Talk:Pan Am Flight 845

Great article, SuperJumbo, thanks! I was an eyewitness to the landing of PA845, from a nearby hilltop. There was ongoing radio news coverage after the takeoff accident, and my mother and I (I was a teenager at the time) walked a few blocks from home with binoculars and a VHF aviation-band radio. There were a few dozen people who watched and listened. Very memorable. MCB 00:54, 29 August 2005 (UTC)

A coworker, who was aboard this aircraft, read this at my desk on 15 May 2006. He says the account is extremely accurate and adds these nits:
 * He sat near row 30, left side. Though all injuries and most of the damage were behind him, he could see the Pacific Ocean thru the floor while they dumped fuel.  This rupture was apparently caused by the landing gear.
 * The aircraft was about half-full of passengers, so except for the injured and two medical doctors, everyone donned life preservers and moved to forward cabins.
 * A six-year-old boy was spared when a flying piece of debris (probably angle iron from an Approach Light Structure) stopped a few inches in front of his chest.
 * The landing was only partially controlled as they'd lost most of the hydraulics and had no brakes. At the first touch down, the plane bounced and blew out all the tires.  It bounced a second time and then skidded right.  Had the plane not stopped, they would have plunged into the ocean.
 * He could not egress through his designated exit door, as it was effectively blocked by the evacuation slide which high winds had blown over the top of the aircraft. Instead, he followed the pilot to the rear of the aircraft and simply stepped onto the ground (the plane tilted back onto its tail).
 * After landing, the plane suddenly tilted back so the front evacuation slides were some 50 feet off the ground, which caused most of the injuries.
 * During and after the thumps, scrapes and flying debris, he heard very few screams. Even though they circled for nearly two hours dumping fuel, virtually all passengers were quiet, orderly and surprisingly calm. Many got religion.  He was disappointed that he's left his shoes and paperback book in the back, as he wanted something to read while they circled.  Ironically, he found a newspaper with headlines of a 747 crash in Tokyo the day before.
 * Pan Am personnel asked him to return his life preserver. He refused and today still has it as a souvenir. User:RobertKeller

I was a passenger on this flight. I was 13 years old at the time and this was my first flight without a parent accompanying me. My recollection:


 * I was sitting in the first (bulkhead) row of the economy section in the starboard window seat directly behind first class. There was no one else in my row of three seats.
 * After rotation, while still on the ground, I looked out the window and saw the runway end. Violent impacts and crashing sounds immediately followed. I believe I remember a life raft stowed in the cabin ceiling over the vestibule of the doorway immediately in front of me crashing to the deck (I'm not completely certain of this -- if someone told me there was no life raft stowed in that position, I'd believe them.) I remember seeing all the inlets on the engine nacelle open, something I'd never seen before. I immediately smelled the tangy scent of hydraulic fluid, though I didn't know what it was at the time.
 * I remember little of the climb. I never left my seat, but I did hike myself up enough once to look aft over my seatback and saw the seats in the next seating section aft (the middle section of economy, over the body landing gear) had been punched up about 8 to 12 inches. All the oxygen masks in that section were deployed, perhaps just jarred loose by the impact.
 * I remember an announcement over the PA asking if there were doctors on board, and flight attendants moving about with blood-stained blouses.
 * Some time after we had climbed, the middle section of economy was evacuated, with the passengers moving forward and aft. Two adult passengers joined me in my row of three seats. During this move, passengers were also allowed to use the heads, and I remember the lines being several passengers deep.
 * We were told we were dumping fuel, that it would take some time and we would return to San Francisco. I remember two seeing two aircraft flying with us for a time, surveying the damage.
 * We were given instructions on donning our life preservers, to take our shoes off, that we would be using slides to evacuate, not to take anything with us from the aircraft and how to brace for impact. Some time before landing the crew came through the cabin and took questions directly from passengers. I remember asking if they were going to use foam (fire-extinguishing foam) on the runway, and being told that they likely would. (Foam was not used.)
 * The approach was smooth as I recall. The aircraft took a very large bounce after first touching down, but that initial touchdown was not violent, nor was the second. There was only one bounce and the tires did not blow out (see the photos of the aircraft in the hangar after the accident in the link in the article).  The bounce was later attributed to the very limited controls left to the pilot and the fact that he was trying to land very softly to prevent collapsing the remaining landing gear.
 * The landing roll seemed smooth, then became rough and loud. I remember leaving my braced position to steal a look out the window and seeing we had left the runway.
 * After coming to a stop, passengers rose from their seats and applauded the successful landing. In my recollection, the aircraft tilted back to rest on its tail so slowly that I didn't notice it while it was happening.
 * I joined the line of passengers to evacuate using the second door on the starboard side. I was about fourth in line to go down the slide when the crew decided to stop using the forward exits and sent the remaining passengers aft. It was only while walking aft that I noticed I was walking downhill. I exited the third door, over the wing.
 * I remember running, then walking, through dry grass to a waiting bus. I relinquished my life vest when asked for it.
 * We were first brought to the terminal at SFO. I was put in the care of an excellent Pan Am employee, (I believe his name was Hank Hashikawa) who escorted me for the rest of the day, made sure I was fed, had a change of clothes and was checked in to the hotel. He also arranging for my onward travel.
 * Passengers were put up in a hotel near the airport for the night. (I'm pretty sure it's now the Best Western Grosvenor Hotel.) Carry-on bags were eventually recovered from the cabin and delivered to the hotel lobby, and I remember going through the bags with other passengers. Checked luggage couldn't be removed from the aircraft and was delivered several days later.
 * I remember going to the roof of the hotel with other passengers to look at the aircraft still sitting in the SFO infield, resting on its tail. I also watched local television news coverage with many replays of the landing that night in the hotel.
 * The next day, I flew first class to Honolulu on Western Airlines, connecting with another Pan Am 747 to Tokyo (economy).

A few months later, my family took a vacation in the Marianas and flew first class on a Pan Am 707 from Toyko to Guam. It was a lightly loaded evening flight and the captain came back to spend some time with the passengers. I remember him speaking of the captain of flight 845 reverentially and saying that with 3 of 4 hydraulic systems out of service, it was truly a remarkable piece of flying to have saved the aircraft (preventing it from "cartwheeling into the bay", I think he said). There was a documentary TV series called "Escape" several years ago, one episode of which dealt with the development in aircraft escape slides. This episode includes video of the slides on this 747 being blown around by high winds after landing, and that this led to the development of much more rigid slides in future aircraft. Twelveup (talk) 16:14, 2 February 2009 (UTC)

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Why do they always claim Pilot Error?

My Grandfather was the Captain of Pan Am flight 845. Contrary to the tone of the Wikipedia article on this accident, which seems to place the bulk of the blame on the Pilot of the Aircraft, I have been informed by many active and retired pilots that he displayed amazing skill and performed admirably under some of the worst circumstances possible.

I have been raised on stories of this accident. According to the information I have been told the following occurred:

1) My grandfather was instructed to depart on 1R.  He was aware that the first 1000 feet of the runway were not usable due to the blast requirements for the freeway, decreasing the length of the runway.  This was apparently common knowledge for pilots flying out of San Francisco, but the Pan Am flight directors were "unaware" of it as it was a procedural issue that applied only to large thrust airplanes that routinely used runway 28R and not an issue with either smaller planes nor an actual shortening of the physical runway.  He questioned the length of the runway, and requested to use runway 28.

That a discussion took place as to the length of the runway is part of the NTSB record. After consultation with the tower (in which the tower and the Pan Am director mis-communicated) my Grandfather was provided an incorrect runway length. Had the runway been the length he was instructed, the plane would have had sufficient distance to clear the runway without incident. The velocity speed calculation would not have been an issue as the plane would have cleared the end of the runway with almost 1000 feet.

2) My Grandfather also questioned the plane's ability to take off on runway 1R at her calculated weight.  He insisted on clarification from the manufacturer (Boeing).  Boeing (in Seattle) was contacted by the Pan Am office in San Francisco by phone, and they instructed Pan Am that the plane would lift off runway 1R, well clear of the end of the runway at her reported weight.

3) My Grandfather had concerns about taking off from runway 1R in a 747.  He questioned the Tower, he questioned Pan Am, and he went so far as to ask clarification from Boeing.  He was informed that if he did not immediately roll the plane into take-off position that he would be removed as Captain and another pilot brought in to ensure the plane's timely departure.

He was basically told that he was wrong, and to shut up and fly the plane or they would get someone who would.

That the plane made it off the ground was a miracle.

The NTSB report shows that my Grandfather was correct in his belief that the runway was too short. Both the physical situation of the runway (the clearway which was not clear), and the requirement to not use throttle for the first 1000 feet of the runway decreased the length to such a degree that no thrust heavy plane should have been using it. The cross wind exceeded the parameters for the use of 1R further decreasing takeoff conditions, and had he been properly informed of the runway length, he would have taxied the plane back to the gate regardless of Pan Am's instructions.

The NTSB report also shows that the engines did not perform to take off thrust per manufacturer specifications. It took an additional 200-300 feet of runway to achieve take off velocity, above and beyond Boeing's calculation. That is a significant amount of runway. The NTSB report clearly states that Boeing was unable to explain why the engines underperformed to this degree, but no mention of the lack of performance is stated as a causal factor.

This reduced engine performance further compounded the mistake that Boeing had made in their calculations for the runways at SFO. Had the plane performed to Boeing's published specifications, even with the rotation at 161 knots, and an under-reported runway length, the plane would have lifted clear of the landing lights that ripped through her fuselage.

The report also shows that the plane was overweight for the runway. Maximum lift off for the 747 for this length of runway was 697,400 lbs. The actual weight of the aircraft was 708,000 meaning that the aircraft was almost 11,000 lbs overweight. 11,000 lbs overweight is not a minor issue. That Boeing did not recognize my Grandfather's concerns when contacted by Pan Am in San Francisco regarding this issue is particularly troubling. No mention is made in the NTSB report regarding the call to Boeing Seattle or my Grandfather's question about the length of the runway and the effect of the additional weight on the take off of the plane.

It is significant that the NTSB report allows that no cockpit voice recorded data was available to review for the time period before the take off. While the Pan Am and the tower do refer to communication between the plane and both of those entities, there is no actual record of what was said. At the inquest, My Grandfather was allowed to answer only "yes" and "no" to questions that he was asked. He was not allowed to clarify any response, nor to explain or add information to the record. It is easy to steer the results of an investigation if you limit the response of the main participants.

I think the true proof of his ability as a pilot are the facts that he was able to get the plane off the ground at all, and that while attempting to land his severely crippled aircraft, an attempt that had never previously been attempted in that model, he was able to do so with no loss of life. The only injuries sustained during the landing occurred when passengers tried to use the emergency escape slides after landing. It took exceptional skill to bring that wounded plane safely in for landing. The loss of elevator control which did not become apparent until it was too late to abort the landing, the failure of the engines to go into reverse, the collapse of the landing gear, I have been told by numerous pilots that this was a truly remarkable feat of flying. And finally, I think the following two items speak for themselves.


 * 1)  Following this accident, all runways are now constructed with recessed or flush lighting, ensuring that the length of a runway is actual usable runway.  Major airports have retrofitted their approach lighting to remove this hazard from their airports where possible.  This incident is acknowledged as the direct reason for that change in construction technique.  The aviation industry readily accepts that had the lighting not been placed on the end of the runway, reducing the length of the runway, there would have been no incident.
 * 2)  Today my Grandfather's actions in this incident are used by the major US airlines as a case study for a pilot who reacted correctly in extremis.  He is upheld as an example of what you SHOULD do.  If you mention the name Calvin York Dyer, do not be surprised to get a very different take on this accident that that which is portrayed in the short article you find on Wikipedia.

At the time this accident took place, the 747 was a new model for Boeing, and both Pan Am and Boeing were depending on its use for the economic success of their respective companies. How comfortable would you be flying on a plane if you heard that the manufacturer did not know the weight limits of its own planes, or that the plane's engines did not perform the way they should? And really, how much faith would a traveler have flying in and out of San Francisco International Airport if it had been reported that the airport did not know long its runways were? Both of these statements were accurate, and were economic poison.

The Wikipedia article places the blame for this accident almost solely on the shoulders of the pilot. The NTSB was facing significant pressure to present the accident as the result of pilot error. When you read the report in full, take into account the lack of cockpit voice data, the refusal of the committee to allow the pilot, or co-pilot to answer except in one word responses, and the pressure being brought to bear to keep consumer confidence in Pan Am, Boeing, and the San Francisco International Airport. Read the report in full, not just the first page, and you will see that there is more to the story that the pilot using the wrong velocity calculations.

My opinion
Well said. But sadly Wikipedia is an encyclopedia, and encyclopedias are not interested in the truth only accepted "fact". I suggest you write a book about the event, your grandfather deserves it. That would also provide reference. Meanwhile getting that crippled Jumbo down without loss of life was great piloting and great heroism and how may families lived out their lives happy because of your grandfather. In good faith AMM — Preceding unsigned comment added by 92.26.110.146 (talk) 22:08, 27 February 2014 (UTC)

Image caption
Does anyone else read the caption to the image (where it references 1971 twice) that the image was taken in 1971 (the year of the incident)? If that is the case, the article suggests it was given it's name 'Clipper Juan T. Trippe' after being repaired and returned to Pan Am some years later and that is what is printed on the aircraft in the image 82.23.66.109 (talk) 12:03, 17 March 2017 (UTC)