Talk:Inquiry

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Pragmatic theory of inquiry
Jon Awbrey 15:34, 8 January 2006 (UTC) xv

Classical models
JA: I am dumping some raw source material here until I can sort it out. Jon Awbrey 19:26, 14 April 2006 (UTC)

References:


 * Aristotle, "The Categories", Harold P. Cooke (trans.), pp. 1–109 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.


 * Aristotle, "On Interpretation", Harold P. Cooke (trans.), pp. 111–179 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.


 * Aristotle, "Prior Analytics", Hugh Tredennick (trans.), pp. 181–531 in Aristotle, Volume 1, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1938.


 * Aristotle, "On the Soul" (De Anima), W.S. Hett (trans.), pp. 1–203 in Aristotle, Volume 8, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann, London, UK, 1936.

Appendix A: Sources Aristotle: On Interpretation Chapter 1 {1} Words spoken are symbols or signs of affections or impressions of the soul; written words are the signs of words spoken. As writing, so also is speech not the same for all races of men. But the mental affections themselves, of which these words are primarily signs, are the same for the whole of mankind, as are also the objects of which those affections are representations or likenesses, images, copies. Aristotle: Prior Analytics Book 1 Chapter 4 {1} When three terms are so related to one another that the last is wholly contained in the middle and the middle is wholly contained in or excluded from the first, the extremes must admit of perfect syllogism. By 'middle term' I mean that which both is contained in another and contains another in itself, and which is the middle by its position also; and by 'extremes' (a) that which is contained in another, and (b) that in which another is contained. For if A is predicated of all B, and B of all C, A must necessarily be predicated of all C. ... I call this kind of figure the First. Chapter 5 {2} When the same term applies to all of one subject and to none of the other, or to all or none of both, I call this kind of figure the Second; and in it by the middle term I mean that which is predicated of both subjects; by the extreme terms, the subjects of which the middle is predicated; by the major term, that which comes next to the middle; and by the minor that which is more distant from it. The middle is placed outside the extreme terms, and is first by position. Chapter 6 {3} If one of the terms applies to all and the other to none of the same subject, or if both terms apply to all or none of it, I call this kind of figure the Third; and in it by the middle I mean that of which both the predications are made; by extremes the predicates; by the major term that which is [further from?] the middle; and by the minor that which is nearer to it. The middle is placed outside the extremes, and is last by position. Book 2 Chapter 21 {1} Similarly too with the theory in the Meno that learning is recollection. For in no case do we find that we have previous knowledge of the individual, but we do find that in the process of induction we acquire knowledge of particular things just as though we could remember them; for there are some things which we know immediately: e.g., if we know that X is a triangle we know that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles. Similarly too in all other cases. {2} Thus whereas we observe particular things by universal knowledge, we do not know them by the knowledge peculiar to them. Hence it is possible to be mistaken about them, not because we have contrary knowledge about them, but because, although we have universal knowledge of them, we are mistaken in our particular knowledge. Book 2 Chapter 23 {1} Induction epagwgh, or inductive reasoning, consists in establishing a relation between one extreme term and the middle term by means of the other extreme; e.g., if B is the middle term of A and C, in proving by means of C that A applies to B; for this is how we effect inductions. E.g., let A stand for 'long-lived', B for 'that which has no bile' and C for the long-lived individuals such as man and horse and mule. Then A applies to the whole of C, for every bileless animal is long-lived. But B, 'not having bile', also applies to all C. Then if C is convertible with B, i.e., if the middle term is not wider in extension, A must apply to B. {2} This kind of syllogism is concerned with the first or immediate premiss. Where there is a middle term, the syllogism proceeds by means of the middle; where there is not, it proceeds by induction. There is a sense in which induction is opposed to syllogism, for the latter shows by the middle term that the major extreme applies to the third, while the former shows by means of the third that the major extreme applies to the middle. Thus by nature the syllogism by means of the middle is prior and more knowable; but syllogism by induction is more apparent to us. Book 2 Chapter 24 {1} We have an Example paradeigma when the major extreme is shown to be applicable to the middle term by means of a term similar to the third. It must be known both that the middle applies to the third term and that the first applies to the term similar to the third. E.g., let A be 'bad', B 'to make war on neighbors', C 'Athens against Thebes' and D 'Thebes against Phocis'. Then if we require to prove that war against Thebes is bad, we must be satisfied that war against neighbors is bad. Evidence of this can be drawn from similar examples, e.g., that war by Thebes against Phocis is bad. Then since war against neighbors is bad, and war against Thebes is against neighbors, it is evident that war against Thebes is bad. Now it is evident that B applies to C and D (for they are both examples of making war on neighbors), and A to D (since the war against Phocis did Thebes no good); but that A applies to B will be proved by means of D. ... {2} Thus it is evident that an example represents the relation, not of part to whole or of whole to part, but of one part to another, where both are subordinate to the same general term, and one of them is known. It differs from induction in that the latter, as we saw, shows from an examination of all the individual cases that the [major] extreme applies to the middle, and does not connect the conclusion with the [minor] extreme; whereas the example does connect it and does not use all the individual cases for its proof. Book 2 Chapter 25 {1} We have Reduction apagwgh (a) when it is obvious that the first term applies to the middle, but that the middle applies to the last term is not obvious, yet nevertheless is more probable or not less probable than the conclusion; or (b) if there are not many intermediate terms between the last and the middle; for in all such cases the effect is to bring us nearer to knowledge. {2} (a) E.g., let A stand for 'that which can be taught', B for 'knowledge' and C for 'morality'. Then that knowledge can be taught is evident; but whether virtue is knowledge is not clear. Then if BC is not less probable or is more probable than AC, we have reduction; for we are nearer to knowledge for having introduced an additional term, whereas before we had no knowledge that AC is true. {3} (b) Or again we have reduction if there are not many intermediate terms between B and C; for in this case too we are brought nearer to knowledge. E.g., suppose that D is 'to square', E 'rectilinear figure' and F 'circle'. Assuming that between E and F there is only one intermediate term - that the circle becomes equal to a rectilinear figure by means of lunules - we should approximate to knowledge. {4} When, however, BC is not more probable than AC, or there are several intermediate terms, I do not use the expression 'reduction'; nor when the proposition BC is immediate; for such a statement implies knowledge. Book 2 Chapter 27 {1} A probability eikoV is not the same as a sign shmeion. The former is a generally accepted premiss; for that which people know to happen or not to happen, or to be or not to be, usually in a particular way, is a probability: e.g., that the envious are malevolent or that those who are loved are affectionate. A sign, however, means a demonstrative premiss which is necessary or generally accepted. That which coexists with something else, or before or after whose happening something else has happened, is a sign of that something's having happened or being. {2} An enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs; and a sign can be taken in three ways - in just as many ways as there are of taking the middle term in the several figures ... {3} We must either classify signs in this way, and regard their middle term as an index tekmhrion (for the name 'index' is given to that which causes us to know, and the middle term is especially of this nature), or describe the arguments drawn from the extremes as 'signs', and that which is drawn from the middle as an 'index'. For the conclusion which is reached through the first figure is most generally accepted and most true. Aristotle: The Art of Rhetoric Book 1 Chapter 2 {1} But for purposes of demonstration, real or apparent, just as Dialectic possesses two modes of argument, induction and the syllogism, real or apparent, the same is the case in Rhetoric; for the example is induction, and the enthymeme a syllogism, and the apparent enthymeme an apparent syllogism. Accordingly I call an enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and an example rhetorical induction. {2} But since few of the propositions of the rhetorical syllogism are necessary, ... it is evident that the materials from which enthymemes are derived will be sometimes necessary, but for the most part only generally true; and these materials being probabilities and signs, it follows that these two elements must correspond to these two kinds of propositions, each to each. ...

TODO
This page should be made more accessible to the laymen

Avinatbezeq (talk) 09:28, 17 October 2021 (UTC)

Convert the ASCII drawings into SVG. dr.ef.tymac 22:13, 19 June 2007 (UTC)

You can use https://ivanceras.github.io/elm-examples/elm-bot-lines/ to convert to SVG. Simplify3 (talk) 03:12, 21 April 2017 (UTC)

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