Talk:World Chess Championship 1954

Allegations of Soviet Collusion

It seems to me that the allegations of collusion at the 1953 Candidates' tournament are much more credible that the famous allegations made by Fischer in the World Chess Championship 1963 cycle, and the article needs something on it. I'll add references here as I find them. Peter Ballard (talk) 02:02, 12 February 2009 (UTC)

• http://www.chesscafe.com/text/skittles171.pdf and http://www.chesscafe.com/text/skittles173.pdf (seem to be from 2002) - Allegations by David Bronstein, review by Andy Soltis. Peter Ballard (talk) 02:04, 12 February 2009 (UTC)

Jan Timman's book Curaçao 1962 is pretty convincing about collusion between Petrosian, Geller, and Keres. Bubba73 (talk), 03:03, 12 February 2009 (UTC)

Sorry, bad choice of words. It's almost beyond doubt there was a drawing pact between those three in 1962, but nothing beyond that. The allegations about Zurich 1953 was that games were deliberately thrown to stop Reshevsky, which to my mind is a stronger form of collusion. Peter Ballard (talk) 03:14, 12 February 2009 (UTC)

Revisiting this 9 years (!) later: Lubomir Kavalek in the Washington Post in 2009 [1]:

Bronstein revealed that during the 1953 Candidates tournament in Zurich, the Soviet players were asked to help Vassily Smyslov finish ahead of Reshevsky and therefore prevent the American grandmaster to reach the world championship match against Botvinnik. It was not necessary. Smyslov played too well and won the event.

And a long copy from Bronstein's book on a forum at chess.com[2], which I'll post here for posterity:

My account of Switzerland would be incomplete, if I did not finally reveal the truth about the tournament in Zurich. Yes, the book about it brought me world fame. But for many years the tournament itself has sat like a thorn in my heart. How long can one suffer? And I have decided to pull out this thorn.

The 1953 Candidates Tournament took place at a difficult time. The events of the Spring (the death of Stalin) and the Summer (the arrest of [the Chief of State Security] Beria) disturbed the whole world – everyone was afraid of a new war and it was no time for chess. And for Soviet citizens the very idea of a trip abroad looked suspicious. Why did they need to go there at those troubled times? But nevertheless an imposing Soviet delegation – nine grandmasters and eight seconds (I alone did not have one) – flew to Switzerland. The FIDE schedule had to be respected.

The tournament was nervy and exhausting: two months' play and 30 rounds! The leaders of the delegation (the deputy head of the Sports Committee [Dmitri] Postinkov, his deputy Moshintsev from the KGB, and grandmaster [Igor] Bondarevsky, who worked for both these organizations) inflamed passions, all the time telling us that on no account must Reshevsky be allowed ahead. If he had qualified for a match with Botvinnik, we would all have had to pay for it. Just think: nine Soviet participants unable to stop one American!

As bad luck would have it, Reshevsky in fact took the lead together with Smyslov. This unsettled our “triumvirate.” And before the 13th round, when I was preparing for my game with Reshevsky, they came to my room (I thought they had had one too many [drinks]) and stated that the following day, despite the black pieces, I had to win. It was an order! There was nothing to be done, and contrary to my habit, for five hours I did not get up from the board – I displayed my zeal. In time trouble, Reshevsky as usual wanted to confuse me. But he met his match. The adjourned position looked only slightly better for me, but fortunately, a study-like way to win was found.

For the time being our leader calmed down. But after Smyslov lost to Kotov, they again grew nervous. Here, after one of the regular [medical] check-ups, the team's doctor Vladimir Alexandovich Ridin reported to Postnikov that Bronstein and Keres were in normal condition, whereas Smyslov had weakened and might not last out to the finish at the desired level....

At any event, the “triumvirate” decided to act. They summoned Keres to the shore of the Zurich lake and over the course of three hours tried to pursuade him to make a quick draw with white against Smyslov, so that in the next round the latter would be able to assail Reshevsky with all his might (I was told this that same eveniing by Tolush, Keres's second).

Keres courageously withstood the pressure. Perhaps he promised to think about it, but he turned up for play … all flushed and agitated, and I saw he was not in a fit state to play. This was also noticed by Smyslov, who suddenly came up to me and asked, “Why is Paul looking at me so maliciously? Have I offended him, or what?” I didn't know what to reply, so I kept quiet – suppose Smyslov did not know what was going on? Keres lost, of course.

The “triumvirate decided to strike while the iron was hot. They convinced Geller that I had supposedly demanded a point from him, so as to not allow Reshevsky to go ahead [of me]....

I naively thought that after Geller the conversation would end. Oh no. “Now,” said Postnikov, lighting up another cigarette, “After Geller, you have Smylov. Remember, that before his game with Reshevsky, he must not be agitated [about the next game with you]. He must know that you will later make a quick draw with him.”

“But I have white!”

“What's the difference? We must not risk an American Winning the tournament.”

“But I too can win in the event of a successful finish.”

“A draw, and a quick one,” Postnikov cut me short. “We have just received a coded telegram from [Moscow]: 'Play between the Soviet participants is to cease.' Do you understand?”

I was stupefied by such a falsehood! My look did not appeal to Moshintsev, and he decided to intensify the pressure by blurting out: “What? Did you seriously think we came here to play chess?!” There was nothing I could say to that. “So,” the KGB agent continued, “Before your game you will go to his room and agree how to make a draw. Is that clear?”

Abridged from “Secret Notes,” by David Bronstein and Sergey Voronkov

The skittles171.pdf article has much of the same, but with extra commentary on round-by-round scores:

The key acts in the drama were Rounds 23 to 26, played October 10 to 14. The standings after Round 22 were: Reshevsky and Smyslov, 13.5 points, Bronstein, 12.5, Keres, 12

A contemporary Soviet version of what happened next was given in the yearbook, Shakhmaty za 1953: "It could be said that the final victory of Smyslov was secured by four games: Keres-Smyslov, Smyslov-Reshevsky, Kotov-Reshevsky and Geller-Bronstein."

The first of these games to be played was Kotov's 67-move victory over Reshevsky in Round 23 - a serious, but far from fatal blow to the American's chances.

Smyslov had the bye that day so technically he and Reshevsky remained tied at 131⁄2 points. Bronstein and Keres moved up to 13 points – and Keres was due to play White the next day against Smyslov.

In the tournament book Bronstein wrote how Keres, trying to erase Smyslov's lead, was motivated by "psychological circumstances" when he "had the idea of taking his chances on a sharp and unusual Kingside attack using two Rooks and no pawns."

But according to Bronstein's 64 article there was a behind-the-scenes struggle well before Keres sat down to play 1.c4: The troika called Keres to the shore of Zurich's lake and tried for three hours to convince him to make a draw with White against Smyslov – so that Smyslov could use all his strength against Reshevsky in Round 25.

"Keres' second, Tolush, told me of this that very night," Bronstein wrote.

"Keres steadfastly withstood the onslaught" at the lake, he added, and may have eased the pressure on him by promising that he would consider what the troika said to him.

"But he came to the game in a fighting mood."

However, Keres was too upset by the situation and in no condition to play, he wrote.

Smyslov saw Keres' strange mood and quickly asked Bronstein why the Estonian was looking at him so sharply.

"Did I offend him?" he asked.

"I didn't know what to say and was silent," Bronstein wrote. "Could he not be in the know?"

"Keres, of course, lost."

The main extra allegation in the Chess Cafe articles is in http://www.chesscafe.com/text/skittles173.pdf (which is on archive.org); that Bronstein was pressured to draw with white against Smyslov in Round 26 (out of 30):

About noon on the day of Round 26 Moshintsev knocked on Bronstein's hotel door.

"Have you been to see him yet?" he asked.

"No."

"Then let's go....Smyslov is waiting."

"And he literally took me by the hand to the neighboring room."

When they got to the room they found Smyslov and his second, Vladimir Simagin, sitting near the window. Smyslov greeted Bronstein while Simagin averted his eyes and looked out the window.

Bronstein said he began by talking about the weather.

"No, Devi," Smyslov said nervously, "Tell me, how me we'll play."

Bronstein mumbled something but Smyslov repeated, "No, how will we play?"

Then, "unexpectedly", Smyslov said: "Well, Keres played for a win and lost."

At that moment, "It became clear to me that he knew from the very start all about this damnable performance," Bronstein wrote.

" 'Okay," I answer. 'We'll play something like...' And I quickly left. Moshintsev awaited me at the door. 'You agreed?' 'Yes.' And he left."

When the game began Smyslov answered his 1.e4 with 1...e5. Bronstein hesitated a few minutes but concluded he had no way out.

He recalled having these thoughts:

"Even if I win, nothing will change... Somebody else will compensate Smyslov with this half-point, or even 'gift' him with a full point."

"And in Moscow there will be new troubles for me. In addition – or first of all? - I was sure that Veinstein had already been arrested for his long-ago work under Beria, and my stubbornness would turn out badly for him."

So he played the Exchange Variation of the Ruy Lopez. It was "the least offensive variation of the Ruy Lopez," wrote Najdorf, who expressed wonder at the selection.

So apparently did Reshevsky.

After 4. Bxc6 he passed by the table where Bronstein and Smyslov were playing. Bronstein said the American stopped and "expressively cleared his throat."

"To this day I hear this sound because the shame hasn't passed," he added.

At the end of the day, following their 21-move draw, the standings showed:

Smyslov 16 points (and a bye); Reshevsky 14.5; Bronstein 14; Keres 13.5 (and a bye);

The rest was anti-climax ...

So in summary, the main allegations are:

• Keres (white) was pressured to draw with Smyslov in Round 24. Keres resisted the pressure, but lost the game, because we was upset.
• Bronstein (white) was pressured to draw with Smyslov in Round 26, and Bronstein complied by playing a tame opening.

Cumulative scores from http://www.mark-weeks.com/chess/5254$cix.htm

• After Round 22: Smyslov + Reshesvsky 13.5/21 (+6), Bronstein 12.5/21 (+4), Keres 12/21 (+3)
• Round 23: Smyslov bye, Reshevsky lost to Kotov, Bronstein draw, Keres won: VS +6, SR +5, DB and PK +4.
• Round 24: Keres-Smyslov 0-1, others drew: VS +7, SR +5, DB +4, PK +3
• Round 25: Geller-Bronstein 1-0, Smyslov defeated Reshevsky, Keres bye, VS +8, PK, SR +4, DB +3

... so when Bronstein sat down opposite Smyslov the start of round 26 (out of 30), Reshevsky's chances were already remote. Adpete (talk) 04:14, 4 April 2018 (UTC)

Another point: the David Bronstein article says that, in this book, Bronstein alleges the favouritism was of the Russian Smyslov ahead of the "non-Russian Soviets" Keres and Bronstein. Well, I can't see any allegation of that in these quotes. As far as I can see, it suggests Smyslov had to be protected because he was leading, not because he was preferable to Keres or Bronstein. Adpete (talk) 03:09, 13 April 2018 (UTC)

Better image

That is straight from 1957 as the image description says. This is 1954. Jishiboka1 (talk) 07:42, 13 March 2023 (UTC)