Talk:Plan of Attack

Untitled
kk attempting clean up of this article today Mokwella 01:17, 8 January 2006 (UTC)


 * The discussion surrounding Colin Powell's opposition to the war is consistent with the information presented in the PBS "Frontline" documentaries on the Bush Administration and it's inner workings. It is clear from the investigation Frontline's personnel conducted that one of the prime reasons for Powell's resignation, and the resignation or voluntary retirement of several key senior personnel in the US Military, was the flawed decision to invade Iraq.  What is not mentioned in the article (and perhaps should not be mentioned directly, given the NPOV goals of Wikipedia) is that as an active Military Officer, Powell was and is bound to support any decision of his President (regardless of any personal views he may hold).  He has, rightly and appropriately, kept his view from becoming public.  We do not know, of course, what he may have said behind closed doors.  I would like to think that, had he chosen to speak out and - if not publicly at least privately - sided with those in the military who opposed the action (either as ill advised, inappropriate or poorly planned), the decision to go to war might have been avoided.  That said, it is possible if not likely that by doing so he would simply have been "swept under the rug" as were many others in opposition to the plan.


 * Powell saw firsthand the untenable situation in the Vietnam war - namely that of going to war with insufficient numbers, and against a poorly defined enemy. This lead him, among others, to develop what is now known as the "Powell Doctrine".  In essence, the doctrine states that the US must never go to war unless an enemy can be clearly identified, unless there is a defined military strategy (including definite goals regarding offensive manouevres, achievements, completion, exit strategy and post conflict operations), and unless the country is willing to commit to the use of overwhelming force.


 * It can be argued that this President's war on terror does not meet any of these criteria, as it is a war of ideology rather than against a particular country or group, it has no cohesive plan beyond the removal of the dictator, the number of troops committed was by most military estimates less than half that required to achieve the war's somewhat tenuous goals, and finally, that there was absolutely no exit strategy or post conflict management plan considered.


 * While these points can clearly be argued by pro-Bush advocates, Woodward's conclusions are shared by a majority of military analysts within the United States, and overwhelmingly shared by foreign analysts. Posthocergopropterhoc 16:25, 18 January 2007 (UTC)

2013 - Failed link (?)
The in in citation 2 of the current version (here) of the page refers to a blog at The Nation (http://www.thenation.com/blogs/capitalgames?pid=73408). Click on this link takes you to an article titled "Plamegate Finale: We Were Right; They Were Wrong." This seems to be an inaccurate link, as the article mentions neither Woodward nor his book. I don't know how to find the original entry at the Nation, can anyone else take a look? Oaktreezulu (talk) 07:07, 8 November 2013 (UTC)