Talk:Quine–Putnam indispensability argument

General indispensability arguments
@Phlsph7: I've made some more changes to the paragraph on general indispensability arguments. I moved it down to the bottom of the background section because I wanted to begin the article with the least difficult content (and I felt some of the information on general indispensability arguments is a bit difficult and abstract). I've also tried to make it a little bit less difficult, but the wording may be a bit ambiguous now. Just wondering if you have any thoughts, e.g. any problems with the new structure/wording? Also, let me know if you'd prefer not to be pinged about this! Alduin2000 (talk) 19:37, 6 October 2022 (UTC)


 * I think the section works fine either way. The motivation for starting with general indispensability arguments would be to go from the general to the specific while the motivation for putting them at the end is to start from the easier contents and move to the more difficult ones. A short example could be added at the end to make it more concrete what "these entities" and theories are. Maybe something like "In this way, it has been argued that ... exist because they are indispensable for ... or that ... exist because they are indispensable for ...". For platonism, it would be "...abstract objects exist because they are indispensable for scientific theories". But this only works if there are easy examples that don't need much explaining. And please feel free to ping me if you have the impression I can be of help. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:31, 7 October 2022 (UTC)
 * Yeah I think it definitely makes sense to add an example at the end, which would tie the paragraph together nicely (by more explicitly showing how the argument "[provides] a justification for belief in abstract mathematical objects". I will look to see if I can find an appropriate source soon, the article probably already contains one for this. Alduin2000 (talk) 11:06, 7 October 2022 (UTC)
 * Your additional sentence helps to make the general characterization more concrete. I was initially thinking about examples from other fields, maybe something like the argument from ways for the existence of possible worlds in modal metaphysics (not sure that this fits perfectly) or an example for indispensability arguments in ethics. But your version is closer to home and works fine as well. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:10, 7 October 2022 (UTC)
 * It's possible that we could add other indispensability arguments in the legacy section, but probably only if there's sourcing showing that they were influenced by Quine/Putnam's indispensability argument. I know that there is sourcing available for Lewis being influenced by Quine on this at the least and we may be able to find something on the "deliberative indispensability argument" for moral realism by Enoch too. I've tried to search for stuff on other indispensability arguments but it's a bit hard to search without getting a million papers on the Quine-Putnam one, so it's a little hard to determine what's proportionate. But I do think a paragraph in that section couldn't hurt. Alduin2000 (talk) 16:22, 7 October 2022 (UTC)
 * Quine's idea that existential quantification implies ontological commitment was very influential and is discussed in many fields outside the philosophy of mathematics. It can be used, for example, as an argument against presentism (since we quantify over past entities) and for modal realism (using the argument from ways mentioned earlier). But I don't think that all these applications fall under the category "indispensability argument". But if there is a clear influence from the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument for some of these cases then mentioning this would be a welcome addition. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:22, 8 October 2022 (UTC)
 * I've made a first attempt at a paragraph on this and have included Lewis' and Enoch's arguments with sources linking their arguments to the indispensability argument. Do you know any other examples which have been covered by secondary sources which might be useful to add? Also let me know if you think there are any problems. Thanks. Alduin2000 (talk) 12:03, 8 October 2022 (UTC)
 * The new addition looks great. It seems discusses some form of indispensability argument concerning the existence of past entities. For ethics,  might also be relevant. There are many similar arguments using truthmaker theory, like the truthmaker argument against phenomenalism or arguments about the existence of fictional entities like . But here it's the same problem as with the others mentioned in my last reply: I'm not sure whether they have also been formulated as indispensability arguments. Phlsph7 (talk) 14:14, 8 October 2022 (UTC)
 * Thanks . Yeah I saw that Sam Baron source googling around after you mentioned presentism in your previous reply (I was previously completely unaware of the connection) but I decided it probably isn't important enough to include because it hasn't generated much discussion in other sources as far as I can tell. Also, Baron says It should, however, be noted that although indispensability arguments against presentism have not been pursued previously, presentists nevertheless consider quantification over the past to be ontologically committing, and so seek to avoid such quantification which makes me think indispensability arguments aren't the common way of framing this line of argument. It seems to be more just an example of the influence of Quine's criterion like you said in your previous replies.
 * Also I've added that other source on ethics you mentioned as a supporting citation but I don't think we should go into detail on that in this article. There are actually quite a few sources on Enoch's argument anyway so possibly it could have its own article. Either way, I think just mentioning it here is enough weight. About truthmakers, I haven't seen anything about them being used to formulate indispensability arguments either but I suppose it's worth a look. But we should make sure that (if they have) they were specifically influenced by Quine/Putnam's arguments because it seems some indispensability arguments cannot ultimately be traced back to them (see e.g. this discussion on indispensability arguments for scientific realism being traced back to Carnap which doesn't mention Quine or Putnam at all).
 * Even if we can't find any other examples, I think those two are pretty good examples of arguments that are important in their own right, which shows the influence of the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument pretty well already. Alduin2000 (talk) 15:24, 8 October 2022 (UTC)
 * Seems like indispensability considerations about fictional objects/non-existents can't be used in the article. According to this article "There is no master argument in favor of the indispensability of non-existent objects." Indispensability considerations also seem to predate Quine and Putnam so can't cite them as influences. From what I've seen, indispensability arguments for the existence of states of affairs/grounding relations and against phenomenalism might be more promising. I still need to research a bit more though. Alduin2000 (talk) 17:19, 8 October 2022 (UTC)
 * You are right that we should be careful about what other indispensability arguments to include. This article is about the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument and there should be a clear connection to justify the inclusion. If the other argument was influenced by it then this satisfies the requirement. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:17, 9 October 2022 (UTC)
 * Hey just wondering what argument you are referring here: If the other argument was influenced by it then this satisfies the requirement? Thanks. Alduin2000 (talk) 13:18, 11 October 2022 (UTC)
 * My point was that the article is not about indispensability arguments in general but about the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument. The "other argument" refers to indispensability arguments that are different from the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument. For example, if it turns out that indispensability arguments against phenomenalism are not really related to the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument then it might be better not to include them. The inclusion of another argument should be justified in some way, for example, because it was influenced or because it is compared to the Quine–Putnam indispensability in some respect. Maybe there could also be a wider article about indispensability arguments in general that covers all such arguments, including the ones that are not directly related to the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:42, 11 October 2022 (UTC)
 * Oh ok yeah that makes complete sense, I understand what you mean now. I agree it would be nice if there was a page just for indispensability arguments in general. Sadly I've found it quite hard to find sources that talk about indispensability arguments in general in much detail, but that could be just because they are being swamped out by papers on the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument making them hard to find. Could also be a rare case in which the more general topic is actually not wiki-notable while the more specific example is. Alduin2000 (talk) 17:15, 11 October 2022 (UTC)
 * Yeah, writing an article on indispensability arguments in general would be difficult. Especially balancing the problem of giving an overview of all the versions while taking into account that the vas majority of the literature is on the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:12, 12 October 2022 (UTC)

Section "Counterarguments"
Also, I meant to ask, do you think the counterarguments section is overcrowded or overwhelming now that some extra content has been added? Alduin2000 (talk) 17:16, 11 October 2022 (UTC)


 * I had a first look at the section "Counterarguments". It seems to get too much into detail which threatens to make the reader lose the bigger picture. Or at least that was my impression after a first read-through. As a gross simplification, the section has the following core messages:
 * paragraph: New introduction
 * paragraph: Mathematical objects are dispensable for science
 * paragraph: Mathematics is false but useful
 * paragraph: Indispensability does not imply existence since mathematics makes no observable difference so observations can't confirm or disconfirm it
 * paragraph: Scientists talk as if there were mathematical objects without believing in them
 * paragraph: Similar to paragraph 4
 * paragraph: Existential quantification does not imply ontological commitment
 * paragraph: Mathematics is not subordinated to empirical science
 * I've added a short introductory paragraph to give the bigger picture but I'm not sure about the exact formulation. It seems to me that the 3rd paragraph could be removed or at least significantly shortened: it is more of a defense of fictionalism (justification of why mathematics can be both false and useful) but not really a direct argument against the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument. Maybe some of the other paragraphs could also be shortened or simplified. But it might be good beforehand to check to what degree you agree with these ideas. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:10, 12 October 2022 (UTC)
 * Yeah it was paragraph 3 that I added recently. Might have gone into too much detail for the purpose of comprehensiveness. Melia's approach is probably enough to illustrate "easy road" fictionalism (as opposed to the "hard road" of finishing Field's project) and his argument is a lot more relevant as a counterargument too. Previously the section was also more structured around: objections to premise 2 (indispensability), objections to premise 1 (mainly confirmational holism) and other miscellaneous counterarguments. That was probably better for letting the reader see the bigger picture. I'll start by reverting things back to that (except with your intro). Alduin2000 (talk) 11:27, 12 October 2022 (UTC)
 * I've also added subsections, what do you think? Alduin2000 (talk) 11:33, 12 October 2022 (UTC)
 * The subsections definitely make the overview clearer and the reduced focus on fictionalism also helps. I'll have a look later to see if further simplifications might be helpful here. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:23, 12 October 2022 (UTC)
 * I've tried to rearrange and simplify the contents in the subsection "Dispensability". Please check to make sure that all the main points are still present and accurate in reformulated version. I removed the passages explaining the structure of Field's formulation (referring to the first part and the second part) since this did not seem important to me for the argument itself. I think the nominalization approach to scientific and mathematical theories is independent of the thesis of mathematical ficionalism so I've separated them into distinct paragraphs. To me, it sounds clearer and simpler this way but I could be mistaken. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:49, 12 October 2022 (UTC)
 * The only think that I think is lost is the idea that Field appeals to the concept of conservativeness to explain why mathematics is so useful. One explanation is that mathematics is literally indispensable in formulating scientific theories. But of course, that is exactly what Field is denying. So he has to provide his alternative explanation. This just gives some context as to why this part of the argument is part of his argument against the indispensability argument (and not just a separate argument for fictionalism). For me, the current wording makes it seem more like an aside or extra detail. But I think the removal of first part/second part stuff and moving details on fictionalism definitely improved the structure. I think it just needs some adjustment in tone or wording or something; I'll think about how to change the focus slightly while retaining your restructuring. I also moved the stuff about modal reformulations down to its own paragraph. I think you were right that it didn't belong in the other paragraph but I think splitting up Field's project is a bit awkward too. Alduin2000 (talk) 18:45, 12 October 2022 (UTC)
 * Also, just realised the attribution of platonism to Putnam. It's controversial whether Putnam endorsed Quine's arguments for platonism in the early 1970s but he definitely distanced himself from arguments for platonism later in life (he still kept to his "no miracles argument" version but as an argument for sentence realism). So I've also slightly changed the wording there too. I think it's looking pretty good now though, thanks for the simplifications! Alduin2000 (talk) 19:03, 12 October 2022 (UTC)
 * Thanks for spotting the issue concerning Putnam and platonism. The reason for moving the passage on the normalization of mathematics to the first paragraph was that both talk about normalizations: a normalization of science and a normalization of mathematics. But I don't feel strongly about this point. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:18, 13 October 2022 (UTC)

Paragraph order for the section "Overview of the argument"
I had another thought for the section "Overview of the argument". The first few paragraphs are each mainly about one topic: naturalism, confirmational holism, indispensability, and ontological commitments. Indispensability and ontological commitments are needed to understand the argument. Naturalism and confirmational holism provide support for the first premise of the argument but, strictly speaking, the argument could be understood without them. So one idea would be to change their order: first the paragraphs on indispensability and ontological commitments so the reader can understand the premises and the conclusion, then the paragraphs on naturalism and confirmational holism so the reader has a good reason to believe the first premise. This would also tie in well the following paragraph starting with "Whilst all of these theses have been used to build up the argument...". The expression "these theses" refers to naturalism and confirmational holism. So explaining these theses just before referring to them and not right at the beginning of the section would be more natural.

Maybe this could also be used to further subdivide the section: One subsection for naturalism and confirmational holism after the introduction and the paragraphs on indispensability and ontological commitments, and another subsection for the last two paragraphs. The first subsection could be called "Naturalism and confirmational holism" and the second subsection maybe "Alternative formulations and consequences". Phlsph7 (talk) 08:35, 7 October 2022 (UTC)


 * The main reason I would be resistant to take this approach is that most reliable sources seem to give naturalism and confirmational holism the most prominence/precedence. The current structure was basically: theses supporting premise 1, premise 2, other details. I feel like this follows other sources pretty well and I would be hesitant to deviate from that because of my or our interpretations of the argument (however well-grounded they are). Also, "these theses" doesn't just refer to naturalism and confirmational holism, it also refers to the fact that other versions of the argument may not necessarily accept Quine's method for determining ontological commitments (i.e. regiment into canonical notation, find all variables bound by an existential quantifier). Actually it is a bit controversial whether the argument can even work without any of them anyway (e.g. see the Marcus 2014 source) which makes me even more cautious about reordering things on that basis. Does any of that make sense? Anyway, we could possibly add subsections in the present structure if that is worrying you, I'll think about what that would look like. Thanks for continuing to think about how to improve the article btw. Alduin2000 (talk) 11:03, 7 October 2022 (UTC)
 * My main reason for this suggestion was that it sounds more logical in my head to explain the basic concepts first and the supporting arguments afterward. But I don't have much familiarity with the reliable sources on this topic. If many of them give the main emphasis to naturalism and confirmational holism then this is a good reason to keep the order as it is. If there is a natural way to divide the section into subsections then it would be helpful, but I don't think that this is that important. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:02, 7 October 2022 (UTC)
 * Yeah that makes total sense Phlsph7. Do you think re-adding a footnote at the mention of ontological commitment in the quoted SEP argument might be useful? Previously there was one explaining that having an ontological commitment to an entity basically means being committed to believing that that entity exists. I know that that's already covered later on but it might be useful to readers and might address the concern of making sure basic concepts are explained straight away. Alduin2000 (talk) 16:14, 7 October 2022 (UTC)
 * You could readd the footnote to the first mention in the lead. But maybe just the first sentence of the previous footnote since we already have a detailed explanation in overview section. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:11, 8 October 2022 (UTC)

New structure
@Phlsph7, : any thoughts on changing the structure to be more like what I have in my sandbox (permanent link)? Just pinging as not many people actively edit this page, feel free to ignore if no thoughts/don't have time or interest Alduin2000 (talk) 13:23, 25 March 2023 (UTC)


 * Hi, I just had a short look at your draft. From what I can tell, it is mainly a rearrangement of the contents of the sections "Overview of the argument" and "Counterarguments" in the current article with a few changes. I think it also uses some contents from the section "Historical development". Is the draft supposed to replace the sections "Overview of the argument" and "Counterarguments" with the rest remaining more or less the same? Or is it supposed to replace the whole article? Phlsph7 (talk) 11:58, 26 March 2023 (UTC)
 * Yeah sorry, supposed to just be a rearrangement of content to replace "Overview of the argument" and "Counterarguments", with everything else staying pretty much the same - main thinking is just to simplify the overview section so that it's a bit less overwhelming. Just making final changes before possibly nominating for FA status and wanted to make sure it's as accessible as possible. Mainly just wanted a few sets of other eyes to make sure it doesn't have obvious problems or to see if you prefer the old structure etc. Alduin2000 (talk) 13:39, 26 March 2023 (UTC)
 * One difficulty with summarizing such debates, and probably one of your reasons for the rearrangement, is that it is often rather difficult to cut them into neat and clearly defined sections. The advantage of the new structure is that it simplifies the overview section and provides separate discussions of each of the main components of the argument. In this regard, the sections "Indispensability", "Confirmational holism", and "Ontological commitment" could be grouped together under the heading "Main components" if it doesn't get too large this way. The advantage of the old structure is that clearly separates the argument from the criticism it received. Both approaches make sense. I'm not sure which one is preferable. One idea for the section "Historical development" would be to reduce it to what came before the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument and find places within the other sections to discuss the later publications. Phlsph7 (talk) 08:15, 27 March 2023 (UTC)
 * Thanks, great idea! I have brought all these new sections together under the heading "major concepts". I might think about how/whether to rework some of the history section like you suggest too. Alduin2000 (talk) 18:54, 4 April 2023 (UTC)

Overhaul of primary sourcing
Just a comment here in case any other editors have objections. I have overhauled the way the article deals with primary sources. The main reason is that I think the previous way was idiosyncratic and probably a bit confusing. I have moved the primary source citations out of sfn footnotes and put them directly into the prose as Harvard citations so that they can sit exactly next to whatever they are referring to (or at least close by). This is still not standard for Wikipedia but I think it should make it clearer what these citations are there for for other editors and readers who are looking at the references for further research on the subject. I have also removed the list of primary sources at the bottom of the article and merged those into the main reflist as I think that list is no longer needed and a full bibliography will be more useful to readers (and less confusing!). Shapeyness (talk) 12:59, 8 October 2023 (UTC)


 * I've partially reverted this change as the inline citations mixed with more traditional wikipedia references is probably even more confusing - I've kept the primary sources list removed though to keep the references section simpler. Shapeyness (talk) 18:19, 20 January 2024 (UTC)

Double-Speak?
"Answering these questions will usually identify the doublespeak in language which might otherwise appear to be legitimate or which might not even appear at first glance to be doublespeak." From the Cambridge English Corpus

Is not this a reasonable description of the Quine–Putnam 'indispensability argument'? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 91.110.75.66 (talk) 20:08, 20 November 2023 (UTC)

Minor source discrepancy
I noticed that "ad nauseam" was misspelled ("ad nauseum") in the David Lewis quote, which appears to be reflected in the quote's Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy source. But checking the original book by Lewis, I see that he spelled it correctly. I changed the spelling in the present article, but wanted to note it here, since bringing it into line with the ultimate source means that this exact quote is no longer technically found in the proximate source, so perhaps the citation should be changed. But then that would erase our acknowledgment that Weatherson's article was where we got the quote, rather than directly from the Lewis book. Splitting hairs, perhaps, but that's kind of in keeping with the subject matter! Lusanaherandraton (talk) 07:00, 22 November 2023 (UTC)


 * The Weatherson article also misspells presumptuous as presumptous, not sure what happened when the quote was copied across or added in. Shapeyness (talk) 19:41, 23 November 2023 (UTC)