User:Yt95/Hungarian holocaust
The following are notes to a request for information on the talk page of Pope Pius XII and the Holocaust c. June 2011:
“This had already begun in 1942, when more than 10,000 'foreign' Jews pushed out of Hungary into the fire of German mobile killing squads. (p. 105, 2000)..[After mentioning the factors that led up to this incident Phayer adds] Other historians, chiefly Randolph L Braham, would add a fourth factor: the failure of the church to protest openly, which led to the 'climate that made the unhindered implementation of the Final Solution possible'[1]
“In June [1943] , the U.S State Department had instructed Harold Tittman to ask the Vatican to intervene on behalf of Hungarian Jews, in doing so it [the Vatican] did not depart from its customary passivity.” [2]
“Beginning in mid-May 1944, more than 400,000 [Hungarian] Jews were 're-settled' [I.e exterminated] over a period of just two months.”[3]
“If, as I have argued, the threat of German retaliation was the critical factor governing Pope Pius during the [1943] fall crisis involving Roman Jews, then he must have greatly relieved when the allies became Rome's occupational force in June of 1944”(p. 89, 2008) [“Minister Osborne put it to the Vatican Secretary of State more bluntly on December 14, 1942: “Instead of thinking of nothing but the bombing of Rome, [the Holy See] should consider [its] duties in respect to the unprecedented crime against humanity of Hitler's campaign of extermination of the Jews”[4]
“In March [1944], the War Refugee Board..urged Pius XII to become involved in saving Hungarian Jews...learned that the Vatican had already told representatives of the Holy See in Hungry ..[to help Jews]” [5]
"Although Pius had resolved to do what he could to save Jews he required a good deal of prodding before he finally intervened {i.e sending an 'open cable'} toward the end of June [1944]. One source of pressure came from the Auchwitz Protocol {a document detailing the extermination process}...”[6]
“When a copy of the Auchwitz Protocol reached the Vatican, the pope sent a messenger to Bratislava to verify its authenticity, even though he had known for well over a year that Jews were being gassed en masse. The Auchwitz Protocol subjected Pope Pius to the same kind of pressure he had felt late in 1942 when the United Nations decried the murder of the Jews. Undoubtedly, the pope did not want to find himself trailing behind the denunciations of other voices and institutions about the events in Hungary...” [7]
“In addition a number of people appealed directly to Pius. The chief rabbis of Palestine, Isaac Herzog and Ben-Zion Meir Uziel; the War Refuge Board; the Archbishop of Westminster at the behest of the British World Jewish Council; and archbishop Edward Money at the behest of Leon Kubowitzki of the United States as well as others prodded Pius to do something. He finally sent Regent Horthy an open (public) telegram on June 25 [1944], urging him to do “everything in his power to save as many unfortunate people [as possible] from further pain and sorrow. The appeal to Horthy, historian Randolph Braham has written, was weak – a 'discrete diplomatic appeal' that did not mention Jews by name. Furthermore, it was not 'pain and sorrow' (as Pius wrote) but death that faced the Jews. [Nevertheless Phayer then notes that the response of world opinion, following the telegram, led to a temporary cessation of deportations]...” [8]
The popes [June 1944] telegram described as “the first of it's kind during the Holocaust period”. [9]
“In contrast to Pius's diplomatically worded message, the responses of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and other leaders took a threatening tone, promising retaliation if Hungarian Jews were not protected.”[10]
“Cardinal Seredi [of Hungary] blew up at [papal] Nuncio Rotta..'it is deceitful for the Apostolic See to carry on diplomatic relations with that German government which carries out the atrocities'. This statement backed Pope Pius into a corner..The cessation of deportations to Auschwitz proved to be no more than a summer respite..” [11]
“The World Jewish Congress turned again to the Vatican to forestall the killing of the remaining 300-400000 Jews....[then mentions further news about mass extermination taking place and the U.S wanting the Vatican to intervene]” [12]
“On October 16 [1944], the U.S State Department again asked that the Holy See[to intervene regarding] deportations...two days later, the U.S asked the Holy See to communicate to the German Ambassador the intention of the Allies to hold those responsible for the atrocities in Hungary accountable. There is nothing in Weizsacker's papers to indicate that the pope conveyed the message. After his audience with Pius on the following day [October 17], Taylor cabled Roosevelt that the 'pope [would] make a special appeal for the salvation of the Jews in Hungry' “ [13]
“The intensity of appeals to the Holy See in October may be taken as an accurate barometer of the danger to the 300,000-400,000 Jews remaining in Hungry. Late in the month the Vatican received still another plea from London and Washington, this time for a radio broadcast by the Holy Father to Hungry. Prompted by the War Refuge Board, the State Department told Taylor 'urgently to approach the pope with the suggestion that he deliver a radio broadcast to the people and clergy appealing to them to temporarily conceal Jews and oppose the deportation and extermination of these peoples to the full extent of their powers'. Instead of a radio broadcast, Pius responded, weakly by sending a congratulatory word to [Cardinal] Seredi for his plan to make October 29th a day of prayer and monetary support for Jews. This was very far indeed from what was asked of the Holy See – a direct appeal by Pope Pius to the Hungarian Catholic people. In early November, Gowen, as assistant to Myron Taylor, sent word that "it was fear of communism that in the fall of that year dissuaded Pope Pius from making a radio broadcast," at the behest of the U.S War refugee Board and the U.S State Department, to save 65,000 Jews about to be deported from Hungry and murdered at Auchwitz-Birkenau. [fn. 131. p. 286, F. C Gowen, Vatican City, to Myron C. Taylor, November 7, 1944, Entry 1069, Box 4, RG 59, location 250/48/29/05, National Archives and Records Administration. Nb see Phayers comments p. 320 re the group of records that form part of RG 59). Osborne provided London with a not altogether different but fuller explanation for why the Pope turned down the request to give a radio broadcast. Osborne said that if he made such an announcement about Jews in Hungary he would have to make a similar statement regarding 'Russian treatment of Poles and Baltic populations.' (fn. 132, p. 286, Morely, Vatican Diplomacy, 10) This was surely a hollow excuse. Pius new very well that the Soviets were not engaged in a Nazi-style genocide or anything like it, and he knew that the Soviets treatment of Poles could not begin to compare with the bestiality of the Nazis from 1940 to 1943 in occupied Poland.” [14]
[ see article from National Catholic Reporter “New documents fuel debate over Pius XII”, John L Allen Jr, Feb. 01, 2010, regarding letters relating to above]
“But, although Nuncio Rotta continued to provide him [Pius XII] with ghastly information regarding the treatment of Jews and their deportation, Pius declined to condemn publicly the collaboration of the Hungarian government” [15]
“There is no doubt that Pius XII did more to save the Jews in Hungary than in any other country. In no other instance did he intervene directly with a foreign government. Even though by that time it was clear that Germany would lose the war and that Rome was out of Hitlers reach, credit must be given for his intervention. In the end, although about 450,000 Hungarian Jews perished, some of the credit for saving the remaining 30 percent of the Jewish population belongs to Pius XII. (of course, this leaves unattended the question of his silence before the deportation of the 450,000.) The fact remains, however, that he could have done more. As before, the Vatican remained passively active regarding Jewish concerns. His failure to appeal directly by radio to Hungarian Catholics left some of them [I.e Catholics] uninhibited in their rapaciousness – forcing starving Jews to pay usurious prices for bread...”[16][my comments: I saw a documentary around 5 years ago in which an Hungarian Catholic described how he took clothes from Jews as they were being transported meekly like “lambs to the slaughter” He was sitting next to his crucifix smiling, without any shame or remorse, when retelling the incident.]
“American Jews continued to appeal to the Vatican for more intervention by the Holy See late in December 1944.” [17]
“The response of the Catholic Church to the murder of the Hungarian Jews late in the Second World War presents a picture of an organization in disarray. A lethargic pope, a zealous nuncio, a callously antisemitic Hungarian cardinal..” [18]
References[edit]
“The Catholic Church and the Holocaust”, 1930-1965, Michael Phayer,Indiana University Press, 2000, ISBN 0-253-21471-8
“Pius XII, The Holocaust and the Cold War”, Michael Phayer, Indiana University Press, 2008, ISBN 978-0-253-34930-9
Notes[edit]
- ^ p. 105, 2000)
- ^ p. 108, 2000
- ^ p. 105, 2000
- ^ Phayer, 2000, p. 63; see also Phayer, 2008, p. 137
- ^ p. 90, 2008
- ^ p. 90, 2008
- ^ p. 91, 2008
- ^ p.91, 2008
- ^ p. 107, 2000
- ^ p. 107, 2000
- ^ p. 91-92, 2008
- ^ p. 92, 2008
- ^ p. 92, 2008
- ^ p. 93, 2008
- ^ p. 109, 2000
- ^ p. 93, 2008
- ^ p. 94, 2008
- ^ p. 109, 2000