Battle of Guningtou

The Battle of Kuningtou or Battle of Guningtou, also known as the Battle of Kinmen , was fought over Kinmen in the Taiwan Strait during the Chinese Civil War in 1949. The failure of the Communists to take the island left it in the hands of the Kuomintang (Nationalists) and crushed their chances of taking Taiwan to destroy the Nationalists completely in the war.

Prelude
Following the establishment of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, the government of the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek began withdrawing its forces from mainland China to Taiwan. However, ROC garrisons remained stationed on the islands of Quemoy (Kinmen) and Matsu, located off the coast in Fujian Province. Commanders of the PRC People's Liberation Army (PLA) believed that Quemoy (Kinmen) and Matsu had to be taken before a final assault on Taiwan. The PLA planned to attack Kinmen from nearby Aotou (澳頭) (in Xindian, Xiamen), Dadeng (Tateng) and Lianhe (Lienho) (蓮河) (then part of Nan'an County, now also in Xindian) by launching a first attack with 9,000 troops to establish a beachhead, before landing a second force of roughly 10,000 on Greater Kinmen Island, expecting to take the entire island in three days from an ROC garrison not expected to be larger than two divisions. The Communists had incorrectly estimated that there were only 12,000 Nationalist soldiers on the entire island, and believed they consisted of green recruits and demoralized remnants of conscripted units that had survived defeats in central China – a miscalculation that would contribute to their calamitous defeat.

Expecting that a PLA attack was imminent, ROC commanders ordered the immediate construction of fortifications. By October, ROC troops had laid 7,455 land mines, and constructed roughly 200 earthen bunkers on the shores of Kinmen, as well as several anti-amphibious landing beach obstacles. The ROC garrison on Kinmen was also reinforced with armor (1st Battalion, 3rd Tank Regiment, which were veterans of Burma campaign, consisting of 22 M5A1 Stuart light tanks organized into two tank companies), battle-hardened infantry, and supplies from the 12th Army. In the opening hours of October 25, the PLA's armada (consisting of hundreds of wooden fishing boats) set sail for Kinmen. They intended to land near the village of Longkou on the narrowest part of the island. But due to the crudeness of their craft, choppy waters and winds, many of them were scattered and carried past Longkou and northwestwards toward the shore of Guningtou instead.

In October 1949, the islands were home to approximately forty thousand residents. Despite its small size, Quemoy's strategic significance lay in its remarkably close proximity to the mainland. This geographical proximity positioned Quemoy as a critical outpost for controlling maritime access to Xiamen and its adjacent coastal areas, making it strategically vital for the Nationalist government's retreat to Taiwan.

October 25
Around 01:30 on October 25, a Nationalist patrol accidentally set off one of the land mines. The blast alerted other units all along the northern shore and the PLA's quiet approach to Kinmen was compromised. Immediately, flares were fired into the air by ROC troops and searchlights swept the area, which brightly illuminated the PLA's fleet and led to their discovery by the Nationalists.

At the time of the discovery, a tank squadron consisting of Tanks 64 and 65, were guarding a tank receiving maintenance (having been stuck in sand the evening prior). Upon seeing the illuminated PLA attack force, the soldiers began returning fire with the tanks. According to reported accounts, an ammunition ship was one of the first hit by ROC tank fire, resulting in a fire that burned neighboring landing craft.

At about 02:00 when the tide had begun to recede, PLA troops from regiments 244, 251, and 253 landed on the north side of Greater Kinmen Island at Kuningtou (古寧頭 ), Huwei (湖尾) and Lungkou (壟口). Regiment 244 was the first ashore landing near Lungkou where Nationalist defenders raked them with machine-gun fire, artillery, and mortars. They suffered heavy casualties. Regiments 251 and 253 fared better, landing near Guningtou and Huwei respectively where they broke through ROC defenses and continued to head inland.

Arriving at high tide, many of the PLA landing vessels became caught on submerged anti-amphibious landing beach obstacles and immobilized. When the tide went out, the PLA landing vessels became beached and were unable to return to the mainland to transport the second wave of reinforcements. Although these Communists were initially supported by artillery fire from the mainland, it had to cease firing once the infantry disembarked. Some of the troops, stranded in their vulnerable landing craft still far from shore, had to swim or wade some 650 yards (600 meters) in order to reach the shore, also rendering them without cover and extremely vulnerable to the defenders' fire. The beached PLA vessels were destroyed shortly afterwards by gunfire from two ROC Navy vessels patrolling off the northwest coast of Kuningtou, strafing runs by ROCAF P-51s, as well as by ROC troops who burned the mostly wooden boats using flamethrowers, grenades, gasoline, and oil.

The advancing PLA forces were met by the ROC 18th Army and US-made M5A1 tanks of ROC 1st Bn, 3rd Tank Regiment. PLA Regiment 244 held high ground at Shuangru Hill (雙乳山), but were beaten back by ROC armor by early morning. PLA Regiment 253 holding Kuanyin Hill (觀音山) and the Huwei Highlands (湖尾高地) were also forced to fall back by 12:00 after an overwhelming ROC counterattack of infantry, tanks, and soldiers with flamethrowers, and supported by mortars and artillery. The PLA troops were attacked from three sides. PLA Regiment 251 managed to break out of an ROC encirclement and entered the village of Kuningtou, and dug in at Lintsuo (林厝). Shortly afterwards, Regiment 251 was attacked by the ROC 14th and 118th divisions, with the ROC 118th division suffering heavy casualties. By the end of the day, the PLA had lost its beachheads at Huwei and Lungkou.

October 26
At 03:00 on October 26, around 1,000 troops in 4 companies from PLA Regiment 246 and the 85th division landed on Kinmen to reinforce PLA forces already on the island landing again at Huwei and Kuningtou. At dawn, Regiment 246 managed to break through ROC forces surrounding the village of Kuningtou, making a rendezvous with the surviving PLA troops taking cover in the town. At 06:30, the ROC 118th division launched a counterattack along the northern coast on PLA forces in Guningtou at Lincuo. The resulting battle was extremely bloody and soon turned into urban warfare in the streets and alleyways of Guningtou. With air support from P-47s and B-24s of the ROC Air Force, ROC forces eventually prevailed, taking Lintsuo by noon and Nanshan (南山) at 3PM. Surviving PLA forces began falling back to the coast.

October 27
By the early morning of October 27, the surviving People's Liberation Army forces had exhausted both their food and ammunition supplies. 1,300 PLA troops retreated to the beaches north of Kuningtou. After a final ROC assault, the remaining PLA troops surrendered to ROC forces at 10:00 on that day. All of the PLA troops who had landed on Kinmen were either killed or captured.

Aftermath


Following the failure at Kuningtou, PLA General Ye Fei submitted an official apology to Mao Tsetung asking to be punished for his failure. General Ye attributed the failure of the operation to three factors: an insufficient number of landing vessels, failure to properly secure the beachheads, and the lack of an overall commanding officer to oversee the three regiments involved in the first wave. As Ye was one of Mao's favorite generals, Mao never took any action against him.

For ROC forces accustomed to continuous defeats against the PLA on the mainland, the victory at Kuningtou provided a much-needed morale boost. The failure of the PRC to take Kinmen effectively halted its advance towards Taiwan. With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the signing of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, the Communist plans to invade Taiwan were put on hold.

Due to the PLA's defeat, the Battle of Kuningtou was not widely publicized in the PRC until early in the 21st century when the publication of articles within the mainland examining reasons for its failure was widely distributed. The army generally concluded that its lack of amphibious landing experience, lack of sophisticated landing craft, lack of armor, low attack-repelling ability, lack of international recognition, and lack of intelligence services contributed to their defeat. As they had expected to win the battle after one day of fighting, they therefore did not bring enough ammunition, supplies, food, and water, on the first wave and also to a lesser degree during the second day's invasion. The battle is seen as being highly significant in Taiwan, as it laid the foundation for the current status quo relationship between Taiwan and mainland China.

People's Liberation Army

 * 3rd Field Army: Chen Yi (Commander and Political Commissar), Su Yu (Deputy Commander)
 * 10th Corps: Ye Fei (Commander), Liu Peishan (Director of Political Department)
 * 28th Army: Chu Shao-ch’ing (Commander), Hsiao Feng (Deputy Commander and Main Planner of the Attack Plan), Li Man-tsun (Deputy Political Commissar)
 * 29th Army: Hu Ping-yun (Commander), Tuan Huan-ching (Deputy Commander), Huang Huo-hsing (Political Commissar)

First Wave


 * 82nd Division, 244th Regiment of the 28th Army
 * 84th Division, 251st Regiment of the 28th Army
 * 85th Division, 253rd Regiment of the 29th Army

Second Wave (only 10 platoons actually landed)


 * 82nd Division, 245th Regiment of the 28th Army
 * 82nd Division, 246th Regiment of the 28th Army (2 companies sent for reinforcement)
 * 87th Division, 259th Regiment of the 29th Army (2 companies sent for reinforcement)

Republic of China Army
Greater Kinmen


 * 12th Corps: Commander Hu Lian, Deputy Commander Ke Yuanfen, Chief of Staff Yang Weihan

Corps Headquarters


 * 18th Army: Commander Gao Kuiyuan, Deputy Commanders Liu Jingrong, Xiao Rui
 * 11th Division: Commander Liu Dinghan, Deputy Commander Zhai Lianyun
 * 31st Regiment (Eastern Greater Kinmen)
 * 32nd Regiment (Eastern Greater Kinmen)
 * 33rd Regiment (Little Kinmen)
 * 118th Division: Commander Li Shulan (Mobile Strike Force)
 * 19th Army: Commander Liu Yunhan, Deputy Commander Wu Chuikun
 * 13th Division (Wu Chuikun served as Commander), not engaged in combat
 * 37th Regiment (Eastern Greater Kinmen)
 * 38th Regiment (Eastern Greater Kinmen)
 * 39th Regiment (Kinmen County, serving as reserve)
 * 14th Division: Commander Luo Xichou (Kinmen County)
 * 18th Division: Commander Yin Jun (53rd Regiment absent, stationed at Jinsha)
 * 22nd Corps: Commander Li Liangrong

Corps Headquarters


 * 25th Army: Commander Shen Xiangkui
 * 40th Division: Commander Fan Lin
 * 45th Division: Commander Lao Shenghuan (Defending Taiwu Mountain and Jinhu)
 * 201st Division of Youth Army (Commander Zheng Guo, lacking 603rd Regiment)
 * Independent Tank 3rd Regiment, 1st Battalion (Commander Chen Zhenwei, 2nd Company absent)
 * Independent Artillery 3rd Regiment, 7th Battalion
 * Independent Artillery 14th Regiment, 1st Battalion
 * Independent Engineering 20th Regiment, 3rd Battalion

5th Army: Commander Li Yuncheng


 * 166th Division: Commander Ye Huixi
 * 200th Division: Commander Ma Xinquan

Air Force (Commander-in-Chief Zhou Zhirou)


 * 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 8th, 10th Squadrons

Navy (Commander-in-Chief Li Yuxi)


 * 2nd Fleet

ROC defenses at the landing site


The M5A1 tanks employed by the ROC forces on Kinmen proved to be effective in countering the human wave attacks employed by the initial PLA landing forces, which were mostly composed of light infantry. ROC tank crews who had depleted their ammunition used their tanks as road rollers to crush PLA infantry. The pivotal role these tanks played caused ROC troops to give the M5A1 the nickname "Bear of Kinmen" (金門之熊). The PLA's initial landing force of the 244th regiment at Longkou (壟口) was met by three tanks (#64, #65, #66) of the 1st platoon, 3rd company of the ROC 1st Battalion, 3rd Tank Regiment. The #66 tank had broken down on the beach the previous evening after company exercises, and the other two tanks in the platoon had been ordered to stay and guard it while repairs were attempted.

The ROC Navy tank landing ship ROCS Chung Lung (中榮) was anchored near the PLA's landing site on October 25, and used its significant firepower (2x2 40mm guns, 6x1 40mm guns, 8x1 20mm guns) to destroy beached PLA landing craft, again made up mostly of wooden junks and fishing boats, during the battle. Chung Lung was supposed to leave on the evening of October 24 after offloading its cargo, but remained, offering an official excuse of "bad weather". The unmentioned real reason the ship remained in the area was that it was running a side business of smuggling brown sugar from Taiwan island in exchange for peanut oil. However, there was not enough peanut oil on the whole island for the deal, so the ship was forced to stay for another day while waiting for more peanut oil to be produced, making it the accidental hero of the battle.

The battle also saw one of the few instances of combined-arms warfare from ROC forces. The ROCA 45th Division that formed part of Kinmen's defense garrison were formerly a ROCAF airfield security brigade and was both equipped with specialized radio equipment and supported by forward air controllers from the ROCAF, giving the division the ability to directly coordinate with ROCAF aircraft operating over the island. The division's commander, on his own initiative, organized air support that arrived before dawn and from his command post ordered airstrikes on PLA landing craft and transport ships off shore. This contributed to stranding of PLA forces already landed on the island.

Legacy
In 1984, the soldiers and the fallen were memorialized in the Guningtou Battle Museum. The M5A1 tanks used the battle were also memorialized, displayed outside the museum.

In Taiwan, the battle was called “The Great Victory at Guningtou”. Later views on the battle reflect a nuanced understanding of its significance and outcome. Government reports and scholarly analyses highlighted Chiang Kai-shek's strategic foresight and the KMT's preparedness as key factors in the victory over the PLA. While acknowledging tactical errors by the PLA, newer perspectives also emphasize the role of "coincidences" that favored the KMT, such as the accidental triggering of a landmine and the sudden revival of malfunctioning tanks. Despite differing interpretations, these analyses underscore the enduring legacy of the battle as a testament to the importance of preparation and readiness in military endeavors.