Draft:Root causes of IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea

Root causes of IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea
This article explores key drivers and root causes of illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing in the Gulf of Guinea.

Structural, political, and institutional root causes
Scholars have emphasized the importance of political conditions and institutional structures when assessing the root causes of IUU fishing. IUU fishing is often named as a "low cost, high reward" offense, and weak political structures and corruption issues are critical drivers for IUU fishing in many African states. Since many of these states lack the resources to enforce existing laws, vessels can act with impunity in their exclusive economic zones. In the Gulf of Guinea, weak governance structures and corruption drive the emergency of maritime crimes such as illicit fishing. Some Gulf of Guinea countries lack the legal infrastructure to prohibit and properly prosecute blue crimes. Others have the necessary legal infrastructure, but corrupt government officials choose not to enforce existing laws for personal gain.

Unstable political and social conditions can be instrumental in enabling organized crime networks to take root and engage in IUU fishing. If a power vacuum exists due to a weak or illegitimate government that cannot provide for its population, criminal networks can fill this vacuum. Political instability, such as civil wars, coup d’états, and epidemics, has been a reoccurring problem in many countries in the Gulf of Guinea. These factors act as root causes for IUU fishing in the region since they leave few legitimate sources of income intact, forcing people into illegal activities. In addition, political instability reduces these states' enforcement capacity at sea, enabling foreign vessels to further exploit the fish stocks of the Gulf of Guinea. By extension, states in the Gulf of Guinea cannot effectively monitor and control their exclusive economic zone, driving the emergence of illicit fishing. In addition, the possibility of using tax havens and flags of convenience to hide the true identity of IUU vessels is also named a root cause for international IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea. The usage of flags of convenience makes identifying the true perpetrator complicated. In addition, legal processing against illegal vessels is nearly impossible when registered in tax havens. Tax havens also allow vessels engaging in IUU fishing to sell their catch with few barriers, mixing the illegally caught fish with catches from legitimate sources to hide the true origin.

Economic Root Causes
While the structural factors above are emphasized as key drivers for IUU fishing, economic factors also serve as key root causes. Illicit fishing is enormously profitable. However, while profitable, it is nevertheless a crime, and some scholars have taken a behavioral science approach to examine why fisheries are willing to commit crimes to make a profit. Gary S. Becker has developed a model for why crime occurs and argues that it comes down to a cost-benefit analysis by the offenders. To commit a crime, the potential reward must surpass legal opportunities and balance against the risk of getting caught. While Becker analyzed criminal acts more broadly, his research has been applied to IUU fishing. Scholars apply Becker' s framework to IUU fishing to understand its root causes and state that illicit fishing is often worth risking from a cost-benefit perspective for offenders. The ever-increasing fish prices increase the profit margin, and since regulations or output quotas do not stop IUU vessels, they catch more fish than legal vessels. Since the risk of being caught is low and sanctions are often mild, criminals are not discouraged. Illicit fishing has become increasingly attractive as the dwindling fish stocks worldwide cannot keep up with the market demand driving prices high.

The cost-benefit approach fits cases of illicit fishing in the Gulf of Guinea. Since these states lack the capacity to protect their waters, offenders rarely get caught, and the potential cost of committing this crime is low. The reason vessels turn to illegal fishing is often profit-driven, and if their capacity to fish is higher than their legal quota, IUU fishing is a desirable option. In addition, they argue that the system of fishing subsidies is a key driver of why illicit fishing occurs. Since subsidies artificially raise the profits for fisheries, they cause actors to maximize their catch through any means.

Focusing solely on a cost-benefit approach does not wholly cover the complexity of why individuals and communities engage in illicit fishing. Fishermen may also engage in IUU fishing because they need to and have few or no other options. For example, poverty creates a desperate need to secure food and money through any means. Social factors, such as poverty, are consistently identified as critical drivers of IUU fishing since they create an abundant, cheap labor force in developing countries, where salaries can be pushed extremely low. Poverty and unemployment are rife across nearly all countries in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, a third of the Niger Delta population was unemployed, and 30% of Gabon's population lived in poverty as of 2015.

While poverty may drive local fishermen to IUU fishing, moral and social reasons can also be critical drivers of IUU fishing. IUU fishing may not always be viewed as a criminal act, and in places where it is frowned upon, the moral cost is rarely high enough to ostracize offenders from their community. Local fishermen may also not view their activities as illegal. Instead, they see it as doing what they must. Regardless of their view on IUU fishing, local participation damages people and the environment equally to that of international vessels.

Patterns of exploitation driving IUU fishing
As described above, numerous economic, political, institutional, social, and moral drivers underpin the existence of illicit fishing within the Gulf of Guinea. Building on this, scholars have also pointed out that root causes such as profit, lack of institutional barriers, and political instability are underpinned by patterns of exploitation. Many African coastal states have rapid population growth, creating an ever-increasing need for fish to feed more and more people. At the same time, fish stocks in the global north and Asia are steadily declining while the global demand for fish products continues to rise. These potential profits push international vessels to engage in IUU fishing along African coastlines to feed the demand. The foreign interest in illegal fishing along the African coast is part of broader patterns of exploitation set up during colonial rule. International actors still utilize the structures established during colonial rule to extract valuable resources across Africa. These resources do not gain the country they were extracted in, but instead, predatory foreign companies overexploit and profit from African resources. These exploitation structures are also visible within IUU fishing. Within former African colonies, market mechanisms that were merely put in place to extract resources and transport valuables back to Europe are now used to extract illegally caught fish. Therefore, colonial and postcolonial structures act as a significant root cause across Africa.

International exploitation through IUU fishing is frequent in the Gulf of Guinea. Foreign vessels from all over the world frequently engage in IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea. Vessels originating worldwide have been spotted fishing illegally in the area. Russian, Chinese, and European vessels are named as frequent perpetrators in the Gulf of Guinea. In addition, scholars state that the previously mentioned issues of African countries being affected by civil wars, state coups, and other security concerns are also rooted in colonialism. Land-based disruptions lessen state capacity to monitor their exclusive economic zone at sea, leaving a power vacuum for international actors to fill. Thereby, international actors can engage in IUU fishing with impunity. Hence, colonial legacies are significant root causes for IUU fishing.

Lastly, although international exploitation is a significant driver for IUU fishing in the Gulf of Guinea, it is also important to mention that state actors and other countries within the region can be equally responsible for the exploitation. The high demand and profits can motivate local governments to disregard international actors' illicit fishing to increase revenue. For example, some corrupt government officials deliberately avoid monitoring international vessel activity for their own gain. When artisanal fisheries engage in illicit fishing in the Gulf of Guinea, they often venture into other states in the region's exclusive economic zon e. Ghana is an example of this practice since its vessels often cross into Liberian waters to engage in IUU fishing. The Ghanaian fleet represents as much as 24% of the catch lost in Liberia to illicit fishing, comparable to the profits lost to Chinese and Korean vessels operating illegally in Liberia. To conclude, international patterns of exploitation are a crucial driver of IUU fishing in the region. However, it is also important to point out that local drivers and practices can be equally foundational in allowing illicit fishing to continue.