Assassination of Karl Hotz



Karl Hotz (29 April 1877, Wertheim am Main, Germany – 20 October 1941), Nantes, France) was a Lt. Colonel in the German military during World War II. With the occupation of France by Nazi Germany in June 1940, Hotz became the military governor of the German military administration in Nantes. He was assassinated in Nantes by French  communists on 20 October 1941, one of the first German soldiers killed by the French Resistance. His assassination led to a massive manhunt for his killers and the retaliatory execution of 48 French citizens by the Germans.  Relations between the German occupiers and French officials in Nantes had been cooperative until the executions which contributed to worsening relationships between the French and their German occupiers.

Early life
Hotz was born in 1877 in Wertheim am Main. He became an army officer and served in Metz where he learned to speak French. He lived in Nantes from 1930-33 as head of a project to build an underground canal system beneath the city. On his return to Nantes as military governor in 1940, he was described by a French employee as "an old man, dry, short, dressed in an artillery officer's uniform" with "a broad smile and kindly expression." Hotz was a music lover and was invited to play the trumpet and piano at the homes of prominent citizens of Nantes and its region.

Background
The German occupation forces in France, under General Otto von Stülpnagel, encountered little violent opposition after the armistice between France and Germany on 22 June 1940 until the 22 June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, an ostensible ally of Nazi Germany, had instructed the French Communist Party (Parti Communiste Français, PCF) to take no action against the German occupying power. With the invasion of the Soviet Union, the French communists changed course and embarked on a "campaign of sabotage and assassination."

On 13 August 1941, a group of 100 young people formed by the PCF youth wing walked out of the Strasbourg – Saint-Denis station singing la Marseillaise under the tricolor flag. French police intervened and German soldiers opened fire. Samuel Tyszelman was hit in the leg. Henri Gautherot (b. 1920) fled but was caught in the nearby Boulevard Saint-Martin. Tyszelman and Gautherot were executed on 19 August. Two days later, on August 21, 1941, the first assassination of a German military officer followed as revenge. The naval management assistant Alfons Moser was shot in the Barbès - Rochechouart metro station by the communist party member Pierre "Frédo" Georges (1919-1944) in Paris, accompanied by Gilbert Brustlein (1919-2009). In retaliation, six French prisoners were convicted, sentenced to death and executed by a newly constituted French special court under pressure from the German occupying forces.

On 22 August, the Germans in Paris announced that all prisoners in French jails because of offenses to the Germans would be regarded as hostages and could be executed in response to resistance to the German occupation. The announcement blamed the attacks on "Jewish Bolsheviks." On 3 September, unknown persons shot and killed Sergeant Ernst Hoffman in Paris. The German army executed three communist prisoners in response. German leader Adolf Hitler was dissatisfied with the "limited executions" and ordered more "drastic measures" with 50 to 100 executions for each assassination of a German soldier. On 15 September, German officer Wilhelm Scheben was shot and killed in Paris. In retaliation, the Germans executed twelve hostages on September 19. The Germans attempted to execute only hostages who had committed sabotage or other serious crimes but if they ran short of hostages they executed people convicted of minor offenses. Six of those executed had been convicted of minor crimes.

About 15 October the French communists extended their attacks on German military personnel to the provinces. The leaders of the self-named "Battalions of Youth," Georges and Albert Ouzoulias, sent Gilbert Brustlein and Guico Spartaco from Paris to Nantes.

Assassination
At 7:30 a.m. on 20 October 1941, Hotz and Captain Wilhelm Sieger were walking across the cathedral square in Nantes en route to their offices when the two assassins, Brustlein and Spartaco, opened fire on them. Brustlein fired three shots into the back of Hotz who died immediately; Spartaco's pistol jammed and Sieger was unharmed. The two ran from the scene into the maze of streets surrounding the square and were not apprehended. The killing of Hotz was random; at the time the assassins did not know that they killed the commander of the German occupiers of Nantes. Fifty years later Brustlein would say that the assassination was an "act of war" and that it ignited the resistance in western France.

The immediate reaction of the French authorities in Nantes was to try to placate the Germans. The French had had good relations with Hotz. The mayor of Nantes and the prefect of the province presented their condolences. The Germans told them that the response to the assassination would be decided by their superiors in Paris and Berlin. The French in Nantes issued an appeal to the citizenry to find Hotz's assassins and condemned the "odious crime." The newspaper blamed the killing on agents of London and Moscow, complimented Hotz on his fairness, and repeated the appeal to find the assassins.

German reprisals
Hitler learned of Hotz's assassination at 10:30 a.m. He advocated the execution of 100 to 150 hostages, a curfew in western France, and a one million franc reward for information leading to the capture of the killers. Hitler blamed the British for the assassination. The responsibility for carrying out Hitler's wishes fell on Otto von Stülpnagel, based in Paris and the military commander of occupied France. Stülpnagel argued for a three-day delay in executing the hostages to allow time to catch the killers. Hitler decreed that fifty hostages would be executed immediately and 50 more if the killers were not caught in two days. The situation was complicated when another communist assassin killed a civilian working for the German military in Bordeaux on 21 October.

French authorities drew up the list from men already in internee and prison camps, using it as an opportunity to rid France of communists. Thirty of the fifty chosen were communists; the other twenty were a varied group, including one man whose offense had been not surrendering his hunting rifle to the Germans. Last minute negotiations between the French and Germans reduced the list to 48. On October 22 the 48 men were executed by the German military and the Schutzstaffel (SS). Their names were published in newspapers the following day. Those executed included Guy Môquet, Charles Michels and Jean-Pierre Timbaud.

French authorities and private citizens tried to persuade the Germans to call off the execution of 50 additional men for the assassination of Hotz (and another 50 in Bordeaux for the assassination there) as had been ordered by Hitler. Stülpnagel agreed and sent a message to Berlin: "the attacks were carried out by small terror attacks and English soldiers or spies who move from place to place;...the majority of Frenchmen do not support them...shooting hostages only embitters the people and makes future rapprochement more difficult...I personally have warned against Polish methods in France." ("Polish methods" referred to widespread German massacres in Poland.)

Exiled French leader Charles de Gaulle weighed in on October 23 advising the French in a BBC radio broadcast not to kill Germans because the Germans could retaliate with massacres. He promised to attack the Germans in France when it became possible. On October 28, Hitler suspended the execution of the additional hostages.

Impact
Stülpnagel continued to disagree with Berlin's policy of mass executions of hostages in retalitation for anti-German acts. German reprisals, he believed "alienated workers, provoked resistance, and forced Germany to send more security forces..." On 17 February 1942, at his request, he was relieved of his duties.

In author Gildea's view, the Hotz assassination resulted in "the whip hand on the German side passed from the military authorities who were tough but fair to the secret police who were interested only in repression." Neumaier contests that opinion by stating that the methods of the German military and the SS were essentially the same.

Gildea disagrees with the later opinion that the assassination of Hotz and the German reprisals ignited French resistance to the German occupation. Rather, he says that the incident "served only to illustrate the madness of armed resistance and the benefits of avoiding reasons to upset the Germans." Laub says that the events of late 1941 caused the French to believe that "neither collaboration nor resistance made sense." Their "unenthusiastic collaboration" with the Germans turned to "sullen acquiescence."