Talk:Battle of New Orleans

Major John Michell of the Royal Artillery
This man commanded one of the three artillery batteries that deployed to the Chesapeake in 1814. Of the four batteries at New Orleans, three were to redeploy to the Low Countries in 1815. He was not at Waterloo, but is in the Order of Battle for the Anglo-Allied Army in Flanders and France - 1815 (see below) https://www.napoleon-series.org/military-info/battles/1815/c_Anglo-Allies1815.html

This man's uncommon spelling surname seems to be mis-spelled in various documents, in the same way that a certain Royal Marine Major's surname is frequently bastardised as "Nichols". (He gets a mention in the London Gazette where his name is mis-spelt as Mitchell.)

Michell later became a general. As you would expect from a general, he is better documented than his contemporaries who never progressed above field rank. The book "Wellington's Guns: The Untold Story of Wellington and His Artillery in the Peninsula and at Waterloo" published in 2013 by Osprey and authored by Nick Lipscombe is worth a read. Michell appears in the chapter about the War of 1812 in volume 2 of the definitive history of the Royal Artillery ("History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery") published in 1873 and authored by Francis Duncan.

His medals were for sale last year, and an impressive write up of the General's military career can be read here. I believe the source of much of this is from Duncan's aforementioned history: https://www.dnw.co.uk/auction-archive/past-catalogues/lot.php?auction_id=531&lot_uid=336797

Lindenfall, hope this is of interest. The biography indicates that he was not exactly a shrinking violet when it came to telling people that he was present at Washington during the War of 1812. Volume 2 of Francis Duncan's history records that after Major Munro, Major Michell was second in seniority of the officers of the Royal Artillery present at New Orleans. Keith H99 (talk) 09:13, 23 November 2021 (UTC)


 * Also present were five companies of riflemen. They were commanded by Major Samuel Mitchell. I am wondering if this is where there has been some confusion. They disembarked at Bayou Catalan on 22 December 1814, having departed Plymouth, Devon on 18 September 1814. Source: William Henry Cope's regimental history of the Rifle Brigade published in 1877. Keith H99 (talk) 11:08, 23 November 2021 (UTC)


 * Pages 192-4 of Cope's aforementioned work mention that Mitchell was taken prisoner during the battle, and released on 15 March 1815, so I would imagine this infantry officer features more in American sources.Keith H99 (talk) 11:20, 23 November 2021 (UTC)

@ Fascinating stuff. Thank you for your thoroughness. I may have to revisit Cope. I think you're correct about the confusion of Mitchells at the battle. Lindenfall (talk) 18:09, 23 November 2021 (UTC)


 * Michell was the most senior artillery officer until the arrival of Major Munro and the highly competent Colonel Alexander Dickson. Dickson's papers from the Peninisular Wars formed the basis of Duncan's definitive history of the Royal Artillery. The papers from this time, covering the years 1809 to 1813 were edited, published in 1905 and republished in 1987. Unfortunately, whilst there has been an edit of the papers for the time period 1814 to 1818 which was carried out in 1992, these papers remain unpublished, and are therefore not in the public domain. Keith H99 (talk) 12:14, 24 November 2021 (UTC)


 * From within the swathes of Dickson's papers from 1794 to 1840, there is a “Journal of Operations in Louisiana". This was published in The Louisiana Historical Quarterly XLIV, Nos. 3 and 4 (January-April 1961). Forrest's memoir was published in the same editions, and was subsequently printed as a book. The following document quotes extensively from it
 * https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/jela/lost_riverfront/Part_1.pdf  Keith H99 (talk) 16:49, 25 November 2021 (UTC)


 * Reilly's book spells his surname as Michell. It mentions that his diary, source 262 is in the possession of the Royal Artillery Institute, as are the papers of Dickson. The quote is on page 305 and not page 296 within Chapter XXII - The Eighth of January. Keith H99 (talk) 11:29, 8 December 2021 (UTC)


 * My comment on Dickson's journal is not quite right. It has never been published as a book. It was published in 1961 in The Louisiana Historical Quarterly with commentary by Carson I A Ritchie (born 1928). Tracking down a copy seems challenging. In contrast, Dickson's journal was published in 1928 in the Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, in three parts, with an introduction and annotations by John H Leslie, and can be accessed via JSTOR. Keith H99 (talk) 14:50, 17 March 2022 (UTC)


 * There is a partial reproduction of the December 1814 entries of Dickson's journals within "The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History, Vol. 4." as published by the Naval Historical Center of the US Navy. Keith H99 (talk) 12:21, 5 April 2024 (UTC)
 * Note to self: Dr Carson Irvine Alexander Ritchie, born Arbroath(?) 10 July 1928 passed away in Leicester in October 2000 Keith H99 (talk) 13:05, 5 April 2024 (UTC)

The alleged British plan to annex Louisiana in 1815
Thomas P Abernethy's 1961 publication is referred to as a discredited speculation about annexation. There have been similar stances by Ronald J. Drez (2015) and Kilmeade & Yaeger (2017). Do these publications merely regurgitate Abernethy, and perpetrate the speculation without any new supporting evidence?Keith H99 (talk) 15:02, 7 July 2023 (UTC)


 * No, Brian Kilmeade (with Don Yaeger) and Ronald Drez did not cite from Abernathy in their bibliography sources.


 * I read James Carr (unable to access pg.179) and he doesn't cover many of the points that historians Ronald Drez, Kilmeade & Yaeger, and (Professor) Walter McDougall have discussed. Daniel Walker Howe offers no direct evidence; it is speculative from him and (to be fair) it is for the "New Orleans school of thought" too as James Carr puts it . . .  And despite what Carr claimed, the British are not totally dismissing the offer from Caleb Strong, they were only dismissing the request for troops.  The British were keeping his offer as a back-up option and could show support with logistical means.  Now why even entertain the idea of logistical support in the United States if the British just wanted this war to “go away”?  The logistical support is still support and is a bit of a contradiction by Carr.


 * As for evidence:
 * Why didn’t Carr mention the British civil servants arriving with their families to accompany them (with the British army) to New Orleans? (per Walter McDougall on here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ooUrBTRxl0o )


 * Why didn’t Carr bring up “extraneous presentation” by in the formal discussions at Ghent?  The British didn’t need to “disavow” the Treaty of Ghent as the Louisiana Purchase was already questioned on a legal document.  Brought up in my last post on here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:War_of_1812/Archive_22#Casus_belli_and_territorial_changes


 * Why didn’t Carr mention the profound economic effect that losing New Orleans (and the Mississippi River) would have on states like Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio?


 * Why didn’t Carr bring up the misplacement of the Mississippi River on the British map? It’s path was rising into Canada on earlier maps (according to Goulburn), so when was this fixed?  I genuinely wonder if there further evidence that the British saw this territory as another potential barrier state (or risk to the Canadas) before the idea was totally dropped.


 * And in an earlier discussion (on a New Orleans public broadcasting panel) related to the Battles of New Orelans, here is a small transcript (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScFS1WAMR9E):
 * Jason Wise (curator for the Historic New Orleans Collection), “The intention had their army succeeded and actually captured the city was to just garrison it with black troops from the two West India regiments that accompanied the expedition and for the main army to move up river to some safer place because the British military establishment believed with good reason that New Orleans was not necessarily the healthiest place to quarter one’s troops. Their long experience in the West Indies with yellow fever gave them some pause about coming to New Orleans.”
 * Ms. Brady would later address this point towards the end of discussion.
 * Patricia Brady (historian): “It doesn’t matter where the big pile of soldiers are, they (the British) were still doing an encirclement, which would have – had they stayed there and made the treaties they would have with the Indians as they had elsewhere – would have disconnected the whole western Appalachia –”
 * Jason Wise made it clear that he disagreed with many of Ronald Drez’s points (and I noticed he seemed to side with Carr on many of them), but noted at the end of his discussion with the panel – responded back, “I have no trouble conceding Ron’s point that it would have been disastrous; it would certainly derailed that sort of American ascendancy that does begin. The outcome of the Battle of New Orleans really settles the question of who owns the Louisiana Purchase.”  Ironic Luck (talk) 20:57, 25 September 2023 (UTC)

The internet says that Jackson said the following. Had the internet existed in the 19th century, I am sure that it would have been prefixed with "By the Eternal," Where does this actually come from?


 * “If General Pakenham and his 10,000 matchless veterans could have annihilated my little army, he would have captured New Orleans and sentried all the contiguous territory, though technically the war was over. Great Britain would have immediately abrogated the Treaty of Ghent and would have ignored Jefferson’s transaction with Napoleon.”

Is this from a speech? Keith H99 (talk) 09:07, 6 April 2024 (UTC)


 * It has been published online by the following character:Thomas Fleming (political writer), but has not been attributed to a published source. The phrasing of this would seem to meet the writer's tub-thumping neo-Con POV, so would like to see whether this is fake history or a bona fide quote. Keith H99 (talk) 09:25, 6 April 2024 (UTC)


 * Formatting error, now corrected Keith H99 (talk) 09:27, 6 April 2024 (UTC)


 * Andrew Jackson: Leading the Battle of New Orleans by Thomas Fleming

''“As Jackson was leaving the White House at the end of his second term in 1837, a congressman asked him if there had been any point to the Battle of New Orleans. After all, it had been fought after the peace treaty was signed. The old warrior gave him one of his patented steely glares and said:”''  “If General Pakenham and his 10,000 matchless veterans could have annihilated my little army…he would have captured New Orleans and sentried all the contiguous territory, though technically the war was over….Great Britain would have immediately abrogated the Treaty of Ghent and would have ignored Jefferson’s transaction with Napoleon.” ” https://www.historynet.com/andrew-jackson-leading-the-battle-of-new-orleans/
 * Are you certain that you have found the correct Thomas Fleming?
 * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Fleming_(historian)
 * “He writes frequently for American Heritage, Military History, and MHQ, the Quarterly Journal of Military History, where he a contributing editor."” 
 * https://historynewsnetwork.org/article/thomas-fleming-chosen-as-new-president-of-the-soci
 * The article was published in the Winter 2001 edition of MHQ. Perhaps they were both writing for the MHQ, but I would think that there would be a middle initial to differentiate between the two of them? Fleming wrote that the comment was said to a congressmen towards the end of Jackson's second term in 1837.  No specific details on the congressman that asked him.   Who was the congressman?  What were the sources or references in the 2001 copy of MHQ magazine?  Ironic Luck (talk) 01:01, 19 April 2024 (UTC)
 * The quote appears to be a reworking of a quote that the fabricator Augustus Buell used in his biography of Jackson.
 * Link: https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=X0KIDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT66&lpg=PT66&dq=Andrew+Jackson+Pakenham+matchless+Thomas+Fleming&source=bl&ots=il8SMnyyy-&sig=ACfU3U3yk693RdRyKhDtVMvUdmBk0yRVaA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiwoMbLoK2FAxVbQUEAHWc4DH0Q6AF6BAg3EAM#v=onepage&q=Andrew%20Jackson%20Pakenham%20matchless%20Thomas%20Fleming&f=false
 * This publication, that he wrote two years after he died, would appear to be the only published source of this quote.Keith H99 (talk) 11:50, 20 April 2024 (UTC)

The following got added to the article as part of a diatribe POV based on 'The internet says..'


 * This is why the British invaded New Orleans in the middle of the Treaty of Ghent negotiations. If the British had won the Battle of New Orleans, they would have likely interpreted that all territories gained from the 1803 Louisiana Purchase would be void and not part of U.S. territory.

Is there a more reliable source than "someone random on the internet"? This is neither the first nor the last time that this opinion has been held since 1815. Do the likes of William Davis or Ronald Drez qualify as historians who are deemed as RS who hold this opinion? I do think the first sentence from the quote above is very clumsy and POV, with the result that this - Archie Bunker with a sledgehammer approach - takes credence away from the argument, and needs to be refined.

Should this be in the "Background" section, or does it warrant its own portion of the article? Keith H99 (talk) 15:35, 6 April 2024 (UTC)
 * The POV above is justified by the contributor using a website as a source, which contains the following woolly verbage
 * 'Many historians think that had the British won the Battle of New Orleans, they may have probably given the Louisiana Purchase back to the Spanish, Glenn] Williams pointed out. Spain had never recognized the U.S. acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase from France, he said. Napoleon wasn't supposed to sell it to the U.S. and Great Britain didn't recognize any treaty Napoleon had signed.'
 * This doesn't exactly tie back, and a better source is required. The same element was added to the Treaty of Ghent article on July 8, 2021 and removed.Keith H99 (talk) 23:12, 7 April 2024 (UTC)


 * What do British historians say? Presumably if such a plan existed it will be well attested to in British archives. Horse Eye&#39;s Back (talk) 15:55, 6 April 2024 (UTC)


 * I don't think the majority of British historians are aware of the existence of the War of 1812. The only contemporary British historian I can think of is Andrew Lambert, who would not be of the opinion that the British had a plan to annex the Louisiana Purchase territory. I would imagine the Canadian historian Donald Graves would share that opinion, too. It's an avenue that David Olusoga has not explored.Keith H99 (talk) 17:04, 6 April 2024 (UTC)


 * I've now got a copy of Drez's book. Apparently the perfidious Redcoats behavior at Ghent was copied by the Communists when negotiating an end to the Korean and Vietnam wars. It seems peculiar there are a dozen references to Korea in his book. From what I have seen so far, he's in the same league as the likes of Kilmeade, with whom he has joint promoted his similar book, and cannot be considered reliable. Some of what I have read displays superficial background research. He tells a good story, and I don't think facts get in the way. Presumably Davis is more plausible as a contemporary historian who can present the argument for the British looking to annex Louisiana, and is considered RS too? Keith H99 (talk) 19:16, 6 April 2024 (UTC)


 * Pg 224. 'Perhaps unique in the annals of military invasions, it carried a civilian staff and members of their families. several bureaucrats, who were to open civil offices in the captured city, were aboard. There was also embarked a collector for the port, who would obviously set up river control and tariff collections. and he was not by himself; his five daughters were aboard with him.(115)'


 * (115) The Niles Register 7 of February 25, 1815, shined the complete light on this part of the deception to take over New Orleans and Louisiana. Niles reported: “The Plantagenet 74 arrived at Havana.... it is notorious that they had also with them a comptroller, collector, printing presses and apparatus, and everything else that belonged to the permanent establishment they originally designed to have made at New Orleans.” Who knew that Velma Dinkley et al were on the editorial staff of this publication? Keith H99 (talk) 21:57, 6 April 2024 (UTC)


 * Pg 222. 'on November 3, the secret orders were opened as Pakenham’s instructions demanded, and much to the surprise of all assembled,citation needed their destination was Jamaica. No one was informed where they would proceed from Jamaica, but all weasel words assumed it would be Louisiana.108
 * 108. George wrottesley, The Life and Correspondence of Field Marshall Sir John Burgoyne, Bart (london: richard Bentley, 1873), vol. 1, p. 299.
 * Colonel Burgoyne's (1782-1871) letter to his sister, dated December 3, 1814. 'We pass the island of Barbadoes.... I take it for granted that we are going to seize upon Louisiana.' accessible here


 * Pg 191. 'Concocted revisionist histories, reporting that the British were weary of war and wanted peace, are shattered by this newsprint of the day. “There are points to be conceded by America before we can put an end to the contest,”
 * screamed the Courier. Those points of concession included these: that Americans relinquish fishing rights, granted to them in the 1783 treaty, allowing them to fish in Canadian waters; the recovery of Louisiana in the name of Spain; and the absolute right of Britain to impress.66'
 * 66. Quoted in Adams, History of the United States, 1801–1817, vol. 3, p. 6.
 * I cannot locate what Drez is on about in the book that he quotes https://archive.org/details/historyofuniteds03adamiala/page/6/mode/2up why?Keith H99 (talk) 21:37, 7 April 2024 (UTC)


 * You've cited the wrong volume. It's in History of the United States of America - Vol III: https://archive.org/details/historyofuniteds09adam/page/6/mode/1up
 * History of the United States of America - Vol III (pg.5)
 *  “The "Times" and "Morning Post" were independent newspapers, and spoke only for themselves ; but the "Courier" was supposed to draw inspiration from the Government, and commonly received the first knowledge of minsters' intentions.”
 * History of the United States of America - Vol III (pg.6 and pg.7)
 *  “Immediately after the capitulation of Paris, March 31, the Ministry turned its attention to the United States, and the "Courier" announced, April 15, that twenty thousand men were to go from the Garonne to America. Mr. Madison, the "Courier" added, had "made a pretty kettle fish of it."  Twenty thousand men were about two thirds of Wellington's English force, and their arrival in America would, as every Englishman believed, insure the success of the campaign.  Not until these troops were embarked would the Ministry begin to negotiate ; but in the middle of May the military measures were complete, and then the "Courier" began to prepare the public mind for terms of peace.”
 *  These terms were the same as announced by the "Times," except that the "Courier" did not object to treating with Madison.  The United States were to be interdicted the fisheries; Spain was to be supported in recovering Louisiana ; the right of impressment must be expressly conceded, - anything short of this would be unwise and a dissapointment.  "There are points which must be conceded by America before we can put an end to the contest."  Such language offered no apparent hope for peace; yet what ever hope existed lay in Castlereach, who inspired it.  Extravagant as the demands were, they fell short of the common expectation.  The "Courier" admitted the propriety of negotiation; it instead neither on Madison's retirement nor on a division of the Union, and it refrained from asserting the whole British demand, or making it an ultimatum.
 * The cheif pressure on the Minstry came from Canada, and could not be ignored. The Canadian government returned to its old complaint that Canadian interests had been ignorantly and wantonly sacrificed by the treaty of 1783, and that the opportunity to correct the wrong should not be lost.  The Canadian official "Gazette" insisted that the United States should be required to surrender the northern part of the State of New York, and that both banks of the St. Lawrence should be Canadian property.  A line from Plattsburg to Sackett's Harbor would satisfy this necessity; but to secure Canadian interests, the British government should further insist on acquiring the east bank of the Niagara River, and on a guaranty of the Indian Territory from Sandusky to Kaskaskias, with the withdrawal of American military posts in the Northwest.  A pamphlet was published in May to explain the subject for the use of the British negotiators, and the required territorial cessions were marked on a map.  The control of the Lakes, the Ohio River as the Indian boundary, and the restoration of Louisiana were the chief sacrifices wished from the United States.  The cession of a part of Maine was rather assumed than claimed, and the fisheries were to be treated as wholly English.” Ironic Luck (talk) 01:01, 19 April 2024 (UTC)


 * Pg 203-4. 'On October 8, in a seeming deviation from their negotiation talking points, the British minister brought up yet another subject. Having contended that land aggrandizement had always been America’s object of the war—vigorously denied by the Americans—they suddenly called into question the legality of the Louisiana Purchase, and that it had been done without the consent of the Spanish king, and that the Spanish foreign minister had actually protested against the cession. “can it be contended,” the British ministers asked, “that the annexation of Louisiana, under such circumstances, did not mark a spirit of territorial aggrandizement?”43'
 * 43. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. 3, p. 721.
 * 43. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. 3, p. 721.
 * omitted in error Keith H99 (talk) 22:51, 7 April 2024 (UTC)
 * repositioned Keith H99 (talk) 12:07, 22 April 2024 (UTC)


 * Pg 187, Drez's viewpoint
 * Such was the nature of [Lord] Liverpool’s deception and revision [in June 1814]. His real intention was to defeat the United States by following his version of Napoleon’s old plan to forever shackle the Americans, to eliminate them as rivals on the high seas, and to dictate land concessions after victory on the battlefield.
 * He had set the negotiation table at Ghent and gathered the Americans to it, where he could dictate its pace. But he delayed sitting at it himself until his army had initiated an offensive on the battlefield. He had embarked on a campaign of propaganda and political maneuvering to exploit all possibilities. Now he awaited a predictable, victorious outcome.


 * The following is of interest
 * Pg 235. 'frantic letters were exchanged between the government and the negotiators to avoid all mention of Louisiana, or boundaries. They were unwilling to discuss this lest it be interpreted as Britain’s recognition of any boundary. Henry Goulburn, one of the British negotiators at Ghent, perfectly described this dilemma.
 * “To accede to the proposition . . . of discussing the boundary of Louisiana, might be considered as a recognition by us of their right to occupy the country; and to accede to it with the reservation proposed as to the country beyond the stony [rocky] Mountains would be to abandon to their encroachment the northwestern coast of America.”35
 * Goulburn also included a very revealing note concerning his understanding of problems that might be couched in any discussions concerning the Louisiana boundary or the Mississippi river.
 * “if we go into discussion as to the boundary of Louisiana, it would be most desirable to have a map of Canada, as claimed by the French in 1760 . . . which must be somewhere in the office.”36 '
 * 35. Goulburn to Bathurst, November 10, 1814, in ibid., p. 427., 36. ibid., p. 433. Both viewable via this link


 * Whilst I do not think this is a reliable source, as background to the campaign in New Orleans, it does raise the question as to why the British did not send more troops in 1814, after the capture of Napoleon. The delay in reaching an agreed peace settlement is something I will look into further. Keith H99 (talk) 09:46, 7 April 2024 (UTC)


 * The map issue is a curious one. Henry Clay and the War of 1812 by Quentin Scott Key (on pg.311):
 * "As to the first of these last two demands, the British were asked if they did not mean to speak of a line from the Mississippi River to the Lake of the Woods, instead of Lake Superior. They said, "No."  They apparanetly had little concept of the geography of the region."  Ironic Luck (talk) 01:01, 19 April 2024 (UTC)


 * Pg 203-4 Legality of Louisiana Purchase: 'On October 8, in a seeming deviation from their negotiation talking points, the British minister brought up yet another subject. Having contended that land aggrandizement had always been America’s object of the war—vigorously denied by the Americans—they suddenly called into question the legality of the Louisiana Purchase, and that it had been done without the consent of the Spanish king, and that the Spanish foreign minister had actually protested against the cession. “can it be contended,” the British ministers asked, “that the annexation of Louisiana, under such circumstances, did not mark a spirit of territorial aggrandizement?”43'


 * "I don't think the majority of British historians are aware of the existence of the War of 1812." is that sarcasm, hyperbole, or a real point? Horse Eye&#39;s Back (talk) 14:48, 7 April 2024 (UTC)
 * That's an honest comment. If you can provide substantive evidence of there being a book published by a British historian for each time an American historian publishes a book on the War of 1812, then I will re-evaluate my viewpoint. That's why the likes of Andrew Lambert sticks out. The interest and awareness seems to be both world wars for British historians, and their outputs in terms of books published. Keith H99 (talk) 19:42, 7 April 2024 (UTC)

Davis states in his book 'no one in [the British] government seems to have advocated permanent possession'. So, his stance would be closer to that of Carr than Drez. I'll have to source a copy, after a favorable preview. Keith H99 (talk) 12:17, 7 April 2024 (UTC)


 * It has been commented elsewhere that the book by Drez is fringe--not a single historian or scholarly journal has accepted his speculations about British intentions It's a populist diatribe, and not history. (That is, unless North Korea is to be added to the list of combatants in 1812.) The publication by William C Davis, in contrast, is worth getting. I just need the time to be able to read it, a book praised by Hickey, Borneman and Groom. Keith H99 (talk) 15:34, 24 April 2024 (UTC)


 * Drez has done his research as evident by my prior responses with some of his source material that you've received, but his book is not accepted by Wikipedia standards (hence "fringe"). Aside from disagreeing with his view on British intentions, what facts did you see Ronald Drez get incorrect within the source material that he cited from?
 * As I have done further research (since 2020), I lean towards the Jason Wise opinion over Drez's opinion, but Carr's opinion (which is somehow treated as RS on Wikipedia) has overlooked many facts and failed to present the entire picture before reaching to his own abrupt conclusion.
 * How did Davis reach the conclusion of "'no one in [the British] government seems to have advocated permanent possession"? That is very specific set of individuals and specific outcome of events; there were multiple possibilities that the British wanted at their disposal.  It would only apply to the annexation of territory or (possibly) British sponsored barrier state.   Some examples:
 * 1) It doesn't rule out the idea that not returning the land (i.e. just giving it to Spain) as that is not in "their (British) possession" and can be left as an unofficial security measure:
 * a) if they had been correct with the population uprising (which they were not)
 * b) or if the colonial marines ended up taking control (look at Prospect Bluff)
 * 2) or financial demand (reparations) if successful in a harsh peace concession.
 * The British goal was past New Orleans and towards Delaware; their failed offensive intent tends to be overlooked when dealing with the war.  Aside from one of Drez's citation sources (History of the United States of America - Vol III) that brought up the publications related to the invasion force, I'll just cite from another author.
 * The Internal Enemy: Slavery and War in Virigina 1771-1832 by Alan Taylor:

(pg.327) - '' “Meanwhile, at Jamaica in the West Indies, Cochrane assembled the primary fleet, reinforced by troops from Europe, for an attack against New Orleans. Near the mouth of the Mississippi River, New Orleans controlled the trade of the great American heartland; the vast watershed between the Appalachian Mountains, on the east, and the Rocky Mountains, to the west. By capturing New Orleans, the British could deepen the economic chaos in the United States and either provoke western secession or dictate harsh peace terms to the American government. Cochrane predicted, "The capture of New Orleans will be the severest blow America can meet with." ''
 * The British had plenty of options once New Orleans was taken. This territory wouldn't have needed to be "annexed" by the British, but it was an option on the table.  Spain was also not in favor of dealing with the United States at this point:


 * The Maroons of Prospect Bluff and Their Quest for Freedom in the Atlantic World by Nathaniel Millett:

(pg.47) - '' “For centuries Spanish Florida had relied on blacks and Indians to defend itself against the aggressive enroachments of the British and the Anglo Americans. Now the Spanish were forced to rely on the British to defend them against the United States in an alliance that would have mystified earlier generations on both sides of the border." ''


 * . . .  And Spain was a far more hostile party with the United States (given the prior Patriot War) in that region; the British were also interested in keeping Spanish Florida away from the United States.  It wasn't as friendly between the Spanish and the British due to Nicolls actions (freeing the Spanish slaves for recruitment and lying about it afterwards), but the British were needed as support and both Spanish and British flags were even raised together during the war.  It is not a stretch to think this would have happened in New Orleans if everything was successful.


 * The Maroons of Prospect Bluff and Their Quest for Freedom in the Atlantic World by Nathaniel Millett:

(pg.88) - '' “In the same month that the war officially ended, Alexander Cochrane expressed an opinion shared by many British politicans and military leaders when he wrote that Britain must take active measures, "for relieving West Florida from the usurped authority of the American Government (being a colony belonging to Spain) and at the same time to afford to the Indian Nations an opportunity of recovering territories of which they have been so unjustly deprived by the United States." The British feared an American Florida and wanted their Red Stick allies to recover the lands taken from them by the Treaty of Fort Jackson. These two goals were intertwined with the realization that a strong and well-armed Red Stick and Seminole presence in the Southeast represented the most realistic hope for Spain to maintain possession of the Floridas. With this in mind, the British encouraged the Red Sticks to endorse the Treaty of Ghent because of the inclusion of Article 9, calling for the restoration of Indian lands to their 1811 boundaries. Accordingly, Cochrane instructed Nicolls to "tell our Indian Allies that they have been included [in the treaty] and that they are placed as to territory as they were in 1811[.] If the peace shall not be ratified, you will have a large reinforcement sent to you at Apalachicola." ''


 * And we all know how Article IX (and later Spanish Florida) turned out. Ironic Luck (talk) 15:39, 25 April 2024 (UTC)

The time of day of specific events on January 8
There are contradictory times from different sources as to when certain events took place. Sunrise would be 0657hrs, and sunset would be 1717hrs.

For instance, Duncan states ' Sir Edward Pakenham quitted his quarters at 5 A.M. on the 8th.... as it was so nearly daylight, he hesitated as to the wisdom of letting them go, as there would not be time for them to get possession of the works on the other side, and to bring up artillery to enfilade the enemy’s line in support of the general attack, which was to take place at daylight.

Thornton's men are observed by Foelcker's men disembarking on the Right Bank at 5am??? Parton has them disembarking at 4am ???

Is there a secondary source out there that has a timeline for the specific events of that day, that can be used to update this article? Keith H99 (talk) 10:12, 9 April 2024 (UTC)


 * I am leaning somewhere towards 5:00 A.M. based on the secondary sources.


 * The Battle of New Orleans: "But for a Piece of Wood" by Ron Chapman:
 * pg.234 - At about 5:00 A.M., Col. Thorton and only 460 soldiers and sailors with a sprinkling of marines (confusion over size of his force, some accounts say 600 men.) using muffled oars disembarked in their few boats to cross the river. They almost immediately disappeared in the thick fog.  At this point, a much more serious problem arose.
 * No one had bothered to calculate the current of the Mississippi River, which ran at about 5 knots. By simply tossing a piece of driftwood into the stream, the strength of the current could have been measured and calculated.  They could then have compensated for the time needed for Thorton to cross the river.  But, no one performed that minor task.  Failure to do this upset the timing of the coordinated plan.  The coming disaster might have been avoided, but for a piece of wood.
 * Despite their determined efforts to paddle swiftly across the river, the current swept Thorton's troops downstream. One can only imagine the anger and frustration felt by Colonel Thorton.  He was an aggressive campaigner and one anxious for success.  Finding himself the victim of persistent incompetency and hesitation had to have nearly driven him to the breaking point.  Once again, he was placed in a nearly impossible situation as a result of the actions of others.
 * After an exhausting and too long cross, Thorton and his much reduced force finally touched the Westbank below the Andry Plantation . . . after dawn ."


 * 1812: The Navy's War by George Daughan:
 * pg.389 - "ON THE MORNING of January 8 Pakenham arose at five o'clock to find that Thorton had failed to make it across the river in time to coordinate with him.  He was not surprised.  He had always been skeptical about Thorton's ability to get his men across the river in a timely fashion.  Pakenham was prepared to go on without him."
 * At six o'clock a heavy mist covered the battle as Dickson got his twenty heavy guns ready. He was to commence firing only when he heard musketry fire.  Major General Sir Samuel Gibbs led the main thrust with 2,300 regulars against Jackson's center left.  Gibb's column stepped forward, two hundred yards to the left of the cypress swamp.  When they were five hundred years from Rodriguez Canal, the fog suddenly lifted, and Jackson's men got a good view of what was coming at them."


 * Henry Clay and the War of 1812 by Quentin Scott Key:
 * pg.411 - "As Thorton's units crossed the river, they had not anticipated the river's fast flow and they landed nearly a mile below their planned debarkation point. As they began their firing, on the far side of the river, Pakenham ordered a rocket to be fired signaling the advance of the main body against Jackson's prepared positions.  Not only was it now broad daylight, the heavy fog had dissipated revealing the bright red coats of the British troops marching in orderly columns to - disaster." (pg.412) - "It was only 8:30 in the morning when the American infantry ceased fire, having lost an enemy that was now stumbling backward over their own dead and dying. The artillery continued to follow the decimated British until two in the afternoon ."  Ironic Luck (talk) 01:01, 19 April 2024 (UTC)


 * It's very peculiar that they are talking about sunrise around 5am, and yet in this day and age, sunrise would be at around 7am. If the attack on the left bank was over in 30 minutes, it was a very early start and finish to the day. Keith H99 (talk) 11:57, 20 April 2024 (UTC)


 * There are some specific references to times of the day in the William C Davis book, I am pleased to report.Keith H99 (talk) 12:04, 22 April 2024 (UTC)

The only major American victory?
Some POV diatribe was added a while ago, unsourced. and I thought it advisable to challenge what has been put forward. It seems to be very juvenile


 * Before New Orleans the war was overall a bloody stalemate with not a single overwhelming land battle victory for the Americans against an elite British Army unit (Lake Erie, Plattsburgh, and Baltimore were won primarily due to naval ships and forts near lakes or the ocean). New England as a whole was against the war.

1. This was not the Eastern Front in 1942. Where is the evidence that it was a 'bloody' stalemate?

2. Given the defeat of the "Darth Vader tea-drinking panzergrenadier division" that had just been covered in laurels at its engagement at Hoth, only to be pulverised at Chalmette by Old Hickory and the A-Team, what credentials does this have as an elite British Army unit?

3. Other than Andrew Jackson fanboys, are there reliable sources that do not consider the outcomes of these three battles as significant? I thought there were direct implications in the negotiations at Ghent in 1814 as a result? This was clearly not the case for the outcome of the Battle of New Orleans, although there is of course the separate debate as to whether Britain would have seized the territory. Keith H99 (talk) 18:25, 22 April 2024 (UTC)

It has been claimed that Britain intended to keep New Orleans?
This is stated in the article, without a source. I've never read this before, and it would seem to contradict the British general orders were that they were prosecuting warfare not for conquest, but to drive the US forces away from Canada. As it seems to be an unsourced claim, with a request for a source not provided, I would recommend it just be taken out to keep this article properly referenced. It would seem spurious, and multiple sources contradicting it are in the article. Deathlibrarian (talk) 07:19, 12 June 2024 (UTC)


 * Can you specify what the sources are exactly contradicting? I'm currently reading William C. Davis and he is very thorough.  He noted (pg.333), "Colonel Thorton and Captain Roberts told Consul Gray a month after the battle that Britain would ransom New Orleans back to Madison for millions of dollars or hold it indefinitely to discourage future adventuring in Canada."  It's quite similar to Madison's view on the Canadas, which currently has a whole section on annexation on the front page of the War of 1812, Davis continues with Lord Bathurst on New Orleans (pg.333), "holding such a place "may entitle us to exact its cession as the price of peace."  Bathurst envisioned the possibility of keeping all or part of Louisiana indefinitely.


 * Davis does make it clear that Lord Liverpool's stance was never made clear, but (pg.334), "Whitehall repeatedly emphasized that the United States had no lawful title to Louisiana. It explicitly told Cochrane and Pakenham they could encourage Louisianans to seek independence from the United States or a return to Spanish dominion so long as they did not promise British assistance or alliance.  Pakenham was actually told that New Orleans would probably be handed over to Spain, and Spaniards shared that expectation."  The issue isn't that Britain was going to annex New Orleans (that was only one option on the table); the issue is that New Orleans would not be returned to the United States.  That is effectively just as bad for the United States.  Professor Alan Taylor has noted in his book that the British could have set forth west secession.
 * I'm almost finished reading Davis's book as he noted the issue (on New Orleans returning to Spain) is "forever unanswerable" and that (pg.336), "it rested on the motives, foibles, and ambitions of men on the scene whose actions could render impotent the most honorable intentions in faraway capitals." Davis's conclusion is that the victory at New Orleans ensured the following peace between the two nations.  As for conquest, have you read the exchange above?  Henry Adams has noted some of the "harsh peace terms" that threatened territorial losses in his volumes. Ironic Luck (talk) 14:38, 12 June 2024 (UTC)


 * In December 2021 the claim was inserted as a keyboard warrior comment, in my humble opinion. I did ask the contributor to provide source based material in support of the text he added, but he has yet to do so.
 * Talk:Battle_of_New_Orleans/Archive_1
 * Anything added without source-based evidence is liable to be removed, as it should be. Keith H99 (talk) 15:59, 17 June 2024 (UTC)
 * Should it be changed to "there was great concern by the Americans that Britain would hold onto the territory indefinitely, but it is left unanswerable due to the outcome of New Orleans"? Ironic Luck (talk) 08:11, 4 July 2024 (UTC)
 * The problem, as I see it, is that a cowardly addition was made to the article, with no sources to back up their comment. If you feel there is merit in tweaking the comment, and adding reliable secondary source/s to back this, so it is not POV, then fine. The comment as it currently stands should have been deleted when it became clear that the keyboard warrior was posting POV, and had no intention of returning so as to cite their sources. Keith H99 (talk) 22:34, 4 July 2024 (UTC)