Talk:Tet Offensive/Archive 3

Re-write
Am beginning a massive re-write of this monstrosity. Only one-third of the article actually deals with the offensive itself, the rest on the fallout. RM Gillespie 16:23, 4 September 2007 (UTC)


 * What do you have in planned for a rewrite? If two-thirds of two thirds of the article is discusses fallout, why not just put in a request to split the article?--Kevin586 17:14, 4 September 2007 (UTC)


 * Because I plan to incorporate all of it. RM Gillespie 15:15, 6 September 2007 (UTC)


 * Completely agree, not only is this thing a monstrosity, but a POV monstrosity at that (see my post below). Your work is sorely needed.  About a 2/3 redaction should be about right. — J M Rice 18:33, 24 September 2007 (UTC)


 * On what grounds is the article a "monstrosity"? What are your specific claims? It is all well and good to toss about words like "monstrosity" but what have you concrete to say? In any event there are far longer history articles on particular batles. If anything the article appears too short. Where for example, one could argue, are the details on the VC Order of battle? Why is a reduction by "two-thirds" a good thing? On what grounds? Please elucidate... LackeyOfImperialism 22:35, 27 September 2007 (UTC)


 * I think the fallout is important because of the profound political effect Tet had on the US, as well as the military effect (decimation of the VC). I would recommend keeping the fallout sections and building up more details of the battle. The article can use some more headings and sub-headings to make it easier to follow, but I don't see much of an issue here as regards length, nor is the article confusing. The major content for a credible presentation is in place, including detail on the Northern side and its plans. LackeyOfImperialism 22:43, 27 September 2007 (UTC)

Hoopes
As Warnke saw it, both sides were disappointed by the results. The enemy failed to capture and hold any major city, and he suffered tremendous losses, perhaps 30,000 killed; also, ARVN fought better than expected. But the attacks produced devastating effects on our side as well -- many cities were overrun and then gravely damaged or destroyed in the process of recapturing them, with heavy loss of life; the enemy still held the countryside and had demonstrated the inherent fragility of the pacification program; large-scale U.S. forces were tied down in remote, uninhabited places like Khesanh and Conthien, unable to move, pounded by enemy artillery, and with their ability to resist direct assault a matter of growing doubt. Finally, it was clear that public opinion in United States had been shaken to the roots. In plain truth, Warnke argued, neither side could win militarily. U.S. strategy should henceforth be based on that reality and should aim, not at victory, but at the kind of staying power necessary to the achievement of a compromise political settlement. In military terms, this meant no further troop increases (for the enemy could and would match them), a pullback from isolated posts like Khesanh, and a far less aggressive ground strategy designed to protect the people where they lived. A revised directive should be sent to Westmoreland making clear that henceforward his primary mission would be to protect the population of South Vietnam. There should also be a renewed effort to open talks, if necessary by halting the bombing. Ken E. Beck 20:36, 13 September 2007 (UTC)


 * No argument from me. That is all pretty well spelled out by the Pentagon Papers. Unfortunately, Warnke's attempt to sway the Clifford Group went for naught. Why the Hoopes? RM Gillespie 17:48, 14 September 2007 (UTC)


 * I agree, Hoopes has little to add.Ken E. Beck 11:56, 17 September 2007 (UTC)

Filled with POV
Once again, as is too common in Wikipedia, this thing is someone's term paper or other pseudo-documentary or "analyis," not a proper article... that's article, not tome! There is so much opinionating here -- and using someone else's opinion as a footnote is not honest sourcing -- that it would take all day to insert citation tags. So, I just posted the POV tag atop. Thanks, Gillespie, for taking on the much needed editing! — J M Rice 18:40, 24 September 2007 (UTC)


 * Yes, it is a sprawling mess at present, but that is the nature of the beast. I could use a little help in finding what you call "opioninating". Could you be more specific? Since all authors have agendas (believe it or not) how is the use of footnotes "not honest sourcing"? RM Gillespie 17:01, 26 September 2007 (UTC)


 * Having read a number of articles in Vietnam, I would have to agree with Gillespie. Exactly what issues are at hand? What is all too common on wikipedia is "drive-by" tagging with few specifics on the Talk Page or elsewhere, and little substantive contribution to the article. Exactly what is "opinionating" and exactly how is it a "tome" versus an "article"? Hoe exactly is this a "term paper"? Where are the specifics of alleged "bias"? "Drive-by" taggers unfortunately provide little information. Until there are concrete specifics, I am removing said tag. LackeyOfImperialism 22:24, 27 September 2007 (UTC)

News Media and Vietnam
To shorten this thing to some controllable length I am planning on removing the media section and creating a separate article for it, since one on the subject does not exist at present. Any input or disagreement on the idea? RM Gillespie 06:45, 28 September 2007 (UTC)
 * I agree 100% Ken E. Beck 11:57, 28 September 2007 (UTC)


 * Since Gillespie is the main author of the article I would defer to his judgement, but the original "Media" section did not seem excessive. At only 1541 words it weighed it at just around 10-11% of the original article, which doesn't seem like an excessive amount given its controversial impact on the US political scene, and its significance- a battle Lt general P. Davidson calls one of the the most significant US post WwII victories. "Drive-by" taggers and quibblers about "recommended" article lengths need to consider content and specifics first. In the Vietnam War political and military factors were closely related. Superficial review for example would advocate taking out several details on Communist planning, such as the influence of the Anti-revision purges on Giap, et al. But such things are a legitimate part of the story, (the north-south faction clash) mentioned in most credible histories of the conflict. They also correct a common popular misconception of Giap as "architect" of Tet, when as the article shows, he was basically opposed. To sacrifice such detail in the interest of vague recommended lengths misses the whole point of writing a history article in the first place. Still, since there is no existing article on the Media subject it cannot hurt to create one. LackeyOfImperialism 17:40, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

Contemporary sources
Here are some relevant contemporary articles I dug up (mostly TIME) that are all available online. I'll post them here and let someone else roll them in. - Crockspot 22:39, 30 September 2007 (UTC)

Problems with article
In my view this article has improved a great deal. Recent edits have shown knowledge and skill. However, in places, only a single point of view is represented. Statements are made as fact that should be shown as opinion with contrary opinions as well. For example: "Although the offensive was a military disaster for communist forces, it also had a profound effect on the American public, ....." This is the - Tet was a victory that was misrepresented by the media, which in turn, caused the public to turn against the war, except the media link has been throughly debunked and has been removed. This view is supported by cherry picking other information. For example some sources say that one of the goals of Tet was to demonstrate to the United States that claims being made about the war were not true. If in fact that was a goal, and that goal was achieved then that requires modification of the term "military disaster". The achievements of the communist are dismissed by saying that there were not the goals and were achieved by happenstance. By the measures used by the Americans, casualties ratios, territory occupied, Tet was a victory for the Allies, no question. However it has been argued that these are not meaningful measures. The view that Tet demonstrated to decisions makers that the war was stalemated and that financial and political costs of success were too high is not represented. Ken E. Beck 18:53, 1 October 2007 (UTC)


 * A fair point on impact but I don't think you are reading what Gillipsie has written closely. Look at that quote again: "Although the offensive was a military disaster for communist forces, it also had a profound effect on the American public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the communists were, due to previous defeats, incapable of launching such a massive effort. The most significant political result of the offensive, therefore, took place in the United States, where the first real questioning of and debate over that nation's war policies took place."


 * The quote says little about the American media controversy. In fact it appears to deal mostly  with the effect upon the American political establishment. The media is not even mentioned. Indeed the whole media section was removed for another article.


 * You also say: "some sources say that one of the goals of Tet was to demonstrate to the United States that claims being made about the war were not true.."
 * OK, but which sources do you refer to? You offer none to back up what you say. In fact the old Media Section quotes documented Communist sources as saying that influencing the US media or elections was not even a primary objective of Tet. The main focus for Hanoi was making the ARVN/GVN crumble and to spark the reputed "General Uprising".


 * You also say: "The view that Tet demonstrated to decisions makers that the war was stalemated and that financial and political costs of success were too high is not represented."
 * THis is not true. Look at Gillepsie's writing in the "Aftermath" section re America: "The Tet Offensive created a crisis in the Johnson administration, which was unable to convince the American public that the offensive had been a major defeat for the communists. The optimistic assessments of the administration and the Pentagon came under heavy criticism and ridicule as the "credibility gap" that had opened in 1967 widened into a chasm. The offensive also had a profound psychological impact on the Johnson administration, elite decision makers, and the public."
 * This pretty much sums up the point you are trying to make. The Johnson regime felt the conflict stalemated and increasingly searched for a way out.


 * Also the article above does not suport what you here==> "The achievements of the communist are dismissed.."
 * To the contrary, the article not only notes the demoralizing impact on the US political establishment, but says as to the communist forces: "Their effort to regain control of the countryside was somewhat more successful. According to the U.S. State Department the NLF "expanded their control in urban areas and have made pacification virtually inoperative. In the Mekong Delta the NLF was stronger now then ever and in other regions the countryside belongs to the VC."[123] General Wheeler reported that the Tet Offensive had brought counterinsurgency programs to a halt and "that to a large extent, the V.C. now controlled the countryside." also North Vietnam had little difficulty making up the casualties inflicted by the offensive..


 * All in all, the article is fairly balanced. Indeed it shows the Communist side of the coin as well, going into details of their planning, aftermath, etc.. to a degree that is much better than similar short writings, which typically just jump into things primarily from the American perspective. I think your arguments might be better held for the Media Influence article. Perhaps you can add a statement in the Aftermath section saying: "Tet demonstrated to US decisions makers that the war was stalemated and that financial and political costs of success were too high.." then back this up with a footnote from your sources. This would easily accomodate the points you raise. LackeyOfImperialism 06:48, 2 October 2007 (UTC)


 * Thank you for your (very civil) remarks, it think the points you make are valid. I am working on sources now. I think the article is good now, a line by line review by editors with differing points of view will improve it. At American Future some interesting quotes from the media, WSJ was the first to bail, (scroll down to Vietnam and Iraq: Public and Government Opinion) this article talks about "The two primary views of Tet may be called the “revisionist view” and the “more recent view” " here  - it is this more recent view that I  plan to find sources for. Ken E. Beck 15:33, 4 October 2007 (UTC)


 * I think you may want to find a more credible source than the second you listed above. I find it hard to credit an author who spells "guerrilla" as "gorilla". RM Gillespie 02:42, 8 October 2007 (UTC)


 * Well, you are right there, be tough editing Tet with a source about gorilla warfare, maybe "Aggression in primates". But I do think Ford might be a good source. I think the quotes in American Future shows a sense of what it was like. Time, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Art Buchwald all combined to create a sense that the public opinion had changed.  Ken E. Beck 21:21, 8 October 2007 (UTC)

Premature qualifications
Wow! The media issue has been debunked? The offensive was not (in general) misrepresented by the media and it did not turn the American public against the war. I haven't even gotten there yet. Even as it stands now, however, Tet was without doubt a "military disaster" for North Vietnam. The measures of the Americans? - they were the only meaningful measures that counted at the time. Hindsight is indeed golden. The defeat of the communist offensive was not the turning point of the war, that point had been reached well before Tet. The offensive only demonstrated to the majority what was becoming ever more obvious to large segments of the administration and the American public, that the game (as it was going to be played) was not worth the candle. That Hanoi made grist of its psychological "victory" was to be expected, but they had in no way planned for or expected it. And we have not even gotten to Clark Clifford yet.

Well, not too bad for an article that, I believe, is about one-half finished. Stay tuned for further developments. And who are you, Ken E. Beck? RM Gillespie 06:11, 2 October 2007 (UTC)
 * Go for it then. As to measurements, even offical communist sources are candid about Tet failures and setbacks:

Tran Van Tra, VIETNAM: HISTORY OF THE BULWARK B2 THEATER, VOL 5: CONCLUDING THE 30-YEARS OF WAR, (Van Nghe Publishing House: Ho Chi Minh City, 1982)

"In 1968, when the U.S. troops numbered nearly 500,000, with all kinds of modern weapons except the atomic bomb and with the purchasing of the services of lackey vassal troops in addition to Thieu's army, we could clearly see the enemy's weakness and our strength, and exploited that strength to a high degree in carrying out the general offensive and uprising of Ter Mau Than, (Tet Offensive) a unique event in the history of war. During Ter we not only attacked the enemy simultaneously in all urban centers, including the U.S. war headquarters in Saigon, the puppet capital, but also wiped out an important part of the U.S.-puppet manpower... 

''However, during Tet of 1968 we did not correctly evaluate the specific balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy, did not fully realize that the enemy still had considerable capabilities and that our capabilities were limited, and set requirements that were beyond our actual strength. In other words, we did not base ourselves on scientific calculation or a careful weighing of all factors, but in part on an illusion based on our subjective desires. For that reason, although that decision was wise, ingenious, and timely, and although its implementation was well organized and bold, there was excellent coordination on all battlefields, everyone acted very bravely, sacrificed their lives, and there was created a significant strategic turning point in Vietnam and Indochina, we suffered large sacrifices and losses with regard to manpower and materiel, especially cadres at the various echelons, which clearly weakened us. ''


 * I believe this section has been directly quoted in the article. It is a shame that the previous volumes of Tra's work (particularly Vol. 3, which deals only with 1968) are not available in the West. RM Gillespie 14:22, 2 October 2007 (UTC)

''Afterwards, we were not only unable to retain the gains we had made but had to overcome a myriad of difficulties in 1969 and 1970 so that the revolution could stand firm in the storm. Although it is true that the revolutionary path is never a primrose path that always goes upward, and there can never be a victory without sacrifice, in the case of Tet 1968, if we had weighed and considered things meticulously, taken into consideration the balance of forces of the two sides, and set forth correct requirements, our victory would have been even greater, less blood would have been spilled by the cadres, enlisted men, and people, and the future development of the revolution would certainly have been far different.."''
 * Keep up the good work. LackeyOfImperialism 07:01, 2 October 2007 (UTC)


 * Perhaps my remarks were to strongly worded. The past edits are very well done and show a knowledge of this which is deeper then my own. Having said that, I believe that the first paragraph is supposed to summarize then entire article - it says "it also had a profound effect on the American public" I do not believe that this point of view is shared by all historians. Is that correct? Ken E. Beck 12:23, 2 October 2007 (UTC)


 * Oh, it had a profound effect all right. I believe the source of that effect is the only thing under debate. As the summary then states it led to the first serious debate within the administration about the military policy since the escalations of 64-65. Is it the "public" thing that is bothering you? Are we discussing the media coverage (true or erroneous) or the credibility gap that had just widened into the Grand Canyon? The "great debate" centers around the political fallout of the offensive, not the military one. Was it the media coverage, public disenchantment, administration realization, or some combo of all three? RM Gillespie 14:22, 2 October 2007 (UTC)


 * I understand the many historians and authors assume that Tet had a profound effect on the American public, but not all. It is one thing to make claims or assumptions about public opinion, it is another thing to measure. Public opinion is measured by using polls, and some who have looked at the polls have come to a different conclusion.  Stanley Karnow says "the momentous Tet episode scarcely altered American attitudes toward the war. American opinion toward the conflict was far more complicated than" Vietnam A History  p 558. There is also this study The Tet Offensive and Middletown: A Study in Contradiction - which may not be usable as a source for Wikipedia. Schmitz p 158 "While the Tet Offensive was certainly a surprise to the American people and government officials alike, in its timing, size and place, it did not produce a dramatic swing in public opinion." Tet did have a profound effect on the U.S goverment -  here: the Time magazine article from 1 Mar 68 (last external link in the article) says this: "In contrast, middle-and lower-echelon officials at the State Department, the Pentagon and U.S. headquarters in Saigon voiced profound pessimism." As an explanation it is my view that Oberdorfer and others may have confused the reaction "inside the beltway" with the  public, something the occurs today as well  Ken E. Beck 16:56, 2 October 2007 (UTC)

Debate

 * I love it! Good criticism and excellent argument! You have no idea how rare that is on wiki. As to the media, the fiscal crisis (vis a vis the Treasury), Clifford's "conversion", more communist info, etc., that is still forthcoming. If I could just get off these 50-hour work weeks and get this hot water heater installed! RM Gillespie 12:18, 3 October 2007 (UTC)

Consistancy
If you are going to interject references into the article, don't you think that they should be consistant with the 99.9 percent of the other references in the article and be placed at the end of a sentence? And, while we are on the subject, why isn't this new source listed in the References section? RM Gillespie 17:15, 11 October 2007 (UTC)
 * Yes, it belongs at the end. I'll use David Schmitz, which is already listed and change it, I have to find the proper page number. - This article, as it stands, is one of the better about Tet I have read so far anywhere. Ken E. Beck 20:26, 11 October 2007 (UTC)

Westmorland, Wheeler, and Mao
"Strangely, the followers of the Maoist line called for large-scale, main force actions rather than the protracted guerrilla war espoused by Mao Zedong" - I don't think this is right. Mao didn't espouse protracted guerrilla war, phase three of Mao is commitment of regular forces (Hammes)

'"Wheeler's bizarre promptings"' - Is this just Westmoreland's alibi for saying "which I desperately need" when he requested more troops? Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr. wrote an article on laying out this viewpoint Another viewpoint is here  - The Joint Chiefs knew that the request would not be approved and were covering their backsides. Ken E. Beck 23:32, 12 October 2007 (UTC)


 * Oh my God, not Harry Summers! Any cursory examination of this diatribe should reveal exactly where the good Colonel stands. It is full of the half-innacuracies for which he is notorious. "McNamara knew as early as 1965 - 1966 that the war could not be won and yet he sent me to Vietnam...blah, blah, blah." Of course McNamara (and the entire Johnson administration) "knew" that the war could not be won in the traditional sense. We were not there to "win", but to convince Hanoi that it could not win. And of course there are the usual references to McNamara and Clifford not as rational human beings but as the servants of the antichrist. The only thing new that Summers has to say is that the Joint Chiefs failed the President, but I had already done that in my Master's thesis The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Escalation of the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1965 back in 1994 (even beat out McMaster's Dereliction of Duty).

As to the second article, it is altogether too general and very vague. What it fails to mention is the very considerable planning and prompting by the Joint Chiefs of President Johnson to escalate the war quickly. First the bombing campaign, then introduction of marines to "protect" the airfields that had been established in SVN to carry it out, and then finally the introduction of more troops to undertake ground operations. According to the Pentagon Papers (and the much larger U.S. Vietnam Realtions of which they are a condensation) the chronology of the troop request described in the article is accurate. Initially, Westmoreland merely wanted replacements, Wheeler wanted a reserve call-up. When Westmoreland realized what his superior was up to, he went along, hoping for a change in strategy (which Wheeler was quick to ascribe to the situation).

As to Mao's strategy, the North Vietnamese never really followed it. Protracted guerrilla warfare to bleed the enemy, followed by the encirclement of the urban areas to isolate the enemy forces, and finally a general offensive and popular uprising that would end the conflict. Indeed, the failure of the North Vietnamese in following this paradigm was often elucidated to in North Vietnamese writings of the period. RM Gillespie 05:12, 13 October 2007 (UTC)

military disaster for communist forces
At present the first section says that tet was "a military disaster for communist forces" but in "The Tet Offensive" by Marc Gilbert and William Head, it says this: "the offensive, while more costly to Hanoi and the Viet Cong than anticipated and falling far short of many of its projected intermediate goals, succeeded in its primary aim of demoralizing not the American people, but their lead­ers, and in securing a bombing halt followed by the commencement of negotiations for a settlement in Hanoi's favor." - Shouldn't the first section reflect this view, which, according to the book, is the view of "Vietnamese historians, American historians of modern Vietnam, (and) Vietnam-era American policy analysts" ? Ken E. Beck 23:55, 12 October 2007 (UTC)

Im a little confused about what your asking but let have a try i think they mean it was a military diasater but a politcal win ForeverDEAD 01:24, 20 October 2007 (UTC)


 * The difficulty is that achieving a 1 to 50 causality ratio could be considered a tactical victory. However achieving that ratio in the Central Highlands is not the same as achieving the same ratio in the center of Saigon, or on the grounds of the U.S. Embassy. Calling the first a military victory and the second a military victory and a political defeat is not consistent with military theory. It has been argued that the attacks in the cites showed that the U.S. did not have military control of the country. Ken E. Beck 22:51, 15 November 2007 (UTC)


 * Sadly, PLAF and PAVN planning for Tet focused on the use of military capture of the urban areas to force an urban communist uprising. It was a failure at this.  A secondary goal was th long term occupation of major centres.  It was a failure at this.  A secondary goal was the cementing of rural controlled areas for the NFL in the second and third waves.  It was a failure at this.  Influencing US public opinion was not a goal of the offensive, and was not particularly connected to NFL / DRVN strategy to win the war. Fifelfoo (talk) 02:08, 13 October 2008 (UTC)

Hindsight
I think we are missing the point here. A look at any contemporary North Vietnamese documentation reveals that the primary goal of the offensive was to either topple the Saigon government or force the installation of a coalition government. A secondary result of either outcome would have been the forcable withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces from South Vietnam. There is very little, if any, mention of the possible effect of the offensive on the U.S. public or administration, other than as a demonstration of communist power. It is quite reasonable that Vietnamese historians have replaced the military goals of the offensive with political ones, but only (and I emphasize only) in retrospect. Western historians seem to be buying into this "long view" (mainly on the basis of Tran Van Tra's later writings) of the offensive's goals, but as I have previously stated, it is not supported by the contemporary documentation. RM Gillespie 04:58, 13 October 2007 (UTC)
 * Marc Gilbert and William Head claim that the view that the Tet Offensive: "succeeded in its primary aim" is the view of most "Vietnamese historians, American historians of modern Vietnam, (and) Vietnam-era American policy analysts". Erik B. Villard says "most Vietnam War historians ...conclude the Tet Offensive "represented a defeat for the United States and its policy in Vietnam". So here are two sources which claim that the view, that Tet was a success for the communist and a failure for the United States is the view of most historians. However you seem to be saying that this view does not belong in this article because they hold this view in error. Is that correct? Ken E. Beck 14:48, 15 October 2007 (UTC)


 * Yes. A military defeat or a political defeat? The argument that the political result was the primary aim of the offensive is gibberish. No contemporary documentation supports it. I can understand Gilbert and Head's statement that Vietnamese historians make such a claim. I would, however, like to see a list of Western historians who make a similar one. Your second quote by Villard is ambiguous. What kind of defeat? Military, political, psychological, all of the above? Is your point that two sources (one wrong and the other ambiguous) claim that the communists achieved the primary aim of their offensive? Dozens of other historians might not agree with you. RM Gillespie 14:59, 15 October 2007 (UTC)


 * Good question. In context Villard seems to be saying he agrees with Schmitz. Schmitz says "Tet was, in fact, a defeat. A defeat for the strategy of attrition and limited war....".


 * I am puzzled by the wide range of "facts" used by various sources. For example,Schmitz says the Offensive was timed, in large part, because of the U.S. election, other sources disagree. There is documents from the CIA that seem to support Schmitz. Also in dispute, the strength of the communist in the South both before and after the Offensive. Ford says that recently, more information from the North has become available. Some of the information is evidently from the North but some is also from U.S. sources such as the C.I.A, and Lyndon Johnson's archives recently opened but not yet fully explored.


 * I think perhaps that because of the wide range of views about Tet, that a new article may be needed. Focus this article on the operational and tactical side, which I think it does to some extent now. A separate article laying out the various political arguments. What do you think? Ken E. Beck 13:37, 16 October 2007 (UTC)


 * Hilarious. A "defeat" in which 7,000 troops were expended against a loss of 75,000? A "defeat" of the strategy of attrition which had forced Hanoi (by its own admission) to launch the offensive in the first place? Where in the review above do you think that Villard espouses that Tet was a military defeat for the U.S.? At some point in the future this article will undoubtedly be subdivided, but it won't be by me. RM Gillespie 14:42, 16 October 2007 (UTC)
 * You may be right, I though Villard seems to be agreeing with Schmitz, perhaps not. But more importantly this is not two sources who hold this point of view. This is two sources that claim that this point of view is the view held by the majority of historians. Ken E. Beck 13:01, 18 October 2007 (UTC)


 * A military defeat or a political defeat? Well, there is this view: "All military operations are policy initiatives, and the only criterion for success or failure is success or failure in achieving policy objectives." - Matthew Yglesias My understanding is that the communist suffered very heavy causalities for limited tactical gains, gains which were blundered away in the second and third phases. Ken E. Beck 15:13, 14 November 2007 (UTC)

Gabriel Kolko: Anatomy of a war, p.303-4:
 * When the Party's Central Committee in January 1967 resolved to embark on Tet 1968, it prepared both for "a decisive victory in a relatively short period of time" and for a continuing protracted war or, at worst, an American escalation. [...] Although the Politburo regarded a coordinated military offensive and general uprising leading to a final victory as possible, its dominant opinion in December 1967 was that the enemy would continue to fight the war, though from a decisively less favorable military, political, and psychological position. [...] Smashing the United States' illusions at this time was all the more crucial because of the dollar crisis, which the Party's press analyzed in great detail in January 1968.

The strategy of Hanoi was not simply to topple the South Vietnamese regime "in a single blow". This is a extremely abridged assertion. Furthermore the political goal was right from the start part of the Vietnamese planning, because of apparent reasons the role of the US was always a decisive matter for Hanoi. --81.173.142.91 (talk) 10:02, 7 March 2008 (UTC)

POV
Wikipedia POV policy is: All Wikipedia articles and other encyclopedic content must be written from a neutral point of view (NPOV), representing fairly and, as much as possible, without bias all significant views (that have been published by reliable sources). Two source have been provided showing the the view of most historians differs from this article. One is Marc Gilbert and William Head claim that the Tet Offensive: "succeeded in its primary aim" is the view of most "Vietnamese historians, American historians of modern Vietnam, (and) Vietnam-era American policy analysts". The second is Erik B. Villard claim "most Vietnam War historians ...conclude the Tet Offensive "represented a defeat for the United States and its policy in Vietnam".

This view, that has been called the view of the majority of historians, is significant and is not represented in this article. Ken E. Beck 14:33, 9 November 2007 (UTC)


 * Well, you, Gilbert, and Head are all entitled to your opinions. They do not, however, reflect the opinions of the vast majority of Vietnam War historians. See above as to disagreement with your sources. RM Gillespie 19:02, 12 November 2007 (UTC)


 * My opinions on the subject of Tet are irrelevant,as you know, as are yours. Tet Offensive has been called the most controversial battle in modern American history. This article, to conform with policy should show the main views. Here are perhaps the three main American views Don Oberdorfer wrote an article in which he acknowledges that new documents from the North have altered historians views.   Ken E. Beck 22:02, 12 November 2007 (UTC)


 * I'm afraid that opinions are all that have been expressed. Although Gilbert and Head can claim that Tet "succeeded in its primary aim" (regardless of extant documentation), where is the historical basis for it? What documents support it? To express the opinion that "most American historians of the Vietnam war" blah, blah, blah, agree with Gillbert and Heads' assessmant is alright in itself, but which historians are we talking about? The documents referred to in the Oberdorfer article are already cited in the Wiki article, so what is your point? The most controversial battle in modern American history? That is quite a claim. Not the fall of Battan or the Battle of the Bulge? Not Peleliu or the Hurtgen Forest? Not the advance to the Yalu River and the Chinese counteroffensive? RM Gillespie 06:48, 14 November 2007 (UTC)


 * Here is some info about Ford Ang Cheng Guan  says documents were released by China and Vietnam during the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 1979, opening of Soviet archives when the cold war thawed, Tran Van Tra in 1982, the research of Ngo Vinh Long, and of course Ang Cheng Guan himself. Ken E. Beck 13:55, 14 November 2007 (UTC)


 * The documents described in the History article (Resolutions 13 and 14) were captured and translated (by Ford) in 1967 and 1968. As far as I know, most of the Soviet and Chinese documents deal primarily with diplomatic matters and logistical activities between those nations and North Vietnam. I don't believe (as far as my research goes) that any of the work by the other three contradicts the article. RM Gillespie 15:56, 14 November 2007 (UTC)

U.S. elections
According to the article: There is conflicting evidence as to whether, or to what extent, the offensive was intended influence either the March primaries or the November presidential election in the U.S The footnotes say Hoang offered opposing viewpoints

Hoang's claim is not that the Offensive was intended to influence the election but rather that Johnson would find it more difficult to escalate the war in the face of public opposition during the election season. This is on page 22. This is repeated on page 23, the outcome of the election was only a reshuffling but that the U.S. president would be unable to make bold policy decisions in an election year. Ken E. Beck 18:30, 9 November 2007 (UTC)


 * I reverted your separate section on "Communist goals" due to the fact that it was not necessary as a separate section. Integrate the text with the existing article if you feel that strongly about it. Alterations, after all, are what this discussion page is all about. RM Gillespie 19:06, 12 November 2007 (UTC)


 * A reading of Hoang's work offers several takes (captured enemy prisoners, documents, etc...) on whether the offensive was planned to have an effect on the elections. RM Gillespie 06:59, 14 November 2007 (UTC)

Changes
Mr. Beck your alterations to the introduction to this A-Class article on the basis of one source, seems a little extreme. You do realize that it now contradicts the entire rest of the content of the article? Or, did you not even bother to read it to find out? I then reverted your deletion of the majority of the following paragraph due to the fact that it had nothing to do with your contention. There was (and is) no doubt about the political and public consequences of the offensive, as is stipulated (once again) by the rest of the article. RM Gillespie 19:12, 15 November 2007 (UTC)
 * In my view "Tet was a military disaster" is too vague, Why not specify? What,  setbacks resulted, on each side? The same is true of "a profound effect on the American administration" ,why not say exactly the results? Ken E. Beck 22:33, 15 November 2007 (UTC)


 * Mainly due to the fact (and Wiki protocol) that the introduction is what it says it is - an introduction. It also explains why I disagree with your alteration of the stated goals of the campaign (I find it hard to believe, based on one document, that an offensive by 85,000 men was launched into the urban areas so that the communists could "gain control of the countryside" - which also, by the way, failed. The primary goal of the offensive was the immediate toppling of the Saigon government, hence "General Offensive, General Uprising".) Historiopgraphically speaking, the consensus is that the offensive followed the stipulations of the original text. I believe that if you continue on with the article, you will find the details of "a military disaster" and the "profound effect on the American administration". -- RM Gillespie (talk) 17:31, 16 November 2007 (UTC)


 * To conform with Wikipedia NPOV policy all significant views must be represented. I believe there are three main views. First from Kevin Drum "There's the military perspective: Tet was a huge setback for the North Vietnamese. They were badly defeated, took huge losses, were operationally crippled, and achieved none of their objectives." The second view, is that the public lost faith in the war because of media coverage. The third view, the view of Schmitz and others, is that Tet reveled that reports of progress in the war were incorrect, the war was stalemated and could not be won at reasonable cost. While the sentence in question supports the first view it fails to support  the second and third views.  On he other hand saying it was a tactical defeat for the communist and the results are controversial(or similar) supports all three views. The point is not what are our views, but what are the significant views of reliable sources. Ken E. Beck (talk) 10:30, 17 November 2007 (UTC)


 * Well, thats nice, but your quote has little to do with the problem at hand. I believe we are discussing the military outcome of the campaign ("military disaster"), which seems to be supported by Drum. What does the media coverage of the offensive have to do with its military outcome? As for the third view, what exactly does the prospect of stalemate have to do with the military defeat of the communists in the Tet Offensive? The war was a stalemate before Tet and it continued to be one for the next five years of the American involvement. The controversy concerning the media's role during the offensive is linked to this article and as to the political ramifications of the prospect of stalemate, I believe that it is duscussed at length in this one. So, where is the problem of keeping the introduction short and to the point? RM Gillespie (talk) 17:47, 17 November 2007 (UTC)


 * Calling the outcome a military disaster requires a narrow view of the term. The offensive failed to cause an uprising and was costly to the communists but the overall aim of the offensive was to produce a political shock which would, according to Kissinger, bring "to a head the compound weakness - or as the North Vietnamese would say, the internal contradictions - of the American position." The military operations were intended to and did produce a shock to the political system and the  result of that shock the "credibility gap" widened and contradictions between Johnson's desire for a limited war, and the failure of limited war, resulted in the breakdown between Johnson, the public, and the military. The shock was far less then the communists hoped but  because of "compound weakness", the relationship between Johnson, the public and the military was fragile and  unable to withstand the shock. Giap was aware that Johnson was losing political support and he was also aware that Westmoreland wanted more troops and that Johnson didn't want to give him any. These tensions snapped when the military was thrown physiologically off-balance by the surprise of Tet.  As a result of being off-balance, on the 12th of Feb. Westmoreland sent Wheeler a message On the assumption that it is our national policy to prohibit the enemy from seizing and permanently occupying the two northern provinces, I intend to hold them at all cost. However, to do so I must reinforce from other areas and accept a major risk, unless I can get reinforcements, which I desperately need. This message, as well as the request for 206,000 troops which came later, accepted at face value or the explanation of duplicity given in the article is a direct result of enemy action.


 * "The Tet Offensive" Gilbert and Head" "the Tet Of­fensive was a three-phase application of military pressure that governed operations conducted as late as November of 1968 and was not a failed, desperate gamble that had to win the war at one stroke, but a successful, multifaceted effort to drive the Americans to the negotiating table.


 * From the same book: From a purely tactical military standpoint the Tet attacks were not successful. Communist leaders failed to gain two of their many parallel objectives: inflicting a signal defeat on American forces and creating a mass southern uprising. Worst of all, they suffered grievous losses which took two years to replace. It is clear, however, that the most important of the enemy's tactical objectives was the breaking of the morale of what Tran Van Tra called the "war party" in Washington; and this breakdown, from the panic that Tet caused in the Pentagon to the demoralization of the "Wise Men" who advised Johnson, was fully achieved.


 * From Schmitz: The Tet Offensive demonstrated that the United States could not win a limited war of attrition in Vietnam and had to change policy. In these terms, Tet was in fact a defeat. A defeat for the strategy of attrition and limited war in Vietnam and the strategy of using military power to force a political structure on Vietnam"


 * The sentence in question could be easily edited to give a wider range of views without unduly lengthening the first section. Ken E. Beck (talk) 01:39, 18 November 2007 (UTC)


 * Once again, we are back to the stated goals of the offensive. Kissinger's quote is nice, but it is also ex post facto. Your Westmoreland quote was part of the attempt to gain more forces and build up the strategic reserve described in detail in the text of the article. Giap's main objective in the offensive was "weakening or destroying the South Vietnamese military through popular revolt." Hoang, p. 26. Resolution 13 of the Lao Dong Party, the theoretical basis of the offensive, stated that the goal of the offensive was to create "a spontaneous uprising in order to win a dsecisive victory in the shortest time possible." Since the offensive failed in creating such an uprising, capturing the cities, (or in your opinion the countryside), and the loss of 75-80,000 men while inflicting only 8,000 casualties in return, that is the basis of a "military disaster".


 * If you will notice, the article stipulates that as an adjunct to the "shock" of the offensive, a reappraisal of the U.S. position in Vietnam was undertaken, but this was an unforseen windfall for the North Vietnamese, who must have been rather shocked (as is also stipulated in the article by a North Vietnamese general) by the political outcome (hence strategic psychological victory). Tet, after all, only signaled the end of the escalation and the beginning of negotiations (which the U.S. had sought for the previous three years), not American withdrawal, which did not begin until one year later. The Schmitz quote tends (as do other more recent writers) to put the cart before the horse. The strategy of attrition was succeeding. It was the basis for Hanoi's attempt to break the deadlock and once again gain the initiative. The limitation of the quote brings us back, once again, to the initial issue (which is, in fact, a non-issue), what kind of victory, what kind of defeat?


 * A "narrow view of the term"? It has always been considered that since the U.S. was "forced" to reconsider its political position vis a vis Vietnam and enter into negotiations, this was a defeat for American policy. Then surely the shoe must fit the other foot. The Party hardliners in Hanoi (who had continuously opposed any form of negotiations) were forced to accept the position of the centerists and moderates and began negotiations in Paris. Was this not political defeat? Breaking the will of the "war Party" - that's hilarious. Hubert H. Humphrey was defeated at the polls in 1968 by Richard Nixon, who would continue (and escalate) American involvement for the next five years. Was this what the North Vietnamese desired as a "political solution" in the U.S.? RM Gillespie (talk) 17:11, 18 November 2007 (UTC)

5,800,111 civilians killed
I have no idea what the actual number should be, but this one is obviously wrong since it far exceeds the total population of the city as listed in the same section. Mild Bill Hiccup (talk) 09:25, 11 December 2007 (UTC)


 * Just another case of vandalism. RM Gillespie (talk) 10:05, 11 December 2007 (UTC)

Communists
The article speaks about "Communist" forces, which sounds a bit too polemic and POV, IMO (in particular as the opposing forces aren't singled out for their political affiliations, and political affiliation isn't necessarily the most important characteristic in this context anyway), how about using more neutral NLF/PAVN (which do get mentioned though), or like? 89.27.19.182 (talk) 20:55, 26 February 2008 (UTC)


 * I'm afraid that you are incorrect in your assumption. The label "communist forces" goes far beyond any political connotation. The armed forces of socialist states were (and are) organized differently than those of other nations. They are doctrinally and ideologically unique in their outlook, training, and motivation. To try to separate the political from the military is, in fact, literally impossible. Just think about it - three man cells, political commissars at every level, manditory indoctrination and "self-criticism", over-control and lack of individual initiative - these are some of the hallmarks of a "communist" military system. RM Gillespie (talk) 05:32, 29 February 2008 (UTC)


 * Sure, they're communist. Maybe you're right and their structure is somehow "essentially" communist. But that isn't relevant here. This is not an article on the structure or ideology of the NLF. This is an article on one of their campaigns. The neutral term is the official title of the force, or it's acronym, NLF. I'm editing this article accordingly. Nonplus (talk) 22:28, 1 May 2008 (UTC)


 * Obviously you seem to believe that the descriptive noun communist has some kind of negative connotation. Sounds like a personal problem. Well, another essential reason that "communist" is utilized as a descriptive is purely to keep repitition to a minimum. But go ahead and over-acronymize. NLF and North Vietnamese get kind of old after a while, especially in an article of this length. RM Gillespie (talk) 20:20, 9 May 2008 (UTC)


 * The Vietnamese government today is proud of being communist, so there is no issue of anyone being insulted. Besides, the only alternative is to use some awkward acronym like "NLF/PAVN". This is almost like writing in code since no normal person talks this way. "NLF/PAVN" is seven syllables long and upside of abbrevations is that they are supposed to be shorter! The official communist history of the war classifies the Vietcong as part of the PAVN just to avoid the need to write both names together all the time. In Vietnamese, the problem is even more serious since the Vietcong is formally referred to as "MTDTGPMNVN".(No, I didn't make that up.) Hanoi dropped the pretense that the Vietcong was a group with an independent political outlook a long time ago. As a practical matter, the Vietcong commander was a North Vietnamese army officer who reported to the Politburo in Hanoi, not to the NLF's executive committee.Kauffner (talk) 03:27, 14 June 2008 (UTC)


 * This article has to be objective. It doesn't make a lot of sense calling them communists. It's a political affiliation, not a military one. Does it make sense to call the Allied Army "capitalist"? This sounds like US Army language. If Wikipedia is supposed to have academic standards, then things have to be called by their name. A misinformed person could argue that Capitalists have different political affiliations but the same is true with Communists, there are also several factions within Marxism. As for the alleged "communist" military system, the comment made here falls between pathetic and sad. The vernacular may appease History Channel fans and Cold War nostalgics but it is academically inaccurate. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Pedro magalhaes86 (talk • contribs) 23:51, 2 October 2009 (UTC)

I want to contest that the Vietnamese were "Communist"... Soeone claimed there was something to "Communist military doctrine", or some such...I agree if we talk about the USSR, but Vietnam? Come on. Most Vietnamese soldiers were regular Vietnamese people who just wanted to be free of foreign occupation, domination and violence. They could have cared less about the "proletariat" and "means of production" all of that.

This reference to Vietnamrese soldiers being communist is biased, to say the least. —Preceding unsigned comment added by SwedishMagician (talk • contribs) 08:18, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

January 30
There is an explanation for this claim:
 * For reasons that are still not completely understood, a wave of attacks began on the preceding morning in the I and II Corps Tactical Zones.

Helmer Aslaksen explains that on August 8, 1967, the North Vietnamese government approved a new lunar calendar specifically compiled for the UTCC7 time zone. Troops in Saigon and other cities to the South were using the traditional calendar and attacked a day later. -- Robocoder ( t|c ) 18:25, 15 April 2008 (UTC)


 * This explination has been around since the immediate aftermath of the offensive, but it is only one of several possible explinations, all of which have merit. We just cannot be positive about the reasoning for the mistiming (or was it mistiming?) and will be until the opening of the Vietnamese archives. Don't hold your breath. RM Gillespie (talk) 12:37, 25 June 2008 (UTC)

I was stationed at PleiKu Air Base in II Corps on January 30, 1968. The Tet Offensive actually started there at 22:00 Viet Nam time (10:00 EST) on January 30, 1968. I know this because January 31, 1968, was my 21st birthday and at midnight January 30/31 I took a break to drink some water to celebrate my birthday. After a few minutes I went back to work distributing ammo to other personnel on the base. User:satin8876Satin8876 (talk) 16:30, 22 February 2011 (UTC)p.s.levin@att.net 11:29 EDT, 2/22/11.

Historical Accuracy
Since Wiki is an international encyclopedia the reference to the Vietnamese names in the first para are necessary. Tet Offensive is of western derivation - it is the US title of the operations. Unfortunately, the US did not launch the offensive, the NLF/PAVN did. It was their operation and their title for it is of equal importance with that of the US. Yes, most westerners call it the Tet Offensive, that is why the article is titled as such, but it is also a bit POV (see footnote).

I am afraid that the term Viet Cong is indeed derogatory. It was cooked up by USAID for President Ngo Dinh Diem early in the advisory period due to the fact that the common Vietnamese reference to anti-government guerrillas was Viet Minh. By giving them a new title, Diem (and the Americans) hoped to remove all of the positive historical baggage that that title carried with it. The same reasoning applied to the US military's continuous reference to PAVN as the NVA, thus removing the confusion alluding to the phrase People's Army in that title. RM Gillespie (talk) 12:32, 25 June 2008 (UTC)


 * See WP:COMMONNAME: "Use the most common name of a person or thing that does not conflict with the names of other people or things." I don't think there is any question that Vietcong/Viet Cong is way more common than NLF, which is an abbreviation that can refer to many things. "Vietcong" was actually coined by a Saigon newspaper, but it doesn't matter where it came from. I have talked to several Vietnamese about this. In today's Vietnam, Việt Cộng is most common way to refer to the group. PAVN? That's just being obscure. NLF and PAVN are English-language abbreviations. Vietcong is a Vietnamese word. What was that about being international? Kauffner (talk) 14:04, 25 June 2008 (UTC)


 * You do not think it necessary to give (at least in the initial paragraph) the official name of the combatant parties? So, in the wiki article on the American Civil War, the forces of the Confederate Sates of America which were most commonly referred to at the time as "rebel", can be referred to in the totality of that article by that term? And the term "damn yankee" may be utilized as the title of the forces of the United States? "Nazis" may reffer to all of the forces of Germany in the Second World War? "Japs" may be used for those of Imperial Japan? America may be substituted for the United States in any and all contexts?

Where do you think the Saigon newspaper got its term? See Cecil Currey, Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA and William H. Hammond, The U.S. Army and the Vietnam War: The Military and the Media, 1962-1968. Washington DC: UCMH, 1988, and Harry Summers, The Vietnam War Almanac. Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1985, p. 351. Once again I reffer (as I already have) to the three reversion rule. This is an A-Class article whose correct references to countries and organizations did not seem to bother the reviewers on the Mil Hist Task Force. And, to be taken seriously, please sign your posts.RM Gillespie (talk) 12:28, 27 June 2008 (UTC)


 * Yes, of course the official names should be given on first reference. And they are: the Vietcong, or National Liberation Front, and the North Vietnamese Army, or People's Army of Vietnam.... "Common name" means the name the reader is most likely to be familiar with, not the name that was most common at the time. If it's a close call, this can be determined according to number of Google hits. The 3RR rule applies to reverts within a 24 hours period, which I don't think is an issue here. Unsigned posts? I don't know what you are referring to. I think "communist" was original phrasing used in this article and before someone changed it to "NLF/PAVN." Kauffner (talk) 14:56, 27 June 2008 (UTC)


 * Republic of Vietnam? Democratic Republic of Vietnam? National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam? NLF/PAVN was the original phrasing. I'm the one that wrote it. RM Gillespie (talk) 19:35, 27 June 2008 (UTC)


 * In the same style? That works for me. Kauffner (talk) 09:45, 28 June 2008 (UTC)

Arkansasmarek (talk) 22:25, 31 December 2010 (UTC)Shouldn't the offical start date of the offensive be 29JAN?

Effects
I have returned the phrasing of the infobox to its original A-class text. Reasoning - (1) The intentional decimation of the NLF during the offensive may have been one of Hanoi's motives for the offensive, but no documentation supports it (2) the Hue massacre, although horrible, had no short or long term effects on the conflict (3) I'm surprised that anyone seriously still buys into the reporting of the Tet Offensive by anti-war Western journalists as a serious repercussion. See News media and the Vietnam War RM Gillespie (talk) 14:57, 18 July 2008 (UTC)


 * Tran Van Tra's version is that he launched the offensive thinking the communists would win and miscalculated. The way he writes, it was obviously painful for him to admit this. Hanoi had complete control over the Vietcong all along, what would be the motive for sacrificing them? In any case, the main outcome of Tet is that the Vietcong were hit hard and never recovered as a fighting force.
 * U.S. public opinion polls show support for the war gradually dropping the longer it went on. There was no dramatic shift in response to Tet. That the communists claimed a victory afterward is not significant. Nixon could get re-elected in 1972 because Americans at that time still thought the war was winnable -- that's almost five years after Tet. Le Duan's dream was to kick the U.S. out of Vietnam without signing anything, and especially without recognizing Thieu's government in Saigon. The only reason he agreed to the peace treaty in January 1973 is because the communists had their backs to the wall at that time. Kauffner (talk) 06:57, 27 July 2008 (UTC)


 * As to the elimination of the NLF (to which I do not personally subscribe), those who support it as a theory contend that it would have been a convenient method of eliminating the nationalist elements (after all, not all of the NLF's members were communists) within the organization. I do not know where you got the idea that Nixon espoused "victory in Vietnam" or that the American public supported any such idea. "Peace with honor" and Vietnamization were the president's goals (when he finally decided that he had any such thing). The fact that Hanoi had not initially sought "psychological victory" during the offensive is irrelevent to the issue. The American public's support for an open-ended commitmant to the struggle was at an end, thanks to the shock of Tet. They had finally, after three years, woken up. Sounds familiar, no? RM Gillespie (talk) 13:13, 3 September 2008 (UTC)


 * "Victory in Vietnam" is not a quote from me. Of course, Nixon wanted to be all things to all people, like most politicans. "Peace with honor" is from a 1973 speech he gave announcing the Paris Peace Accord. (The phrase is originally from Disraeli.) When he was running for president, Nixon promised an "honorable end" to the war. (You can see the TV ad here.) Nixon's real war plan was to keep South Vietnam alive long enough to pass the problem off to his successor. In the 1972 presidential elections, Nixon defeated McGovern, a peacenik candidate whose slogan was, "Come home, America." I think its odd that you can cite all these books, but you don't seem to know basic facts about the war.
 * Not many Americans supported "open-ended commitment" even before Tet. They wanted to see progress toward victory, peace, or whatever. Nixon's polls numbers shot up whenever he looked serious about winning the war. At that time, most people assumed that the war would end with a peace treaty, although we know now that "peace treatyism" was a waste of time.
 * Why do you think America "woke up" in 1968? Because of all the protests and riots that year? These are misremembered. Vietnam was just one of several issues involved. The big race riots started in the summer of 1967. Polls show Johnson popularity declining with each major riot. It wasn't Tet that forced him to leave office.
 * The Vietcong was a top-down organization that took its orders from Hanoi. Tran Van Tra and the other Vietcong commanders were officers in the North Vietnamese army serving under military discipline. The private political beliefs of individual members did not affect the character of the organization. Kauffner (talk) 15:53, 3 September 2008 (UTC)


 * A "winnable war" in 1972? Winnable for whom? If Lam Son 719 and the Nguyen Hue Offensive had not proven that the South Vietnamese could not stand alone without American power to back them what did they prove? Regardless of the U.S public's praise of the Cambodian Campaign or Linebacker II, they were not going approve the return of U.S. forces to Vietnam after 1970. The Paris treaty ended up only guaranteeing the removal of U.S. forces, which was exactly what the President, Congress, the American people, and the Politburo in Hanoi wanted. By the way, Vietnamization was the brainchild of Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird (one of the few members of the administration with any brains), created as an afterthought to give teeth to Nixon's claim that he had a "plan to end the war" (which, in fact did not exist). Not many Americans supported an open-ended commitment? Half of the U.S. active duty military personnel were serving in SEA by 1968, before the boom was lowered. "Although we know?" Very nice, but "They" did not know. The goal was not a treaty, but a viable and stable South Vietnam able to defend itself against the North (in other words, a pipe dream). I suggest you read a biography (or Johnson's autobiography) to find the reasoning behind his declining to run for president in 1968. Race riots were the least of his problems. Try political unrest (from the left and right), rising taxes, skyrocketing inflation, an economy on the skids, and a four-year old war that was fueling all of the above. Speak about a lack of basic knowledge? Me, I'm just a veteran of the war and have been a historian of it ever since. What do I know.


 * My use of the "appellation" Viet Cong (two words) comes from their chief opponents, the United States Army, which utilizes it in its official histories today (as opposed to NLF, the correct title, which it utilized in all documents before 1985). Yes, the commanders of the NLF were all officers in PAVN and avowed communists, but the rank and file cadres were not. If you cannot see the difference between military and psychological victory (try the Alamo or Pearl Harbor as examples) then there is probably not much I can do to convince you otherwise. (RM Gillespie (talk) 13:36, 13 September 2008 (UTC))


 * The communists spent years saying they would never recognize Thieu's government, but became more flexible on this point after the Easter Offensive -- and this breakthrough led directly to the Paris Peace Treaty. It was certainly a big change from the days when Hanoi could afford to return Johnson's peace proposals unopened. You seem to think that Tet and every other offensive was a communist victory, but Hanoi obviously didn't see it that way. The "secret plan to end the war" is not a phrase Nixon used, but something Humphrey accused him of. (What Nixon actually said was, "new leadership will end the war".)
 * If you had asked Americans in 1970 if they wanted to send more troops to Vietnam, I don't doubt that the answer would be 'no.' But that would have been true in 1965 as well. As president, Johnson could lead and was able create suppost for the positions he took. I think Westmoreland had the right idea when idea when he proposed cutting the Hochiminh Trail with ground troops by launching an offensive into Laos. Public support and willingness to sacrifice would naturally decline if it seemed that the plan was to lose slowly. But if everyone knew the war was unwinnable in 1972, why didn't they vote for McGovern? IMO, the 1972 congressional election was the turning point of the war because congress responded by adopting a defeatist agenda, especially the Case-Church Amendment, which was enacted in June 1973.
 * "Viet Cong" or "Vietcong" is fine with me. "Vietcong" is from Merriam-Webster (the dictionary standard for American spelling). The Times of London also uses "Vietcong." Wikipedia standard is common usage, to use the form most readily understand by the reader. Not that it matters, but Viet Cong in common usage in Vietnam as well.
 * With all those the credentials, you should be able to argue circles around me. But somehow it's not working out like that. Kauffner (talk) 04:57, 14 September 2008 (UTC)

What is your point about negotiations and the Easter Offensive? After Operation Linebacker II "bombed Hanoi back to the conference table" (the one they never left), it was the U.S. that reduced its demands in Paris, not the North Vietnamese. Who cared if the Thieu government was recognized? The U.S. was leaving, and that was all that mattered. I guess you don't remember Nixon's speeches during the 1968 campaign the way I do, when he did claim to have a "secret plan."
 * Sorry bud, but let's try.

As for your assumption concerning sending ground forces in 65, according to gallup pools of the time, you are wrong. Did Santa Ana see the fall of the Alamo as a victory for Houston's forces? Did The Imperial Japanese Navy see Pearl Harbor as a psychological victory for the U.S.? As for Westy's plan to expand the war into Laos, lets see who disagreed with you - the President, the Congress, the State Department, the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the PRC, and the Soviet Union (oh, and lets not forget the Laotians, remember them? - our "allies"). The election of 1972? Three-quarters of our forces had already withdrawn from SEA. The war was over. Do you even remember the election? George McGovern? Jesus!

As for the Cooper-Church Amendment, it was introduced in Congress in the summer of 1970 (passed in 73), when the "defeatist" Democrats did not control Congress. It was only the culmination of bi-partisan Congressional antagonism that had grown steadily since 1965 (with the idiotic passage of the Southeast Asia Resolution [oops! common usage again, that would be the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution]) and Nixon's expansion of the war into Cambodia in 1970 (and the illegal Operation Menu, which was public knowledge by then). Defeatist? More like realism finally setting in (and trying to curb what was becoming imperial executive power).RM Gillespie (talk) 14:05, 22 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Linebacker II was months after the Easter Offensive. Who cared if the Thieu government was recognized? Here you're making my arguments for me. To me, the entire treaty was a sham. No provision was put into effect, except for the one about releasing POWs. New York Times runs columns every year denouncing the "Christmas bombing" for delaying the signing of the treaty, but frankly I don't see how signing earlier would have improved it. The more resources the Soviets had to divert to Vietnam, the less had to make trouble elsewhere. I know the VC were famous for conducting operations on a shoestring, but an enormous quantity of communist resources were ground up on the Hochiminh Trail. In any case, U.S. bombing continued until August and ended not because of the treaty, but because of the Case-Church Amendment -- which you have mistakenly conflated with Cooper-Church.
 * Gallup's question about Vietnam asked if the war was a mistake. When this question was first asked and in August 1965, 60%-24% said no it wasn't. In mid-1970, 36 percent said the war was not a mistake, but only 10 percent favored sending more soldiers. So the two questions get quite different responses.
 * The State Department disagreed with Westmoreland, a West Point graduate and the commander in the field? I guess that settles it.
 * This discussion is all based on your memory from 40 years ago? I have to say, that would explain a lot.Kauffner (talk) 04:12, 23 November 2008 (UTC)

Hanoi's bargaining position changed very little before, during, or after the Nguyen Hue Offensive. They were willing to let Thieu remain in power as long as a cease fire in place was instituted, the PRG was recognized as a legitimate entity by Saigon, acceptance of a North Vietnamese presence in the south, and an American withdrawal. In fact, these concessions had already been offered to Hanoi through America's Russian emissaries before the offensive began {David Fulgham & Terrence Maitland South Vietnam on Trial. Boston Publishing Company, 1984, p. 183). Linebacker II was mentioned above re. the only roadblock to a negotiated political settlement - Nguyen Van Thieu, not Hanoi. As for your opinion as to whether "signing it earlier would have improved it," you may be correct, but it certainly would have saved at least several thousand lives. It was not that Hanoi "could afford" to return Johnson's peace initiatives. Their position had always been that their would be no negotiations until the bombing of the north had ended. When it ended, they negotiated. As for interdicting the Ho Chi Minh Trail had the effect you seem to think it had, even the U.S. Air Force now admits that only 2-10 percent of materiel was destroyed enroute (see Bernard Nalty, The War against Trucks. Washington DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2005, pgs. 297-298).
 * So Sorry!

"Conflating" the Cooper-Church and Case-Church amendments? The latter was only a beefed-up reintroduction of the former. As for the "defeatists" who passed Case-Church: "Two factors seemed to be behind the decision of all committee Republicans [the Senate Appropriations Committee, which introduced the bill] to support the amendment. The first was simple war-weariness felt by liberals and conservatives alike. More important, conservatives joined liberals in fearing that the continued bombing of Cambodia might entice the country back into combat in Vietnam" (Samuel Lipsman & Stephen Weiss, The False Peace. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985, p. 90). In the initial 63-19 voted that passed the bill through the Senate,20 Republicans out of 36 voted for it. Barry Goldwater even joined the anti-war majority after Nixon initially vetoed the bill.

As for your Westmoreland/State Department point, you seem to be doing what you always do. State opposed his Full Cry plan, so Westy must be right! You then seem to pass over the rest of my above statement. His superiors at the Joint Chiefs and CINCPAC opposed any of his efforts to implement the plan, for obvious reasons. He may have been a graduate of the Point, but he was also the first American commander to lose a war. As far as your intended insult concerning my age or memory is concerned, I hold it as high praise, considering that I have had 40 years in which to read the great majority of the historical and biographical works produced concerning the war, research and write about it, and discuss it with its participants. I would think that a perusal of any of the articles produced (and citations listed) by this editor would prove that he does not "rely on his memory."RM Gillespie (talk) 14:50, 26 November 2008 (UTC)


 * I would prefer "local revolutionary cadre" / PRG / NFL / PLAF / PAVN when breaking down analysis into which section of the anti-American anti-RVN movement did what. Vietcong is tolerable when talking broadly of the entire Southern movement.  Using Vietcong interchangably for the political organisation (NFL / PRG) or the military organisation (PLAF / PAVN) is imprecise, and presents an unreasonable view of the anti-RVN forces as monolithic.  Similarly, it obscures the difference between the revolution on the ground and the DRVN's desire to implement state socialism. Fifelfoo (talk) 02:20, 13 October 2008 (UTC)

Greetings from the parallel universe!

 * no negotiations until the bombing of the north had ended. Say what??? It's like you live some parallel universe. The U.S. was negotiating and bombing the North simultaneously all through the war. North Vietnamese delegates first arrived at the Paris Peace Conference in April 1968 while Rolling Thunder was in progress. The original Operation Linebacker bombed the North from May until October 1972, yet formal negotiations nonetheless restarted in August. Linebacker II was a response to a walkout by the North Vietnamese delegation. As Friedrich the Great put it, "Diplomacy without bombs is like music without instruments." Kauffner (talk) 17:44, 26 November 2008 (UTC)


 * I have no idea where you got the idea that Hanoi was previously negotiating for anything. Yes, Washington trotted out proposel after proposel (mainly through Canadian and British intermediaries), but Hanoi responded to none of them. On 31 March 1968, Johnson declared a bombing halt over North Vietnam and Rolling Thunder was suspended. Ironically, Dean Rusk and the military expected that the North Vietnamese would, once again, refuse to negotiate. They were surprised, therefore, when, three days after Johnson's announcement, Hanoi agreed to open talks in Paris. The North Vietnamese correctly assumed that Johnson would not have made the concession unless he was seriously willing to talk. And the talks would not continue without a bombing halt. Although you are correct in stating that Rolling Thunder did resume, Johnson announced on 31 October (after extensive wrangling over the format for negotiations between the DRV, NLF, RVN, and the US were ironed out) that as of 1 November 1968, Rolling Thunder would terminate. Only then did the Paris Peace Conference begin.
 * As for Operation Linebacker (or the retaliatory strikes into the southern panhandle which preceeded it) or Linebacker II, for that matter, they were either expected tactical responses or short-lived measures and not continuious campaigns years in the implementation. The North Vietnamese knew by 1972 that the US was looking for an out and were playing the "fight-talk" card which served them so well. I would also suggest, that you find out more concerning the political activities of the US, DRV, and President Thieu which preceeded Linebacker II.
 * I am beginning to wonder why you never seem to reply to any of my other negations of your points and as to why, since you seem to have opinions on all of these topics, you have not brought them up in discussions in the articles (which abound) concerning them. Why are we discussing the 1 November bombing halt in an article on the Tet Offensive? RM Gillespie (talk) 14:20, 28 November 2008 (UTC)


 * I interpret the above as an admission that the U.S. was in fact bombing the North during the negotiations, albeit only as "expected tactical responses or short-lived measures," whatever that means. You don't understand the motivation for the peace treaty. For Nixon, it was strictly about election year politics. Nixon planned to unveil the treaty just before the election as the original "October Surprise". It doesn't imply that he was "looking for an out." He certainly hadn't given up on Vietnam at that point. As the election approached, Nixon realized that he was so far ahead of McGovern that this gimmick was unnecessary. So he lost interest in the treaty and instead authorized Linebacker II. The turning point of the war didn't occurred until months later, in March 1973. This is when Nixon realized that there was nothing he could do that would prevent Congress from passing Case-Church.
 * Your analysis assumes that the North Vietnamese leadership set communist strategy, but the reality is that Moscow was often pulling the strings. The reason the Soviets suddenly became eager for an agreement in mid-1972 is because they wanted to refocus on the Middle East. Lê Ðức Thọ made crucial concessions to Kissinger on Aug. 1, less than two weeks after Sadat announced the expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt. This tactic allowed Sadat to blackmail the Soviets into redirecting military aid to Egypt and Syria in preparation for the October War (1973). Kauffner (talk) 01:49, 29 November 2008 (UTC)

You are the one that made the above statement that the US was negotiating and bombing "all through the war," not me. Did you mean "after 1968" - then I'll take your lack of response to the cessation of Rolling Thunder as a preliminary to negotiations as a concession. As I do all of ther above points which you seem to have forgotten as soon as they are questioned. If you cannot tell the difference between short-term tactical responses and long-term campaigns, I'm sorry. The US motivation for the peace treaty? How about simply getting out of Vietnam while saving as much face as possible? What Nixon may have promised (or believed) concerning South Vietnam's future was a moot point by 1972. Although he authorized the bombing campaigns as a response to the Nguyen Hue Offensive, no ground forces would be recommitted. Congress and the American people would not have allowed it. Regardless of Nixon's pledges to Thieu, we were not going back.

So, the North Vietnamese followed Moscow and Peking's lead? Sounds rather old school (e.g. expansive Moscow-dominated communist conspiracy) Where in the world did you get that idea? I would like you to pick any point during this war and point an example of it to me with any rational argument. What difference did it make to Hanoi that the Americans/Soviets/Chinese were reaching detente? Hanoi had not listened to either of them (and moved against their wishes) when they sent troops south in 1965-1966 and escalated the war. The Politburo had rebuffed Mao's "return to guerrilla war" advice. Hanoi had rather blatantly played one off against the other for more than a decade. Do you actually believe that if the rest of the socialist world had ended their aid to North Vietnam or condemned it that Hanoi would have folded? Moscow was eager for a treaty that would allow them to concentrate on the Middle East? Sounds kind of contradictory. Wouldn't that allow the US to concentrate on the Middle East as well (as they did during the 1973 war)?

The concessions made (on 14 August by the PRG) allowed for the simultaneous recognition of the Thieu and PRG administrations. The "breakthrough" came on 26 September, when Le Du Tho dropped the demand for a coalition government and proposed the establishment of a Provisional Government of National Concord. The only stumbling block left was Thieu, who had not been consulted during any of these negotiations, and was handed Kissinger's October agreement as a fait accompli. And why are we agruing about events in 1972 and 1973 in an article on the Tet Offensive? Do you have an answer yet?RM Gillespie (talk) 12:40, 30 November 2008 (UTC)


 * Pick any point in the war The most obvious example is the Geneva Accords of 1954, which were imposed on the Vietminh by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. Zhou wanted a divided Vietnam so that the country would not be a threat to China. This is certainly not the same as what the Vietminh leadership wanted at that time.
 * Of course Hanoi would have folded without aid from the "socialist world". (BTW, this phrase reveals you as a communist.) Do you think North Vietnam was some kind of uber-nation, ready to take on the entire world? Without Chinese rice, the army would have had to discharge military-age men to work on the farms. An army marches on its stomach and all that. As for the escalation in 1965-66, that would have been impossible without the increase in Soviet military aid that followed Kosygin's visit to Hanoi in February 1965.
 * Despite Johnson's proclaimed bombing halt in March 1968, bombing under Rolling Thunder continued at the same level as before, only concentrated in the panhandle. Yet negotiations in Paris started on May 10. I don't think historians dispute the fact that Brezhnev put pressure on Hanoi to concluded a treaty in 1972. As far as whether this was good strategy or not, the Soviets had already tried the idea of ratchting the pressure up on Israel and South Vietnam simultaneously in 1965-67 -- and that didn't work out so well for them.
 * What Nixon may have promised (or believed) concerning South Vietnam's future was a moot point by 1972. I must say that's quite an attitude you have there -- as if you were the ultimate authority on these issues and Nixon just an ignorant fool.
 * You make so many points without backing them up that I don't feel the need rebut every one. This is especially true when you are simply repeating points that I have already refuted, for example the Cooper-Church/Case-Church stuff. You ask a lot of questions -- and then you turn around and complain that I answer. Kauffner (talk) 14:30, 30 November 2008 (UTC)

Any point in the war - jeez, I thought we were confining ourselves to the Second Indochina War (much less the Tet Offensive) here. Are we now to include the French period too? What does the aid provided to Hanoi in 1965 have to do with a possible cutoff of aid in 1972? Do you actually believe that the North Vietnamese and NLF would have thrown up their hands, after 30 years of struggle, and just called it quits? North Vietnam would take on the entire world? Or just the Republic of South Vietnam, which would have been their only opposition. I thought you were the one that was complaining about the "defeatists" in Congress that were nailing the coffin shut with Case-Church? Who do you think elected those "defeatists" (Republicans and Democrats)? The Martians? I guess that you are unaware of communist logistical arrangements during the war. PAVN/NLF troops within SVN ate off the population, rice being exacted as taxation. The troops in Cambodia bought 150,000 tons of rice per year from the government and population (only 29,000 tons of supplies were imported through Sihanoukville - all weapons and munitions - between 1966 and 1969). Pre-1970 the only PAVN personnel who had to be fed by the HCM Trail were the personnel who worked it in Laos. Post-1970 the Trail had been so greatly expanded (both in Laos and Cambodia) that supply diffivulties were eliminated (with a 3-15% loss rate to alled interdiction efforts).

As for Rolling Thunder continuing in the panhandle, I believe I covered that in the Wiki article I wrote with the same title (Operation Rolling Thunder), along with other articles that cover most of the material we have discussed above, heavily footnoted (as per your claim that I did so "without backing them up"). Sorry, but the "bombing halt" over NVN meant exactly that. The only exceptions were retaliatory strikes against PAVN artillery potisions north of the DMZ. Remember the sacking of General Levalle? That was for conducting unauthorized strikes into the panhandle. As if I was the ultimate authority? I am a historian who rarely deals in conjecture, documentary history usually being enough in itself. As for Nixon being "an ignorant fool," well, I think history has already passed a judgement on that one. I do not believe you have refuted any single point that I have made during this interminable discussion. Must be my bad memory. Concerning your last intended insult (you should think of another avenue of approach, since you are not very good at it) it would be rather amusing, if it were not so sad. I must be a rather strange old "socialist" (with a bad memory). One who served his capitalist homeland in helping to stem the Red tide back during the Easter Offensive and then served as a "bulwark against expansive communism" in Europa. Wierd world huh? Man this is getting tedious. RM Gillespie (talk) 15:11, 2 December 2008 (UTC)


 * In Communist terminology, the "American War" lasted from 1954 to 1975. Not that I see it that way, but I had supposed you might be sympathetic to this view. Were Korean communists less determined than Vietnamese? Yet the North Koreans made peace without conquering the South. IMO, the basic difference is that in Korea the U.S. bombed everywhere in Korea without letting political factors interfere and sent soldiers across the 38th parallel. In Vietnam the communists could feel secure in the North, except possibly for a couple brief periods when the bombing was especially intense. An offensive into Laos or North Vietnam would have been a statement that we were "in it to win it." As we've seen more recently in Iraq, this kind of statement can be more important then the math of logistics or body counts. U.S. troops in Laos would have been behind enemy lines and in a position to strike at a whole range of objectives in North Vietnam. The reason these possibilities were not explored isn't because they were militarily impractical, but because Johnson followed containment -- a deliberate policy not to win for fear that victory would create a new MacArthur. You "rarely deal in conjecture" -- but somehow you are confident that the communists would have won in any scenario. Even if this is true, the longer the war went on, the more communist resources would have been consumed. Those resources would otherwise have been applied to some other project.
 * As far all the stuff about how great you are goes, you would know about that than me. If learning about the war is really so "tedious", you don't have to read what I write. BTW, VC rice buying in Cambodia was not about logistics. Sihanouk was screwing over the Cambodian peasants by buying rice only at an extremely low price. So the VC could buy rice in Cambodia, smuggle it to South Vietnam, and sell it at a profit. In 1967, Cambodia's legal economy collapsed as a result. That's a factoid about the war you didn't know, I'm quite sure. Kauffner (talk) 05:18, 1 February 2009 (UTC)


 * Gee Whiz! - I'm not a "socialist dupe" anymore? You mean in Vietnamese terminology, don't you?. How about those Laotians and Cambodians? No, I think Second Indochina War works better. I think you mean the Chinese and the North Koreans don't you? Who do you think took precedence there? Bombed everywhere? I think you should find out more about the bombing in Korea. Try Eduard Mark's Aerial Interdiction: Airpower and the Land Battle in Three American Wars. Not about logistics? I thought you were the guy talking about armies marching on their stomachs? Remember the old aphorism that "amateurs study strategy and tactics, professionals study logistics?" Create a new McArthur? Have you forgotten the reason that his battleship got sunk? I think it was called the Chinese intervention. See Xiobang Li's A History of the Modern Chinese Army pgs. 215-226. There was a reason, after all, why "rollback" was replaced by containment. No, I don't deal in conjecture, but obviously you do. Those resources would otherwise have been applied to some other project. Really? And what crystal ball did you get that from? As for your "factoid" with which I am not familiar, check out the articles on the Cambodian Civil War and the Ho Chi Minh trail, both authored by myself. After all, it was not just Sihanouk that was selling that rice. Try our old buddy Lon Nol as well.RM Gillespie (talk) 12:45, 3 February 2009 (UTC)


 * In Korea, the Soviets called the shots. After Stalin's death, the new leadership in the Kremlin decided try "peaceful co-existence". The Geneva accord for Vietnam was part of the same policy shift. I wasn't thinking so much about MacArthur's military leadership as the way he returned home and challenged Truman politically. At that time, he was treated as a conquering hero. It was Johnson's nightmare that a victorious field commander would do something similar to him. Another important origin for Johnson's containment policy is the misunderstanding that the Chinese invaded Korea because U.S. troops crossed the 38th parallel. (In fact, the Chinese politburo approved intervention immediately upon receiving the news of Inchon.)
 * The argument that if the U.S. wasn't fighting in Vietnam the Soviets would be using their resources to make trouble elsewhere was a common one at the time. It was used by McNamara and other leaders. It is the logic behind containment doctrine. But to you it merits only a snide remark. We do know that there was competition between the Middle East and Vietnam for Soviet resources. Do you think the communists cared anything about South Vietnamese peasants or the unity of Vietnam? The whole point of the war was make trouble for the United States so as to make way for worldwide proletarian revolution, or at least catch the U.S. off guard someplace with more strategic value. Kauffner (talk) 05:33, 4 February 2009 (UTC)

More from the Parallel Universe!

 * In Korea? I do not remember that any Soviet troops fought there (with the exception of volunteer pilots). Sounds like the old boogyman of "world-wide Moscow dominated Communism" to me. It is now generally concurred by historians that Kim Il Sung sprang the invasion on Stalin as a fait accompli. It is strange that you then go on to discuss the Chinese intervention. Was the Chinese intervention then a reaction to Moscow "calling the shots?" Although Mao did become concerned about the US invasion of N. Korea, the decision to directly intervene did not take place until 5 October 1950, when Marshal Peng Dehuai swung his support to Mao's interventionist policy (see Xiaobang Li, A History of the Modern Chinese Army, pgs. 82-86). So President Johnson precluded a victory in Vietnam due to his fear of a "general on horseback"? Where exactly did this come from? Although MacArthur was extremely popular when he returned from Korea, you see what that got him. Why would Johnson have feared it? "Johnson's containment policy" was just a continuation of the bi-partisan consensus in foreign policy reached by Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy.
 * As per the Soviets "making trouble elsewhere", it was you who made the original unattributed statement somewhere up above, not McNamara. My "snide remark" was aimed at "your" attribution, not that of "other leaders" of the time. Do you still believe that the leadership of North Vietnam, southern nationalists - the whole gamut of individuals who fought the Japanese, French, Americans, and South Vietnamese - did so solely in the name of socialism? If the leadership in Hanoi did not care a whit concderning the peasants and workers of their nation, then what was the ultimate goal of all those concerned? In whose name and to what end was the revolution carried out? Hell, even Stalin was a true believer. As to the notion that the Indochina War was fought by the Vietnamese and supported by the Soviets and Chinese to "make way for worldwide proletarian revolution" is to reduce the realpolitik of the period and the nationalist zeal of those concerned to the level of a cartoon. I'm sure that Brezhnev and Mao (wherever they are) would get a good laugh out of it.RM Gillespie (talk) 14:54, 11 March 2009 (UTC)


 * The stuff about Johnson is from Trans-Pacific Relations: America, Europe, and Asia in the Twentieth Century (2003) Richard J. Jensen et al, p. 180. So your position on McNamara is....that McNamara agreed with you and that's why he supported intervention? The communist leadership needed an enemy to justify internal repression and to explain the need for foreign aid. Mao actually favored a divided Vietnam as less of a threat to China. The communists trace the beginning of the war to a speech Ho made during the Geneva Conference in July 1954. Ho told his fellow communists that "the U.S. is the enemy of the peoples of the world" and that North Vietnamese policy would be to, "concentrate our forces to oppose the American imperialists" (Victory in Vietnam, p. 4). In other words, as soon as it became apparent that the French were leaving, Ho needed a new enemy, so he picked America. This was long before canceled elections or the arrival of U.S. troops. I suspect Ho was just being cynical. But by the time Le Duan came to power in 1957, the leadership was indoctrinated to believe that war with America was necessary.
 * As for the Korean War, the Chinese crossed the Yalu on October 9. Do you really think they prepared an offensive in only four days? Think of the all the time it took to prepare Tet. Troops had to be moved all the way from the south of China and mustered in Manchuria. Mao told the Politburo on August 4 that he would intervene in Korea as soon as Chinese troops were ready. The extended Politburo meeting on Oct. 5 was held to explain policy to the second tier leadership. The standing Politburo had already approved the offensive. (China's Road to the Korean War by Chen Jian, p. 184) Kauffner (talk) 08:53, 13 July 2009 (UTC)

NLF (NLF, PLAF) / DRVN (DRVN, PAVN) OR VC (VC, VC) / North Vietnam (North Vietnam, NVA)
Right. It is time to have this argument out. Revert wars have broken out. To avoid an extensive discussion, please lists your points under the headings below. We can lay out our points, then figure this out once and for all. I checked the talk archives, and this discussion has not been had in full here, and it seems pertinent as involved editors are highly attached to different nomenclature styles.Fifelfoo (talk) 15:33, 11 January 2009 (UTC)

Arguments in favour of "Self-styled" nomenclature

 * NLF, PLAF, DRVN, PAVN are correct English names and acronyms for the forces present. It is a matter of courtesy and encyclopedic correctness that the correct titles be used.Fifelfoo (talk) 15:33, 11 January 2009 (UTC)

Arguments in favour of "OPFOR declared" nomenclature

 * 1) OPFOR declared nomenclatures are the most commonly used titles by non-specialist English speakers.Fifelfoo (talk) 15:33, 11 January 2009 (UTC)

Other interesting arguments

 * 1) Neither set of nomenclatures are in Vietnamese.Fifelfoo (talk) 15:33, 11 January 2009 (UTC)
 * 2) In most situations, I prefer to call organizations by the names they call themselves. In the case of "Viet Cong," however, I make an exception.  "Viet Cong" meant Vietnamese Communist.  The members of the organization didn't like this term--they preferred "National Liberation Front" (NLF)--because they liked to pretend that it was not a Communist-dominated organization.  This was, however, a pretense; the NLF was thoroughly under the control of the Communist Party (formally the Lao Dong Party).  When an organization chooses a name for itself that is part of an effort to misrepresent its nature, I do not feel obliged to use that name.In the choice between "People's Army of Vietnam" (PAVN) and "North Vietnamese Army" (NVA), on the other hand, I prefer PAVN.  Calling it the NVA encourages the misunderstanding of many Americans, who think of the PAVN as having been essentially and fundamentally a North Vietnamese organization, in which southerners did not play any significant role.  Ed Moise (talk) 22:29, 10 April 2009 (UTC)
 * 3) I agree with the above, although I still hang with NLF over Viet Cong, an appellation cooked up by the US AID to benefit the Diem regime. I do not believe that an article on the American Civil War would refer to Confederate States forces solely by the appellation "rebel." Dr. Moise, as one of your former students, it is good to hear from the master again.RM Gillespie (talk) 15:38, 10 July 2009 (UTC)
 * I agree that they preferred to distinguish themselves from Communists, but not for the reasons that you like to 'pretend' that they do. Communists had been part of the liberation of the nation of Viet Nam since they fought against the Japanese in World War 2, and the French after that; the Viet Cong had some pretty big shoes to fill, and renaming themselves might have gone a little way towards giving them a reputation of their own as fighters for their country. I don't claim to know why they called themselves the NLF, but I am quite sure that you don't. There is no indication whatever that the Viet Cong were ashamed of their communist roots, support, or leadership; quite the contrary, the communists were inextricably linked in the minds of Vietnamese to Viet Nam's fight for freedom for one hundred and eighty seven years against the Americans, the Australians, the Chinese, the English, the French, and the Japanese. The communists, in turn, fully expected to win, and welcomed, the elections mandated by the Geneva Conference of 1954; and the US believed they would also, that's why it backed Ngo Dinh Diem. Fifty years later, in exactly the same way, the US backed Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah against Hamas, which had already won its elections. - The United States in Vietnam: An analysis in depth of the history of America's involvement in Vietnam by George McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis Delta Books, 1967.Anarchangel (talk) 14:02, 12 July 2009 (UTC)


 * As a Hamas supporter, you might want to look at this poll. Internationally-supervised elections that would include the North were never part of Vietcong's platform, not something they demanded in Paris. I suspect the communists were relieved that Diem blinked first and cancelled the election scheduled at Geneva. In the official history, the election is mentioned only once. There is nothing about it being cancelled and certainly no suggestion that this was a cause for war.
 * Where did the name NLF come from? There were earlier NLFs in Greece and Algeria, so the Vietcong copied the name. There was a huge deception campaign in the 1960s claiming the NLF was made up of "diverse elements" and was indigenous to the South. Here is a typical example. Imaginary southern leaders for the Vietcong were created. The chairman of NLF proclaimed himself a "neutralist." The communists were delusional about their level of support in the South, as the results of the Tet offensive demonstrate. Yet they were not so delusional as to believe that communism (or even unification) were selling points in the South. After the war, there was a series of candid admissions from Hanoi that the Vietcong was always just branch of the PAVN and fought under North Vietnamese officers. Kauffner (talk) 04:03, 13 July 2009 (UTC)

Debate attending on arguments
I believe we should use self-declared nomenclatures, as they allow for a greater precision between the NLF and the PLAF in particularly, the civil and military wings of the Vietnam Workers Party lead anti-colonial movement.Fifelfoo (talk) 15:33, 11 January 2009 (UTC)


 * You call the abbreviations "self-styled" and "self-declared", but the Vietnamese were never consistent on the issue how the names of their organizations should appear in English. Someone else, usually the U.S. military, translated the names and created these abbreviations. The official Vietnam News Agency doesn't use any of these abbreviations -- it's usually just "People's Army", regardless of whether the soldiers were northerners or southerners. The use of a lot of acronyms makes the text look ugly. Who else uses "PLAF"? Perhaps there can be a terminology section that explains all these names, but otherwise I think just "Communist" is fine. Kauffner (talk) 16:28, 11 January 2009 (UTC)


 * Then all NLF (originally utilized in the text instead of PLAF) units and PAVN units should be simply be referred to as "communist" and acronyms make the text look ugly? Wow! my English professors would be appalled. Talk about redundant and boring text, much less the then necessary deletion of all "communist" unit titles, which distinguish between NLF and PAVN units.RM Gillespie (talk) 12:57, 3 February 2009 (UTC)


 * "Please excuse him, he's from Barcelona"? Communist is faint praise indeed coming from you, K. Are we to consider your suggestion a joke? The names will be as the consensus of writers on the subject makes them. Hopefully that is 'just fine' with you. If not, o well. Anarchangel (talk) 14:02, 12 July 2009 (UTC)


 * At one point, the abbreviation "NLF/PAVN" was all over article (or even worse, "PLAF/PAVN"). I thought this looked rather ugly, and it certainly isn't the way most authors deal with this problem. Kauffner (talk) 04:18, 13 July 2009 (UTC)

Vietnamese name for offensive
The Vietnamese version of this article is called Sự kiện Tết Mậu Thân (Events during the festival of the year of the monkey). Judging from Google, (Tet, year of the monkey) appears to be the common name (73,600 hits). Trần Văn Trà refers to the offensive as "Tet Mau Than" in his memoirs, so the communists certainly used the word as well. gets only 215 hits and does not appear to be a standard or common usage. I would interpret "official name" as "the name as it appears in the official history." Victory in Vietnam calls it "General Offensive and Uprising of Tet 1968" (p. 206), "Tet offensive" (p. 212), and "Tet General Offensive" (p. 224). Kauffner (talk) 10:40, 12 July 2009 (UTC)


 * Your search seems incomplete. Any search for a long string of words will inevitably get fewer hits than key words or phrases from the string. To say nothing of, at least one author who is cited in the article calls Tet just exactly that. Conversely, your search for Tet, year of the monkey, is bloated with entries that have absolutely nothing to do with the Tet offensive. I have restored the previous nomenclature; I can see no reason why they should not both be included until this is resolved to our mutual satisfaction. Anarchangel (talk) 14:02, 12 July 2009 (UTC)


 * As a calendar event, Tết Mậu Thân reoccurs every 60 years, but it does not appear that any significant number of hits relate to 1908 or 1848. There are many names for the offensive in Vietnamese and I don't think we want to list them all. I don't see a basis for claiming that Cuộc Tổng tiến công và nổi dậy năm 1968 is more "official" than some other name. Any of the names that appear in the official history can be considered official. If what is meant is the long-form name, that would be, "General Offensive and Uprising of Tet 1968" (either or ). Kauffner (talk) 02:54, 13 July 2009 (UTC)

Psychological victory/strategic victory
I suppose the term "psychological victory" is meant to imply that Tet had an enormous impact on U.S. public opinion. But polls at the time show support for the war declining gradually the longer it went on -- no dramatic reaction to Tet. ("the momentous Tet episode scarcely altered American attitudes toward the war. American opinion toward the conflict was far more complicated than" Karnow, Vietnam A History, p 558) In one sense, every month the communists stayed in business brought them one month closer to victory, one month closer to the date when the U.S. Congress would call a halt to U.S. involvement by passing the Case-Church Amendment. But in military terms, Tet was an overwhelming U.S. victory with communist forces largely pushed out of South Vietnam and into Cambodia. Kauffner (talk) 08:59, 17 July 2009 (UTC)
 * I think "public relations" or "propaganda" victory would be appropriate, given when is on all the textbooks, yes, even though the books sometimes quote the opinion polls where no obvious spike/collapse can be seen  YellowMonkey  ( cricket photo poll! ) paid editing=POV 06:29, 11 August 2009 (UTC)

Improvements
Well I've done a bit of reading on this topic and will start doing improvements and such. Hopefully these arguments of the past will fade away  YellowMonkey  ( cricket photo poll! ) paid editing=POV 06:39, 11 August 2009 (UTC)

Background
The preface re: the author of "light at the end of the tunnel" is irrelevant to this article. There are (unverified) citations it was said by NSA Walt Rustow in Dec. 1967, LBJ, and by General Westmoreland. Which, if any, are correct belongs elsewhere and could identify the source in literature (Robert Lowell, P.G. Wodehouse?). Recommend deletion of this entry. DUden (talk) 16:06, 15 August 2009 (UTC)

Discussion of neutrality
There is highly POV statements and implications in this article. First, refer everyone by their names like "north vietnam" "south vietnam" "america" or "united states." If one of them is written as "communists" write the other one as "anti-communist." Don't put "communist" and "American" in one sentence when talking about both of these compatants. That is POV. This is totally strategic victory for North Vietnam. Stop writing things like "depleted Vietcong" or whatever, which is highly POV. We can also write that "Americans got shocked and scared and left." That is legitimate. Keep that in the mind. Americans were shocked, left and North Vietnam won. Get over it. Period. 97.124.255.177 (talk) 05:50, 22 August 2009 (UTC)


 * We've extensively discussed naming terminologies. Until definitive works come forward on the internal relationship between the VWP, NFL, non-VWP NFL cadre and PLAF the balance we've struck tends to be the consensus.  For example, historians agree the leading party within the NFL was the VWP cadre, and that VWP cadre strongly influenced the direction of PLAF deployments through the NFL and through the DRVN.
 * As far as the "victory" goes, the NFL's internal military resources were exhausted entirely, and responsibility for military operations shifted to the DRVN's provision of manpower through the PAVN transferring troops into PLAF units. The DRVN and NFL failed to achieve any of the objectives listed in the General Offensive General Uprising plan.
 * Americans didn't get shocked and leave, I suggest you look into the Cambodian and Laotian incursions, and the role of US forces in the 1972 General Offensive. Had Americans "got shocked at left" the PRG would have had a much easier time in 1968-1975.Fifelfoo (talk) 08:31, 22 August 2009 (UTC)


 * I'm not sure what you talking about. I suggest we resolve this naming conventions fast. My immediate suggestion is to stop calling North Vietnamese "communists" everywhere. That word has a very negative and bad meaning. I hope you see this point. In this case we should remove all "American" "United States" and replace it with "anti-communists" if we are going to have "communist" in there. Naming conventions are critical and not sufficient right now. This is strategic victory and propanda victory. Americans obviously were shocked as it is writen in the lead paragraph: "shocked the American public." I suggest you re-read the introduction paragraph closely and the naming convention as it stands right now is totally inadequate and highly POV to the point of vandalistic. We must resolve this immedialy. Don't revert all of my edits. Revert the ones about victory and such but don't make NVA "communist" or I will make every "American" word to "anti-communists to be fair. This article can also be written totally POV from NVA side characterizing americans as "invaders" "oppressors" and "anti-communists." Don't remove that template until this discussion is totally through. The neutrality of this article is being fundamentally questioned and disputed from the beginning to the end. Your "extensive discussion of naming terminologies" are totally not enough and has not done any good in this article as far as I can see. 97.124.255.177 (talk) 09:46, 22 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Nevermind taking a break from all this conflicted edit-warring. Leave this section for future reference. The naming convention still has a huge problem. Taking a little rest from this conflicted possible edit-warring. Other users please add my suggestions to the article so that we don't label the opponents. It will never be OK with Australins to be named as "anti-communists" because it makes them unhuman. It would be the same reaction for North Vietnam. Americans don't like to be called "anti-communists" and much rather be called "Americans." North Vietnamese don't want to be called "communists." They much rather want to be called "North Vietnamese." Peace :) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 97.124.255.177 (talk) 10:40, 22 August 2009 (UTC)


 * Your ideas about people like to be called are just projection. Vietnamese Communists don't think the word "Communist" carries a negative meaning. In the article, "Communist" is not being used to mean "North Vietnamese", but rather northern and southern communists collectively. Otherwise, we'd have use a phrase like "NVA and Vietcong" or "PAVN/NLF", which is an awkward solution at best. Of course, they were all soldiers in the same army and it made no difference operationally, but at the time a great deal of attention was paid to the issue of which units had been recruited in the North and which ones in the South.
 * The U.S. left Vietnam five years after Tet. I suppose Tet was a factor in the mix, but it's not reasonable to imply that there was an obvious and direct causality. The withdrawal of U.S. ground forces during "Vietnamization" was successful precisely because the level of the communist threat had declined. Kauffner (talk) 14:25, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

Phrase 1
I was considering editing the side bar with fast facts from saying "Phrase 1" to "Phase 1" which I believe is correct, but I wanted to ensure that this was correct before doing so. I'm not sure if this is a proper way to regard the situation, but I believe it is a phase, unless I am unaware of the situation's proper terminology. Thanks. Chicagotrains (talk) 05:07, 16 December 2009 (UTC)
 * Well spotted sir! I found half a dozen, fixed them. However long have they been there??! Little grape (talk) 08:03, 16 December 2009 (UTC)

"mini tet offensives"
can we honestly say "mini tet offensives?" it was an offensives that coincided with the tet, or new year, in the beginning of the year. the mini-offensives occurred 6 months later. seems sort of unrelated. see T%E1%BA%BFt, see Offensive (military) Vinithehat (talk) 02:38, 31 January 2010 (UTC)

Anyone?

Pending changes
This article is one of a number selected for the early stage of the trial of the Pending Changes system on the English language Wikipedia. All the articles listed at Pending changes/Queue  are being considered for level 1 pending changes protection.

The following request appears on that page:

Comments on the suitability of theis page for "Pending changes" would be appreciated.

Please update the Queue page as appropriate.

Note that I am not involved in this project any much more than any other editor, just posting these notes since it is quite a big change, potentially

Regards, Rich Farmbrough, 00:19, 17 June 2010 (UTC).

Heroism of ARVN, undo x2 (then how should it be documented)
After two undo's I would like to know where and how to document the heroism of the ARVN during Tet. The first undo reason: "sorry undue weight on a smaller unit. it can't fit in this article on a major offensive" Ok, agreed

I then tried to add some documentation to the article where it stated "some were outstanding". The second undo reason: "sorry no, the general books on the Tet Offensive don't mention this unit, as the focus was on Saigon and Hue"

That is correct, that is why there is a seperate articles specifically dedicated to the First Battle of Saigon and Battle of Hue. This is where the rest of the pertinent information goes.

The offensive may have targeted Saigon and Hue heavily, but the rest of South Vietnam was also attacked very heavily. In the article itself, the first two sentences of the Offensive section clearly state that II Corps and Pleiku were targeted. The next sentence clearly states that the attacking forces were large (battalion-strength). The size of the forces can also be verified in DA General Order No. 24, 27 April 1971 http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/go7124.pdf.

Finally, there are only two South Vietnemese units that have earned the Presidential Unit Citation (US) that I know off. The first a VNAF unit in 1966 and an ARVN unit during Tet.

Thank you in advance for your comments on how to document the ARVN's heroism during Tet.TnCom (talk) 06:50, 18 June 2010 (UTC)
 * I'm well aware that around 40 or more cities and towns were attacked, but the reason why the history books only focus on Hue and Saigon is that Hue has street-to-street fighting for about three weeks and an enormous amount of people were killed and most of hte city flattened to kill off the entrenched communists. In Saigon it was for about a week and a large chunk of Cholon was flattened. In the other cities, the communists were generally crushed within two days or less with little damage. If the Cavalry squadron was battalion strength, entire divisions were in Hue. It appears that the fighting in Pleiku lasted one day or less judging by the content of the citation, and obviously it didn't create the political imagery that Saigon and Hue did, given that one of the main impacts was the Offensive was a communist political victory  YellowMonkey  ( vote in the Southern Stars and White Ferns supermodel photo poll )  05:57, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Tet Offensive -- Introduction, 2nd paragraph is incorrect
The 2nd paragraph of the introduction states as follows:

“The operations are referred to as the Tet Offensive because they began during the early morning hours of 31 January 1968, Tết Nguyên Đán, the first day of the year on a traditional lunar calendar and the most important Vietnamese holiday. Both North and South Vietnam announced on national radio broadcasts that there would be a two-day cease-fire during the holiday. In Vietnamese, the offensive is called Cuộc Tổng tiến công và nổi dậy ("General Offensive and Uprising"), or Tết Mậu Thân (Tet, year of the monkey).”

This is not entirely correct. The first day of the Vietnamese New Year in 1968 was the 30th of January and not the 31st.

In my recent book, Crucible Vietnam, I wrote the following:

“On the 30th of January (first day of the Vietnamese New Year), Pleiku became the focus of enemy attacks in the Central Highlands. Although most everyone knows of the intense fighting that took place in the old imperial capital city of Hué, and around Saigon -- in the Chinese section of Cholon as well as on the U.S. Embassy grounds itself where nineteen VC gained entry and fired away with rockets and small arms until they were all killed, many people may not be aware that during the first eighteen hours of the Tet Offensive, “II Corps (the Highlands in particular) received the bulk and intensity of the enemy attacks.” Fighting raged in the Highlands cities of Pleiku, Kontum, Ban Me Thuot, and Tan Canh (near Dak To). Out along the coast (in II Corps) fighting broke out in Nha Trang, and there were also early enemy attacks further up the coast in I Corps at Hoi An and Da Nang (fifty miles south of Hué).

Around 1:00 in the morning on the 30th of January (most of the enemy attacks throughout South Vietnam would commence more than twenty-four hours later -- on the 31st of January), Pleiku began receiving enemy 82-mm mortar rounds, as well as B-40 (RPG-7) and Russian-made 122-mm rockets, of which numerous 122-mm rockets were fired at the Air Base, ripping apart a maintenance hanger and several barracks buildings.”

Hopefully the Wikipedia editors will re-write the 2nd paragraph of the introduction.

Source: A. T. Lawrence, author of Crucible Vietnam: Memoir of an Infantry Lieutenant (2009 ed.). McFarland. ISBN 0786445173, p. 128. [Footnoted source: Telegram From the Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Forces (Sharp) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/Saigon, January 30, 1968, 1255Z.] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.197.57.247 (talk) 03:45, 6 September 2010 (UTC)

Regarding the first day of Tet during 1968, I have seen various articles, some of which claim that the Vietnamese used a different lunar calendar than the Chinese, or that the North Vietnamese had a different lunar calendar than the South Vietnamese. However I have found a Canadian National Post article, which appears to agree (as do most all Chinese lunar calendars) that the 1968 Tet lunar New year began on the 30th of January and not the the 31st of January:

Scott Van Wynsberghe on Ho Chi Minh’s Tet offensive in Vietnam: Losing the battle, winning the war, Posted: January 31, 2008, 3:00 PM. “They came in the night, by the tens of thousands. In the first hours of Jan. 31, 1968 — one day into the Vietnamese lunar New Year, or ‘Tet’ — Communist fighters invaded over a hundred towns and cities of what was then South Vietnam.”

Hopefully this lends credence to the fact that the 30th (vice the 31st) constituted the first day of Tet 1968, keeping in mind that there were numerous communist attacks in I Corps and II Corps military regions of Vietnam on the 30th of January. A. T. Lawrence72.197.84.216 (talk) 05:49, 11 September 2010 (UTC)

The introductory paragraphs to the Tet Offensive are incorrect in some other instances. For example, South Vietnam had six autonomous cities: Saigon, Dalat, Hué, Da Nang, Cam Ranh, and Vung Tau. So when you write in the article “five of the six autonomous cities,. ., and the southern capital.” You should more correctly say, “five of the six autonomous cities (including the southern capital),”  And wherever you write 31 January in the Introduction, you should replace it with 30 January. If you look down the article at the first two paragraphs under the section titled, Offensive, you can see that portion was handled correctly. It’s just the introduction that needs some polishing. Source: A. T. Lawrence, author of Crucible Vietnam: Memoir of an Infantry Lieutenant (2009 ed.). McFarland. ISBN 0786445173, p. 127. [Footnoted source: Thayer, Thomas C., ed., “A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War 1965-1972.” Washington, D.C.: OASD(SA) RP, Southeast Asia Intelligence Division, Pentagon, Volume 9, Population Security, May 9, 1977]. A. T. Lawrence72.197.84.216 (talk) 23:24, 16 September 2010 (UTC)

Aftermath -- United States
I was able to edit the Discussion directly with the following, but felt I should also display it here as well.

United States, 2nd paragraph, 2nd sentence reads as follows:

“As a result of the heavy fighting, 1968 went on to become the deadliest year of the war for the US forces with 16,592 soldiers killed.”

This is not correct, 16,899 Americans died in Vietnam during 1968. As I have written in my recent book, Crucible Vietnam:

There were a total of 16,899 American deaths (hostile and non-hostile) in Vietnam during 1968. Hostile deaths included 13,005 killed in action, 1,630 died of wounds, 272 missing in action/declared dead, and 23 captured/declared dead. An additional 1,969 Americans suffered non-hostile deaths, which included illness, accidents, missing/presumed dead, and even homicides.

Source: A. T. Lawrence, author of Crucible Vietnam: Memoir of an Infantry Lieutenant (2009 ed.). McFarland. ISBN 0786445173, p. 160. [footnoted source: Department of Defense Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD), Defense Manpower Data Center, casualty figures provided to author on 31 Dec 2007.] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.197.57.247 (talk) 05:48, 6 September 2010 (UTC)