Talk:Scientific method/Archive 4

RK's 29 Aug 03 redaction (because of 'overwriting') misses, I think, a serious and significant point. Indeed this was a long article and it may be that it should be (or have been) two or more, but at least some of what he removed was my work. And much of what he removed was there for a specific reason, to wit: there is much problem in curretn culture with scientism, confusion and resentment about what science is, and just plain misunderstanding. Thus, it is important to anticipate such reactions and include material in such articles which addresses at least something about these difficulties. For instance, there is a widespread conviction among many that there is some magic about science. Some of the material I included was designed to show, by illustration, that this is largely a misconception. In addition, many people are under the impression that a scientific law is a sort of ultimate holy writ handed down by whomever. Scientific method, being instumental in providing support for some, and contradiction of others, scientific theories or even laws, is an appropriate place to point out that when it works (however it works) final truth is not an outcome. Nor is it a goal of the effort. Some of that material was also excised -- apparently by RK.

I suggest that a discussion of the approach he used may be in order, and for that matter some discussion of my views on the issue as well. Otherwise we may have an editing to_and_fro orbiting the same point(s). A higher dimensional orbit in 'meaning space', presumably.

This is an important article covering a topic (and connections) on which unclear thinking has major public policy implications. We should, collectively, do the best we can to reduce that unclear thinking and to dispel as much of the myth and misconception as we can. In this article, I think that onus may be discharged by including some content which addresses those issues for those who might read it. As for the rest of society who do not read Wikipeida, being pressured this way and that as to what 'the science shows' by those with an axe (economic or ideological or otherwise) to grind, I have few ideas. Improve the general level of the educational system perhaps. But that can't be addressed in a Wikipedia article. The archives of discussion of this article illustrate that many Wikipeians have felt it important.

One aspect of this article on my list to adjust, toward a NPOV, is the references. They are currently skewed, in my view, toward a particular sort of revisionism. And there are always copy edits to do, some of which I try for every time I drop in for some gardening. This by way of noting that the article prior to RK's work (ie, removal of work) was hardly ideal in my view.

Comments?


 * These are good point. I actually agree with you on these ideas; I just don't see how they fit in an article focused on a discussion of the scientific method; they have more to do with science in general. Maybe we can take your text (still saved!) and move it to the more general science article?  Or, as others have pointed out, both science and the scientific method articles are getting pretty big.


 * 2.Sept.03 RK: I'm glad we agree -- at least in principle. I thought the removed material belonged (in some form) here because "scientific method" has totemic connotations for some, and because confusion and mistake about the nature of science, scientific method, and scientists' authority is so critical. There is much misunderstanding of what 'science' is and how it does what it does, and "scientific method" is closely tied with much of that. For instance, the perversion of the global warming debate into something deconstructionist (motivations of this or that scientifc commentator being paramount) while making simultaneous 'objective' noises, is not only intellectually repellent, but postively dangerous if the result is bad policy. The public, including Wikipedia readers, should have an antidote or something usable as an innoculant.


 * I'm fully aware of the assorted reifications here, and intended -- with the example about Edison, as part of a sequence of Newton Kekule Edison -- to show by less abstract example that scientific creativity comes from unknown sources, that acieintists themselves aren't too clear on it and so disagree, and that its source is not -- at least not quite -- a part of any formal model of scientific method. This concentrates, I thought, the reader's mind on the 'method' as opposed to the magical moment of insight, or as Edison would apparently have it, the sweaty moment when tired and tried, one realizes something significant.
 * You are correct that this corrective impluse probably belongs in science, but I think it belongs in method as well since the misunderstanding will come here too. And probably in philosophy of science as well. Any suggestions as to achieving the educational goal of disabusing the totemic believer in Scientific Method of his/her misapprehensions? Pending a better idea, I would advocate returning some (much? all?) of the excised material. I no longer have a copy, so am unable to cite line and word.
 * ww

With respect I find 168's latest revision of the introduction to be verbose and confusing. Mention of the judicial system seems completely out of place in an introduction. &#9774; Eclecticology 21:20 27 Jun 2003 (UTC)

My reference to the judicial system is an attempt to allude to who judges and in what context they judge research to be "pseudoscience" on the basis of whether or not it adheres to "the scientific method." It comes up with regard to what expert testimony or evidence should be admissibile in a court of law (e.g. data showing that smoking is good for you) and what evidence is good enough to base regulations on (e.g. regarding the impact of a species extinction or greenhouse-gas emissions). I can't think of any more important context in which it comes up, not to say that philosophical discussions have no importance at all. If no context is mentioned, I worry readers will think that scientists themselves have such conversations, which I think they never do, unless they're talking to lawyers or senators or commenting on the news. Scientists do talk about each others' methods of arriving at particular results, I just think they rarely about "the scientific method." 168... 22:22 27 Jun 2003 (UTC)


 * I have no comment on the language, but I do think 168 makes a valid and in fact important point and however it may be re-written the point should be kept. As I understand it -- speaking sociologically -- "scientific method" can refer to one of three things: first, a model developed by some outside observer (e.g. a sociologist or historian of science, or a philosopher) of how scientists work; a model scientists themselves use to guide their work; a model other institutions -- 168 refers to courts but of course granting agencies and the institutions that govern them (for example, the US Senate) -- use to police scientific work.  I guess in an ideal world all three models would be identical, and I am sure that in some cases they are.  But I also know that in many cases they are not.  I take 168's points to be:
 * we need to distinugish between how scientists really work, and how they are "supposed" to work, and
 * we need to be attentive to the institutional context in which scientists work
 * If I understand 168 correctly, I agree completely. 168, let me know! Slrubenstein

Yes, that's more or less where I'm coming from, and I like how you have broken down the various entangled issues, which I didn't try to express myself, but probably should have. You seem to suggest that I didn't address granting agencies, but I meant to do so with reference to "policy" and "agencies." I think "granting agencies" might have to be regarded as spanning several spheres, because one of the places where the rubber meets the road in grant decisions, at the NIH, for example, is in the "study sections." There you have working scientists summoned to Washington to award points to various proposals, on which basis the petitioners either get money or they don't. My earlier comments about what scientists talk about I believe would apply especially to these scientists engaged in ranking proposals. On the other hand, you have scientists-turned-administrators on the agency staff, who at the NSF, for example, may get involved in penning pamphlets on "How to be a Scientist" for scientists in training, and you have the higher-ups who schmooze with the White House, Justice, Congress, etc. I suspect Eclecticology is not really complaining about verbosity (the use of more words than are necessary to convey a point) but about whether all the points I made need or deserve making. If somebody can make a point more succinctly, I'd be as happy as anybody to see it done.168... 03:23 28 Jun 2003 (UTC)

Actually, with respect to the three types of models you describe, SLR, maybe I should clarify that I don't think scientists carry around a _single_ procedural model, which they compare against what they do and what other scientists do. Instead I think they carry around lots of models of how different particular things should be done. Now it may be that some logician someday will show that all of these models that the scientists are using reduce to the same single string of Boolean operators (personally, I'm dubious), but I think most scientists themselves regard themselves as having various opinions about how various things should be done. This is not to say that scientists aren't taught "the scientific method" in highschool like everyone else. I've met scientists who have never have bothered to question that lesson. So despite what they and their graduate students are doing in the lab, nevertheless they hold the view that, as scientists, they must be following "the scientific method" (in fact, there's a convention in writing scientific papers to fabricate a narrative that conforms to the scientific method, rather than describing one's actual motives for an experiment and the actual sequence in which observations were made--me, I call it lying). So maybe we need a fourth category for situations where it is necessary to distinguish a model scientists have in one part of their head from the model or models they actually use to guide their work and to judge others'. 168... 19:31 28 Jun 2003 (UTC)


 * Of course I agree with you here -- the three types of models I mentioned above are just types, and I should have been clearer that there need not be consensus. This is not just true for scientists themselves -- sociologicsts and historicans of science may have competing models of how (they think) scientists work, just as different institutions (such as granting agencies) may have different criteria.  I do suspect that for any one of the three types I mentioned there may be a dominant or hegemonic model, and competing models.  As for your final point, I agree but I don't think it calls for a fourth category -- I think you are making a generally valid point that should be considered for any section of the article. Slrubenstein

I'm not talking about consensus, but rather self-consistency on the part of individual scientists. I just thought it worth mentioning that a scientist, when asked, might with all sincerity describe to you a model, which it turns out disagrees with how he or she actually operates. On the one hand, I thought you more or less captured this point when you wrote "we need to distinguish between how scientists really work, and how they are "supposed" to work" (i.e. where the scientists themselves are among those doing the supposing). But when you defined the category of "a model scientists themselves use to guide their work," that articulation seemed in danger of creating the impression that scientists are conscious of or have access to the model they are using, so that by just asking any one of them we could know what that model is. I think that would be a bad assumption. Actually I'm not sure the contents of that fourth category I was arguing for--"what scientists _think_ they're doing--would be so interesting. I think historians and sociologists and others have done a lot more thinking about it than scientists have. If you want to know the secret to a perfect golf swing, you're probably better off asking a coach or a sports kinesiologist than asking Tiger Woods.168... 20:17 28 Jun 2003 (UTC)


 * Okay, I don't think we are really disagreeing, just elaborating on various points which I think we both agree all belong in the article -- somewhere. I take your main point now to be,
 * that scientists are conscious of or have access to the model they are using, so that by just asking any one of them we could know what that model is. I think that would be a bad assumption.
 * And I think this is a fine point -- most anthropologists take it as a virtual axiom that most people do not and cannot articulate the reasons for their behaviors, or the models that guide them, and I am sure this is true for many scientists. Still, although I think it is a valid and important point to make, I think it needs to be positioned very carefully in the article and also fleshed out with some examples (evidence).  This is because although as I said I am sure your point is often valid, it isn't universally so -- for one thing, one part of many scientists' education (the whole PhD process) is being "disciplined," taught both how to do things and also taught a particular story or set of explanations for why they do things the way they do.  Now, I do not think that the story (or explanations) scientists tell to account for their actions is the whole story (which is why I think there is an important role for historians and sociologists of science) -- but I do think that many scientists are taught to have a very strong opinion about how things should (emphasis on should) and should not be done.  Also, some -- perhaps few, but notable nonetheless -- scientists have reflected on the methods they use (in some cases, explicitly invoking principles not covered in this article, and perhaps not sufficiently recognized by philosophers -- principles such as the imagination and chance).  Finally, as you yourself pointed out, scientists often times do have to give an account of their methods to others (e.g. courts, granting agencies).  For me, the larger point is still that no one account of how scientists work is sufficient, and that many of the accounts reflect interests or conditions beyond that of some quest for knowledge of the world, narrowly conceived.  That said, I want to reiterate that I think your point is valid.  Obviously, this article needs more contextualization and discussion not only of "what the 'scientific method' is," but also "how people determine what the 'scientific method' is," and also what kin dof "work" -- not just strictly "scientific" but political, economic, and social as well -- does some notion of or investment in the notion of a "scientific method" do for people?  And I think it is points such as the ones you have been making that make it clear why these topics should be explored in the article.  But at this point, I wish other contributers (such as Eclecticology, RK, and the rest) would weigh in. Slrubenstein


 * My point in referring to 168's verbosity not about whether he was making valid points, but about whether the introduction was the right place for doing that. We all easily recognize that thare are many controversies surrounding the scientific method; that this discussion is taking place at all is proof of that.  The introductory paragraphs and the section summarizing the steps in the scientific method should be written with the reader in mind, particularly a reader who simply wants to know what the scientific method is without being thrust immediately into all the controversies that surround it.  For the introduction it would be sufficient to simply say that controversies exist.  If he wants to know about the controversies he's welcome to read on beyond that.  Wandering into judicial proceedings in this part of the article is going to chase people away more confused than when they started.  Maybe I'm just trying to focus things back on the simple fact that this is an encyclopedia article.


 * I'm sorry that I won't be able to comment again for another month while I travel east to visit in-laws. My wife's application of the scientific method starts from the hypothesis that I spend too much time in front of a computer screen. :-)  &#9774; Eclecticology 18:37 29 Jun 2003 (UTC)

This disagreement it seems is really about NPOV. I wonder if Eclecticology realizes that a lot of people(perhaps the majority of scholars?) don't _believe_ there is a single method that all science follows. So an encyclopedia article that sets about to address a single method that all science follows should be like an article on Catholocism: You don't start "While there is some controversy, on the first day God created the heaven and the earth..." i.e. You have to pay more than lip service to the perspective of non-believers. 168... 16:32 30 Jun 2003 (UTC)


 * I think this subject is fascinating. It really needs a few more words though.  First we should make it clear that it is the US judicial system and government under discussion.  Next, and here I've done a little research, the supreme court has there own version of "the scientific method" known as the Daubert Criteria (see http://www.daubertexpert.com ).  Here's an outline of the criteria:


 * "The four Daubert criteria for evaluating the admissibility of expert testimony are: (1) whether the methods upon which the testimony is based are centered upon a testable hypothesis; (2) the known or potential rate of error associated with the method; (3) whether the method has been subject to peer review; and (4) whether the method is generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. "


 * These criteria are explicitly an attempt to meld different philosophies of science (most notably Popper's and Kuhn's). My suggestion is that this topic be moved to the 'Public Policy' section near the bottom of the article and we say something more general in the introduction about the role of scientific method in society.  --Chris

I agree Daubert and that stuff are really interesting, including the way the courts have solicited input from philosophers and historians of science. I noticed that link you offered doesn't seem to work though. 168... 20:22 2 Jul 2003 (UTC)

''In some cultural traditions (e.g. Anglo-American), if a method of obtaining knowledge this way does not sufficiently use mathematics, then it is not considered a science. In other traditions (e.g. continental European), methods of exploring knowledge which approximately follow the above description, but only using natural language, without using mathematics, are considered to be included in the category corresponding to the word which translates in English to science.''

I come from Canada, and have read many books printed in English-speaking countries, but have only rarely seen this. Sometimes one makes the distinction between hard sciences, like physics and chemistry, and soft sciences, like sociology and psychology, and one may even judge the latter as incomplete or improperly done. But the idea that science must use math simply isn't there, and so I don't think there's a basis for the cultural division you speak of.

The soft sciences such as sociology and psychology include many researchers who use mathematics and use statistics, so you have not yet shown that your notion of science includes knowledge-methods of which some totally reject any overt use of maths. Would you include literature (Moliere, Shakespeare, Zola, Proust), the bits of political sciences which are math-free, installation art? Are these sciences? They make hypotheses about the world, they experiment with it, they find that some experiments work, some don't, they evaluate their experiments.

In my experience, people in rich, English-speaking countries would tend to exclude these from science, largely because of the lack of maths. i'm not trying to be post-modern here, and i'm a bit uncomfortable with arguing for a sharp anglo vs euro division, but in my experience, there is a real spectrum of how the word science is used. Personally (and i admit i'm a scientist who works with simple mathematics ;), i prefer to think that the bits of sociology and psychology which do not have enough maths to disambiguate their hypotheses, experiments, evaluation etc are not science, while other bits do qualify as science. It's also true that in this point of view (i'm certainly not alone), use of maths is necessary, though not sufficient. Bad use of maths (and especially statistics) leads to poor science.

Back to the cultural bit, since it's not just my opinion alone which is relevant: maybe another way of putting it is that in some cultures there's simply no sharp division between arts and sciences. Here's a department of the CNRS (Centre national de recherche scientifique) in France, showing its subject areas (sections):

http://www.cnrs.fr/SHS/departement/sections.php

''section 31 Hommes et milieux : ?volution, interactions    section 32  Mondes anciens et m?di?vaux    section 33  Formation du monde moderne    section 34  Repr?sentations, langages - Communication    section 35  Pens?e philosophique - Sciences des textes - Cr?ation artistique, scientifique et technique    section 36  Sociologie - Normes et r?gles    section 37  Economie et soci?t? section 38 Unit? de l'homme et diversit? des cultures   section 39  Espaces, territoires et soci?t?s    section 40  Politique, pouvoir, organisation''

More or less: society, ancient history, medieval history, modern history, human languages, philosophy, artistic creation, human unity and diversity; space, territories and societies; politics, power and organisation.

i guess these mostly fall under soft sciences in English, but many people insist that they are simply not sciences. Rather than having endless arguments, describing the source of the dispute seems to me the wikipedia way to go. Anyway, i'm not that keen to do a language search to trace the use of the word science, so please have a look to see if my correction is sufficiently NPOV (wait a few minutes)... Boud 14:01 16 Jul 2003 (UTC)


 * None of those subjects are science in any way, shape or form. Sadly, many people now use the word "science" as an adjective to add onto every subject one studies. You can even talk about "Political science", yet this subject has no relationship to science at all. They are using the same word, but in a very different way. RK 12:31, 22 Aug 2003 (UTC)

Did Darwin use math? I don't think anyone would hesitate to call him a scientist. What about the Leakeys and Jane Goodall? 168... 22:02 16 Jul 2003 (UTC)

I think the section on Scientific Models, Theories and Laws could be expanded on. I'd like to see some dicussion/elaboration on the fact that a collection of models which are called a Theory is not just a best guess, in the way someone might say this is just a working theory which hasn't yet had any verification. This especially is to address those folks who claim that the theory of Evolution is just the current best guess of scientists.

Also it might useful to point out that just because a Theory (or even a "Law") can't explain some anomaly doesn't mean the Theory is totally discarded. An example would be how Newton's "Laws" of Gravity could not explain the orbit of Pluto did not mean that the "Laws" were totally wrong. Einstein's General Theory of Relativity simply superceeded Newton's because it could explain everything Newton's could, as well as the orbit of Pluto. This is to point out just because someone can come up with one thing which can't be explained by the current Theory, doesn't mean that the Theory is wrong. Often the Theory will still be used, even with one or more anomalies, until some other Theory comes along which explains things better that the previous Theory could. I.E. it's not just enough to point out an anomaly in the Theory of Evolution to discard it, but one would have to offer a better theory which explained all the the facts which the current Theory of Evolution does, and explained the anomaly. MikeCinKc 02:30 22 Jul 2003 (UTC)


 * Historically that last requirement has been more often "honoured in the breach". The Copernican system for instance was inferior in its raw explanatory power for a long time. And yet it was widely accepted as being superiour to the Aristotelian view of the heavens. The reason for its adoption was the nebulous esthetic bias that a "smaller body" should circle a "larger body" rather than otherwise. (This didn't of course prevent its supporters from claiming explanatory power as an "additional" point in its favor, once it finally did start to be useful in a real sense ;) -- Cimon Avaro on a pogo-stick 07:11 22 Jul 2003 (UTC)

I have removed the following materail from the article. It did not fit in the section that it was in; it seems to be a philosophical detour. Also, it seems idosyncratic, and veers off into a discussion of "what is science"? which has nothing to do with this article. This better fits in an article on culture or philosophy. Finally the description about mathematics is not well written; the point seems lost; I fear it will confuse most readers. RK 12:31, 22 Aug 2003 (UTC)


 * Debate about what is true science, between individuals and among cultures, often depends strongly on whether or not a method of obtaining knowledge this way sufficiently and correctly uses mathematics to minimise ambiguity in describing these steps. The mathematics required for a knowledge-seeking method to be considered a science (in the stricter interpretation) is not necessarily numerical, nor does it require explicit use of algebraic equations: implicit use of set theory or graph theory and the simple, correct use of statistics can be enough. To avoid ambiguity in cultures with a wider interpretation of science or scientific method, the literal translation of the term empirical science is generally sufficient to signify what in English is usually meant by the single word science. The terms hard science and soft science can also help to describe the degree of mathematics usage in different areas of knowledge-seeking - the more a science uses mathematics, the more it is hard (however, pseudo-sciences often also use mathematics, but make incorrect use of statistics and insufficiently apply the above steps).

Removed "Even outside science scientific paradigms may be applied to such diverse questions as diagnosing medical patients, investigating murders or researching social trends. "


 * These are not outside science; they are examples of science applied to practical concerns. RK

Removed "The goals of distinguishing good science from bad and of identifying a recipe for progress offer justification enough for many to seek to identify and characterize "the scientific method." For other thinkers and observers, which include philosophers, and some historians, sociologists and anthropologists, the motivation is a more basic curiosity about how science works. "


 * This is off-topic for a discussion of the scientific method. It belongs more in an article on a cultural or social analysis of science, or something like that. RK

Perhaps not surprisingly, given that I wrote it, I disagree totally. What it's there for is to give a naive reader reason to care about the scientific method and to read more of the article. Take it out and fewer people will read it, I can almost guarantee it--except that I have no idea whether anybody reads these things.168... 20:10, 22 Aug 2003 (UTC)


 * It seems that User:168... has more faith in the reader's attention span than I do. If the defining section of a subject doesn't grab readers by getting right to the point the readers will go away quickly.  It's not a matter of whether those points are valid, but of where they are best placed.  &#9774; Eclecticology 20:39, 2003 Aug 22 (UTC)

I essentially agree with your efforts to trim the fat from the text. Nevertheless, I do regard measurement as a part of observation. If we the object being studied is measured with a length of 5cm., that is an observation. "Wonder" seems more a part of hypothesizing than of measurement. &#9774; Eclecticology


 * How can you measure something, without first deciding what it is that we are going to measure? What are you measuring or testing?  How are you measuring or testing this unknown something?  Why are you measuring or testing something to begin with?  The first step, which we are currently calling "Observation" is when a person decides that something is of interest. We could also label this step "First coming up with an idea". Only after we decide to look at something specific can we decide what properties to measure, and how to measure these properties. And only after we make these decisions can we get equipment together to make the actual measurement. RK

As it stands this article is somewhat lengthy. We have a summary of the steps in the scientific method followed by several sections to expand on those steps. To keep the article size manageable I would sugggest splitting off those explanatory paragraphs to something like Steps in the scientific method. &#9774; Eclecticology 22:35, 2003 Aug 22 (UTC)


 * I agree that if this article gets longer we should do this. However, its current length still seems reasonable. If you click "Printable view", and use a modest sized font, printed out this entire article is six or seven pages long. This is the same length as the longer articles in Encyclopedia Brittanica (c). RK 22:50, 22 Aug 2003 (UTC)

I raised the issue of dividing the article because of the 32k warning that appears when I want to edit.

Although we still disagree about measurement, I moved "wonder" where you do not appear to have opposed by interpretation.

In attempting to understand your views about measurement it seems to me that your view suggests a scientific method that is a more linear process while I see it as a cyclical series of incremental steps. With the initial observation perhaps you are right and no measurement takes place, but in the subsequent iterations measurements (which could include a simple count of objects) will often be required. Not all measurements will need complex instruments.

I've reverted 168's latest changes as they only add to the confusion about the subject. I was glad to see you remove the pseudo/junk-sciences comments since my impression has been in the past that you are no great supporter of such things. In one sense I suppose he's right that they are opposites to science, but that's a bit like saying that criminality exists because there are laws. &#9774; Eclecticology 05:50, 2003 Aug 23 (UTC)

There's no "because" in there. The U.S. Senate does not exist because of the House and the presidency, but an article about the U.S. Senate would do well to mention and link to those two others up top. As I said in the heading to my edit, it helps delineate the topic. I think it was precipitous to revert all my changes like that. You assume RK agrees, but he removed the content before I made my argument for it. Plus I moved things around and strengthened them. Does anyone else support this reversion?168... 15:42, 23 Aug 2003 (UTC)

Also you can you cite the particular confusion(s) that you say my edits added too, Eclecticology? If you can't, I'll assume you reverted just for reasons of taste.168... 15:44, 23 Aug 2003 (UTC)

Humble suggestion.
Since the matter of the length of this article is even used as a justification for edits in edit-summaries, I think it would be a good time to split this article. Why not spin out the bottom 1/3 of the article? The only problem I see with this is what the title of that article should be. arguments over the scientific method; views of the scientific method; examinations of the scientific methor? Any better suggestions? In the long run, a periodical wipeout of added stuff from the article is not the way to go, IMHO. -- Cimon Avaro on a pogo-stick 18:09, Aug 29, 2003 (UTC)


 * Yeah. I mentioned splitting the article before. My preference would be to split out the several sections that expand on the Steps in the scientific method.  The summary list earlier in the article would stay here with a link to the steps for those who want more detail.  &#9774; Eclecticology 21:23, 2003 Aug 29 (UTC)


 * Splitting is good, but why split the article in half and have exactly the same topic in both parts? Why not limit this article to the discussion of the scientific method, and take out the other ideas and put them in a new article. RK 21:37, 29 Aug 2003 (UTC)


 * I'm flexible about how it should be split. &#9774; Eclecticology 21:45, 2003 Aug 29 (UTC)


 * I have just removed a few sections from this article that were more on science in general than on the scientific method, and I moved these parts to the science article. (It was a lot shorter than this article anyways!) They seem to fit there better. RK 21:47, 29 Aug 2003 (UTC)

-

WW writes "You are correct that this corrective impluse probably belongs in science, but I think it belongs in method as well since the misunderstanding will come here too. And probably in philosophy of science as well. Any suggestions as to achieving the educational goal of disabusing the totemic believer in Scientific Method of his/her misapprehensions? Pending a better idea, I would advocate returning some (much? all?) of the excised material. I no longer have a copy, so am unable to cite line and word."

I think that these paragraphs include the material in question: RK 21:07, 2 Sep 2003 (UTC)


 * There are no rules or procedures or guidelines for the production of new hypotheses. Their appearance is largely mysterious. The history of science is filled with stories of scientists describing a "flash of inspiration", or a hunch, which then motivated them to look for evidence to support their assertion. The anecdote that an apple falling on Isaac Newton's head inspired his theory of gravity is a popular example of this (there is no evidence that the apple fell on his head while he was sitting under a tree; all Newton said was that his ideas were inspired "by the fall of an apple.") Kekule's account of the origin of his hypothesis of the structure of the benzene-ring (dreaming of snakes biting their own tails while he dozed on a tram trip) is better attested. On the other hand, Thomas Edison famously said that invention was 99% perspiration and 1% inspiration. It probably isn't important that he mostly did engineering and product development, not science per se.


 * Scientists tend to look for theories that are "elegant" or "beautiful"; in contrast to the usual English use of these terms, scientists have a more specific meaning in mind. "Elegance" (or "beauty") refers to the ability of a theory to neatly explain all known facts as simply as possible, or in a manner consistent with Ockham's Razor. It has usually been the case that the more elegant a hypothesis is, in comparison to other possibilities, the more likely it will turn out to be the best. Thus far, however, there is no idea of why elegance should be favored; perhaps we like simplicity and so regard it as elegant.


 * Scientists differ on how 'real' their models of reality (their theories and laws) are - the traditional concern of philosophy of science itself. Extreme skeptics argue that no empirical methods are so truly accurate as to be able to 'validate' any given theory, and therefore all of science must be seen as quasi-empirical. In effect, they argue that mathematics is just another science, and science is just another human construction, and that the scientific method itself is a way that human cultures come to agree on facts, notations, and even predictions. Others observe that mathematics has no experimental tests for any of its results and that mathematics and science are fundamentally quite different. That mathematical results apply thoughout much of science is, fundamentally mysterious. Eugene Wigner of MIT wrote a famous paper entitled The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics, examining this very thing. It's still among the best treatments of a connection(s) subjuct which remains almost totally obscure.

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As of the 26th of Sept, an anonymous editor has removed almost all the content from this article. While the remaining nubbin may satisfy some of those who thought it was getting too large, the remedy seems to have killed the patient. Over the next few days I will be trying to restore what seems to me to have been best about the existing article and that has been thrown out with the bath water.

I invite the anonymous editor to provide some insight into what was intended.


 * RK has restored the article for which thanks, RK. I'm still going to try to get to it and make some improvements, though.

---

Both of these sentences....
 * "Science allows for creativity, genius, inspiration and new ideas to enter at any stage in the scientific process. What differentiates science from non-science is that it only makes use of falsifiable hypotheses."

strike me as more idealistic than realistic. There's a lot of politics and sociology to science--bad things happen to good ideas, and vice versa. 168... 06:41, 10 Oct 2003 (UTC)

I quite agree. For that matter, it seems to me that honesty requires mentioning that sometimes even outright luck (or serendipity) contributes to the advancement science, though that factor could hardly be considered part of any "method" of science. Grizzly 07:05, 10 Oct 2003 (UTC)

''Demarcation criteria are a whole area of research in the philosophy of science. I don't think we can do the subject justice in one sentence starting "What differentiates science from non-science is...". On the other hand the subject is, no doubt, related to scientific method making it worth a mention. There is aleady a section on demarcation in the Pseudoscience article. Maybe this could be turned into an article on its own. --Chris''

Changed my mind about the science/non-science bit and instead tried to introduce some background (as I see it) to the rest of the section. --Chris

Found something odd lurking in the criticism section:

"Imre Lakatos showed how people studying the natural world have, throughout the ages, constructed historical accounts to suit their pet philosophies [...] this is essentially a sociological or psychological observation about the practice of actual scientists, not an inherent feature of science apart from some of its practitioners."

What on earth does that mean, "not an inherent feature of science apart from some of its practitioners"? Is it possible even to imagine science without its practitioners?

Unequal to the task to breathing some sense into this closing sentence, I've decided to remove it. Any objections? --Chris

Another point in the criticism section. The section about Feyerabend would be much more clear if his quotes were removed. They are difficult to understand and IMO their points are beside the point of the main Feyerabend criticisms, if I understand correctly. Tempshill 17:33, 14 Oct 2003 (UTC)

''Agreed. I tried to argue a while back that the last Feyerabend quote has also been misinterpreted. In any case, the same quote (and interpretation) are copied on the Paul Feyerabend article. I'd be somewhat happier if the mistake only occured in one place. --Chris''

After reviewing the chemical company example in the Public Policy section, I find it quite unsatisfactory. My primary concern at this point is that it appears to muddle legislation and litigation. Legislation would concern general rules relating to dumping in any stream. Litigation would apply those rules to a particular compny and a particular stream. &#9774; Eclecticology 23:41, 2003 Oct 19 (UTC)

I just edited that section, so that to me at least it no longer suggests litigation. I also edited the paragraph before it. I still think the section is missing something though, because it doesn't make a case for itself that it belongs in an article on scientific method. 168... 02:08, 20 Oct 2003 (UTC)

It strikes me now that the step-by-step summary of the scientific method seems to be sneakily arguing for a view of the scientific method that the rest of the article doesn't. By including "publish" among the steps, it's saying in effect that science is not something an individual (say on a deserted island) can perform and that instead it's what emerges from the collective activity of many researchers. I'd say that's a case that could be made, but that it should be made explicitly and/or not made in the list. 168... 02:17, 20 Oct 2003 (UTC)


 * Yes, science can't be done alone. A person might think that they have made a scientific discovery, but how can a person find flaws in their own thinking, if any such flaws exist? For most people, this is impossible. That is why at some point a scientist will needs to show their ideas and work to others, and get feedback. Also, what if there was a flaw in their measuring apparatus?  How could one person, by themselves, ever learn this without comparing their measurement techniques to those of other people?  And knowledge produced by one person, and kept secret, is not considered part of mankind's scientific knowledge.  In theory, one person can do science, and achieve results. But if they never check to see if they are correct, and no ever finds out, then their work is lost to humanity. RK 02:31, Oct 20, 2003 (UTC)

My point was that just that this idea should be either fleshed out or left out from the section with the step-by-step summary. If it's a point that everyone is willing to sign on to, I think it should not only be fleshed out in the section with the list, but should be mentioned in the intro. Right now the summary in which the idea implicitly appear ends up being somewhat equivocal. Although the list contains "publish" and "reproduce," the step-by-step format suggests a recipe for how one person can produce one piece of science. 168... 02:59, 20 Oct 2003 (UTC)