Deductive-nomological model

The deductive-nomological model (DN model) of scientific explanation, also known as Hempel's model, the Hempel–Oppenheim model, the Popper–Hempel model, or the covering law model, is a formal view of scientifically answering questions asking, "Why...?". The DN model poses scientific explanation as a deductive structure, one where truth of its premises entails truth of its conclusion, hinged on accurate prediction or postdiction of the phenomenon to be explained.

Because of problems concerning humans' ability to define, discover, and know causality, this was omitted in initial formulations of the DN model. Causality was thought to be incidentally approximated by realistic selection of premises that derive the phenomenon of interest from observed starting conditions plus general laws. Still, the DN model formally permitted causally irrelevant factors. Also, derivability from observations and laws sometimes yielded absurd answers.

When logical empiricism fell out of favor in the 1960s, the DN model was widely seen as a flawed or greatly incomplete model of scientific explanation. Nonetheless, it remained an idealized version of scientific explanation, and one that was rather accurate when applied to modern physics. In the early 1980s, a revision to the DN model emphasized maximal specificity for relevance of the conditions and axioms stated. Together with Hempel's inductive-statistical model, the DN model forms scientific explanation's covering law model, which is also termed, from critical angle, subsumption theory.

Form
The term deductive distinguishes the DN model's intended determinism from the probabilism of inductive inferences. The term nomological is derived from the Greek word νόμος or nomos, meaning "law". The DN model holds to a view of scientific explanation whose conditions of adequacy (CA)—semiformal but stated classically—are derivability (CA1), lawlikeness (CA2), empirical content (CA3), and truth (CA4).

In the DN model, a law axiomatizes an unrestricted generalization from antecedent A to consequent B by conditional proposition—If A, then B—and has empirical content testable. A law differs from mere true regularity—for instance, George always carries only $1 bills in his wallet—by supporting counterfactual claims and thus suggesting what must be true, while following from a scientific theory's axiomatic structure.

The phenomenon to be explained is the explanandum—an event, law, or theory—whereas the premises to explain it are explanans, true or highly confirmed, containing at least one universal law, and entailing the explanandum. Thus, given the explanans as initial, specific conditions C1, C2, ... Cn plus general laws L1, L2, ... Ln, the phenomenon E as explanandum is a deductive consequence, thereby scientifically explained.

Roots
Aristotle's scientific explanation in Physics resembles the DN model, an idealized form of scientific explanation. The framework of Aristotelian physics—Aristotelian metaphysics—reflected the perspective of this principally biologist, who, amid living entities' undeniable purposiveness, formalized vitalism and teleology, an intrinsic morality in nature. With emergence of Copernicanism, however, Descartes introduced mechanical philosophy, then Newton rigorously posed lawlike explanation, both Descartes and especially Newton shunning teleology within natural philosophy. At 1740, David Hume staked Hume's fork, highlighted the problem of induction, and found humans ignorant of either necessary or sufficient causality. For more discursive discussions of types of causality—necessary, sufficient, necessary and sufficient, component, sufficient component, counterfactual—see Rothman & Greenland, Parascandola & Weed, as well as Kundi. Following is more direct elucidation:

A necessary cause is a causal condition required for an event to occur. A sufficient cause is a causal condition complete to produce an event. Necessary is not always sufficient, however, since other casual factors—that is, other component causes—might be required to produce the event. Conversely, a sufficient cause is not always a necessary cause, since differing sufficient causes might likewise produce the event. Strictly speaking, a sufficient cause cannot be a single factor, as any causal factor must act casually through many other factors. And although a necessary cause might exist, humans cannot verify one, since humans cannot check every possible state of affairs. (Language can state necessary causality as a tautology—a statement whose terms' arrangement and meanings render it is logically true by mere definition—which, as an analytic statement, is uninformative about the actual world. A statement referring to and contingent on the world's actualities is a synthetic statement, rather.)

Sufficient causality is more actually sufficient component causality—a complete set of component causes interacting within a causal constellation—which, however, is beyond humans' capacity to fully discover. Yet humans tend intuitively to conceive of causality as necessary and sufficient—a single factor both required and complete—the one and only cause, the cause. One may so view flipping a light switch. The switch's flip was not sufficient cause, however, but contingent on countless factors—intact bulb, intact wiring, circuit box, bill payment, utility company, neighborhood infrastructure, engineering of technology by Thomas Edison and Nikola Tesla, explanation of electricity by James Clerk Maxwell, harnessing of electricity by Benjamin Franklin, metal refining, metal mining, and on and on—while, whatever the tally of events, nature's causal mechanical structure remains a mystery.

From a Humean perspective, the light's putative inability to come on without the switch's flip is neither a logical necessity nor an empirical finding, since no experience ever reveals that the world either is or will remain universally uniform as to the aspects appearing to bind the switch's flip as the necessary event for the light's coming on. If the light comes on without switch flip, surprise will affect one's mind, but one's mind cannot know that the event violated nature. As just a mundane possibility, an activity within the wall could have connected the wires and completed the circuit without the switch's flip.

Though apparently enjoying the scandals that trailed his own explanations, Hume was very practical and his skepticism was quite uneven (Flew p. 156). Although Hume rejected orthodox theism and sought to reject metaphysics, Hume supposedly extended Newtonian method to the human mind, which Hume, in a sort of antiCopernican move, placed as the pivot of human knowledge (Flew p. 154). Hume thus placed his own theory of knowledge on par with Newton's theory of motion (Buckle pp. 70–71, Redman pp. 182–83, Schliesser § abstract). Hume found enumerative induction an unavoidable custom required for one to live (Gattei pp. 28–29). Hume found constant conjunction to reveal a modest causality type: counterfactual causality. Silent as to causal role—whether necessity, sufficiency, component strength, or mechanism—counterfactual causality is simply that alteration of a factor prevents or produces the event of interest. Hume also highlighted the fact/value gap, as what is does not itself reveal what ought.

Near 1780, countering Hume's ostensibly radical empiricism, Immanuel Kant highlighted extreme rationalism—as by Descartes or Spinoza—and sought middle ground. Inferring the mind to arrange experience of the world into substance, space, and time, Kant placed the mind as part of the causal constellation of experience and thereby found Newton's theory of motion universally true, yet knowledge of things in themselves impossible. Safeguarding science, then, Kant paradoxically stripped it of scientific realism. Aborting Francis Bacon's inductivist mission to dissolve the veil of appearance to uncover the noumena—metaphysical view of nature's ultimate truths—Kant's transcendental idealism tasked science with simply modeling patterns of phenomena. Safeguarding metaphysics, too, it found the mind's constants holding also universal moral truths, and launched German idealism.

Auguste Comte found the problem of induction rather irrelevant since enumerative induction is grounded on the empiricism available, while science's point is not metaphysical truth. Comte found human knowledge had evolved from theological to metaphysical to scientific—the ultimate stage—rejecting both theology and metaphysics as asking questions unanswerable and posing answers unverifiable. Comte in the 1830s expounded positivism—the first modern philosophy of science and simultaneously a political philosophy —rejecting conjectures about unobservables, thus rejecting search for causes. Positivism predicts observations, confirms the predictions, and states a law, thereupon applied to benefit human society. From late 19th century into the early 20th century, the influence of positivism spanned the globe. Meanwhile, evolutionary theory's natural selection brought the Copernican Revolution into biology and eventuated in the first conceptual alternative to vitalism and teleology.

Growth
Whereas Comtean positivism posed science as description, logical positivism emerged in the late 1920s and posed science as explanation, perhaps to better unify empirical sciences by covering not only fundamental science—that is, fundamental physics—but special sciences, too, such as biology, psychology, economics, and anthropology. After defeat of National Socialism with World War II's close in 1945, logical positivism shifted to a milder variant, logical empiricism. All variants of the movement, which lasted until 1965, are neopositivism, sharing the quest of verificationism.

Neopositivists led emergence of the philosophy subdiscipline philosophy of science, researching such questions and aspects of scientific theory and knowledge. Scientific realism takes scientific theory's statements at face value, thus accorded either falsity or truth—probable or approximate or actual. Neopositivists held scientific antirealism as instrumentalism, holding scientific theory as simply a device to predict observations and their course, while statements on nature's unobservable aspects are elliptical at or metaphorical of its observable aspects, rather.Chakravartty, "Scientific realism", §4 "Antirealism: Foils for scientific realism", §4.1 "Empiricism", in SEP, 2013: "Traditionally, instrumentalists maintain that terms for unobservables, by themselves, have no meaning; construed literally, statements involving them are not even candidates for truth or falsity. The most influential advocates of instrumentalism were the logical empiricists (or logical positivists), including Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel, associated with the Vienna Circle group of philosophers and scientists as well as important contributors elsewhere. In order to rationalize the ubiquitous use of terms which might otherwise be taken to refer to unobservables in scientific discourse, they adopted a non-literal semantics according to which these terms acquire meaning by being associated with terms for observables (for example, 'electron' might mean 'white streak in a cloud chamber'), or with demonstrable laboratory procedures (a view called 'operationalism'). Insuperable difficulties with this semantics led ultimately (in large measure) to the demise of logical empiricism and the growth of realism. The contrast here is not merely in semantics and epistemology: a number of logical empiricists also held the neo-Kantian view that ontological questions 'external' to the frameworks for knowledge represented by theories are also meaningless (the choice of a framework is made solely on pragmatic grounds), thereby rejecting the metaphysical dimension of realism (as in Carnap 1950)".


 * Okasha, Philosophy of Science (Oxford U P, 2002), p. 62: "Strictly we should distinguish two sorts of anti-realism. According to the first sort, talk of unobservable entities is not to be understood literally at all.  So when a scientist puts forward a theory about electrons, for example, we should not take him to be asserting the existence of entities called 'electrons'.  Rather, his talk of electrons is metaphorical.  This form of anti-realism was popular in the first half of the 20th century, but few people advocate it today.  It was motivated largely by a doctrine in the philosophy of language, according to which it is not possible to make meaningful assertions about things that cannot in principle be observed, a doctrine that few contemporary philosophers accept.  The second sort of anti-realism accepts that talk of unobservable entities should be taken at face value: if a theory says that electrons are negatively charged, it is true if electrons do exist and are negatively charged, but false otherwise.  But we will never know which, says the anti-realist.  So the correct attitude towards the claims that scientists make about unobservable reality is one of total agnosticism.  They are either true or false, but we are incapable of finding out which.  Most modern anti-realism is of this second sort".

DN model received its most detailed, influential statement by Carl G Hempel, first in his 1942 article "The function of general laws in history", and more explicitly with Paul Oppenheim in their 1948 article "Studies in the logic of explanation". Leading logical empiricist, Hempel embraced the Humean empiricist view that humans observe sequence of sensory events, not cause and effect, as causal relations and casual mechanisms are unobservables. DN model bypasses causality beyond mere constant conjunction: first an event like A, then always an event like B.

Hempel held natural laws—empirically confirmed regularities—as satisfactory, and if included realistically to approximate causality. In later articles, Hempel defended DN model and proposed probabilistic explanation by inductive-statistical model (IS model). DN model and IS model—whereby the probability must be high, such as at least 50% —together form covering law model, as named by a critic, William Dray. Derivation of statistical laws from other statistical laws goes to the deductive-statistical model (DS model). Georg Henrik von Wright, another critic, named the totality subsumption theory.

Decline
Amid failure of neopositivism's fundamental tenets, Hempel in 1965 abandoned verificationism, signaling neopositivism's demise. Fetzer, "Carl Hempel", §3 "Scientific reasoning", in SEP, 2013: "The need to dismantle the verifiability criterion of meaningfulness together with the demise of the observational/theoretical distinction meant that logical positivism no longer represented a rationally defensible position. At least two of its defining tenets had been shown to be without merit.  Since most philosophers believed that Quine had shown the analytic/synthetic distinction was also untenable, moreover, many concluded that the enterprise had been a total failure.  Among the important benefits of Hempel's critique, however, was the production of more general and flexible criteria of cognitive significance in Hempel (1965b), included in a collection of his studies, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (1965d). There he proposed that cognitive significance could not be adequately captured by means of principles of verification or falsification, whose defects were parallel, but instead required a far more subtle and nuanced approach.

Hempel suggested multiple criteria for assessing the cognitive significance of different theoretical systems, where significance is not categorical but rather a matter of degree: 'Significant systems range from those whose entire extralogical vocabulary consists of observation terms, through theories whose formulation relies heavily on theoretical constructs, on to systems with hardly any bearing on potential empirical findings' (Hempel 1965b: 117). The criteria Hempel offered for evaluating the 'degrees of significance' of theoretical systems (as conjunctions of hypotheses, definitions, and auxiliary claims) were (a) the clarity and precision with which they are formulated, including explicit connections to observational language; (b) the systematic—explanatory and predictive—power of such a system, in relation to observable phenomena; (c) the formal simplicity of the systems with which a certain degree of systematic power is attained; and (d) the extent to which those systems have been confirmed by experimental evidence (Hempel 1965b). The elegance of Hempel's study laid to rest any lingering aspirations for simple criteria of 'cognitive significance' and signaled the demise of logical positivism as a philosophical movement". From 1930 onward, Karl Popper attacked positivism, although, paradoxically, Popper was commonly mistaken for a positivist.  Even Popper's 1934 book embraces DN model, widely accepted as the model of scientific explanation for as long as physics remained the model of science examined by philosophers of science.

In the 1940s, filling the vast observational gap between cytology and biochemistry, cell biology arose and established existence of cell organelles besides the nucleus. Launched in the late 1930s, the molecular biology research program cracked a genetic code in the early 1960s and then converged with cell biology as cell and molecular biology, its breakthroughs and discoveries defying DN model by arriving in quest not of lawlike explanation but of causal mechanisms. Biology became a new model of science, while special sciences were no longer thought defective by lacking universal laws, as borne by physics.

In 1948, when explicating DN model and stating scientific explanation's semiformal conditions of adequacy, Hempel and Oppenheim acknowledged redundancy of the third, empirical content, implied by the other three—derivability, lawlikeness, and truth. In the early 1980s, upon widespread view that causality ensures the explanans' relevance, Wesley Salmon called for returning cause to because, and along with James Fetzer helped replace CA3 empirical content with CA3' strict maximal specificity.

Salmon introduced causal mechanical explanation, never clarifying how it proceeds, yet reviving philosophers' interest in such. Via shortcomings of Hempel's inductive-statistical model (IS model), Salmon introduced statistical-relevance model (SR model). Although DN model remained an idealized form of scientific explanation, especially in applied sciences, most philosophers of science consider DN model flawed by excluding many types of explanations generally accepted as scientific.

Strengths
As theory of knowledge, epistemology differs from ontology, which is a subbranch of metaphysics, theory of reality. Ontology proposes categories of being—what sorts of things exist—and so, although a scientific theory's ontological commitment can be modified in light of experience, an ontological commitment inevitably precedes empirical inquiry.

Natural laws, so called, are statements of humans' observations, thus are epistemological—concerning human knowledge—the epistemic. Causal mechanisms and structures existing putatively independently of minds exist, or would exist, in the natural world's structure itself, and thus are ontological, the ontic. Blurring epistemic with ontic—as by incautiously presuming a natural law to refer to a causal mechanism, or to trace structures realistically during unobserved transitions, or to be true regularities always unvarying—tends to generate a category mistake.

Discarding ontic commitments, including causality per se, DN model permits a theory's laws to be reduced to—that is, subsumed by—a more fundamental theory's laws. The higher theory's laws are explained in DN model by the lower theory's laws. Thus, the epistemic success of Newtonian theory's law of universal gravitation is reduced to—thus explained by—Albert Einstein's general theory of relativity, although Einstein's discards Newton's ontic claim that universal gravitation's epistemic success predicting Kepler's laws of planetary motion is through a causal mechanism of a straightly attractive force instantly traversing absolute space despite absolute time.

Covering law model reflects neopositivism's vision of empirical science, a vision interpreting or presuming unity of science, whereby all empirical sciences are either fundamental science—that is, fundamental physics—or are special sciences, whether astrophysics, chemistry, biology, geology, psychology, economics, and so on. All special sciences would network via covering law model. And by stating boundary conditions while supplying bridge laws, any special law would reduce to a lower special law, ultimately reducing—theoretically although generally not practically—to fundamental science. (Boundary conditions are specified conditions whereby the phenomena of interest occur. Bridge laws translate terms in one science to terms in another science.)

Weaknesses
By DN model, if one asks, "Why is that shadow 20 feet long?", another can answer, "Because that flagpole is 15 feet tall, the Sun is at x angle, and laws of electromagnetism". Yet by problem of symmetry, if one instead asked, "Why is that flagpole 15 feet tall?", another could answer, "Because that shadow is 20 feet long, the Sun is at x angle, and laws of electromagnetism", likewise a deduction from observed conditions and scientific laws, but an answer clearly incorrect. By the problem of irrelevance, if one asks, "Why did that man not get pregnant?", one could in part answer, among the explanans, "Because he took birth control pills"—if he factually took them, and the law of their preventing pregnancy—as covering law model poses no restriction to bar that observation from the explanans.

Many philosophers have concluded that causality is integral to scientific explanation. DN model offers a necessary condition of a causal explanation—successful prediction—but not sufficient conditions of causal explanation, as a universal regularity can include spurious relations or simple correlations, for instance Z always following Y, but not Z because of Y, instead Y and then Z as an effect of X. By relating temperature, pressure, and volume of gas within a container, Boyle's law permits prediction of an unknown variable—volume, pressure, or temperature—but does not explain why to expect that unless one adds, perhaps, the kinetic theory of gases.

Scientific explanations increasingly pose not determinism's universal laws, but probabilism's chance, ceteris paribus laws. Smoking's contribution to lung cancer fails even the inductive-statistical model (IS model), requiring probability over 0.5 (50%). (Probability standardly ranges from 0 (0%) to 1 (100%).) Epidemiology, an applied science that uses statistics in search of associations between events, cannot show causality, but consistently found higher incidence of lung cancer in smokers versus otherwise similar nonsmokers, although the proportion of smokers who develop lung cancer is modest. Versus nonsmokers, however, smokers as a group showed over 20 times the risk of lung cancer, and in conjunction with basic research, consensus followed that smoking had been scientifically explained as a cause of lung cancer, responsible for some cases that without smoking would not have occurred, a probabilistic counterfactual causality.

Covering action
Through lawlike explanation, fundamental physics—often perceived as fundamental science—has proceeded through intertheory relation and theory reduction, thereby resolving experimental paradoxes to great historical success, resembling covering law model. In early 20th century, Ernst Mach as well as Wilhelm Ostwald had resisted Ludwig Boltzmann's reduction of thermodynamics—and thereby Boyle's law —to statistical mechanics partly because it rested on kinetic theory of gas, hinging on atomic/molecular theory of matter. Mach as well as Ostwald viewed matter as a variant of energy, and molecules as mathematical illusions, as even Boltzmann thought possible.

In 1905, via statistical mechanics, Albert Einstein predicted the phenomenon Brownian motion—unexplained since reported in 1827 by botanist Robert Brown. Soon, most physicists accepted that atoms and molecules were unobservable yet real. Also in 1905, Einstein explained the electromagnetic field's energy as distributed in particles, doubted until this helped resolve atomic theory in the 1910s and 1920s. Physicists had explained the electromagnetic field's energy as mechanical energy, like an ocean wave's bodily impact, not water droplets individually showered (Grandy, Everyday Quantum Reality, pp. 22–23). In the 1890s, the problem of blackbody radiation was paradoxical until Max Planck theorized quantum exhibiting the Planck constant—a minimum unit of energy. The quanta were mysterious, not viewed as particles, yet simply as units of energy. Another paradox, however, was the photoelectric effect.

As shorter wavelength yields more waves per unit distance, lower wavelength is higher wave frequency. Within the electromagnetic spectrum's visible portion, frequency sets the color. Light's intensity, however, is the wave's amplitude as the wave's height. In a strictly wave explanation, a greater intensity—higher wave amplitude—raises the mechanical energy delivered, namely, the wave's impact, and thereby yields greater physical effect. And yet in the photoelectric effect, only a certain color and beyond—a certain frequency and higher—was found to knock electrons off a metal surface. Below that frequency or color, raising the intensity of the light still knocked no electrons off.

Einstein modeled Planck's quanta as each a particle whose individual energy was the Planck constant multiplied by the light's wave's frequency: at only a certain frequency and beyond would each particle be energetic enough to eject an electron from its orbital. Although elevating the intensity of light would deliver more energy—more total particles—each individual particle would still lack sufficient energy to dislodge an electron. Einstein's model, far more intricate, used probability theory to explain rates of elections ejections as rates of collisions with electromagnetic particles. This revival of the particle hypothesis of light—generally attributed to Newton—was widely doubted. By 1920, however, the explanation helped solve problems in atomic theory, and thus quantum mechanics emerged. In 1926, Gilbert N. Lewis termed the particles photons. QED models them as the electromagnetic field's messenger particles or force carriers, emitted and absorbed by electrons and by other particles undergoing transitions. Meanwhile, all known physical phenomena were gravitational or electromagnetic, whose two theories misaligned. Yet belief in aether as the source of all physical phenomena was virtually unanimous. At experimental paradoxes, physicists modified the aether's hypothetical properties.

Finding the luminiferous aether a useless hypothesis, Einstein in 1905 a priori unified all inertial reference frames to state special principle of relativity, which, by omitting aether, converted space and time into relative phenomena whose relativity aligned electrodynamics with the Newtonian principle Galilean relativity or invariance. Originally epistemic or instrumental, this was interpreted as ontic or realist—that is, a causal mechanical explanation—and the principle became a theory, refuting Newtonian gravitation. By predictive success in 1919, general relativity apparently overthrew Newton's theory, a revolution in science resisted by many yet fulfilled around 1930.

In 1925, Werner Heisenberg as well as Erwin Schrödinger independently formalized quantum mechanics (QM). Despite clashing explanations, the two theories made identical predictions. Paul Dirac's 1928 model of the electron was set to special relativity, launching QM into the first quantum field theory (QFT), quantum electrodynamics (QED). From it, Dirac interpreted and predicted the electron's antiparticle, soon discovered and termed positron, but the QED failed electrodynamics at high energies. Elsewhere and otherwise, strong nuclear force and weak nuclear force were discovered.

In 1941, Richard Feynman introduced QM's path integral formalism, which if taken toward interpretation as a causal mechanical model clashes with Heisenberg's matrix formalism and with Schrödinger's wave formalism, although all three are empirically identical, sharing predictions.From 1925 to 1926, independently but nearly simultaneously, Werner Heisenberg as well as Erwin Schrödinger developed quantum mechanics (Zee in Feynman, QED, p. xiv). Schrödinger introduced wave mechanics, whose wave function is discerned by a partial differential equation, now termed Schrödinger equation (p xiv). Heisenberg, who also stated the uncertainty principle, along with Max Born and Pascual Jordan introduced matrix mechanics, which rather confusingly talked of operators acting on quantum states (p xiv). If taken as causal mechanically explanatory, the two formalisms vividly disagree, and yet are indiscernible empirically, that is, when not used for interpretation, and taken as simply formalism (p. xv). In 1941, at a party in a tavern in Princeton, New Jersey, visiting physicist Herbert Jehle mentioned to Richard Feynman a different formalism suggested by Paul Dirac, who developed bra–ket notation, in 1932 (p xv). The next day, Feynman completed Dirac's suggested approach as sum over histories or sum over paths or path integrals (p xv). Feynman would joke that this approach—which sums all possible paths that a particle could take, as though the particle actually takes them all, canceling themselves out except for one pathway, the particle's most efficient—abolishes the uncertainty principle (p. xvi). All empirically equivalent, Schrödinger's wave formalism, Heisenberg's matrix formalism, and Feynman's path integral formalism all incorporate the uncertain principle (p xvi).

There is no particular barrier to additional formalisms, which could be, simply have not been, developed and widely disseminated (p. xvii). In a particular physical discipline, however, and on a particular problem, one of the three formalisms might be easier than others to operate (pp. xvi–xvii). By the 1960s, path integral formalism virtually vanished from use, while matrix formalism was the "canonical" (p. xvii). In the 1970s, path integral formalism made a "roaring comeback", became the predominant means to make predictions from QFT, and impelled Feynman to an aura of mystique (p. xviii). Next, working on QED, Feynman sought to model particles without fields and find the vacuum truly empty. As each known fundamental force is apparently an effect of a field, Feynman failed. Louis de Broglie's waveparticle duality had rendered atomism—indivisible particles in a void—untenable, and highlighted the very notion of discontinuous particles as selfcontradictory.

Meeting in 1947, Freeman Dyson, Richard Feynman, Julian Schwinger, and Sin-Itiro Tomonaga soon introduced renormalization, a procedure converting QED to physics' most predictively precise theory, subsuming chemistry, optics, and statistical mechanics. QED thus won physicists' general acceptance. Paul Dirac criticized its need for renormalization as showing its unnaturalness, and called for an aether. In 1947, Willis Lamb had found unexpected motion of electron orbitals, shifted since the vacuum is not truly empty. Close, "Much ado about nothing", Nova, PBS/WGBH, 2012:

"This new quantum mechanical view of nothing began to emerge in 1947, when Willis Lamb measured spectrum of hydrogen. The electron in a hydrogen atom cannot move wherever it pleases but instead is restricted to specific paths.  This is analogous to climbing a ladder: You cannot end up at arbitrary heights above ground, only those where there are rungs to stand on.  Quantum mechanics explains the spacing of the rungs on the atomic ladder and predicts the frequencies of radiation that are emitted or absorbed when an electron switches from one to another.  According to the state of the art in 1947, which assumed the hydrogen atom to consist of just an electron, a proton, and an electric field, two of these rungs have identical energy. However, Lamb's measurements showed that these two rungs differ in energy by about one part in a million.  What could be causing this tiny but significant difference?

"When physicists drew up their simple picture of the atom, they had forgotten something: Nothing. Lamb had become the first person to observe experimentally that the vacuum is not empty, but is instead seething with ephemeral electrons and their anti-matter analogues, positrons.  These electrons and positrons disappear almost instantaneously, but in their brief mayfly moment of existence they alter the shape of the atom's electromagnetic field slightly.  This momentary interaction with the electron inside the hydrogen atom kicks one of the rungs of the ladder just a bit higher than it would be otherwise.

"This is all possible because, in quantum mechanics, energy is not conserved on very short timescales, or for very short distances. Stranger still, the more precisely you attempt to look at something—or at nothing—the more dramatic these energy fluctuations become.  Combine that with Einstein's E=mc2, which implies that energy can congeal in material form, and you have a recipe for particles that bubble in and out of existence even in the void.  This effect allowed Lamb to literally measure something from nothing". Yet emptiness was catchy, abolishing aether conceptually, and physics proceeded ostensibly without it, even suppressing it. Meanwhile, "sickened by untidy math, most philosophers of physics tend to neglect QED".

Physicists have feared even mentioning aether, renamed vacuum, which—as such—is nonexistent. General philosophers of science commonly believe that aether, rather, is fictitious, "relegated to the dustbin of scientific history ever since" 1905 brought special relativity. Einstein was noncommittal to aether's nonexistence, simply said it superfluous. Abolishing Newtonian motion for electrodynamic primacy, however, Einstein inadvertently reinforced aether, and to explain motion was led back to aether in general relativity. Yet resistance to relativity theory became associated with earlier theories of aether, whose word and concept became taboo. Einstein explained special relativity's compatibility with an aether, but Einstein aether, too, was opposed. Objects became conceived as pinned directly on space and time by abstract geometric relations lacking ghostly or fluid medium.

By 1970, QED along with weak nuclear field was reduced to electroweak theory (EWT), and the strong nuclear field was modeled as quantum chromodynamics (QCD). Comprised by EWT, QCD, and Higgs field, this Standard Model of particle physics is an "effective theory", not truly fundamental. As QCD's particles are considered nonexistent in the everyday world, QCD especially suggests an aether, routinely found by physics experiments to exist and to exhibit relativistic symmetry. Confirmation of the Higgs particle, modeled as a condensation within the Higgs field, corroborates aether, although physics need not state or even include aether. Organizing regularities of observations—as in the covering law model—physicists find superfluous the quest to discover aether.

In 1905, from special relativity, Einstein deduced mass–energy equivalence, particles being variant forms of distributed energy, how particles colliding at vast speed experience that energy's transformation into mass, producing heavier particles, although physicists' talk promotes confusion. As "the contemporary locus of metaphysical research", QFTs pose particles not as existing individually, yet as excitation modes of fields, the particles and their masses being states of aether, apparently unifying all physical phenomena as the more fundamental causal reality, as long ago foreseen. Yet a quantum field is an intricate abstraction—a mathematical field—virtually inconceivable as a classical field's physical properties. Nature's deeper aspects, still unknown, might elude any possible field theory.

Though discovery of causality is popularly thought science's aim, search for it was shunned by the Newtonian research program, even more Newtonian than was Isaac Newton. By now, most theoretical physicists infer that the four, known fundamental interactions would reduce to superstring theory, whereby atoms and molecules, after all, are energy vibrations holding mathematical, geometric forms. Given uncertainties of scientific realism,Challenges to scientific realism are captured succinctly by Bolotin, Approach to Aristotle's Physics (SUNY P, 1998), pp. 33–34, commenting about modern science, "But it has not succeeded, of course, in encompassing all phenomena, at least not yet. For it laws are mathematical idealizations, idealizations, moreover, with no immediate basis in experience and with no evident connection to the ultimate causes of the natural world.  For instance, Newton's first law of motion (the law of inertia) requires us to imagine a body that is always at rest or else moving aimlessly in a straight line at a constant speed, even though we never see such a body, and even though according to his own theory of universal gravitation, it is impossible that there can be one. This fundamental law, then, which begins with a claim about what would happen in a situation that never exists, carries no conviction except insofar as it helps to predict observable events. Thus, despite the amazing success of Newton's laws in predicting the observed positions of the planets and other bodies, Einstein and Infeld are correct to say, in The Evolution of Physics, that 'we can well imagine another system, based on different assumptions, might work just as well'. Einstein and Infeld go on to assert that 'physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world'. To illustrate what they mean by this assertion, they compare the modern scientist to a man trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. If he is ingenious, they acknowledge, this man 'may form some picture of a mechanism which would be responsible for all the things he observes'. But they add that he 'may never quite be sure his picture is the only one which could explain his observations. He will never be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility or the meaning of such a comparison'. In other words, modern science cannot claim, and it will never be able to claim, that it has the definite understanding of any natural phenomenon". some conclude that the concept causality raises comprehensibility of scientific explanation and thus is key folk science, but compromises precision of scientific explanation and is dropped as a science matures. Even epidemiology is maturing to heed the severe difficulties with presumptions about causality.  Covering law model is among Carl G Hempel's admired contributions to philosophy of science.