Talk:Attack on Pearl Harbor/Archive 3

Foreknowledge?
Since the OP has reverted my attempts to ameliorate this section, I have deleted it. Anyone who would take Stinnett's book seriously must first explain why those knowledgeable of Navy cryptology discredit his findings. See for example Steven Budiansky's analysis at [http://www.dean.usma.edu/math/pubs/cryptologia/ClassicArticleReprints/V24N2PP119-130Budiansky.PDF}


 * I support that. There's a tendency on wikipedia to include every freak theory about everything. Someone writes a speculative book about something, a (well-meaning) wikipedian reads said book, and thinks: "Hey, this should be in the encyclopedia!" It shouldn't. Shanes 16:21, 9 March 2006 (UTC)

You asked on the moderated Usenet WWII newsgroup about Stinnett's book and got this response: '''Rubbish. While the footnotes seem to me to be largely correct, they don't support the claims in the text, and in some cases directly contradict those claims'''. The writer gave other objections as well. So I think the section should stay out altogether, though if the OP wants to include the book in Further Reading as an alternate explanation, that's appropriate. --Cubdriver 11:23, 10 March 2006 (UTC)


 * I would like to see a link to the book somewhere in the article, i dont really care where.--Striver 12:13, 10 March 2006 (UTC)

I see that the rightwing, war-loving, hierarchy-loving "history buffs" have managed to delete all the references to how the American government deliberately let Pearl harbor be bombed, and how they worked for months to make it happen, so that they could use that to manufacture consent for the profitable war to follow.

There is MUCH MORE to this controversy than just the cryptography angle. There are interviews where powerful people talk about how they need to make this Pearl Harbor incident happen. Much more, too.

No doubt these rightwingers, oops, I mean "libertarians" will erase this comment of mine...

-cryofan 5-17-2006
 * I'm a left-wing, war-hating history buff. I've read Stinnett. He's full of shit, & his own notes, his own interview sources, contradict him. Examine his argument, then examine the facts. Trekphiler 05:45, 12 November 2006 (UTC)


 * This article is quite long already. Those matters are handled at Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate, and Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor (book). -Will Beback 17:36, 17 May 2006 (UTC)

I'd like to see more about how FDR ordered the fleet to be moved from California to this vulnerable position in 1939, and how he fired Admiral Richardson for opposing the move. Also how the second Admiral Kimmel also voiced security concerns. Why not focus on facts that in a court of law would prove FDR's intentions beyond a reasonable doubt. --Cyrus255
 * We're not here to "prove" anything. This article concerns the attack, so longterm strategic decisions belong elsewhere. Lastly, the goal of a navy is to go into "harm's way" - they do no good in a port. There was little reason to think that Pearl Harbor was vulnerable. You might want to read Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate. -Will Beback 05:04, 22 June 2006 (UTC)

There are three sides to the foreknowledge contoversy. The Traditionalists support the conventional history that blames the PH Attack on bureaucratic bumbling. The second side is the Opposition who accuse FDR of deceiving the American public about his foreknowledge. The third side are the Revisionists who argue that, based on recently released documents, FDR had foreknowledge of the attack, but did what he had to do based on the incomplete information he was given. This web page "Attack on Pearl Harbor" is the provence of the Traditionalists and I have no problem with anything on their page. The foreknowlege issue does not belong here. Stinnett's book is Revisionist and, in fairness to FDR, he points out that FDR was told that damage to US Navy ships would be minimal because his military advisors believed that Japan could not use torpedos in the shallow water of the harbor. Stinnett also mentions that FDR turned white in the face when told of the actual damage. I think is is safe to say that FDR was as shocked at the damage report as those who did not have foreknowledge. I do have a problem with the Opposition because they apply a double standard. They blame FDR for allowing the PH attack to proceed with the resulting loss of lives, but do not blame him for approving the Normandy invasion when he knew thousands of US soldiers would die, either on the beach or further inland. Operation Overlord for the Normany invasion was surrounded by massive deception of the public about when and where. The Opposition does not accuse FDR of deceit regarding the Normandy invasion. Why all the hostility regarding the PH attack? This only causes the Traditionalists to become too defensive, believing they are defending the honor of the Navy and FDR. One problem with Stinnett's book is the title, which may have been his editor's doing. If it had been titled "Day of Shock" it would not have had the hostile accusatory tone that "Day of Deceit" has. I believe FDR had foreknowledge, that the provocations were intentional, that FDR made a very difficult judgment call, and he did the honorable thing. I admire him greatly for it. 4.235.207.173 04:39, 23 July 2006 (UTC)


 * Your take is notable in being novel. Most arguing for foreknowledge seem to have no admiration of FDR at all, though many think the Navy did well. But, regardless of any of that, these comments belong at the Advance Knowledge article. This article is concernced with the attack, and mentions motive sand alternatives only in passing. That mention should be there to be sure, but this is a long article and so the mention should be (must be) brief. I suggest that you move this long comment to the Talk: page (with appropriate edits) as it is much more relevant there.
 * Your division of PH discussants into three clases is an interesting one. I don't think I agree, but thank you for giving me a freshish perspective. ww 19:52, 22 July 2006 (UTC)
 * It's notable for being ignorant. Examine what FDR was actually doing & you'll see he didn't want to provoke Japan to war. "Advance knowledge" presumes he knew Japan would bomb Pearl. Nobody outside Japan knew that; hell, many outside NGS didn't know. (For damn sure IJA didn't!) Trekphiler 05:51, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

Japanese Justifications for the Attack
I added a citation (#5) to a "Japanese views" paragraph. The referenced Internet article by Arima provides a good view from the Japanese perspective and may be worth reviewing to see if more material should be referenced from it in the main article. Cla68 13:33, 12 April 2006 (UTC)

Japanese strategic motivations
This is really a fine article, but I didn't get a convincing sense of Japanese strategic motivations for the attack. Perhaps the relevant sections could be explained more clearly. Take a step back, and try to get a sense of the big picture, perhaps? (A reader's perspective.)


 * The "Japanese Perspective" section at the end of the article goes into the Japanese strategic motivations in greater detail. Perhaps more of that section could be placed earlier in the article to further explain why Japan decided to attack Pearl Harbor?  However, since the article has already achieved "Features" article status (the "cream of the crop" of Wikipedia articles), I'm not sure if there will be much support to make any major changes to the article. Cla68 12:45, 11 April 2006 (UTC)
 * The Japanese perspective section could certainly use some improvement. Coincidentally, someone has provided us with a source on that topic, see above. -Will Beback 19:08, 11 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Okay, I'll work on the Japanese perspective section. I'll look at adding some more background from the Japanese POV at the beginning of the article also since there seems to be some support for doing that. Cla68 13:59, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
 * The large edit by Cla68 is generally good, but I think there is quite a bit of POV in respect to the account of imperialism in east Asia. It's more complex than the account given, adn in any case, this is not the article for coping with those issues. A mention of a long-standing Japanese committment to resistance to any extension of that imperialism to Japan itself is probably appropriate here, however. But the idea that Japan's long extended push for control of  was merely due to oppostition to Western imperialism is highly debatable. Worth recording the debate here on WP, just not in this article. Thoughts? Comments? ww 15:54, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
 * What you say is definitely true, since I was using Japanese sources (which I'll add later since it's so time consuming to have to reorder the notes table at the bottom), I can see that the Japanese POV probably came through too strongly. Please feel free to edit for NPOV.  I'm probably too close to the Japanese side at the moment to do a good job on it.  Appreciate the help with the section. Cla68 16:14, 12 April 2006 (UTC)  Actually, on second thought, I'll give others a day or so to edit it for any balancing or NPOV that may be required, and then I'll add the citations after that. Cla68 19:35, 12 April 2006 (UTC)


 * This is good material, thanks for researching it, Cla68. However I suggest either deleting the 19th century material or summarizing it in a sentence. We are only sketching the strategic view here. Cheers, -Will Beback 22:35, 12 April 2006 (UTC)


 * 1st paragraph shortened as requested. I believe that the events around the Opium War along with the Meiji restoration began the chain reaction of events that resulted in the war between Japan and the U.S.  Thus, I'm reluctant to take out any more of the verbiage on the subject.  However, if anyone can summarize it even further, that would probably be of benefit to the article. Cla68 23:52, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
 * That may be true, but this isn't "Causes of World War II". A "Main article" link to that article or a similar one may be appropriate. But the material here is good. Let's just keep it compact. Cheers, -Will Beback 00:19, 13 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Okay, I'll work on it some more and add the link you suggest. Cla68 13:01, 13 April 2006 (UTC)

I rewrote some parts of the "Japanese Perspective" section and added an additional reference to try to show better what the Japanese were thinking then and now. I'll try to add the citations to the "Background" section today since the section now appears to be acceptable to the community. Cla68 13:59, 14 April 2006 (UTC)
 * Done. By the way, the number of notes at the bottom of the entry doesn't match the number of citations in the body of the article although they seem to be in order until the last citation.  Perhaps some text was removed without removing the endnotes that went along with it. Cla68 14:44, 14 April 2006 (UTC)


 * Added graphic to same section that supports the subject of that section. Moved the "Utah" picture to earlier in the article. Cla68 15:59, 17 April 2006 (UTC)

I'm a former history teacher with an MA in U.S. history. This is an excellent article, but is still overly American-centric (I'm American by the way). The section on Japanese preparations mentions both British and American influences on Japanese preliminary planning. No mention whatsoever is made of Minoru Genda's original thinking, for example the seemingly well-documented fact that Genda saw a video of American carriers sailing in box formation (during a 30s naval review) which led him to originate the idea of massed carrier aircraft attacking one target. I read the discussion above about the bogus (IMO) theories of how FDR allowed/masterminded the attack as well. These theories detract from the Japanese accomplishment, since they assume the Japanese couldn't have engineered this attack on their own. Since many of you have worked long and hard on this article, I am asking: would it be appropriate for me to add some details regarding Minoru Genda's original thinking? They will be accurately foot-noted.Markm62 08:34, 28 September 2006 (UTC)
 * M, There's a kind of silent convention which leaves comment sections from some time ago (as in this instance 4/06) alone and to start a new section with a substantially later comment (in this instance 9/06). I think your comment here would have been best in a new section.
 * That said, I agree that Genda's contribution is deserving of a sentence or two. The problem is that if everyone gets a sentence or two we will end up with a poor article consisting mostly of glued together single sentences. with that in mind, be bold and dive in. At worst, there'll be some sloshing back and forth as people intervene to clean up the article from your depradations.
 * If you're up for a project, you might consider a major cleanup of the prior knowledge article which by now has slumped into a collection of sincerely and strongly held assertions and is not really an article at all. It needs a professionally skilled eye. ww 00:25, 29 September 2006 (UTC)


 * Bravo, Markm62! It's about time somebody acknowledges the Japanese weren't stupid. It's not like they needed FDR or whoever planned the Taranto attack (I'm so embarrassed I can't name him...) to draw them a diagram. ("Enemy ships. Harbor. Hmm...should I attack them? Nawww.")
 * To that let me comment, from the notes:
 * "Holmes' argument that, had the U.S. Navy been warned of the attack and put to sea, it would have likely resulted in an even greater disaster."
 * It wasn't just Jasper. Nimitz commented (I don't recall when) it could have been 10000 or 20000 casualties, not 2400, & postwar (in Congressional testimony?), Joe Rochefort agreed, more or less. (Stinnett uses it to imply he knew the attack was coming, a lunatic apprasial of a professional sailor's outlook; Rochefort had friends & classmates among the dead. And I agree with Nimitz & Rochefort.) Trekphiler 06:20, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

Nagumo's decision to withdraw
The fifth bullet point under this heading states that "The timing of a third strike would have been such that aircraft would probably have returned to their carriers after dark." Earlier in the article, the beginning of the attack is quoted as being 7.53am Hawaiian Time, and just after that the duration of the attack is put at "Ninety minutes". It seems to me that the timing of the conclusion of the battle is incompatible with the notion that a third strike would have ended after dark, which even conservatively would have been at least another 6 or 7 hours away. Does anyone have more reliable information than what I have quoted?


 * 6 a.m.: planes take off from carriers. 7:55 a.m.: first wave attacks (i.e., nearly two hours en route). 8:25 a.m.: second wave. 9:30 last planes withdraw. Presumably the last planes would have landed about 11:30 a.m. A CAP would of course be up and might have to be refueled before taking off again. Then the attack planes would have to be brought back on deck, refueled, and rearmed. Two hours in total? Just a guess. We're now up to 1:30 p.m. Two hours to Pearl Harbor, an hour over target, and two hours back. They would have had daylight, almost certainly, and high losses were acceptable, so if some or many didn't get back to the carriers, that was all right. So it doesn't seem to me that daylight was a huge problem. --Cubdriver 21:49, 21 April 2006 (UTC)


 * User:David Newton added the material long ago. I've placed a request on his talk page to address this issue. FYI, high losses were not acceptable, according to what I've read. -Will Beback 21:57, 21 April 2006 (UTC)

Think what would have had to happen. The first and second strikes used separate planes that were fueled and launched from the carriers before the first strike reached their targets. Any third strike would have had to have used planes that had taken part in the first and/or second strikes. That means at minimum:


 * 1) The planes from the first and second strikes would have had to have flown back to the Japanese carriers and been recovered.
 * 2) The planes would have had to have been assessed for damage,
 * 3) The planes would have had to have been refuelled,
 * 4) The planes would have had to have been rearmed,
 * 5) The planes would have had to have been relaunched,
 * 6) The planes would have had to have flown back to Pearl Harbor,
 * 7) The planes would have had to have attacked again,
 * 8) The planes would have had to have flown back to the Japanese carriers and been recovered.

The last planes from the first and second waves landing back on the carriers at about 11:30am would have been reasonable. That leaves six and a half hours of daylight or so. The Japanese carriers were about 200 miles from Pearl Harbor which at the cruising speeds of the torpedo aircraft and dive bombers of the day was at least 1.5 hours of flying. There we have, just getting to and from the target, 3 hours used up out of the 6.5 available.

Launching carrier aircraft is a significant time factor that most people don't think about. Assuming four launches a minute on a modern aircraft carrier it will still take 15 minutes to get a 60 aircraft strike outbound. The Japanese aircraft carriers were certainly not capable of 4 launches a minute, although there were 6 of them taking part so that is less of a problem than it might appear. However we also have the fact that a large strike of aircraft needs to climb to cruising height and get in formation before leaving for the strike. Doing that with WWII aircraft is a considerable undertaking in and of itself due to their relatively slow rate of climb. It could very easily have taken 30-45 minutes to get a strike airborne and underway, and possibly as much as an hour. Assuming 45 minutes we have now used up 3.75 hours out of the 6.5 available simply to launch the aircraft and for them to travel to and from the target.

We now move on to damage assessment. If a third strike was to be flown then aircraft potentially taking part would have had to have been assessed for battle damage before being cleared. That could easily have taken 15-30 minutes. Let's say it took 15 minutes extra as it could fairly easily have run in parallel with recovery operations. That means 4 hours of the 6.5 available have been used up to check the planes for battle damage, launch them and for travel time.

We now have to consider refuelling and rearming. That was a long process and Japanese carrier doctrine was not as efficient as American in this respect. Midway is the classic example of what can happen if you get caught in the middle of refuelling and rearming. Let's say that took 90 minutes as a rough guess. That's 5.5 hours of the 6.5 available used up.

Now thinking about the attack itself. The first set of strikes lasted for 90 minutes in total. That did include a considerable gap between the two waves. Let's say the attack lasted for 30 minutes. That's 6 hours out of the 6.5 available used up.

So we have 30 minutes left as a safety margin, time to make the actual decision to strike, and time to deal with CAP operations. 30 minutes is not much of a safety margin and CAP aircraft would certainly have been in the air given the proximity to US soil. That's also assuming 90 minutes for rearming instead of the 2 hours assumed above and 90 minutes each way for transit rather than 2 hours each way for transit. Assume those and we are very much into darkness when the Japanese aircraft come back to the carriers.

That's why the Japanese aircraft could very easily have come back in the dark. David Newton 22:28, 29 April 2006 (UTC)


 * Another perspective: Tameichi Hara states that from the very beginning, Japanese naval commanders were constantly being harangued by headquarters staff admirals to conserve fuel, ammunition, personnel, and equipment as much as possible with the implication that their careers and honor were being judged by this criteria.  Hara believes that the reason why so many Japanese commanders withdrew just when it appeared they had a decisive victory in hand (Battle of Savo Island, Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, Battle off Samar) was for this reason.  This may have contributed to Nagumo's decision also.

Source:  Cla68 17:48, 24 April 2006 (UTC)


 * Consider a hypothetical third wave, which planes would be used, returning first wave or returning second wave? Was every plane capable of independent navigation? First two waves, was any effort made to 'bunch up"? Is recovery slower than launch? Do planes from different ships fly in the same formation? were there plans for a third wave? I just don't see how anything beyond a piecemeal effort would be possible. CorvetteZ51 17:47, 4 November 2006 (UTC)


 * Don't forget another factor, often overlooked. Nagumo's destroyers were burning fuel oil by the ton, & he had no AOs to replenish it. Just getting to Pearl threatened to force him to leave them behind on his return. The longer he stayed, the worse it would be. See Goldstein & Dillon (using Prange research), The Pearl Harbor Papers. Trekphiler 06:28, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

I renamed the title of this subsection, "The Third Wave", and downgraded it to a subsection of "Attack". I did this because it seems for flow better, and because the Third Wave was previously alluded to. The title "Naguma Withdrawl" doesn't do anything for me. --Otheus 14:14, 10 January 2007 (UTC)

US Aircraft Carriers
I have heard that the US carriers (having the largest radar and patrol radii) were out of harbour searching for the Japanese fleet when the attack hit. Can anybody please comment on this? Rednaxela 15:47, 3 May 2006 (UTC)
 * That appears incorrect. We cover the absence of the carriers briefly in the Attack on Pearl Harbor. -Will Beback 22:14, 3 May 2006 (UTC)


 * It's wrong. E & Lex were returning from ferry missions to Wake & Midway ; Sara was in Puget Sound under refit. Trekphiler 06:39, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

The surprise attack
Japan was suppose to declare war 30 min before attacking, but writing the declaration of war took too long and the air planes had reached their target before it was finished. So this is why Nagumo ws forced to initiate a suprise attack. The Japanese believed in honor nad a suprise attack was not honorable at all.
 * Um, sorry to burst your bubble, but (a) declaring war and then attacking Pearl Harbor 30 minutes later is still tantamount to a surprise attack (not to mention subsequent attacks on the British, Dutch, and French, just to name a few), and (b) your comment about Japan not launching a surprise attack for honor's sake is dangerously misinformed. The Japanese had no compunction about launching a surpise attack, and were more than willing to do it to the Russians in 1904 at Port Arthur. Raul654 02:58, 9 May 2006 (UTC)
 * I believe that many of the Japanese leaders desired to make a distinction between a sneak attack and a surprise attack. In the chapter from Japan at War, an Oral History (full book citation in the notes section of the main article) in which Admiral Yamamoto's former personal aid is interviewed, the aid says that Yamamoto wanted the U.S. to be given an announcement of breaking-off of relations just before the attack occurred so that the attack wouldn't be considered "sneaky," but instead, a "surprise."  Of course, even if that had happened as Yamamoto desired, the people of the U.S. may have still have considered it a sneak attack.  In fact, the difference between a "sneak" attack and a "surprise" attack is, of course, very debatable, if there is a difference. Cla68 16:49, 26 June 2006 (UTC)
 * Sneak attack implies a dishonorable tactic of leading your opponent to believe your intentions are other than what they are, and/or disregarding conventions in order to take advantage of the opponent's expectation that you would fight by the conventions other than those you have used in the past. After the Battle of Port Arthur in 1904, no one in the west was entitled to believe the Japanese wouldn't use the same tactice of surprize attack suddenly at the height of diplomatic tensions.  Indeed, Togo had studied the practices of the West very closely, and was merely applying the lessons he learned from the French while he was in China observing their practices during the Battle of Foochow.  The French issued no warnings, no formal severing of relations, and their attack was devastating.  Togo saw this was the way business was done, proceeded to use it on the Russians, and later when Yamamoto, a known proponent of naval aviation was placed in charge of the Combined Fleet in 1939, how can anyone claim it was such a huge surprize that Yamamoto would not do the same?  He was simply following what he viewed and anyone in the west should have viewed as standard operating procedure in the far east theater.


 * Was Operation El Dorado Canyon a sneak attack? Our first response is certainly not, and the first thing that comes to mind is justification- Lybian treachery already set the rules that marquis of queensbury conventions did not apply.  Don't be too shocked that justification and recitation of percieved treachery by the west was at the forefront of the thinking of Japanese leaders.  I think it is more accurate to say that the Japanese view was while the attack may have been a surprise to the american and japanese public, but it was simple arrogance that led the american leadership not to expect an attack on Pearl Harbor.
 * There is substantial credence to this viewpoint. The British and Americans had given Japan two options in China.  Either back down, or go to war.  In fact, the American military staff in the far east was informed that war was a likely scenario, and it was a common view that it was inevitable.  So what was the big surprize here?  The prevailing opinion amoung the British and American navies was simply that the attack would be in the far east, not in the western theater.  As for the notion that a carrier force would be this effective, the article notes the stunning effectiveness of Yarnell's Blue team attack on Pearl harbor which did precisely what the Japanese did 9 years later:
 * attack from the north from behind a storm front
 * attack on a sleepy winter Sunday morning
 * destroy the army fighters on the ground,
 * air defence neutralized, proceed to destroy the fleet at anchor in the harbor with torpedos and bombs
 * It was no surprise to the navy that this could be done. Mitchell also proved the vulnerability of battleships, and though his and Yarnell's exercises were discounted as unrealistic, there was no excuse to reject the undeniable new reality presented by real world the Attack on Taranto in 1940.  Sorry, but this gave the Americans ample time to appreciate the vulnerability and build defences.  It was well known by the allies how to defend effectively from long range attack, but the response was far from a best system employing destroyer pickets and something like Britain's Chain Home coordinated air defence system.  The "wide open barn door" deficiencies in American defences have all been thoroughly remarked on and were corrected, but only after yet another undeniable demonstration for the bone headed military leadership.  So where does that leave us?  1) the Japanese were obeying conventions they learned from the west and demonstrated as their standard operating procedure in the 1904 war with Russia 2) the Americans actually were expecting an attack- they were only wrong about the location.  3) The American naval leadership chose to disregard the vulnerability of their base revealed by Taranto and the war games that Mitchell and Yarnell- they were surprized only because they were in denial- they were living in the past.
 * Certainly everyone today agrees that it was a foolish decision on the part of the Japanese to attack. But the surprise relied more on the fact that the US navy was in denial about the threats posed by naval aviation in general, and the capabilities of the Japanese in specific.  Further, the American leadership was not entitled to claim the Japanese were behaving in an unpredicable manner.  They had demonstrated their doctrine of sudden attack over an extended period of time.  Not attacking until formal breaking off of relations is a demonstration of poor character as was the attack by the French on the Chinese at Foochow.  But the Pearl Harbor attack equally illustrates the poor character demonstrated by American leadership who stubbornly refused to believe their own tests and the experience of Taranto that Pearl Harbor was seriously vulnerable to attack by massed naval aviation.  Kimmel and Short were guilty of dereliction, but for larger reasons that what they were accused of in the commission report.  Further, they had a lot of company in the upper ranks for their dereliction of duty.  -Mak 21:29, 6 September 2006 (UTC)
 * I believe the problem was not so much that they considered an attack impossible, but highly improbable. Signal intelligence had given the americans an excellent picture of the japanese movements in Southeast Asia. They didn't know everything, but they knew that large japanese invasion forces were on the move and going to land somewhere in Malaya, Borneo and the Philippines. These information was so much taken from decoded messages, but from data gathered by the much simpler means of direction-finding and traffic analysis (unlike MAGIC this data was avaiable to the Kimmel and Short). The invasion forces maintained radio silence once out of port to keep, so their positions to be discovered by direction-finding, but were still receiving messages addressed to them, so it was pretty obvious they were at sea (because they were not confirming receipt of these messages and the other side demand confimation as usual). Because there was no identifiable radio traffic either from the carriers or to the carriers, it was assumed they were still in Japan communicating by short-range radio, which was to weak to be received by the far away listening posts. A similar radio-blackout had been observed during earlier operations, were the carriers were indeed in Japan as strategic reserve. So the assumption was the carriers and the main battleforce were in Japan waiting for the reaction of the US-Pacific fleet, ready to attack it if it should move toward the Philippines. This was apparently indeed the japanese Plan B, if the japanese carriers should be discovered enroute to Pearl Harbor. With hindsight it would probably have been the better plan. Everybody was lulled in by that analysis and believed there was no imminent threat to Pearl Harbor. Also keep in mind that the mobile radar were operating only from 04:00am to 07:00am, because that was considered to be the most likely time of an attack. Though it was obviously folly not to operate the radar 24h a day, it shows that they had the basics figured out correctly, if there was to be an attack it would happen early in the morning. Nevfennas 19:19, 10 September 2006 (UTC)


 * Don't forget, also, the radar operators & fighter controllers were very junior & very inexperienced, & radar (unlike now) was very new-fangled & extremely secret... It's likely none of them knew (exactly) how it worked. And the PPI scope, common now, wasn't in use, so the size of the Japanese formation might well have been mistaken for the (expected) inbound B-17s. Trekphiler 06:47, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

List of Ships
Is there a Wikipedia article 'List of Ships at Pearl Harbor' someplace? If not, would someone like to create one? 147.240.236.9 21:29, 15 May 2006 (UTC)


 * See also Category:Attack on Pearl Harbor, which should have all of our attack-related articles. -Will Beback 22:27, 15 May 2006 (UTC)

Oil Leak
Regarding how fast the oil is leaking, I only reworded the picture caption, and do not know the source of this info, i.e. 2 cubic inches per 30 seconds. However, I did google find this USGS article that states a quart of oil escapes per day. 4 cu. inches per min. is a much faster leak than a quart a day, for sure. Anyone have more info on the rate of the leak? Leon7 22:31, 31 May 2006 (UTC)
 * I was there many years ago and as I recall it was a whole lot less than either of those, a few drops a day. There wasn't much of an oil slick, just a hint of rainbow here & there on the water. A quart a day for 65 years would amount to about 6000 gallons leaked by now, seems excessive. Doovinator 01:57, 1 June 2006 (UTC)


 * Further research shows that the Arizona had a total fuel capacity of 4,630 tons of oil. I assume the ship was near capacity while docked in Pearl Harbor.  Viewed in that light, the leakage seems completely reasonable (but, as the article cited below state, disastrous for Pearl Harbor should the fuel tanks corrode and rupture further).  --ElKevbo 17:13, 1 June 2006 (UTC)


 * About a quart a day (see http://soundwaves.usgs.gov/2003/01/ and http://www.pastfoundation.org/Arizona/Legacy_2.htm ). I'm new to WP and have never added a citation before.  If someone would format these into the article, I'd appreciate it.  Thanks. Leon7 07:24, 1 June 2006 (UTC)


 * References added. Thanks so much for finding them!  --ElKevbo 17:18, 1 June 2006 (UTC)

'Treachery'
In the intro paragraph, "The U.S. public was greatly offended by the treachery of the attack" seems an inappropriate (and somewhat loaded) phrase, and in any case needs more explanation. 'Treachery' implies that the attack was a breach of pre-existing trust (such as a treaty or alliance), but this was not really the case. The Americans were not officially at war with the Japanese, but nor did they trust the Japanese. I assume what is intended here is to say that the U.S. public were offended because the attack was made before any official declaration of war. This should be made explicit. Ben Finn 16:50, 1 June 2006 (UTC)
 * You're right. The word should be changed. MickeyK 19:32, 6 June 2006 (UTC)

How many US ships damaged or sunk?
The introduction says that 18 US ships were damaged or sunk whereas the infobox says 16. Which is correct? Please edit and cite a source to help prevent this kind of confusion in the future. --ElKevbo 23:24, 1 June 2006 (UTC)
 * I have changed the paragraph in the article to state that twelve ships were sunk or severely damaged. Which I think is a more fitting description and assessment of the actual damage. In fact many ships took some form of damage or another.  However I feel that this number more accurately describes the significant damage that was done.  I am not suggesting that the infobox be changed, because of the varying degrees of damage.  My source for the number of 12 ships comes from
 * Five battleships were sunk or sinking, three destroyers were wrecked, a minelayer and target ship had capsized, two cruisers were badly damaged and many other ships needed repairs
 * What does everyone else think? -- malo (tlk) (cntrbtns) 03:59, 4 June 2006 (UTC)


 * some perspective is needed here. The US had 16 old and one new battleship at the time, five were sunk or grounded. One was usable 15 months later. The old battleships played a minor role in the rest of war. The two cruisers that were damaged, were rapidly patched up. Two destroyers were writeoffs, but were stripped of usable parts. One desroyer had its bow blow off, but was repairable.CorvetteZ51 00:22, 9 November 2006 (UTC)


 * Corv, You may be interested that theres's a book by a Navy salvage driver who worked at Pearl in the months following, starting almost immediately. His account of work on the Arizona is pretty starck. Brings home what one knows intellectually, but not so viscerally. He also reports that parts were selvaged from several ships, not just hte destroyers. Great read, if not really great literature. And, of course, the title and author excape me completely... A librarian will be able to find it right quick, I'd think. Jim something, maybe? ww 23:21, 9 November 2006 (UTC)

Why is there no mention of this well-documented note?
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Warning of an Attack on Pearl Harbor, 27 January 1941

[Telegram: Paraphrase]

TOKYO, January 27, 1941-6 p.m. [Received January 27-6: 38 a.m.]

125. A member of the Embassy was told by my --- colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of "trouble" between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use of all the Japanese military facilities. My colleague said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic.

GREW

Source: U.S., Department of State, Publication 1983, Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, D.C.: U.S., Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 617-618


 * Because that would imply that the USA government let Americans dies so they could kill even more Americane in order to make some cash on the weapons industry, and since that is imposible, the note simply did not hapen and anyone beliving it is factual should start taking their medication. --Striver 14:46, 4 June 2006 (UTC)


 * This article focuses on the attack itself. We have an entire article on the topic of the Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate. -Will Beback 20:33, 6 June 2006 (UTC)
 * There's a better reason to exclude it: it's been described, accurately, as little more than cocktail party gossip. Trekphiler 06:51, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

15" shell used as armour piercing bombs ?
It's interesting how, according to the authors, main gun navy shells caliber used as aircraft launched bombs is different. According to my opinion the Japanese used 14" and 16", simply because no Imperial battleship had 15" guns, while 14" for 600 kg and 16" for 900 kg shells were available respectively from "Hiei" (or "Fuso", "Ise" etc. WWI design classes) and from the Washigton treaty "Nagato" class. It's unlike that Germans or Italian supplied 15" shells from "Bismark" or "Veneto", while there were no captured supplies of 15"L42 English rounds of French "Richelieau" 381mm guns. And it's very unlike that an aircraft different from a two-engine bomber could lift a 18" "Yamato" shell.
 * It's conventional to sign your edits with four twiddles (~) in a row which adds your nickname (or IP address if you're not logged in) and the date and time of the edit. In any case, if yoyur facts are correct, I'd guess that what was actually used were 600 kg 14" shells. if you can verify this, please be bold and change the references. Looks like a good catch. ww 04:50, 6 July 2006 (UTC)


 * Very good catch. As I recall, they were converted 356mm (14") & 406mm (16"), & the 356mm were more common.
 * In the same vein, can somebody confirm Type 95 torpedos were airlaunched? AFAIK, these were sub-launched, not suitable for aircraft. Trekphiler 05:42 & 07:42, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

edits of 6 July changing Harbor to Harbour wrong in this instance
The wholesale changes of Harbor to Harbour in these edits violates a WP policy in re UK v US spelling diffs. The policy is to accept both, avoid mixing, and use the 'natural' one if possible. All without changing existing articles wholesale. In this case the term is a US English one, is used officially with the US spelling,nad the entire article was consistently so already, and liekwise the title. Should be changed back. Would the editor who made the changes undertake to revet them? ww 04:50, 6 July 2006 (UTC)

myth vs history = low quality
As it currently exists, this section makes some undistinguished points about the context of the Pearl Harbor attack, Hawaiian history, and the long tension even conflict between Japan and other nations (empires, ...) in the Pacific. Much of this seems superfluous in an already long article. At the very least, the writing is floppy and we should do better if these points are to be made here. Recall that this is a WP Featured Article. Comments from observers? Agree? Disagree? Suggestions? ww 14:21, 10 July 2006 (UTC)


 * Agree with User:Ww's assessment. There are no facts here, only setting up dubious strawmen and then tilting at them. I think the entire section should be deleted. --Paul 17:11, 10 July 2006 (UTC)

links inappropriate; time to prune and replant
We are accumulating lots of links to here to things that are relevant to the Alternative theories article. Let's be clear for our reader. Whatever our opinion about pre warning and such, this is an article about the attack, not about conspiracy to permit or encourage it. Those things have their own article and should be there. We mention this controversy here and provide references to an extensive article on the various aspects of the subject. Accordingly, I'll try to remember to come back in a day or two and do the gardening, transplanting the necessary links to the other article. Already did it with a link to the text of the Statute in which Congress endorsed some of the alternative theories. Comments? Thoughts? Suggestions? Especially if different than the plan described here? ww 22:03, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

new claim, needs source
The claim in an edit this date, that the attack began after news of the operation in Thailand had started is new to me. Have I just forgotten, or has this recently turned up? ww 17:55, 21 July 2006 (UTC)


 * It's not new, you missed it. The Thai invasion force was well underway before the attack began. It had been sighted, no less, which was one reason the U.S. believed Pearl was safe, since everybody thought the IJN was incapable of mounting more than one major operation at a time. Ooops... Trekphiler 05:38, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

poorly constructed sentence?
I'm reading over this entry for the first time, and was thrown for a loop by this sentence: "The U.S. upped the presssure on Japan to force withdraw by renouncing the 1911 U.S.-Japanese treaty of commerce an act which later permitted imposing embargoes." First, "pressure on Japan to force withdraw"? I imagine it's a typo. (If "force withdraw" was the intended phrase, and it actually means something coherent, than it must be some esoteric construction and so maybe the wording should be changed anyway.) Secondly, "the 1911 U.S.-Japanese treaty of commerce an act which later permitted imposing embargoes." Aside from the apparent need for a comma between "commerce" and "an," and perhaps need caps for Treaty of Commerce, the sentence is still mildly unclear. The renouncing of the treaty allowed who to impose embargoes on whom? why? gni 23:05, 7 August 2006


 * I've rewritten the paragraph to try to make it more clear. Take a look. --Paul 17:00, 9 August 2006 (UTC)

Intro edit to name attacking carriers
Forgive my impertinence, but am I the only one who sees no point to naming each of the attacking carriers in the introduction of the article? I understand mentioning who attacked, but the first four words of the article are "[t]he Imperial Japanese Navy." I think that does the trick -- and considering the article's featured status, we ought to think hard about adding a whole paragraph to the introduction, IMHO, w/ no consensus about a compelling reason to do that. --GGreeneVa 04:28, 20 August 2006 (UTC)


 * Agreed. Since its featured status, this article has declined in quality by the inclusion of a myriad of tangential facts that more properly belong in an article or book about factors leading to WWII. I've cut the Intro back to something more crisp.  The names of the Japanese Aircraft Carriers remains elsewhere in the article. --Paul 18:16, 20 August 2006 (UTC)

H.P. Willmott on third strike arguments
Willmott, in his second book entitled "Pearl Harbor" (I have two distinct ones) claims that the Japanese would not have attacked the dockyard facilities and oil storage areas in any case, that all references to such recommendations he found postdate WWII. Specifically, he says that Genda urged a third attack on the ships, and that only after WWII did Genda realize that the facilities were a worthwhile target. Unfortunately, this book was written after Willmott decided to stop sourcing most of what he said, and in any case he couldn't demonstrate an absence of references. This is a potentially touchy area, and I thought I'd bring it up before going ahead and editing. Dht 23:37, 16 September 2006 (UTC)


 * If it's true Genda didn't realize this til postwar, I'm astonished. These targets of opportunity should have been irresistible to any officer worth his stripes, which is why I've always wondered why they weren't on the original target list. Trekphiler 05:35, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

Stop using the word "Japanese" too much
That word is making it very American centric, little racist and discriminatory. If you want this article to be neutral and nice, it should say "Japan" instead of "the Japanese." These words are making things personal and have this "us versus them" attitude. Whenever just say "Japan" or "Empire of Japan. 168.253.23.96 03:23, 17 September 2006 (UTC)
 * In the English language, "Japan" is not the same thing as "the Japanese" and the language uses that distinction. So, to say that the Italians like pasta is not the same as to say that Italy likes pasta, nor can one say that Texas is large meaning that Texans are large. Quite a few are, of course, but certainly not all.
 * The suggestion here simply does not result in acceptable English writing. In addition, there is no inherent racist connotation or discriminatory connotation of "Japanese", and there is nothing American centric about it as the usage is the same in all English speaking areas. ww 09:19, 18 September 2006 (UTC)

Opening sentence...
The article seems to go a little against protocol by assuming prior knowledge of the event on the part of the reader - it does not explain the subject of the article and puts much more space into explaining when it happened. Everyone knows what a telephone is, but the article on it doesn't begin with something along the lines of The telephone was invented by Alexander Graham Bell - that would be an abomination. elvenscout742 21:35, 21 September 2006 (UTC)


 * The way Wiki works is if you think you can improve it, give it a shot! Make sure to explain in the edit comments what you are about...--Paul 22:02, 21 September 2006 (UTC)

Pearl Harbor as "home soil?"
The article under "Mythical status" says "Pearl Harbor is a major event in American history marking the first time since the War of 1812 America was attacked on its home soil by another country." This claim neglects the "attack on U.S. soil" by the Confederate forces in the Civil War, the attacks on the U.S. forces and citizens by Native Americans, and the attack on the U.S town of Columbus New Mexicos by Pancho Villa in 1916.Furthermore, when I click on "home soil" up comes "Homeland" which is defined as "A homeland (rel. country of origin and native land) is the concept of the territory (cultural geography) to which an ethnic group holds a long history and a deep cultural association with —the country in which a particular national identity began. As a common noun, it simply connotes the country of one's origin." In 1941 Hawaii was not regarded by many U.S. citizens as our "homeland" or our "native soil" or our "home soil" and certainly not as the place "where our national identity began" any more than Guantanamo is today or Iraq be if we have military bases there 40 odd years from today. Hawaii in 1941 was just a military base and a tourism destination. The U.S. anger was over a sneak attack which killed thousands of our military and weakened our defense capability, not that our "home soil had been attacked." It was a territory 2300 miles from the U.S. that the U.S. navy and marines had seized in 1893 in support of American planters, and to obtain a naval based and fueling station in the Pacific, as noted in US Public Law 103-150 in Wikisource. It had only been a U.S. territory since 1898, or 43 years at the time of the attack. Becoming a U.S. territory was within living memory of many Hawaiians and U.S. citizens. For these reasons, I suggest that the "mythic status" section be removed.Edison 15:26, 25 September 2006 (UTC)


 * Hawaii was a US territory as of 1900, so your analogy to Iraq isn't exactly valid. Comparing it to Puerto Rico or Guam might be more realistic.  In any event, Americans at the time immediately felt that America had been attacked 'at home' (see newspaper headlines and articles on the day following the attack) as opposed to being attacked in a foreign country.  I believe however, that this part of the article is attempting to mention the status that the event obtained after the war.  It doesn't do a great job of calling that out and could be improved (perhaps split?) Scottsh 05:43, 1 October 2006 (UTC)


 * There was a "home soil" sense, compared to the reaction to the attacks in the Philippines. It's been suggested, had Yamamoto not insisted on targeting the Pacific Fleet, Japan might have gotten away with attacking the Philippines without war with the U.S. at all. Trekphiler 06:55, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

General Billy Mitchell
Please metion General Billy Mitchell somewhere in the article on the attack on Pearl Harbor. He did warn his superiors in 1924 with a 324 page report, (and according to the movie; "The Court-Martial of Billy Mitchell (film)" with Gary Cooper), repeated the warnings at his trial.24.195.255.68 14:37, 30 September 2006 (UTC)Bennett Turk

Genda Not Mentioned in article?
I want some input before I add a paragraph about Minoru Genda's part in the Pearl Harbor story. I have some issues with the 'Japanese preparations' section.

The reference to the British attack on Taranto is entirely appropriate but implies that the British 'shallow running torpedo secret' was merely copied, and not improved upon (which is the actual case).

Plus I don't see any connection to U.S. Admiral Harry Yarnell's 1932 Army-Navy exercises. Were the results of this exercise available to the public? Is there any evidence that the Japanese knew of these exercises? Is there any evidence that Onishi or Genda or Yamamoto specifically knew about these exercises?

The issue here is that this section of the article implies that the Japanese simply copied British and American ideas, which I believe is not accurate. Thoughts? Markm62 17:33, 4 October 2006 (UTC)


 * I'd say the mentions of Yarnell & Taranto bear more on whether the U.S. should've been surprised. It's not like Genda needed somebody to draw him a diagram (tho if it's true he didn't realize the significance of the tank farm, Navy Yard, sub base, power station, & torpedo store, maybe somebody should've!) Trekphiler 06:58, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

HOW WASHINGTON DID  VOTE  (1941).
DECEMBER 1941 - In Washington the Senate approved the war resolution against Japan 82 to 0, the House voted 388 to 1. Against Germany the count was 88 to 0 in the Senate and 393 to 0 in the House. Against Italy the count was 90 to 0 in the Senate and 399 to 0 in the House.

Casualties
The infobox currently shows 2,403 military plus 68 civilian casualties.

Until an anonymous editor changed it a while ago, it said 2,335 military plus 68 civilian.

I can't seem to find a consistent number in a quick search. The following sites show 2,338 total, including 48 civilian: This site shows 2,390 total, including 49 civilian: This site shows 3,435 total casualties: Do we have a solid reference for those numbers? -- Jim Douglas (talk) (contribs)  04:06, 8 November 2006 (UTC)
 * http://www.nps.gov/archive/usar/home.htm
 * http://www.nps.gov/archive/usar/ExtendWeb1.html
 * http://www.nps.gov/archive/usar/fact_sheet.html
 * http://www.nps.gov/usar/historyculture/people.htm
 * http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/house/chapter-23-joint-pearl-harbor-attack.html


 * The "INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES" reported "The Navy and Marine Corps suffered a total of 2,835 casualties, of which 2,086 officers and men were killed or fatally wounded. Seven hundred and forty-nine wounded survived....The Army suffered a total of 600 casualties, including 194 killed in action and 360 wounded." That would amount to 3,435 total military casualties. They don't list any civilian casualties. -Will Beback 06:02, 8 November 2006 (UTC)


 * The commonly accepted, & most often quoted, number is 2403. Trekphiler 07:13, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

I declare
I deleted this:
 * "Having already signed a pact with Germany and Italy, this meant Japan would be fighting against the Allied Powers. "

This is false, or mistaken. The pact demanded the signatories come to the aid if one already engaged in war was attacked by a third power (such as the U.S. attacking Germany). This was not the circumstance in play. Trekphiler 07:13, 12 November 2006 (UTC)
 * Funny, later on in the article, it has the correct information.... Trekphiler 12:02, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

Division
I added this:
 * "There was considerable division in the Japanese high command. The Army wanted to "go south", intending to capture oil and mineral reserves in the Dutch East Indies. The Navy was certain this would bring the U.S. into the war. To forestall American interference, an attack on the Pacific Fleet was considered essential. (The certainty of American aid to Britain in the Pacific is far from clear, and was even at the time.)"

See Willmott, H. P. Empires in the Balance. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute Press, 1982; Hayashi, Saburo, & Coox, Alvin D. Kōgun. Quantico, WV: Marine Corps Association, 1959 (reprints Teiheiyo Senso Rikusen Gaishi, Tokyo, 1951); & Peattie, Mark R., & Evans, David C. Kaigun. Annapolis: United States Naval Institute Press, 1997. Trekphiler 07:37, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

Sam! Rewrite!
How did this ever get Featured Article status? It's full of mistakes. I rewrote this:
 * "explicitly warned war with Japan was expected in the very near future, . And, on the day of the attack, General Marshall sent an imminent-war warning message to Pearl Harbor specifically."

This is the same old revisionist garbage. It omits, as usual, the content of the messages & implies they warned of an attack on Pearl Harbor specifically. They did nothing of the kind. In fact, everywhere but Pearl Harbor was mentioned.

I deleted this:
 * "and in any case was court-martialed the next year"

It implies a connection between his criticisms over Pearl & his court martial. There wasn't one. There was one in Richardson's removal.

I rewrote this:
 * "U.S. signals intelligence, through the Army's Signal Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence's OP-20-G unit, intercepted Japanese diplomatic traffic and had broken many Japanese ciphers, though none carried strategic or tactical military information. Distribution of this intelligence was capricious and confusing, and did not include material from Japan's military traffic as this was not available. At best, the information was partial, seemingly contradictory, or insufficiently distributed (as in the case of the Winds Code). Warnings were sent to all U.S. commands in the Pacific, including the explicit war warning message in late November 1941. Despite the growing information pointing to a new phase of Japan's aggression, there was no information available pointing specifically toward Pearl Harbor."

It's misleading & erroneous. To begin with, JN-25 had been broken as early as September 1940. It wasn't provided to FDR (as far as I know) because it was naval information only. J-19 (which the Japanese called Tsu) had been broken, and there was information in J-19 pointing to an attack on Pearl (the notorious "bomb plot" message), but J-19 wasn't being read because there wasn't enough manpower for Purple & JN-25, let alone lower grade cyphers, & the relevant signals had been "masked" to look like consular traffic (which was being ignored, for lack of manpower...) The Winds Code is a red herring that deserves to be ignored.

I rewrote this:
 * "In 1924, General Billy Mitchell delivered a 324 page report to his superiors warning of a future war with Japan, possibly including an air-attack on Pearl Harbor; he was essentially ignored. American commanders had been warned tests demonstrated shallow-water aerial torpedo launches were possible, but no one in charge in Hawaii fully appreciated the danger. Nevertheless, believing Pearl Harbor had natural defenses against torpedo attack (e.g., the shallow water), the U.S. Navy failed to deploy torpedo nets or baffles, which they judged an interference with ordinary operations, and so a low priority. Due to a claimed shortage of long-range aircraft, long reconnaissance patrols (chiefly Navy flying boats and Army Air Corps bombers) were not being made as often as required for adequate coverage, or as were later shown to be possible (e.g., immediately after the attack and with fewer planes). At the time of the attack, the Army, which was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor, was in training mode rather than on an alert footing. Most of its portable anti-aircraft guns were stowed, with the ammunition locked in separate armories. To avoid upsetting property owners, officers did not keep guns dispersed around the Pearl Harbor base (i.e., on private property)."

It's misleading & erroneous. There was a real shortage of LR a/c in Hawaii; Kimmel had only 36 PBYs operational. The Army was responsible for LR patrol, per a prewar agreement, & Short was not going to get more B-17s; they were going to the Philippines, which had a higher priority, & Britiain, which had a higher one still. (Trials "immediately after the attack", I suspect, concentrated on the known attack direction, which neither Kimmel nor Short could afford to beforehand.) The Army & Navy were both on a training status; note, despite having all the information available, DC didn't change this. And it was Kimmel, not Short, who was responsible for defending the Fleet.

I rewrote this:
 * "because of decryption and typing delays, Embassy personnel"

adding this:
 * "and because Tokyo had neglected to inform them of the crucial necessity to deliver it on time"

As written, it was misleading (based on a common myth). Funny thing is, OP-20G got it decrypted, translated, typed, & delivered in plenty of time...

I added this:
 * "Even before Nagumo began launching, at 04.30, minesweeper USS Condor spotted a midget submarine outside the Harbor entrance and alerted destroyer Ward. Ward carried out a fruitless search."

I deleted the "routine patarol"; given Condor's warning, I doubt it was routine. (There's some question in my mind Ward was aware it was a midget; should this be stated as fact?) Also, TBS exchanges were monitored ashore, but the presence of a potential midget sub was never reported to Kimmel, allegedly because watchkeepers were asleep (Costello, Days of Infamy).

I rewrote to this:
 * "MacArthur had nine hours of warning the Japanese had attacked at Pearl (and specific orders to commence operations)."

because it wasn't the Army Air Corps that got the warning; it was about 9½h, not 10; & MacArthur got a call from Marshall, around 04.30 or 05.30 in Manilla, ordering, "Execute Rainbow 5". (MacArthur lies about getting it.) Trekphiler 07:52, 07:59, 08:16, 08:42, 08:54, 09:07, & 09:20, 12 November 2006 (UTC)


 * Trek,


 * How did it get FA status? Well, it was a bit smaller and less chaotic at the time.
 * As for your edits noted above, I applaud your industry, thank you for the reminder that the Thailand fleet had been sighted before the Pearl Harbor attack (had slipped my mind), and must disagree with the tone and some of the facts in these edits. In fact, JN-25 was NOT broken prior to 12.1.41 in any edition. This was at the beginning of its life, a superencrypted additive code/cypher. There were several new editions (one on 12.1.41) and became a two part code as well. In the absence of considerable depth at any particular edition, such systems (essentially state of the practical art of the time) are very difficult to break. The highest credible estimate of the percentage of JN-25 broken prior to 12.1.41 is about 10%. wh the opening of hostibilies, traffic increased, much more depth became possible, and the 12.1.41 edition was steadily broken to the point of sufficient information to stage the Midway ambush. As for attack information in minor codes/cyphers, one which had been broken did indeed carry a warning. It was sent, IRC, on 12.6.41 but not decrypted till 12.8.41.


 * Edits to the contrary are ill made in my view.

As for others, I should be glad to discuss them with you, but suspect the likely volume is likely to be more than this talk page can manage. Perhaps private email, and then a return to editing here? ww 09:48, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

I'm inclined to rewrite this:
 * "Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest vessels present), they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser Helena was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the neighboring minelayer Oglala. Two destroyers in dry dock were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel bunkers. The leaking fuel caught fire and flooding the dry dock with water made the oil rise, which burned out the ships. The light cruiser Raleigh was hit by a torpedo and holed. The light cruiser Honolulu was damaged but remained in service. The destroyer Cassin capsized, and destroyer Downes was heavily damaged. The repair vessel Vestal, moored alongside Arizona, was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane tender Curtiss was also damaged."

It's misleading. My guess is, the attacks on cruisers were mistaken identity, being taken for battleships, & the DDs were certainly in error. Of the 79 ships in the harbor that morning, besides the heavies, only a handful were even touched. Trekphiler 09:59, 12 November 2006 (UTC)

I added this:
 * "Others believe Japanese trade protection was so incompetent, U.S. submarines could have strangled Japan into defeat alone."

I'm relying on Blair, Silent Victory (Lippincott, 1975) & Parillo, Japanese Merchant Marine in WW2 (USNI Press, 1993). Neither expressly says it, but that's the gist of it. Trekphiler 11:23, 12 November 2006 (UTC)