Talk:Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki/Archive 3

What Richard B. Frank said and did not say
Richard Frank 'downfall..', Page 140-141 :

" The numbers supplied by the Army in this table are not accurate...because the Japanese strategy was to tie down American forces for the longest time possible to delay attack on the homelands...the bulk of the Japanese garrison died of disease and starvation rather than in combat, losses were about 37,900. .. Given these discrepancies the supposed 22.6 to 1 casualty ratio should be taken with a large grain of salt. Indeed, in the final revised version of this paper of July 11, 1945, while the 22.6 to 1 claim remained, it was acknowledged that the overall Japanese-U.S. ratio casualty achieved by MacArthur was no more than 5 to 1."

I believe a correct way to quote is: source XX according to source YY, then implying one hasn’t looked up source XX but has it from source YY.

I still see it as a problem to wiki’s reliability that some people insist that the quote –that is taken out of context – is on page 134-137, when it actually is on page 140-141.

The reason why I corrected the reference to Frank page 135-137 is he has at least 5 tables on different casualty estimates on these pages, making me suspect that the one who made the reference has it from a secondary source and not from Frank himself.

--Robertmossing (talk) 07:25, 21 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Your leaving chunks out makes Frank say things he did not say. Actual quote is "The numbers supplied by the Army in this table are not accurate. For example, the post-war US official histories gave Japanese total strength on Leyte at only 59,400 to 70,000, not all of whom became casualties, and US Army battle casualties alone, without non-battle losses, at 15,584.  On Luzon, because the Japanese strategy was to tie down American forces for the longest time possible to delay attack on the Homeland, the Imperial Army evaded decisive engagements, and consequently the bulk of the Japanese garrison died of disease and starvation rather than in combat. US losses were about 37,900. Edward321 (talk) 14:34, 21 June 2012 (UTC)

Seems to me that Binkernet deletes all opposition to the bomb. This is the 4th he deletes:
"In 1945 ..., Secretary of War Stimson visited my headquarters in Germany, [and] informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act.... During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and second because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face.' The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude, almost angrily refuting the reasons I gave for my quick conclusions." DWIGHT EISENHOWER http://www.doug-long.com/quotes.htm http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/do_history/decisions/hiroshima.html http://www.dark-stories.com/eng/atomic_nagasaki_hiroshima.htm

Binkernet claims the quotation is cherry-picked. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Robertmossing (talk • contribs) 09:12, 28 June 2012 (UTC)


 * So, rather than explain your rationale for wanting to include the quote, you just abuse Binkernet yet again? Nick-D (talk) 09:23, 28 June 2012 (UTC)


 * Dude, you presented the quote out of context and with critical parts deleted. The context is that Eisenhower was not part of the decision-making process in Japan. His opinion would have been very important if the bomb was ready in time to be dropped on Berlin, but that is not the case. The deleted parts have Ike saying that he was not part of the decision; he knew full well it did not matter much what he thought of the bomb. The positioning of the cherry-picked quote, and its wording, gives an unwarranted importance to Ike's opinion on the matter. Binksternet (talk) 13:56, 28 June 2012 (UTC)


 * Ike wrote in his 1963 book, The White House years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956, on pages 312 and 313, "I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. I was not, of course, called upon, officially, for any advice or counsel concerning the matter, because the European theater of which I was the commanding general, was not involved, the forces of Hitler having already been defeated. But the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent. During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and second because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face.' The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude, almost angrily refuting the reasons I gave for my quick conclusions. But in spite of his instant rejection of my opinion, it never occurred to Secretary Stimson to question my loyalty to America, or for me to think that anyone else would or could do so. In the same way I refused to accept any implication that Dr. Oppenheimer was disloyal to America or was a security risk merely because he had opposed the development of a weapon many hundreds of times more terrifying than anything we had then produced."
 * Furthermore, Eisenhower, during his presidency, expanded America's arsenal of nuclear weapons. Nuclear testing was stepped up, with more powerful bombs produced. Eisenhower was not dead-set against the bomb as a weapon of state. Sure, he was against it being used in August 1945, but that was a minor sideline to the actual bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Ike's opinion was not weighed. Binksternet (talk) 14:27, 28 June 2012 (UTC)

This seems to me totally irrelevant and a character assassination of Dwight D. Eisenhower:

''- Ike wrote in his 1963 book.. - it never occurred to Secretary Stimson to question my loyalty to America - Furthermore, Eisenhower, during his presidency, expanded America's arsenal of nuclear weapons.''

The quotation of Eisenhower I put here is repeated on many websites about the bomb. It summarizes the view many have: the bomb was unnecessary as Japan was already defeated. --Robertmossing (talk) 07:51, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * The Eisenhower quote is incomplete. It is quoted incomplete and without context on many websites.  The view of many regarding the lack of necessity of the bomb should thus be easier for you to cite as many reliable sources should be providing accounts of participants in the decision making process opposing it.  Which many involved in the decision opposed it and what RS do you have to support this? --LauraHale (talk) 13:55, 29 June 2012 (UTC)

ANI Discussion
Peeked in today and I see if anything things are getting worse. For information I have raised the disruption on this article at WP:ANI. Wee Curry Monster talk 12:23, 29 June 2012 (UTC)

Estimated Japanese casualties/deaths from invasion
We have multiple sources discussing how many Japanese military men and civilians were expected to be wounded or killed in the course of a land invasion of the Home Islands by Allied troops. Let's figure out what are the best sources.


 * The Shockley-Wright estimate was "...we shall probably have to kill at least 5 to 10 million Japanese." Many sources, one being Giancreco's Hell To Pay, page 115.
 * Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy said "...Japanese casualties were conservatively estimated to run as high as 10 million." From Robert P. Newman's Enola Gay and the Court of History, page 11.
 * MacArthur's planners gave an estimate of 22 Japanese dead for every American dead. This group of planners gave four estimates of American dead depending on the length of invasion before surrender: two weeks, one month, two months, four months.
 * 9,727 American dead in two weeks
 * 22,576 American dead in one month
 * 55,906 American dead in two months
 * 124,935 American dead in four months
 * These numbers are from John Ray Skates' The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb. Thus we can calculate MacArthur's staff estimate of Japanese dead, multiplying the above figures by 22:
 * 213,994 Japanese dead in two weeks
 * 496,672 Japanese dead in one month
 * 1,229,932 Japanese dead in two months
 * 2,748,570 Japanese dead in four months
 * Giangreco wrote that there were suddenly more Japanese troops defending Kyushu in the summer of 1945. The estimates of Japanese troop strength was raised from 3.5 million to 5 million. They were expected to fight to the death. Taken from Robert James Maddox's Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, pages 91 to 92.
 * Richard Stewart KirKendall says that 400,000 additional Japanese dead were expected in Hokkaido as part of the coming Soviet invasion. Harry's Farewell: Interpreting and Teaching the Truman Presidency, pages 133 to 134.
 * Stanley Sandler writes that Japanese casualties, not specifically deaths, would have been "huge—certainly in the many hundreds of thousands, and perhaps in the millions". From World War II in the Pacific: An Encyclopedia.
 * Richard Holmes noted that certain Japanese leaders called for "the honorable death of a hundred million" of their own people.

I believe the above numbers represent the main thread of estimates. Binksternet (talk) 00:00, 12 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Nice research. When I get all my books out of boxes this weekend I might be able to add more. It's also worth noting that Japan was on the brink of famine at the end of the war due to a bad rice harvest and the Allied blockade, and if the war had continued into 1946 there would have been mass starvation (which in the event was only avoided due to food aid from the US after the war). Nick-D (talk) 08:59, 12 June 2012 (UTC)
 * ♠Agreed, well done on the research.
 * ♠I have a couple of concerns. The 22:1 is predicated, it seems, on the "expectation of no surrender" (whence also my 2d concern). By 1945, inducing surrender in IJA forces had become common & was proving very successful, when applied. The problem appears to be, MacArthur was (as I understand it) hostile to psywar... (based on You Can't Fight Tanks with Bayonets). I presume he'd be in charge. Was it possible to "persuade" him to make more use of psywar? Would only the Marines deployed be using it? This is bound to have an influence.
 * ♠In the same vein, is there a larger psywar effort, aimed at the Japanese government? (Leaflets & broadcasts about "honorable end to war", not "surrender", so forth, per the psywar advice...)
 * ♠I entirely agree, famine was highly likely. If there was destruction of the rail/road net to inhibit troop movements, the impact on movement of civilian food & fuel would have been devastating. Does widespread famine lead to a change of government & an end to the war?
 * ♠Most important IMO, does the USG simply say, "We'll let you keep an Emperor if you quit fighting"? That, at bottom, was the problem: the U.S. refused to clarify the matter (& Japan's "stubborn refusal" wasn't: the mokusatsu was more a "no comment", not knowing if she could get the one term she insisted on--& one she ultimately did get).
 * ♠Finally, let's be clear: the "100 million dead" is hyperbole, no more. It was a phrase to mean "united Japan".  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  12:23, 12 June 2012 (UTC)
 * Certainly "a hundred million" is hyperbole, but it was widely heard in Japan, and was part of the story of resistance to invasion, resistance to surrender. Binksternet (talk) 13:57, 12 June 2012 (UTC)

Binkernet is fighting hard to keep the bias in favour of the bombs - as a gift to mankind and to the Japanese especially as it saved lives. He picks the highest estimates of casualties - with no regard to the authority of the source. The ‘Shockley-Wright-report’ was not part of the decision-making. D. M. Giangreco states: “The war ended before Shockley's proposal could be considered.“ { http://www.endusmilitarism.org/casualty_projections_Giangreco.html page 568}. Shockley also made his report on the assumption that the Japanese would fight to the last bullet. An assumption that proved to be wrong in the Soviet-Manchuria-war. Less than 100.000 soldiers were killed in a battle that involved more than 2.5 million soldiers and lasted for at least 10 days. But of course you have ‘judged’ as an expert that this is no valuable compare… Talk:Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The calculations you make above I consider pure speculation. Richard Frank in Downfall advocates for the view that the bomb ended the war. But in a later article from 2006 he softens that view. “Racing the Enemy (Tsuyoshi Hasegawa), however, convinces me that the emperor’s intervention takes primacy even above the atomic bombs in collapsing the will of the militarists in Tokyo…. , I believe Hirohito would have attempted to intervene to end the war regardless of whether atomic bombs or Soviet intervention occurred. Abandonment of Ketsu Go by the emperor and the collapse of civilian morale would have undermined the will of the leaders of the armed forces in Tokyo to continue. The surrender of the government probably would have occurred between the end of August and the end of October. ..What then finally motivated Hirohito? The short and most candid answer is that the record so far contains no definitive answer. “http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-diplo&month=0601&week=c&msg=ManJt2X9LNJv0FlYMdsPZQ&user=&pw= — Preceding unsigned comment added by Robertmossing (talk • contribs) 14:31, 13 June 2012 (UTC) --Robertmossing (talk) 14:54, 13 June 2012 (UTC)


 * Again, you're comparing two completely different things: Japanese troops fighting for Manchuria, a recently taken colony, and Japanese troops fighting on the Home Islands, a desperate situation that every observer expected to involve much more Japanese fanaticism. The death toll in Manchuria is not a yardstick by which war deaths in Japan itself can be measured. And nobody in the USA used these deaths as the measurement! They used the hard fight for Okinawa as the yardstick.
 * The turning point for Hirohito was mid-March 1945 when he walked through Tokyo to view the damage from the horrific firebombing raid, the largest death toll in any one air raid, ever, the one that killed approximately 100,000 Japanese people. After that very emotional day, Hirohito knew in his heart as well as his intellect that Japan could not win. However, in the five months between that time and the atomic bomb attacks, Hirohito did not intervene to end the war. Conjecture about when he might have done so is exactly that: conjecture. Just as we can report that reliable sources were predicting as many as 10 million Japanese lives saved by dropping the atomic bombs, we can report that reliable sources were speculating about a possible intervention by Hirohito to end the war. It's a matter of weighing reliable sources relative to the overall importance to the topic, the same as always. We know that there was a core of fanatic military leaders who wanted the war to continue all the way to self-destruction, and they were in power. How was Hirohito to get rid of these guys? We do not know, and it seems he did not know, either.
 * Robert James Maddox, in Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism, writes that former president Herbert Hoover assessed (30 May 1945, "Memorandum on Ending the Japanese War") the price of a land invasion of Japan, telling Truman and Stimson that it would cost "500,000 to 1,000,000 lives" of American soldiers. Cordell Hull and Joseph Grew saw this estimate and agreed with it.
 * Michael Kort, in The Columbia Guide to Hiroshima and the Bomb, page 154, says that the Shockley memorandum on casualties was printed on 21 July 1945. Kort said this report, which predicted as many as 4 million US casualties including 400,000 to 800,000 dead Americans in an invasion of Japan, "almost certainly reached Stimson." Kort also tells us about the 30 August 1944 Joint Strategic Survey Committee report, citing the "Saipan ratio" which established a 7:1 death ratio between Japanese defenders and American attackers. The same report predicted 500,000 American dead in a land invasion of Japan, making this an early (1944) [prediction of 3.5 million Japanese deaths from land invasion.
 * You said something about Giangreco changing his mind by 1997. He wrote in 2003 ("Evolving Methodologies in Casualty Reporting to the American Public During World War II") that the American public was hearing from several sources that the fighting in Japan was going to take a long time, more than a year, and that it was going to kill "500,000 to 750,000, perhaps 1,000,000" Americans, according to a piece published in May 1945 in the Los Angeles Times: "Palmer Warns No Easy Way Open to Beat Japs". Palmer's article is also cited by Robert James Maddox who notes that Palmer predicted the Japanese to field 5–6 million troops on the Home Islands. Another estimate cited by Giangreco appeared in the New Republic on 28 May 1945, an editorial predicting huge U.S. casualties in a land invasion of Japan, to destroy the Japanese Army if they got in the way of surrender. Another high estimate appeared before the American public in a widely heard radio program. In June 1945, Yank magazine told the US troops that the invasion of Japan might take a year or two years (Kort, page 151.) If 500,000 Americans were expected to die attacking for a year or more, far more than a million Japanese were certain to die defending. This is, of course, conjecture, propaganda and hyperbole, but the numbers were in the air at the time; they established the American dread of a land invasion and the general American sigh of relief at the dropping of the atomic bombs and the apparently related Japanese surrender which followed directly. Giangreco quotes an older US soldier who said, "Thank God for the atom bomb." Binksternet (talk) 01:01, 14 June 2012 (UTC)
 * ♠That's if you accept the Bomb had the effect on Japan in 1945 we think it did. Aside the impact of the Sov declaration, look at it from Japan's POV. What was the difference between the Bomb & the firebombings? Cities were going up in smoke anyhow. (Yes, I know, there's a qualitative difference, but it's not as obvious in 1945 IMO as it is now.)
 * ♠Add to that the decision to invade. Why do we presume it had to happen immediately? USG planners allowed for up to a year (later shortened to six months) from the defeat of Germany to the surrender of Japan. Why wouldn't extending the blockade & bombing do, until surrender was achieved?
 * ♠And, most important IMO, why couldn't Truman simply have said, "We'll let you keep the Imperial System, provided you stop fighting now."?
 * ♠These questions, IMO, are more salient than the defense of high casualties & invasion. And AFAIK, no satisfactory answers exist. IMO, the fact they don't is the best case against use.
 * ♠I think these are all in Decision, so if our opinionated friend really wants to add "opposition", he might be better advised to look there, & look into these questions, rather than try pulling his own quotation fraud by misrepresenting the position being attributed...  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  10:03, 14 June 2012 (UTC)
 * If we can take the word of Richard Frank, who used the unredacted, original "Magic" intercepts of Japanese diplomatic cables, then we have Foreign Minister Togo's outright refusal when his own ambassador to Moscow suggested that unconditional surrender with preservation of the Throne was the best to be hoped for. ["Togo's July 21 response noted that he had been informed of [ambassador] Sato's message which...reminded policy makers that Sato 'advocated unconditional surrender provided the Imperial House [i.e. the Throne] was preserved.' To this proposal, the Foreign Minister declared, 'we are unable to accept [it] under any circumstances.'" Downfall, 229-30.]  Kw0134 (talk) 23:04, 31 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Thx for that. It doesn't address the later thinking, tho. At one point, Japan was hoping for no loss of territory & disarming herself, too. I don't doubt this hard position would shift, just as the others did.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  03:33, 1 August 2012 (UTC)

Would you please specify why you consider the quote ‘incomplete, misleading’
"...in [July] 1945... Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. ...the Secretary… asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent. … I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. " - Dwight Eisenhower http://www.doug-long.com/quotes.htm http://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/do_history/decisions/hiroshima.html http://www.dark-stories.com/eng/atomic_nagasaki_hiroshima.htm

Put by me on Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki to counterbalance the (misleading?) quote by Winston Churchill - and deleted by you. Thank you.--Robertmossing (talk) 08:48, 29 June 2012 (UTC)


 * Yes. The quote is too long.  It leaves out pieces of key information.  It is not properly contextualized.  Maybe if you shortened it to something like: Secretary of War Stimson visited Eisenhower before the bombs were dropped on Japan to inform the European theater commander of what was to happen and asked his opinion on it.  Eisenhower indicated his hesitancy to use the bombs as he did not think it was necessary.  Eisenhower's opinion though was at no time considered as part of the discussion regarding whether or not to drop the bomb and he went on to build up the United States nuclear arsenal during his presidency.


 * Would you be okay with text like that in the article in lieu of the quote? --LauraHale (talk) 08:57, 29 June 2012 (UTC)

First it is no longer a quote. Second you seem to participate in the character assassination of Dwight D. Eisenhower by converting ‘my grave misgivings’ into ‘hesitancy’ and stating ‘he went on to build up the United States nuclear arsenal during his presidency’. What has the last to do with anything? Eisenhower did never – to my knowledge - drop a nuclear bomb. A lot of the opposition against the bomb was actually based on a fear to start a nuclear arm race – and history proved them right. See The Franck Report, June 11, 1945, http://www.dannen.com/decision/franck.html I agree that the quote is LONG, but each time I make an attempt to shorten it, I am accused of ’cherry picking’ (see up page) --Robertmossing (talk) 09:27, 29 June 2012 (UTC)


 * The reason it shouldn't go in is simple. Eisenhower had no more say in use than Oppenheimer; thus, misgivings, grave or otherwise, by either of them (& make no mistake, Oppenheimer's were as grave as they come), made not the slightest difference. Nor, I suggest, does his buildup of nuclear weapons make a difference. Once there was a first use, & knowledge the Sovs had the Bomb, he would have had scant choice but to build up; doing less would have been irresponsible (contrary to what the green loons will say today about disarmement...).  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  11:05, 11:10, & 11:11, 29 June 2012 (UTC)


 * @Robert: How would you contextualize the Eisenhower quote against the backdrop of these facts:
 * Eisenhower increased the USA's nuclear arsenal during his time as president?
 * Eisenhower was not asked to give an opinion, nor was his opinion weighted, in any discussion regarding the use of the atom bomb by US leadership?
 * Eisenhower was not operationally placed inside the US government to have all information at hand to formulate the best response?
 * Can you provide ON THIS TALK PAGE the surrounding text you would place to best contextualise a FULLER QUOTE that would include "I was not, of course, called upon, officially, for any advice or counsel concerning the matter, because the European theater of which I was the commanding general, was not involved, the forces of Hitler having already been defeated. But the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent." If we can better see how you would contextualise the text with the knowledge the only way you'll get consensus to include it is with those three questions answered in, perhaps we can better work towards your desired quote which Binkernet provided worked into the article? --LauraHale (talk) 13:52, 29 June 2012 (UTC)


 * Eisenhower's opinion about dropping atomic bombs on Japan is interesting but it is not crucial to the topic. We should definitely avoid quoting him because doing so give too much weight to his words. Instead, if it seems appropriate, we should tell the reader his opinion along with opinions of other public figures and topic experts who were not part of the decision-making process. Again, no quote. Binksternet (talk) 15:43, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * That is pretty much my feeling on it too. The addition does not make sense given the article's scope and the context it is being added.  Also, the quote is waaaay too long. --LauraHale (talk) 20:55, 29 June 2012 (UTC)
 * I'm not at all sure mentioning it at all makes sense. He had no say in use at the time (which is what this page is about), & his actions as POTUS don't bear on the decision. At best, mention on his page is merited, IMO. Absent evidence Stimson's views were influenced, which they appear not to have been, & if Stimson's weren't, it's pretty obvious Byrnes' & Truman's weren't going to be, either.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  00:13, 30 June 2012 (UTC)

As stated earlier Winston Churcill framed quote is misleading and absurd especially concerning the British losses. And he was no part of the decision making either. I feel that you want to keep the bias of the article by now demanding that the opposition has to have been part of the decision making. This is absurd! If you really mean that I suggest you start to delete all POV's that do not meet the LauraHale-criterias:

- (subject) not asked to give an opinion, nor was his opinion weighted in any discussion regarding the use of the atom bomb

- (subject) was not operationally placed inside the US government to have all information at hand to formulate the best response

It would interest me to know how Father John A. Siemes (ref 67) and Federal Council of Churches (no reference) – along with a lot of other statements in the article meet the LauraHale-criterias.

--Robertmossing (talk) 07:59, 30 June 2012 (UTC)

Recent edit war
I am distressed to see the recent friction here as reported at WP:AN/I. On reflection I have decided to try WP:0RR. This essay will give a pointer to my philosophy in doing this rather than simply protecting. I will immediately block on sight any editor who reverts anything that is not clear-cut vandalism. If in doubt, do not revert. Any queries should be brought here to article talk and a compromise agreed. I want to be absolutely crystal clear that this applies to all parties to the recent edit war, not just the one who was complained about centrally. --John (talk) 15:16, 30 June 2012 (UTC)
 * While I'm grateful for your intervention, how long do you propose maintaining 0RR for? It's likely to be unworkable in the long run given that this is an unprotected article on a contentious topic which attracts 300+ page views per day. Nick-D (talk) 00:03, 1 July 2012 (UTC)
 * The immediate result is most likely the usual editors here will be holding their collective breath to see if Robertmossing puts any of his preferred bits back in. At least the 0RR decision did not cement the wrong version . The damage, though, would be if a non-neutral content edit brings more contentious material to the article, and it has to stay in for a period of discussion. Binksternet (talk) 00:19, 1 July 2012 (UTC)
 * ♠It did leave an unpleasant taste in my mouth, I have to say, given there's really been one main culprit...
 * ♠That said, I do get it. I also agree with both the above comments. The 0RR is, at best, a band-aid. I honestly see no good solution but a long-term (probably indefinite, regrettably) block on the one editor who is pushing a POV, here. Which is doubly sad, since the position taken is a valid one IMO.
 * ♠I'm less concerned about anything worse going in for the immediate future. This has been so contentious, I suspect it's scared off anyone else, at least for now. (Perhaps the only good thing to come of it. ;p )
 * ♠I also think the fuse is effectively lit, now, on Robertmossing's patience, & I suspect he'll hit his limit before the 0RR is taken off again.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  08:49, 1 July 2012 (UTC)


 * As there has been no recent edit-warrring, I have now lifted this restriction. Please let me know if any other restricion becomes necessary. --John (talk) 13:07, 15 August 2012 (UTC)

Where's Giangreco's recent book?
I'm surprised that no one has referenced D.M. Giangreco's recent book Hell to Pay: Operation Downfall and the Invasion of Japan, 1945–47, ISBN 978-1-59114-316-1. It's got a chapter or two on expected casualties, Purple Heart production, etc.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 23:37, 30 June 2012 (UTC)
 * What new insights does the book provide on the casualty numbers from those who were involved in making the decision? --LauraHale (talk) 07:34, 1 July 2012 (UTC)
 * Rather a lot: Giangreco provides (in my view) strong evidence that the worst-case casualty estimates Truman and the US military were working off were entirely credible, and were actually very likely to have been revised up considerably if the war hadn't ended when it did. He also discusses the likely Japanese casualties if an invasion had taken place. Nick-D (talk) 08:13, 1 July 2012 (UTC)

Rationale attack
In reference to THIS, let's not seek to get personal even before we have started a dialogue, and let's discuss here. Civilly please, as no editor here gets a trophy for voluntering his time (unless, of course, someone considers arrogance trophy-worthy). My name is Mercy11 (talk) 18:37, 3 October 2012 (UTC), and I approve this message.


 * That's not personal. It's simply nonsensical to demand a source saying it's a minority view when the majority of views disagrees, if only because the claim isn't being made by a source. Do you also demand a source for it being a minority view the earth is flat?  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  19:01, 3 October 2012 (UTC)


 * Let's stay put on Wikipedia policies instead of on nonsensical arguments: the earth is not under discussion here.


 * Why do you want to stress it is a "minority" view? Everything in Wikipedia has to be WP:V and thus backed by a WP:RS source or it has to go as WP:OR. If others say Hasegawa's view is a minority view, then you should have sources. If you *sense* that that's the case, and even if you *know* that that's the case, but don't have sources, then you've got a problem, and it cannot stay in Wikipedia.


 * The alternative is to reword &/or move the text out of the WP:LEAD altogether for lack of WP:WEIGHT. This, however, would make little sense for it is precisely this sort of debate the article is about. But simply because others -and you- believe along with those whom you perceive are in the majority, that is not a valid RS to warrant categorically presenting it - in particular, in the lead - with the "minority view" label. That's against policy.


 * I invite you to check out the other 3 paragraphs in the lead talking about the atomic bomb debates (was/was not the proximate cause of Japan's surrender; was/was not necessary for US to achieve victory; was/was not an extension of the already fierce conventional air raids on Japan): none of them use the word "minority". The problem with that use is that, unless you provide a verbatim quote that makes use of such categorically powerful term, it comes across as leaning towards the majority view, and both the majority and the minority view should be reported in their factual form, with no hint of editorialization. How about if we reworded those paragraghs as follows:


 * One more observation: Japan's surrender may have been the result of, not one, but various factors acting concurrently: the Russian declaration, the atomic bomb, the fierce conventional raids on Japan, etc. This view does not seem to be argued enough in the article.


 * I have restored the article to remove the words "claim" and "miniroity view" as these are against POV and OR policy. Please do not change it until this dispute is over.


 * My name is Mercy11 (talk) 16:02, 4 October 2012 (UTC), and I approve this message.

Hasegawa is no longer a minor voice in the debate. Noam Chomsky calls his work, Racing the Enemy, "the most highly regarded scholarly study..." of the debate. John W. Dower casts Hasegawa as the norm and Sadao Asada as the contrarian (Asada argues the shock of the bomb being much more important than the Soviet declaration of war.) University of Southampton professor Campbell Craig joins Sergey S. Radchenko in depicting Hasegawa the equal of Stanford University professor David Holloway with whom Hasegawa disagrees sharply regarding the reasons Stalin rushed to engage Japan by mid-August 1945. These views by Hasegawa's peers show him to be accorded scholarly respect. We should not call Hasegawa's views "minority". Binksternet (talk) 17:20, 4 October 2012 (UTC)


 * ♠"Why do you want to stress it is a "minority" view?" I don't. Before now, I was unaware of it having wider acceptance. That being true, it is AFAIK in a minority.
 * ♠"If others say Hasegawa's view is a minority view, then you should have sources" Yes, if others say it. Which is why I mentioned the flat earth: AFAIK, nobody is saying somebody's view of a flat earth is a minority; the majority of published sources are saying something else. For that, I don't need sourcing, & it's not OR to say so. To my knowledge, the mainstream view was contrary to the one espoused. which makes it, by default, a minority view. If I'm wrong about that, I'm more than happy to be corrected on it.
 * " Japan's surrender may have been the result of...various factors.... This view does not seem to be argued enough in the article." With that, I entirley agree.
 * ♠I also don't appreciate baseless claims of personal attacks.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  21:18, 4 October 2012 (UTC)


 * Trekphiler, I heard your earth is flat argument before and I hear it ad nauseum again. The problem with that analogy-based argument is that it is not applicable here because you are attempting to compare apples and oranges: In the 14th century EVERYBODY believed the earth was flat, and TODAY everyone knows that in the 14th century everybody believed the earth was flat. That is very different from claiming that TODAY a minority of people BELIEVE the earth is flat. From this, it is clear that your intended analogy breaks down. But, again, this discussion is not about the earth being/not being flat, but about the Bombings, so let's stick to the Bombings please. If you must make an analogy it would need to suffer from no errors in reasoning. If you want to push for the "minority" claim, it needs to be sourced, per the WP:V policy. My name is Mercy11 (talk) 19:46, 5 October 2012 (UTC), and I approve this message.


 * I'm not the one suffering the fallacy. This isn't about the number of people, 14th Century or now, who believed Earth was flat, it's about the number of reliable sources saying so. (Also, you're wrong "everybody" believed Earth was flat in the 14th Century: mariners & others knew perfectly well it wasn't & had for centuries.) So, too, it's about the number of sources, frex, saying there was a conspiracy to attack Pearl Harbor. That's also a minority view, & saying it is doesn't require sourcing, because the source isn't saying it. Do you demand sourcing for it being a majority view Einstein was right about relativity? That Kepler's laws are correct? That the Sun is the center of the Solar System? Or only for this claim, because it opposes your own POV?
 * More to the point, why do you insist on beating this to death? I've acknowledged I may have been wrong & I'm not changing it back, but you continue to attack my reasoning as if I am. Perhaps I have grounds to complain about it. And perhaps I should.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  20:22, 5 October 2012 (UTC)


 * I think the disconnect is in that I was expecting you to assess my proposed suggested wording (above) for the affected paragraphs in the lead, and you seem to have not noticed my proposal. So my question is, Are you agreeable that the wording read as follows:

or is there an objection to something like that? I am proposing it that way because it seems to me it gives each camp (proponents and opponents), equal share in the lead. But maybe you have a different view still. So, Can you provide a response as to whether you are OK with that wording and/or whether you still object? My name is Mercy11 (talk) 03:47, 6 October 2012 (UTC), and I approve this message.


 * As there has been no objection after some six days, I have implemented the suggested change stated above. Regards to all those who participated in this lively exchange of thoughts! My name is Mercy11 (talk) 03:24, 12 October 2012 (UTC), and I approve this message.

Stimson's comments
For an article dealing with a debate, the use of ''“The atomic bomb was more than a weapon of terrible destruction; it was a psychological weapon. ” —Former U.S. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, 1947[1]'' prominently displayed in the beginning of the article, gives the impression of preferential treatment to that side of the debate, seems POV and should be removed or placed elsewehre further down in the body of teh article. My name is Mercy11 (talk) 15:24, 7 September 2012 (UTC), and I approve this message.


 * I agree Mercy. But this article has so a strong bias in favour of the bomb...it is unendurabuable. But I tried - and I tried hard to fight the American War-Criminal-Nuclear-Lobby, but in vain -it is a national trauma. But all non-english article on wiki are balanced and non-biased - so let the Americans isolate them selvelves in their self-pathos. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Robertmossing (talk • contribs) 16:36, 3 October 2012 (UTC)
 * --Robertmossing (talk) 16:40, 3 October 2012 (UTC)


 * I'm not seeing the POV. That looks like a fair description of the Bomb at the time & a fair assessment of its impact, perceived and intended. As for the "strong pro-Bomb bias", I'm not seeing that, either. Opposition at the time was nearly nil, & nobody in a position to influence use was opposed. That's not bias; that's the state of play.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  17:36, 3 October 2012 (UTC)


 * The bomb was absolutely a weapon of psychology, intended to shock Japan into surrender. Stimson correctly states the case. Binksternet (talk) 17:02, 4 October 2012 (UTC)


 * TREKphiler & Binksternet, no one is saying that the statement is not "a fair description of the Bomb at the time & a fair assessment of its impact", and no one is saying "The bomb was absolutely [not] a weapon of psychology, intended to shock Japan into surrender". What is being said is that, if the article is about the "DEBATE" (per its title) over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, then presenting Mr. Stimson's statement, and only Mr. Stimson's statement, up-front, in a prominent manner, in a prominent and otherwise empty-space area, within large quotation marks, at the start of the article, BUT without sharing equal space, in an equally upfront, prominent manner, and also at the start of the article, in equally prominent area of the article, and with equally prominent large quotation marks, for the OPPOSING view(s) in this DEBATE article, then THAT is a violation of WP:NPOV policy. This is what is being said. My name is Mercy11 (talk) 19:29, 5 October 2012 (UTC), and I approve this message.


 * Are you suggesting a particular quote to serve as counterbalance to Stimson's? Binksternet (talk) 20:34, 5 October 2012 (UTC)
 * That would be one alternative but, in my opinion, by far the least desirable because it would make the article look like a WP:BATTLEGROUND, and not encyclopedic, especially if done in the opening area of the article. But that's just me, and I am very little artistic and little visionary and very little imaginative when it comes to formats, layouts, etc. But maybe if someone is creative enough (format- and layout-wise) that would be one way to go about it since, after all, this is an article about a DEBATE. Still I would tend to shy away from such "on your face" format where two competing viewpoints are thrown at the reader right at the begining of the article: that might be OK for articles in TIME and Newsweek, but not for an encyclopedia, imo. What I would consider reasonable, fair, not POV, and encyclopedic is if that quote gets incorporated into the text of the article. This is how virtually every other article in the encyclopedia is laid out - "why would this one have to be different?", is what I ask myself. My name is Mercy11 (talk) 03:34, 6 October 2012 (UTC), and I approve this message.

I don't really see what this quote adds, and I don't think that its directly relevant to the topic of the article (it's unlikely that anyone from either side of the debate would disagree with Stimson's statement here, as it was basically stating the obvious). Nick-D (talk) 03:51, 6 October 2012 (UTC)


 * I wouldn't oppose removing the quote, except for the proposition it's POV. If a leading quote that effectively takes no position is considered POV (& this evidently is), how, then, are opponents of this quote going to be satisfied when it's replaced by one that does take a position contrary to theirs? How much stronger is the outcry going to be then? I expect the demand will be for a quote that expressly & explicitly criticises use of the Bomb. Need I say that fails NPOV?  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  04:31, 6 October 2012 (UTC)
 * I am not sure where you read that someone is proposing that the existing quote be replaced by one from the opposing side. I certainly never made such proposal myself. What I have proposed from the start is that teh existing quote be removed,,, or at least be moved down into a pertinent area of the article. My name is Mercy11 (talk) 04:35, 6 October 2012 (UTC), and I approve this message.
 * Yes, I think that outright removal and non-replacement would be the best option. There's no need to have quotes in the lead, and it would be very difficult to find representative quotes given the huge numbers of views on this topic. Nick-D (talk) 04:48, 6 October 2012 (UTC)
 * Suits me. I really don't care if there's a lead quote or not.  TREKphiler   any time you're ready, Uhura  04:54, 6 October 2012 (UTC)


 * Humm,, user Robertmossing hasn't contributed here for several days and user Binksternet (who has not commented on this either) did not appear to have any huge objection either way other than asking his most recent question above, so I have relocated the quote using plain wording to a location that hopefully is not objectionable to anyone. My name is Mercy11 (talk) 05:26, 6 October 2012 (UTC), and I approve this message.
 * BTW, in case anyone here is wondering, I did not remove the POV template from the article yet because there is still another pov-bearing discussion ongoing (immediately following this section). My name is Mercy11 (talk) 05:28, 6 October 2012 (UTC), and I approve this message.
 * Both issues having been addressed, I am proceeding to removing the POV tag. My name is Mercy11 (talk) 01:38, 25 October 2012 (UTC), and I approve this message.

Just reworded a section that stunk of WP:TRUTH
There was a sentence here that read ...but they are not true, so I reworded the section and inserted some WP:BALANCE as it also stunk of WP:SYNTH.

I think it would be a good addition to have the views of the B-29 bomber crews included, such as those on the Bockscar, not to mention the views of the surviving cities inhabitants, the Hibakusha over whether it was justified. Boundarylayer (talk) 19:32, 28 May 2013 (UTC)

Is the "saving lives" argument faithfully represented?
The section meant to represent the argument that dropping the bomb saved lives does not merely present that side of the debate, but rather presents that side of the debate from a critical perspective. The third paragraph presents evidence that the U.S. targeted Hiroshima and Nagasaki for demonstrative reasons: -- i.e. Hiroshima and Nagasaki "were preserved from conventional bombing raids" in order to clearly demonstrate the effectiveness of the nuclear attack without mitigating factors, such as damage from previous attacks. This fact -- followed up with the reminder that "otherwise they would have all been fire-bombed" -- rather than supporting the argument that bombings were necessary, reminds the reader of the cynicism with which they were carried out. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Joeletaylor (talk • contribs) 02:40, 24 June 2013 (UTC)

strategic bombing survey inaccuracies
The SBS put out a number of reports (you can find them in the Truman library) and Nitze was one member of a larger committee, one of two vice chairmen. Giving him sole authorial credit needs justification and I've tagged it cn at this point. TMLutas (talk) 16:21, 9 August 2013 (UTC)


 * The cn template is not quite the right tool for the job. Template:Verify source is probably closer to what you wanted. At any rate, the best method would be to locate the other authors and attribute them as appropriate, or to simply to modify the prose to reduce the implication that Nitze was alone. Binksternet (talk) 19:10, 9 August 2013 (UTC)


 * Yeah, I noticed that too. For the report cited, I've switched to indicate Nitze's membership of it, i.e. membership of the Survey in Japan (he wasn't chairman). TheTimesArentAChanging (talk) 16:48, 2 December 2013 (UTC)

Changes by impersonator/sock
I won't revert again due to the threat of blocking on the edit page, although the IP who reverted has not been blocked. If the changes were explained I might be happy with them. I will revert in a week if no explanation is forthcoming. Bevo74 (talk) 12:17, 4 December 2013 (UTC)


 * After socking by iloveandrea, using two different socks, the IP editor's changes look very suspicious. Worse, they appear non-neutral. I have reverted the IP. Binksternet (talk) 15:46, 4 December 2013 (UTC)

Opposition : Japanese nuclear weapons program
This section doesn't really make any sense; I can't even figure out what the author is trying to say. In any case it doesn't seem to provide any argument against the atomic bombings. I suggest a rewrite, if not complete removal. (24.209.142.69 (talk) 16:57, 3 February 2014 (UTC))
 * I have removed the section, since two months have passed and no one has attempted to rewrite this section or defended its inclusion. The information contained within this segment was available in the article on the Japanese nuclear weapons program so Wikipedia has lost no knowledge because of the edit. If you think this segment should not have been deleted, please REWRITE the original so it presents an argument against the atomic bombings and not simply revert the edit (as it stood, it was some information on the program, as well as a hypothetical argument FOR the bombing based on evidence which was not found; it made absolutely no sense as written.) (147.202.198.33 (talk) 15:29, 21 April 2014 (UTC))
 * And I've reverted your edit, so there you go. Any use of the atomic bomb in a demonstration or as a shock weapon relied on the Japanese recognizing it for what it was. Therefore, these strategies relied on the existence of the Japanese program. There was also the possibility that the demonstration of the atomic bomb would prompt a Japanese response. Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:40, 21 April 2014 (UTC)

Eliminate the "bombings as war crimes" section?
Since there was no international law at the time of the use of the atomic bombs in 1945 and that they weren't declared war crimes at the time, I don't think this section should be in this article page anymore because it's very unfair. The Blitz and the bombings of Nanking and Canton by the Axis Air Forces were not considered war crimes and I think it's time for a change since this section has been here for years. XXzoonamiXX (talk) 09:09, 6 March 2014 (UTC)


 * Disagree. There has been a lot of discussion about the bombings as war crimes despite the lack of signed treaties about aerial bombing. We follow the published sources; we do not block them out on a whim. Binksternet (talk) 14:15, 6 March 2014 (UTC)
 * There was an international law at the time, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. These forbid the bombardment of undefended cities. Despite the fighters and antiaircraft guns (not to mention Hiroshima's substantial garrison), lawyers have argued that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were undefended, and that the bombing was therefore a war crime. Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:20, 6 March 2014 (UTC)
 * That's not a good argument considering the lawyers' "arguments" wasn't even backed up by facts and existing international conventions in WWII. It's well known fact the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 were woefully absent when it comes to the rise of air power, especially the use of fixed-wing aircraft in warfare, right after the adoption of the Hague Conventions. The conventions only addressed the bombardment by land and sea, not by aircraft. If the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 were general applications, then there would not be need for a special convention called the Bombardment by Naval Forces in Time of War (Hague IX); October 18, 1907 in the first place. The aerial bombardments of Coventry and Rotterdam by the Germans weren't treated as war crimes following World War II. Since that section had been there for so long, it's time for a change. If the Hague Rules of Air Warfare of 1923 was adopted and entered into force as a standard international law, then you guys would have a case there but since the Air Warfare rules wasn't adopted and never went into force, aerial bombardment of cities in enemy territory before and during World War II wasn't treated as war crimes by all sides.XXzoonamiXX (talk) 02:18, 7 March 2014 (UTC)
 * The aerial bombardments of Coventry and Rotterdam by the Germans were treated as war crimes following World War II, and Herman Göring and Albert Kesselring stood trial for them. In the Hiroshima case, the arguments have to be taken seriously because the Japanese court ruled in their favour. Hawkeye7 (talk) 11:05, 7 March 2014 (UTC)
 * Your information is wrong. It's well known fact that Herman Goering was NOT sentenced to death for the aerial bombardments of Rotterdam and Coventry; he was sentenced to death because of his involvement in the Holocaust and the use of POWs and detainees as slave labors and rightly so. The same with Albert Kesselring. He pointed out during the trial that "the Hague Convention on land warfare did not provide for the requirements of air warfare." None of the charges against these officers included aerial bombardment. American war crimes prosecutor Telford Taylor even said that aerial bombardment was so extensive in all sides during WWII that none of the judges in both the Nuremberg and the Tokyo Trials even brought the topic up and and none of the judges put aerial bombardment in the war crimes category. To them, aerial bombardment was simply an extension of artillery bombardment which were used to shell defended cities that killed thousands of civilians during the same war. Therefore, both the aerial and artillery bombardments in WWII were treated as acts of war, rather than criminal. If you look at these links, none of these charges included aerial bombardment, not one. http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/imt/tgmwc/tgmwc-09/tgmwc-09-79-07.shtml, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/Goering1.html, and http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/JudgeGoering.html XXzoonamiXX (talk) 19:54, 7 March 2014 (UTC)
 * I never said anything about Nuremberg or the death sentence. Hawkeye7 (talk) 11:45, 11 March 2014 (UTC)
 * I don't understand why we would take relevant information away from the reader. The "debate" includes the accusation of war crime, so that's why we must write about it. Binksternet (talk) 20:03, 7 March 2014 (UTC)
 * I agree completely with Binksternet. The literature on this topic often includes discussions of whether the attacks were war crimes, and there's no grounds from excluding this from the article, not least as many (most?) Japanese people believe that they did constitute war crimes. Bush lawyering is not grounds for deciding the content of articles. Nick-D (talk) 22:43, 7 March 2014 (UTC)
 * What we may think doesn't mean there's no debate on it, & it's the existence of the debate that's under discussion. Leave it in.  TREK philer   any time you're ready, Uhura  21:02, 10 March 2014 (UTC)
 * Agreed. This article is not about trying the case, it is about the debate itself. Hawkeye7 (talk) 11:45, 11 March 2014 (UTC)

The debate over the use of the bombs has nothing to do with whether it merits being in the category of a war crime. Thus it's an entirely circular argument, no decision to use or not use the bomb(s) would be made on this basis. May as well debate that any act of war is a crime, using the bomb(s) doesn't seem to rate as a more of a crime than burying people alive as ISIS has recently done which may only differ in numbers counted. Which is the more egregious sin seems a rather pointless academic argument. I agree, it is out of context as all war is a crime against something or someone. The decision to stop them by the allies was never precipitated by a question of war crimes. In fact to the allies, both Japan and Germany had already committed war crimes. War is war, it is always going to bring death and destruction, the crime has already been committed, stopping it by any means necessary may in fact be merciful and hardly be consider yet another crime. You're debating which is more of a crime being killed by an assailant with a gun or by a baseball bat. The crime isn't the weapon of destruction, it's the resulting death. As a crime murder is murder, there is no category of weapon used. You have to first prove that the resulting deaths were murders by using the Atomic weapons vs any other types of weapons since no one has yet charged a crime. A murder cannot be made a murder by virtue of the weapon used, this is not possible. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Tedslate (talk • contribs) 16:49, 30 August 2014 (UTC)

The debate over the use of bomb has everything to do with whether it is a war crime. The international convention at the time was silent as to air bombardment of civilians. Your analogy to murder is inappropriate, but even then, if the law specifies what weapons are defined as murder weapons, and a baseball bat is left out, then killing someone with a baseball bat is not murder, absurd though that may be. Jokem (talk) 06:55, 24 January 2015 (UTC)
 * The international law at the time was not silent as to air bombardment of civilians. The Hague Conventions of 1907 said: "Article 25: The attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited."


 * There was no prohibition against indiscriminate bombardment of civilians in defended places. So the argument that it was a war crime rests on whether Hiroshima was an undefended city. Hawkeye7 (talk) 07:31, 24 January 2015 (UTC)

Since both had anti-aircraft batteries, that looks like a 'defended' city to me. Jokem (talk) 06:09, 30 January 2015 (UTC)
 * That would seem to be common sense but in Ryuichi Shimoda et al. v. The State (1963), a Japanese court ruled otherwise. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:22, 30 January 2015 (UTC)

A bombs or Soviet?
My edit regarding Soviet declaration of war being the real reason for Japanese surrender had been removed for two reason. 1. The view is disputed. 2. Badly written. I disagree on both.

1. Russian declaration, as opposed to atomic bomb, being the major reason for Japanese surrender is a well established topic in this debate, with multiple of scholarly and historical sources. Also, please note that I did not assert this as a truth. I presented as a part of argument for "Against" side. Trying to delete properly sourced content as "disputed" would smack of attempt to censor the side one does not agree on.

2. Badly written. I do apologise if my writing is poor. However, this is not due to myself being lazy. Wikipedia explicitly state that they would encourage people who are not native English speaker to contribute. In this instance, I believe my contribution to be genuine (because I made proper citation) and helpful (as not highlighting Soviet or A bombs debate would highly skewed the article.). If you think my source is valid, then please improve my contribution rather than just try to keep such contribution of of this article.

If I may add my two cents, this article's editorial puzzlingly incorporate Russian declaration into "Support" side. As far as I can see from the contents, A bombs was not the real reason but a convenient pretext. Considering how important this issue, one section should incorporate two opposing arguments under one section. Removing debate that Russian declaration as opposed to atomic bombing was the real reason behind Japanese surrender does not advance the understanding issue. Vapour (talk)


 * As an aside, to attempt to classify it as "either" A bombs "or" Soviet is a red herring. There were MANY more than just these two factors, and it was NOT any single one of them - it was a combination of ALL of them. Pdfpdf (talk) 14:10, 11 January 2015 (UTC)


 * Vapour's addition based on Colin Powell was too far away from the literature to be accepted. Colin Powell's analysis does not have a parallel among other military historians who usually describe Japan's decision makers as unable to end the war for other reasons than increased resolve after brought about by the long bombing campaign. Powell is also wrong that the high-altitude B-29 attacks aimed solely at Japan's heavy industry had "measurable success"—instead the results were miserable to almost mediocre. Binksternet (talk) 14:45, 11 January 2015 (UTC)


 * A couple things.
 * The USSR's entry into the war was after the first bomb, right? So it can be argued that the first bomb precipitated the Soviet attack on Japan?
 * Stalin had already said at the Tehran Conference in November 1943 that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan once Germany was defeated. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, he agreed to a timetable: that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan within 90 days of the war with Germany ending. In April 1945, Japan was informed that the Soviet Union was terminating the Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact. Under its terms, either side could terminate at a year's notice. (The concern was that Japan might attack the Soviet Union first, remembering that Japan was still on the offensive in China in early 1945.) The final and official decision for war was made on 27 June 1945. So the process of the Soviet Union's entry was a long and slow one. Following the bombing of Hiroshima, Stalin ordered the attack to begin at midnight on 9 August, two days earlier than planned. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:12, 30 January 2015 (UTC)
 * Yes, and Stalin's word can be considered to be 100% reliable, right? Jokem (talk) 07:26, 31 January 2015 (UTC)
 * Well obviously the Soviet Union had to break the Neutrality Pact Japan in order to keep the Yalta agreement to the United States; but the United States officials didn't expect him to do it for nothing. Stalin was offered concessions, in the form of restoration of territories lost to Japan after the war of 1904-05. Hawkeye7 (talk) 09:08, 31 January 2015 (UTC)
 * With regard to 'measurable success', how is that defined? Certainly the effect on heavy industry was profoundly destructive, but since the Allies had effectively strangled the import of raw materials in to Japan, I ask how useful is it to destroy idle factories?  Jokem (talk) 07:13, 24 January 2015 (UTC)
 * The factories were not idle. Japan had stockpiled large quantities of raw materials. In both Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the factories continued to operate. Hawkeye7 (talk) 21:12, 30 January 2015 (UTC)
 * Do you have references to this? My books are stockpiled somewhere so I cannot declare where I read this.  Jokem (talk) 07:30, 31 January 2015 (UTC)
 * From the The United States Strategic Bombing Survey: The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, June 30, 1946: First Hiroshima (p. 8): "Industry in the center of the city was effectively wiped out. Though small workshops numbered several thousand, they represented only one-fourth of the total industrial production of Hiroshima, since many of them had only one or two workers. The bulk of the city's output came from large plants located on the outskirts of the city; one-half of the industrial production came from only five firms. Of these larger companies, only one suffered more than superficial damage. Of their working force, 94 percent were uninjured. Since electric power was available, and materials and working force were not destroyed, plants ordinarily responsible for nearly three-fourths of Hiroshima's industrial production could have resumed normal operation within 30 days of the attack had the war continued."


 * As for Nagasaki (p. 13):"Shortage of raw materials had reduced operations at these four Mitsubishi plants to a fraction of their capacity. Had the raw material situation been normal and had the war continued, it is estimated that restoration of production would have been possible though slow. The dockyard, which was affected mainly by the 1 August attack rather than by the atomic bomb, would have been able to produce at 80 percent of full capacity within 3 or 4 months.The steel works would have required a year to get into substantial production, the electric works could have resumed production at a reduced rate within 2 months and been back at capacity within 6months, and the arms plant would have required 15 months to reach two-thirds of their former capacity."


 * Hawkeye7 (talk) 09:30, 31 January 2015 (UTC)
 * I am confused at this Hawkeye. I had already said the Allies had squeezed the import of raw materials to a trickle.  You replied the Japanese had stockpiled lots of raw materials.  What is being said here is there is a shortage of raw materials.

So which is it, a shortage or vast stockpiles? Jokem (talk) 20:40, 31 January 2015 (UTC)
 * Both. Japan was able to continue imports from Indonesia until operations on Luzon and the Southern Philippines cut this route in early 1945. Imports from the Asian mainland became restricted by the inshore mining campaign and the occupation of Okinawa in the second quarter of 1945. But there were always shortages, which affected some industries more than others. Hawkeye7 (talk) 22:35, 31 January 2015 (UTC)

The Desire for Comprehensive Recordings of the Effects of Nuclear Radiations Motivated the Second Bomb's Early Use
Because the survivors of Hiroshima were dispersing and/or dying and thus their valuable positional data relative to the blast source was being lost and also because their injuries were healing and/or new symptoms were emerging and the Americans could not study these processes, they used the second bomb. Also because the second bomb was a different design from the first, and the Americans wanted its pertinent "killing data," this further incentivized its premature detonation. Because these motives and acts are so callous, they took precautions that few or no records were made of any such discussions. However these facts speak for themselves. Ecstatist (talk) 08:11, 4 March 2015 (UTC)
 * The plutonium bomb design had been tested at Trinity already. Contrary to your thesis the untested bomb design was that of Little Boy. Not that I expect this fact to change your belief in this preposterous theory of yours.--Sturmvogel 66 (talk) 14:10, 4 March 2015 (UTC)


 * Ridiculous nonsense, unsupported by any published source. The second bomb was dropped by military men who used it because it was available as a weapon. Binksternet (talk) 16:42, 4 March 2015 (UTC)
 * Their orders were that "additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff". Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:00, 4 March 2015 (UTC)
 * Exactly. Binksternet (talk) 20:22, 4 March 2015 (UTC)

Overlapping quotations
In the section Bombings as war crimes, there are two quotations overlapping one another. One is by Robert Oppenheimer, the other by Arthur D. Little. Could anyone edit them?--Adûnâi (talk) 06:35, 15 March 2015 (UTC)
 * I seem to have fixed this issue by switching the placement of the Robert Oppenheimer quote box and the Hiroshima Peace Park image. 65.0.118.18 (talk) 09:04, 22 June 2015 (UTC)

External links modified
Hello fellow Wikipedians,

I have just added archive links to 1 one external link on Debate over the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Please take a moment to review my edit. If necessary, add after the link to keep me from modifying it. Alternatively, you can add to keep me off the page altogether. I made the following changes:
 * Added archive https://web.archive.org/20081225073015/http://www.weeklystandard.com:80/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/894mnyyl.asp to http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000%5C000%5C005%5C894mnyyl.asp

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 * Verified correct. Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:08, 21 January 2016 (UTC)

Deceptive subsection
The first subsection of the "Support" section is about all the lives an invasion may have cost. What the subsection doesn't mention is why such an invasion would even have to occur. This would be more fitting on the Operation Downfall page since the first subsection of the "Oppose" subsection already deals with this point. Senior officers believed that Japan was already willing to surrender, and that such an invasion was entirely unnecessary. Bataaf van Oranje (talk) 12:57, 24 January 2016 (UTC)

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Introduction inaccurate
The article is about "debate over the atomic bombing". That is a rather vague and confusing title. However presumably the debate would include legality, justification and effect. However the introductory paragraphs refer to none of these, merely the Potsdam Declaration, which had nothing to do with the atomic bombing.Royalcourtier (talk) 02:46, 22 May 2016 (UTC)

Legality
The whole section on legality is vague and unreferenced. There have been a number of scholarly works on the legality of the atomic bombings (or rather their illegality). Why aren't these quoted?Royalcourtier (talk) 02:50, 22 May 2016 (UTC)

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Japanese Force Dispositions?
Overall, the article is fairly well written. However, there is one issue that seems to me there must be a fairly simple solution to. That being the Japanese Force dispositions on the Home Islands. We already have such a map for Operation Coronet in the article from the allied side, but surely there must be a similar map for the Japanese forces stationed in Kyushu and central Honshu. Such a map would illustrate both the Navy and Army's fears for the invasion and the extent to which the Japanese prepared, beyond mere numbers. Would a map like this be acceptable, or would this stray too much into OR? Map: http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V2%20P2/Images/p_162t.jpg CWalker (talk) 15:20, 6 September 2016 (UTC)


 * A map like that could be worked into the article. Binksternet (talk) 19:44, 18 September 2016 (UTC)
 * This is the corresponding map of Kyushu (Operation Olympic). Hawkeye7 (talk) 20:47, 18 September 2016 (UTC)

Alternatives to invasion
There should be more mention of the alternatives to Operation Downfall. A naval blockade of Japan, combined with firebombing of the cities and railways, would have rapidly starved Japan into surrendering unconditionally before the proposed invasion was to take place. (Geafbks (talk) 15:58, 18 September 2016 (UTC))


 * Rapidly? Japan was starving by October 1944 according to this book. Even in August 1944, factory workers were weak with malnutrition. Serious country-wide starvation was evident by the end of 1944. So the process of starvation was working slowly, not rapidly.
 * If you want to see more mention of this issue you should find books that discuss it. Binksternet (talk) 16:23, 18 September 2016 (UTC)


 * If Operation Starvation had begun earlier Japan would have had to surrender by the early summer of 1945. (Geafbks (talk) 17:11, 18 September 2016 (UTC))


 * Conjecture has no leverage here. Binksternet (talk) 19:42, 18 September 2016 (UTC)
 * Please note that this thread was started by banned editor User:HarveyCarter for his usual trolling purposes. Nick-D (talk) 08:50, 19 September 2016 (UTC)

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