Kargil Air War

The Kargil Air War was fought between India and Pakistan during the Kargil War from May to July 1999 in the Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere along the line of control. In India, the conflict is also referred to as Operation Vijay (विजय, lit. 'Victory'), which was the codename of the Indian military operation in the region. The Indian Air Force acted jointly with the Indian Army to flush out the Pakistan Army and paramilitary troops from vacated Indian positions along the line of control, in what was designated as Operation Safed Sagar (ऑपरेशन सफेद सागर, lit. 'White Sea').

Background
The conflict was triggered by the infiltration of Pakistani troops—disguised as Kashmiri militants—into strategic positions on the Indian side of the line of control which serves as the de facto border between the two countries in the disputed region of Kashmir. During its initial stages, Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind by casualties and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff showed the involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces,  led by General Ashraf Rashid.

First bombing campaign
The Indian Air Force (IAF) had been carrying out routine Electronic intelligence (ELINT), photo and aerial reconnaissance since early May in such weather. On May 21, a Canberra PR57 from 106 Squadron on a reconnaissance mission, flown by Sqn Ldr A Perumal and Sqn Ldr UK Jha, was hit by a Chinese-made Anza infrared surface-to-air missile. The plane returned to the nearest IAF base, Srinagar, on one engine, and the crew landed safely. The Indian Govt, intent on not provoking escalation, cleared limited use of offensive and defensive Air Power only on May 25, restricted entirely to the Indian side of the Line of Control. There was no opposition at all by the Pakistani Air Force, leaving the IAF free to carry out its attacks with impunity.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) flew its first air support missions on 26 May, operating from the Indian airfields of Srinagar, Awantipora and Adampur. Ground attack aircraft MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-27s, Jaguars and helicopter gunships struck insurgent positions. The Mirage 2000 fleet was inducted on 30 May. Although the MiG-21 is built mainly for air interception with a secondary role of ground attack, it is capable of operating in restricted spaces, albeit with limited influence, which was of importance in the Kargil terrain.

The initial strikes had the Air Defence versions of the MiG-21s and (later) MiG-29s providing fighter cover. Mil Mi-17 gunships were also deployed in the Tololing sector. Srinagar Airport was at this time closed to civilian air-traffic and dedicated to the Indian Air Force.

Second bombing campaign
Starting May 30, the LGB capable Mirage 2000, which was deemed the best aircraft in the IAF inventory capable of optimum performance under the conditions of high-altitude seen in the zone of conflict, was used extensively. Armed initially with 250 kg "dumb" bombs, No. 7 Squadron led by Wg Cdr Sandeep Chabra, struck over three days infiltrator positions in Muntho Dhalo, Tiger Hill and Point 4388 in the Drass Sector. The receding snowline in June laid bare the hitherto camouflaged Pakistani positions, opening them up to non-stop day and night attacks by the Mirage 2000 and, subsequently, all aircraft. Through the last weeks of June, the Mirages, armed with LGBs as well as with "dumbs", repeatedly struck the heavily defended Tiger Hill. Only 9 LGBs were used in this war, 8 by the Mirage and one by a Jaguar, as the dumb bombs proved highly effective. The first of the LGB missions on June 24 were observed by the (then) Chief of Air Staff, ACM AY Tipnis. All LGBs were delivered by two-seaters, with the rear-seat pilot doubling up as a WSO. The Mirage 2000 proved its worth in this war. Such was its accuracy with dumb bombs that an LGB-equipped two-seater would join up as the tail of a 2 or 4-ship formation of other Mirages carrying between 6-12 dumb bombs each, film their attacks, and only if the results were less than optimal, or if it had spotted a Command and Control bunker on its Litening sensor / camera, let loose its LGB. The IAF therefore used the LGB selectively. All aircraft operated at an altitude of 9–10,000 metres, (~30-33,000 feet above sea level), diving when required and pulling out well out of MANPADs range. The low number of airstrips for take off and landing of the flights also constrained the regularity and efficiency of the attacks. Despite this, there were hundreds of sorties on the intruders with no further material or personnel casualties enabling a gradual takeover of the mountain posts by Indian troops. According to the IAF, the "air strikes against the Pakistani infiltrators, supply camps and other targets yielded rich dividends."

All remaining intruders were withdrawn and the operation was ended, being declared a success by the IAF in having achieved its primary objectives. However, there has also been criticism of the methods initially used and the type of planes being unsuitable to the terrain that resulted in early losses. This is believed by many in the Air force as coming as a wake up call to upgrade the ageing fleet of aircraft (especially the attack aircraft and helicopters) to better enable them to fight in the mountainous region. But, in the context of the war and in light of the poor information available on the infiltrations, the Indian Air Force was able to coordinate well with the Army and provide air support to the recapture of most of the posts before Pakistan decided to withdraw its remaining troops.

26 May Mig-27 shootdown
Flt. Lt. Kambampati Nachiketa a Mikoyan MiG-27 pilot from No. 9 Squadron IAF (Wolfpack) who took part in a strike in the Batalik Sector on 26 May 1999. Armed with 80mm rockets and the aircraft's 30mm cannon, Nachiketa attacked an enemy position. During the operation, the aircraft took a hit from a Anza surface-to-air missile of the Pakistan Army Air Defence Corps;, and Nachiketa was forced to eject. After ejecting, Nachiketa evaded immediate capture but after two to three hours, a Pakistani army patrol captured him. Nachiketa continued to fire his service pistol until he ran out of bullets. He was taken to a prison in Rawalpindi where he was beaten up by Pakistani soldiers until a senior officer intervened. Speaking to NDTV in 2016, Nachiketa said: The jawans who had captured me were trying to manhandle me and maybe trying to kill me because, for them, I was just an enemy pilot who had fired on their locations from the air... Fortunately, the officer who came was very mature. He realised the situation that I am now a captive and now I need not be handled that way. So he was able to control them, which was a big effort because they were very aggressive at that stage.

27 May Mig-21 shootdown
On 27 May 1999, as part of Operation Safed Sagar during Kargil War, Sqn Ldr Ahuja was undertaking a photo reconnaissance mission. Another member of the mission, Flt Lt Nachiketa ejected from his MiG-27L after an engine flame out. Sqn Ldr Ahuja stayed over enemy positions to help the rescue attempts knowing full well the existence of enemy surface-to-air missiles in the area. However, his MiG-21MF fighter, C-1539, was hit by a shoulder-fired FIM-92 Stinger. Ahuja gave a radio call – "Hercules, something has hit my plane, possibility of missile hit cannot be ruled out, I am ejecting over...(location).". IAF authorities lost track of his aircraft and all communication shortly afterward.According to the data released by the Indian Air Force, Ahuja's aircraft had crossed the Line of Control, a ceasefire line and pseudo-border agreed upon by India and Pakistan in 1972 to maintain status quo in Kashmir. It is claimed by the Indian Air force that he was killed by Pakistani Soldiers after landing safely as his post-mortem report says that he had two fatal bullet injuries and fractured knee which was caused when he landed after ejection (shows that he was alive when landed). However, these claims were strictly rejected by Pakistan. Sqn Leader Ahuja's body would be recovered by the men of the 10th Battalion of the Garhwal Rifles.

28 May Mi-17 shootdown
On 28 May, a Mi-17 piloted by Squadron leader Rajiv Pundir was shot down- with the loss of all four of the crew- when it was hit by three Stinger missiles while on an offensive sortie in the Tololing sector. These losses forced the Indian Air Force to reassess its strategy. The helicopters were immediately withdrawn from offensive roles as a measure against the man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS or MPADS) in possession of the infiltrators.

Aftermath
The lessons learned in this limited war influenced Indian Air Force to upgrade its combat fleet. It acquired and later started co-developing Sukhoi Su-30MKI heavy fighters with Russia beginning in the early 2000s. Development of HAL Tejas was also accelerated.