Talk:Compatibilism

hope evry1 likes split
I hope everyone with a vested interest in these articles likes the latest versions. I tried to really summarize the arguments that were made (and often re-made). I haven't touched the "theology" subsection at all yet...

This page is the result of splitting Compatibilism and incompatibilism (again, with much editing).-Tesseract2 (talk) 07:23, 28 August 2010 (UTC)

Clarification regarding metaphysical presuppositions in the introduction
I think it may be fair to reword the introductory portion regarding metaphysics. Such clauses as "for reasons that have nothing to do with metaphysics", and the like are not precisely correct. It is rather the case that they either make no explicit appeal to a particular metaphysic, or that they are assuming one in their system or argument. And that further, it is sometimes the case that compatibilism is entirely motivated by metaphysical concerns. For instance some view of compatibilist doctrine could be that God determines all that will come to pass, and that the will of men must be such that they are still morally responsible for their actions. Thus the compatibilist position is wholly motivated by a desire to reconcile these two metaphysical truths. So the metaphysical claims are 1. God exists. 2. God has created the world that exists. 3. God has determined the outcome of all contingencies in the world from start to eternity. 4. God will judge men for their moral actions. 5. Moral actions are actions which men are truly responsible for. 6. Actions for which one is responsible are only those in which one is free. Therefore: I must have a version of will which is compatible with the divine determinism of (3), and the freedom of (6).

Thus the introduction is somewhat one-sided in its presentation of compatibilism and its motivations and foundations. It would benefit from a little rounding out.

71.230.164.112 (talk) 18:11, 29 October 2014 (UTC)Scott Doherty

Alternative as imaginary removal
That section doesn't portray the right connotation of compatibilism. Compatibilists do hold that the agent could have done otherwise and most compatibilists do say that a number of our actions aren't do to external sources (they say that anything we do, conciously or not, is part of our 'free will' i.e. As long as it was from internal sources it was 'person's decision'.) from Stanford encyclopaedia (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/#TerOneForFreWilPro)

"The classical compatibilists wanted to show their incompatibilist interlocutors that when one asserted that a freely willing agent had alternatives available to her—that is, when it was asserted that she could have done otherwise—that assertion could be analyzed as a conditional statement, a statement that is perspicuously compatible with determinism."

Additionally, on the Stanford encyclopaedia, there are many instances when compatibilism is portrayed as the belief that the agent could have done otherwise.

" As for the Classical Incompatibilist Argument, some compatibilists have responded to this argument by denying the truth of the second premise: If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one actually does. By doing so, these compatibilists embrace a Garden of Forking Paths model of control."

"This argument shook compatibilism, and rightly so. The classical compatibilists' failure to analyze statements of an agent's abilities in terms of counterfactual conditionals (see section 3.3) left the compatibilists with no perspicuous retort to the crucial second premise of the Classical Incompatibilist Argument (see section 2.1). And the Consequence Argument provides powerful support for this argument’s second premise. If, according to the Argument, determinism implies that the future will unfold in only one way, and if no one has any power to alter its unfolding in that particular way, then it seems that no one can do other than she does. It is fair to say that the Consequence Argument earned the incompatibilists the dialectical advantage. The burden of proof was placed upon the compatibilists, at least to show what was wrong with the Consequence Argument, and better yet, to provide some positive account of the ability to do otherwise. So even though many compatibilists are committed to thinking that the Consequence Argument is unsound, it nevertheless set the agenda for many contemporary compatibilist theories of free will and moral responsibility."

"The classical compatibilists responded by arguing that determinism is compatible with the ability to do otherwise. To show this, they attempted to analyze an agent's ability to do otherwise in conditional terms (e.g., Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, p.73; Ayer, 1954; or Hobart, 1934). Since determinism is a thesis about what must happen in the future given the actual past, determinism is consistent with the future being different given a different past. So the classical compatibilists analyzed any assertion that an agent could have done otherwise as a conditional assertion reporting what an agent would have done under certain counterfactual conditions."

"Hence, classical compatibilists were prepared to defend a Garden of Forking Paths model of control. [i.e. the ability to have chose otherwise]"

Basically, the argument that there was no ability to choose otherwise is an incompatibilitic argument- the polar opposite of compatibilism. Therefore, I think that section is insufficient with the compatibilistic thesis and it should be removed.Hubbiskalski (talk) 20:12, 13 December 2016 (UTC)

Maybe I'm just blind but I don't see those quotes anywhere. Can you tell me what sections they're from? Apollo The Logician (talk) 22:09, 13 December 2016 (UTC)


 * Yeah, the first quote is from '3.3 The Classical Compatibilist Conditional Analysis' about 7th paragraph. The second quote is from '2.3 Compatibilists' Ameliorating Efforts' 1st paragraph. The third quote is from '4.1 The Consequence Argument' about 4th paragraph.
 * The fourth quote is from '3.3 The Classical Compatibilist Conditional Analysis' about 4th paragraph. The fifth quote is from '3.3 The Classical Compatibilist Conditional Analysis' 3rd paragraph. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Hubbiskalski (talk • contribs) 22:50, 13 December 2016 (UTC)


 * So, would it be ok if that section was removed?Hubbiskalski (talk) 23:20, 13 December 2016 (UTC)


 * All it says is that some compatibilists say an agent could have done otherwiseApollo The Logician (talk) 15:43, 14 December 2016 (UTC)
 * It say that majority of compatibilists think that the agent could have done otherwise, many have even attempted to argue that position is. That is one of their thesis, the part makes it out as if every compatibilists thinks that an agent could not have done otherwise (which is more of what incompatibilists say) and that it is not true. I think the section should be removed, please, as it confuses comptaibilism a bit with incompatibilism.Hubbiskalski (talk) 15:12, 14 December 2016 (UTC)


 * Show me the quote where it says that.Apollo The Logician (talk) 15:43, 14 December 2016 (UTC)


 * From what I found, a set of compatibilists do not believe in alternate choices a set of compatibilits do. So it is not correct to say that they'll often will hold that belief. Additionally, I found no source stating that compatibilists believe in logical determinism, and compatibilists do hold that not all actions are caused by external sources ("However, many (but by no means all) compatibilists do think that we are sometimes free."). Some do believe in alternate choice some don't, however, it is incoherent to portray most compatibilits as believing in logical determinism when there are many who have argued that against it. Please, that section is a bit misleading and should be removed.Hubbiskalski (talk) 16:22, 14 December 2016 (UTC)
 * It's been edited Apollo The Logician (talk) 16:26, 14 December 2016 (UTC)


 * oh ok, that's a better alternative. Sorry for being so pedantic.Hubbiskalski (talk) 16:28, 14 December 2016 (UTC)

A dualist mind is not required, but it solves the main problems while introducing its own
Does compatibilism require mind–body dualism, for a belief in an immaterial mind or soul perceiving, thinking, choosing freely (as in will), and as a result acting independently on one's body, which would otherwise be governed only by causally deterministic physics, allowing the mind or soul to act as a puppeteer imposing choices on matter which would otherwise not be open to nondeterministic alternatives? EllenCT (talk) 07:21, 3 June 2019 (UTC)

To answer my own question, no it is not required, and non-naturalism is not usually used as a foundation for compatibilism, but it solves all of its issues other than the ones it raises (e.g., how does an immaterial mind act on a material body?) EllenCT (talk) 08:45, 3 June 2019 (UTC)