Talk:Our Mathematical Universe

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I created a new article for this book, because it seems to me notable on its own, based on my own reading and the number of reviews in notable journals. I was looking for a Wikipedia article about the book and found instead a redirect to a subsection of Mathematical universe hypothesis.

I don't think this book, which goes into a lot of other areas, belongs as a sub-section of MUH. On the other hand, I don't think MUH, which has apparently been talked about for more than a decade, belongs as a subsection of an article about this book. HouseOfChange (talk) 03:39, 3 May 2014 (UTC)

Controversy (add the controversy paragraph)
We cannot blame Max Tegmark for analyzing an impersonal mathematical universe without the person-god or the rare dogma of the atheistic Buddhist magic impersonal field which violates physics (even rare atheistic religions have a field which is personocratic; being the projection of the personhood of the believer; and values and purpose compatible with personhood are falsely attributed/ascribed to everything).

Even if metaphysical personocracy (dominance of one or more persons and/or personhood) were correct, that still would require an analytical proof; but personhood (see: Mary Anne Warren - the criteria for personhood) is not cosmogonic nor causing the existence of physics. If we separate the "personhood" of god from his ousia/substance/essence, then god is nonfundamental (he has more fundamental components). If god's personhood is tautological to his divine essence, then any bearer of personhood/person is god (precosmic creator and controller of the universe) which is obviously wrong.

We cannot blame Max Tegmark for seeking the metalogical foundations of physics.

Tegmarkism is the cloud of ideas that evolved from Max Tegmark, like Platonism is the cloud of ideas that evolved from Plato. The Tegmarkists and the Platonists are not expressing the ideas of the initial thinker, but reshape and evolve them while branching out and correcting some details.

We might claim that not all systems lead to physicality, evolve mathematical tools to judge the physicality of "algorithms in topological algebra", and some of these algorithms do have undecidable physicality.

There is no single definition for all computability theory problems; we should evolve ways to test each separate example.

Some lazy people, when they find a mistake, they burn the whole book. Wise people keep the main ideas, correct it and evolve it.

Mathematics and physics aren't philosophy based on common sense. New mathematical tools should replace intuition.

We cannot blame mathematicians for having an initial vague idea. Humanity is not dead; it is alive, so we will work to improve Tegmarkism, which isn't actually Tegmarkism, but the evolution of physics itself at a more metalogical level. But because metalogic itself has limitations, the best way to avoid axiomaticity is: 1. each universe is not the total truth but one out of many solutions; a system with finite mathematical components or infinite with a pattern is possible to be described or approached if perfect description is undecidable for fundamental mathematical reasons. Leonard Susskind in one relaxed YouTube interview correctly claimed that any theory is an effective theory, even the final theory; because the physical reality is shaped as a connectome of all fields and orders of magnitude (if there is a sole god-field, that would require axioms thus nonproofs; and nonproofs are bad science or nonscience). — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A02:587:4103:EA43:DDD5:EF22:E90A:5A0 (talk) 11:46, 9 October 2020 (UTC)