already had planned to give the exact details about the French troops, which indeed were not particularly weak. Source is the battle report by Commandant d'Eskadron Michon

This perhaps shows the danger of relying on primary sources. What we normally refer to as Hotchkiss H35 tanks were called AMRs within Cavalry units.

AMAG: The R-35/H-35/H-39 were medium infantry tanks with a 35-40 mm armour and a main gun of 3,7 cm, the S-35 a medium battle tank. That secondary sources mix up the 35 series all the time shows how little they know, but that they mix them up with an AMR vehicle is worse. The AMR-35 was a light tank [12,5 mm armour, 13 mm heavy MG main weapon with AT capacity], a Renault tank that was used in GRDI's (mechanised cavalry recce units) and RDP's [light cavalry]. Not only the Michon report mentions them, but the battle order of 7th French Army does too. Mix up only applies between the AMR-35 and R-35. But an AMR was an Automitrailleuse Reconnaissance, or armoured car recce type. That was the indication for lightly armoured vehicles. The other '35' vehicles were Char, or Tanks. The mix up between the AMR-35 and the R-35 is because of the same constructor and the same year reference. Mixup with the Hotchkiss vehicles is simply out of the question. Grebbegoos (talk) 09:10, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

MWAK: Well, the point is that no standard AMR 35 was present in any GRDI. Five GRDIs had four ZT2 and ZT3s — but precisely those that were part of 7th Army had none. However, they had vehicles they officially called "AMR" — because they functioned as such — but these were "AMR Hotchkiss 35 H"s. So if the tank platoon of the Michon force was detached from another GRDI it must have consisted of H 35s or "H 39"s. But if it came from 4e RDP it indeed were true AMR 35s.--MWAK (talk) 15:36, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 02:00, 16 March 2009 (UTC) I fully appreciate your comments. Indeed there is lots of confusion about what formations did and which did not appear on Dutch soil. French sources seriously contradict and I have quite a few! Michon speaks in his account of AMR-35's. That could make a lot of sense. Nevertheless I tend to yield in this instance that possibly H-35's were involved. Michon is not quite clear whether the Char came from 4.RDP or one of the GRDI's. Both were around, so nothing is to clear out. Grebbegoos (talk) 02:00, 16 March 2009 (UTC)

MWAK: One more historical mystery then :o).--MWAK (talk) 16:25, 17 March 2009 (UTC)

Michon's outfit was 5.GRDI. I have thoroughly researched the GR's operating in the convines of the French 7th Armee. 5.GRDI had (as it comes to tanks) one squadron of 13 off H-35 and 2.GRDI had 13 H-39's. They were the only two GR's with actual tanks. The balance indeed had a platoon of AMR-ZT light recce tanks only, or no tracked AFV's at all. AMR as a designation for H-35 / H-39 is wrong, as you supposingly know. The abriviation refers to vehciles equipped with machineguns and as we know the H-35 had 3,7 cm guns. Grebbegoos (talk) 01:59, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

Interesting information! Indeed "AMR" would literally refer to a Automitrailleuse, thus a "machinegun vehicle", but the French Cavalry used that term for any tank, as it officially did not have any tanks (chars). Even the SOMUA S35 was a Automitrailleuse de Combat.--MWAK (talk) 07:24, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

Indeed, names were used wrongly all the time. Last week I browsed a German KTB on a specific topic, incidentally recording them speaking of 'Leichte Kampfwagen' in stead of 'Leichte Panzerspaehwagen'. Like the Dutch reports mix up tanks and armoured cars all the time. The allocation of genuine tanks in both GR's by the way doesn't mention them being involved in the Moerdijk event. By that time the tank squadron was still withheld in Belgium ... It is therefore just for sake of our mutual quest for accurate role-outs that I mentioned it. Grebbegoos (talk) 14:21, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

Heavy counterattacks on Rotterdam bridgehead?

- The Dutch did everything they could to get rid of the German stronghold on the northern bank of the Meuze in Rotterdam. In fact the Dutch had managed to push the Germans back into one building only, but since that building was unapproachable and impossible to pound by indirect artillery fire, the Germans were able to hold out.

Still, no all-out attack was made. I am afraid you lack the insight or knowledge to assess this. I suggest that you either study this case or leave out the judgements. Why do you think the Germans considered the Verzekeringsgebouw hell on earth? Because they felt only tickled? The building was situated such that in order to approach it Dutch formations would have to expose themselves in the wide open. Numereous attempts were made to flatten the building with mortars and even artillery. But in vain. Simply storming the building would have exposed the troops on their flanks to fierce German fire. Perhaps you are aware that the Boompjes and Bolwerk were controlled by German MG and mortar fire from the Noordereiland. Please refrain from this kind of conclusion without the proper awareness of the scene!

Well, it's the Amersfoort conclusion. He also states that Winkelman was dissatisfied about the results of the 11th and perhaps we can rephrase it that way. I do not deny the very difficult local conditions.

AMAG: it is typically the one sighted vision we so well know from the poor secondary sources in Holland. In stead of looking at the German side, where awe and respect was shown and where the very point of yielding had been reached on the 13th, we'd like to cling to Amersfoort who considers that the Dutch unlike the Japanese failed to launch a large kamikaze act. Amersfoort is a genuine desk-analist. I don´t buy anything for his battlefield assessments. The Germans already stopped assaulting the bridge area at the 10th. The Dutch continued to put pressure on the Germans and nearly succeeded. The German report of the few dozen remaining men on the northside shows ´we were on the verge of break-down, virtually all were wounded at least once, our ammo was low and almost depleted, we considered surrender to have the wounded treated. Then the Dutch attack stalled'. It was referred to the Marines action. Again, there should be not suggestion that the Dutch didn't do their utmost. Pure suggestion and not our place here to do so.Grebbegoos (talk) 09:11, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

MWAK: In any case the Winkelman assessment should be mentioned. This can then be balanced by a more detailed description of the local situation at this crucial point, adding a touch of drama :o). But remember this is the 11th we're talking about. What exactly was done that day in the way of artillery attacks?--MWAK (talk) 15:56, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 02:09, 16 March 2009 (UTC) Already on the 10th a battery of 10,5 cm was moved into Rotterdam to assist. It was positioned west of the Boompjes. The problem is that with the 10,5 cm guns one could not reach the particular Insurance Building. That's why I earlier referred to the battle field awareness. The site was much contained, hard to reach by arty fire. Howitzers could reach it with their steep projectory but their straddle tends to be quite significant. that would mean jeopardizing the adjacent Dutch positions and those could not be evacuated obviously. Direct fire was hard too, because the building was quite impossible to shell from the Dutch controlled area. Mortar fire would land on top of the building. It was tried, but didn;t work out. The Noordereiland was pounded to pieces. But that helped little. Winkelman's assessment matters little. What did he know? He knew what was told, but the bugger didn't give a toss. Scharroo, being a engineer and not a tactician, was left in charge for five consecutive days. Two minor staff officers were sent to him, only later lt-col Wilson came but not to take over but to concur. Winkelman had little knowledge about the major details in Rotterdam, what did he know about the fine details? Practically nothing. If you read the hearing-minutes of the inquiries of Winkelman, you can simply confirm for yourself that even in 1947-1949 he knew very little of the details yet. His contest was loaded with bad assessments. He shouldn't be our source.Grebbegoos (talk) 02:09, 16 March 2009 (UTC)

MWAK: Well, Winkelman's assesment would not so much be a source, as a historical fact. As a fact, we can't leave it out (well, we can of course but we should not :o) but we can prevent unbalanced conclusions to be drawn by the reader.--MWAK (talk) 16:29, 17 March 2009 (UTC)

French wanted to occupy the Geertruidenberg sector?

- The fact that the French forces had not occupied the sector north of Breda, was not deliberate but caused by slow French doing. It was the French strategy to maintain a strong defence from Keizersveer (Geertruidenberg) southwards to Turnhout. Would this have been executed accordingly the 9.PD would have met the French on their northern route as well.

Amersfoort states it was deliberate.It was not. Please refer to the French battle reports. The unit that had to occupy the zone delayed its manoeuvre because it would first safeguard its retreat route. That took so much time - during which it was air raided too - that it was only half way when the Germans had already reached Lage Zwaluwe and Moerdijk

This is very interesting. Which unit exactly had to occupy the Geertruidenberg sector? And at what date and time?

AMAG: 4.RDP [lichte cavalerie) was under instructions to occupy a sector north of Breda. Some recce units of that unit indeed launched a number of recce missions, but that was that. The regiment basically stayed in the Etten region. Grebbegoos (talk) 09:12, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

MWAK: Rereading it, I see that Amersfoort also states originally a full occupation was ordered but that afterwards the order was limited. Can this be the solution of our problem?--MWAK (talk) 15:59, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 02:15, 16 March 2009 (UTC) Partially. On the 12th Hypothese Breda was officially abandoned. That modified the plans to such extend that not a main defence but simply a screen defence would be formed around Breda. But even the screen formations never reached the northern sector of Breda. Whether that was deliberate or not, leaves to be seen. The French claim not, the Dutch claim that the French commander deliberately slowed the action so that eventually the Germans would outrun him. I personally feel that the French have deliberately left the door open to Moerdijk, in order to see the pressure disappear upnorth rather than switched onto their side. But, the facts still say that the French plans were indeed to occupy this zone with light forces. Would it have mattered? I think not. They would have run like they did anywhere else in Holland. They had already totally given up on us and wanted nothing else than getting back south soonest. But that is only my humble opinion Grebbegoos (talk) 02:15, 16 March 2009 (UTC)

MWAK: But if we make mention of both phases in the plans, that would suffice?--MWAK (talk) 16:35, 17 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 16:00, 28 March 2009 (UTC) I would suggest to mention that the Gr de Beauchesne was instructed by Giraud to man the northflank of Breda but failed to do so. The exact reasons I cannot proof, only deduct. So perhaps its wise to hold on to mentioning just the fact that the Beauchesne outfit never reached its targetted area. Grebbegoos (talk) 16:00, 28 March 2009 (UTC)

When did Winkelman perceive his strategic mistake?

- Winkelman did receive notification of passing armour in the Langstraat but he and his staff did not appreciate the intel as genuine. As such he did not start to appreciate the overall German strategy, which is a matter that he should be held accountable for.

This is not at all how Amersfoort suggests it. What is your source exactly? Try the memoires and the Committee reports

But we can agree that after the radio Bremen broadcast he understood his mistake?--MWAK (talk) 07:59, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

AMAG: certainly

OK, I had already changed it to that extent, as you may have seen.--MWAK (talk) 16:00, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

Overall

AMAG: If we can agree on the basics and leave out the many unnecessary suggestive conclusions, we should be able to finalize this page. Simply stick to the facts and figures and no Amersfoort baloney intwined. After all, this is Wiki and it requires facts.

Thanks for the very helpful chapter-wise follow-up! Grebbegoos (talk) 09:15, 13 March 2009 (UTC)

You're welcome! But again, it should be emphasized that it is in the nature of an encyclopedia to give a higher-order account. Especially if we want to relate a large number of relevant facts, the larger outlines should be all the more clear. So we have to mention conclusions — even from Amersfoort! Indeed, should these be controversial this is all the more reason to mention them, though balanced with contrary conclusions from other secondary sources.--MWAK (talk) 16:07, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 16:01, 28 March 2009 (UTC) Are we in line now with the updates MWAK? Grebbegoos (talk) 16:01, 28 March 2009 (UTC)

I believe so and will change the article in conformation with it — and then (start) add(ing) the sections for 13 May, 14 May, the events in Zealand etc. Sorry for not answering earlier: I was away on a little trip of my own.--MWAK (talk) 07:15, 29 March 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 12:58, 30 March 2009 (UTC) No prob's. We all got other things on our mind from time to time ... Grebbegoos (talk) 12:58, 30 March 2009 (UTC)

German equipment superiority

I think there are three good arguments to keep the passage:

1. There is such a myth; see Frieser.
2. It is really a myth: not even in relation to Belgium did the Germans possess a clear advantage in infantry, armour and artillery equipment.
3. It needs to be mentioned or otherwise people might assume the claim that the Dutch were inferiorly equipped is just an instance of this myth. Also it is informative to indicate that of all the allies the Dutch were the worst equipped.--MWAK (talk) 18:40, 17 April 2009 (UTC)

1. I think you misunderstand. It may be a myth where the British and French are concerned, but not the Netherlands. This article is about the Battle of the Netherlands, is it not?
2. This is not at all true.
3. They were inferior in quality - one needs to take into everything, including air power. Dapi89 (talk) 12:11, 19 April 2009 (UTC)

1. But the point of mentioning it, is exactly that it is a myth for the British and the French — but not for the Netherlands.
2. Keep in mind that we are referring to the relative, not the absolute, strength. Belgian divisions had about the same equipment as German divisions as regards their infantry support weapons and divisional artillery. The armour situation is more complex. People tend to forget the T.13 mechanised guns. Include them and you get a 278 organic vehicle strength in tanks and mechanised guns for 22 divisions. The German army, about 6.5 times larger, had about 9.2 times the tank and mechanised gun organic strength. Not a very great imbalance. Furthermore, those 228 T.13s (and the eight AMC 35s) were armed with a 47 mm gun; so the ratio for well-armed vehicles was about 1:4. All this apart from the fact that those German divisions fighting the Belgians had less AFVs even in the absolute sense.
3. True: all allies were inferiorly equipped as regards air power. Still, on balance (the main British and French armies had relatively more armour and artillery) there did not exist a German equipment superiority — as the Myth would have it: i.e. such a blatant gap in technological development that this alone would suffice to explain the German victory. And people might know about this (am I overly optimistic here? :o) and therefore it is useful to tell them that in the case of the Dutch there really was such a gap.--MWAK (talk) 13:49, 19 April 2009 (UTC)

What constitutes superiority? In combat power, French and British tanks were more heavily armed and protected. But the German tanks were more reliable and most, if not all were fitted with radios. This contrasts with the Allies - something like one in eight. So which is better? As for as tactical operations are concerned.......

I have literature which states that the Belgians were inferior in numbers and armaments. This was made worse by German air superiority which often caught them out in the open. When alone (which they were for the most part) the Germans had the advantage. When it comes to artillery, one needs to factor in dive bombers.

It is complicated. I care less about all this stuff, than people asserting the Germans won because they had "a clever battle plan that the inferior allied command failed to deal with", better "training", and better aircraft technology. The campaign was lost because of poor diplomacy and a crap French General Staff. Gamelin ignored intelligence from Belgium and Switzerland, failed to make any allowance for a German attack anywhere else other than in Belgium, and committed all his reserves in one go.

Anywho, you can add it back if you like. Its no "biggie". What would you say to creating a Battle of Belgium? Dapi89 (talk) 18:46, 19 April 2009 (UTC)

That would be nice; but allow me to finish this one and Battle of France first ;o). I'll try to make the wording more subtle.--MWAK (talk) 05:07, 20 April 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 23:41, 12 May 2009 (UTC)

I fully appreciate KH Frieser as an authority on the Westfeldzug and particularly the operational, tactical and strategical features op that operation. But let us agree on the fact that the material knowledge of Frieser leaves much to be desired. I find his material analyses, both quantitative and qualitative, poor and often easy to reject. He clearly over compensates out of a basic genuine point of the German might and force being traditionally overrated. His airforce comparison is a fake and his armour comparison deliberately overdressed. He even manages to count the Dutch APV's as tanks. Moreover, he makes the worthless H-35 tank a well armoured and well armed medium battle tank (whereas it was a poorly cast iron, under-gunned light infantry tank). That analyses (and many more as both his books on the Westfeldzug gets along) made him - as a material expert - unreliable. He should be regarded as a expert on strategic and operational matters though.

Putting this into Dutch-German perspective, the German 4.Welle divisions 254.ID and 256.ID hardly managed to outclass any of the Dutch divisions but in man-power. The general age of the German infantry in Holland was higher than the general infantry age of the Dutch Field Army. Obviously the German units often outclassed the Dutch organisation wise as well as in respect to the quality of cadre, but I totally agree with the authors of 'Mei 1940' that this well preserved myth of the German invasion force being superior is an ill representation all along. Generally spoken, the Westfeldzug was a German success born from improvisation and opportunity together with a giant portion of kind facilitation by the Western allies ... Grebbegoos (talk) 23:41, 12 May 2009 (UTC)

Well, German infantry was not all that better equipped than Dutch infantry. You've forced me to change my mind on this :o). It is true that Frieser in several occasions gives too high numbers for French tanks and also rates them too high. E.g. it had escaped him that the AMC 35 was not even in service with the French army on 10 May, nor was armoured with 40 mm plates. A statement like Die französischen AMR und AMC waren teilweise mit MG, größtenteils jedoch mit einer 2,5 oder 3,7 cm-Kanone bewaffnet is thus completely off the mark. To his defence I must add that his mistakes came from following the academic literature...--MWAK (talk) 16:23, 13 May 2009 (UTC)

Grebbegoos (talk) 20:49, 13 May 2009 (UTC) I am quite oblivious on those 'academic' sources KHF used. My sources tell me that the French tanks from Renault and Hotchkiss suffered from very poor body moulds (high carbon castings, much inclusions), many substandard thicknesses and yields and that the V-notch of the bodywork was so poor that the armour not even equalized 20 mm armour plating. The S-35 did not suffer from this deficit, mainly because they used different specs and different mills. Moreover, the H-35 and Renault tanks suffered from huge mechanical problems as did the S-35 of which more were put out of action by mechanical malfuntion than enemy doing. And than obviously the main gun matter that involved all light and medium tanks of the French with exception of the few upgraded H-35/39 and the powerful 47 mm of the Somua. The majority of the 3,7 cm guns were the short barrel version not even capable of denting the armour plating of the Pz.Kfw.III and IV. These deficits were not marginal but substantial. So substantial that H-35 battalions were extremely vulnerable and truly jeopardized total annihilation once engaged with Pz.III and IV and/or AT squads. I am quite capable of forgiving KHF for his flaws as it comes to material matters, but then again, it is of such magnitude that it did take away some of the gloom from this excellent research on the operational and strategical side of the Westfeldzug. I am surprised that he has not been warned by some of his co-workers on this matter. Never mind though. Back on topic ;) Grebbegoos (talk) 20:49, 13 May 2009 (UTC)