Talk:Operation Pamphlet

Comments
Hi Nick, copyedited given this might be destined for A-Class Review, and I had a couple of points/queries; Other than the above, I think it's ready for ACR. Interesting you expressed pleasant surprise that I could wring such a detailed article out of No. 491 Squadron RAAF -- I'd never have imagined that an article on a troop convoy that suffered no losses could be so detailed and interesting! Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 08:04, 24 November 2014 (UTC)
 * "The movement of the division took place in groups, with each spending one or two days at a transit camp at Qassin where it handed its vehicles to British authorities." Um, each what -- brigade, battalion...?
 * "A total of 622 AIF personnel remained in the Middle East after the five ships departed Egypt, but this figure was reduced to below 20 by March 1943." Worth stating how those 600-odd got home (or transferred elsewhere)?
 * Thanks Ian. The first refers to "groups" - the source doesn't say how big they were (I'd guess battalions given the way the AIF operated, but who knows). The source doesn't say how the other 600 soldiers returned home - I presume that they travelled in small groups on ships/planes (presumably going via India given the way the convoy system worked). The level of coverage which has been accorded to this convoy surprised me as well - I had no idea why War at Sea: A Naval Atlas, 1939–1945 devoted a page to it until I started looking into the availability of referencing. It's an interesting example of wartime logistics I guess (and involving four of the famous "monster" liners sailing together doesn't hurt!). Nick-D (talk) 09:22, 24 November 2014 (UTC)
 * Funny, the way it was expressed I just didn't equate "each" with "groups". I might reword just a bit if that's okay, but feel free to revert if it doesn't work for you. Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 09:46, 24 November 2014 (UTC)

Major significance of the operation
The tension, political, strategic and tactical (fear of losses), around this operation was high as it involved such a redistribution of force and commitment of very critical shipping—not to mention the commitment of the prominent "Monsters"—in competition with such "little" efforts as BOLERO (build up of U.S. forces in the U.K. for an invasion), China support and Soviet Lend-Lease efforts. The issue of MacArthur possibly collaborating with Curtin to essentially undermine previous policy was another instance of his continued and problematic lack of coordination with his direct superiors. Strategic Planning For Coalition Warfare 1941-1942 (United States Army In World War II official history series) covers the whole issue from the U.S. perspective in Chapter IX (some bad OCR in the html version) and the MacArthur issue on pp 212—213. From the .pdf version a bit on that (my emphasis):


 * What gave these proposals a peculiar character was Mr. Curtin's explanation that he was presenting them at the request of MacArthur. The British Prime Minister sent them to the President, expressing curiosity to know whether the President or his Pacific War Council had passed on them and whether MacArthur had “any authority from the United States for taking such a line.” Though Churchill ruled out these proposals as unsound, on the ground that India was in greater danger than Australia, he considered them to be “none the less a cause of concern when put forward on General MacArthur's authority.” ''The President, too, was concerned, being somewhat uneasy (as Admiral King reported) over the use Mr. Curtin had made of MacArthur's opinions.

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 * The War Department, called upon to comment on Churchill's message, suggested that the proposals be taken as coming—as earlier ones to the same effect had come—from Mr. Curtin, on his own responsibility, and offered the explanation that in Melbourne it might seem natural and proper to present them as MacArthur's estimate of what was needed to meet the situation with which they were jointly preoccupied. It had been assumed in Washington, to be sure, that MacArthur, since he was operating under the direction of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, would transmit his recommendations to Washington. The War Department had in fact lately received from him a request for aircraft carriers, and had told him that they were “not now available.” But the War Department had received no request for more transpacific shipping nor for the British divisions destined for India. MacArthur to send all such requests to the The War Department proposed to tell JCS, who would then bring up for consideration by the CCS any involving British forces. This point having been cleared up, the British Prime Minister might rest assured that “any request reaching you from Mr. Curtin is made upon his own responsibility.”


 * The proposed message, drawn up by the War Department, was acceptable to the President, so far as it went. He only added that, if Mr. Churchill liked, he would himself urge Mr. Curtin not to press for the release of the Australian divisions.76 The President had to do rather more to satisfy MacArthur, who took very ill the War Department statement of policy governing his relations with Curtin. As he observed, it seemed “to imply some breach of frankness” on his part. General MacArthur explained that he had not outlined except to the War Department his own ideas on grand strategy, but when asked, had given Curtin his own opinion on specific questions connected with the defense of the Southwest Pacific, in the belief that it was his duty to do so and “for [no] other purpose” than Curtin's personal information. He assured General Marshall, “I have no idea of bringing pressure to bear through any channels open to the Australian Government in order to support indirectly any views that I may hold.” He disclaimed all responsibility for their being put to any such use and told General Marshall “Our government should pay no attention to anything attributed to me except that which I communicate to them over my own signature.” Finally, he offered what amounted to a justification, on grounds of policy, of the views that he had expressed in Melbourne on the need for additional reinforcements. He pointed out that he could hardly continue as an Allied commander without the confidence of the Australian Government, which was—and long before his arrival had been—preoccupied with the security of Australia. (pp 213—214)


 * In respect to the case at hand, he [Roosevelt] declared his hope that Australia would leave its troops in the Middle East. At the War Department's suggestion, he pointed out that the release and replacement of these troops would take so much shipping as to reduce the strength of the British forces in the Middle East by 60,000. He concluded with a graceful reference to his dependence, as in this case, on MacArthur's fulfillment of his peculiar two-fold mission: “I well realize your difficult problems, and that you have to be an ambassador as well as Supreme Commander.” (pp 214—215)

Palmeira (talk) 13:54, 5 April 2015 (UTC)


 * Thanks, but that's actually referring to April 1942. Nick-D (talk) 22:56, 5 April 2015 (UTC)


 * Right! Sorry, maybe not enough coffee! Palmeira (talk) 15:33, 6 April 2015 (UTC)