Talk:Armoured flight deck

Table
The article states that the Essex class carriers had 2.5" of flight deck armor, and that armour strakes on the Illustrious class aircraft carriers were main deck armour. Are these facts correct? Kablammo 15:30, 28 October 2007 (UTC)
 * More specifically, weren't the Essex carriers unarmored on the flight deck (aside from a few inches of Douglas fir)?
 * Fixed. Source for Essex armor:   Kablammo 22:00, 28 October 2007 (UTC)
 * The figures given for Illustrious look OK, but horizontal deck armour is not a strake, is it? (E.H.H. Archibald in The Metal Fighting Ship in the Royal Navy, 1860-1970, gives the RN carriers' armour at 3" flight deck, 2.5" main deck, and 4.5" sides and hanger sides.)
 * Fixed per source.
 * How much of the low freeboard of the Midway class was due to later modifications?
 * Source for low freeboard:  21:48, 28 October 2007 (UTC)
 * I believe that the fuel purging system came about after the experience of the Lexington lost at Coral Sea. Whether the wooden flight decks in fact were a serious risk may be questionable-- the carriers which were lost or seriously damaged suffered explosions below the level of the flight deck.  There is footage of planes which crashed on landing spilling burning fuel; it was easily extinguished and flight operations resumed.
 * The article would benefit from more citation to authorities, especially for comparisions, such as between US and UK, and other judgments or conclusory assertions. I'm not saying they are wrong, just that they should have citations.
 * Kablammo 20:05, 28 October 2007 (UTC)


 * I should probably explain that I created this article as a spin off of Flight deck. While it was there, it took up quite a bit of space. I've actually asked some of your questions myself, and believe much about the info presented could use cleaning up. Personally the only info I'm confident about is the difference in size between British and American carrier air wings as a direct result of where the armored deck is placed.


 * Though I do plan to fix this article in the future you are of course welcome to as well :) (I've gotten distracted working on the Attack on Pearl Harbor.) Anynobody 21:47, 28 October 2007 (UTC)

I've added a lot of additional info, and touched upon the differing design requirements of each navy. I've also added some information regarding the severe financial restrictions that faced the post-war RN, and how these effected the ability to repair war damages carriers. A simple discussion of numbers of aircraft carried does not explain the differing operational doctrine of the USN and RN, and use of a permanent deck park on USN carriers, which is largely responsible for the larger USN aircraft complement. 70.71.251.142 (talk) 03:00, 15 January 2009 (UTC)

Strength Deck?
How about some explanation of this term? It's used, but not defined or linked. 68.83.72.162 (talk) 08:39, 12 October 2008 (UTC)

"American damage control took days or even months"
I'm a bit skeptical of this - it seems to be confusing full repairs with damage control; in almost every case the immediate damage control was finished within hours. The difference seems to be that in most cases, American carriers finished the day's operations if they were able to, then pulled back for repairs. Most documentation seems to indicate that kamikaze damage that completely ruined a carrier's ability to operate aircraft was rare (cases like Enterprise where a kamikaze hit the ship's elevator, something that a British carrier would not have quickly recovered from either), most of them say that normal flight operations were restored within hours. Iceberg3k (talk) 14:59, 17 February 2008 (UTC)
 * That said, Formidable's survival of her 4 May 1945 kamikaze hit is a tribute to the toughness of her construction, I doubt there are many ships of any type that could have survived damage like that and still continued their mission. Iceberg3k (talk) 15:02, 17 February 2008 (UTC)

Link to other discussion
This article has been a subject of brief discussion at Wikipedia_talk:WikiProject_Ships. Project members and participants there have been invited to continue the discussion here. As stated there by TomTheHand, these essays may be useful in improving the article. (They likely are the uncited sources for parts of it). Kablammo 15:11, 29 October 2007 (UTC)

Protection against NAval Gunfire
I think I remember reading an account of the Guadalcanal Campaign in which it was claimed that the wooden decks of the American carriers allowed them to be penetrated by heavy Japanese gunfire, whose armour-piercing ammo did not explode, thus protecting the US carriers from extensive daage. Can anyone confirm this, and, if so, maybe incorporate it into the article? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 84.129.147.169 (talk) 19:11, 18 March 2009 (UTC)

≥== Circumstances ==

As a result, in the late 1930s, the FAA did not have any modern high-performance aircraft at its disposal, indeed its first monoplane, the Blackburn Skua, only flew for the first time in 1937. So what? When did the USN get its first monoplane? The SBN had its first flight in 1936, the biplanes fighters were retired in 1940 and SBCs were still on CV in 1942.Markus Becker02 (talk) 14:36, 28 May 2009 (UTC)

As best as I can tell the USN got it's first monoplane in 1937 and it first flew in 1936. To my knowledge, this was the TBD Devastator. (There are several other candidates including the BT-1 and SB2U, but neither of these was much if any earlier. The F2A was almost certainly later.) In any case, no navy had much of a jump. The IJN introduced the A5M at about the same time as the Devastator, and I believe that was Japan's first naval monoplane. I'd actually be inclined to say that this difference is so small as to be irrelevant to the discussion. SymphonicPoet (talk) 06:54, 23 August 2010 (UTC)

The Royal Navy had planned to be operating the Fairey Firefly and Fairey Barracuda by 1942, but these plans fell apart after the Fall of France and the necessity to give RAF aircraft priority for production and development. Interestingly, the Sea Hurricane, which was pressed into naval service had a rather better record, in RN service in 1941-42, than the Martlet (Grumman F4F), especially during Operation Pedestal, when they served together.Damwiki1 (talk) 08:12, 23 August 2010 (UTC)


 * For Britain, the two most likely enemies in the 1930s were Germany and Italy, and neither had any aircraft carriers. Hence, at a time of limited defence budgets, as well as popular sentiment towards disarmament, the Fleet Air Arm was forced to take a back seat when it came to newer, more modern aircraft.


 * In addition, any war involving Britain with these two countries was assumed to also involve France as an ally of Britain, hence the French Navy would be able to share some of the burden. The surrender of France in 1940 changed that.

Arguing with the photos
Photo captions are not the place to argues points. Anyway, much of this article is synthesis, mkaing points sthe original source probably did not make. I'm seriously conidering AFDing hte article, as I doubt it will ever be neutral. - BilCat (talk) 08:24, 5 December 2009 (UTC)
 * I've had concerns about this article for years. The lack of references is a major problem. I don't think that it would pass an AfD though, as it is on a viable topic. Nick-D (talk) 09:08, 5 December 2009 (UTC)
 * I agree that this article probably doesn't need to exist, there is usually a brief but totally acceptable mention of the differences in the carrier articles themselves.


 * As to the question of arguing points in a caption, I tend to think they (captions) should be as brief as possible but there will always be exceptions. In this case someone appears to be saying that British carriers could store aircraft in their overheads, which is not correct according to the source given. On page 62 Roberts says they could store spare fuselages (some minus their tail sections) but does not say complete aircraft.


 * To sum up, if this article isn't deleted, and the editor insists on citing Roberts in the caption, it should read like this:Anynobody(?) 21:42, 5 December 2009 (UTC)



USN carriers could not carry complete aircraft in their overheads either. The hanger height was insufficient for this and the aircraft had to be partially disassembled for overhead storage, typically by removing their props and rudders.Damwiki1 (talk) 20:32, 26 April 2010 (UTC)

current attempts at Vandalism
It would appear that there is a concerted attempt to vandalize this article. This has been reported and hopefully the page will be protected from further attacks. Damwiki1 (talk) 08:06, 12 November 2010 (UTC)


 * Done :) EyeSerene talk 08:46, 12 November 2010 (UTC)

Recent edits by Damwiki1
I see that some explanations for my recent edits is needed:
 * 1) Dubious 'quotations' by Damwiki1 from Friedman's 'U.S. Aircraft Carriers':
 * a) p.259-261 - Refers to Forrestal class projects, as existed prior to the adoption of an angled flight deck. No mention if Forrestal class, as realized, possessed flight deck armor. As I've mentioned earlier.
 * b) p.271 - refers to "CVA 3/53, a " project of an carrier of about Midway class size" and "CVA 10/53, a modified variant of CVA 3/53 project".
 * c) p.280 ("The USN DCNO (Air) in discussing follow on designs to the Forrestal class: "The only saving available was armor: "a couple of inches of armor plating is hardly more than splinter protection against modern weapons, yet it imposes a tremendous penalty in topside weight plus the necessity for massive support structure. If not eliminated, this armor could at least be dropped to hangar deck levels..." ") directly refers to elimination or removal of armor from the flight deck of the project, while not directly dealing with the details of previous classes. (However - this is perhaps the most relevant quotation, as for the CVA 66, which is dealt with here, was based upon modified CVA 64.)
 * 2) Added online references - mostly non descript webs, hardly any concerned with the construction of the ships in any depth; and IMHO mostly not in compliance with respective Wikipedia guidelines. I don't see any rationale for removing maintenance templates under unconvincing pretences of 'vandalism', as these webs need checking, in each respective case.
 * 3) Own research by Damwiki1 - if the 'ref' given by him refers to 3in armor, treating it as "at least 1.5 in" is way beyond wp:NOR.
 * I hope someone will deal with these issues, as that's not for the first time Damwiki1 came with such dubiuos refs.
 * Thank you. --195.113.8.138 (talk) 14:47, 12 November 2010 (UTC)
 * The issue at hand is whether or not the Forrestal Class and some later classes have armoured flight decks. The answer is clearly yes. The data in Friedman points to flight deck armour of about 1.5in (60lb) and this is consistent with the numerous web references, the statement by the USN DCNO (Air) and the various design studies that resulted in the Forrestal class which saw repeated demands by BuShips for flight deck armour of at least 1.5in. Not surprisingly there are a number of credible sources some written by persons with intimate knowledge of the ship, which state that these ships have flight deck armour, especially since a horrific flight deck accident resulted in that armour being breached along with similar accidents on later designs. Yet, to further your own case, that these ships do not have any flight deck armour, you removed each and every reference that states that they do!!! This creates the distinct impression that no amount of data would satisfy you, especially since your last edit contained a personal attack against me specifically, however, here is another quote:"The main armor carried on Enterprise is the heavy armored flight deck. This was to prove a significant factor in the catastrophic fire and explosions that occurred on En~etprise's flight deck in 1969. The US Navy learned its lesson the hard way during World War II when all its carriers had only armored hangar decks. All attack carriers built since the Midway class have had armored flight decks." Cracknell, W.H, Cmdr USN, Warship Profile 15, USS Enterprise (CVAN 65) Nuclear Attack Carrier, p56. You also seem very conversant with wikipedia yet you haven't bothered to create a user name despite the fact that you appear to being using multiple IP addresses.Damwiki1 (talk) 20:32, 12 November 2010 (UTC)

POV
In my opinion, this article have a strong British slant, some of the citation are in contrary with the article. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 70.79.115.121 (talk) 18:11, 21 December 2010 (UTC)
 * Perhaps you can be a bit more specific? If there are errors or incorrect citations I will be happy to correct them.Damwiki1 (talk) 21:15, 21 December 2010 (UTC)
 * Here's some USN comments on RN armoured carriers which I will probably add to the article:

''4-27    As a result of study of damage sustained by various British carriers prior to our entry into the war, two important departures from traditional U.S. Navy carrier design were incorporated in the CVB Class, then still under development. HMS ILLUSTRIOUS in an action off Malta on 1 January 1941 was hit by several bombs, three of which detonated in the hangar space. Large fires swept fore and aft among parked planes thereby demonstrating the desirability of attempting to confine the limits of such explosions and fires by structural sectionalization of the hangar space. On the CVB Class the hangar was therefore divided into five compartments separated by 40 and 50-pound STS division bulkheads extending from the hangar deck to the flight deck, each fitted with a large door suitable for handling aircraft. It is hoped that this sectionalization, in conjunction with sprinkler and fog foam systems, will effectively prevent fires from spreading throughout the hangar spaces, as occurred on FRANKLIN on 30 October and 19 March. The damage experiences of several British carriers, which unlike our own were fitted with armored flight decks, demonstrated the effectiveness of such armor in shielding hangar spaces from GP bombs and vital spaces below the hangar deck from SAP bombs. Accordingly, the CVB Class was designed with an armored flight deck consisting of 3-1/2-inch STS from frames 46 to 175 with a hangar deck consisting of two courses of 40-pound STS between frames 36 and 192. Although none of the CVB Class carriers were completed in time to take part in war operations, the effectiveness of armored flight decks against Kamikaze attacks was demonstrated by various carriers attached to the British Pacific Fleet. Reference (k) reports two such interesting cases. The VICTORIOUS was struck by three Kamikaze aircraft, two of which ricocheted off the armored flight deck and over the side, causing no important damage. The third carried a bomb which detonated at frame 30 starboard at the butt of the 3-inch flight deck armor with 1-1/2-inch "D" quality (equivalent to HTS) steel. It does not appear that the Kamikaze actually struck the ship. The bomb detonation, however, depressed the 3-inch deck slightly but did not tear it open. On the other hand, the 1-1/2-inch "D" quality deck plating was ripped open over a total area of about 25 square feet. Two days were required for temporary repairs, at the conclusion of which the ship was fully operational. HMS FORMIDABLE was hit by two bombs, the first of which struck and detonated on the flight deck 9 feet to port of the center-line at frame 79, directly over a deep bent and at a juncture of three armored plates. The armored deck was depressed over an area 24 feet long and 20 feet wide. Maximum depression was 15 inches. Adjacent bents spaced 12 feet forward and aft of the point of impact were slightly depressed. A hole 2 square feet in area was blown in the 3-inch deck. Three fragments penetrated downward through the ship into the center boiler room. The damage in this boiler room, which was not described, temporarily reduced speed to 18 knots. The second bomb struck and detonated on the centerline of the flight deck at frame 94. The 3-inch deck and deep bent directly below the point of impact were depressed about 4-1/2 inches and one rivet was knocked out. However, the ship was fully operational within about 5 hours, including flight operations.'' from:CV13 Damage Report These comments regarding the effectiveness of the armoured flight deck design are taken from the USS Franklin's damage report where Franklin was ripped apart and 1/3 of the crew killed or wounded by bombs which could not have penetrated the armoured flight deck of a Royal Navy aircraft carrier. This excerpt is an eloquent testimony as to why the USN decided to adopt armoured flight decks on all aircraft carriers starting with the Midway class.Damwiki1 (talk) 10:28, 22 December 2010 (UTC)


 * This is nothing to do with unfortunate mishap with Franklin or the tactical advantage of Armored flight deck. The whole tone of the article is British POV.


 * "The British approach of armoured flight decks was an effective form of passive defense from bombs and :kamikaze attacks that actually struck their carriers, but the American carriers primarily relied on :fighters to prevent the carriers from being hit in the first place. RN carriers such as Ark Royal or :Illustrious had far heavier AA outfits than their USN counterparts, up to the introduction of the USN :Essex class carriers"

Fairly misleading and incomplete, a weak explanation for "passive defenses". USN had a large cruiser and destroyer screens for anti-aircraft defenses, not just "larger fighters" (also even up the lack of AA on the carriers). Kamikazes menace started in 1944, why brought up a 1940 AA spec? Indeed USN air defenses is not enough, in addition they faced an extremely trained and MOTIVATED Japanese aircrew (from 1941-1943), compared that to the German and the Italians. European Axis anti ship capability are weak and they are lucky to sink a heavy cruiser and its long shot if they can sink a WWI era battleship. The Vals and Kates are vastly superior to European Axis anti-ship aircraft. By the time British Pacific fleet arrived, they faced a large number of inexperience aircrew.


 * "The RN was thus faced with designing a carrier that would be survivable under the conditions to be :expected in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Pacific Oceans, and before the development of effective :naval Radar. The USN, in contrast, was able to benefit from technology transfers from the UK and the :wartime experiences of the RN, which was freely shared with the USN, prior to its entry into the war, :allowing it to anticipate the changes needed to prepare its carriers for coming conflict with Japan."

The indeed Americans benefited the British radar technology, not enough to save Yorktown and Hornet. The Yorktown class' radar system is less sophisticated than the one found on Essex class. 3 ocean design is not relevant and nothing to do with Armour flight deck and more like a series of irrelevant excuses on the British side. USS wasp and USS Ranger, despite having a menial task, they performed fairly well in Mediterranean along with the British warships.


 * "US carriers and their fighters shot down more than 1,900 suicide aircraft during Operation Kikusui :(the last and largest Kamikaze attack in the Okinawa campaign), versus a mere 75 for the British, yet :both forces suffered the same number of serious hits (four), on their carriers although the kamikazes :made 173[9] Strikes against other USN targets, while the 4 USN carriers suffered a massive death :toll, in contrast to the relatively light casualties on the RN carriers.[10]." 70.79.115.121 (talk)

Very misleading and this sounds like a dismissal of a larger air group advantage and again, a slight British bias (after reading the last sentence).


 * "The differences in construction were determined by doctrine that was largely driven by the different :circumstances of the RN and USN. The USN had its own aircraft procurement budget and procedures, :independent of the Army Air Corps. The RN's Fleet Air Arm (FAA) had been constrained inter-war by the :Royal Air Force's development of a strategic bomber force - the Fleet Air Arm then being part of the :RAF. As a result, in the late 1930s, the FAA did not have any modern high-performance aircraft at its :disposal, indeed its first monoplane, the Blackburn Skua, only flew for the first time in 1937. "

Relevant from 1939-41. Seafires and Sea Hurricanes arrived late enough not to have any difference in Europe. Not relevant in 1944, The British able to pull on par with the USN with aircraft quality with Seafires, corsairs, avengers and some wildcats.

The explanation of tactical advantage of Armour flight deck is weakened by some British bias. The philosophies behind NOT HAVING ARMORED FLIGHT DECK was not explained properly. The article often jump from 1940 then to 1944 and forth and the facts get muddy. Occasionally it seems the article seems to compares the Royal Navy in 1939 vs USN in 1942. The armored flight deck indeed have tactical advantage, The British can operate a smaller number of carriers as effective as nearly twice the number of USN carriers. Since 1943, The USN have enough carriers that they can afford to pull damaged one for repairs w/o losing striking power. Compared from 1941-1942, USS Enterprise was heavily damaged during the Solomon and Guadalcanal campaign, they were not able to repair her until the arrival of USS Saratoga and HMS Victorious. 70.79.115.121 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 20:21, 23 December 2010 (UTC).
 * You seem to be saying that the article is poorly written, and to some extent I agree but this doesn't mean it has a bias. The USN after its WW2 war experience decided to adopt armoured flight decks for all its new carriers and they didn't do this because they were biased towards the British, they did it because they became convinced that the advantages of armoured flight decks outweighed the disadvantages and there are abundant historical sources that state this, some of which have been quoted and/or referenced in the article, but stating historical fact does not imply bias, especially when it was the USN that came to the conclusion that armoured flight decks were superior.Damwiki1 (talk) 22:18, 23 December 2010 (UTC)

Yorktown and Hornet
Deleted the line claiming Yorktown and Hornet were succumb by bombs. Get the fact straight, both ships were bombed and suffered heavy casualties, but it did not lead to the sinking. Yorktown's boiler were extinguished by a bomb and flight deck holed, but damage control crew fixed her up into combat worthy state. The second wave of Kates crippled the Yorktown and the submarine finished her off.

This is found from Hornet's wikipedia article:

the torpedo planes planted two torpedoes in Hornet between 09:13 and 09:17, knocking out her engines

Hornet was struck by bombs, but the torpedoes crippled her first and another wave of torpedo bombers damaged her further. The Japanese surface forces were getting closer and Hornet was too badly damage, so they have to abandoned and scuttle her. Therefore, the lack of armored flight deck was not a direct contribution to the loss of Hornet and Yorktown, not even close.

The Yorktown's were more vulnerable to torpedoes than bombs. Yorktown classes have enough deck armor (of course not on the flight deck level) to resist bombs planting into ship's vitals. 70.79.115.121 (talk) 18:33, 21 December 2010 (UTC) You removed this statement: Yorktown and Hornet succumbed after first being crippled by bomb hits in 1942,. This statement does not claim that either ship was sunk by bombs. It states that they were crippled by bomb hits and then sunk. Yorktown was rendered dead in the water by bomb hits, for about an hour and even after she resumed movement, had her speed cut by about 10 knots which helped the IJN locate her again and to subsequently hit her with torpedoes. Here is the conclusion of the USN's damage report: F. Conclusion 56 . In view of the recognized inadequacy of the torpedo protection system in YORKTOWN, it is remarkable that that ship remained afloat as long as she did after such extensive under - water damage. In spite of leakage which occurred through some transverse bulkheads which should have remained tight, the watertight integrity and subdivision, and the initial stability of the ship were sufficient to give her an excellent power of survival. If the machinery arrangement had been such that all power would not have been lost as a result of one bomb hit plus the two closely spaced hits on the port side, it is very probable that the ship could have made port under her own power, after the attacks on June 4 if no further damage had occurred. It may be argued that if she had left the area under her own power she might have been able to avoid further attack. Although this argument is somewhat conjectural, it is certainly true that she would have had a better chance of avoiding attack if underway under her own power than when lying dead in the water. Insofar as hull damage is concerned she might even have survived the June 6 attack, but this second attack might have caused complete loss of power even with a better machinery arrangement. Source:(USN Damage report: U.S.S. YORKTOWN (CV-5), BOMB AND TORPEDO DAMAGE - Coral Sea, May 8, 1942). The loss of the Hornet is more complex in that the bomb and torpedo damage occurred within moments of each other, yet Hornet's damage report concluded that bomb damage did contribute to the loss by destroying vital electrical systems, causing damage to the boiler uptakes and a general degradation of her damage control capability. The report also notes that there was extensive splinter damage to Hornet caused by splinters that penetrated the armoured deck. However, I agree that the statement removed was too general in regard to Hornet, but I believe the available information supports the statement in the case of Yorktown. Both damage reports can be read here: Damwiki1 (talk) 23:06, 21 December 2010 (UTC)


 * In Midway, Yorktown was incapacitated, but not crippled. The Yorktown, despite of slower speed) was able to dodge few torpedoes before running out of luck (the Japanese are motivated and extremely well trained compared to the Americans). I am not dismissing the advantage of armored flight deck, I am pointing it out a misleading statement about Hornet and Yorktown's demise. Had the Yorktown fitted with an armored flight deck, the crew spend more time refueling and rearming the aircraft than repairing and bought them more time to prepare for second wave of attackers. In Coral Sea, Yorktown was able to retreat, and lucky enough not to encounter more torpedo bombers. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 70.79.115.121 (talk) 20:29, 23 December 2010 (UTC)

Unbalanced opinion regarding photos
The Photos were added to this article before the casualty information was added to the caption. The casualty information provides the reader with a context with which to judge the relative amounts of damage received by each carrier, especially as the copious amounts of smoke from Victorious make it appear to have suffered heavy damage, when this was not the case. However, the fact remains that Franklin was gutted by one or two bomb hits that could not have have penetrated the armoured deck of an RN carrier.Damwiki1 (talk) 20:26, 26 January 2011 (UTC) Additionally the quote from Franklin's damage report specifically details the attack on Victorious so the two photos provide a very relevant context to the article.Damwiki1 (talk) 21:08, 26 January 2011 (UTC)


 * A 'relevant' context if the article is an advocacy piece, which according to NPOV it should not be. The captions read like something from an infomercial, comparing Superproduct to Brand X.  If a true context were to be provided, it would also include the numerous US carriers which suffered kamikaze hits and were conducting flight ops agin within hours; the fact that the Brits suffered no damage equivalent to Bunker Hill and Franklin is as much a function of the nugatory British presence in the Pacific as anything else. Context would also point out that Bunker Hill suffered such terrible damage because she was hit in the midst of fueled and armed aircraft on deck; the presence or absence of flight deck armor was not a factor. Solicitr (talk) 18:15, 4 April 2011 (UTC)

Regarding Unbalanced Opinion on Photos
Hello: You seem to have missed the point of the edit; as your above response indicates. It's not the photos, but the extreme, and lopsided examples given. Anyone who follows the links provided, or has general knowledge of carrier warfare in WW2, would notice. There exist examples in both armoured, and non-armoured flight deck carriers, which have suffered more or less due to enemy attacks. Such extreme examples given, lean toward a non-neutral bias, in preference of armoured flight decked carriers, over non armoured flight deck carriers. This calls into question the reason why the sample was given. Both armoured deck, and non armoured deck carriers, had benefits as well as flaws. When entering information in Wikipedia, comments giving weight to a point of view, or bias, or an unbalanced view, should be avoided. Such actions are contrary to the purpose of this web-site. Objective facts should be provided and the point of view, provided by the reader. — Preceding unsigned comment added by contribs) 07:42, 27 January 2011 (UTC) Why did you not respond above? Why the new section to discuss a topic already under discussion? 8 kamikaze hits on RN carriers resulted in 122 casualties, or an average of about 15 per hit, so Victorious' total of 22 is actually above average for RN carriers and about average for all hits on RN carriers. Franklin is an extreme case, but Franklin's damage is a powerful argument in favour of armoured flight decks and her damage report is proof of this, because the damage resulted from bomb hits that would have been defeated by an armoured flight deck. The USN came to believe in the efficacy of armoured flight decks before it entered the war, but unfortunately after the Essex class was designed, and all USN carriers from the Midway class onward have had armoured flight decks. Both the USN and RN believed that armoured flight decks were preferable and desirable and, not surprisingly the article supports both navy's conclusions, especially since the Franklin disaster was predicted by USN advocates of armoured flight decks, even before the US entered the war:


 * "8 kamikaze hits on RN carriers resulted in 122 casualties"


 * Hardly based on comparable statistical samples. No British carriers were hard hit principally because there were hardly any there in the Pacific; why not mention the extensive damage and casualties inflicted on Illustrious by the Luftwaffe?  He vaunted armored deck certainly didn't keep the bombs out then, and she was out of the war for over a year. Formidable was knocked out for 6 months in 1941 as well, and Indomitable for the same length of time after taking a bomb through the unarmored portion of her flight deck during Pedestal.
 * In other words, of the RN's six armor-deck carriers that saw significant war service, three, or 50%, suffered damage sufficient to send them home for repair for six months or more. Whereas of the Essex class, the article focuses on the single ship out of 15 which indeed suffered a catastrophic flight-deck penetration, and makes no mention of the many occasions when damage as a result of bombs or kamikazes was as modest as that suffered by Victorious. (Note: Aircraft make terrible penetrators, and kamikazes themselves, as opposed to their bombs, tended to stack up on even a wood-over-.75" STS "unarmored" deck). Solicitr (talk) 18:35, 4 April 2011 (UTC)
 * "...There was also the flight deck to consider; here the proposed standard was the 500-pounder, and the chief advocate was :Captain John S. McCain of the Ranger. He actually preferred a relatively small carrier, as long as it could be protected :against bombing. Again and again he told the General Board that any U.S. carrier, if her flight and hangar decks were crowded :with fuelled and bombed aircraft, was a potential inferno, and that friendly fighters could not
 * guarantee the security of any flight deck..."

Friedman, US Aircraft Carriers, p139-140. I agree that this article needs a rewrite since it has evolved piecemeal over several years, but the unavoidable historical fact is that both the USN and RN came to favour armoured flight decks and that any encyclopaedic article that is written without bias will show this to be true and also tell the reader why the USN came to favour armoured flight decks, and the Franklin disaster was a powerful argument that firmly convinced the USN that armoured flight decks were indispensable.Damwiki1 (talk) 08:54, 27 January 2011 (UTC)

"and all subsequent USN fleet carriers featured [armored] flight decks" Untrue. None of the Nimitzes have armored flight decks. Solicitr (talk) 18:40, 4 April 2011 (UTC)
 * Can you can provide a reference?Damwiki1 (talk) 20:35, 4 April 2011 (UTC)
 * The wikipedia article on the Nimitz class states: "...Other improvements to the ships since that time include upgraded flight deck ballistic protection..." and is referenced to page 113 of Polmar. Other references are easy to find, such as: "Armor: hangar, flight deck, magazines and reactors protected" at Nimitz class.Damwiki1 (talk) 20:56, 4 April 2011 (UTC)


 * Except for the magazines and engineering spaces, that 'protection' is a Kevlar splinter barrier. The Nimitzes were designed with anti-ship missiles in mind, not dive-bombers. Solicitr (talk) 14:45, 5 April 2011 (UTC)

Solicitr it is considered bad form to add comments anywhere except at the bottom, and I nearly missed your comments above: "...Whereas of the Essex class, the article focuses on the single ship out of 15 which indeed suffered a catastrophic flight-deck penetration...". Bunker Hill also suffered catastrophic damage and again suffered more casualties in a single attack than all the RN armoured carriers combined, from all forms of attack during all of WW2!:USS Bunker Hill CV-17, "11 May 1945: Severely damaged by two suicide planes which started large fires and explosions.  Casualties were 346 men killed, 43 missing, and 264 wounded". The article traces the development of the armoured flight deck and the experience of the USN during WW2 brought them firmly down on the side of armoured flight decks, and the lengthy quote from Franklin's damage report confirms this, and it directly compares the resistance of RN and USN carriers to kamikaze and bomb attack.Damwiki1 (talk) 21:53, 4 April 2011 (UTC)


 * Bunker Hill is simply not relevant to the discussion; she was hit in the midst of fueled and armed planes on the flight deck which started a conflagration; the presence or absence of an AFD was not a factor. Again you want to bring up "all the RN armoured deck carriers combined", without mentioning that "all" was a tiny handful which spent barely any time in the Pacific: you can't make a meaningful comparison with that denominator. Nor can you be bothered to mention
 * Essex: Kamikaze hit 25-11-44, repaired in 2 weeks
 * Yorktown: direct bomb hit 18-3-45, flight operations not interrupted
 * Intrepid: two kamikaze hits 25-11-44, flight ops resumed in 2 hours, two months repairs; kamikaze 16-4-45, flight ops resumed in three hours
 * Franklin: kamikaze 9-10-44, no significant damage; kamikaze 30-10-44, 2 months repairs
 * Ticonderoga: 2 kamikazes 21-1-45, bad fire, out 3 months. The only case in WWII other than Franklin where an AFD might have made a difference
 * Randolph: kamikaze 11-3-45, penetrated ship's side, 3 weeks repairs on station
 * Lexington: kamikaze 6-11-44, destroyed island, flight ops resumed in 20 minutes
 * Wasp: AP bomb 19-3-45, penetrated armored hangar deck and detonated in crew mess, ship proceeded with the heaviest week of air ops by any carrier during the war.
 * Hancock: kamikaze 1-4-45, air ops resumed in an hour


 * "the experience of the USN during WW2 brought them firmly down on the side of armoured flight decks"- resulting in the Midway class, universally acknowledged to be a poor design, and the USNs subsequent abandonment of the AFD (Enterprise was the last carrier to have one). What can be said is that the number of hits on US carriers led the Navy to re-assess its belief that fighters + AAA would prevent strikes from occurring.
 * Deck park:that passage is also a case of special pleading. The Essewx class had hangar capacity for four squadrons (72 aircraft)- that is, double that of Illustrious.  The deck park allowed the embarkation of a fifth squadron for a total of 90.  Moreover, the Essexes had sufficient room for spare wings and fuselages amounting to an additional 20 a/c. Solicitr (talk) 14:43, 5 April 2011 (UTC)
 * Can you please provide some sources for your statements? I have provided sources for mine and they state that all USN fleet carriers from Midway on have had armoured flight decks. The Midway class served for many decades, so it seems that they cannot have been unsuccessful. Again the article is not about the war experiences of the Essex class, but about the development of armoured flight decks and why the USN adopted them. Damwiki1 (talk) 18:10, 5 April 2011 (UTC)

Complicated introduction

 * Comparison is often made between some of designs of the Royal Navy (RN) and the United States Navy (USN). The two navies followed differing philosophies in the use of armour on carrier flight decks starting with the design of the RN's Illustrious class and ending with the design of the Midway class, when the USN also adopted armoured flight decks. The two classes most easily compared, are the RN's Illustrious class and Implacable class and their nearest USN contemporaries, the Yorktown and Essex classes. The Illustrious class followed the Yorktown but preceded the Essex, while the Implacable class design predated the Essex but these ships were completed after the lead ships of the Essex class. The development of armoured flight deck carriers proceeded during World War Two and before the end of World War Two, both the USN, with USS Midway and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) with Taiho and Shinano would also commission armoured flight deck carriers, while all USN fleet aircraft carriers built since 1945 feature armoured flight decks. The remainder of the IJN carrier force during World War II had unarmored flight decks just like the Yorktown and Essex classes of the USN.

This part of the introduction seems to be rather complicated and a bit hard to read (for those not familiar with all the types of carriers). Perhaps this should be in another part of the article? --Fintelia (talk) 00:41, 20 March 2011 (UTC)
 * How about this :

The Royal navy developed armoured flight deck aircraft carriers, with HMS Illustrious being the first such ship to see service. The RN then commissioned two modified variants of the Illustrious design, with HMS Indomitable in 1941 and the two ships of the Implacable sub-class in 1944. The RN's experience with armoured carriers then influenced the USN which introduced their first armoured carrier, the USS Midway in 1945, and all subsequent USN fleet carriers featured flight decks. The IJN introduced their first armoured flight carrier, the IJNS Taiho in 1944, and commissioned their next armoured flight deck carrier, Shinano in 1945. Damwiki1 (talk) 22:43, 20 March 2011 (UTC)

NPOV
This article is grotesquely slanted in a "Brits rukle Yankz drool" Way. It goes to extraordinary lengths to minimize the defects of RN carriers, with several distrotions or outrtright falshoods such as "The use of a permanent deck park appeared to give USN carriers a much larger aircraft capacity than contemporary RN armoured flight deck carriers however the largest part of the disparity between RN and USN carriers in aircraft capacity was due to the use of a permanent deck park on USN carriers" - which is rubbish. The Essexc class had hangarage greater then the Illustrious' hangar + deck park combined. Solicitr (talk) 11:37, 16 April 2011 (UTC)


 * This article is about the development of armoured flight decks which were introduced by the RN and later adopted by the USN and the traces the reasons for this. All the statements in this article are fully sourced to reputable sources. However, just to prove a point, Essex hanger area = 654ft x 70 ft = 45780 sq ft. Indomitable's hangers = 408 x 62 + 208 x 62 = 666 x 62 = 38192 sq ft or 84% of Essex. Essex's standard displacement = 27500tons versus 23000 tons for Indomitable or 84% of Essex, so proportionally, Indomitable has the same hanger area as Essex. Implacable had 458 x 62 + 208 x 62 hangers and so had larger hangar area than Essex, on a proportional basis. Ark Royal (1939) had even larger hangar area than Essex, 568ft x60ft + 452ft x 60ft = 61200 sq ft on only 22000 tons or about 1/3 more than Essex, yet Ark Royal never operated with more than 60 aircraft, because she did not use a permanent deck park. A quote where Friedman discuss Essex and the armoured RN carriers: "Friedman, British carrier aviation : the evolution of the ships and their aircraft, Naval Institute Press, 1988, ISBN 0870210548, P.145: "As for comparisons with foreign construction, the US Essex class comes to mind. It is only rarely appreciated that the Essexes were much larger ships. First and most important, although they were loosely based on treaty-limited ships, they were designed and built outside the treaty regime, and their original design tonnage was 27,500...""Damwiki1 (talk) 12:32, 16 April 2011 (UTC)


 * I will remove the NPOV tag unless there is a reply.Damwiki1 (talk) 06:32, 20 April 2011 (UTC)


 * LOL! - you have to feel sorry for the people who are trying to decry the use of armoured flight decks. They can't very well call the armoured flight deck useless without implying that their own navy's Director of Constructions is in error in designing the feature into the subsequent US Fleet Carriers. Presumably he is/was in a better position to know than a bunch of unqualified people on a glorified forum. Otherwise I'm sure the US Navy would be delighted to hear that it could get such 'informed' and accurate technical opinions for nothing rather than paying a number of specialised Naval Staff personnel a considerable sum in dollars for their hard-won experience. Hey, why not just ask someone on the street.


 * Never mind. After all; 'Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery'.


 * The copied it and so it must be worthwhile - you don't copy something if it's no good. Only a fool does that. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.112.68.219 (talk) 20:55, 19 June 2011 (UTC)

Man, it's ******* bragging **** and laughing hyenas like you that take the fun out of reading Wikipedia.
 * edited previous unsigned entry to remove vulgarity.Damwiki1 (talk) 18:06, 14 July 2011 (UTC)

Unclear quote on Enterprise armoured flight deck
Near the end the article quotes "The main armor carried on Enterprise is the heavy armored flight deck. This was to prove a significant factor in the catastrophic fire and explosions that occurred on Enterprise's flight deck in 1969." which confused me until the nth reading. Presumably the flight deck armour was significant by [minimising damage from] the fire and explosions ? - Why use an unclear quote ? Why use a quote at all ? - Rod57 (talk) 21:12, 22 September 2020 (UTC)


 * The quote is there to show that CVN Enterprise had an armoured flight deck.Damwiki1 (talk) 04:25, 29 September 2020 (UTC)

What is protective deck in the table in Design section

 * What is protective deck column in the table in Design section ?
 * The hangar deck column is presumably specifying the floor of the hangar deck, excluding its walls ? - Rod57 (talk) 21:35, 22 September 2020 (UTC)


 * The Protective deck is an armoured deck located below the hangar deck level. A deck is a nautical term equivalent to floor. Damwiki1 (talk) 04:24, 29 September 2020 (UTC)