Talk:Essays in Positive Economics

Epistemology
I'd put in some links to logical positivist thinking in Friedman's essay. Another author felt that the article didn't need that. I wonder if we might discuss that.

I think it's important to demonstrate that Friedman's views on methodology were not in themselves new - what was new was their application to economics. The views were in large measure logical positivist views - e.g. the passage about theories not having merit in themselves aside from their hypotheses is simply the analytic-synthetic distinction from logical positivist philosophy (itself largely from Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus).

It would be wrong to give the impression that Friedman originated these ideas. The essay's contribution is their application in economics (of course, the same goes for JN Keynes' adoption of Hume's is / ought distinction)

There is, of course, some controversy over whether and to what extent Friedman should be viewed as a fully consistent logical positivist. I guess this is why another contributor felt the article didn't need these links. My point is weaker than that - Friedman doesn't have to be regarded as full logical positivist for us to correctly identify those parts of his thinking that certainly owe their intellectual lineage to that school of thought. Thoughts?

I suppose this being an encylopaedia even an interpretation of a work needs to be referenced. I reccommend Hausman D (1984) 'The Philosophy of Economics': "... Milton Friedman's well-known essay ... attempts to show that economics satisfies positivist standards" (p. 39). There is also of course Hollis and Nell's controversial work in the late 1970s which argued that neoclassical economics post-Friedman actually presupposes a logical positivist epistemology. From the other end of the spectrum, Rothbard and various Austrians also described Friedman's essay as positivist. --Nmcmurdo 00:09, 18 January 2007 (UTC)


 * Hello, N. I don't know whether I am "another author" as referred to above, but I'll assume that I am & respond. An earlier Edit summary did refer to the new Boland (1987, p. 456) cite. That states & gives references for the argument that Friedman's essay was a critique of 1930s logical (called 'analytical') positivism, not a proponent thereof, despite contrary assertions and assumptions of earlier authors.  Any assertion about Friedman drawing on logical positivism would seriously mislead if it failed to reflect other sources.   Analogies are often dangerous, but here goes.  If Karl Popper was described as a logical positivist merely b/c he had overlapping concerns, it would be seriously misleading to say that he had adopted logical positivist ideas.  Popper was of course a great critic of logical positivism.  It is safe to say that among admirers of Friedman, many see a resemblance to Popper (e.g., Alan Walters, The New Palgrave, v. 2, p. 423).  So, is Friedman both a proponent of (uniquely) logical positivist ideas and a serious critic of them?  Sources and evidence in literature have a bearing on elucidiating of course.


 * Exposition is all section 1 did. Documented or undocumented characterizations of Friedman's drawing on one school or another is something else, different from exposition.  There is no question here of excluding commentary of others, but for clarity, I don't see a point of mixing them.   What is your thought?


 * I do think that analytic/synthetic distinction & Wittgenstein influence on Friedman would carry no water without meeting Policies and guidelines, including Reliable sources, Neutral point of view, No original research, and Verifiability standards.


 * Separate matter: I do not believe that the positive economics article lead reflects current usage and that that is source of misundertanding.  Thomasmeeks 02:52, 18 January 2007 (UTC)


 * The key then, is not to label Friedman a logical positivist, but to identify those parts of his thinking that originated with the logical positivists (the analytic-synthetic distinction should be high up the list), using citations. Popper may also be worth a mention. --Nmcmurdo 20:26, 21 January 2007 (UTC)


 * Hi, N. Well, labelling is certainly part of it. Logical positivism was both a school and a doctrine, neither of which does the Essay endorse or even cite (despite lots of citation on points throughout).  Yes, I agree that if one could associate a part of his thinking uniquely associated with logical positivism, that would be  interesting. But, if not, it is open to the criticism of unverifiability.  It is certainly much disputed.  The analytic/synthetic distinction is Kant's (dissolved by the "last of the logicai positivists," Quine).  Mentioning Popper? Tempting, but here again, what's the evidence on the connection? Thomasmeeks 22:04, 21 January 2007 (UTC)


 * Friedman's analytic-synthetic disctinction is a logical positivist version - it bears little relation to Kant (in particular of course Friedman follows the positivists in rejecting Kant's synthetic a priori). The way MF uses this device is very similar to that set out by A J Ayer's 'Language Truth and Logic' - a fairly accessible logical positivist text (Wittgenstein's Tractatus is difficult). --Nmcmurdo 00:33, 23 January 2007 (UTC)


 * Ayer of course preserved Kant's analytic/synthetic distinction in his own work, even as he attempted to adapt it to his purposes. My general hope is that the principle of charity would temper editing impulses and keep the cost of conveying information low ("always as simple as possible but no simpler" to paraphrase Einstein).   Not that that is esp. important in the present instance.  Thomasmeeks 18:08, 23 January 2007 (UTC)


 * MF basically applies this in economics. --Nmcmurdo 22:15, 23 January 2007 (UTC)