Talk:Master–slave morality

Q)
1) If anyone knows the citations for the last sentence, which tells us that Nietzsche considered Cartesian proofs for God as only possible from the perspective of a Master morality, could they please place them in the text. 81.78.93.55 22:37, 4 May 2006 (UTC)

2) "Fear is the mother of morality."[3] It says JGB 123 is the source but JGB 123 is: "123. Auch das Concubinat ist corrumpirt worden: - durch die Ehe.", which is not Fear is the mother of morality. So I suggest someone corrects the source!

A)
The best indication I can find in Nietzsche's English translations is the second paragraph of the first chapter of Beyond Good and Evil. It attempts to demonstrate the primacy of the ability to think hypothetically ('perhaps...') to the ability to evaluate truth. Here Nietzsche cites "The concealed God", most likely alluding to the search for God, as an example of the kind of thinking requiring the embrace of 'perhaps...'. This approach is credited to and personified by "Philosophers" as Nietzsche defines in following paragraphs. Finally, at the end of the Ninth paragraph ' philosophy is this tyrannical impulse itself, the most spiritual Will to Power, the will to "creation of the world," the will to the causa prima. '

I am not the author of the disputed claim about Nietzsche, nor do I favor its specific language, but I do agree with the gist that Nietzsche required master morality as a necessary condition for anything he would consider to be a source of critical analysis. I doubt the specific use of "Cartesian proof" in this sense because Nietzsche is bitterly critical of the leap in Cogito ergo sum, and I wonder whether Nietzsche would attribute master morality to Rene Decartes. After all "I mistrust and avoid all systematizers. The will to a system is a lack of integrity." (Twilight) seems to question whether Nietzsche would consider Decartes one of the philosophers driven by "the will to the causa prima." Nietzsche seems to be disappointed in "Cogito ergo sum" as a cop out (Beyond Good and Evil).

--Jeremy McMillan 171.161.160.10 18:36, 31 May 2007 (UTC)

Although an excellent beginning, this article in its totality is rather misleading in terms of the direction/purpose Nietzsche had for developing this historical framework of value creation. This is better flushed out in Beyond Good and Evil. Simply, Master Morality is that of "might makes right", as we see with most animals in the world. It's a very direct application of genetic evolution. From this were born the Slave Morality of social animals, including humans. This describes the development of cultural evolution in response to the "tooth and nail" of genetic evolution. Nietzsche goes out of his way to describe how this is a significant improvement over Master Morality (while he will later criticize Slave Morality in its modern sense). As the article does say, Slave Morality (cultural evolution) brought about an intellectual cleverness and creativity. But, Nietzsche describes how the restraint of wearing Slave Morality too long makes humans as organisms weak and atrophied as well. Slave Morality is providing ever diminishing returns, and Nietzsche gleans "on the distant horizon" of human evolution the need to cast off and move Beyond ("overcoming") Slave Morality just as humans needed to overcome Master Morality. Again, Nietzsche reminds his readers that we do not wish to return to a Master Morality, and that there are much more creative/artistic means of Will to Power outside the context of Master Morality (the "Evil" within the context of Slave Morality) and Slave Morality (the "Good" within the context of Slave Morality) -- hence, Beyond Good and Evil. In modern parlance, the overcoming individual (Ubermensch) must create a new table of values beyond both genetic evolution ("what's natural is what's good") and cultural evolution ("what's popular is what's good") to a realm of individual evolution ("I choose to express myself"). 71.162.255.58 06:53, 19 August 2006 (UTC)


 * "In modern parlance..."??? Seems like a lot more is being done in the comment above than a change in "manner or mode of speech".  Is there text of Neitszche in which genetic, individual, and cultural evolution are linked to master-slave morality?  —Preceding unsigned comment added by Radimast (talk • contribs) 12:58, 4 January 2009 (UTC)


 * "Might makes right" is a cultural idea, not a "direct application" of genetic evolution, which is amoral, contingent, provisional and often very unmighty. It is Social Darwinism, not actual Darwinism (or post-Darwinism.) This is biting off way more than the article can possibly chew. It needs citations, not still more personal commentary. 76.23.157.102 (talk) 09:13, 7 October 2009 (UTC)

Racial and cultural bias (Moved from article)
You need to provide proof or reference that Nietzsche implied or even postulated this. This is not true. I mean the part about him applying the concept of slave or master morality to specific races or cultures (i.e., individual persons). This is the genesis of racism in Nietzschean philosophy - and quite a subjective observation, at best.
 * 67.168.125.175 —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 86.136.230.9 (talk) 07:44, 3 April 2007 (UTC).

Nietzsche's AntiBlack White Racism
On the Genealogy of Morals. Trans. Douglas Smith. Oxford University Press, 1998. , p. 49:

"By way of consolation to the more delicate, perhaps in those does pain did not hurt as much as it does today. At least, that might be the conclusion of a physician who has treated Negroes* (these taken as representatives of prehistoric man--) for serious cases of internal inflammation; such inflammation would bring even the best-organized European to the brink of despair--but this is not the case with Negroes. (The curve of human capacity for pain seems in fact to fall off extraordinarily abruptly, once past the upper ten thousand or ten million of the higher culture; and I personally have no doubt that in comparison with a single painful night undergone by one hysterical little bluestocking, the total suffering of all the animals put to the knife in the interests of scientific research simply does not enter into consideration.)"

-Why don't you quote the whole thing? I think that by quoting only the part that serves your interests you are taking Nietzsche out of context. The paragraph starts like this: "Today, when suffering is always brought forward as the principle argument against existence, as the worst question mark, one does well to recall the ages in which the opposite opinion prevailed because men were unwilling to refrain from making suffer and saw in it an enchantment of the first order, a genuine seduction to life." On the Genealogy of Morals. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. Vintage Books, Random House, New York, 1969. , p. 67

Now that we have the whole idea Nietzsche is dealing with I think we can have a clearer interpretation of what he was trying to say. If you have read a bit of Nietzsche you would have had noticed that he tends to be a rather ironic, sarcastic, and even funny writer. I believe that in this case he is mocking pessimists who tend to devalue existence because of the pain and suffering we are bound to find in it. In other words, he appears to be mockingly asking them: so, what was it about past ages where pain was considered the opposite, that is, a seduction to life, something appealing rather than something repulsive? Was it the fact that pain did not hurt as much as it does today? Maybe prehistoric men felt less pain than you do now, delicate ones? He seems to be making fun of the feeble excuse his delicate contemporaries made in order to justify their weakness, to the point that they even got to make scientific claims about the resistance to pain people of different skin colour have.

I hope this helps, if someone thinks differently please respond to this and let's get a discussion going. — Preceding unsigned comment added by GerardoPo (talk • contribs) 23:02, 19 March 2021 (UTC)

Note 49 by Douglas Smith, p. 147: "Nietzsche's terminology and views here are clearly racist, assuming an evolutionary difference between white European and black African."

James Winchester, "Nietzsche's Racial Profiling" in Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy. Ed. Walls, Andrew. Cornell University Press, 2005. 255:

"At one point Nietzsche suggests that black skin may be a sign of lesser intelligence as well as a sign that one is closer to the apes (Dawn/Daybreak 241). Nietzsche clearly shares some of the basic tenets of nineteenth-century race theory ... In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche writes that Negroes are representatives of prehistoric men (vorgeschlictlichen Menschen) who are capable of enduring pain that would drive the best-organized European to despair (Genealogy 2.7). Today most would see this claim about Africans as a prejudice. Who today would defend the claim that blacks feel pain less acutely than whites, particularly given that such a characterization could be used to justify the enslavement and maltreatment of blacks? ... William Preston uses this passage to make the claim that Nietzsche is a cruel racist, and there are in fact many places that support this claim (William A. Preston, "Nietzsche on Blacks" in Existence in Black: An Anthology of Black Existential Philosophy. Gordon, Lewis. Routledge, 1997, 169). Preston also argues that Nietzsche is equating Negroes to lab animals and that Nietzsche feels that blacks are worth so little that men of distinction will not derive much pleasure in oppressing them. As we have already seen, Nietzsche states unambiguously that cruelty is essential to every 'higher' culture..."

"In On the Genealogy of Morals, we find a discussion of the Aryan race, which is, Nietzsche proclaims, white. Against Rudolf Virchow, whom Nietzsche credits with having created a careful ethnographic map of Germany, Nietzsche argues that dark-haired peoples of Germany cannot be Celtic. Germany's dark-haired people are essentially pre-Aryan. Nietzsche further argues that suppressed races are coming to the fore again in Europe, and one can see this on the basis of the emergence of darker coloring and shorter skulls. He says it is even possible that modern democracy, or even more likely modern anarchism and the inclination for the commune, 'the most primitive form of society which is now shared by all socialists in Europe', is a sign of the counter-attack of the pre-Aryan races. The Aryan race may very well be in a state of physiological decline..."

Gooding-Williams, Robert, "SUPPOSING NIETZSCHE TO BE BLACK--WHAT THEN?" in (same author) Look, a Negro!: Philosophical Essays on Race, Culture and Politics. Routledge, 2005.

"While new and still newer Nietzsches continue to thrive...older Nietzsches remain-one of which is Nietzsche, the philosopher of aristocratic radicalism, but likewise the brutally scathing critic of socialism, feminism, and liberalism-indeed, of all forms of modern egalitarianism. This, for example, is the figure Georg Lukacs describes in writing that Nietzsche's 'whole life's work was a continuous polemic against Marxism and socialism' (The Destruction of Reason). Similarly, it is the figure William Preston evokes when...he insists that 'Nietzsche's whole philosophy-and not just his view of blacks-is racist.' In an essay meant for an anthology devoted to black existentialism ('Nietzsche on Blacks' in Existence in Black: An Anthology of Black Existential Philosophy. Gordon, Lewis. Routledge, 1997, 169), Preston asks, 'Can Nietzsche help black existentialists find answers to their own questions?' 'No' is Preston's clear response to this question, but a careful reading of his argument urges a still stronger conclusion-namely, that progressive philosophers given to a serious engagement with issues like white supremacy, colonialism, black politics, and black identity-whether or not they are existentialists, and whether or not they are black-have no use for Nietzsche. Preston tends toward this conclusion when he claims that Nietzsche saw suffering black people as laboratory animals that he wanted 'to make ... suffer more.' In effect, Preston argues that black and other progressives have no use for Nietzsche, because Nietzsche was a 'cruel racist' and a forwardlooking, trans-European 'man of the Right.'

...In his excellent essay on Nietzsche and colonialism, Robert Holub remarks that events heralding Germany's emergence as a colonial power (Germany began to acquire colonies in Africa and the Pacific in 1884) 'reached their height during the years that Nietzsche was composing his major works' ('Nietzsche's Colonialist Imagination: Nueva Germania, Good Europeanism, and Great Politics' in The Imperialist Imagination: German Colonialism and its Legacy, ed. Sara Friedrichsmeyer, Sara Lennox). Holub also reminds his readers that Nietzsche became personally involved with colonialism through the adventures of his sister and brother-in-law, Elisabeth and Bernhard Forster, founders of the Paraguayan colony of Nueva Germania. Finally, and most important for my purposes, Holub recognizes that this personal involvement has 'a philosophical counterpart in [Nietzsche's] writings.' More exactly, he acknowledges that Nietzsche's philosophical imagination becomes a colonialist imagination when it conjures the images of the 'good European' and a 'great politics' to envision a caste of 'new philosophers' that would rule Europe and subjugate the entire earth. A critic of the sort of nationalism the Forsters embraced,

Nietzsche endorsed a supranationalist imperialism, and his 'untimeliness ... involves his unusual way of approaching the problems posed by foreign affairs and world politics. Eschewing the nationalist, mercantile, and utopian/idealist approach to colonization, he developed ... a conceptual framework that entailed a geopolitical perspective. In the 'good European' he found a term for a future elite that could overcome the nation-state, create a superior cultural life, and achieve domination of the world. With 'great politics' he offered an alternative to parliamentary life and actual colonial fantasies, as well as a vague blueprint for global conquest on a grand scale.'

Holub's description of Nietzsche's geopolitics helps put Preston's remarks into perspective. Thus, when Preston describes Nietzsche as a forward-looking, trans-European 'man of the Right,' he alludes to Nietzsche's colonialist fantasy of a future, European elite that would dominate the world beyond Europe. When he describes Nietzsche as a racist, he reminds us that this fantasy is, in part, the fantasy of a black Africa subjected to European rule, and that Nietzsche's antiblack racism (evident, for example, in his suggestion that the black race is less intelligent than the white races; see Daybreak, aphorism 241; On the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, aphorism 7, where Nietzsche takes blacks as representatives of prehistoric man) in tandem with his enthusiasm for breeding higher human beings, suggests that he imagined an 'imperialism of the future' as involving the domination of racially inferior black Africans by racially superior white Europeans. In short, Preston exposes the white supremacist connotations of Nietzsche's colonialist imagination."

Cf. Abir Taha, Nietzsche, Prophet of Nazism: The Cult of the Superman: Unveiling the Nazi Secret Doctrine —Preceding unsigned comment added by 172.131.55.73 (talk) 03:55, 6 October 2007 (UTC)

Left-wing Corruption of Nietzsche
The corruption of Nietzsche's philosophy in the Wikipedia articles by radical-left activists is insane. What better way to neutralize one's enemy than to appropriate, weaken, soften and distort him? The German Rudiger Safranski, at least, has the balls to speak the truth in a world gone mad with doctrinaire socialistic political correctness:

"According to Nietzsche, nature produces the weak and the strong, the advantaged and disadvantaged. There is no benevolent providence and no equitable distribution of chances to get ahead in life. Before this backdrop, morality can be defined as an attempt to even out the 'injustice' of nature and create counterbalances. The power of natural destinies needs to be broken. In Nietzsche's view, Christianity represented an absolutely brilliant attempt to accomplish this aim ... Nietzsche greatly admired the power of Christianity to set values, but he was not grateful to it, because its consideration for the weak and the morality of evening things out impeded the progress and development of a higher stage of mankind.

Nietzsche could envision this higher stage of mankind only as a culmination of culture in its 'peaks of rapture,' which is to say in successful individuals and achievements. The will to power unleashes the dynamics of culmination, but it is also the will to power that forms a moral alliance on the side of the weak. This alliance works at cross-purposes with the goal of culmination and ultimately, in Nietzsche's view, leads to widespread equalization and degeneration. As a modern version of the 'Christian theory of morality,' this alliance forms the backbone of democracy and socialism. Nietzsche adamantly opposed all such movements. For him, the meaning of world history was not happiness and prosperity of the greatest possible number but individual manifestations of success in life. The culture of political and social democracy was a concern of the 'last people,' whom he disparaged. He threw overboard the state-sponsored ethics of the common welfare because he regarded such ethics as an impediment to the self-configuration of great individuals. If, however, the great personalities were to vanish, the only remaining significance of history would be lost in the process. By defending the residual significance of history, Nietzsche assailed democracy and declared what mattered was 'delaying the complete appeasement of the democratic herd-animal'(11,587; WP 125) ... Nietzsche opted against democratic life organized according to the principle of welfare. For him, a world of that sort would signal the triumph of the human herd animal...

If we are content to regard this highly personal philosophy and these maneuvers of self-configuration with fascination and perhaps even admiration, but are not willing to abandon the idea of democracy and justice, it is likely that Nietzsche would have accused us of feeble compromise, indecisiveness, and epitomizing the ominous 'blinking' of the 'last men.'" Safranski, Rudiger (trans. Shelley Frisch), Nietzsche: A Philosophical Biography, Norton, 2002, pp. 296-298. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 63.3.10.2 (talk) 14:05, 12 September 2007 (UTC)


 * Whilst I agree that Nieztsche was certainly not "left-wing" (infact, adamently right wing - no wonder Hitler was so impressed by his ideas...), his greatest influence has been on the left. Why?  Because he defined them (and the working class they are so determined to espouse), through his description of nihilism, so accurately.  Better than Marx could possibly have hoped to.


 * But why is this "no bad thing"? Well, to be frank, Nieztsches ideas were mental.  "Lets only regard those who are important" "history is meaningless without its leaders, its significant figures" therefore "we should ignore the needs of the weak and pander to the desires of the powerful and the wealthy (the ubermensch!)".  Correct me if I am wrong, but this is no bastardisation of what he meant.


 * So why, if he is such a Nazi, do his ideas have so much weight on modern sociological thought? Well, I imagine that it is because he was able to put his emotions aside when describing modern morality.  He did so with accuracy and in depth.  This is something that few achieve.  But if you could take out the propaganda, most modern political movements would have much to learn from the "other sides" criticisms of them.


 * Of course, it is arguable that if one agrees with Nietzsches analysis of "master-slave morality", then one must agree with his conclusions. Not being a philosopher, I would struggle to fully analyse such a hypothesis without having all the arguments presented to me.  But I would say that I disagree, based on some un-related revealations that have occured in my personal life.


 * To sumarise, a section of the left embraces Niezsches analysis, but many are not aware of his solution. To discredit the solution, all they need do is highlight the similarities with Hitlers own "final solution".  This does not indicate an inherent bias within wikipedia, rather a very poor article on "master-slave morality".  82.0.206.215 (talk) 22:46, 11 February 2008 (UTC)
 * Well a 14-year discourse can't possibly be useful...but I will endeavor to answer this question with a rather simple statement: these so-called left wing academics--well, many of them are just liberals, slaves like the rest--they believe far more sincerely in Nietzsche than any of their public statements, not cloaked in dense, philosophical language, would suggest. But it was Freud who first equated "Social Justice" with Slave Morality! How many so-called left-wing academics don't read them together!
 * But I do believe they are sincerely Left wing, and I say this because I think Nietzsche himself didn't understand the full extent of Marx, especially the Marx as implemented by the Soviet Union and the CCP, the Marx who was nothing if not violent, if not one who fully acknowledged conflict as the highest morality! Well, I know Nietzsche wasn't a Hegelian...but permit me this excess...
 * So what can I say, the Left--the real Left, the Left of Foucault and the Frankfurt school, of Deleuze, all those students of Heidegger--has all the more to gain, when all they want is society to explode! To disregard them...first disregard their wayward students, locked in the Ivory Tower as they are--in short, neutered. Disregard all the corporate whitewashings of Black Lives Matter, all the cheap moralizing and victimhood, and embrace the lootings, the terror, the violence, the cities on fire while the poor, feted whites fled their glass houses! So afraid they had to kneel in obeyance. What was that, if not a return to man's more primitive nobility, a return to the great war-machine of the Aryans--those blond beasts, not the decadence they bred. Ah, but it died like the rest...if only this whole country would be torn asunder. The world even...
 * But you see (well, you, for all I know "you" could be dead by now) what I mean, right? Surely, if nothing else, you can see that the academy does its best, but in the end Marx was right, the working class, those prepared to fight, will overcome resistance, will be constantly overcoming. I pity the intellectual who thinks otherwise, who tries to "soften", as you say, all the implications. They will not survive.
 * 74.105.253.119 (talk) 06:51, 2 April 2022 (UTC)

Note that the text above is misquoted ("According to Nietzsche," doesn't occur). This talk section may be found at Talk:Master–slave morality, Talk:Transvaluation of values, and Talk:Nietzschean affirmation. Note that "master-slave morality" does not occur in the quote and that no criticisms of or suggestions for improving the article are given. Hyacinth (talk) 05:44, 6 December 2016 (UTC)

Historical Context (Hegel, etc.)
Is there a reason there's no historical context for Nietzsche's ideas about master-slave morality? I think they might have, you know, maybe been a little bit influenced by Hegel. Just a hunch. I'm really not an expert, and I don't feel qualified to write this up, but it seems like a glaring omission. --Mrnorwood (talk) 19:08, 11 February 2008 (UTC)


 * This article is rubbish. Poorly written, it would confuse anyone but someone who already knows plenty about Nietzsche.  I am also unqualified to improve it, but reccomend someone does.  I may even get round to doing some reading to try to make such changes myself...  82.0.206.215 (talk) 22:50, 11 February 2008 (UTC)


 * If you know of any writings of Hegel about this topic, or any other notable experts' ideas on the topic, feel free to add them to the article. At the very least, you could post some sources in discussion.  If you want the articles here improved, then you should help us!  We're not machines, ya know! ;) -70.119.126.195 (talk) 09:48, 10 October 2008 (UTC)

Confused
"Nietzsche claimed that the nascent democratic movement of his time was essentially slavish and weak[citation needed]. Weakness conquered strength, slave conquered master, re-sentiment conquered sentiment."

So Nietzsche was confused or is it me? If something conquers something else, maybe it was not weak at all? Can he pick and choose how to apply the value "weak"? Is it just the wording in the article that is bad?

To me, after reading this article, it seems Nietzsche disliked "slave morality" and had his ideas influenced by his own feelings, not by logic. If slave morality is so weak, then how did it come to dominate master morality, if indeed it did?

Confusing :P

213.141.89.53 (talk) 21:00, 14 September 2008 (UTC)


 * To address your confusion... Nietzsche was not stating that slave-morality is a weak concept.  He was saying that it was devised by those who are weak to serve the will of those who are weak.  Basically someone who has adopted a slave-morality will no longer attempt to regard human strengths as valuable.  He or she instead re-evaluates and regards human strengths as evil.  Thus, it can be said that slave-morality is a morality OF weakness, but not that it is a weak morality.  Ya get it?  :) -70.119.126.195 (talk) 09:44, 10 October 2008 (UTC)

Who else is extremely happy to stumble upon this article? I think that we should improve this article a little more.Mike Babic (talk) 05:43, 3 December 2008 (UTC)

Nietzsche's Supposed Beliefs
I've removed the following text from the article. My reasons are below the text.

“Nietzsche, however, did not believe that humans should adopt master morality as the be-all-end-all code of behavior - he believed that the revaluation of morals would correct the inconsistencies in both master and slave morality - but simply that master morality was preferable to slave morality, although this is debatable. Walter Kaufmann, for one, disagrees that Nietzsche actually preferred master morality to slave morality. He certainly is more critical of slave morality, but this is partly because he believes that slave morality is modern society's more imminent danger.”

First, who can say with certainty that ANYONE believes ANYTHING without giving proof. That's basically slander. Second, it's all very POV, in favor of slave morality. To say that Nietzsche was against master-morality is insane. Was he also against the concept of Ubermensch, and the will to power? Third, even if Nietzsche was against it, that information probably doesn't belong in this article.

If anyone reverts, please add sources, and also let me know in this discussion page, how it's not POV, and why the info is relevant.

Thanks, -70.119.126.195 (talk) 10:06, 10 October 2008 (UTC)
 * Actually, it doesn't seem to be in favor of anything whatsoever as far as I can see. In fact, it's almost POV anti-everything. Zazaban (talk) 23:49, 8 December 2008 (UTC)

You removed one of the most correct passages. He believed that the master morality was animalistic, an unfinished human, while the slave was a natural reaction caused by the master morality, and that neither of these moralities were good. The Master that used intelligence and emotions to overcome his unfinished state and become a full human, a human that "internalized" (as he put it) the world instead of externalizing it like a narcissist was the ubermensch. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.249.90.160 (talk) 19:25, 26 January 2017 (UTC)

Basics
This article has no outside citations and is obviously someone's personal essay. Why is it still here? 76.23.157.102 (talk) 09:10, 7 October 2009 (UTC)

Agreed. There is not one instance of secondary sourcing, it is all straight primary sourcing with the author acting as the de facto Nietzsche interpreter, which is blatant original resource. There are PLENTY of secondary sources on Nietzsche out there guys... hell, I had to buy three of them just for one class on the guy. This whole article seriously reads like an "Interpret Nietzsche's Slave Morality in Your Own Words" essay and is thus, not encyclopaedic in tone. 65.184.233.253 (talk) 23:11, 6 December 2009 (UTC)

Nonexistent (?)
As far as I can see, there is no Master-slave morality. The text describes two presumably incompatible moralities by simple association of subjective colorations, pessimistic/optimistic, master/slave, will/reaction, etc.. Shouldn't the article name be Master and slave moralities? It is actually a dichotomy, not a concept per se. ... said: Rursus ( m bork³ ) 08:45, 12 January 2010 (UTC)

Potential for discussion of master-slave morailty from other sources
While i know ayn rand gets hated on by many on the interwebs, in her second novel, "The Fountainhead," there is excellent discussion about this master-slave morality. Such discussion that i believe she almost finishes nietzche's work on the topic by coming to certain conclusions regarding the disavowment of BOTH slave AND master morality. At one point one of the characters asserts, "The master-slave relationship is a noose tied on both ends." Implying that masters are just as dependent on slaves as slaves are on their master. Seeing as how i am merely an amatear and hobbist philosopher, i feel underqualified to write in this section if it would at all be even appropriate here, but certainly i feel like there should be discussion of other philosophic dissertations on this idea, as i feel like it is one of nietzche's most important if not most important, as what you can do in an existentialist sense is incredible with these ideas. --DanteMX (talk) 17:40, 16 September 2010 (UTC)


 * Ayn Rand is not a significant philosopher, and certainly not a significant scholar on Nietzsche. We certainly do need to use secondary sources to develop this article, but why not start with Gille Deleuze's book on Nietszche - he is an actual philosopher of note, and the book is a notable work on Nietzsche.  I am sure there are other good works on Nietzsche that put him in his context. Slrubenstein   |  Talk 19:13, 4 September 2011 (UTC)

Master-slave morality v. Aquinas
It is clearly possible to compare certain aspects of the master-slave morality with Aquinas. For instance, Nietzsche holds being a master as the universal good for humans, whereas Aquinas emphasises human happiness as man's universal earthly goal, to abstain from temporal goods in favour of longer-term goods as vital in this pursuit, and the absence of humility (i.e. pride) as the number one reason for short-term, self-destructive actions. Is it possible to compare backwards in time without it becoming original research? Narssarssuaq (talk) 12:31, 4 July 2012 (UTC)
 * The comparison with Aquinas is original research unless Aquinas actually writes about Master-slave morality in those terms (which is not asserted). I'm deleting this material as OR and irrelevant. We could just as easily compare Nietzsche with Hume or many other philosophers who have written about similar things. Metamagician3000 (talk) 01:20, 14 December 2014 (UTC)

Intentions and consequences.
I am highly knowledgeable about this topic, if I may say so myself, and actually completely disagree with what this article says about intentions and consequences. The consequences/intentions distinction is taken from aphorism 32 of Beyond Good and Evil—which book is the prequel to the Genealogy of Morals—, but what Nietzsche says there is rather the converse of what the article says:


 * "During the longest period of human history—so-called prehistorical times—the value or disvalue of an action was derived from its consequences: the action itself was considered as little as its origin, it was rather the way a distinction or disgrace still reaches back today from a child to its parents, in China, it was the retroactive force of success or failure that led men to think well or ill of an action. Let us call this period the pre-moral period of mankind: the imperative 'know thyself!' was as yet unknown. In the last ten thousand years, however, one has reached the point, step by step, in a few large regions on the earth, where it is no longer the consequences but the origin of an action that one allows to decide its value: on the whole this is a great event which involves a considerable refinement of vision and standards, the unconscious aftereffect of the rule of aristocratic values and the faith in 'descent,' the sign of a period that one may call moral in the narrower sense: it involves the first attempt at self-knowledge. Instead of the consequences, the origin: indeed a reversal of perspective! And certainly a reversal achieved only after long struggles and vacillations! To be sure: a calamitous new superstition, an odd narrowness of interpretation, thus became dominant: the origin of an action was interpreted in the most definite sense as origin in an intention; one came to agree that the value of an action lay in the value of the intention. The intention as the whole origin and prehistory of an action: almost to the present day this prejudice dominated moral praise, blame, judgment, and philosophy on earth."

Sorry for quoting at length, but it's functional. Note that Nietzsche ties the weighing of actions on a scale of good or bad intentions—which the article tells us is a mark of slave morality—to "the rule of aristocratic values and the faith in 'descent'"! And, in aphorism 190 of BGE, he says:


 * "There is something in Plato's morality which does not really belong to Plato but is only to be met with in his philosophy, one might say in spite of Plato: namely Socratism, for which he was really too noble. 'No one wants to do injury to himself, therefore all badness is involuntary. For the bad man does injury to himself: this he would not do if he knew that badness is bad. Thus the bad man is bad only in consequence of an error; if one cures him of his error, one necessarily makes him—good.'— This way of reasoning smells of the mob, which sees in bad behavior only its disagreeable consequences and actually judges 'it is stupid to act badly'; while it takes 'good' without further ado to be identical with 'useful and pleasant.' In the case of every utilitarian morality one may conjecture in advance a similar origin and follow one's nose: one will seldom go astray.— Plato did all he could to interpret something refined and noble into his teacher's proposition, above all himself[.]"

Note: the mob sees in behaviour only its consequences; it is moblike, and not refined and noble, to reason like that!

Also, in Genealogy of Morals 1.5, Nietzsche calls the "'commune'" (as in "Communism") "the most primitive form of society", and suggests that the inclination towards it be a symptom of the fact that "the conqueror- and master-race, the race of the Aryans, is [...] succumbing physiologically"!

In the light of all of the above, we can make the following table of vertically related, horizontal opposites:


 * prehistory—history
 * primitive—"evolved"
 * "commune"—class hierarchy
 * pre-Aryan—Aryan
 * moblike—refined and noble
 * slave/herd—master
 * slave/herd morality—master morality
 * offspring—parentage
 * consequences—intentions

"Man as measure of all things"
Why did someone tag the following:

"In this sense, the master morality is the full recognition that oneself is the measure of all things.[citation needed]"

...in need of a citation? I did not write this line nor the one before it, but if you read the one right before it, the meaning (i.e., the "sense") of this claim is clear. I am of the opinion that no citation is required here. If anything, the problem is with the use of the word 'recognition'. Thoughts? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Dialog.groupie (talk • contribs) 16:53, 9 April 2015 (UTC)

Psychopath
Can it be pointed out that this philosophy does not include feeling emotions? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 192.161.200.5 (talk) 01:26, 9 May 2017 (UTC)


 * I really don't think that is relevant...
 * 74.105.253.119 (talk) 06:26, 2 April 2022 (UTC)