Talk:German influence on Soviet rocketry

Joint work of Korolev and Gröttrup from 1945 to 1950
Chertok's Rockets and People is misleading and incorrect in some areas. He is exaggerating his own role in developing guidance systems and he is fully denying the German impact on Soviet rocket development. As an example, Chertok claims that Korolev had never been to Gorodomlya island where the core group of the German rocket scientists was working from 1948 to 1952 (and a first group already from November 1946). Pictures in prove that Korolew visited Gorodomlya. For sure, Korolev's stay in Gorodomlya was no a holiday trap as ypu can see from the participation of Pobedonostsev, another member of the rocket development in NII-88 in Podlipki, with Gorodomlya the "branch no. 1". In 1949 he revisited Gorodomlya where only German scientists were working. There were also visits of Dmitry Ustinov, the then Minister of Armament, in Gorodomlya. In 1948/1949 the Soviets were urgently pressing for larger longe-range rockets with a range of up to 3,000 km and a payload of 3 tons for nuclear weapons.

From Chertok's misleading or even wrong information the main author of this article derives that there was a minor relation between Korolev and Gröttrup (which he also wrongly reverted in the Helmut Gröttrup article).

There was a long tradition in the Soviet Union and later Russia to deny or understate the German contribution to the Soviet rocket technology. Stalin had a strong focus on claiming that every success was Soviet based only. Also Korolev with his proven Gulag experience could not stay back from this culture. Only later - and even after Siddiqi's analysis - some researchers unveiled details of the cooperation.

Yet another (more reliable) source is Anatoly Zak in 2012: ''However in the last few years, the latest historical publications renewed claims about the extensive influence of the Gorodomlya team on the Soviet rocketry. Not surprisingly, such assessments originated in Germany. Dr. Olaf Przybilski from the Technical University of Dresden pointed out at a striking resemblance between a cone-like aerodynamic shape proposed by the Gröttrup team for several of its rockets and Korolev’s own designs, which appeared in metal years later. Korolev’s largest rockets – the R-7 and the ill-fated N1 moon rocket, both featured exotic conical shape. Russian sources are yet to collaborate this claim.''

Also the Russian Zvezda supports this gain of the cooperation. This company goes back to the German work in Gorodomlya started in 1946 and has become a supplier of Russina guidance technology. In its 2016 publication (70 Years) the Russian enterprise described a similar view on the German contributions with technical details supporting Prybilski's analysis. Just as of today: Have a look on the similarities between the designs of the G-4 (Gröttrup's team in 1948) and the Soviet R-7  (Korolew's team in 1957 for launching the Sputnik) with the shape and size). Only major difference: The G-4 was designed with one swivel-mounted engine of 100 tons while each R-7 booster used RD-107 with four combustion chambers, each with a similar size of the V2 engine but upgraded performance. This was because Valentin Glushko did not manage and stabilize the complex design in time. SchmiAlf (talk) 10:08, 24 September 2022 (UTC)


 * SchmiALF, as per WP:TALK “The purpose of an article's talk page is to provide space for editors to discuss changes to its associated article or WikiProject. Article talk pages should not be used by editors as platforms for their personal views on a subject.” From the above I am unsure what changes, if any, you are proposing to this article. You appear to be pushing a mainly German based historical view, which I believe I have adequately covered in the “Historical analysis” section of this article. If I have time later this week I can provide a more detailed reply to your above points, however I see that you have now made alterations to the Helmut Gröttrup article and I believe my time is better spent addressing these changes.


 * I also note the following that was posted by another editor here on Valentin Glushko’ Talk page, which I believe is relevant to the points you have raised above:
 * “I urge some caution with regard to the biography on Encyclopedia Astronautica, because it toes the line of a particular nationist German historian who claims that all of Russian rocket inventions were made by captured Germans. There is no documentary evidence at all that Germans designed the KS-50, ED-140 or RD-105 engines or had anything to do with the R-7 packet rocket design.  This is just stated without proof in the articles and books by this historian and parroted on the astronautix.com site.  Russian documentation multiple eyewitness accounts all claim that the Germans worked on the R-1 project and were completely isolated from more advanced missile projects, for security reasons.  The Germans who worked in the Soviet Union were almost all debriefed by the CIA and some by von Braun.  Yet none of these claims about inventing later rocket and engine technology appeared until the 1990s, after technical details of those  missiles were made public by Russian sources.  I fear these conspiracy theories will be dragged into wikipedia, and we will never hear the end of it. I recommend looking at articles on Soviet rocket engines by the American engineer George Sutton, and articles and books by Asif Siddiqi.  For a scholarly treatment of the German work in USSR, look at Michael Uhl's book "Stalins V2" (in German).”
 * Ilenart626 (talk) 22:05, 25 September 2022 (UTC)
 * You are right that there is some caution needed for any source of this subject. There may be personal reasons for some views (such as Chertok, von Braun, also Gröttrup's wife), political reasons (a massive problem of Soviet history until 1990 and even later, a massive problem also for the US for explaining why the Soviets got the Sputnik first) and secret information which was deleted or not released. Publishing on Soviet rocket technology before 1990 was dangerous with the KGB having an eye on it.
 * I agree, that Uhl's dissertation of 2016 has become a very reliable source after his investigations in Moscow. Many of the changes I've reverted in Gröttrup's article can be found in Uhl's work. So the Soviet/German cooperation in Moscow and Gorodomlya lasted until 1950, with visits of Korolev and Ustinov in October 1949 (see also Siddiqi, p. 81). Alexander Korolev, the grand-son of the pioneer stated in 2019 as follows https://rvsn.ruzhany.info/0_2018/gorodomlja_01_00.html#my01_10: "German engineers helped to understand the technologies of the V-2, in the translation of documentation. In addition, some of the ideas proposed by the Germans were used in subsequent Soviet developments."
 * The isolation you are referencing was one-way: The Germans did not get any insight in Soviet developments and test results. But there was unlimited information flow in the other direction with many questions and presentations. Of course we cannot prove that the conical shape of the R-7 design is based on G-2 and G-4 ideas. The Soviet might have invented it by themselves. But there is no evidence of the opposite as well. Why was the US approach completely different? SchmiAlf (talk) 17:14, 27 September 2022 (UTC)

Translation for German source
regarding your latest changes, as per WP:NONENG can you provide an English translation for pages 81, 98, 132-133, 152-159, 167-168 of Stalins V-2. Der Technologietransfer der deutschen Fernlenkwaffentechnik in die UdSSR und der Aufbau der sowjetischenn Raketenindustrie 1945 bis 1959. Ilenart626 (talk) 10:22, 29 September 2022 (UTC)


 * How should this be done? As a quote it can't be added in the article itself. Even then it is major effort to translate these excerpts (with pictures).
 * I guess that it is a specific issue about the topic that there is a lot of German publications with only some of them translated into English. Just to mention Werner Albring (Gorodomlia) and Kurt Magnus (Raketensklaven).
 * Alexander Korolev, grandson of Sergei Korolev, has provided an excellent summary of the German activities in Gorodomlya (see https://rvsn.ruzhany.info/0_2018/gorodomlja_01_00.html. Although it is in Russian language, Google translator helps very much. He describes that Korolev and Ustinov had visited Gorodomlya in 1949 (not for holiday reasons!), exactly what is reported by Matthias Uhl. He also quotes a 1951 memorandum On the use of German specialists where Dmitry Ustinov summarizes the work of the German specialists to Lavrentiy Beria as follows:
 * On the use of German specialists:
 * “In accordance with your instructions, I report on the use of German specialists in NII-88 of the Ministry of Armaments:
 * German specialists arrived from Germany at NII-88 in November 1946.
 * As of October 1, 1951, the number of working specialists was 166 people and 289 members of their families. All foreign specialists with their families are housed in Branch No. 1 of NII-88 on Gorodomlya Island of Lake Seliger, [in] the Kalinin Region.
 * The German specialists were mainly tasked with the following tasks:
 * To assist in the reconstruction of technical documentation and the reproduction of the captured German A-4 rocket.
 * Develop projects for new products of rocket technology, using your experience and knowledge in this area.
 * To develop and manufacture modeling installations and various measuring equipment according to individual tasks of NII-88.
 * During their stay at NII-88, German specialists carried out the following work:
 * In 1947:
 * Participation in the assembly and restoration of the technical documentation of the A-4 rocket.
 * Performance of individual computational and theoretical work on aerodynamics and ballistics.
 * Consultations of Soviet specialists on the A-4 missile and other missiles developed in Germany.
 * Participation in laboratory and bench tests of components and assemblies, in the installation and debugging of special technological equipment and apparatus that arrived from Germany (unique portal welding machines for tail parts, control panels and control equipment for horizontal missile tests, etc.), as well as in assembly 10 pieces of A-4 missiles made from German components and parts.
 * In October-November 1947, German specialists took part in the flight tests of the A-4 (V-2) and provided significant assistance.
 * In 1948:
 * A preliminary design of the R-10 rocket (i.e., G-1) with a range of 800 km, with a payload of 250 kg and a preliminary design of the R-12 rocket (i.e., G-2) with a range of 2500 km, with a payload of 1 ton have been developed. In these projects, a number of new structural elements are proposed, the principles of operation of which have been tested on experimental models and samples.
 * A sample of a modeling installation for the complex testing of a rocket with a control system has been created.
 * A number of measuring devices have been developed, for example: fuel level sensors in rocket tanks, a differential pressure gauge with safety valves, a dynamometric thrust sensor, a summing gyroscope and a device for testing it, various types of unformers, etc.
 * In 1949:
 * A draft design of the R-14 missile with a range of 3,000 km, with a payload of 3 tons and a preliminary design of a cruise missile R-15 with a range of 3,000 km, with a payload of 3 tons, with radio control have been developed. In these rockets, the general design schemes of the rocket are given, computational and theoretical work has been carried out, and ways and methods for solving certain new control issues have been outlined (replacement of the gas rudders of the R-14 product (i.e., G-4) with an oscillating combustion chamber). However, due to the bulkiness of the structures (large overall dimensions) and a number of unresolved problematic issues of aerodynamics and stabilization, the supply of fuel components, etc., the continuation of these works turned out to be impractical.
 * Manufactured: simulation unit MU-2 and three-plane simulation unit MU-3, which are used in NII-88.
 * In 1950:
 * An autonomous control system with radio correction was designed to control A-4 (V-2) products, samples of devices for this system were made. They are currently being tested on an aircraft.
 * An improved MU-4 simulation unit, which is used in our work, has been designed and manufactured.
 * Three- and six-component aerodynamic balances have been developed; three-component balances are currently in operation at Branch No. 1 at NII-88.
 * A technical design of the alpha stabilizer has been developed.
 * In 1951:
 * Manufactured and handed over to NII-88 single-plane modeling installations; automatic adjustment of wind tunnels was designed, the model of which is under production.
 * The debugging of six-component aerodynamic balances for the pipe T-112 NII-88 is being carried out.
 * Various radio engineering, aerodynamic, electrical equipment, as well as devices for testing under vibration conditions, have been designed and manufactured.
 * Conclusion:
 * German specialists working in the field of jet technology provided significant assistance in the restoration and reconstruction of German structures - especially in the first period of time.
 * Some of their theoretical, design and experimental work was used in the design of domestic samples.
 * Due to the long separation from modern achievements in science and technology, the work of German specialists is becoming less effective, and at the present time, when fundamentally new, more advanced models of products are being created, they do not provide significant assistance."
 * Also Matthias Uhl has known Ustinov's memorandum and quotes it on page 259-250 of his dissertation. SchmiAlf (talk) 14:04, 29 September 2022 (UTC)


 * thanks for your response however unfortunately it is not what I requested. As per WP:NONENG, as you are providing a non-English source, can you provide a quotation of relevant portions of the original source on this article talk page.  This is so that myself and other Editors can verify the text you have included and ensure it complies with WP:VERIFY.  To assist you I have added the Template:Request quotation for the specific citations I am requesting,  Note that I have concerns with some of the wording you have added, particularly the ones relating to “Büro Gröttrup” and “Institut Nordhausen…headed by Korolew as the Chief Engineer and Gröttrup as the German head.” as other sources (ie Siddiqi’s Challenge to Apollo) does not mention “Büro Gröttrup” and states that that Gaydukovo was head of Institute Nordhausen with Korolev as first deputy director and chief engineer and Gröttrup was in charge of a German / Soviet division responsible for preparing a detailed history of the A-4. Ilenart626 (talk) 10:36, 30 September 2022 (UTC)
 * The role of Lew Gaydukov is easily explained. He was the military head of Institut Nordhausen with Korolev as the technical head (see ru:Гайдуков, Лев Михайлович). This Russian article describes the background of Institut Nordhausen which was created in Febr 1946 according to Matthias Uhl, p. 91: "Gaidukov announced that the Institut Nordhausen will be founded on base of the Institut Rabe to to create a leading research and development center for the V-2 in the Soviet zone. In parallel he founded the Institut Berlin as a separate reseach center for working on anti-aircraft missiles." Uhl, p. 92: "The most important task was the reconstruction and the reproduction of the long-range missile V-2 to be established in Thuringia. For this purpose the Institut Nordhausen was established from Institut Rabe and Büro Gröttrup. General Gaidukov was appointed as the military head, Korolev as the chief engineer of the research center. The central administration of the institute was located in Bleicherode. In addition, the institut directed the research and production site in Nordhausen, Kleinbodungen, Sömmerda, Sondershausen and Lehesten." Uhl, p.93, depicts a diagram "General organizational structure of the special committee for rocketry in the Soviet Occupation Zone" with the Institut Nordhausen, where L.M. Gaidukov is named as the military head, S. P. Korolev as the Soviet chief engineer and H. Gröttrup as the German head. Chertok is heading the sub-group "Guidance" as the Soviet head. Uhl continues on p. 94: "German head of the Institut Nordhausen was Helmut Gröttrup acting as the general director. The headquarter of the German administration for the Zentralwerke - how the Institut Nordhausen was called as well - was in Bleicherode, Schillerstraße 14-16. The Soviet direction resided in Schillerstraße 1 and 13." And later: "The largest group of the German specialists within the Institut Nordhausen was the department "Guidance" which also worked in Bleicherode. Most of the 82 engineers and specialists had been employees of the Institut Rabe before and were working for the reconstruction of radio-controlled guidance systems and the necessary gyroscope system.
 * A facsilimile document in Jürgen Michels, Peenemünde und seine Erben in Ost und West (1997), p. 189, depicts an employment contract concluded between Büro Gröttrup and Dr. Hoch on April 25, 1946. It is signed by Gröttrup with a seal "BÜRO GRÖTTRUP Bleicherode/Südharz" as employer. A clause of the contract determines "Bleicherode as the location of the job and the right for instant dismissal if it would be changed for any reason". Nevertheless, this clause did not help Johannes Hoch who was among the people of Operation Ossawakim. SchmiAlf (talk) 12:08, 1 October 2022 (UTC)

Work in the USSR
Details for the German groups are provided by Uhl, p. 132-133, for the arrival of the German group in the Soviet Union after Operation Ossawakim: "In total, 2,552 German specialists together with 4,008 family members were relocated to the USSR. [...] 302 of them had knowledge in rocketry. The majority, 175 worked in NII-88 for the ministry of armaments. In NII-885 the ministry for production of telecommunications and its OKB-1 the special committee no. 2 assigned 43 German rocket scientists. They assisted in designing guidance and control systems for long-range and anti-aircraft missiles. The ministry of shipping occupied 23 specialists in Leningrad to develop gyroscopes for the stabilization of rockets and command units for the target guidance of anti-aircraft missiles. 8 German specialists worked for the development of rocket fuels in the ministry of chemical industry. In the ministry of agricultural engineering 27 German engineers designed fuses for the missile warheads and constructed unguided solid-fueled missile. In OKB-456 of the ministry of aviation industry in Khimki 23 specialists worked for liquid-propellant rocket engines." Basically the 175+23=198 specialists had been recruited from the Institut Nordhausen (Zentralwerke) in Bleicherode and near locations.

The allocation of the 175 specialists in NII-88 is described by Uhl, p. 136-137, as follows: "In Podlipki 99 of the German specialists remained for putting the production facilities from the Soviet Occupation Zone into operation and support assembly. The other 76 design engineers were transferred to the Gorodomlya island in lake Seliger, 330 km north-west of Moscow."

The testing of V-2 in Kapustin Yar in October 1947 is described by Uhl, p. 152 as follows: "Together with the Soviet design engineers from NII-88, also 13 German specialists arrived at the launching site in the Kasachian steppe (11 from Podlipki, 2 from Gorodomlya)." After describing the failures with the first two shots on October 18 and 20, 1947, Uhl continues (p. 153): "Ustinov decided that the present German specialists should analyze the reasons. [...] The Germans around Helmut Gröttrup decided quickly that their own knowledge was insufficient for a quick solution of the problem and asked to fly in the guidance specialists Kurt Magnus and Johannes Hoch." The quoted persons are provided with a photo on p. 158. SchmiAlf (talk) 15:32, 1 October 2022 (UTC)

Reverted SchmiAlf‘s contraversial edits
Have today reverted the edits that SchmiAlf has made as they are contraversial in that they promote a view of German influence that the majority of references do not support. Therefore I believe a consensus is required before any changes are made. I already believe the article provides an adequate balance, but happy to discuss and reach a consensus.

Schmilf, I see that you have provided two new references, both in German. Please provide a translation of both and advise why these two references should over ride the conclusions in the “Historical analysis” section, particularly Siddiqi(2000) on pages 40,63 & 83–84, Neufield and Mick (2003). Ilenart626 (talk) 09:29, 15 August 2023 (UTC)


 * I agree that your edits should remain. The stated claims do not seem to be backed up by the given sources.
 * I believe this whole page requires further review as it appears to violate neutrality and editorial rules in several places; notably claiming a book is "epic" and stating it was highly rated the Wall Street Journal, despite the only source linking to the author's page and not the Wall Street Journal. Lostsandwich (talk) 09:52, 15 August 2023 (UTC)
 * This discussion is going on since some time. There were definively severe flaws of the earlier changes done by @Ilenart626 which I addressed in the discussion above. It is not true at all that the German contribution stopped by the end of 1947 as was cited, and that there was marginal influence only at all. Even with the quoted sources this was not supported, not by Siddiqi and Boris Certok (who published a specific Soviet view).
 * There is a newly referenced CIA report (Aug 26, 1953) which is based on information from the German aircraft engineer Konrad Toebe (as we know from other documents, e.g. Przybilski). Read this first before you start deleting. The Russian publication of 2016 is fully documented together with a German translation. The argument of "translate first" is strange - as you can check it yourself with the help of many translation tools. The essential section is quoted in the article now. This direct statement of an official Russian source (reviewing from 2016) is clearly at the same level as Siddiqi's conclusions in 2000 with limited access to Soviet documents. It was clearly Soviet policy to deny German (or other foreign) influence on their development (and hide or destroy according documents). Siddiqi's statements on page 40 is related to 1946, page 63 to 1948, and pp. 83-84 clearly contraindicate your earlier statements that the German influence was marginal. You insisted on this statement although I provided an English translation of Ustinov's history (see above under Translation for German Source). @Ilenart626, which is the driver for your agitation contra German influence in Soviet space technology?   SchmiAlf (talk) 10:20, 15 August 2023 (UTC)
 * my request for translation is as per WP:NONENG “…if a dispute arises involving a citation to a non-English source, editors may request a quotation of relevant portions of the original source be provided, either in text, in a footnote, or on the article talk page”. You have included a reference to a German Utube and some sort of promotional(?) PDF.  Please provide a translation of both in English so your claims can be verified.  Ilenart626 (talk) 10:36, 15 August 2023 (UTC)
 * @Ilenart626, I do not understand the motivation of your changes. It is destructive. Already the first change, which you are sticking at since mor than one vear, clearly shows the bias: " However, after 1947 the Soviets made very little use of German specialists and their  influence  on the future Soviet space program was  marginal ." Where are your arguments for this? I think it is proven by Ustinovs and Koroljows visits to Gorodomlya into late 1949 that the Soviets had a major interest in the German developments. In addition, you deleted the proof of the similarity between G-4 / R-14 and the R-7 boosters without any argument. I guess we need admin support for solving this issue. SchmiAlf (talk) 06:46, 16 August 2023 (UTC)

SchmiAlf, the statement in the summary "However, after 1947 the Soviets made very little use of German specialists and their influence on the future Soviet space program was marginal." is supported by the details in the “Historical Analysis” section. In particular it is supported by this section on page 84 of Siddiqi 2000:
 * “On the other hand, the available evidence suggests that Korolev and his team made very little use of German expertise, at least after 1947. Their influence over the direction of the Soviet balistic missile program was marginal at best”

It is also supported by 5 other references in this section.

You have deleted the above wording in the summary and replaced with the following:
 * “…including long range and intercontinental missiles. After 1949 the Soviets made very little use of German specialists, but they influenced the future Soviet space program with basic technology for the R-5 and R-7 missile development. ”

This single reference is to a Utube Video in German, which you have failed to provide a translation to English as required by    WP:NONENG and I requested above. So yes I have reverted your edit. How am I and other editors suppose to review and verify whether your single reference to a German Utube video is enough to overide the six other references?

Regarding “the proof of the similarity between G-4 / R-14 and the R-7 boosters“ I have also reviewed pages 11-14 of the 1954 CIA report which you have referenced to support the following:
 * ”The R-7 boosters, developed from 1954, show a clear similarity with the G-4 concept, both in dimensions and shape. Only the engine was drafted as a single engine, while Glushko could not achieve this challenging goal and developed the RD-107 engine with four smaller engines. This R-7 design has also used details of the design for the oxygen and alcohol containers which also build the external skin of the boosters.“

These pages describe the engineering design of a R-14 missile and includes several items that highlight differences to a R-10. I can see no mention of “R-7”, “G-4” or any reference to “Glushko” or problems he was having with “RD-107”, which is also not mentioned. As your statement is not supported by this reference it should be deleted.

SchmiAlf I believe you are pov pushing a WP:Fringe theory that is not supported by credible articles describing the Soviet Space program. Given our previous discussions, I am happy if you want to initiate WP:Dispute. Ilenart626 (talk) 13:24, 16 August 2023 (UTC)


 * Siddiqi's statement on page 84 seems to be the decisive base of @Ilenart626‘s approach for rating the German influence. It it were true or undoubted, I would step back in this discussion here. However, Siddiqi's says that his claim is based on "available evidence" (from his perspective, at the year of 2000) although he quotes other sources claiming the opposite (which may belong to the other five source you mention). So tell me please which „other 5 references in this section support Siddiqi’s statement“. It is neither James Harford, nor Ordway and Sharp, nor the CIA.
 * The historical facts are different. Even Siddiqi (pp. 80-83) mentions a lot of details of the German work on Gorodomlya island for the G-2 and G-4 concepts until February 1950 with several visits of Soviet high-ranking personnel:
 * "On April 4, 1949, Minister of Armaments Ustinov personally visited the Gorodomlya facility with a proposal to the Germans to design a missile that could carry a three-ton warhead a distance of 3,000 kilometers."
 * "On October 1, 1949, Ustinov sent N 11 -88 Director Maj. General Gonor, Chief Engineer Pobedonostsev, and Chief Designer Korolev to Gorodomlya to be briefed on the G-4 missile. It was a rare interaction between the latter and the Germans, and it was probably Korolev 's last visit to the island."
 * Why should they have visited Gorodmlya? To watch the Germans playing sports and gardening (as Certok put it for 1950 and later)? The only explanation is that Soviets had a great interest in German support for the G-4 “Skizzenprojekt” and related tasks for their own developments of long range and intercontinental missiles. Of course, no CIA paper of 1952 or 1953 did mention the R-7 explicitly, even in 1957 they were completely dumbfounded by the Sputnik launch.
 * It is even probable that there was a later visit of Korolev to Gorodomlya, as mentioned by Werner Albring’s Gorodomlia (p. 172): “Some time later, Mr. Gröttrup told me that Mr. Korolev had come to the island once again and visited him in his office. The subject of the conversation was the last project. Korolev had seemed very depressed and had acted as if they were seeing each other for the last time in their lives. Gröttrup suspected that Korolev must be having great personal difficulties.”  This situation perfectly fits to the failed R-2 starts in autumn 1950 (cf. Siddiqi, p. 70-72). It may well be that Gröttrup did not report the CIA this incident to avoid personal trouble for Korolev who was forbidden to contact the then isolated Germans but trusted Gröttrup’s secrecy and knowledgeable support. We need to consider that the Soviets (and Russians), during and after the Cold War, were not eager to admit relevant German contribution. This is true for many Soviet historians, including most Korolev’s biographers and Certok’s auto-biography.
 * Siddiqi continued on p. 82: "Work on the G-4 and G-5 projects coincided with a marked decrease in work among the Germans. In April 1950, the Ministry of Armaments formally decided to terminate further work on long-range missiles at Branch No. I at Gorodomlya. Also, by order of the ministry, on March 29 of that year [1950], all access to classified materials was denied to the Germans. Despite the order, the Soviets continued to ask advice on technical matters well into 1951, by which time Gröttrup had been replaced as technical leader of the Germans by Johannes Hoch, who died soon after from appendicitis. [In fact, he was followed by Waldemar Wolff after a few weeks.] Despite the poor living conditions at Gorodomlya, the NII-88 leadership operated a well-maintained set of technical facilities at the island that were regularly used by the Soviets. In early 1951, groups of young Soviet engineers migrated to Gorodomlya ostensibly to be taught by the experienced Germans at these excellent facilities."
 * Siddiqi's statement on page 84 contradicts his own research details on pp. 80-83. Therefore my statement “After 1949 the Soviets made very little use of German specialists, […]” comes much closer to the historical facts and even Siddiqui's history. Maybe, even Siddiqi meant this year "1949" and just ran into a typing error on page 84 (his history had already touched 1950 and suddenly jumped back to 1947).
 * Further investigations of CIA reports from 1952 to 1954, based on “interrogations” of German returnees from Gorodomlya, lead me to compare the amazing similarities between the G-4/R-14 design (page 23 of the CIA report) with the known R-7 boosters. It is like adding one plus one for stating “[…], but they influenced the future Soviet space program with basic technology for the R-5 and R-7 missile development.” In large agreement, this view is also supported by Marc Wade’s Encyclopedia Astronautica. So it is not “POV-pushing” or a “fringe idea” of my own. In addition, there is the Russian “70 Years of Swesda 1946-2016” document which is worth referencing as a valid source for the German contributions and is not a “promotional PDF”. We may agree to leave out the Techsperimente video (Utub) and the associated sketch as long as there is no English translation available. If we continue in a constructive way, I can add further details of R-7 motor developments, which is only partially addressed in the CIA document of 1953-08-26 (and put this into the talk first for discussion). SchmiAlf (talk) 17:12, 17 August 2023 (UTC)
 * After some research in Siddiqi's document I'm giving hints for additional information:
 * p. 108 (1952): "The configuration of the ICBM in the original N3 studies owed much to the shape of the abandoned R-3 missile, which was a classically constructed sleek cylinder. The new design incorporated tapered boosters, similar to elongated cones and superficially similar to the German A-4 [should read: G-4]. Engineers at OKB-I evidently gravitated to a conical shape for the strap-ons primarily because of the aerodynamic advantages over a standard cylindrical design. Furthermore, the size of the engines, the possibility of imparting additional thrust to the central sustainer, and the opportunity of decreasing tank wall thickness eventually prompted the engineers to drop the classic cylinder design. The end result was four conical-shaped boosters attached to a central element. which widened in its diameter to meet the apexes of each of the four cones." [see also CIA 1953-08-26, item 10b, for the advantages of the conical shape]
 * pp. 129-130 (1954): "The most important factor was clearly propulsion. Preliminary calculations showed that Glushko's singlechamber LOX-kerosene RD-105 and RD-106 engines with thrust ranges of fifty to sixty tons would prove inadequate for the task of lifting a five-and-a-half-ton payload. The engines themselves were performing poorly during ground tests at OKB-456 because of burning instabilities in the combustion chambers. which led to high-frequency vibrations. Glushko's introduction of ribbed combustion chamber walls for cooling helped alleviate heating problems. but the engines had reached the physical upper limits of thrust. [...] Glushko could combine four combustion chambers together, all fed by the same turbopump. Although the unstable burning problem remained. its effects were drastically reduced because of the low thrust of each chamber. The advantages were numerous. Not only were performance values improved. but there also were considerable savings in engine mass compared to the thrust levels achieved. [...] The engines that emerged from this redesign were the RD-107 and RD-108." [see also CIA 1953-08-26, item 6a, for for using four to six A4-motors per G-4, item 6b for a multi-stage rocket with "surrounding missiles"; in fact the RD-107 has a thrust of approx. 4 A4-motors = 100 tons.
 * SchmiAlf (talk) 08:53, 18 August 2023 (UTC)


 * SchmiAlf, in reply to your statement “Siddiqi's statement on page 84 seems to be the decisive base of Ilenart626's approach for rating the German influence”; if you review Siddiqi’s Wikipedia article you will see Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974 is “…widely considered  to be the best English-language history of the Soviet space program in print and was identified by The Wall Street Journal as "one of the five best books" on space exploration.  ”.  So yes I consider the opinion from this book should be preeminent. The rest of your reasoning appears to be your own conclusions (ie reasons for Soviet’s visiting Gorodmlya) or combining various statements from Siddiqi, CIA reports and other sources to support your conclusions.  In other words you are contravening  both WP:OR and WP:SYNTH in your arguments. When you disregard your conclusions and synthesis of articles, I cannot see any reason to change my views. Ilenart626 (talk) 14:14, 20 August 2023 (UTC)
 * @Ilenart626, you did not answer to my question. I'm not doubting Siddiqi as a generally reliable source (unlike you generally doubt Marc Wade’s Encyclopedia Astronautica and delete references in other articles like Intercontinental ballistic missile just claiming them as "unreliable" without saying what especially is wrong). All six references which you have added here do not explain Siddiqi's contradiction between his findings on pp. 80-83 (which are supported by many other sources) contrary to his isolated statement on p. 84 without any further proof or reference. It is not my conclusion ... it is just common sense. Therefore I'm deleting the sentence "However, after 1947 the Soviets made very little use of German specialists and their influence on the future Soviet space program was marginal." because it is "implausible and misleading". SchmiAlf (talk) 07:51, 21 August 2023 (UTC)

SchmiAlf, the 5 other references that support Siddiqi's opinion are Chertok (2005) Ley (1969), Russians Space Web, Mick (2003) and Neufeld (2012)

Note that some of these references are saying that the German had little influence, for example:
 * Chertok - “…the Germans had little influence and the R-7 rocket that propelled the Sputnik 1 to orbit was "free of the "birthmarks" of German rocket technology" and
 * Ley - “In reality, the Germans did not build anything for the Russians, did not “supervise" the firings, and did not introduce innovations”

While the other take a more balanced view, for example:
 * Russian Space Web - “As it often happens in history, the truth might lie in between…” and
 * Mick & Neufeld - “As a gross generalization, one can say that the initial transfer of Third Reich knowledge, both in the eastern occupation zone and in the USSR, was a success, but afterwards the value of most of the German teams quickly diminished as a result of the Stalinist policy of isolation and secrecy, compounded by linguistic difficulties, differences in engineering cultures, rivalry and resentment from indigenous engineers and scientists, and the inefficiencies and disin- centives of the planned economy.”

Note that it is not my opinion that “…after 1947 the Soviets made very little use of German specialists and their influence on the future Soviet space program was marginal”. It is the opinion of Siddiqi, supported by the above 5 additional references. I have not assumed that there is a “… typing error on page 84…”. None of the above has “…lead me to compare the amazing similarities…”.

Regarding the Encyclopedia Astronautica, as you are well aware, the site is no longer updated or maintained and most space scholars consider the site to be unreliable, as detailed in its article, and this reference.

So again you are relying on syntheseis of various sources and your own conclusions to support your view, therefore I am reverting your latest edit.

SchmiAlf please do not make any further edits to the article based on your own research and conclusions. Suggest you review both both WP:OR and WP:SYNTH. If you do not want to WP:DROP THE STICK suggest you look to third opinions, dispute resolution noticeboard or requests for comment. Ilenart626 (talk) 13:24, 22 August 2023 (UTC)


 * Our basic dispute is whether the work of the German specialists during 1948 and 1949 had a "marginal influence only" on Soviet rocketry. My comments to first on the "5 other references which support Siddiqi":
 * Chertok (2005): His "Rockets and People" was published in 1995 in Russia and edited (translated?) by Siddiqi who referred to it frequently in his "Challenge to Apollo". Chertok's main argument is (vol 2, p. 73): "Before the historical day of 4 October 1957, foreign publications wrote to the effect that the Russians were using German experience and German specialists to develop their rockets. All of these conversations and stories ended after the world saw the first artificial Earth satellite. The famous R-7 rocket, the first intercontinental missile, free of the “birthmarks” of German rocket technology, inserted this satellite into orbit." In a strict sense he is right because the Germans never set up any drawing or fixed any screw of the R-7 developed from 1954. We also need to consider that Chertok was ruled by the doctrine that all Soviet rocketry success was achieved by Soviet engineers only, with a deadly risk when "revealing state secrets". On vol 2, p. 68, he has written: "In 1950 the nature of the work conducted by NII-88 Branch No. 1 changed. The Ministry of Armaments officially decided to halt further work on the design of long-range rockets in the German workforce. This decision was prompted by the perfectly understandable pessimistic moods of the Germans, the lack of faith in the purpose of their further work, and their loss of creative enthusiasm. The gap between the problems posed in 1947 and the actual capabilities for solving them was so obvious by 1950 that promises to correct the situation inspired little of the confidence required for work. As I mentioned earlier, for further productive work on the development of rockets, the main thing was that we needed to allow the German specialists to participate in joint work in all areas of our cooperation. But this would have involved “revealing state secrets.” The island’s isolation led to an ever increasing gap between the German scientists’ level of knowledge and experience and that of the specialists from the “mainland.”  This statement supports my view that the relevance of the German work was stopped by the end of 1949 (and not end of 1947). Chertok also admits "creative enthusiasm".
 * Ley (1969): How should he have had any closer insight at that time, without access to Soviet and CIA documents, without any related publications during the Cold War?
 * The other references you mention have a more balanced view and are not supporting a marginal influence only.
 * The arguments that the German work had a "more than marginal influence and lasted until the end of 1949" are supported as follows:
 * German participation/contributions to scientific-technical meetings at NII-88 in December 1948, July 1949 in Gorodomlya (Russian Web Space) In Dec 1949, the Germans were not invited for the first time.
 * Siddiqis description "The end of the Road for the Germans" (p. 80-83) with many details of Soviet visits to Gorodomlya in 1948 and 1949, including high-ranking Ustinov and Korolew. These visits were not for fun but with a
 * This situation of sketching G-1 (R-10), G-2 (R-12), G-4 (R-14) and Soviet interest during 1948/1949 has been largely described by Irmgard Gröttrup's Rocket Wife (1959), Werner Albring's Gorodomlia (1991, German only), Kurt Magnus' Raketensklaven (1999, German only). Technical details are found in Encyclopedia Astronautica.
 * Ernest Schwiebert in USAF's Ballistic Missiles - 1954-1964: "The work of the captive German scientists and technicians served as a yardstick against which Soviet accomplishments could be measured, and the Soviets were capable of extracting those developments useful to their program and of discarding others which they had already surpassed," (quoted from Russian Web Space, id=56)
 * CIA report The R-14 Project, a Design of a Long Range Missile at Gorodomlya Island (RDP80-00810A001800090003-0, August 1953) with details for R-14 including the advantages/dimensions of the conical shape, use of very thin steel or aluminium for "single-shell self-containing structure" (now known as Balloon tank) with detailed calculation for the pressure level, detacheable warhead, use of one or four motors per rocket, etc. (most probably based on Konrad Toebe's interrogation, also compare to Olaf Przybilski's research)
 * CIA report Development of Guided Missiles at Bleicherode and Institute 88 (RDP80-00810A003300530005-2, January 1954) (based on Helmut Gröttrup's interrogation)
 * CIA report Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field (RDP79R01012A008900020001-3), March 1957): "We believe that exploitation of the Germans, together with parallel and subsequent native efforts, enabled the USSR to make significant process in the development of ballistic missiles of short and medium ranges after 1948. In addition to the 25- and 35-ton thrust rocket motors which were available at that time, we believe that a 100-ton thrust motor was successfully developed by 1953." (The R-7 (rocket family), had a 100-ton motor RD-107 with four burning chamber, 4x 25 ton.)
 * CIA report Analysis of Soviet earth satellite and launching device (DOC_0000124270, November 1957). "The total thrust of the second Soviet satellite (Sputnik II) must have been 1,000 tons or more, and its weight at launch must have been 500,000 kg or 500 metric tons (if it is true that the payload weight was approximately 500 kg)." Gröttrup stated in his interrogation 1954: "Furthermore, it was generally held up to now that the ratio thrust/take-off weights should be approximately two. This assumption was wrong, since it did not take into account the dependence of the “empty” weight on the thrust for reasons of strength. discovered (although it must be admitted that investigations were very rough) that values as low as 1.2 for this ratio could give optimum results under certain conditions." In reality, the R-7 for Sputnik 2 had a launch weight of approx. 270 tons due to light-weight construction and used a ratio thrust/take-off weights of 1.4.
 * The Russian 70 Years of Swesda 1946-2016 document (2016) acknowledged the German contributions as follows: "The German experience in terms of basic research and practical engineering application became a good school for the Soviet scientists. Many valuable ideas were adopted from the German collective, which saved the Soviet rocket industry many years of development and mistakes. [...] In the technically simplified design of a single-stage rocket with a conical shape, many innovations were again implemented: For the first time there were no gas thrusters, the rocket was equipped with stages in longitudinal and transverse pitch, with a bundle of three engines as a propulsion block and engine control during acceleration."
 * System for the simultaneaous emptying of both tanks as proposed by Gröttrup in his CIA interrogation (id 23): "Detailed mathematical investigations showed that large losses in range occurred as soon as the mixture strength [of alcohol and oxygen] departed from its optimum value. This was not because of the relatively small resulting change in thrust, but because of change in the quantity of fuel remaining at cutoff. For this reason, rockets intended for maximum range were fitted with special fuel meters in both tanks. These meters regulated the fuel consumption so that both tanks became empty at the same time." This principle was later used with R-5 Pobeda and R-7 (see Система опорожнения баков in Russian Wikipedia) (of course never officially recognized as German invention).
 * The facts above proof that there were German "birthmarks" for the Soviet rocketry and that the German work fully continued until the end of 1949. I propose that we agree on removing Siddiqi's statement in the header section of the article and that we have the pros and cons of the controversary handled as separate sections. It must not be the approach that everything contradicting Siddiqi's (and Chertok's) questionable statements is reverted with reference to well-understood guiding principles of Wikipedia. The truth may be more complicated and no historian has the perfect answer.  SchmiAlf (talk) 11:53, 25 August 2023 (UTC)
 * SchmiAlf, as I have repeatedly said above, there is no consensus for your edits based on your own research and conclusions, which contradicts both both WP:OR and WP:SYNTH. You are pov pushing a WP:Fringe theory that is not supported by credible articles describing the Soviet Space program. Again, as I have previously said above, you should initiate WP:Dispute if you want to pursue your controversial edits. Ilenart626 (talk) 04:36, 3 September 2023 (UTC)
 * I have started Dispute resolution noticeboard SchmiAlf (talk) 08:27, 3 September 2023 (UTC)
 * Meanwhile this dispute has been moved to Dispute resolution noticeboard/Archive 237 SchmiAlf (talk) 07:30, 11 October 2023 (UTC)

RFC on Last Sentence of Lede
Which of the following should be the last sentence of the lede paragraph? Robert McClenon (talk) 06:37, 2 October 2023 (UTC)

A. - The existing last sentence: B. C.

Please reply A or B or C with a brief statement in the Survey. Please do not reply to the statements of other editors in the Survey. You may engage in back-and-forth discussion in the Discussion section; that's what it's for.

Survey
Option A or C for the following reasons: Ilenart626 (talk) 10:27, 2 October 2023 (UTC)
 * Option A is supported by Asif Siddiqi’s Challenge to Apollo: The Soviet Union and the Space Race, 1945-1974 (2000) Washington, D.C: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA History Div, which is described in Siddiqi’s Wikipedia article as “…widely considered to be the best English-language history of the Soviet space program” in print and was identified by The Wall Street Journal as "one of the five best books" on space exploration.” Siddiiqi view states on page 84: “On the other hand, the available evidence suggests that Korolev and his team made very little use of German expertise, at least after 1947. Their influence over the direction of the Soviet balistic missile program was marginal at best”
 * Option C is supported both by by Siddiqi’s (2000) statement on page 84 and Michael Nuefeld’s The Nazi aerospace exodus: towards a global, transnational history (2012)], History and Technology: An International Journal, statement on page 58 “The Germans played a central role in that process, including the further development of the missile and its rocket engine, but after 1948 they were increasingly frozen out and set to work on theoretical designs that were never used.”
 * The date in option A is supported by Siddiqi (2000) which specifies “1947” on page 84, whilst the dates in option C is supported both by Siddiqi (2000) and by Neufeld (2012) which specifies “1948” on page 58.
 * Options A and C reflect the conclusions of the historical analysis section of the article, as per WP:MOSLEAD.

Option B for the following reasons:
 * Option A is not consistent with Siddiqi's (2000) own description of the German involvements after 1947: In April 1949, the Soviet minister of armaments Dmitry Ustinov urgently ordered the German specialists to work on G-4 (R-14) and G-5 designs with results reviewed by Soviet managers and specialists in October 1949 who ordered "minor redesign efforts until February 1950" (Siddiqi, p. 81), and "the Soviets continued to ask advice on technical matters well into 1951. [...] In early 1951, groups of young Soviet engineers migrated to Gorodomlya ostensibly to be taught by the experienced Germans at these excellent facilities. It was the last time that the Soviets would make active use of German expertise in the postwar years." (Siddiqi, p. 82).


 * Option C does not reflect the German involvement and intensive Soviet interest documented by high-level bilateral meetings on Gorodomlya Island (April 1949, October 1949) as mentioned above.
 * According to Russian Web Space "Ustinov made a decision to phase out the advanced missile development work on Gorodomlya in April 1950" (which is not "after 1947-48"). Therefore the statement "they were set to work on theoretical designs that were never used" is applicable (with exceptions) only for the period after April 1950.


 * Option B is supported on basis of Matthias Uhl's Stalins V2 dissertation (2005) on the "Technology Transfer of German Missile Technology in the USSR and the Buildup of the Soviet Rocket Industry 1945 to 1959" with many details of research in Russian archives, pp. 132-216. Ustinov's 1951 report to Beria draws the following conclusion:
 * "The German specialists who have worked in the field of reactive technology have given considerable aid in restoring and reconstructing the German designs, especially in the first period. Their individual theoretical, design, and experimental work was used in designing Soviet models. "
 * German returnees from USSR have reported innovative concepts of G-2 (R-12) and [G-4 (R-14) (e.g., in 1953-08 CIA interrogation and 1954-01 CIA interrogation) and provide details of technical concepts and calculations later found in Soviet missiles. These reports were not considered by Siddiqi (2000) and Neufeld (2012) because the CIA released them in 2010 only.

--SchmiAlf (talk) 12:28, 2 October 2023 (UTC)

Following response from @Neopeius has been copied from the Space race talk page Ilenart626 (talk) 01:00, 22 November 2023 (UTC)


 * Option C based on the only sources I have on hand (Chertok and Siddiqi). However, since the sentence was not proper English ("However, due to a combination of security and political requirements, after 1947-48 they were excluded and set to work on theoretical designs that were never used, the Soviets made very little use of German specialists and their future influence on the Soviet space program was marginal."), I'd instead say, "However, due to a combination of security and political requirements, after 1947-48 they were excluded and set to work on theoretical designs that were never used; the Soviets made very little use of German specialists and their future influence on the Soviet space program was marginal." If we need further sources, I can ask Asif (we are both members of the AAS History Committee) if he can recommend other published sources on the issue. --Neopeius (talk) 22:26, 21 November 2023 (UTC)

Based on @Neopeius' latest comment on the  Space race talk page (14:34, 3 December 2023 (UTC)) the above vote is no longer valid and was therefore crossed out. --SchmiAlf (talk) 14:45, 5 December 2023 (UTC)
 * Based on that comment, I revise my proposed language to: "However, due to a combination of security and political requirements, from the late 1940s they were excluded from Soviet rocket design, while they continued developing plans for the G-2 and G-4, they were never produced. Nevertheless, the Soviets used the work of Gröttrup’s team to verify their own efforts and incorporated useful innovations by the Germans into their own designs." --Neopeius (talk) 14:57, 5 December 2023 (UTC)

This RFC has been open more than 10 weeks and so far 2 editors prefer a modified C (myself and Caeciliusinhorto-public in the discussion section below) and two editors prefer modified wording above (SchmiAlf and Neopeius, though I suspect Neopeius may of changed his support considering his recent comments at Talk:Space Race). Therefore there is no consensus and I believe this RFC should be closed. However the details in Talk:German influence on the Soviet space program below provides a way forward with updating this article, including the Lead. Ilenart626 (talk) 09:53, 17 December 2023 (UTC)

Discussion
I note that in SchmiAlf‘s survey comments dated 2 October above: Ilenart626 (talk) 15:19, 2 October 2023 (UTC)
 * SchmiAlf’s analysis of option A and C are their own analysis of a primary source, which he notes Siddiqi on p. 81 has already considered. In other words, it is their own analysis (in contravention of WP:OR) which they believe is better than Siddiqi's (2000), a secondary source, that has been cited by the The Wall Street Journal as "one of the five best books" on space exploration.
 * SchmiAlf’s analysis of Russian Web Space does not support his statement that "Ustinov made a decision to phase out the advanced missile development work on Gorodomlya in April 1950". I assume this is either WP:OR or WP:SYNTH
 * as SchmiAlf is well aware, Matthias Uhl's Stalins V2 and Dmitry Ustinov’s 1951 report were considered by Siddiqi in his (2009) essay “Germans in Russia: Cold War, Technology Transfer, and National Identity”, where Siddiiqi delves into how and why German specialist were not used. This highlights further reasons as to why the Soviets ignored German expertise, including secrecy requirements, Zhdanovshchina and Korolev’s conviction as an enemy of the state. In other words, SchmiAlf believes his own analysis of these sources should overide Siddiiqi.
 * SchmiAlf’s analysis of 1950’s CIA interrogations are again his own analysis of primary sources, which does not prove anything. The CIA had no knowledge of what the Soviets were doing with this work.  As Neufeld (2012) concluded, these were “theoretical designs that were never used”.


 * I'm referring to primary sources because they are relevant and are deemed reliable. Primary source states: "In contexts such as historical writing, it is almost always advisable to use primary sources and that "if none are available, it is only with great caution that [the author] may proceed to make use of secondary sources." The sources which I'm mentioning were recorded in 1953 and 1954 during DIA interrogations but were never analyzed by Siddiqi (2000), Siddiqi (2009), Neufeld (2012), Uhl (2005), and Mick (2003). It is the closest view we have, much closer to the original events as compared to Chertok (1994) and Ordway ( 1989) and not confused or biased by later story-telling.
 * Siddiqi (2009) and Neufeld (2012) basically use the same historical basis known around 2000 to 2005. While Siddiqi (2000) has brought up the statement used here for Option A, Neufeld (2012) argues quite differently into the direction of Option B or Option C when writing on page 58: “The Germans played a central role in that process, including the further development of the missile and its rocket engine, but after 1948 they were increasingly frozen out and set to work on theoretical designs that were never used.” (underline added by me). This statement can be interpreted in the way of Option B and Option C, depending on the point of view and evaluations of other sources. It does not contradict Option B.
 * Siddigi (2009)'s update did not really consider the details of the additonal sources he mentioned (Uhl' Stalins V-2 (2005), Magnus' Raketensklaven (1999), Albring's Gorodomlia (1991)), with the following errors identified on pp. 129-130:
 * Kurt Magnus joined the Bleicherode team on April 25, 1946 (Magnus, p. 23), not before Helmut Gröttrup in July 1945. Magnus was recruited by Helmut Gröttrup from the university of Göttingen (not Hettingen) (Magnus, p. 20). The same applies for Werner Albring (Albring, pp. 37-43).
 * The initial salary of Helmut Gröttrup (not: Herman Gröttrup) was 7,000 rubles "plus a personal bonus" as proven by Gröttrup's copy of salary note of Dec 29, 1946, not 4,500 rubles as stated by Siddiqi (2009). Albring (p. 103) mentions 10,000 rubles for Gröttrup (which may include the bonus). The value of 4,500 rubles is documented by Febr 25, 1951 in RGAE 397-1-105 (referred by Uhl, quoted by Siddiqi on p. 141 but not considered in depth), after the German team "was frozen out" and Gröttrup had been replaced by Waldemar Wolff as head of the German team after September 1950.
 * The initial salary of Kurt Magnus was 7,000 rubles (Magnus, p. 80).
 * Siddiqi (2009) (p. 130) states without providing a source: "Gröttrup and his wife and two children, for example, lived in the six-room villa belonging to a former Soviet minister, complete with all necessary amenities, including Mrs. Gröttrup’s chauffeur-driven BMW and her transplanted horse." In Siddiqui (2000), p. 45, we find a similar statement, but without the horse, referring to "Chertok, Rakety i Iyudi, pp. 196-97; Ordway and Sharpe, The Rocket Team, p. 325" as source. According to Magnus (p. 60) the "villa" was a "ground floor wooden building with two apartments" (one of them for Johannes Hoch, another deported German scientist with three children). Chertok did not mention a horse for Irmgard Gröttrup in Bleicherode or Moscow.
 * SchmiAlf (talk) 17:46, 2 October 2023 (UTC)
 * Re. primary sources: while it is true that academic history writing relies on interpreting primary sources, that is not wikipedia's job. WP:RS says: Prefer secondary sources – Articles should rely on secondary sources whenever possible. For example, a paper reviewing existing research, a review article, monograph, or textbook is often better than a primary research paper. When relying on primary sources, extreme caution is advised. Wikipedians should never interpret the content of primary sources for themselves.
 * Re. Siddiqui 2000. He explicitly concludes his discussion of the G-4 and G-5 designs by saying that the influence of this work on the future of the Soviet ballistics program was "marginal at best". It doesn't matter if you think the G-4 and G-5 designs were important to the future of the Soviet space program: what we care about is whether the reliable sources do, and in the case of Siddiqui "marginal at best" is about as clear as a source can be.
 * If there's a disagreement between Siddiqui and Neufeld as to whether 1947 or 1948 is the date after which the Germans were frozen out, we can always compromise and say something like "from the late 1940s", citing both sources. Contra your claim that Neufeld "does not contradict option B" however, it clearly does: Neufeld says that they were frozen out "after 1948" which contradicts the claim in option B that the key date was 1949 just as much as it contradicts the claim in option A that the key date was 1947. Caeciliusinhorto-public (talk) 11:29, 27 October 2023 (UTC)
 * Basically WP:RS it is fully understood as a guideline to avoid too deep diving into details and get lost. However, Siddiqi has some issues in consistency. From a higher level it looks like he wrote his conclusion ("after 1947 ... marginal at best") and later added details based on Ordway and Sharpe (p. 337-338) in the part prior to his conclusion. Siddiqi does no really consider their definite summary (p. 337): "The R-14 finally proposed by the Germans [in 1949] was certainly no 'uprated' V-2. It was a new departure in rocket design. Indeed, at the time, it was considerably in advance of anything proposed or thought of by von Braun and his team in the United States." The following details of conical shape, monocoque structure, swivelable nozzles for roll control, etc., are all mentioned in the 1953-08-26 CIA interrogation on R-14 already known to Ordway and Sharpe (see reference on p. 442) although it had not been officially released by the CIA by 1979. Given this and many examples for such technology improvements in later rocket designs of East and West one cannot really conclude that the German influence after 1947 was marginal. In addition, Ordway and Sharpe is a more relevant (and neutral) secondary source (with Siddiqi being a third source only in this case).
 * To solve the mutual blocking in this dispute I'm proposing to replace the last sentence of the current lede by Neufeld's (2012) (p. 58) statement: “The Germans played a central role in that process, including the further development of the missile and its rocket engine, but after 1948 they were increasingly frozen out and set to work on theoretical designs that were never used.” This is much closer to option B and option C. As a suggestion, we might paraphrase it as follows: “The German team contributed to missile and engine designs for larger range and payload. For secrecy reasons, they became more and more isolated after 1948 and were eventually restricted to theoretical designs with marginal Soviet interest.” SchmiAlf (talk) 15:55, 30 October 2023 (UTC)
 * From a higher level it looks like he wrote his conclusion ("after 1947 ... marginal at best") and later added details based on Ordway and Sharpe (p. 337-338) in the part prior to his conclusion. This really sounds like you reaching to explain away the fact that you don't like Siddiqui's conclusion. Siddiqui's conclusion says what it says; it's not our place to speculate without evidence on how he came to that conclusion.
 * Ordway and Sharpe is a more relevant (and neutral) secondary source As far as I can see Ordway and Sharpe say nothing in the pages you cited about the point at issue. They spend several pages talking about what the Germans were doing in the post-1948 period, but if they say anything about the extent to which that had an influence on the development of the Soviet rocket progam I'm not seeing it.  Can you quote the relevant text?
 * The German team contributed to missile and engine designs for larger range and payload. For secrecy reasons, they became more and more isolated after 1948 and were eventually restricted to theoretical designs with marginal Soviet interest. I have two issues with this: firstly that it's a misleading paraphrase of Neufeld, suggesting that "more isolated after 1948" and "eventually restricted to theoretical designs" were separate phases; Neufeld's "after 1948 they were increasingly frozen out and set to work on theoretical designs" does not suggest this. Secondly, two sources have been provided for the date from which the German scientists were increasingly isolated: Siddiqui says 1947 and Neufeld says 1948.  Unless there's evidence that scholars generally agree with Neufeld in dating this to 1948 (which I do not see provided here) I do not see the justification for omitting Siddiqui altogether here.
 * Option C looks to me the text which best fits the sources which have been provided in this discussion. Alternatively, rather than saying "from 1947-48" we could say "from the late 1940s", which would avoid us explicitly stating the 1947 date proposed by Siddiqui which you don't like. Caeciliusinhorto-public (talk) 10:41, 1 November 2023 (UTC)
 * I’m ok with changing Option C from “…after 1947-48…” to “…from the late 1940s…” Ilenart626 (talk) 13:09, 1 November 2023 (UTC)
 * The issue with Siddiqi (2000) is that he ignored the essential innovative details of G-4/R-14 presented during the years 1948 and 1949 (on pp. 80-83) within his isolated statement on p. 84. He did not explain how he came to this conclusion after the Soviets were eagerly interested in the German concepts in late 1949. It had "influence on the Soviet space program" as quite a lot of details of later Soviet rockets have proven which I have summarized earlier in controversial talk above and have been partially addressed by Ordway (1979).
 * The proposed Option C with twisting "after 1947" into "from the late 1940s" is about the same as Siddiqi p. 84, just with other words, including the venomed "marginal". It does not reflect anything of Neufeld's (2012) (and Anytoly Zak etc.) different conclusions which I tried to paraphrase.
 * It seems to me that Siddiqi (2000) is referred to as the Holy Bible of space science, as certified 2006 by the Wall Street Journal, and no newer insight may doubt it. Turning down my findings by WP:SP and other formal objections does not support neutrality of Wikipedia. SchmiAlf (talk) 10:04, 3 November 2023 (UTC)
 * The issue with Siddiqi (2000) is that he ignored the essential innovative details of G-4/R-14 presented during the years 1948 and 1949 (on pp. 80-83) within his isolated statement on p. 84. You are citing the three pages that Siddiqi spends discussing the G-4 program as evidence that Siddiqi failed to consider the G-4 program? Really?
 * It seems to me that Siddiqi (2000) is referred to as the Holy Bible of space science, as certified 2006 by the Wall Street Journal, and no newer insight may doubt it can you actually cite an example of a newer reliable source which doubts Siddiqi here? Neufeld has a slight difference in making the key date 1948 rather than 1947, and the Zak source you cite above concludes that "Russian sources are yet to collaborate this claim" (i.e. that the German team had signficant impact on Soviet rocketry). Caeciliusinhorto-public (talk) 14:11, 3 November 2023 (UTC)
 * On the first question: Siddiqi describes the G-4 program in 1949 (like Ordway/Sharpe) but fails to accept its importance for the future Soviet rocketry development with his conclusive statement. The German influence was neither marginal nor did it end in 1947.
 * Neufeld's statement is completely different with saying "after 1948 they were increasingly frozen out" (so it was a process which began in 1949) and not mentioning that "the German influence was marginal" (which is somewhat true for the period of 1950 thru 1953). Therefore Option C is far off from Neufeld's statement and not acceptable as a compromise.
 * One Russian source which was not available to Zak (2012) is the publication for the 70th anniversary of Zvezda enterprise (1946-2016). The Soviets and Russians continued the work of German team within the former branch No. 1 of Korolev's NII-88, on Gorodomlya Island (now Solnechny). This 2016 publication summarizes the German influence as follows (pp. 7-8):
 * In the new project G-2 (R-12) Gröttrups group found the optimal technical solution for creating a missile capable of delivering a warhead weighing at least one ton over a distance of over 2,500 km. Innovations were again incorporated into the technologically simplified design of the single-stage conical rocket for the first time. It was envisaged to abandon the gas-jet rudders, longitudinal and transverse division of the rocket into stages, a propulsion system as a block with three engines, and thrust control during acceleration.
 * When implementing the next rocket project of G-4 (R-14) with a range of 3,000 and a warhead of 3 tons the German team tried to use all accumulated experience. The rocket had to fly ten times further than the V-2. Changes were made to the design of this rocket until 1950, although the team understood the impossibility of building this rocket, like all the previous ones. The future plans for all developments in the NII-88 were kept strictly secret. In Podlipki, similar work was carried out in parallel by purely Soviet design groups, which were fully informed about the German project solutions. All the developments of the branch were available in two copies, one of which was sent to NII-88.
 * Branch № 1 was not briefed in detail about Soviet projects. The flight data of the missile tests were never disclosed. The complete isolation of the branch and the indefinite location of the collective led to a slowdown in the pace of German scientific research.
 * The Soviet R-2, R-5 and R-7 rockets show quite a lot of details which have been adapted although the German team did not construct them. The Soviets eventually managed to be first in space with Sputnik in 1957, then five years ahead of US space technology. Exactly as Ordway/Sharpe (1979) concluded: The R-14 finally proposed by the Germans [in 1949] was certainly no 'uprated' V-2. It was a new departure in rocket design. Indeed, at the time, it was considerably in advance of anything proposed or thought of by von Braun and his team in the United States. Marginal influence only? Ridiculous! SchmiAlf (talk) 09:56, 4 November 2023 (UTC)
 * SchmiAlf, I believe Caeciliusinhorto is being clear when they requested  can you actually cite an example of a newer reliable source which doubts Siddiqi here?. I note this is very similar to my Fourth Statement during the moderated discussion where I said “The main reason I disagree with SchmiAlf’s changes is that they have failed to provide reliable sources that support ‘that German specialists had a significant influence on the Soviet space program after 1947’”. In your Fifth to Ninth statements you failed to provide any reliable sources, with many of your statements being similar to your reply to  Caeciliusinhorto’s request above. I believe this is the crux of the issue.  You either need to provide a reliable source that clearly states “German specialists had a significant influence on the Soviet space program after 1947”, or accept what Siddiqi is clearly saying. Your own opinions and views on this issue are irrelevant. Ilenart626 (talk) 16:34, 4 November 2023 (UTC)
 * In addition to Ilenart626's entirely accurate reply, I want to pick up on your claim that Neufeld's statement is completely different with saying "after 1948 they were increasingly frozen out" (so it was a process which began in 1949). Saying that something happened more after 1948 does not necessarily imply that it  after 1948.
 * The R-14 finally proposed by the Germans [in 1949] was certainly no 'uprated' V-2. It was a new departure in rocket design. Indeed, at the time, it was considerably in advance of anything proposed or thought of by von Braun and his team in the United States Nothing about this contradicts "marginal influence". "Marginal influence" does not mean "the German team's work was not technically impressive"; it means "the Russian space program was not significantly influenced by the German team's work". Caeciliusinhorto-public (talk) 15:37, 6 November 2023 (UTC)
 * I understand the "crux" of this issue which is a consequence of the Soviet secrecy and even xenophobia that Soviet rocket technology was developed by Soviet engineers only. However, the Zvezda source tells a different story of German influence and has a solid Soviet/Russian historical basis. Even if nothing in Ordway/Sharpe is contradicting "marginal influence" (how should it?), not a single word is supporting it and Siddiqi can't base his claim upon them.
 * The Forgotten Rocketeers: German Scientists in the Soviet Union, 1945–1959 - War on the Rocks, 2019 tells a different story:
 * Despite their absence in the records, German rocket scientists had a lasting imprint on Soviet rocketry. The work of captured German scientists enabled the Soviet Union to rapidly catch up to, and briefly surpass, the United States in rocket technology. Without German contributions, both the space race and the nuclear arms race would have looked vastly different. [...] After the successful development of the R-1, the German teams’ work centered on theoretical design work for the next generation of intermediate-range ballistic missiles. The most influential of these was the R-14, also designated the G-4 in honor of German designer Helmut Groettrup. While the design itself never left the drawing board, revolutionary elements of the R-14 would influence the next generation of Soviet designs: the rocket included a new system of swiveling nozzles to control the flow of exhaust gas, was to be launched from an underground silo, and had the range and capacity to carry a nuclear warhead to targets in Western Europe. Unknown to Groettrup, Soviet planners had commissioned the R-14 design to compete against a Soviet-designed rocket, the R-3. After evaluation, Soviet planners concluded the German design was superior.
 * This view is supported by Anatoly Zak: The Rest of the Rocket Scientists (2003) as follows:
 * Historians, however, disagree about the impact of German rocket scientists on the Soviet program. “In reality, the Germans did not build anything for the Russians, did not ‘supervise’ the firings, and did not introduce innovations,” wrote German-born rocket historian (and von Braun colleague) Willy Ley in 1968. Nearly three decades later, Boris Chertok echoed the opinion in his memoirs. The R-7, the Soviets’ first ICBM and the vehicle that launched Sputnik, bore no German “birth marks,” he wrote. However, Olaf Przybilski, an historian at the Technical University of Dresden, disagrees. His analysis, published in Germany in 1997, points out a striking resemblance between a cone-like aerodynamic shape the Gröttrup team had proposed for several rockets and the conical shape of Korolev’s largest designs—the R-7 and the ill-fated N1 moon rocket. The truth lies somewhere in between. Germans did not design the Sputnik or its rocket, but the ideas developed by Gröttrup’s team on Gorodomlya did influence Soviet designers and accelerate their efforts. SchmiAlf (talk) 17:42, 6 November 2023 (UTC)


 * SchmiAlf, I have gone through the above details and I cannot see anything that is not already covered in the article.
 * The Zvezda source is describing the German team’s work at Gorodomlya Island, which is already covered in the “Work in the USSR” section. Their is no mention or conclusions drawn about future influence on tbe Soviet space programme.
 * The "Forgotten Rocketeers" is a rehash of existing sources, with no new evidence provided that are not already covered. I have gone through the links in this source and cannot see anything that is not already covered in the Historical analysis section. Note the statement towards the end of Forgotten Rocketeers “While the extent of German influence on the Soviet Union’s space program and strategic forces remains debated,…”.
 * Anatoly Zak’s “The Rest of the Rocket Scientists (2003)” is a repeat of information from his Russian Space Web website that is already included and referenced in the article, in particular German contribution in the Soviet rocketry: Myth and Reality. I note the main item you quote are Olaf Przybilski’s conclusion, which is already covered in the Historical analysis section. Regarding Olaf’s conclusion, note that Zak concluded that “Russian sources are yet to collaborate this claim.” and likewise Siddiqi (2008) p.22 stated Olaf reached his conclusions “…without much convincing evidence…”. Again, all of this is already covered by the Historical analysis section and I believe the current Lead is a fair summation of the overall article.
 * Note that all these sources are not differentiating the extent of German technology and early German efforts with German specialists influence after 1947, which is highlighted by Siddiqi (2003) p84. Hence the lead already includes “The involvement of German scientists and engineers was an essential catalyst to early Soviet efforts. In 1945 and 1946 the use of German expertise was invaluable in reducing the time needed to master the intricacies of the V-2 rocket, establishing production of the R-1 rocket and enable a base for further developments.”


 * Finally I noted that "Forgotton Rocketeers" contains a new reference to Siddiqi (2003) I had not seen before. I note that it contains additional testimonials, including:
 * ”The essential reference work for Soviet/Russian space history . . . for anyone hoping to make sense of the too many 'truths' of Soviet Space history."--Journal of Military History.
 * "We finally have a definitive English-language history covering the first three decades of the Soviet Union's space program. Sixteen years in the making, Asif Siddiqi's amazingly detailed book provides a kaleidoscopic view of the technical and political evolution of Soviet missile and space projects. . . . a veritable gold-mind of factual information."--Air Power History.
 * ”An extraordinary volume. . . . This is not simply an account of one side of the space race. It is nothing less than the first full-scale, detailed explanation of how and why the Soviet Union led the world into space. It belongs on the shelf of every historian with an interest in flight, technology and politics, the Cold War, or any one of a score of related topics."--The Public Historian.
 * This is all further evidence of why I believe the conclusions by Siddiqi should be paramount, as already explained in the Historical analysis section. Ilenart626 (talk) 14:25, 7 November 2023 (UTC)
 * Quoting journals and newspapers (including the Wall Street Journal) for pimping up Siddiqi's work (which is epic, no doubt) does not prove anything. Benevolent opinions for promotion (from early 2000s) cannot be considered a peer review and lack relevance. BTW, Siddiqi (2003) is just the first part of Siddiqi (2000), so nothing new.
 * Your judgement is based on inverted logic. How can you rely on Siddiqi (2000) to derive a final conclusion in the Historical analysis section following several statements which have been published later and were yet unknown to Siddiqi (except he had visionary power)? This is like putting the cart before the horse. Siddiqi's "after 1947 ... marginal" statement cannot be considered "balanced" because he did not know Zak (2003), Zak (2012) and Forgotten Rocketeers (2019) which clearly state German influence on later Soviet designs (from R-14 to R-7). Opposed to your multiple references, neither Mick (2003) nor Zak (2012) nor Neufeld (2012) did support Siddiqi's isolated statement "after 1947 ... marginal" or anything similar (although they might have known it). Also the more general CIA statement quoted below does not suggest this conclusion.
 * The later Siddiqi (2009): Germans in Russia took a more moderate view, did not repeat his 2000 conclusion and summarized instead: The most striking aspect of this episode is the extent to which Soviet actors, principally industrial administrators and engineers, intervened in the process of Soviet-German cooperation to render the Germans less  useful. When the German work in the Soviet program became more difficult to integrate with concomitant Soviet work due to the needs of secrecy, personality conflicts, and the nationalist Zhdanovshchina campaign, the Soviets slowed down German activities until it could be conclusively shown that the fruits of their work had little utility. In other words, the Germans’ ultimate fate had less to do with their expertise (which was quite impressive) than with the perception of their expertise. The latter was easier to manipulate and eventually overshadowed the former.
 * The Forgotten Rocketeers (2019) was written by scholars of history (Lance Kokonos and Ian Ona Johnson) and is a comprehensive overview of known facts based on most of the sources cited above, also touching the development of anti-aircraft missiles.
 * This is why I cannot follow ilenart626's arguments for the validity of the disputed statement in the Lead and his biased conclusions in the Historical analysis section which are linked as kind of circular reasoning. Obviously the interest of the Wikipedia community for this survey has been marginal since more than five weeks. Alternatively, we may just delete the disputed statement from the Lead and rewrite the Historical analysis by a more neutral point of view on this controversial subject and "come to a compromise about how a controversy should be described, so that it is fair to all sides" as recommended here. SchmiAlf (talk) 10:09, 9 November 2023 (UTC)


 * SchmiAlf for the last 12 months you have pushed a fringe theory, which DonPMitchell in 2009 called a conspiracy theory, which overstates the German influence on the Soviet space. You have used a variety of sources, including utube videos, original research and synthesis of sources to push your fringe theory. The latest “source” you have now found is The Forgotten Rocketeers (2019) which you state …was written by scholars of history (Lance Kokonos and Ian Ona Johnson)…. When I looked up these “scholars of history” to see how many articles they have written about the Soviet Space program I found one. Looks like  Kokonos’s latest article is The Missing Realism of Biden’s Pro-LGBTQ Foreign Policy. At least Johnson has written about German / Soviet relations, however only one is about the Soviet space program, the one you are stating as being clearly state German influence on later Soviet designs. I also note in your reply that you have conveniently ignored their statement towards the end of the article “While the extent of German influence on the Soviet Union’s space program and strategic forces remains debated,…” unlike you they obviously understand that their views are debatable.  Also note that I am not the only wiki editor with these views, I have already highlighted DonPMitchell’s comments above; note this discussion on Talk:R-7 Semyorka where @DonPMitchell and @Mark Lincoln discuss the “myth” of German involvement. I have pinged both of these editors and hopefully they will be able to provide their views on this rfc.


 * neither Mick (2003) nor Zak (2012) nor Neufeld (2012) did support Siddiqi's isolated statement "after 1947 ... marginal" or anything similar…. This statement is simply wrong. I note above that Caeciliusinhorto-public has already queued your interpretation of Neufeld, which I support. Nuefeld (2012) statement on p58 “…but after 1948 they were increasingly frozen out and set to work on theoretical designs that were never used.” is very close to Siddiqi’s 2000 statement on p84  “Their influence over the direction of the Soviet balistic missile program was marginal at best”. Nuefeld on p58 also gives a good summary of Mick (2003) “Thanks to the work of Mick in particular, we have an especially clear view of the overall successes and failures of Soviet policy in employing the Germans. As a gross generalization, one can say that the initial transfer of Third Reich knowledge, both in the eastern occupation zone and in the USSR, was a success, but afterwards the value of most of the German teams quickly diminished as a result of the Stalinist policy of isolation and secrecy, compounded by linguistic difficulties, differences in engineering cultures, rivalry and resentment from indigenous engineers and scientists, and the inefficiencies and disincentives of the planned economy.“ Siddiqi’s “marginal”,  Neufeld‘s “frozen out and Mick‘s “quickly diminished” are all saying the same thing about German personel’s influence on the Soviet space program. Zak’s website German contribution in the Soviet rocketry: Myth and Reality gives a summary similar to The Historical analysis section of the article.


 * I could go on but after 12 months of arguing with you I see little point in continuing the debate. This is an rfc which we were both hoping to have other views.  I note that @Caeciliusinhorto has previously commented above, hopefully they will be able to review our latest responses and provide a third opinion, particularly whether they support options A, B or C on Last Sentence of Lead.Ilenart626 (talk) 09:44, 11 November 2023 (UTC)
 * Instead of answering how you explain your inverted logic, you aggressively defend your understating summary in the Historical analysis section (essential parts highlighted bold):
 * ''However, due to a combination of reasons, including secrecy requirements due to the military nature of the work, political considerations and personal reasons from some key players, from 1947 the Soviets made very little use of German specialists. They were effectively frozen out from ongoing research and their influence on the future Soviet space program was marginal.
 * Again, this is by no means compatible to what Zak (2003/2012) ("influence on later designs") and Neufeld (2012) ("after 1948 ... increasingly") have stated. This summary is your fringe theory which a cursory reader of the article (pre-triggered by the Lead!) might take away as follows:
 * The Germans "received fairly high wages and good conditions", better than Soviet personnel. In October 1947, 13 (out of 302) German specialists helped the USSR to launch the V-2 (recovered from German parts) in Kapustin Yar and proposed some improvements of V-2 (the G-1 draft plan) without any interest from Korolev. Their contributions and "influence were marginal after 1947" and they were "spending their time playing sports, gardening, or reading".
 * Why the hell did the hunger-stricken Soviets seize the costly German specialists (more than 500 people altogether) for another five or six years? How could the Germans know too many secrets about Soviet rocketry as they were living isolated on a remote island and had only thought about (marginal) V-2 improvements? Not a really conclusive and convincing logic. SchmiAlf (talk) 21:41, 12 November 2023 (UTC)

This survey has no feedback so far although I invited readers of related articles to participate, maybe because the case is too complicated. Therefore I'd like to propose the following changes: --SchmiAlf (talk) 10:28, 4 October 2023 (UTC)
 * Restrict to either Option A or Option C (Ilenart626 to choose which one)
 * Keep Option B as an alternative.
 * Add an Option D to delete the last sentence of the lead section: "However, after 1947 the Soviets made very little use of German specialists and their influence on the future Soviet space program was marginal." It may be discussed, in more depth, in the German_influence_on_the_Soviet_space_program section.


 * The survey has commenced and only been running for two days. I believe we should leave as is. Ilenart626 (talk) 11:11, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

Changes to Historical analysis section
SchmiAlf, I note that you have made changes to the Historical analysis section. Please do not make any changes to this section until consensus has been reached on the Talk page for any changes to this section. I am reverting your change until concensus have been reached for any change.

I also note that moderated discussion at Dispute resolution noticeboard/Archive 237 is still underway with the “RFC on Last Sentence of Lead” being actively discussed above by three editors; you, me and Caeciliusinhorto. It make no sense to be editing the Historical analysis section until the RFC is closed as it directly impacts on the RFC details. Also note that we have both agreed to abide by DRN Rule D which clearly states “Do not edit the article while moderated discussion is in progress.” Ilenart626 (talk) 15:45, 4 November 2023 (UTC)

Discussion with Asif Siddiqi about German influence on the Soviet space program.
With Neopeius‘s permission the details below have been copied from Talk:Space Race regarding his discussion with Asif Siddiqi about German influence on the Soviet space program.
 * SchmiAlf I have had a lengthy discussion with Asif, and he has also provided me full copies of articles we have been using for citations. Based on these, I plan on proposing new language that will probably please Ilenart626 and may well satisfy you, as well. With Asif's permission, I will also relay what he said to me verbatim (this is obviously not citable scholarship, but he has as much right to be heard as we do.) :) --Neopeius (talk) 17:42, 9 December 2023 (UTC)
 * Strike that last. I find I am out of time for the weekend. I'll just tell you my thoughts:
 * 1) The current language under Soviet rocket development is thoroughly inappropriate (and I'm sorry for not catching this before). Nearly half the verbiage is dedicated to the Germans, which makes it look like the Soviets hardly had their own program. It needs a complete rewrite. You can reference my R-1 (missile), R-2 (missile), and R-5 Pobeda articles for what I think are pretty good summaries of the early history of Soviet work. Mentioning the German involvement in Germany from 1945-1947, and the marginal work done in the USSR till 1953 is fine, but it honestly should not be more than two sentences, and more work done on the Soviet side.
 * 2) I have a copies of Siddiqi's 2001 "Rocket engineers from the Glushko Design Bureau" and his 2009 article "Germans in Russia: Cold War, Technology Transfer, and National Identity"—if you need them, email me at gideon@galacticjourney.org. The former details the contributions of Baum (the second highest paid employee in Glushko's OKB for a time). He concludes: "In sum, there is evidence to suggest that the Soviets benefited from the German contribution [to rocket engine design] much more than they have admitted so far, but much less than some recent German accounts [such as from Przybilski] have claimed."
 * 3) At the end of a longer message, Asif concluded with:
 * "1. German technology (V2, rocket engines, test stands, guidance systems) were absolutely crucial to the foundation of the postwar Soviet missile program. There's no way that the Soviets do anything without that.
 * 2. I know I differ from Przybilski on the interpretation of the contribution of German expertise in the 1946-51 period. Besides a few significant things, I don't think it was that important. I will say that while I don't agree with Przybilski (he depends almost entirely on post-facto German memoir material), I am glad that it's out there for people to decide."
 * In the body of his email, he says that, while German innovations were incorporated into the R-2, the R-3/R-5/R-7 were wildly different designs, starting with their change in propellants.
 * Long story short: German influence on initial program, profound. On rocket engines, not inconsiderable, but probably not profound. On post-R-2 designs, negligible.
 * So a rewrite of that whole section would:
 * A) Reduce the German content while expanding the Soviet content
 * B) Reflect Asif's scholarship, which I think is solid, though a side note to Przybilski, if there be any space, might be okay. I doubt this article is the place to go in depth into this discussion, however. There just isn't room, and it takes emphasis away from the main point—the Soviet ICBM is a Soviet invention "free of the fingerprints of German designers".
 * Thanks for bringing me in to offer my opinion. I'm sorry I don't have the energy to do the rewrite myself. --Neopeius (talk) 19:14, 9 December 2023 (UTC)
 * Thankyou Neopeius your input and Asif’s comments are highly valued. Would suggest that your above comments be copied to Soviet rocketry and German influence on the Soviet space program talk pages, with the Soviet rocketry being the article that goes indepth into this discussion. I should have some time available over the Xmas break to work on an update referencing the articles you mentioned. Then summaries can be included in this article, Soviet space program  and similar articles, that point back to Soviet rocketry.  The German influence of the Soviet space program can then be the main article to include  Przybilski’s view.  What do you think? Ilenart626 (talk) 23:39, 9 December 2023 (UTC)
 * If you're not opposed, I'd be obliged and grateful if you copied them there. You have my license to do so. And I agree. Even Asif says it's good to represent that view, even if it is a minority. And who knows? Maybe when SchmiAlf publishes his article, it'll be convincing. :) --Neopeius (talk) 06:11, 10 December 2023 (UTC)

Ilenart626 (talk) 08:53, 10 December 2023 (UTC)

Suggested change to article title
Suggest this article be renamed / moved to “German influence on Soviet rocketry”. Updates I have recently made to the Soviet rocketry article have highlighted that this topic covers more than just the Soviet space program. The R-1 and R-2 missiles were created primarily for the Strategic Rocket Forces, therefore believe this would be a more appropriate title. Comments? Ilenart626 (talk) 22:09, 4 January 2024 (UTC)


 * This makes sense. But it was more than just supporting Soviet R-1 (the V-2 copy) and R-2 (a lengthened R-1). SchmiAlf (talk) 08:56, 5 January 2024 (UTC)
 * ✅ article moved from “German influence on the Soviet space program” to “ German influence on Soviet rocketry” Ilenart626 (talk) 12:01, 16 January 2024 (UTC)