Talk:Analytic philosophy/Archive 1

"Key analytic philosophers"
That Russell and, to a lesser though still no small extent, Kripke are included as key analytic philosophers makes sense, but to put Peter Singer and Rosalind Hursthouse in the same category as the former two, especially when talking strictly about contribution to the tradition of analytic philosophy, is problematic in my opinion. They are, without a doubt, controversial philosophers, but they are certainly not "key analytic philosophers", for I can name many other philosophers which many will surely agree have made greater contributions. E.g. Whitehead (for his Principia in collaboration with Russell), Frege for his contributions to predicate logic, Moore for his Principia Ethica, Wittgenstein for his contributions in both his periods (Tractatus and PI), Ayer/Carnap and the Vienna Circle for logical positivism, Quine for Two Dogmas, J.L. Austin for early legal positivism (the discredited but influential Command Theory of Law), H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law that revived interest in legal positivism again, John Rawls for his influential political philosophy found in A Theory of Justice, Popper's theory of falsification in the philosophy of science, Thomas Kuhn's analysis of scientific revolutions and their incommensurable, and countless other philosophers all seem to have influenced the analytic tradition much more than Singer or Hursthouse. I'm not trying to disrespect these two philosophers but the neutrality of this article seems questionable when all those philosophers are omitted as "Key analytic philosophers" while Singer and Hursthouse are chosen. —Preceding unsigned comment added by David TW C (talk • contribs) 04:32, 28 January 2010 (UTC)
 * Singer and Hursthouse were "chosen" simply because they had pictures that could be used. Wittgenstein and Frege were originally pictured but had to be removed due to rights issues with their photos. I've removed the word "key" to avoid giving the wrong idea. - Atfyfe (talk) 06:18, 28 January 2010 (UTC)
 * Good catch, btw. - Atfyfe (talk) 08:22, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

-The comment about Singer and especially Hursthouse is really correct. I'm an analytic philosopher and have never heard of Hursthouse. Extremely bizarre inclusion. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 67.243.56.21 (talk) 22:06, 24 January 2011 (UTC)
 * Again, this is not a neutrality issue. Those philosophers simply have pictures in the public domain and happen to be prominent analytic philosophers. Clearly there is a whole long list of more important analytic philosophers. If you can find a picture in the public domain and you'd like to edit the photo and change out Singer and Hursthouse with someone like Rawls or Kuhn, I'd be supportive. However, I see no reason to go through the effort myself given that I don't take "key" to mean "one of the top 20 most important" but rather "prominent". - Atfyfe (talk) 00:36, 26 January 2011 (UTC)
 * "I'm an analytic philosopher and have never heard of Hursthouse." Not much of an analytic philosopher then; you might want to catch up on ethics of the last 40 years. - Atfyfe (talk) 07:05, 31 January 2013 (UTC)

Identifiable Historical Period
I know a semi-serious suggestion by one philosopher to say that:

analytic philosphy = Period from "On Denoting" and LW's TLP to "2 Dogmas of Empiricism" & Philosophical Investigations —Preceding unsigned comment added by 194.73.99.6 (talk) 12:05, 18 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Yes, this is a pretty common usage of "analytic philosophy" (although most philosophers will grant that there's a bit of blurriness around the start and end dates). It should be better reflected in the intro.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by BrownApple (talk • contribs) 17:14, 27 May 2008 (UTC)

Some Clarification Needed:
In the following clause:

As a young Austrian soldier, Ludwig Wittgenstein expanded and developed Russell's logical atomism into a comprehensive system in a brief book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The world is the existence of certain states of affairs; these states of affairs can be expressed in the language of first-order predicate logic. So a picture of the world can be built up by expressing atomic facts in atomic propositions, and linking them using logical operators.

i restructured the first sentence to what is shown, removing the POV word "remarkable." Also, the entire clause is in need of sclarification: are the statements made a summary of viewpoints from the book? i can only assume this is so, but it's not entirely clear. As i am personally unfamiliar with analytic philosophy, this is a clarification job for someone else to do. MiraFirefly 21:50, 30 January 2007 (UTC)

Nietzsche and analytic attitude
I think it would be useful (as a critique of analytic philosophy) -to mention the influence of Nietzschean perspectivism over continental philosophy and the social sciences in general. Analytic philosophy is averse to anything that eludes the analytic framework. Continental philosophy craves for perspectives -and thus the influence from the social sciences, history, psychology, etc.

Analytical philosophy is also an ATTITUDE -i.e. mocking continental positions by invoking half-ass comments about the words they are expressed in. For a very good criticism of analytic attitude/posturing, see the first issue of 'Radical Philosophy' on 'Professional philosophers'. Also, the Penguin dictionary of Philosophy has a very powerful (albeit short)criticism of analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy goes round in circles and does not achieve much -but 'hey, we're consistent/right and logical, no?'. In a world marked by the death of God, I fear these kids have gone mad! --Cookydog.


 * Who is Cookydog? --Ludvikus 14:27, 7 February 2007 (UTC)

Re: Nietzsche and analytic attitude
I don't think it would be useful to discuss Nietzsche's influence on continental philosophy because it has no relation to analytic philosophy at all. If you wish to mention Nietzsche in the criticism of analytic philosophy section featured on the page, go for it, but it seems to be well written as is.

In terms of your normative claims, not every analytic philosopher is completely averse to anything not analytic. Some analytic philosophers have attempeted to logically analyze continental positions. For example, many people read Plato from a continental viewpoint, but a lot of studies like those done by Gallop have tried to logically analyze Plato. Most intuitions, from any philosophy or perspective, are logically analyzable and probably contain some form of an argument structure. Of course, if you look at some of the implications of analytic philosophy, especially the logical positivists and Wittgenstein, there are things a continental philosopher can also take from that and argue for or against. On the other hand, here's a link to an article written by Keith DeRose where he tries to tackle his failure to understand, and severe distaste of, postmodernism ... http://bengal-ng.missouri.edu/~kvanvigj/certain_doubts/index.php?p=453.

Lastly, I imagine that most analytic philosophers would understand the fallacy in mocking a philosophical position. An analytic philosopher is very aware that sound argumentation isn't performed with extreme emotion and attacks. However, sometimes a word or two in jest is quite separate from a full-blown derviable argument against another philosopher's position.


 * Who's unsigned comment does the above belong to ? --Ludvikus 14:27, 7 February 2007 (UTC)

Re: Nietzsche and analytic attitude (Carnap on Nietzsche)
It is also interesting to note that while the logical positivist, Rudolf Carnap let loose on Heidegger in "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language," he had nothing but praise for Nietzsche. There, Carnap discerned similarities between Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics as found in say *Human, All too Human* and his own. He seems to have regarded Nietzsche as a "metaphyscian" who had the good sense to avoid the errors for which he reproached other metaphysicians. He admired the "empirical content" of Nietzsche's work, including especially its "historical analyses of specific artistic phenomena, or a historical-psychological analysis of morals." And he praised Nietzsche for having chosen the medium of poetry in such works as *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* for presenting his ideas rather attempting to present them in a theoretical treatise. The fact that Carnap found much to praise in the work of Nietzsche is significant since in "The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language," Carnap went on the attack against Heidegger, whose metaphysical statements,  Carnap dismissed as meaningless. Apparently for Carnap,part of Nietzsche's greatness was the fact that he used poetic means for expressing himself. This fit in with Carnap's view that metaphysics fails because it makes meaningless statements. For Carnap, language had a variety of functions to perform. One of those is the making cognitively meaningful statements. Other functions include the making of what Carnap described as emotive statements. Such language can express Lebensgefühl. Metaphysics attempts to express Lebensgefühl too but fails because it can only issue meaningless statements. The appropriate means for expressing Lebensgefühl is art rather than metaphysics, and Nietzsche was praised by Carnap for realizing that. For Carnap, Nietzsche was the metaphysician who had the greatest artistic talent.

BTW I have recently been reading Arthur Danto's Nietzsche book. There Danto makes the point that Nietzsche in his work anticipated some of the central ideas of 20th century philosophical movements including logical positivism and existentialism. Curiously, enough, I can find no reference in Danto's book to Carnap. --JimFarm 01:48, 8 June 2006 (UTC)

This article states that this is the dominant form of philosophy in English speaking countries. Among the college educated, isn't it also the dominant form of philosophy in Russian and other nations in the former Soviet Union? Outside of religious schools, isn't it also the dominant form of philosophy in Israel? RK 19:51, 5 Sep 2003 (UTC)


 * Perfectly true. Also Scandinavia and Japan, if I am correctly informed.  And, for that matter, France and Germany despite what literary theorists would have us believe.  (that Descombes is more philosophically significant than Derrida, is what I mean.) But that doesn't make the article's claim contenious, since, while it does say that most philosophy practiced in the English speaking world is analytic; it does not say or imply that this is not true of other countries as well.  This is sensible for two reasons: (1) This is an English enyclopedia, and it is most useful to adress what philosophy denotes to speakers of English. (2) Analytic is most likely to be contrasted, if at all, with Continental; constraining its claim to generality within the English speaking world forestalls complaints by "Continentalists" that they are being maltreated.  (Or perhaps oppressed.)


 * Hear, hear. But a list of countries in which analytic philosophy is prominent woudl also be interesting. Banno 21:35, Aug 3, 2004 (UTC)


 * Gadamer has considerable influence in Germany (=here), and I'd hesitate to say analytic philosophy is more influential than phenomenology here. The humanities vs. science divide is, if anything, a bigger deal here than elsewhere, with humanities being stronger than in anglosaxon countries, which benefits phenomenology.  No doubt, though, that analytic philosophy is a big deal here in Germany though.  Charles Stewart 07:35, 1 Mar 2005 (UTC)


 * Hermeneutics appears to be an unrecognized phenomena - is it because Continental philosophy, as a region, is not recognized? Is Gadamer a practioner of Hermeneutics, a philosophical practice which does not fit neatly into Anglo-American philosophy? And how about Semiotics - is that simply nonsense? How does it relate to Analytical philosophy? Ludvikus 14:34, 7 February 2007 (UTC)

Analytic v Continental philosophy
Without wishing to seem defensive I'd say that in my limited experience continental philosophers spend far more time taking a haughty attitude towards analytic philosophy than vice versa. As to your claim that analytic philosophy doesn't achieve much, I'd dispute that but it really depends on your definition of achieve. I think it's practice creates a greater clarity of mind and allows for a deeper understanding of important philosophical questions and plausible positions in response to them, even if analytic philosophers only rarely reach a consensus on what the right answers are. Besides if your complaint about it not achieving much is in relation to analytic philosophers rarely reaching consensuses much the same could be said of the alternatives. Also in terms of achievements look at the mathematical discoveries inspired and connected to analytic philosophy. Also consider interdisciplinary work that analytic philosophers do with computer science, cog sci, physics and other sciences.

- My knowledge in this area is very limited, but it seems strange to me that there is nearly no mention of the relation to continental philosophy, although those two terms are used quasi-symmetrical a lot of the time. 85.127.14.60 (talk) 11:20, 23 April 2008 (UTC)


 * The two traditions are very different. To be honest, I don't think there's enough areas of overlap for there to even be meaningful comparison between the two, especially not in terms of "achievements" since they aim for very different ends. It's like comparing the achievements of poetry to painting in their contributions to art. —Preceding unsigned comment added by David TW C (talk • contribs) 08:34, 29 January 2010 (UTC)


 * "...it seems strange to me that there is nearly no mention of the relation to continental philosophy" I agree. They are often defined in contrast to one another and so I think any attempt to define one without mentioning the other is inadequate. - Atfyfe (talk) 07:08, 31 January 2013 (UTC)

Is Carnap German or Austrian?
Currently he is listed as Austrian, but I thought he was German. When Arne Naess discussed Heidegger in Four Philosophers. He said 'How could you put that man in the same book as me?' Personal Communication

Carnap was of German origin, but in the 1920s he accepted from Moritz Schlick an invitation to teach in Vienna, where he became a leading member of the Vienna Circle, so it would be accurate to describe him as being both a German and an Austrian IMO. JimFarm (talk) 15:01, 21 March 2010 (UTC)

History of Analytic Philosopy
Here's a sketch for how this might proceed:

1. G. E. Moore, Common Sense philosophy. Rejection of British Post-Hegel Idealism.

2. Russell: Logical Analysis, Logical Atomism. Sense-data theory.

3. (Early) Wittgenstein: Tractatus. Formal Logic. "Ideal Language Philosophy"

4. Logical Positivism and Logical Empiricism. Vienna Circle. Carnap. Verificationism. Analytic-synthetic distinction. Rejection of Metaphysics, Ethics, Aesthetics. "Emotivism."

5. Oxford School. Ryle, Austin. Teachings of later Wittgenstein. "Ordinary Language Philosophy."

6. Published late work of Wittgenstein. "Linguistic Philosophy"

7. Late American pragmatism. Immigration of logicians and scientists from Europe in the 30s. Philosophy of science. Quine. Behaviourism.

8. Philosophy of Language. Natural Language Semantics. Davidson. Oxford in 70's. Strawson, Dummett, McDowell, Evans.

9. The Re-emergence of Metaphysics: modal realism, Humean Supervenience, counterfactual analysis of causation, the writings of David Lewis.

10. Revival of Political philosophy: Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin.

11. Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Science. Turing. . . Churchlands.

12. New pragmatism: Rorty, Putnam. Banno 08:36, Apr 12, 2004 (UTC)

Would it be useful to put this in terms of the historic divergence between early-modern british empericism (the progenitor of contemporary analytic) and early-modern continental rationalism (the progenitor of contemporary continental)? --mporch 01:28, 3 Jun 2004 (UTC)

I would like to remove the new paragraph which states:
 * Analytic philosophy, perhaps because its origin lay in dismissing the releance of Hegel and Hegelian philosophers (such as Marx)...

I don't remember learning anything like this in college! And since analytic philosophy existed before Hegel and Marx, isn't claim this just analytic-philosophy bashing? RK 00:21, Aug 17, 2004 (UTC)


 * You've been misinformed or are confusing two issues. In a broad sense, you could call all rigorous, well-thought-out philosophy "analytic philosophy", if you wanted, but nobody uses the term that way, and the article is quite explicit that the term names philosophy descended from Russell, Frege, and Moore, and, by extension, any post-Russell-Frege-Moore philosophy working with a certain amount of technical rigour and use of logic, etc.  This "analytic philosophy" did not exist before Marx or Hegel--couldn't have--and was, in the case of Russell and Moore, very clearly and explicitly a reaction against Hegel and Hegelians. (Frege was only ever considered an analytic philosopher retrospectively, largely via the work of Michael Dummett.) And, in any case, this sense of "analytic philosophy" is the one intended by all but the most casual contemporary use of the term by all philosophers I've read.


 * More to the point, (regarding the context of the remark you quote) analytic philosophy in fact did produce almost no politicial philosophy until A Theory of Justice. That very fact seems to constitute a much bigger criticism of early analytic philosophy than claiming that they rejected Hegel, which, if anything, at least offers them an excuse for not theorizing about politics. Most assessments of Rawls' contribution to philosophy will point to this exact fact, uncontroversially to my knowledge.  In any case, analytic philosophy can do political theory (case in point), and the remark certainly wasn't intended as "bashing". (I wrote it, along with the paragraph earlier on this "talk" page assessing the (lack of) merits of the "analytic" and "continental" distinction.)


 * Also, Popper was quite explicitly anti-Hegel. --Goethean 16:58, 18 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Terrible. Analytical philosophy was and always will have been started with Frege. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 192.12.88.68 (talk) 20:35, 20 October 2010 (UTC)

The sentence,

"French philosopher Jacques Derrida expressed a counter argument to this quest for clarity against difficulty, saying that "the difficulty of a discourse is not a sin--nor is it the effect of obscurantism or irrationalism. And that it is often the contrary that is true: obscurantism can invade a language of communication that is seemingly direct, simple, straightforward.""

seems out of place in this part of the article. Perhaps it should be moved to the 'criticism' section? --Taekwandean (talk) 11:10, 27 October 2010 (UTC)

Missing figures, Chomsky's influence
Key figures missing from above: Kripke (I suppose he is implicit in modal realism), ethical skeptics (Anscombe, Macintyre, Williams), Blackburn.

The history should make explicit the impact of Chomsky's ascendancy on the way that philosophy of language was done, especially in the USA. Eg. when Quine wrote The problem of meaning in linguistics, Bloomfield was the alpha male of US linguistics. Anti-Chomskians in philosophy are interesting, therefore, eg. Warren Goldfarb Charles Stewart 07:35, 1 Mar 2005 (UTC)


 * I've always thought of MacIntyre as an American Continental-style philosopher, if you get my drift. But I don't know if anyone else considers him such. --Goethean 17:00, 18 Mar 2005 (UTC)

Missed this comment first time round... MacIntyre's exposure to (and reaction against) ordinary language philosophy, and his study of Wittgenstein in the days when only analytics were excited about him, have left a distinctly analytic imprint on him: have a look at the philosophical articles in Against the Self Images of the Age. Certainly, his involvement with Thomism doesn't look very analytic, but if you take a step back, there's something similar about the path he has taken and that which Williams has. And while we're at it, he did his philosophy boot camp in the UK, which makes him a British philosopher in my eyes. --- Charles Stewart 14:21, 15 Jun 2005 (UTC)


 * I think Macintyre (along with Martin Jay, but thats another story for another time) is a philosopher whose work shows how meaningless (in both the ordinary language and philosophical sense) the distinction between 'analytic' and 'continental' philosophy becomes whenever it attempts to incorporate the work of a philosopher who fails to accept the self-images of the age, as it were. While he certainly has no lack of training in the methodology of anglo-american philosophy, his historicist approach to philosophical speculation and his 'narrative consciousness' theories are far from standard operating procedure.  He has also written approvingly about Freud, and felt the need to specifically engage with Lacan over differences in interpretation of psychoanalytic theory.  Asking whether Macintyre is analytic or continental is like asking if John Lennon is a mod or a rocker.  As far as he is concerned, he's an aristotelian and that is that.Jimmyq2305 19:39, 31 August 2006 (UTC)

"Analytic"
I was just wondering if the "analytic" in "analytic philosophy" has anything to do with the use of the term analytic in logic, i.e. the analytic/synthetic distinction...? Also, would Quine be considered an Analytic philosopher?

yes to both your questions Hanshans23

Analytic is characterized, normally, by its effort to clarify philosophical issues by analysis and logical rigor--i.e., by method (2), above. This seems to imply that other philosophies do not care for logical rigor. Furthermore G.E. Moores defense of common sense realism and ethical intuitionism does not really owe much to logical rigour. Instead, common sense and intuitionims relies on supposedly self-evident facts (because of the lack of logical arguments). That's my humble opinion. Kikl 12:44, 1 February 2006 (UTC)

Analytical philosophy subjects itself to logical rigor. Choosing to go to ridiculous levels of skepticism does not make things you object to not logically rigorous, it just makes your skepticism silly. For instance, faced with a hand waving in front of your face, only a continental philosopher would think "by god, I don't think there's a hand in front of me!." Hopefully that sheds some light on how ridiculous the field can be =) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 192.12.88.68 (talk) 20:40, 20 October 2010 (UTC)

tractatus

 * "The Tractatus is a dense and thought-provoking work; but perhaps its most interesting utterance from the point of view of the method of analytic philosophy is:


 * 5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.


 * This shows clearly the reason for the close relationship between philosophy of language and analytic philosophy. Language is the principal—or perhaps the only—tool of the philosopher. For Wittgenstein, and for analytic philosophy in general, philosophy consists in clarifying how language can be used. The hope is that when language is used clearly, philosophical problems are found to dissolve."

The first sentence of that excerpt is pretty astonishing. I would have thought that identifying the single most 'interesting utterance from the point of view of the method of analytic philosophy' would be a bold undertaking for a lone writer, with no NPOV obligations to worry about, let alone a Wikipedia article.

The rest of the excerpt presents Wittgensteinian quietism as a universal characteristic of analytic philosophy, which is patently false. Obviously quietism is fairly prevalent in anayltic philosophy, but so is antagonism to it, even amongst philosophers who support the central role of philosophy of language.

All in all, this section strikes me as pushing an agenda, and falling far short of NPOV.

Ncsaint 01:08, 26 January 2006 (UTC)


 * No one has responded to this one way or another, so I took a first shot at rewriting the section. - Ncsaint 17:48, 2 February 2006 (UTC)

Nice. Same part of article goes on:


 * "Wittgenstein thought he had set out the 'final solution' to all philosophical problems, and so went off to become a school teacher."

That's from the Preface to the 1918 edition to the Tractatus - "I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems". Should a reference to the source be added and the single quotes changed to double? Atherton 20:20, 28 February 2006 (UTC)

It is stated that "Ludwig Wittgenstein expanded and developed Russell's logical atomism". In fact, it was just the other way round, Russell expanded on Wittgenstein's Tractatus.. (see introduction of the first edition of the Tractatus by Russell) Breiten (talk) 16:18, 7 February 2008 (UTC)


 * I think the history of the theory of logical atomism is sufficiently complex that we shouldn't put either priority claim in the article. Russell was the first to refer to a theory of logical atomism, but Wittgenstein's theory was hardly a straightforward elaboration of Russell's.  The SEP articles on logical atomism do a good job of reflecting this fact. JustinBlank (talk) 22:03, 10 February 2008 (UTC)

section headings
what is the story with the section headings with no coherent content beneath them? Are those placeholders for content that someone is about to provide? If so, is anyone actually working on said content? - Ncsaint 01:44, 27 February 2006 (UTC)

Is the Article Bias Towards Analytic Philosophy?
As I read the article I noticed that there was no section or even a sentence about criticism of Analytic Philosophy. Could someone do some sources for Criticism of the topic so that both sides can be heard?

I believe an example of a critic of this Philosophy was Ayn Rand but I can't remember in what book she wrote about the subject. The Fading Light 9:21, 21 March 2006


 * At least within the philosophical community, Ayn Rand would not be considered an important critic of "analytic philosophy." Richard Rorty would probably be the most viable contender, but I would discourage adding such a section to this article, since it would almost certainly turn into a venting ground for people to express their personal biases.  The article as it stands now is not for or against analytic philosophy. It is just describing it, and that is how it should be.--BrownApple (talk) 08:44, 28 May 2008 (UTC)

Actually, the article features a fairly lengthy criticism in its section on the analytic ethical position and in the section talking about its relations to continental philosophy. The article notes that Philippa Foot vigorously attacked the logical positivist stance on ethics, and also says that Wittgenstein realized that his logical atomism "solution to all of philosophy" was inadequate. Also there is this explicitly critical passage, "analytic philosophy, under one interpretation, failed by its own systematic lights to demonstrate the meaninglessness or fictitiousness of the concepts it attacked. At least, few analytic philosophers today would agree that they have anything like an exact and proven theory of which terms are meaningful and which meaningless. Contemporary analytic philosophy journals are — for good or ill — as rich in metaphysics as any continental philosopher." Also, I always thought that Ayn Rand supported analytic philosophy, especially from what I read of the collection of her lectures in Objectivism: the Philosophy of Ayn Rand. However, I'm not certain about this. --Brizimm 05:38, 22 March 2006 (UTC)

Name Dropping
THe introduction of the article is really bad. The introduction does not provide any introduction to analytic philosophy as it should. Instead, a whole bunch of more or less famous philosophers is mentioned. So what. Such a list may be added to the end of the article. It is inappropriate at the beginning.


 * Yeah, there's too many names and too many links; it's a bit overwhelming. --Brandon Dilbeck 04:36, 10 October 2006 (UTC)

Poor account
This is a remarkably poor article. Virtually no citations, to start with. The factual accuracy of much of it is questionable. The little history it presents is questionable. Indeed the main point of the article appears to be to contrast analytic with continental philosophy - a pointless exercise! "The doctrines most often called "analytic philosophy" are logical positivism and logical atomism" - cobblers! Must come past and fix it up some time. Banno 20:04, 27 November 2006 (UTC)

German article on "Analytische Philosophie"
The german version is very nice and readable, yet does have quite a different narrative, if not so say tells a completely different story than the english version. Maybe someone could cross-check them. Anyway, the German thing ends with stating that, since the 80ies, Analytical philosophy is critized for being ahistoric and not taking into account the subjective nature of natural language, therefore making 'objective', positivist truth finding via language and logic unviable. Pretty much the same argument I heard from a Prof from the University of Vienna (Franz Martin Wimmer, you can google him). He specializes in intercultural philosophy and is interested in the way language forms the ontological systems we think and operate in. By the way, Poststructuralism is not dead and any important political philosophy of the last 30 years of course is based on or influenced by Michel Foucault, who is very close to a God (but of course, you anglophony philosopher don't believe in him either). Noname IP from Vienna, Austria. 19:07 10th of December 2006 (GMT+1)

Improvements to "Relation to continental philosophy"
I note the improvements made in this section recently but still it gives the impression that Analytic offers no critique of Hegel. It is given simply as some kind of instinctual "backlash against British Idealism". Now the move of Moore and Russell was also against pragmatism, and was not just a fresh start from nothing but also a return to Leibniz, mathematics, and rationalism. -- -- Lucas (Talk) 03:16, 28 January 2007 (UTC)
 * I agree that there is a need for more extensive additions. Not sure I agree with your rendition here, though. But with proper citations, go ahead and add it. Your marking of the need for citations is quite appropriate. Banno 09:41, 28 January 2007 (UTC)
 * Good work, guys. I support your ability to talk to each other. I hope FT2 is watching. And I assume Good Faith (Wiki Rule) about it, as I hope you do with me. Peace. --Ludvikus 15:53, 28 January 2007 (UTC)

Euro Society for Analytic Philosophy
I dont think that illuminating the relation to Continental is served by one-sided "news-flash" quotations from the Euro-Society for Analytic Philosophy without any historical setting. Is not a claim of reivival from such a party obviously POV, too temporal, and in their interest, as it attempts to stimulate demand for their own organization and in their once per three year meetings?

Also it gives only the relation of Analytic to the Continent of Europe, not its relation to Continental philosophy.

The list of countries given is incomplete and adequate. If one person teaches/studies Analytic amongst the 80m Germans, does German get listed? By giving such a long list you give the impression of an accuracy which is not there. I think we need to clarify the fact that Analytic and Continental are taught in most Universities the world over but that in certain places one is more predominant. Most US/UK universities also have offerings (however meagre) of Continental philosophy and vice-versa. -- Lucas (Talk) 21:29, 29 January 2007 (UTC)
 * I think the discussion already takes up too much space in the article. But if you have a better source, please use it. In the mean time, leave it in. Banno 21:37, 29 January 2007 (UTC)

Also note, if you visit the Euro-Analytic website for France/Portugal/Spain/Central Europe/Croatia you'll find a number of them appear to be defunct having only had meetings in the 90s or in 2000/2001. Of the other two countries, Italy and German, there appears to be some ongoing activities. -- Lucas (Talk) 21:43, 29 January 2007 (UTC)

G. H. von Wright
Where does he fit in the grand scheme if things? --Ludvikus 16:26, 29 January 2007 (UTC)

Analytic metaphysics
Strawson's Individuals is almost fifty years old, and I wasn't sure what the phrase about coming "into its own" meant, so I moved Strawson up the list and put in a neutral description which doesn't refer to it being recent. KD Tries Again 20:19, 29 January 2007 (UTC)KD

Political Philosophy
The article used to say:
 * Analytic philosophy, perhaps because its origin lay in dismissing the relevance of Hegel and Hegelian philosophers (such as Marx), had little to say about political ideas for most of its history. This was changed radically, and almost single-handedly, by John Rawls in a series of papers from the 1950s onward ...

This mention of Hegel and Marx has been removed today. Does anyone have a reference to backup such a removal? Or is there any other information apart from Russell & Moore's strong critique of Hegel and British idealism in founding analytical philosophy? -- Lucas (Talk) 01:25, 31 January 2007 (UTC)
 * The removal of an unsupported suggestion requires a citation? That Analytic philosophy avoided politics because it doesn't like Hegel needs a citation, or it is OR. Banno 18:03, 31 January 2007 (UTC)


 * I'm not so sure about this. Consider if ever substantive comment in wiki-philosophy that was without a full and accurate citation was deleted.  What would it look like?  There is a case perhaps for any major changes to some long-established or self-evident ideas in wiki-philosophy to be only warranted by at least some citation or argument on its talk page.  For the removal of this idea which I would say is quite commonly held there has been no talk nor citation.  -- Lucas (Talk) 20:36, 31 January 2007 (UTC)


 * I have some sympathy for that view. It might be commonly held that Analytic philosophers thought (think?) Hegel irrelevant. But it is not commonly held that this was the reason they did not do much political philosophy. This last requires support. Banno 20:43, 31 January 2007 (UTC)

Well that sounds reasonable to me. Hegel was deprecated, political philosophy was absent for some time. But we cannot see a link between these two statements as being obvious. The issue in any case is complicated, even if it is in a Hegelian manner, by the fierce politics of the time. -- Lucas (Talk) 21:12, 31 January 2007 (UTC)


 * I have removed the sentence as not only is the first part original research without support, but the supposed effect is quite dubious as well. I discussed this issue with User:Lucas on the Talk page for Continental philosophy, and it was his citation of this sentence that brought the sentence to my attention.  For those of you missing out on said page's enlightening discussions, I have excerpted one relevant paragraph (by me, addressing Lucas):

The sentence you quote from the article on analytic philosophy is an example of why I generally ignore other poorly-written articles when trying to improve another one. It is weaselly POV speculation ("perhaps...") that trades in a false stereotype: analytic philosophy had little to say about politics? But what about the Vienna Circle's association with leftist politics ("most of us, myself included, were socialists" - Carnap), as published in the Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung? Russell's numerous political publications and highly visible antiwar activism, from WWI to Vietnam? Popper's massive book against totalitarianism? Rorty and Putnam were practically Communists in the 60s and 70s. Oh, and Chomsky and Rawls and Nozick and Sen and Williams and.... Yeah, except for them, analytic philosophy had "little to say about political ideas".


 * The political activism of the Vienna Circle was well-known, appeared in print, and was explicitly seen as part of their philosophical program. Pending a more nuanced discussion of analytic political philosophy pre-1970, I have deleted the dubious sentence. 271828182 22:19, 31 January 2007 (UTC)

Part of a program but is not part of analytic philosophy. Nor is this page talking of Vienna but of Analytic.

I would say that analytic philosophy as philosophy had little to say about politics until Rawls. I would say that certain philosophers who practiced Analytic happened to have political views (like anyone), and may have published in support of these ideas, since they had a name, but these things were not part of their Analytic philosophy or "the philosophy of language". Would you say any of these pre-Rawlsian non-philosophical efforts, are now studied as part of philosophy? I don't think so. -- Lucas (Talk) 23:01, 31 January 2007 (UTC)

Analytic philosophy
Some remarks below on the article as it stands today (2 Feb 2007). It is mostly critical, as you see, but there are plenty of hints as to how it might be improved. I will have a go at improving it over the weekend. Dbuckner 08:15, 2 February 2007 (UTC)

1. The introduction contains no overall characterisation of what analytic philosophy is (by a 'characterisation' I mean a list of characateristics or features that would allow the reader easily to identify the characterised thing when he or she saw it, and also to identify anything else as not being the characterised thing). It says it is a dominant philosophical movement (yes, but what are the distinguishing features, slogans, beliefs, methods of that movement), that its founders were Moore and Russell (who were they, asked the uninformed reader), that these in turn were influenced by Frege (who was he?) and that many leading analytics came from Germany and Austria (OK, but what actually is analytic philosophy?). There is then the usual Wiki list of analytic philosophers (fine, but who are these people and what do they do for a living – what actually is analytic philosophy?).
 * Nor is analytic philosophy properly a single movement, but rather a range of approaches to philosophical issues. The trouble is of course that there will be some exceptions to any proposed definition, which will be argued about until a bunch of weasel words are introduced, and then someone will edit those out, starting the cycle once again. Banno 01:40, 3 February 2007 (UTC)

2. Thus the introduction is practically useless. The next section is called 'The term analytic philosophy'. This begins by saying that a.p. includes ' logical positivism, logical atomism and ordinary language philosophy'. Fine, but what are these fields? What actually is a.p.? Then, even worse, it says that few analytic philosophers adhere to any of these. Right. And that it would be a mistake to equate any of these to analytic p. Fine. As a reader who came to this article without any idea of what this subject is, I am now well and truly in the dark.

3. The section goes on to talk about the methods which characterise a.p., which is the closest the article gets to saying what it is. That's good, but why did I, the naïve reader, have to wait so long? However, this bit is far from correct, as it is much too wide. It gives necessary conditions, such as clarity and precision, emphasis on argumentation &c, which characterise many philosophical schools apart from a.p. It does not mention the importance given by a.p. to formal methods of analysis (Russell's Theory of Descriptions as being a widely held paradigm for a.p., e.g.). The next two sentences (a.p. not being about 'meaning of life', and the stuff about focus and debate) are badly written, uncited and probably untrue.

4. The final part of this section says it began with Frege, Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein. This repeats the introduction, is not properly part of this section anyway, and moreover fails to say what these philosophers actually did. It says that a.p. includes 'all those who work in their vein'. Yes, but what was their vein? The gentle reader is still in the dark.

5. The next section is called 'Relation to continental philosophy'. This is awkwardly written. It says the distinction is 'problematic', which is a bad way of beginning a section about something, and it says that it contrasts a method against a region. Possibly, but the reader still hasn't the faintest idea about what the analytic method actually is, so how does this help? There is a short passage about the The European Society for Analytic Philosophy, but it is unclear why it is in the section.

6. The next section is called 'Formalism and natural languages'. This starts with the unhelpful claim that 'Part of analytic approach is the clarification of philosophical problems by examining the language used to express them'. Yes, but how do analytics think this helps? Any informative answer would have to mention the two conflicting view on this held by analytics, namely 1. Ordinary language is misleading disguises its logical form, and that philosophical propositions become meaningless or trivial once we attempt to reduce them to the correct logical form. 2. Ordinary language is not misleading, and the correct logical form of ordinary language is ordinary language. However, 'philosophical propositions' are not ordinary language because they contain ersatz metaphysical terminology – once this terminology is analysed using plain language, we find it is meaningless nonsense (e.g. Geach's remarks on 'Nothing noths' in 'Mental Acts').

7. The next sentence 'Two major threads weave through this tradition: formalism and natural language' is poorly written and, once again, fails to explain the issue, which is the two threads mentioned in (6) above (formalism = the belief that analysis should be reduction of ordinary language to logical form, natural language = the view that ordinary language is not misleading, but metaphysical language is.  The next sentence attempts to clarify this by saying ' The former seeks to understand language, and hence philosophical problems, by making use of formal logic.'.  Yes, but for goodness' sake how?   It then says 'it seeks to formalize the way in which philosophical statements are made'.  This does not explain why formalist analytic p's would do this, namely (as just explained above) to show that the problem disappears on reduction, because the p. statement either is shown to be trivial, or cannot be so reduced, thus meaningless.

8. The sentence that follows deserves quoting in full, because it is such WP:BOLLOCKS.


 * This has led to a number of successes, including modern logic, recognizing the primary importance of sense and reference in the construction of meaning, Kurt Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem, Bertrand Russell's theory of definite descriptions, Karl Popper's theory of falsificationism and Alfred Tarski's Semantic Theory of Truth.

What? The statement that this (whatever this is, presumably the 'two threads' first mentioned) led to modern logic is either nonsense, or wrong. What is meant by 'modern logic'. If it means first order predicate calculus, most of the development of this took place very early on (Frege and Peirce gave us most of it), was complete by the 1920's, and in any case took place in parallel with anything else that happened in the Analytic tradition. The phrase 'recognizing the primary importance of sense and reference in the construction of meaning' is gobbledegook. What follows returns to the usual list-salad – things mentioned to show the erudition of the writer, without any context or explanation. The mention of the Theory of Descriptions is good, as it is the paradigm of the analytic method (said Ramsey). But, er, what actually is the Theory of Descriptions? And what is the Incompleteness Theorem, the theory of falsificationism (sic), the Semantic Theory of Truth. Obscurum per obscurius.

9. Then we have "The other thread seeks to understand philosophical ideas by a close and careful examination of the natural language used to express them – usually with some emphasis on the importance of common sense in dealing with difficult concepts." But why do OLP's do this? And the mention of common sense here seems to confuse earlier methods of philosophy (Reid, Berkeley) with the underlying principles of OLP. The statement that 'These two threads intertwine, sometimes implacably opposed to each other, sometimes virtually identical' was clearly intended as a masterpiece of prose, but quite out of place in an encyclopedia article. The statement 'Famously, Wittgenstein started out in the formalism camp, but ended up in the natural language camp.' is probably the only accurate statement in the article, but of course without clear and accurate statements of what "formalism camp" and "natural language camp" represent, it is completely meaningless.

10. The next section is called 'Formalism'. The first subsection is called 'Logical atomism'. It opens with the oft-repeated statement that analytic philosophy has its origins in Gottlob Frege’s development of predicate logic. This adds a little to the many statements that went before, but only a little. What is predicate logic? Does this not conflict with the earlier statement about 'modern logic' developing as a result of the analytic movement. It contains the blatantly false claim that 'This permitted a much wider range of sentences to be parsed into logical form.' This is debatable: some (e.g. Sommers, plural quantificationists) hold that predicate calculus in the form developed by Frege is more restrictive than the old traditional logic, other (e.g. Wittgenstein II) held that the logical form of ordinary language is ordinary language.

11. Next there is a potentially useful remark about Russell's use of predicate calculus to analyse the word 'is. But it is too far out of context to be useful

12. There is another allusion to the Theory of Descriptions in the sentence "Russell sought to resolve various philosophical issues by applying such clear and clean distinctions, most famously in the case of the Present King of France." Good God. We are nearly there, we have nearly arrived at the paradigm itself. But the term 'Theory of Descriptions' is missing. And how does 'the Present King of France' connect with anything at all?

13. The next subsection is called "The Tractatus". It correctly state that "As a young Austrian soldier, Ludwig Wittgenstein expanded and developed Russell's logical atomism into a comprehensive system in a brief book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus". Presumably the remark about 'Austrian soldier' is the work of the editor whose subtle hand may be detected throughout the article, and who covertly maintains that there is no such thing as 'continental philosophy' because it was really all the work of the Austrians and others. But only an insider will know that. And what, again, is 'logical atomism'? Then it continues with some summary doctrines of the Tractatus. Obscurum per obscurius again. The Tractatus is a famously opaque and difficult book. How does it help our grandmother, whose complete understanding of the basics of analytic philosophy should be the intended result of this article, to repeat the sybilline pronouncements of one of the most difficult books ever written? 'A picture of the world can be built up by expressing atomic facts in atomic propositions'. Indeed.

14.  There follows a brief mention of the 'limits of my language mean the limits of my world'. Now this is really important. The philosophical doctrine which underlies all of Wittgenstein's philosophy, in all periods, is that the result of philosophy is not a number of 'philosophical propositions' [philosophische Sätze], but to make propositions clear. Philosophy should make clear and delimit sharply the thoughts which otherwise are, as it were, opaque and blurred. This is one of the central ideas of analytic philosophy, and is a manifesto of positivism. But it occurs too late, and might be confused with a brief subsection about the biography of one of its leading figures.

15. The sentence 'Wittgenstein thought he had set out the 'final solution' to all philosophical problems, and so went off to become a school teacher' is 1066-ish, and moreover conceals the importance of the section by disguising it as biography. (Actually, an insider will understand it is not really biography, as W's decision to do this is deeply connected with the 'limits of language' thing. But this will only be obvious to insiders, whereas the article should clearly explain analytic philosophy to outsiders and grandmothers.

16. "However, he later revisited the inadequacy of logical atomism, and further expanded the philosophy of language by his posthumous book Philosophical Investigations." Pure 1066.

17. The section "Natural language semantics" helpfully explains that "This section is a stub. You can help by expanding it." Indeed.

18. The section "Reaction against idealism" is another stub.

19. The section "Ordinary language philosophy" refers us to another article. (Main article: Ordinary language philosophy).

20. There is a brief mention of the Oxford school (list of philosophers), and contains the frightful sentence "Rather than viewing philosophical problems with respect to logic, ordinary language philosophy sets forth the notion of consideration with respect to the ordinary usage of the linguistic terms germane to such problems. "  Word salad.

21. A bit of OR "While schools such as logical positivism focus on logical terms, supposed to be universal and separate from contingent factors (such as culture, language, historical conditions), ordinary language philosophy emphasizes the use of language by ordinary people. It may be argued, then, that ordinary language philosophy is of a more sociological grounding, as it essentially focuses on the use of language within social contexts."

22. The section entitled " Logical positivism and logical empiricism" is a list, and contains no verb anywhere in sight.

23. "Philosophy of mind and cognitive science"  Stub.

24. The section "Ethics in analytic philosophy" is helpful in that it explains how and why the analytic tradition initially had little to say on the subject of ethics. This, relatively speaking, is the best section of the article, but that isn't really saying much.

25. "Political philosophy" is both listy and short.

26. "Analytical Marxism" is interesting, but I know nothing about the subject, so won't comment.

27. "Communitarianism", likewise. These final sections are generally better than anything that goes before, but you could hardly blame the average reader for not venturing this far. It was a pretty brave and intrepid expedition on my part, I felt, to get to the very end of this ignoble article about a noble and great tradition.

Dbuckner 08:15, 2 February 2007 (UTC)


 * All good points. Have you had a look at the German page? The four "phases" are a bit dubious, but an historical approach would be the best way to go; as brief as possible, of course, with links to the main articles. I intend to fiddle around the edges for a few days, and look forward to any other contributions.   Banno 08:55, 2 February 2007 (UTC)


 * I strongly agree with DBuckner's points. This article is more laundry list than coherent, and is riddled with bad writing and basic errors.  It's also worth noting that analytic philosophy post-1970 is so broad and diverse as to resist an easy overview. 271828182 14:02, 2 February 2007 (UTC)

New start
My recent edits are not by any means supposed to be definitive, but perhaps to give some direction. An introduction with a rough outline of what AP is, then a very brief history, and perhaps an account of the present situation; these to be made more detailed in the body of the article. I've not referenced it either, since this can be done in the main body. The result I hope has been to remove the emphasis on the juxtaposition of Continental and analytic philosophy, which is of quite secondary importance in the present context, and to ready the article for a more detailed historical account. Banno 03:33, 3 February 2007 (UTC)


 * As to defining Analytic in a way other than the previous intro, it might not be easy. To quote from the Oxford Companion on this:
 * The philosophical disagreements between, say, Logical Positivism and the later Wittgenstein, or the methodological divergences between, say, Frege and Ryle, make it hard to give ‘analytical philosophy’ clear sense or reference
 * One solution might be to follow the example on the Continental page where a list of various philosophical positions or areas within Continental are given. So for analytic it might look something like:
 * philosophy of science(disputable), ordinary language philosophy, descriptivism, logical positivism, philosophy of science, semantic realism, ontological relativity, transcendentalism (or "connective analysis"), phil of mind, etc..


 * As to mention of the AP/CP "juxtaposition", it's amusing to see another editor is also busy trying to remove any mention that analytic differs from continental. Why the sudden change?  Especially if there is evidence that the division has become more rather than less extreme over the past few years?  Is analytic philosophy on wiki entering a denial stage? Does it not suit Anglophone politics or is it suddenly embarassed to find someone else was in the room all along?  I ask these questions since your partner editor, who is also suddenly entering denial on this, could not give me any reasonable explanation (or neutral sources) and so I must turn to these less logical explanations.  I would suggest you are in any case doing an injustice to analytic philosophy.


 * And by the way, you fail to mention, in your new intro, from which continent that weakness for logical positivism arrived! Which reminds me, while you are at it, why dont you start airbrushing logical positivism out of analytic. -- Lucas (Talk) 04:52, 3 February 2007 (UTC)
 * What are you talking about? Who denies that the division has become more extreme, or that there ever was a division. Dbuckner 09:19, 3 February 2007 (UTC)
 * Oh I see, Banno said the juxtaposition was of 'secondary importance'. Yes.  It is of some importance that analytic philosophy sees itself as opposed, but it is not of fundamental importance.  Dbuckner 09:21, 3 February 2007 (UTC)


 * It is not that it "sees itself opposed", it is not suggested in this context that Continental someone has some particular problem with Analytic. In the quotes I gave directly above and in the IEP on Analytic, you'll find that it could be true that you cannot fully explain what analytic is, without contrasting it to Continental. -- Lucas (Talk) 23:29, 3 February 2007 (UTC)

Further work on intro
I have built on Banno's excellent work on the intro. I moved some of his edits into a section on 'history'. I removed the section on Continental philosophy, for now.

The current intro stresses three main features of analytic philosophy. There should be three sections in the main article corresponding to these.

First, the view that there are no specifically philosophical propositions. This can lead to a discussion of positivism generally, and then the views of Russell and Wittgenstein.

Second, the idea of logical form. This is the place for Russell's theory of descriptions, Wittgenstein's and Ramsey's view of it as the 'paradigm of philosophy'. Something about the disagreements about what the correct logical form is (which is the real disagreement of analytic philosophy).

Third, the point that analytic philosophy somehow defines itself as opposed to 'continental' philosophy. The Internet Encyclopedia (which is a pretty good resource) mentions this. I am surprised that Lucas thinks people are claiming there is no distinction. Who said that? Not me. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by Dbuckner (talk • contribs) 09:18, 3 February 2007 (UTC).

I removed the bit about "mistrust" because it is not in the reference. The IEP merely says the way of identifying analytic is by contrasting it to continental:
 * Consequently, it has always relied on contrasts with other approaches to philosophy—especially approaches to which it found itself fundamentally opposed—to help clarify its own nature. Initially, it was opposed to British Idealism, and then to "traditional philosophy" at large. Later, it found itself opposed both to classical Phenomenology (for example, Husserl) and its offspring, such as Existentialism (Sartre, Camus, and so forth) and also "Continental"’ or "Postmodern" philosophy

I'm also looking at the final paragraph on "sweeping philosophical systems", was that job assigned by Locke, get your brush out! This is misworded. Anyway, how could you get less sweeping than "1. The world is the totality of facts." Or LP's semantic tables.

Yes I have noted a couple of editors attempt to deny this distinction and remove it. However, they seem to do it out of instinct and have no references to back up their claim. Others seem to think that it is just an accident and that conscious individuals were not involved. -- Lucas (Talk) 22:51, 3 February 2007 (UTC)


 * I put the final para in because I was asked to. I'm doing some further research to see whether it should stay in. Dbuckner 09:21, 4 February 2007 (UTC)


 * This looks suspicious, are you making a statement and now searching for, perhaps dubious, backup, tertiary sources, etc.? In any case the problem with the intro is that it gives a largely historical view of what analytic is, it does not give it as it is, in its fullness.  The material should be in a "history of analytic" section. -- Lucas (Talk) 10:02, 4 February 2007 (UTC)

I am certainly of the opinion that something needs to be said in the article on the relationship between analytical philosophy and continental philosophy. As Lucas points out, analytical philosophers (i.e. Russell, Moore) initially defined themselves by way of contrast with British idealism. Later on, the Vienna Circle and the analytical philosophers who were influenced by the Circle, tended to define themselves against both traditional metaphysics and against phenomenology as practiced by Husserl and later by Heidegger. Rudolf Carnap, for instance, liked to cite Heidegger's writings as examples of how philosophy should not be done, as did A.J. Ayer. Also, the fact that Heidegger had been a Nazi under the Third Reich helped to widen the gulf between analytical and continental philosophers. On the other hand there has long been tendencies within analytical philosophy which have sought a rapprochement with continental philosophy: Morton White long ago called for a "reunion in philosophy" between analytical philosophy and continental philosophy by way of a holistic pragmatism. Richard Rorty has likewise sought to bridge the gap between analytical philosophy and continental philosophy with a postmodern pragmatism. Some analytical philosophers have written more or less sympathetic studies of thinkers that are crucial in the continental tradition. For example, Arthur Danto's and Alexander Nehamas's studies of Nietzsche. Nevertheless, the gulf between analytical philosophy and continental philosophy persists and should be addressed in an article on analytical philosophy. JimFarm 12:49, 4 February 2007 (UTC)

Removed section
Here's the text of the section removed by Dbuckner, replaced by Lucas, and re-removed by Dbuckner here with the edit summary "removed because it needs work". Now it can be worked on until the various editors collectively deem it OK for international public viewing. ... Kenosis 17:42, 4 February 2007 (UTC)
 * - 	== Relation to continental philosophy ==
 * - 	The term "continental philosophy" is used to contrast analytic philosophy with philosophy in continental Europe. This is a somewhat problematic juxtaposition, since it contrasts a philosophical method, analytic philosophy, against a region, continental Europe.
 * - 	Some commentators have instead contrasted continental philosophy with Anglophone or anglo-american philosophy. But this distinction is also misleading, since analytic philosophy's founding fathers, Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, the Logical Positivists (the Vienna Circle), the Logical Empiricists (in Berlin), and the Polish logicians were all from the continent of Europe. The early work of Moore and Russell was primarily a critique of British Idealism.
 * - 	The European Society for Analytic Philosophy holds continental-wide conventions every third year. It claims that analytic philosophy is practiced in most countries in Europe, and it claims that:
 * - 	"However convenient the opposition between 'Analytic' and 'Continental' philosophy may be, it is inadequate, for there are analytic philosophers on the Continent, and the values and aspirations of analytic philosophy are (meant to be) universal." 	 17:42, 4 February 2007 (UTC)
 * - 	The European Society for Analytic Philosophy holds continental-wide conventions every third year. It claims that analytic philosophy is practiced in most countries in Europe, and it claims that:
 * - 	"However convenient the opposition between 'Analytic' and 'Continental' philosophy may be, it is inadequate, for there are analytic philosophers on the Continent, and the values and aspirations of analytic philosophy are (meant to be) universal." 	 17:42, 4 February 2007 (UTC)
 * - 	"However convenient the opposition between 'Analytic' and 'Continental' philosophy may be, it is inadequate, for there are analytic philosophers on the Continent, and the values and aspirations of analytic philosophy are (meant to be) universal." 	 17:42, 4 February 2007 (UTC)

By way of explanation, sections sometimes arise from the history of the development of a page, in such a way that the purpose of the section is not clear to new editors. The above was added after the article anglo-american philosophy was re-directed here, more or less as an explanation of that re-direction. Hence the first two paragraphs. The second also intentionally shows that analytic philosophy is grounded in the work of philosophers from the continent; but this fact should come out in a properly re-written history section. The last paragraphs are simply argument contra the assertion that analytic philosophy is exclusively Anglophone. In summary, this section is here as a response to the views of a particular editor. Banno 20:14, 4 February 2007 (UTC)

Well, perhaps this section was just included on the analytic page to deal with some of the issues raised in the discussion of anglo-american philosophy. But there was for a long time before that discussion, section 2 in the article, called "relation to continental philosophy". It contained a rather long discussion but many of the same points were raised. And perhaps it is indicative of the ongoing disputes in this area that it seems easier to remove it altogether. In any case, let me include what it used to say on this issue below, just to see if there may be some informative stuff getting lost ( -- Lucas (Talk) 03:18, 5 February 2007 (UTC)):

"The term "analytic philosophy" in part denotes the fact that most of this philosophy traces its roots to the early 20th century movement of "logical analysis"; in part the term serves to distinguish "analytic" from other kinds of philosophy, especially "continental philosophy". The latter denotes mainly philosophy that has taken place on continental Europe after (and partially in response to or reaction against) Hegel. Analytic or Anglophone philosophy developed, in part, as a reaction against the strong influence of Hegel's obscure and neologistic way of writing.

One term (analytic) conventionally indicates a method of philosophy, while the other (continental) indicates, rather, a geographical origin. The distinction is, for this reason, quite misleading. Analytic philosophy's founding fathers, Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, the Logical Positivists (the Vienna Circle), the Logical Empiricists (in Berlin), and the Polish logicians were all products of the continent of Europe. Much philosophy in Germany and Italy today, most of that in the Nordic Countries, and a great deal scattered over the rest of the continent and in Latin America, is likewise analytic. The European Society for Analytic Philosophy [1] holds continental-wide conventions every third year. Conversely, continental philosophy is pursued today perhaps by more people in English-speaking countries than anywhere else, if primarily in comparative literature or cultural studies departments.

Many now claim that the distinction is worthless: that the subject matter of continental philosophy is capable of being studied using the now-traditional tools of analytic philosophy. If this is true, the phrase "analytic philosophy" might be redundant, or maybe normative, as in "rigorous philosophy". The phrase "continental philosophy", like "Greek philosophy", would denote a certain historical period or series of schools in philosophy: German idealism, Marxism, psychoanalysis qua philosophy, existentialism, phenomenology, and post-structuralism.

The split between the two began early in the twentieth century. The logical positivists of the 1920s promoted a systematic rejection of metaphysics, and a generalised hostility to certain metaphysical concepts that they considered meaningless or ill-conceived: for example, God, the immaterial soul or universals such as "redness". This was at the same time that Martin Heidegger was dominating philosophy in Germany, and becoming influential in France, and his work became the object of frequent derision in English-speaking philosophy departments. It should be noted that Heidegger himself offered a vigorous rejection of metaphysics, but that his version of metaphysics differs radically from the analytics'.

Analytic philosophy, under one interpretation, failed by its own systematic lights to demonstrate the meaninglessness or fictitiousness of the concepts it attacked. At least, few analytic philosophers today would agree that they have anything like an exact and proven theory of which terms are meaningful and which meaningless. Contemporary analytic philosophy journals are — for good or ill — as rich in metaphysics as the work of any continental philosopher."


 * Which is far, far too much. This is an article on analytic philosophy, not on the difference between analytic and continental philosophy. There are other substantial problems with this material, all of which have been discussed; what a pain to have to go over them again! Banno 20:26, 5 February 2007 (UTC)
 * The early work of Moore and Russell was not a critique of British Idealism. Moore was a follower of the school in his early work, and Russell credits Moore with making the break (in his My Philosophical Development).  The long section just quoted by Lucas seems to be a mixture of arguable personal opinion and error: Heidegger hardly 'dominated' German philosophy in the 1920s (he was, according to Arendt, much discussed among students, but B&T didn't appear until 1927), he was unknown in France, and effectively unknown in England.  The sentence about Heidegger which follows is incomprehensible.     KD Tries Again 19:59, 5 February 2007 (UTC)KD


 * I disocciate myself from anything in the quote from the article I gave above. I was just reminding people that this matter is traditionally an important one for the analytic page and given plenty of space there.  I agree with Banno, it should not try and cover the split in general or give a neutral bird's-eye on the split, but show how analytic "relates itself" to continental.  It may need to say why Russell's critique of Hegel was not taken up on the continent and, yet, how unlike other periods in the history of philosophy, this did not block the progress of analytic in England. -- Lucas (Talk) 02:04, 6 February 2007 (UTC)


 * I don't think it even needs to say that, as Hegelianism did not dominate continental philosophy in this period. Hegel was largely forgotten in France until Kojeve and Hyppolite resuscitated interest in the 1930s; and I think he was much less important in Germany than Kant.  I am not sure that anything more than a sentence on Continental philosophy is needed here, with a link to that page.  KD Tries Again 16:41, 6 February 2007 (UTC)KD


 * It is different to say when Hegelianism fell from favor in a retrospective, since in that it looks like both England and the Continent had moved on from Hegelianism with the appearance of phenomenology on one side and the philosophy of "Logical Analysis" on the other. But it was not until the 40s and 50s that there were major changes in the curricula.  Until then Hegel was a part of basic teaching on both sides.  Kojeve and Hyppolite renewed interest in Hegel amongst some of the leading lights, more than they revived an ignored philosopher onto the basic curriculum.  Heidegger had also included Hegel on time & spirit in his major work.


 * The point I try to make is how a philosophy, eg, analytic, makes a critique of Hegel which is not well received on the Continent, yet this does not block its progress toward dominating the Anglo-scene. And vice-versa for Continental.   In contrast, the interaction of Berkeley-Hume-Kant-Hegel affects both English and Continental philosophy and blocks or promotes philosophies accordingly.  -- Lucas (Talk) 15:45, 7 February 2007 (UTC)

On the material that was removed
1. Keep something about the way early analytic philosophy defined itself in part by a reaction to Hegelianism. This is not to be confused with the reaction to Heidegger that happened later.

2. Drop as far as possible the stuff about definition by method vs by geography. There is an interesting point there that 'continenal philosophy' is in some sense defined from the outside, by analytic philosophers (i.e. as stuff that is not analytic & is in their eyes something distinctively European). But that is not for this article.

3. On the para that begins " Many now claim that the distinction is worthless" – there is truth in that, but it belongs elsewhere.

4. That para that begins "The split between the two began early in the twentieth century" has no clear thread, so drop (unless someone can summarise in a sentence what it is trying to say, then rewrite it so it reflects that summary).

5. The para that begins "Analytic philosophy, under one interpretation" is blatant OR. Drop.

Dbuckner 14:46, 6 February 2007 (UTC)

PS a good paper on the 'great divide'. Dbuckner 16:00, 6 February 2007 (UTC)


 * A quote from the above: "John Searle likens distinguishing between philosophies in this way to the claim that America has two parts, Kansas and business" Love it! Banno 20:22, 6 February 2007 (UTC)

PPS And so also is this. Dbuckner 16:16, 6 February 2007 (UTC)
 * I look forward to reading that. It seems to me that Wittgenstein is very close to Heidegger on the external world issue - but that's my POV, so I'll shut up.  KD Tries Again 20:26, 6 February 2007 (UTC)KD


 * Inspired by all of this I read the first 40 pages or so of Being and Time (in the now infamous Macquarrie & Robinson translation) last night. Then I reached the bit where he says that Appearance is what doesn't show itself.  He justifies this by an analogy: a disease, the actual disease, is hidden from us.  It appears only through its symptoms.  Thus what appears (the disease) is hidden from us.  This seems about as far from Wittgenstein (as least, the later W) as you can get.


 * I thought some more about the geography issue. Perhaps there is a case for connecting culture with certain ways of doing philosophy.  Peirce actually argues this here  (search for the paragraph beginning "From very early times, …").  He claims that the English national character 1. Is unsystematic (e.g. legal system), 2.  resists any theoretical complication as long as there is the least possibility that the facts can be explained in a simpler way, 3. rejects any conception which cannot be made perfectly definite and easily intelligible.  Dbuckner 08:57, 7 February 2007 (UTC)


 * Well I take back all I've said about you (if it was ever ad-hominem) and thank you for the references. I agree with the spirit of this since one way to confusion about the issue is to talk of geography only in relation to Continental, and talk of analytic only in terms of method.  Both phenomenology and analytic began as new methods of philosophy.  And at this stage both methods have developed to the extent that Continental and Analytic are really just designators or names.  And the geographic counterpart for analytic is Anglophone or Anglo-American.
 * The idea that the English are not systematic, is not in "character" (just look at Tristram Shandy, Newton or Darwin), it comes from political conservatism and the fact that the spirit of the French revolution never reached England in the form it did via Napoleon on the Continent. Though remember Hegelianism, the great systematic philosophy was dominant in England for almost a century and the early system breakers were Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, both philosophers on the continental.  Analytic is also very systematic in its Logical Positivist mode, in contrast to Heideggerean poeticising mode of philosophy.


 * The scandal of philosophy for Heidegger was that so many philosophers had beaten themselves up over trying to prove the existence of the external world. For Heidegger it is there before you even try to talk about it, his starting point is not the subject which then goes on to try and prove the outside world, but the "subject in the world".  This sentiment I think Wittgenstein would have agreed with.  -- Lucas (Talk) 17:30, 7 February 2007 (UTC)


 * "For Heidegger it [the external world] is there before you even try to talk about it." I think you may have just stated it carelessly, but that is pretty much the opposite of what Heidegger asserted.  KD Tries Again 20:31, 7 February 2007 (UTC)KD


 * Being and Time

The period 1916-27 constitutes the spell of creative silence in Heidegger's development. Many aspects of this period remain unclear, but the main lines of personal experience and intellectual contact can be traced. Heidegger works with Husserl, whom he will succeed at Freiburg in 1928, and masters the mental discipline and vocabulary of phenomenology, of the search for a firm basis for perception and cognition in acts of pure consciousness. Karl Barth's commentary on The Epistle to the Romans appears in 1918. It influences Heidegger's whole style of textual exposition, of word-by-word interpretation, and directs his attention to the radical, psychologizing theology of  Kierkegaard. This theological interest, from 1923 on, brings Heidegger into close exchange with Bultmann, and forms the basis for a persistent mutual awareness between Heideggerian ontology and the modern "theology of crisis" and de-mythologization. --from Martin Heidegger by George Steiner, pp. 73-74 Yours truly, --Ludvikus 18:10, 7 February 2007 (UTC)

Mistrust of Continental
I removed mention of this from the intro. It is unsupported, or maybe someone tried to give a fake source or attempting to shift ground. I also take issue with the complex source given for this comment:
 * Third, a rejection of sweeping philosophical systems in favour of close attention to detail.[4] Among some (but by no means all) analytic philosophers, this rejection of "grand theory" has taken the form of a defence of common sense and ordinary language against the pretensions of metaphysicians

The source is given as: ^ See, e.g., the works of G.E. Moore and J.L. Austin. Now I could equally add "see the founding document of analytic, the Tractatus". The opening statement of which is? The most sweeping one in the history of philosophy, (that is, if you exclude the bible from philosophy). -- Lucas (Talk) 01:42, 17 February 2007 (UTC)

Introduction
The current article has many problems. The one I take the greatest issue with is the state of the introduction, which is frankly just wrong, i.e. factually false. It identifies three features of analytic philosophy, all of which are either contentious or trivial.

First, the claim that analytic philosophers think that there are no specifically philosophical truths. While this doctrine has shown up from time to time, it is false. For example, I would take both the analytic/synthetic distinction, as well as the verification principle of meaning, to be taken to be philosophical truths by Logical Positivists. While they might have thought that many traditional philosophical problems were pseudoproblems, this did not commit them to claiming that there are no philosophical truths. Moreover, I suspect that more than a few analytic philosophers have been willing to discuss the foundations of science, rather than just taking its results as given (see, for example, Richard Rorty, or, for that matter, analytic philosophy of science).

Second, the claim that "logical clarification of thoughts can only be achieved by analysis of the logical form of philosophical propositions." Frankly, if you told a modern analytic philosopher that they believed that, they'd probably look at you funny. It's either trivially true - logical clarification of thought can be achieved by... logical clarification of thoughts - or it is a far more contentious doctrine, and one whose meaning is not clear at all.

Third, the claim that analytic philosophy rejects "sweeping philosophical systems." As has been noted elsewhere, just go look at the Tractatus - or John Rawls. And what exactly is close attention to detail? Is it incompatible with having a system?

In short, the introduction introduces a variety of simply false claims about the nature of analytic philosophy. As a result, I wrote a better one. For a field as varied as analytic philosophy, a historical introduction is best. As I concluded, the field is not unified by a belief in any particular doctrines - including the three listed in the current introduction - but rather by a tradition, engagement with particular problems, a certain style of writing and presentation, and a sort of philosophic toolbox centered on language. Admittedly, my introduction is unsourced (I'll do my best to provide some sources when I have time). But at the very least it is more true than the current one.


 * I should be more specific than "current." The introduction I have written is ; the introduction I refer to as current is.

-JSH

—The preceding unsigned comment was added by 128.135.24.173 (talk) 18:39, 8 May 2007 (UTC).

Recent anon lede rewrite
Analytic philosophy is a philosophical tradition that emerged in the Anglo-American world in the twentieth century (often contrasted with Continental Philosophy). Attempting to give an exhaustive description of it, however, is like trying to nail smoke to a wall. The best understanding will come from knowing a little about its history; as such, this will be a very brief historical introduction to analytic philosophy.

Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege are the founders of Analytic Philosophy. Both were seminal mathematicians and logicians, and their logical-mathematical work is closely tied to their philosophical work. One notable idea produced by Russell, which is paradigmatic of his philosophical work, was an analysis of the word “exists,” as well as the descriptions theory of proper names. Briefly, Russell argued that saying “X exists” does in fact say nothing about the thing named by “X.” Rather, it is claiming that there is such a thing – that the term “X” has a referent. One target of this claim is the ontological argument for the existence of God, which treats “existence” as a property of objects. Indeed, Russell was often interested in getting at the ‘underlying structure’ of ordinary language, to reveal the solutions to puzzles that we are led in to when we consider only the surface grammar. (In the above example, the claim “X exists” looks grammatically somewhat like “X is purple.” But while the second predicates a property – purple – of the object named by “X,” the first actually predicates a property of the term “X.” By revealing the underlying structure, Russell attempted to resolve philosophical problems).

Gottlob Frege elucidated some of the basic concepts of analytic philosophy, which have since permeated it entirely. First among these is the distinction between sense, or meaning, and reference. To use his example, the words “Morning Star” literally mean “That star that rises over there in the morning,” while “Evening Star” means “That star that sets over there in the evening.” On the other hand, both “Morning Star” and “Evening Star” refer to the same object in the world – Venus.

But perhaps the movement most associated with Analytic Philosophy is Logical Positivism. This was a particular philosophical movement that arose in Vienna – specifically among the Vienna Circle, a group of young philosophers, including Rudolf Carnap. They were reacting to what they saw as the metaphysical nonsense prevalent in European philosophy at the time. Much of traditional metaphysics they took to be nonsense cloaked in impressive sounding words.

The two main doctrines of logical positivism are these: first, that all meaningful sentences are either analytic or synthetic. Analytic sentences are those that are true simply in virtue of the meanings of the words involved (the paradigm case being “All bachelors are unmarried,” since bachelors are by definition unmarried men). Analytic sentences are trivial: they express nothing substantial, and only tell us about the meanings of words. Synthetic sentences are not trivially true. The Logical Positivists held that the meaning of all synthetic sentences was constituted by their verification conditions – more or less, how one would go about verifying them. As an extension of that, only verifiable synthetic sentences are meaningful.

These doctrines allowed the Logical Positivists to both rule out much of speculative metaphysics as unverifiable nonsense, as well as to put forth a variety of large projects. But we’ll pass over these, primarily because Logical Positivism was decisively defeated by three considerations. The first of these is due to W.V.O. Quine in his seminal paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” In this, Quine attacked the very idea of a principled distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences, as well as the possibility of verifying sentences in isolation from the rest of a language. The second of these is the application of Positivist doctrines to themselves. It was asked, ‘Is the verification principle of meaning analytic or synthetic? If it is analytic, then it is merely vacuously true, and tells us nothing substantial. And if it is synthetic, how exactly would we go about verifying it?’

The last problem was the increasingly arcane and technical nature of Positive doctrines. Here, they have been presented merely in a rough outline. And that is indeed how they began. But as time progressed, more and more work was done to give them greater specificity and precision, with the result that the system as a whole was transformed from a few simple doctrines to a technical mess that seemed increasingly less plausible.

With the fall of Logical Positivism, AP became less a tradition unified by any particular set of doctrines, than a tradition unified by a certain style of philosophical writing, as well as by certain concerns and approaches, specifically an emphasis on language. The style is reminiscent of the early approaches of Frege and Russell, as well as the Logical Positivists’ reaction to metaphysical obscurity. It includes an emphasis on clarity and precision, even to the extent of becoming overly technical. Clarity of concepts and logical arguments are also highly valued.

The concerns with language take a number of forms. In some, traditional philosophical problems become transformed into problems in language. For example, the question of whether their might be alternative, incommensurable frameworks of reasoning becomes transformed into a question of translation between languages in Donald Davidson’s paper “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” But more than that, analytic philosophers have been concerned with the limits of linguistic expression – of what sorts of claims can be given linguistic expression. Notable among these is Ludwig Wittgenstein, who in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was concerned with ‘setting the bounds of sense.’ But it should not be thought that all AP is merely philosophy of language. Indeed, the linguistic approach, as well as the emphasis on clarity of argument, are typical of Analytic ethics, an early example being G.E. Moore’s Principia Ethica.

In conclusion, Analytic Philosophy is a tremendously varied tradition. And many modern Anglo-American philosophers would consciously identify as Analytic Philosophers (though they might want to offer a variety of qualifications on just what that means). In short, Analytic Philosophy is a living tradition, alive and well in the modern academy.

If anyone can mine this for useful content, please feel free to do so.&#91;&#91;User:Skomorokh&#124;&lt;i&gt;&lt;font color=404040&gt;Skomorokh&lt;/font&gt;&lt;/i&gt; &#91;&#91;User talk:Skomorokh&#124;&lt;font color=&quot;black&quot;&gt;&#39;&#39;talk&#39;&#39;&lt;/font&gt;]]]] 16:39, 9 May 2007 (UTC)

Etymological curiosity
But does anyone out there have any idea who first used the term "analytic philosophy" in the approximate sense of this article and what there intentions were (e.g. historical classification, definition, etc.)? --Francesco Franco 12:08, 14 May 2007 (UTC)


 * I have asked a specialist in the history of early analytic philosophy. He didn't actually know, but he suspected it was probably used around World War I, or more likely a little bit thereafter, by younger philosophers who wanted to identify themselves with one or both of Russell and Moore.  However, nothing I've ever read gave a precise origin for the term.  Complicating matters, (I think) the term "philosophical analysis" was used before anyone referred to "analytic philosophy", and was used a bit more loosely. JustinBlank (talk) 08:29, 18 January 2009 (UTC)


 * You are replying to a pretty old message. As I wrote on Francesco's talk page at the time, Alan Richardson wrote a paper finding very few uses before the late 1940s. 271828182 (talk) 03:28, 19 January 2009 (UTC)


 * I wonder what he Alan Richardson found as the first use of the expression? The OED is usually good at such matters. In passing The Routledge Encyclopedia, see ( http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=VQ-GhVWTH84C&pg=PA225&lpg=PA225&dq=%22analytical+philosophy%22+first+use+of+phrase&source=web&ots=kvkdQou_wf&sig=Frg2KOvjs1I56MIsFEIyhlYo-oc&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=8&ct=result) cites Bergam G. "A positiveness Metaphysics of Conciosness", 1945 in MIND: new series 54: pp 193-286. --Philogo 14:00, 19 January 2009 (UTC)

The Incompleteness Theorem
From the article, "Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead show that mathematics can be based on fundamental logical principles. " I would like to leave this edit for someone else, or let it be discussed, but Godel's Incompleteness Theorem a few years after Principia Mathematica came out showed exactly that Russell and Whitehead had failed to, in paraphrase, build mathematics from the ground up. In summary, his work showed that no finite set of axioms could determine the truth of all statements in mathematics. There exist true mathematical statements which cannot be generated by the set of axioms. 12.147.134.239 04:49, 7 June 2007 (UTC) (Ub3rm4th)

This article is too historical
The article treats somewhat archaic concepts ( like the concept of logical form) as contemporary; the article seems to fail to distinguish past and present analytic philosophy in a dangerous way. Also the article has a very historical focus while most people who search for this article are probably more interested in the way analytic philosophy is now. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 129.78.64.102 (talk) 04:47, 3 November 2007 (UTC)


 * You're right (though I would point out that the introduction does tag its discussion specifically as "historical"). The problem is that that "present analytic philosophy" has no obvious identity, except in a tribal-academic sense: who writes for what journals, who was whose advisor, "who you sit with for lunch", etc.  In other words, it's not a specifically philosophical difference, it's a historical one!  In any case, the article could be much improved.  Wish me and others long life and lots of free time. 271828182 17:34, 3 November 2007 (UTC)


 * Making a non-historical article about analytic philosophy might be prohibitively long. The article is already somewhat long, but a few important contemporary areas have no discussion (epistemology and metaphysics spring to mind), while others have only limited discussion or a stub.  I wonder if for the sake of manageability, the article should focus on the history of the subject, and then include a good guide to articles on other topics in contemporary analytic philosophy.  That said, I'm not particularly familiar with the way things are run on wikipedia. JustinBlank 04:55, 5 November 2007 (UTC)

Quick-failed "good article" nomination
Per the quick-fail criteria of the GA process, any article that has cleanup or expansion banners must be failed immediately, and does not require an in-depth review. Please make sure to thoroughly review the GA criteria before renominating. If you feel this decision was in error, you may seek a reassessment. Thank you for your work so far, Van Tucky  talk 23:48, 22 November 2007 (UTC)

Essence/family resemblance
The article claims that the words "analytic philosophy" do not designate a concept. There is no essential quality or property that can be assigned to analytic philosophy. Instead, there are several different qualities or properties that can be assigned to several different philosophies. These characteristics are said to have an essential "family resemblance." (The term "analytic philosophy" may mark merely a family resemblance across disparate philosophical views, or historical lines of influence.) But, the "family resemblance" is, itself, the common, essential property that defines analytic philosophy. What is the family resemblance? If we know that, then we know the essential predicate that tells us what analytic philosophy is. Analytic philosophy is (family resemblance). Since the words "analytic philosophy" designate a variety of concepts, the result is ambiguity. Ambiguity is removed when one word designates one concept. The Wiki article is therefore ambiguous and communicates no meaning. An unambiguous meaning could be given to it if is said to mean that philosophical concepts should be analyzed in order to find what perceptions are their base and foundation. But this is nothing new. Schopenhauer clearly explained how concepts must ultimately be based on experienced perceptions in order to be sensible. He opposed Fichte's and Hegel's comical exaggeration of Kant's obscurity. Analytic philosophy opposed such obscurity. Did it do so by insisting on the analysis of concepts in order to find their sensible, perceptual ground? If so, then this is the essential predicate and there is no need of Wittgensteinian talk about family resemblance.[User:Lestrade|Lestrade]] (talk) 17:33, 12 April 2008 (UTC)Lestrade


 * Perhaps it would help if you wrote on a chalkboard a hundred times each:


 * "Wikipedia is not a publisher of original thought"


 * and


 * "Wikipedia is not a soapbox".


 * I also recommend:


 * "People whose knowledge of philosophy is limited to idol worship of one philosopher shouldn't edit philosophy articles."


 * Oh, and you could read the article on family resemblance too. 271828182 (talk) 07:42, 13 April 2008 (UTC)

Introduction Again
The introduction currently contains the following sentence:

Insofar as broad generalizations can be made, analytic philosophy is defined by its emphasis on clarity and argument, often achieved via modern formal logic and analysis of language, and a respect for the natural sciences.[4][5]

It is sourced to Colin McGinn, basically. I suggest modifying this claim to the following:

Insofar as broad generalizations can be made, analytic philosophy is defined by its emphasis on a particular conception of clarity and argument, often thought to be achieved by means of formal logic and analysis of language; it is also defined by a particular conception of the natural sciences.

OR, alternately:

Insofar as broad generalizations can be made, analytic philosophers take their mode of philosophizing to be distinguished through an emphasis on clarity and rigor, understood in terms of formal logic and analysis of language, and through a respect for the natural sciences.

Why these changes? Mostly because it is not clear to me that scientism = respect for the sciences (if, for instance, scientism falsely portrays the sciences, it might be thought to lack respect for them) and it is not clear to me that writing in a particular prose style constitutes the only means to clarity or argument.

Making these changes would not entail changing the citations.

There is no reason why this article should commit itself to a specific philosophical position on either point merely in order to describe analytic philosophy. My proposed changes continue to describe analytic philosophers' de dicto commitments, without taking on the disputed de re claims.

131.96.50.143 (talk) 16:54, 24 April 2008 (UTC)pluralist

Large Revision
I've just made a lot of changes to the article, including substantial reorganization, some additions, and a new distinction between analytic philosophy as a historical program and analytic philosophy as a style.

I think these constitute a big improvement, and I hope you will agree.

--BrownApple (talk) 09:11, 28 May 2008 (UTC)


 * I don't object to the spirit of the rewrite; the distinction between the historical roots of AP and the current, umbrella use of the term needed to be strengthened. However, the rewrite is almost entirely unsourced, whereas the previous introduction, despite its flaws, was heavily sourced.  This is a particular problem since I doubt you will find any reference to the phrase "analytic philosophy" in the works of Frege, Russell, or Moore.  Applying the term AP to these "founding fathers" is a retrospective notion.  Wikipedia is not an opportunity to write a personal essay -- even though it may be right -- it needs to be a reference source, and needs scrupulous verification and avoidance of OR.  I don't want to revert, but this is a serious problem with the current revision. 271828182 (talk) 20:21, 28 May 2008 (UTC)


 * Three points. First, I think it's customary to treat Russell and Moore as analytic philosophers, whether or not they used the term in their early work (I don't actually know whether they did).  They are recognizably among the founders of the tradition, so they count as part of it.  The same is probably true of Frege.  To take one example (first one I came across) the SEP article on Analysis refers to "analytic philosophy as founded by Frege and Russell.


 * Second, while I think the revision gives the article a more natural structure, some material was lost in the revision that ought to have been kept. I think the article ought to have a section on natural language semantics in the Davidsonian program, even if we didn't have much information.


 * Lastly, I second the thought that the introduction now appears too opinionated or too much like a statement of personal opinion. In particular, I think the "two senses" claim could be much more modest--I doubt that it adequately characterizes analytic philosopher's perception of their tradition.


 * --JustinBlank (talk) 14:10, 29 May 2008 (UTC)


 * All good points. As far as Natural Language semantics and Davidson, I tried to preserve most of the content of the article, but it looks like those couple sentences fell through the cracks...  Maybe we can add them back to a "Philosophy of Language" subsection under the second main section?  Here are the sentences in question:


 * Natural Language Semantics


 * In the late 1960s and onwards, there was an increasing interest in giving a formal semantic treatment of natural languages, but without the assumptions of logical positivism about what form that semantic treatment must take. Donald Davidson was the most prominent figure in this trend. Davidson held that a linguistic theory should take the form of a finite set of rules which would give truth conditions for every potential sentence of the language.


 * As far as the introduction goes, unfortunately you're right that what I've written isn't necessarily the consensus view of all philosophers... There are perfectly good philosophers who claim "analytic philosophy" refers to a style and that's that.  There are also many philosophers who write about "analytic philosophy" as a historical program that's currently more or less dead.  We need to find some way of mediating between these various view-points, while keeping the intro readable.  What I wrote was my attempt to do so, but surely it can be improved.  For example, some of the things I wrote in the second paragraph seem inappropriate to me now for a wikipedia article.


 * Nevertheless, I think the basic (non-original) distinction here is a helpful one, particularly since it helps to make clear why so many contemporary branches of philosophy classified as "analytic" have rather little to do with the philosophical programs of Frege and Russell.


 * BrownApple (talk) 09:42, 30 May 2008 (UTC)


 * After giving some time to consider the changes, I reverted the introduction to the old one, which was far more scrupulously sourced and neutrally phrased. I retained the important improvement of BrownApple's version, viz., a distinction between "analytic philosophy 1900-1960" and "contemporary analytic philosophy", and made that distinction more clear in the opening paragraphs.  I foregrounded the generic sense, since that is the most prevalent usage that an encyclopedia user will need to know.  Obviously, this article still has a long way to go, and still has some glaring Frankenstein seams, but the introduction from May 28 2008 was too poorly sourced to let stand. 271828182 (talk) 22:49, 23 September 2008 (UTC)

Analytic Philosophy after the 1960s and Political Philosophy
I personally don't like this section particularly the title "The End? 1960 and Beyond". Some of the sentences are rather vague. For example
 * Wittgenstein’s arguments against his original Tractatus position were disregarded in the face of a somewhat vulgarised revival of that very position. This now calls itself analytic philosophy, though writers such as Hacker dispute its right to that title. “What from Wittgenstein’s perspective were diseases of the intellect, to many of which he had succumbed as a young man and which he had laboured long to extirpate, broke out afresh in mutated virulent forms."

I think the Political philosophy section could be expanded to include the influence John Locke, Thomas Paine and John Stuart Mill have had on Analytic political philosophy. Also why is there nothing mentioned of the contributions of both Karl Popper and Friedrich von Hayek to Analytic Political Philosophy?

However the article is quite good. Keep up the good work. Exiledone (talk) 17:54, 4 June 2008 (UTC)

Wittgenstein
Under the section Ideal Language Analysis, LW is presented as an ideal language philospher, and indeed he is in the Tractatus. But he radically dismissed the endeavor with his Philosophical Investigations--for which he is probably, now, most famous. Much earlier than that, by 1931 he had already referred to his own work in the Tractatus as "dogmatic" (see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy under LW). I suggest making an amendment to the effect that this section represents only early LW, and that it should not be taken as representative of his later philosophy, nor should the reader assume that contemporary philosophers refer to his philosophy with reference to this work. Rdanneskjold (talk) 13:49, 8 October 2008 (UTC)

Habermas
Also, if Habermas isn't analytic philosophy, does he really belong here at all? I'm sure we can leave his mention to the contemporary philosophy page. Rdanneskjold (talk) 03:27, 17 October 2008 (UTC)

Too many notes!
This poor article has more paragraphs than a dog has fleas. And a whole lot of them contain just one or two sentences referring to other main articles. And so much waffle, repetition and verbosity. Dreadful!--Philogo 00:19, 8 November 2008 (UTC)

1960 and Beyond
I cut out a section of this whicc appeared to me to be opiniated unsubstatiated waffle. I left what was the nub of the matter presented. Another editor had reinstated on grounds that was a worthwhile discussion. I do not feel the article is the place for discussion no matter how worthwhile but should consist of matters that can be supported by citations. The article as a whole is far too windy, verbose, and opiniated - it reads like a first year undergrad essay (no dispected intended - I wrote many such myslef!) rather than an encyclopedia article. We should prune the articel back so it is fairly factual with neutral point of view for general reader. I am mondd to resisntate my cuts. What do other editors think? --Philogo 00:57, 9 November 2008 (UTC)

Suggestion
I looked over your edit again. I would be happy with all of it, if we retain more of the information from Hacker since it's information on the development and style of modern analytic philosophy. Salvaging some of the information contained in the quote “As he argues, philosophy’s center of gravity shifted from Britain to the US in the mid 70s (mostly for economic reasons), where, under the influence of the growing prestige of certain exciting scientific and technological developments, like computers, neurophysiology and Chomskyan linguistics, Wittgenstein’s arguments against his original Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus position were disregarded in the face of a somewhat vulgarised revival of that very position,” would satisfy me. Rdanneskjold (talk) 17:48, 9 November 2008 (UTC)
 * Well I will revert back to mey edit then you can addback what you think it intersting and approriate. I would obeserve however that the article says that the vast majoritt philosophers in mthe anglo-Amercan trasitions describe themsleves as analytincal philspohers. We should not give too much wiegt the one person whose view is that they ar not analytical philosophers at all. I think we would HAVE to conclude that he is using the term "analytcial philoph" in a different sens to his thousand of collegues.  As for the stuff begining "As he argues..." those three words indoicate lack of neutrality.  Your own expression "some of the information" indicate that you yourself see Hacker's view as "information" rather than opinion.  Does even Hacker himself offer the material as fact?  This is supposed to be an encycopedia article so it shold present facts or prsent alternative view without taking sides.  Hope you agree! --Philogo 01:33, 10 November 2008 (UTC)

This section hasn't really been improved much. Perhaps it's the American in me, but I don't see why Hacker's views get so much focus, or why Kripke isn't mentioned at all. Wittgenstein isn't nearly as important as Quine or Kripke, at least in America. The article as a whole needs lots of work, but this section really fails to represent contemporary philosophy aside from oblique references to naturalism. Analytic philosophy nowadays is just philosophy done in the same style as Frege, Russell, Moore, and Carnap (Wittgenstein's style is not really imitated or considered to be paradigmatic of analytic philosophy by anyone), and there needs to be more talk of pluralism beyond what there is here (it's also biased against this conception of analysis). A bit about how philosophy differs in Australia, America, Britain, and Scandinavia (the Continent doesn't have the same sort of analytic cohesiveness yet) would be great. 72.200.74.23 (talk) 02:47, 6 January 2009 (UTC)


 * Material on Hacker slimmed; one guy's view should not take up one third of our account of the last half-century and not presented as fact, no matter how interesting (IMHO). More material needed for the last 48 years. Not sure that "style" is quite the right concept.  As I see it Frege, Russell and others advocated a METHOD of doing philosophy as a paradign.  It is be-littling to describe it as a "style" just as it would be to so characterise the methods of doing science of Galileo and Newton or  e.g. the hypothetico-deductive method.  Similary I am not sure how much it matters how things differ between different countries.  We would not expect an aricle on say Maths and Science since 1960 to compare and contrast Maths In New Zealand and Scotland, or discuss Californian Physics or Welsh Quantum Mechanics would we?  --Philogo 13:26, 6 January 2009 (UTC)


 * Frege and Russell might well be interpreted as having offered methods and/or paradigms for other philosophers. However, the point made in the 1960s section, it seems to me, was precisely that philosophers who have gone on calling themselves "analytic" have largely dropped the assumptions that underlay those methods--a point which seems quite correct.  —Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.246.191.83 (talk) 17:25, 6 January 2009 (UTC)

a posteriori
Could it be said that "Analytic philosophy" is essentially a posteriori philosophy? 4.255.52.121 (talk) 20:38, 8 March 2009 (UTC)


 * I'm not sure what you mean by this, but from the sounds of it "no." Even the name "analytic" philosophy connotes a priori analysis of concepts rather than a posteriori investigation into the world. -Atfyfe (talk) 22:36, 8 March 2009 (UTC)
 * Agree with Atfyfe--Philogo (talk) 09:44, 6 April 2009 (UTC)

Philosophy of science
I admit I don't follow the day-to-day battles of philosophers of science, but this section makes it seem that people are still arguing about Kuhn and Feyerabend, when in fact most philosophy of science engages directly with actual contemporary science and is largely of a realist flavor (indeed, lots of work in 'general philosophy of science' doesn't have much to do with Kuhn and Feyerabend anymore). Perhaps someone who knows the field better than I do can come and fix up this section. 68.90.50.32 (talk) 02:16, 10 June 2009 (UTC)

Sense and Reference in the Begriffsschrift?
"Frege's own work, the Begriffsschrift, developed the concepts of a specific form of modern logic by making use of the notions of the sense and reference"

I'm nearly certain that the Begriffschrift didn't deal with sense and reference, it was simply a 'concept script' or formal notation for second-order logic. Sense and Reference wasn't published until much later. BrideOfKripkenstein (talk) 03:26, 18 August 2009 (UTC)

It's possible that the original author of that sentence confused 'sense' and 'reference' with 'content of a proposition' and 'judgment' which are heavily used in the Begriffschrift? At any rate, I think that comment should be removed. --Taekwandean (talk) 11:41, 4 July 2010 (UTC)

Schools of Thought - Clarification Needed
Is the Schools of Thought section of the article schools of thought in philosophy or schools of thought in analytic philosophy?

Also, can anyone tell me why analytic philosophy is not listed in this article? If it should be listed there, then just let me know and I'll add it. Thanks. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Bill the Cat 7 (talk • contribs) 09:23, 7 January 2010 (UTC)


 * They are the schools of thought in analytic philosophy. I've made the change since its harmless, but I really don't think it was needed. It was implied that they are schools of thought in analytic philosophy because this is the entry for analytic philosophy. Atfyfe (talk) 23:30, 7 January 2010 (UTC)


 * Well, yes, I thought so too. But I just wanted to be sure because some people can be "sticklers".  Thank you for making it clear.


 * By the way, should "analytic philosophy" be listed here?  Thanks again.  Bill the Cat 7 (talk) 03:27, 8 January 2010 (UTC)


 * Probably. - Atfyfe (talk) 21:54, 8 January 2010 (UTC)

Recent "dubious - discuss" and "clarify" tags by Rursus
User:Rursus has raised questions about the following passage:

According to him[20], in the mid 1970s, partly for economic reasons, philosophy’s centre of gravity shifted from Britain to the US, where Wittgenstein’s influence had never been well rooted. There, under the influence of the growing prestige of some exciting scientific and technological developments, like computers, neurophysiology and Chomskyan linguistics, his powerful arguments were simply disregardedclarification needed. "What from Wittgenstein’s perspective were diseases of the intellect, to many of which he had succumbed as a young man and which he had laboured long to extirpate, broke out afresh in mutated virulent forms" (Hacker p272)dubious – discuss.


 * (1) [clarification needed] - huh|reason=WHY? WIKIPEDIA SHOULDN'T EMIT PHILOSOPHICAL/POLITICAL SLOGANS.


 * So I am a little confused by Rursus' comment here. I am not sure what he means when he mentions "slogans". However, I am skeptical about the claim: "There, under the influence of the growing prestige of some exciting scientific and technological developments, like computers, neurophysiology and Chomskyan linguistics, his powerful arguments were simply disregarded." Were Wittgenstein's philosophic "powerful" arguments really "disregarded" for these non-philosophical reasons. Even if partly true, it is also the case that philosophers just found problems with his arguments.


 * (2) [dubious – discuss] - dubious|reason=THIS SEEMS TO BE A POSITIVIST INTERPRETATION OF WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS, WHILE THE REAL WITTGENSTEIN WAS DECIDEDLY ANTI-POSITIVIST.


 * Two things: (1) I don't know how obvious or accepted the claim that early-Wittgenstein wasn't a postivist is; (2) The point of the quote is that later-Wittgenstein's Ordinary Language Philosophy was largely abandoned in the 1960's and philosophers returned to the sort of philosophy he regarded as a disease of the intellect.

Overall, I think these sections are very well written and that while there is some truth to Rursus' concerns here, I don't think they warrant these tags. If he wants to reword these sections I'd be all for it since there is room for imporvement, but I don't think there is any real problem with them. - Atfyfe (talk) 04:39, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

Husserl's book irrelevant? (the "Origins: Frege" section)
What Frege criticized in it was eventually abandoned by Husserl so that the contrast isn't really of great implications. The remaining thing that rather sheepishly justify mentioning the book, namely that Frege's review was behind Husserl changing his views, is now widely contested I guess. So maybe Husserl's book is irrelevant here. What do you think? -- AMSA83 (talk) 23:50, 24 February 2010 (UTC)

I am not sure that Husserl's book is completely irrelevant here. Some might say that the parting of the ways is somewhere between Husserl and Frege, so using his book as a contrast to what Frege was doing might be appropriate. --Taekwandean (talk) 12:28, 28 June 2010 (UTC)

Kripke's Locke Lectures
This article is quite a mishmash. It veers in quality from quite informative to pointlessly POV. The presence of this passage is particularly odd:

'' Kripke delivered the John Locke lectures in philosophy at Oxford in 1973. Titled Reference and Existence, they are in many respects a continuation of Naming and Necessity, and deal with the subjects of fictional names and perceptual error. They have never been published and the transcript is officially available only in a reading copy in the university philosophy library, which cannot be copied or cited without Kripke's permission.''

I like Kripke and all, and I don't even mind that the philosophy of language section seems to be mostly about him, but who cares where the transcripts of these lectures are kept? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.5.174.124 (talk) 06:54, 16 March 2010 (UTC)


 * This article is typical Wikipedia on philosophy -- an accumulation of wildly uneven contributions by diverse hands. (Interestingly, the quality generally goes south the farther the article progresses.)  I agree that this part is irrelevant -- why not edit it? 271828182 (talk) 21:01, 28 June 2010 (UTC)

Thomism and Marxism in the Opening Paragraph?
The last line of the opening paragraph now states: "Analytic philosophy is sometimes understood in contrast to other philosophical movements, such as continental philosophy, Thomism, or Marxism."

This is bizzare. I believe it once just compared analytic philosophy to continental philosophy, which makes sense to do considering how they are often even defined in contrast to one another. To mention Thomism and Marxism seems just random. Why not rationalism and empiricism? I tried to re-write it without the mention of Thomism and Marxism but then someone just undid my revision. I want to avoid an edit war, so I'm taking it to the discussion section. Thoughts?

- Atfyfe (talk) 23:38, 23 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Here come some references. 271828182 (talk) 00:30, 24 July 2010 (UTC)

I think I am inclined to agree with Atfyfe. While it makes sense to speak of analytic philosophy in contrast with continental philosophy, I am not sure that the same holds true in regards to the relations between analytic philosophy and movements like Thomism or Marxism. After all, now a days, it is not uncommon to speak of analytical Thomists like Peter Geach or his late wife, G.E.M. Anscombe, and people also refer to analytical Marxists like the late G.A. Cohen, to cite a couple of examples. So, it would seem that analytic philosophy, as a movement, is orthogonal to movements like Thomism or Marxism, not something that can be defined in contrast with them.

JimFarm (talk) 22:18, 28 July 2010 (UTC)


 * Yes, the assimilation of all philosophy to the analytic brand (or the brand's dilution into a meaningless slogan) proceeds apace. I have heard of "analytic Heideggerians", "analytic Hegelians", and "analytic phenomenologists".  Brian Leiter has long said the best continental philosophy is done in analytic programs, which seems to imply there are "analytic continentals".  In any case, I have done what an encyclopedia article demands, which is to provide verifiable content.  I don't object to additions to illustrate the vapidity of the term. 271828182 (talk) 06:22, 29 July 2010 (UTC)

I have just adjusted this last sentence - the contrast with Continental Philosophy needs to stand out above the other types of philosophies listed here.Ollie Cromwell (talk) 15:18, 18 April 2012 (UTC)


 * Nice work. - Atfyfe (talk) 15:20, 18 April 2012 (UTC)

Thanks Ollie Cromwell (talk) 15:22, 19 April 2012 (UTC)

POV in "History"
The history section -- particularly the subsections "The dismissal of the humanities" and "Geographic hegemony" -- is badly written and tendentious. (The Tourette-like repetition of the word "hegemony" is particularly fun.) Some examples:

"Historically, they haven't paid any interest to arts or literature."

"Some analytic philosophers have gone as far as delegitimize as 'not philosophy', or not worth reading anymore, the work of major philosophers of the past that are in contrast with the analytic tradition."

"American literary critic J. Hillis Miller cited an episode on the imperialism of Analytic philosophers."

I don't feel qualified enough to rewrite the whole section myself -- but since it currently reads like a B- Critical Theory undergrad paper, somebody ought to. EdwardTattsyrup (talk) 17:00, 16 September 2010 (UTC)

Criticism section
From this edit by User:Savabubble, which removed the criticism section tag:
 * The article is neutral in point of view but to discuss generalized criticisms this section is the best way, integrating criticism would not present it at the appropriate level.--User:Savabubble

Personally I think the criticism section is ok as long as the points of criticism are also present in the rest of the article.--Sum (talk) 16:24, 19 September 2010 (UTC)

Bullets
Are the bullets in the lede section really necessary? Not only are there bullets, but actually two levels of bullets, which really seems like overkill for an introduction. The information is fairly important, but digging into the contrasts between logical positivism and foundationalism just doesn't seem like an introductory point. I propose that the section be trimmed down significantly. — Zujine |talk 05:17, 14 May 2012 (UTC)


 * "Seems like" is not a compelling reason to discard well-sourced content. 271828182 (talk) 07:01, 14 May 2012 (UTC)


 * Apologies for not being more clear. I'm not suggesting we discard it, but move it out of the lede section. — Zujine |talk 13:43, 16 May 2012 (UTC)

"Anglosaxon" and the rest
I mean the fragment "the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Scandinavia, Australia, and New Zealand". It makes false impression, that a.ph. is a chiefly Anglosaxon thing (at least Scandinavia is mentioned...). In the article as a whole Poland, Austria and Finland, where the role of a.ph. is also very large, are totally neglected - I think it should be mentioned at least in the lead. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.6.9.7 (talk) 03:57, 27 November 2012 (UTC)
 * Absolutely agree. I don't think we should remove the "angloaxon thing" but I do think we need to modify things to include the countries you mention. - Atfyfe (talk) 07:11, 31 January 2013 (UTC)