Talk:Standard-type battleship

us standard type battleship
The subject of "standard type battleship" is mentioned in several WP entries on US battleships. The writeups all have minor differences but do point out that the Nevada through Colorado classes represented a deliberate uniform standard in top speed (~21 knots), tactical turn radius (~700 yards), cruising range at economical speed (~8,000+ miles) intended to avoid the problems of other navies (particularly the British and Japanese) who had fast and slow battleships that could not operate together as a unit (or if they did would be limited by the ship with slowest speed, shortest range and widest turn radius). A single article (well-written) on the subject would be better than the same subject treated differently in several scattered battleship articles. Naaman Brown (talk) 19:16, 22 July 2009 (UTC)

incidental characteristics of the standard type
The key to the Standard type battleship is the common tactical operating characteristics (armor, range, top speed, turning) that allowed any combination to be deployed as a single unit. There are a number of co-incidental facts about the Standard type battleship classes:


 * The battleship classes preceding and following the five classes of the Standard type had one main deck level from bow to stern (flush deck). The standard types all had a forecastle 3/5 of the main deck then the quarterdeck dropped one deck level for the remaining 2/5 of the hull.


 * The Standards were the last battleships constructed with lattice or cage masts. All were rebuilt in the 1920s and 1930s. The oldest were modernized with tripod masts (Nevada and Pennsylvania class) or tower superstructures (New Mexico class). The newer Standards (Tennessee and Colorado class) retained their cage masts. The fore and aft tripod and cage masts were equal heights with large multi-level fire control tops. The New Mexico class superstructure had a tall fore tower and a shorter aft tower with pole mast.


 * Like the preceding classes, the Standards were built with submerged torpedo tubes which were removed during the rebuilds; the following battleship classes were designed without torpedo rooms.


 * At the outbreak of World War II, the standards assigned to the Pacific Fleet all had tripod or cage mast with control top; the standards assigned to the Atlantic fleet had the tower superstructure, which resembled the "Queen Ann mansion" towers of the old Royal Navy battleships rebuilt in the 1920s and 1930s.


 * The Standards were designed before the era of the aircraft carrier. They were designed for armor protection and firepower to match other battleships, sacrificing speed. (The idea was, if your armor and guns were better, let faster enemy battleships come to you and fight.)

These are interesting factoids about the Standard type, but they are co-incidental and not relevant to the purpose of the Standard: shared tactical operating characteristics. For that reason, I am leaving this in Talk to avoid cluttering the entry. Naaman Brown (talk) 12:05, 14 August 2009 (UTC)

Biased Article
I am bothered that the article doesn't even attempt to address the drawbacks with the standard battleship concept - most notably the problem of block obsolesence which was a major headache for the USN in the 30's. Basically this means because the ships all have virtually identical characteristics, they will all become obsolete at the same time and all need to be replaced at the same time. This is a bad thing. Getztashida (talk) 18:33, 21 January 2011 (UTC)

Errors in previous Version
The prior version (and another talk thread) cited block obsolescence with the standard type as a problem specifically related to their uniform speeds of 21 knots. It claimed the low speed was a major handicap and that interim vessels with a speed of 25 knots remained useful.

The fact is 25 knot classes did not and were unable to operate with the fast carrier task forces that became the focal point of WWII pacific operations. Even the North Carolina and South Dakota classes were marginal in this respect and it was their speed which became one of the principal reasons they were not retained in Reserve Status like the Iowas. Secondly the Standards were not all identical and they did not all become obsolete as a group. In fact the 3 of the Big 5 which were extensively modernized were considered to be nearly equivalent to new construction (Friedman page 389) in every respect except speed and were scrapped only a year before the North Carolinas and South Dakotas. The only reasons the Standards could all be considered obsolete at the same time where as a result of the advent of carrier warfare and their lack of speed. But in this respect only the US Iowa class was fast enough the properly operate with modern carrier task forces and post war except as a gunfire support ship even they were considered obsolete.

Secondly the Yamato class was developed not to obsolete the Standards at one fell swoop but to overcome guaranteed US numerical superiority with a ship that would be an order of magnitude more powerful than anything the US might be expected to field.

The other problem in the original article is the statement that "Their low speed was a liability to their deployment in the vast expanses of the Pacific, for instance they could not accompany the fleet carriers that had become the dominant combatant. By contrast, the contemporary Queen Elizabeth were fast enough and saw more front line action in the confines of the Mediterranean."

Their low speed did not present special issues in the Pacific because of the distances involved. The edit correctly recognizes that their speed prevented them from operating with the fast carrier task forces and it was that inability which relegated them to second line duties. The Queen Elizabeth’s were more active in the Med but that was a very different conflict than the Pacific. Furthermore the majority of the US Battleline was undergoing repairs or fitting out early in the war and the remaining ships were held back in part again because they couldn't operate with fast carrier task forces. A 25 knot type (Or 23 which was what the QE's actually were) would not have been used any differently.

An additional comment on the edit. The revised version (using the cited source paper on the standard types) properly addresses the impact of their speed and the speed of their contemporaries upon their operations. It also notes (again from the paper cited as a source in the original) that the standards demonstrated superior resistance to battle damage and greater staying power than their contemporaries. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.255.141.221 (talk) 19:38, 16 March 2013 (UTC)


 * Ive reverted your recent edit, I think it's only fair that I explain why. Firstly, at the most basic level the fabric of your edit has been to remove any negative comment on the standard battleship concept and replace them with criticism of contemporary ships from rival navies. This is not indicative of a NPOV.  You may not like the idea of block obsolescence, but it is a real thing and the US standard battleship program is regularly used as an historical example.  This can be cited if you wish and an appropriate response would have been to challenge us for citations, not remove the section wholesale because it offended you.  I should add that block obsolescence was not a problem unique to the USN, the criticism applied equally to the Royal Navies three classes of 13.5" gunned dreadnoughts.


 * Secondly, this is an article about the standard type battleship, not why you don't like the QE class. Most of your commentary on the QE class ships is frankly irrelevant and perhaps more importantly, often completely incorrect as well.  For example, you have mistaken the squadron speed of the 5th BS for the actual speed of all the ships that made up the formation.  The slowest of the QEs was HMS Valiant, who was built with defective turbines and could only achieve 23.5 knots, she was solely responsible for the 5th BS's squadron speed of 23 knots.  All of the other QEs posted trial speeds over 24 knots when they were constructed.  After being rebuilt during the 1930's, HMS Warspite posted 23.86 knots on trials despite being significantly over her original legend displacement and her pit log recorded a speed through the water of 24.5 knots at the battle of Calabria.  Once HMS Valiant had new engines installed when she was rebuilt, all the QE's were effectively 24 knot ships.


 * On your statement that the standards showed greater resistance to damage than their contemporaries. I find this comment very difficult to take seriously - the first time any of the standard battleships received any significant damage, many of them were put out of action, two of them permanently - I am, of course, talking about Pearl Harbour.  I know that that there were mitigating circumstances there but the same could be said of HMS Royal Oak and thereafter the only time a standard type battleship received any battle damage at all was when USS Pennsylvania suffered severe damage from a single, small aerial torpedo.  This is hardly evidence that "During World War II the Standards also demonstrated superior resistance to battle damage and greater staying power than their foreign contemporaries."  By contrast all the QE's present at Jutland were hit repeatedly and only Warspite suffered serious damage.  During WWII Warspite survived being attacked by a Fritz X glide bomb demonstrably capable of breaking a battleship's back with a single hit whilst Valiant managed to survive a floating dry dock collapsing around her.  Both ships were badly damaged by these incidents, but objectively they were no less repairable than the standards that were rebuilt after Pearl Harbour - there was simply neither the funds nor the requirement to repair the ships in 1943.  I concede that HMS Barham was sunk by torpedoes, but then again so was USS Oklahoma.  I'm not saying the Standards weren't tough ships, but the evidence that they were 'tougher' than their contemporaries simply isn't there.


 * You have also completely misunderstood the reason for the Grand fleet's decision to stop deploying the 5th BS independently. Firstly, the 5th BS was not intended to be fielded as an independent formation in the first place and was only deployed in this manner at Jutland because Adm Beatty had lobbied to have them attached the the BCF in lieu of the 3rd BCS which was training with the Grand Fleet at time.  Secondly, the the QE's were still felt to have sufficient margin of speed over the older 20-21 knot battleships of the HSF, but Jutland had revealed the Kaiser and Konig class battleships to be capable of speeds over 23 knots themselves and it was realized that the QEs could not simply flee from the most powerful element of the German battlefleet if they were isolated from the Grand Fleet.


 * You also state that interim "25 knot" battleships could not support fast carrier groups. So what?  That only matters is you have fast carrier groups in the first place.  It didn't effect the RN in the slightest because they didn't operate under that doctrine and they were much more concerned with countering the relatively few modern fast battleships operated by their European enemies - a role for which they considered the R class battleships to be woefully inadequate because they were too slow, whereas the QE class were just fast enough to be tactically relevant.  The raison-d'etre of the battleship was to fight other battleships and by 1939, 21 knots was considered too slow to perform that duty against the latest warships whilst 25-ish knots was still just about usable.  Once the fast carrier group came on the scene then 'all' battleships were obsolete - not just the slow ones.


 * Finally, you are forgetting that the "interim" types with a speed of about 25 knots also includes the Japanese Fusos (23 knots), Ises (24 knots) and Nagatos (26 knots). The relatively high speed of the Nagatos in particular permitted them to serve alongside the 27 knot Yamatos and their armour protection was at least equivalent to the Standards.  For all the fact that they didn't get to do much in the war, the Nagatos are usually regarded as very formidable ships - do you disagree?


 * In conclusion, your edit would have been better if it had focused on the standard type battleships only and avoided making qualitative comparisons with other ships. Your information on the QE class is incorrect and not relevant to the discussion anyway.  As to the Block obsolesence section - I will find some citations for you, but I'm afraid it won't go away because it is traditionally the number one objection to the entire standard battleship concept and to leave it out of the article would be unencyclopedic.  Getztashida (talk) 19:29, 21 March 2013 (UTC)

I'm going to take issue with a lot of what was said here. That being said I think the entire article needs a new look. It tends to treat the standards as a homogeneous whole which is not the case.

First with respect to block obsolescence, which seems from the history to be at the heart of your concerns with the standards, you fail to cite any sources to support your views. To my way of thinking without supporting evidence its little more than personal opinion. By contrast the unsigned edit cited sources (Friedman) in support of his contention that the Standards did in fact not become obsolete as a group. In support of that (and I think official USN opinion as cited by Friedman is pretty strong) I would add that the Standards were in fact several distinct classes of ships and each class incorporated evolutionary improvements on the others. One only has to compare the Nevada class to the Colorado class to see just how different the ships ultimately became.

Second I don't think the edit proffered represented an attack on the QE class. It correctly noted that at least during WWI the British fleet found that it could not in fact operate the QE class as a separate fast wing. Whether the QE class was in general a 23 or 24 knot ship is really irrelevant to the discussion at hand. The point was that other Navies which operated BB's of differing speed capabilities were forced to operate those ships at the speed at the speed of the slowest ship in the squadron. A 23 knot ship enjoys too small a speed margin over a 21 knot ship (especially when variations in trial versus service speeds are considered) to offer a major increase in tactical utility. The Nagato’s at 26 knots were much closer as you noted to the 28-30 knot speeds enjoyed by modern fast battleships but when you look at ships built during the same period as the standards they stand out as an exception. All of the British ships built during that era were 21 knot ships except for the QEs at 23-24 and the Fuso’s and Is’se at 23 knots as built. The two knot difference between the standards and the vast majority of their contemporaries (including Nelson and Rodney) is tactically insignificant.

With respect to the mission of a battleship you can't ignore the fact that changed over time. The RN did not attempt to operate carriers on the US model until late in the war and by then only the KGV class was used as an escort. That the QE's had a more active war than the R class was due to inherent design problems with the R class that made it all but impossible to modernize the class. See Burt's British Battleships 1919-1945 as a good reference. It should also be noted that the R class was very successful at driving off powerful German Surface units by their mere presence early in the war. There is simply no evidence to support the assertion that a 21 knot battleship was incapable of engaging a faster ship. Now obviously if the faster ships want to run away you can't run them down but US doctrine was to advance on, attack, and seize targets that would force their enemy to come out and fight. If your being forced to fight then the ability to run away doesn’t matter for much.

So if the US standards weren't used as actively as the QE's during WWII why was that? And would a service speed of 24 or 25 knots have changed that? The answer is no for two reasons. First the war in the Pacific centered on fast carrier task forces. A speed of 21 knots was too slow for carrier operations and even the 28knot North Carolina and South Dakota classes were considered marginal. Had the later standards been built to a 24 or 25 knot speed standard it’s highly unlikely that it would have changed how they were employed in WWII. Secondly is Pearl Harbor. Those ships that weren't damaged at Pearl were held in reserve and it took years to reconstruct the ships that were raised. By the time the US battle line was back to full strength the carrier was the dominant force and it was clear that the pre-war vision of the battle line advancing across the Pacific was no longer relevant. Consequently the slower ships were relegated to second line duties providing naval gunfire support. WWII showed that a 28 knot ship was the bare minimum to operate with the carrier task forces and the postwar evaluation that only the Iowa's really had the speed to do so shows that even that really wasn't enough.

With respect to damage resistance have you read the cited source? It does a pretty thorough job of looking at the whole picture and that picture I think justifies the comment. The performance of Resolution and Ramillies was especially poor considering they were struck by a single torpedo. Finally you ask “so what” if the QE’s couldn’t accompany Fast Carrier task forces. The reason that’s relevant is that the original article cited their low speed as a liability in Pacific Operations and the usefulness of the QE’s in the med. You can’t have it both ways. Either operation with carriers had become the new speed standard (Pacific) or 23 knots (RN Med) was perfectly acceptable. There is simply no evidence that the RN operated the QE’s in a significantly different manner because they had a 2-3 knot speed advantage over the R class. The QE’s bore the brunt of that fighting because the truly modern ships were in the Home Fleet guarding against Tirpitz and the R class hadn’t been at all modernized. Thus the RN deployed the best ships it had forward. The speed difference was nice but not a game changer. If you can show that credible contemporary sources were concerned about block obsolescence solely on the basis of the 21 knot maximum speeds then I’d love to see them. But I’m not aware of any evaluations from the period that thought the 21 knot speeds of the standards had rendered them obsolete en mass. Had that been the case then the USN certainly could have and likely would have re-engined the ships to improve their maximum speeds. That there was no serious thought ever given to such a program is further proof that the USN did not consider a 25 knot a vast improvement on a 21 knot ship. Even the aborted South Dakota class of 1920 was only designed to a 23 knot standard. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Ski206 (talk • contribs) 20:59, 1 April 2013 (UTC)


 * I took the trouble of finding a primary source to support Block Obsolescence being a concern for the USN, and you go ahead and delete the entire section then ask me for a citation afterwards? You've got some cheek.  You are welcome to edit the article, but if you're going to tear out cited material just because you don't like it then I will put it right back.
 * Your assertion that the Standards were not homogeneous is ridiculous, the whole point of the Standard Battleship concept was to build ships as homogeneous as possible so that they could all serve interchangeably in a single battle line.
 * As to the QE class, they truly are irrelevant to the discussion at hand - however, I took the trouble to make a point by point rebuttal because the "facts" inserted into the article were more or less entirely false. By explaining why I hoped to prevent their reinsertion at a later date.  You're wasting all our time arguing about them.  They were only mentioned in the first place as an example of a class of ships with an intermediate speed - the Nagato's could have just as easily been used as an example and there is no point discussing them beyond that.  Getztashida (talk) 21:55, 2 April 2013 (UTC)
 * Incidentally, I was under the impression that self published work online did not cut the mustard as source material for Wikipedia. I have run into Joseph Czarnecki occasionally on forums whilst I have no axe to grind with him, I know him well enough to know he has an angle on the subject and his work is not entirely unbiased.  His writing on the subject, whilst an interesting perspective and perfectly valid and scholarly for self published material is no more citable than my own.  Getztashida (talk) 22:08, 2 April 2013 (UTC)


 * I'm curious if you have actually read the report you cite on block obsolescence? Because it dates from a 1962 Congressional Investigation (by which time the North Carolina's and South Dakota's were being sold for scrap and all of the standards had already been turned into Razor blades) so I’d be very surprised if battleships were really an issue before the committee. I can't find a copy online but I strongly suspect in 1962 the issue wasn't block obsolescence of a group of Battleships from the 20's but that of war built cruisers and destroyers. If you know of an online version of the report you cite I'd be very interested in reading it. Because even if the issue is raised the context in which it’s raised and by whom can be very telling. It would be one thing for an Admiral with war experience to talk about the fleet’s concerns over the block obsolescence of the Nevada through ColoradoSki206 (talk) 16:05, 3 April 2013 (UTC) class ships and quite another for some Congressman who spent the war as a B-17 bombardier (if he served at all) to raise the issue. Incidentally I don’t see any evidence that the US Navy viewed the “standards” as a homogenous group of ships but rather as 5 distinct classes of ships.


 * Part of the problem here is that the US Navy never set out to build a single class of battleships. Rather what became known of the "Standard Type" was essentially forced on them by political forces which continued to dictate that follow on classes essentially duplicate the previous classes. In the framework of a Navy whose design dictates did not significantly change (armor over speed and the need to have enough range for Pacific operations for example) this led to a group of ships with many common characteristics. However contrary to your assertion they were far from identical. The number and locations of their secondary batteries changed. They evolved from a mixture of twin and triple turrets (with the guns mounted on a common truninon) to all 3 guns turrets (guns on individual slides) to 16" twin gun turrets as well as seeing increases in maximum gun elevation. Their defense against torpedo attack evolved considerably from class to class and when they were reconstructed in the 20's and 30's the Big 5 did not need blistering to bring their torpedo resistance up current standards. They evolved from Geared Turbines to Turboelectric drive which permitted significant changes in subdivision and watertight compartmentalization. Their propulsion also evolved from a 2 shaft to a 4 shaft configuration.


 * Then there is the question of the differences between the ships as they were first commissioned and their final states when they went to the breakers. All of them had evolved considerably over the years seeing improvements in every area except speed. And I'll return to what Norman Friedman says on page 389 in Chapter 17 "Postwar" of his book on US Battleships. "The "Big Five" were retained. The three fully re-constructed unites were often described as equivalent to modern battleships in everything but speed." Yes they were slow especially by the standards of the Iowa's but did this single aspect render all of them obsolete?


 * Webster's defines obsolete as "no longer in use or no longer useful" Is it fair to state that the standards fit that definition? In one respect yes, WWII essentially rendered the battleship obsolete with the carrier becoming the new standard of naval power. To quote Friedman again "The very large surviving US battle fleet, ten new ships, five old but modernized ones, and one incomplete hull (the Kentucky) was therefore reduced to what, before 1941, had been subsidiary tasks: fire support, carrier escort, fleet flagship duty, ordnance experimentation." The only task in that list that the 21 knot speed prevents them from accomplishing is carrier escort. And in that respect post war the US Navy judged even the 28knot classes too slow.


 * But within the context of their lifespan did the standards ever become "no longer in use or no longer useful"? I think the answer is clearly no. As Battleships there is no reason to think that they wouldn't have given a very good account of themselves against their contemporaries. Especially in the context of the Pacific War they were designed to fight. If the US Navy had seen a need for 25knot ships in the immediate aftermath of WWI they would have designed them. But the follow on ships were designed to make 23 knots. Would a speed of 23 or even 25 knots have changed their employment in WWII? Again viewed objectively the answer has to be no. A 25 knot flank speed would still have left them too slow to operate with the carrier task forces and they would have ended up fighting the same war they ultimately did. Too look at their service records is hardly indicative of ships that "were no longer useful".Ski206 (talk) 16:05, 3 April 2013 (UTC)


 * The paper talks about block obsolescence being a problem where large numbers of similar ships are ordered in quick succession in general. You will note which sentence I specifically referenced; "However, a major concern with having a fleet of similar ships built at the same time is block obsolescence."  The previous revert had been marked "Prior Version inaccurate Block obsolesence not an issue" so I was looking for a citation that demonstrated that Navies in general and the US Navy in particular did consider block obsolescence to be an issue.


 * With regard to a citation for the block obsolescence of the Standard battleships in particular - you've got the burden of proof the wrong way around. I have provided a citation that block obsolescence is a problem when you order large numbers of similar warships in a short space of time, but if you do a Google search for something like "Standard battleship block obsolescence" most of the results that come up tend to be opinion pieces running along the lines of "Contrary to popular opinion, the Standard Battleships were not effected by block obsolescence."  This is to be expected because block obsolescence is a problem that crops up a lot in capital asset management (you'll find many examples in transport infrastructure, architecture, national power grid management, etc) so the burden of proof that the standard battleships were not subject to it was on those authors making that claim.  I can demonstrate that block obsolescence would be a problem from first principles, but that's original research.  It is better that the article states (with a citation) that block obsolescence is normally a problem for large warship groups and then the other perspective is put (with other appropriate citations).  Now I have no problem with both perspectives being presented, but the repeated wholesale deletion of the only section of the article discussing block obsolescence at all is unacceptable.  Getztashida (talk) 16:52, 3 April 2013 (UTC)


 * So I'm guessing (and if I'm wrong you have my apologies) based on your reply that you haven't actually read the reference you cited. And to my way of thinking if you’re going to cite material as a reference you should have more than just the title to go on.


 * So three questions now arise. 1.) Is block obsolescence real? 2.) When does it apply to a ship or class of ships? and 3.) Did that concern apply to the 5 BB classes that made up the "standard type"? With respect to the first yes absolutely. The USN clearly faced that issue in the 60's when almost the whole of its destroyer fleet was war built Gearing and Sumner class destroyers. With respect to the second question the answer is twofold. First if a class of ships can't be modernized to make them fit for modern warfare then clearly you have a group of ships that going to become obsolete as a block. This for example was the central problem with the R class which because of their design were not suitable for the kind of upgrades the QE class enjoyed. But in many cases a ship can be upgraded to modern standards (like those units of the QE class that were modernized. or the FRAM Gearing's. But in other cases the ship simply becomes too old and too worn out to worth further service. A good example of this is the Enterprise which although from a combat systems standpoint is still fully capable at 50+ years of service has simply reached the end of her life. Now with respect to question 3 did this apply to the standards? I think the answer is no. As I've said above the US Navy certainly didn't view the Standards as one homogenous class of ships. I think the record shows they viewed each ship class individually and treated them as such with respect to how they were employed and modernized. And from Nevada in 1914 to West Virginia in 1923 we have a 9 year span in when each ship was commissioned. And certainly by the end of WWII they were very different ships with vastly different prospects for future useful service. As I've already quoted above the USN considered to modernized units of the Big 5 to be nearly equivalent to new construction at wars end.


 * Except of course for speed. But if we are going to judge them obsolete solely on that basis then we have to judge nearly the whole of every nation’s Battleships constructed in the same era as obsolete. However the evidence simply doesn't support that. As battleships many of these slower ships gave very good service during the inter war and war years. And its worthy of note as well that speeds varied across the ships. Burt says that QE and Valiant were only good for 22-23 knots after their major reconstructions. Friedman cites post (pre-war) reconstruction trial speeds of 20.28 for Nevada, 20.89 for Pennsylvania, but only 19.68 for Oklahoma. On the other end of the spectrum Mississippi made 21.68 and New Mexico 21.8 on their post reconstruction trials. That's potentially only a 1 knot difference between a "slow" standard and a "fast" QE at roughly the same point in their careers. There is no doubt that their slow speed became a liability in the age of the fast carrier task force but that was equally true of the contemporary RN and IJN ships. And as I’ve stated before its highly unlikely that had they been capable of 24 or 25 knots it would have changed the war they fought.


 * So here is my problem with your position. You seem to be citing a source you haven't read to support your argument. You feel both sides of the debate deserve equal weight in the article but from what I can see from my own reading and research you’re the only one arguing it applies here. There is simply no evidence that the USN felt that it had a major problem on its hands in that it needed to replace all of the standard class ships in a short period of time. Especially given the 9 year difference in when the first and last units were commissioned. And until you can cite evidence from credible sources (or even point to widespread debate amongst naval historians) that the problem of block obsolescence applied to these 5 distinct classes of ships despite their various modernizations I feel strongly that it doesn’t belong in the article.Ski206 (talk) 19:59, 3 April 2013 (UTC)

OK, here's an outside opinion on this, from someone who's been reading and rereading Friedman's US Battleships pretty much constantly for the last three years or so. Block obsolescence presumably was not something on Secretary Daniels's mind when he approved the Standards. However, given that every year excepting FY14 (the Arizona), the General Board submitted a set of characteristics to the Secretary that would be a significant upgrade over the previous year's class of ships, it's pretty clear that to the General Board (if not to Bureau of Construction & Repair, who seemingly never wanted to make any changes at ALL and almost always proposed repeating the previous ship) felt that not only was block obsolescence a serious issue (note their concern about the Washington Treaty giving the British superiority from about 1952-1956 due to the Colorados having reached end-of-life, but the Nelsons still being within their lifespans), but that the Pennsylvanias were already obsolete/less than fully adequate by FY15. All that Daniels seemed to care about was keeping construction costs down; from the Pennsylvania (FY14) to the California (FY17), the changes made were exceedingly minor, basically increasing deck armor and main battery elevation. The Colorados of FY18 differed from the Tennessees (FY17) in the main battery, rendering them "unbalanced" by the standards of the day, and actually conformed to the C&R alternative design for a 16" battleship that was the General Board's least favored option, for that very reason. In other words, given that the General Board had basically been requesting the eventual BB-49 design every year from FY16 on until they finally got them approved just in time for the Washington Treaty to kill them, I'd say that block obsolescence definitely played into their decisions. As a note, the entire "Standard-type battleship" concept wasn't referred to as such by the Navy at the time; it seems to be a term created by later historians, looking at the nearly homogenous battle line it resulted in with the benefit of hindsight.  Indeed, Friedman directly repudiates the idea that the General Board was trying to create a homogenous battle line on page 113, regarding the Pennsylvanias vice the Nevadas:  "As usual, C&R tried to duplicate its latest design, objecting that it was the General Board's own policy to build in squadrons of four....  The General Board was unimpressed. The new ships would still be able to combine tactically with the Nevadas, even though they were 55-feet longer. There was no point in repeating inferior ships if better ones could be had." There was no desire to create a "standard" design by the General Board, only by the Secretary of the Navy, looking to minimize how much he had to fight on Capitol Hill to get the construction projects funded.  rdfox 76 (talk) 00:12, 4 April 2013 (UTC)


 * Rdfox you've hit on one of my major problems with this article and it's why I plan to spend the next several hours with Friedman. The standard class was not a single class of ships created with the intention of producing a fully homogenous line of battle. It was essentially an accident in that the Navy was not allowed to buy the ships it wanted but rather was forced into making small changes from class to class as a result of political limitations.


 * I do think you have misunderstood what Friedman says with respect to the Nelsons outliving the Colorados. On page 211 this concern is raised in the context of a treaty proposal to limit future main gain caliber to 12 inches. Friedman states "Moreover they would have the last of the 16-inch ships, since the lives of the Nelsons would necessarily expire long after those of the newest U.S. Colorados." Given that this concern was raised in the context of negotiations for a treaty limitation that was not adopted I don't see it as support for the idea that the standards faced block obsolescence. Unless of course I’ve missed something in that respect but I went through the index for references to both ships and this seemed to be the closest to what you were talking about.


 * As I said I’m going to re-read the chapter on the standards but I think chapter 10 on reconstruction is pretty telling as well. To quote Friedman “In the aftermath of the Washington Conference, the U.S. Navy was left with three groups of battleships: the old coal-burners, deficient in deck, side, and underwater protection and whose only deck armor consisted of a thin waterline deck; the Nevada, Pennsylvania, and New Mexico classes, deficient in underwater protection; and the satisfactory turboelectric battleships of the Tennessee and Colorado classes. The question then was to what extent the first two groups could be brought up to the standards of the third.” — Preceding unsigned comment added by Ski206 (talk • contribs) 02:13, 4 April 2013 (UTC)


 * I don't have much time to comment or edit at the moment, but so there is no misunderstanding - I do not have a copy of the full text of the report I cited and getting one would take several weeks at least, but I did read the abstract so I am not citing a reference of the strength of it's title alone. As I was merely attempting to reference the point that block obsolescence is a concern for homogenous warship groups (whereas the previous edit had dismissed it as not being a problem at all) I didn't see that detailed reading of the document was necessary considering it's very existence is evidence that the US government has given consideration to the problem of block obsolescence in their navy.


 * Incidentally, I believe that the information that Rdfox has just given us is exactly the kind of material the article needs. I am not precious about the wording of the article and a properly cited rewrite of Rdfox's commentary would be infinitely preferable to the previous, clumsy description of block obsolescence that I wrote.  I do not, however consider it appropriate to keep removing the existing content while the subject is still under discussion.  Getztashida (talk) 16:29, 4 April 2013 (UTC)


 * I'm curious on a couple of points. First what exactly about the standards do you think made them subject to block obsolescence? Second do you normally consider it appropriate to cite works that you haven't read especially when it's likely that they may not apply to issue at hand? The debate isn't about whether block obsolescence is real. It's about whether such a criticism can be applied to the standards as a group. A link to the abstract you mention might at least be a good starting point. Ski206 (talk) 19:45, 4 April 2013 (UTC)

FYI, I've protected the article until this dispute has been resolved. Ed [talk] [majestic titan] 19:54, 4 April 2013 (UTC)

New Yorks
these qualify as standards insofar as they have the same guns in type and number as the Nevadas, similar speed, and the only exception being the lack of an all or nothing armor scheme which was one of the progressive changes. But functionally they were used as and sailed with the other standards. 74.193.44.32 (talk) 22:27, 24 December 2022 (UTC)

OMT progress
As part of OMT, I am working on this article, if you wish you may check the References section I just added (I renamed the previous References to Footnotes) and order them, I will be adding a section per class and a subsection per ship.

SEKDIS (talk) 09:18, 5 May 2023 (UTC)


 * Due to it now following all criteria, article has been upped to B-Class. Could someone please put in the criteria for the next class (I think it is GA-Class, but I am fairly new, so I do not now much about classes yet)? Thank you.
 * SEKDIS (talk) 09:30, 5 May 2023 (UTC)