Talk:Battle off Samar

Note regarding Class B
I haven't read the entire article, but while it cites references at the end of the article, there are no in-article citations, which is important to move up the assessment ladder. I need to see citations before I make any reccommendations for Class A.--Daysleeper47 20:20, 8 February 2007 (UTC)
 * Here is my position. You have a ton of references, but no inline citations. Inline citation has information on how to cite inline, which, if you look at FA-class articles, is the norm for citations for articles of high quality. --Daysleeper47 16:09, 22 August 2007 (UTC)\
 * Actually, the Military History Project just changed the requirements for B-Class under Criteria I. As a result, I'm going to have to demote this one to "Start" class.  I hate to, but no inline citations results in a failure under that criteria.Cam (Chat) 04:31, 4 April 2008 (UTC)
 * Agreed. Inline citations are critical here and this article will go nowhere without them. --Daysleeper47 (talk) 12:20, 4 April 2008 (UTC)

Time Standards
Time in the U.S. Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard is not reported or recorded with any colons. This is probably true for the Army as well. For an example, see HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II by Samuel Eliot Morison. For a specific example, 0826 is written exactly like this, w/o any colons. The times are given on a 24-hour clock - for example, 1654. In reading aloud, the time is read "1654 hours", for example. It is hard to believe that such things are not obvious, considering how many thousands of times that they have been written in naval and military history books of WW II and the Korean War. Just because other presentations might do it differently is no excuse, because this is an article about an American naval battle of WW II, which is considered to be modern times. If you don't want to write times, dates, altitudes, and depths in the official Navy and Air Force ways, that brands you immediately as a rank amateur who cannot even emulate the genius of Samuel Eliot Morison -- who in civilian life was a professor of history at Harvard University, but he also retired as a rear admiral in the U.S. Naval Reserve.98.67.168.208 (talk) 23:45, 21 June 2012 (UTC)

POV
Not so much because of any major disputable facts but because of a multitude of unobjective adjectives and phrases that are completely unworthy of an encyclopaedia.--Cancun771 20:11, 24 April 2007 (UTC)


 * Well, that is pretty vague for a POV tag. A POV tag helps others to fix the problem but when there are no specific issues, then how can others do anything about it?  Instead, why not just remove those adjectives that you object to rather than tag it?--Blue Tie 09:27, 1 May 2007 (UTC)
 * As you can see, I started today. A comparison should make clear what kind of language I am getting at. It's a long article however and I do have to earn a living.
 * Basically, I do think it is very clear for those who want to see it what makes this text biased.
 * Apart from that I noticed that plenty of the events are accounted for two or more times. The whole text could possibly do with some restructuring and overall pruning.--Cancun771 18:05, 1 May 2007 (UTC)
 * I have looked at the first half of your edits and generally I think they are good. Some I do not really think are an improvement but these are a minority.  On the other hand though, I do not really see you changing the POV.  Instead, what I see you doing in changing somewhat more dramatic language for more dispassionate and detached language.  That is more a style choice than an issue with POV. --Blue Tie 03:49, 2 May 2007 (UTC)
 * So let me make it plain: This article had been written completely from the US of A's point of view, glorifying their military victory. I hardly think Wikipedia is the place for that but rather for depicting the facts.
 * It is going to read more boring once I'm finished, I'm the first one to admit that. Then again, people don't come here to read a gripping yarn. There are other places for that.--Cancun771 14:15, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

Sensationalism is a form of POV that should be removed as per WP:NPOV. I support Cancun771's edits, though we should be careful to preserve any useful information. Incidentally, this propagandist writing style has crept up in several articles related to the Pacific War. However, it is generally accompanied by seemingly credible information(I spot checked some figures and description of events against the DANFS), so it may be best to just weed out the POV and try to retain a neutral narrative despite the extra effort. -- Vyn 11:36, 11 May 2007 (UTC)
 * Just noticed that some information was moved instead of removed. Will make adjustments to that then. -- Vyn 11:40, 11 May 2007 (UTC)
 * Again, just because it reads more interestingly does not make it have a non-neutral POV. I do not believe it should be written from one country's point of view and sometimes the article was written from that view. But just because the writing is vivid, that does not make it pov. And no, WP:NPOV does not support "sensationalism" but I do not recall seeing it condemned either.  I tend to be a stickler for NPOV.  But it is possible to make an article worse by being to slavish to a policy so that you strip the language of brightness.  THAT is not what WP:NPOV is about.--Blue Tie 04:22, 12 May 2007 (UTC)
 * My opinion is that stripping sensationalism from this article can only improve its quality. I do not believe it is worth sacrificing NPOV just to make an article read more interestingly. We are of course, both working with inherently subjective standards when trying to evaluate sensationalism. If you feel strongly about this issue, why not insert some edits so we can get a better feel about your preferences and go from there? (WP:NPOV's position on sensationalism seems quite clear to me by the way, seeing as how it is clearly noted under section 1.2 as a form of bias) -- Vyn 08:52, 12 May 2007 (UTC)

(Unindent)Well, as I said before, I am mostly ok with your edits. But once in a while I feel like in the interest of "dispassion" you remove a word or phrase that is correct but brighter for a word that is also correct but less interesting. Individual instances seem a bit petty. I may come and take a look and make an edit or two and we can see if we are really far off. --Blue Tie 14:48, 12 May 2007 (UTC)
 * I think that I understand NPOV. One of the underlying study-values of the historical incident in question, though, pertains to the extent that a critical mass and combination of individual bravery and inspirational command leadership can daunt rational, normally skilled and disciplined opponents and result in objectively inexplicable military-conflict outcomes. I'm not sure how one can explore this interesting aspect of the history of military conflicts, and more generally human psychology, without describing the most notable and relevant instances of bravery and inspirational behavior. It would be a fundamental error to categorize descriptions of bravery and inspirational behavior in a conflict context as inherently sensationalist...though of course language and bias limits are appropriate.
 * One also has the conceptual problem that in almost all military conflicts, the prevailing side records the history, and the opposing side has both fewer witness-survivors as sources, and a lesser motivation to focus on the details of the most notable defeats. It's easy to agree that the present article contains unbalanced extents of American-viewpoint and Japanese-viewpoint description, but given the broad dismay and even shame at the outcome of the battle within IJN, in the context of Japanese social and military-cultural norms of the time, it's understandable that little comparable Japanese-viewpoint history exists. There were assassination threats against the Japanese task force commander Takeo Kurita following his return to Japan, and one can reasonably surmise that historians were not eager to expose themselves to the same threats by recording the history in question.
 * Military history always is most densely concentrated around victories and inspiring behavior, and it appears from the body of existing history that this battle represents an extreme case of disproportion in regard to that historical-concentration consideration. That fact may preclude creation of an article exhibiting the sort of content-balance that seems to be called for above. In that case, would substantive description of the American actions during this event be impermissible? JWilly48519 04:01, 17 May 2007 (UTC)
 * Note BTW that there are apparent factual errors, at least in relation to the usually accepted history, in the brief and less "sensational" description of the Samar action in the article on Takeo Kurita. Whatever the language and bias failings of the pre-edits article here, at least it appears to be factually consistent with the usually accepted history. JWilly48519 04:24, 17 May 2007 (UTC)

"The Yamato alone displaced as much as all units of Taffy 3 combined." This line, quoted from the article, says it all. Was this event not fantastic? Was it not the proverbial David versus Goliath at sea? It was what it was. It was an astounding event and rhetoric any less-so would simply be remiss and fall far from the mark. I'm left trying to decide whether objections as stated above are simply petty jealousies or a concerted effort towards revisionism. The jury is still out. Xl five lx 17:07, 4 August 2007 (UTC)
 * The battle was actually fairly even. 300+ aircraft (U.S.) versus large surface ships (Japanese) who didn't have reliable air support, only their guns.  One U.S. carrier was sunk by gunfire, one by kamikaze, and several destroyers/destroyer escorts by gunfire.  The Japanese lost three? heavy cruisers to air attack when they didn't have any cruisers under construction to replace them.  So who do you think won the battle?  To say that the U.S. won the battle isn't POV, it's the truth.  The Japanese had a (at least) tactical opportunity and failed to capitalize.  The fact that their battleships and cruisers scored so few hits is apparently due to their laid up status at Truk and Brunei for so much time, in some cases years.  They couldn't hit the broadside of a barn.  The Japanese should have killed the "Taffeys" and destroyed the invasion forces.  The fact that they didn't means that they the had lost the strategic opportunity to decide the course of the war in the Pacific.  The Battle off Samar was at least a tactical draw, and a strategic U.S. victory.  It finished the Japanese combined fleet once and for all as an effective fighting force.  If anyone disagrees with me I expect to see some very credible sources, either in English, Japanese, or in any other langauge. Cla68 17:56, 4 August 2007 (UTC)
 * In some sense, I think you are both right. By the traditional naval thinking of the time, this battle should have been a blow-out.  The Japanese way overpowered the Americans.  But WWII was a lesson in the importance of naval air power.  The Americans had the kind of power that counted -- air power.  Luck was certainly with the Americans that day.  As with Pearl Harbor, fate forced the US to do what it should have planned to do anyway:  Rely heavily on naval air power.  --Westwind273 (talk) 10:02, 1 August 2008 (UTC)


 * "The fact that their battleships and cruisers scored so few hits is apparently due to their laid up status at Truk and Brunei for so much time, in some cases years."

- Truk hadn't been in use for major fleet units since the Battle of the Philippine Sea, which rendered it untenable. If you read Admiral Ugaki's diary, you would see just how frequently and intensely the IJN fleet units were exercizing between the summer through the Battle off Samar in preparation for what they called 'the decisive battle'. During this period, their fleet exercizes and at sea training could be deemed nothing short of adequate.


 * "They couldn't hit the broadside of a barn."

- Would it shock you to learn that Gambier Bay, the single ship 'hit' most often, did not sink as a result of any of those numerous hits? According to the Bureau of Ships, Design Division, Preliminary Design Section, War Damage Assessment Team, headed by Capt. Les Kniskern no single hit on Gambier Bay was fatal. Nor was her loss the result of the cumulative effect of any two or more hits - of which, mind you, she had taken scores. What dealt her fatal blows were two near misses. One opened a gaping hole in one of her engine rooms, the other in the machinary space that separated the two engine rooms. These two breaches in her hull alone had the area enough to overwhelm the pumping capacity aboard ship. In fact, the one fatal near miss didn't even open up a hole, per se, but merely a split in her shell strake that ran from the turn of her bilge up to the hangar deck.

Perhaps an irrational interpretation might employ this knowledge to support just how poorly IJN shooting was that morning. But bouyancy isn't determined by hits or misses, accuracy nor inaccuracy - you either have it - or you sink like a stone. Period.

- Or, let's examine the fate of CVE-68 Kalinin Bay. A dozen (12) documented, later verified by damage assessment, direct HITS by medium caliber shells. These were a combination of both 6" and 8" shells obviously fired from light and heavy cruisers, respectively. Much like Gambier Bay, none of these hits were enough to sink her. But she was indeed nearly lost. Ok, you've by now guessed. Two large caliber, 14" or greater, shells exploded close aboard under her counter. Close aboard. That means near misses, again. It wasn't any of the twelve HITS that got her in trouble and left her lagging behind the other four retreating carriers, it was the two near misses. Only an hour an one-half later, after Sprague had reduced the formation's speed was Kalinin Bay able to catch and rejoin. Had the engagement lasted perhaps just minutes longer, before Kurita got the eebees and turned away, Kalinin Bay would certainly be on the bottom as well as Gambier Bay.


 * "The Japanese should have killed the "Taffeys" and destroyed the invasion forces."

- Clearly, they would have "killed the Taffys" had Kurita chosen to finish the job. There is no doubt in my mind. As for the invasion forces as well? That, in my opinion, is highly speculative - much moreso than the Taffys. Xl five lx 22:58, 4 August 2007 (UTC)
 * You make some good points and that should teach me not to comment on military controversies after a few draughts of junmai ginjo. Anyway, Yamato fired more than 100 18-inch shells and apparently didn't score a single hit on anything.  Perhaps if she had actually had some main battery gunfire practice in the preceeding two years her crew could have done better.  Similar situation with the other Japanese battleships involved.  I don't think that it's coincidence that most, if not all, of the hits on Gambier and Kalinin came from cruiser gunfire.  The Japanese cruisers, in contrast to the battleships, had seen much more action during the war and their experience showed in this battle.  Therefore, the loss of three of them in this battle is significant. Cla68 06:30, 5 August 2007 (UTC)

IJN BB Kongo did exemplary shooting all that morning. Hits on CVEs Gambier Bay, Kalinin Bay, Fanshaw Bay, DEs Dennis, Samuel B. Roberts, DDs Johnston and Hoel, (which she practically destroyed single-handedly) all were attributed to Kongo.

As for Yamato, I have never learned anything to the contrary of what you claim. Spending all that time combing DD Heerman's torpedoes pretty much took her out of the battle, along with Nagato. Naturally, therefore, it would follow that their shooting (from extremely long ranges) would have a very low percentage of hits.

The one IJN BB I think should be singled out to illustrate your point would be BB Haruna. Haruna was inboard of Kongo, so how in the world did Kongo manage to hit everything that moved while shooting over Haruna whereas the latter apparently hit nothing all day despite being at closer range to the targets?

Point being: At least Yamato and Nagato have plausible excuses. They were under direct torpedo attack and effected radical evasive maneuvers to avoid being hit. OK. I can buy that. But was anyone aboard Haruna even in the Navy? Xl five lx 02:15, 6 August 2007 (UTC)

There is ONE thing I strongly object to regarding this article. But first, I'd like to say that this piece is extremely well done - extremely. It has obviously been researched to an extent above the caliber normally found here on wiki. A sad commentary, I know, but factual.

The one thing that concerns me is the inclusion of pure conjecture. Every Secondary source ever written cites Seki as having been the pilot to hit and sink the St. Lo. I realize this. But every Primary source says no, he didn't. In fact it is still an argument being waged to this day. The Japanese sent observer planes along with the Kamikazes. This was true on this particular flight. In fact, one observer was dedicated to documenting the results of Seki's attack specifically that day. This observer reported Seki glanced off a carrier and his bomb did not explode. His report then added that subsequent to Seki's attack a second plane struck the same carrier.

The observer was no less than Hiroyoshi Nishizawa, Japan's leading fighter ace.

The CO of St. Lo, Captain McKenna, reported a single plane did the damage to his ship. Also, McKenna reported the plane was carrying a bomb under each wing. Seki carried a single 250kg bomb. With very clear evidence of contradiction such as these, how is it possible to conclude with any modicum of certainty that Seki did indeed sink St. Lo, as this article states? In fact, there is more primary source evidence to show that Seki did not dive on St. Lo at all, but rather another of the CVEs attacked at that same time - Kitkun Bay, or Kalinin Bay, being the most likely. Xl five lx 16:44, 6 August 2007 (UTC)

2008
I am completely FOR TRUTH and accurate details. However, if you let the Japanese poiont of view run this, it will be a case of US aggression against the poor, poor Japanese. Don't you people know that they are completely rewriting their history books with less than truth. They blackmailed Clint Eastwood into doing Letters From Iwo Jimo so he could do Flags of Our Fathers. I think the Japanese are less than truthful about their past and even current events prove this. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.250.12.42 (talk) 09:41, 23 March 2008 (UTC)


 * Folks I can't understand why there is still a NPOV tag and now the article doesn't seem to mention St. Lo being sunk in the narrative. I'm going to take off the tag and say St. Lo was sunk after a plane with a single bomb crashed into the flight deck during the 10:47 kamikaze attack. Anynobody 06:38, 7 June 2008 (UTC)
 * I always presumed the Japanese point of view on the Battle off Samar was that Kurita should have committed seppuku for losing such a ridiculous mismatch. Jsc1973 (talk) 16:24, 23 November 2010 (UTC)

The reason is simple, anything done by US Forces was wrong or overrated. This is quite likely the single most glorious moment in the history of the US Navy, and that Navy has had a lot of glorious moments. Live with it revisionists, every Navy in the world wishes this had been them. When the Japanese withdrew, the crews of their destroyers came out on their decks to salute the sinking US destroyers. They knew bravery when they saw it. So how about you Euros, who wish you had sailors like this, lay off the constant anti-US b.s? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.245.126.107 (talk) 17:36, 31 May 2011 (UTC)

Mistake
In the Battle section, a bit of info doesn't fit with the Leyte Gulf article. Halsey had not left with 4 carrier groups. He left with 3. The fourth was away on resupply and was not in the area during most of the battle.ParallelPain (talk) 08:32, 10 December 2007 (UTC)

Inconsistency
The article first claims that St. Lo is credited with "the only hit in naval history known to have been made on an enemy surface vessel by gunfire from a carrier", then soon after states that not only that she score two more hits, but that Kalinin Bay hit a heavy cruiser, not once but twice, and a destroyer as well. Which is correct? Clarityfiend (talk) 17:50, 6 April 2008 (UTC)

First? rather than only? --Naaman Brown (talk) 12:56, 10 September 2014 (UTC)

Halsey's move north.
In the article it states "He left behind only a light screen of destroyers and destroyer escorts to protect three escort carrier groups of the 7th Fleet." This is misleading. The screen was part of 7th fleet, not 3rd fleet. They were left behind, but Halsey didn't leave them, they were not part of his fleet. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jfdavis668 (talk • contribs) 17:00, 29 June 2009 (UTC)

I agree. In fact I noticed the same problem and came here to the talk page to address it. When I saw that you brought up the same point nine years ago I decided to fix it myself. Please check the edit that I made a few minutes ago. Tupelo the typo fixer (talk) 22:35, 17 July 2018 (UTC)

Japanese destroyer sunk?
When and where did this happen? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 124.171.83.198 (talk) 14:52, 7 November 2010 (UTC)

Apparently not in the Battle off Samar island. In the overall Battle(s) of Leyte Gulf, IJN destroyers were sunk, but in the Battle off Samar, one destroyer received serious damage but all IJN destroyers that entered the Battle survived. IJN destroyer Akizuki was sunk on the Battle of/off Cape Egano which is seperate but related battle with losses (carriers Zuikaku, Chitose and Zuihō) not counted in the Battle off Samar either. (I spendt a few days building a timeline or two to straighten out these confusing battles in my mind.) -- Naaman Brown (talk) 12:58, 2 August 2014 (UTC) Follow up: Part of the problem is the timing of the battle in some histories, which consider Kurita's disengagement and withdrawal the end of the action, and do not count the Kamikaze attacks (including the sinking of St Lo) later that same day, or the sinking of IJN DD Nowaki the next day by DD USS Owen of TF34. --Naaman Brown (talk) 12:25, 10 September 2014 (UTC)

Afaik, multiple ships sustained heavy damage such as having essentially all deck mounted equipment and weaponry destroyed by the smaller american ships that were unable to actually penetrate the larger japanese ships armor with their guns, however I believe you are correct regarding the Japanese destroyer. The bow was blown off by a torpedo hit and two other japanese ships were taken out of the battle because they had to assist the damaged destroyer and tow her out of the battle. (mm-- history channel officianado)

Incorrect references to www.bosamar.com
Several references (17 total) from my website www.bosamar.com Action Reports and other documents added on 10 June 2012 are incorrectly listed as 'bosmar.com' (the letter 'a' being dropped) read = BOSAMAR. I request the Originator (174.64.7.122) or someone other than myself fix all incorrect references. Thank you. Bosamar (talk) 15:38, 10 June 2012 (UTC)

Upon closer review, many of the newly added references mentioned above are linked to the incorrect page on www.bosamar.com. Bosamar (talk) 17:14, 10 June 2012 (UTC)

There are now 22 instances of incorrectly listing references to 'bosmar.com' (the letter 'a' being dropped). It's BOSAMAR not BOSMAR. Read = BOSAMAR. Bosamar (talk) 05:00, 12 June 2012 (UTC)

I fixed all instances of 'bosmar' vice 'bosamar'. However, several of these newly added reference links are linked to the incorrect page on bosamar.com.Bosamar (talk) 05:32, 12 June 2012 (UTC)

PLEASE NOTE: As owner of www.bosamar.com I do not allow direct links to .pdf files (Action Reports) on my website, several of which are referenced in this article. I do however allow links to pages on my website that contain those links. To view Action Reports on www.bosamar.com you must login/register with www.bosamar.com. As an added security measure I have disabled direct links to all .pdf files on my website. There is however an abundance of material on my website that is not restricted, many of which are referenced in this article without restriction. If you desire to reference a .pdf file (Action Report) on my website please link it to its associated page file. In keeping with that policy I have repaired all the links to references that point to a .pdf file (Action Report) on my website. On a side note I have no intention of 'taking over' this article. I am only concerned with links to my website. I usually only edit content that I consider to be in error. Thank you. Bosamar (talk) 20:06, 20 June 2012 (UTC)

Opening Paragraph Could Be Better
I think the opening paragraph of this otherwise fine article could possibly be written better. It is the second sentence that I cite:

"As the only major action in the larger battle where the Americans were largely unprepared against the opposing forces, it has been cited by historians as one of the greatest military mismatches in naval history." (current as of 11/11/2012)

Despite already knowing how this Naval History story ends, I found this sentence to be confusingly written. I could write it more clearly myself (just moving a few words around) but I thought I'd present the idea here first.

BTW, I am a Navy veteran who went against the SOVIETS (heard from them lately?), and am currently enjoying sitting in the shade of trees. And today is 11/11/12.

-Mole In The Hole

JamesMadison (talk) 02:30, 12 November 2012 (UTC)

far superior force
I think this sentence needs just a little clarification:

Due to the ferocity of the defense, Kurita was convinced that he was facing a far superior force and withdrew from the battle, ending the threat to the troop transports and supply ships.

There isn't anything here that I disagree with, but I think some might get a wrong idea from it. I would say that Kurita thought he was facing a force far superior to the one he was actually facing, so if that is the meaning then I agree, but think it needs clarification. I highly doubt that Kurita thought he was facing a force far superior to his own. Tupelo the typo fixer (talk) 19:55, 10 January 2013 (UTC)

The Japanese action reports describes the Taffy III escort carriers as Essex class fleet carriers, the destroyers as Baltimore class heavy cruisers and the destroyer escorts as destroyers. So "Kurita thought he was facing a force far superior to the one he was actually facing" is correct. Especially after IJN BBs Kongo and Haruna reported the similar sized Taffy II south of Taffy III. -- Naaman Brown (talk) 13:06, 2 August 2014 (UTC)

Japanese Lost More Planes Than They Had?
In the infobox, Japanese Strength lists 30 Aircraft, but 52 aircraft under losses. I suspect that there is an apples vs. Oranges issue here, strengths may be only listing kamikaze aircraft and losses are all categories. Would be nice to have some consistancy.

Which destroyer launched the torpedoes that forced Yamato away?
The sections for Hoel and Heermann both say that the ship in question launched the torpedoes that Yamato turned away to avoid, heading out of the battle for several minutes before the torpedoes ran out of fuel. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.228.53.38 (talk) 04:51, 24 April 2016 (UTC)

Quote incorrectly attributed
The quote attributed to CDR Robert W. Copeland was made by CDR Evans of USS Johnston. This (BTW) is noted in the wiki article on Robert Copeland. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 107.77.214.229 (talk) 03:21, 15 October 2016 (UTC)

Battle Summary: how many ships?
The Battle Summary begins "A force of 33 Japanese warships (four battleships, eight cruisers, and eleven destroyers)" Math: 4 + 8 + 11 = 23. Which is correct, 33 warships or 23? Leperflesh (talk) 22:23, 7 March 2017 (UTC)

Several sections have very few or even no citations
Most of the information seems generally correct but a few things seem questionable or misleading, and I have no way of verifying for lack of citations. I will check some sources when I have the time and rephrase/remove if necessary. Boris0192 (talk) 03:19, 7 September 2017 (UTC)

Reason Kurita withdrew from the battle
Ive often heard it stated that Kurita withdrew from the battle mistakenly believing that he was facing the main US fleet. However in this article there is no reference to that. (Although it is in fact what history books commonly say) What I am curious about is whether there is a reference that cites Kurita directly as to his motives for withdrawing. If not then why is this what is typically believed? I ask this because it is not at all obvious that is why he withdrew. The two sides were not really as unevenly matched as one might suppose. While the carries were small escort carriers instead of the larger fleet carriers, they had a large contingent of aircraft. WWII was the time when it was discovered that naval guns were no longer at the forefront of naval warfare, and were instead replaced by carrier based aircraft. It matters little where the aircraft land, but instead what weapons they carry and that in fact was the true reason for the dire situation of the american forces in that fight. They, as was mentioned in the article, were conducting operations in support of ground operations for nearby us forces. As such the aircraft were outfitted with bombs designed for that role instead of the anti-ship bombs that would be needed for fleet combat. It would have taken close to a half hour to re-equip the aircraft with the appropriate weaponry so it was decided to use them as is. Their bombs however were largely ineffective against the ships they were targeted against. That in fact is the reason that it is not at all clear that Kurita withdrew because he thought he was facing a much larger and more capable fleet. Once the aircraft dropped their bombs they flew to an island airfield to be refueled and refit with the correct anti-ship bombs. The aircraft on their first attack run scored many direct hits however their bombs were largely useless. When those aircraft returned, properly armed, it would be expected they would again score multiple direct and accurate hits with their bombs. This time however the effects would have been devastating. Kurita likely would have noticed the aircraft were improperly armed, and realized that the reason was that he had taken them by surprise. He would also have likely realized that the aircraft that had flow off toward the island would be rearmed and sent back, how long it would take to rearm them and how long it would taken them to fly the round trip. If he had not sank the enemy fleet well before those aircraft returned, he would have had little choice but to withdraw, or lose his entire fleet. (Presumably if he HAD sank the entire fleet, he would still have withdrew before the aircraft returned) While this is also speculation, its as valid,or more so than speculation that he withdrew because he mistakenly believed he was fighting a much larger force. Unless there is an actual quote,or something written in a report to support that view, its dubious at best.

This is actually reminiscent of the oft stated confusion over the japanese rationale for canceling the planned second attack wave on Pearl Harbor. An obvious reason presents itself. One of the main objectives at Pearl Harbor was to destroy the American carrier fleet. However that day, the carriers were not there, but instead out on an exercise. The Japanese fleet was sitting out in the middle of the Pacific, with its aircraft at Pearl Harbor. Its hard to imagine that the US carriers would have sat around doing nothing when they heard that Pearl was under attack. They would obviously have put planes in the air to search for the japanese fleet, knowing they were vulnerable without their aircraft. In fact, if the american carriers were within a days travel from Pearl, and the Japanese were within striking distance of Pearl, there was a significant risk that the American carriers were within easy striking distance of the Japanese fleet. Perhaps,perhaps not, but if they were, it could have been a devastating loss to the japanese. They could have lost their carrier fleet and their trained pilots, at the same time they started a war and failed to take out the american carriers. It would not have required any great degree of tactical brilliance to see this. Any reasonably competent tactician should be aware of these factors. Unless there is clear documentation to indicate ineptitude, I would think that it would be more reasonable to attribute their actions to a basic degree of competence.

— Preceding unsigned comment added by 134.134.139.75 (talk) 19:00, 17 January 2018 (UTC)

Japanese aircraft
1. As of now the infobox lists Japanese forces as including 30 aircraft, Japanese losses as 52 aircraft???

2. Where did the kamikaze aircraft come from? Japanese big ships carried aircraft (Yamato is listed as carrying 7 Nakajima E8N or Nakajima E4N); but the kamikaze article says "On 25 October 1944, during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Kamikaze Special Attack Force carried out its first mission. Five A6M Zeros, led by Lieutenant Seki, were escorted to the target by leading Japanese ace Hiroyoshi Nishizawa where they attacked several escort carriers". Were they land-based? I've added mention of aircraft carried on warships in the article, but not said directly that they made the attacks. Best wishes, Pol098 (talk) 11:41, 5 April 2021 (UTC)


 * Hmm. This will take some research. Just for rough calculations, adding up just the float plane capability of the battleships and cruisers in Center Force, I get: 7 (Yamato), 3 (Nagato), 3 (Kongō), 3 (Haruna), 2 (Chōkai), 2 (Haguro), 3 (Kumano), 3 (Suzuya), 6 (Chikuma), 6 (Tone), 2 (Yahagi), 2 (Noshiro); totaling 22. But those are all just floatplanes, most of them probably unable to carry bombs for a kamikaze mission. I believe there were some land-based aircraft involved (skimming Morison, he mentions a few instances, but they are scattered through the Samar chapters, which are a major portion of volume XII).
 * But from the last paragraph of, "By 26 October day's end, 55 kamikazes from the Special Attack Force had also damaged three large escort carriers ... and three smaller escorts ...". My hunch is that the 52 number might be conflated/related to the total kamikaze numbers in the combined BoLG. sbb (talk) 12:59, 5 April 2021 (UTC)
 * They came from Luzon. Last paragraph of : "As the desperate surface action was coming to an end, Vice Admiral Takijirō Ōnishi put his Japanese Special Attack Units into operation from bases on Luzon island, launching kamikaze attacks against the Allied ships in Leyte Gulf and the escort carrier units off Samar. The escort carrier St. Lo of Taffy 3 was hit by a kamikaze aircraft and sank after a series of internal explosions." That paragraph cites Morison (XII) p. 302 and Hornfischer 2004, 352–354.
 * Morison p. 302 states, "Five aircraft from Malabcat, Luzon, jumped Taffy 3 at 1050, just as Clifton Sprague's carriers, respited from enemy gunfire, were trying to recover their own aircraft. ... Kitkun Bay ... caught the first attack. A Zeke ... crashed the port catwalk and bounced into the sea, but the bomb that it carried exploded, causing considerable damage. Two planes went for Fanshaw Bay, but both were shot down. The other two dove toward White Plains. ... One that was already smoking turn and dove onto St. Lo.
 * Hornfischer 2004 states on p. 301, "Shortly before eleven A.M. Taffy 3 came under wholesale kamikaze attack. The Japanese Army Air Corps had debuted this horrific new mode of warfare earlier that morning, when six imperial planes took off from bases on Davao and attacked Thomas Sprague's Taffy 1 task unit. At 10:50, five more aircraft flying from airdromes on Luzon arrived over Taffy 3 ..."
 * So... it sounds like five kamikaze aircraft were involved in the Battle off Samar. sbb (talk) 19:55, 6 April 2021 (UTC)

Inaccuracies?
There are several points that seem to be wrong, or unclear. I don't know enough about the subject, or the reliability of the sources, to "correct" them. The reference I've been using to check is the Potts article, which doesn't seem to be authoritative.

It talks of 235 US fighters, and 143 torpedo bombers, a precise number different from the ~400 or 450 stated in the article, and the breakdown of types is relevant and worth including. I suppose both types of aircraft would have been able to carry some sort of bomb load, in the absence of torpedoes.

Potts says the carriers were "not provided" with [any?] AP bombs or torpedoes. The article says, citing Potts: the carriers "only carried a few" armour-piercing bombs or torpedoes. It would seem reasonable, if 143 torpedo bombers were carried, that torpedoes would be available.

The article says, unsourced: "In later sorties from the carriers of Taffy 2, the aircraft had enough time to be rearmed with torpedoes and armor-piercing bombs that could be expected to be more effective against warships." This raises two questions: did the carriers actually have any of these weapons? And did the aircraft actually return to the carriers to rearm and refuel, as the article says? These two points are crucial: was the air element moderately fanged or almost toothless? No aerial torpedo attacks are mentioned in the article, and the bomb damage sounds compatible with non-AP bombs.

Best wishes, Pol098 (talk) 16:17, 6 April 2021 (UTC)


 * Another inaccuracy concerns the Long Lance torpedoes. The article states that they did not produce a wake.  I am pretty sure this is wrong.  The Long Lance, like our own Mk14 torpedoes, used an internal combustion engine.  The major difference was that the Long Lance, as stated, used compressed pure oxygen instead of compressed air and thus produced more efficient combustion.  But they still produced exhaust gasses that left a wake.  I have seen pictures of Long Lances in the water, from WWII, which showed a very clear wake. Mobius Mk2 (talk) 05:45, 21 July 2022 (UTC)

Hey, from my understanding (which is very little. I am a novice in history), it was that the escort carriers present were not fitted for ASuW and instead were fitted for convoy escort, CAS, and other duties pertaining to the Landings. It may carry a little amount of ASuW capabilities in the form of aerial launched torpedo.

In direct quote of the article "Very few carried anti-ship bombs or aerial torpedoes which would have enabled aircraft to sink heavy armored warships. The Wildcats were deemed a better fit on such small aircraft carriers instead of the faster and heavier Grumman F6F Hellcats that were flown from the larger U.S. Navy carriers. Their pilots were ordered "to attack the Japanese task force and proceed to Tacloban airstrip, Leyte, to rearm and refuel". Many of the planes continued to make "dry runs" after expending their ammunition and ordnance to distract the enemy. At about 07:20 the formation entered the squall, and the Japanese fire slackened markedly as they did not have gunnery radar that could penetrate the rain and smoke. "

I couldn't find anything specifically on the torpedo bombers but if anything I would assume they would mirror the same idea, going to the Tacloban airstrip in order to rearm repair, and refuel. I want to note the source I 'cited' isn't mine of choice, it is the one also linked in the article, so I put it there for reference if anyone else has that book and could give insight. Also note the Tacloban wiki page "Daniel Z. Romualdez Airport" is the one that is put in as as internal link. Going to that Wikipedia page however only tells you the tenant units during the time period and not whether any action occurred at the strip during Samar or any time during the BoLG.

As to it's contents and what it claims, the main Battle off Samar page states that it was the Wildcats that received the order however makes no attempt at all to claim that the Torpedo Bombers did. If we do know the attitude of the fighters though, it may give you an insight in where the torpedo bombers tried landing and or taking off. It probably would be harder to land though considering the carriers were constantly entering and exiting rain squalls.

This may be able to answer your questions but it doesn't directly talk about or give a definitive answer to the torpedo bomber problem.

Sincerely, IMHEROBRINE123321 (talk) 07:33, 21 April 2021 (GMT)

Section "Japanese Losses"
The first half of the first paragraph is describing something also described as not true. Why? --91.5.104.60 (talk) 00:17, 14 May 2021 (UTC)


 * Because the recent find of Chokai by RV Petrel seems to disprove the theory that its torpedoes were set off by bomb or 5" gunfire. Agreed, though, the passages need citation of reliable sources for both the old theory and the new findings by RV Petrel. &emsp;—&#8239;sbb&#8239;(talk) 06:07, 14 May 2021 (UTC)
 * Agreed. The wreck of the Chokai shows that the torpedoes were intact indicating the old theory is probably wrong.  Naval historians now seem to think it likely the explosion on the Chokai was the result of friendly fire, a hit from Kongo's main guns as Chokai crossed its line of fire. Mobius Mk2 (talk) 05:35, 21 July 2022 (UTC)

Biased Lede
I haven't read the rest of the article, but that lede seems to try to conjure up a David Vs. Goliath situation, which is not at all accurate. Sure, US surface forces were hilariously outgunned, but four and a half Essexes worth of planes were helping them.

As a point of comparison, 88 planes were enough to delete Force Z. That's 44 planes per capital ship, pretty much spot on for Center Force if you count cruisers as capital ships and disregard destroyers.

Not saying that those destroyer crews didn't have balls of steel, but the overall numbers were not nearly as bad as depicted for the US Navy. --84.132.144.110 (talk) 20:17, 22 March 2022 (UTC)


 * The 88 planes that destroyed Force Z were equipped for the job. As stated in the article: "Very few carried anti-ship bombs or aerial torpedoes which would have enabled aircraft to sink heavy armored warships.".
 * The planes could suppress and distract crews and spot ships but weren't very useful in terms off offensive power.
 * The David and goliath aspect is more one of unprepared force succeeds in hasty defense. Snellejelle99 (talk) 09:33, 11 November 2022 (UTC)

amount of carriers in infobox
The info box states that the strength of the US force consists of "6 escort carriers (taffy 3)". Why are the other 10 escort escort carriers from taffy 1 and 2 not in this infobox? If their planes are listed shouldn't the ships be listed as well? Snellejelle99 (talk) 02:26, 13 October 2022 (UTC)

Problem article
As had been raised up several times before, not only does this article go overboard with pop history mythology, but it also uses questionable sources like 'last stand of the tin can sailors' wherever it does, and has a lot of original research, unverified claims, and to top things off it is written entirely from an American perspective (the article is split into sections, each dedicated to an American ship, and closes it off with a discussion of Halsey), aside from being absurdly biased it is also structured in a questionable format. Sormando (talk) 12:28, 16 February 2023 (UTC)

Sinking of Nowaki
This article, in section Japanese Losses, states:

While withdrawing from the battle area, Nowaki was herself sunk, with the loss of all but one of Chikuma's surviving crewmen, it is unknown how the Nowaki was lost and is still a topic of research today.

The main Battle of Leyte Gulf article states something contradictory:

Cruisers and destroyers of TG 34.5, however, caught the Japanese destroyer Nowaki—the last straggler from Center Force—off San Bernardino Strait, and sank her with all hands, including the survivors from Chikuma.

Either the other article is wrong, or it is known how the Nowaki was lost. (My uneducated guess is that it is unknown how TG 34.5 sank Nowaki, but that it is known that TG 34.5 sank Nowaki.)

Someone with knowledge of primary sources should update both articles to be consistent. LeTouchre (talk) 14:42, 30 May 2023 (UTC)

Lead rewrite
The previous lead felt kind of clunky and incomplete, so hopefully the new version is clearer and acceptable. I mostly relied on the Encyclopedia Britannica article summary as a guide for what warranted inclusion in the lead. I also ref'd the Naval History and Heritage Command website. I don't think I added much that was new - mostly a reference to the Johnston and the awards received. Mbinebri (talk) 22:11, 11 June 2023 (UTC)

How is Samar a Tactical Victory for Japan
Samar is a small battle in a larger one Leyte Gulf. and After Leyte, Admiral Ozawa is quoted to say when asked about the battle of Leyte overall 'I felt that it was the end.'https://archive.org/details/militaryhistoryo00full/] (Page 618). So if Samar was a tactical victory than why did Admiral Ozawa say 'I felt that it was the end'. Jonnylego109 (talk) 15:42, 14 September 2023 (UTC)


 * I concur with that statement. I'd say the sinking of three IJN heavy cruisers (plus a light cruiser and a destroyer sunk in the battle's aftermath) to be more significant than a few small vessels the US navy had dozens upon dozens upon dozens of. Micheal Harrens (talk) 04:37, 2 July 2024 (UTC)