Talk:West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish

STATE case
The reason why this case doesn't really signal a change in "commerce clause" jurisprudence is that it upheld STATE, not CONGRESSIONAL legislation. This means there would be no reason to mention the "commerce clause," that portion of the enumerated rights under Article 1, Sect. 8 of the Constitution dealing with Congress' right to regulate INTERSTATE commerce. What this case did signal was a willingness to break from the laissez-faire model promoted by "The Four Horsemen of Reaction," and State's rights to curtail the liberty of contract, justified by their police powers, to promote legitimate state interests. Since this type of legislation (minimum wage), was of the same variety as much New Deal legislation, West Coast Hotel hinted that such deference might be granted to similar Congressional legislation (i.e. New Deal Legislation) which WOULD require the commerce clause as justification. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Mgroh531 (talk • contribs) 16:51, 16 December 2009 (UTC)

Commerce Clause
How exactly did this decision signal "an expansion of Commerce Clause jurisprudence"? As far as I can see there is no relation at all. —suriv (talk) 16:13, 8 January 2009 (UTC)

Needs vital info!
Suriv, your question is legit. The decision did indeed signal an expansion of the Commerce Clasue". More importantly, though, this was the decision that ended the Lochner era (a product of this was the expansion of the Commerce Clause).  The case's relation to the Lochner Era is the reason it's important and it's not even mentioned here.  Would someone be willing to do this? (refrence to the stitch in time that saved nine would also be nice)Piratejosh85 (talk) 02:24, 22 April 2009 (UTC)

Actually, this case has no implication of Interstate Commerce, because interstate commerce was not before the court in this particular case, where there is the implicit doctrine of Judicial Restraint which requires that the court may only hear and decide issues for which writ of cert was granted, meaning in this case, that because this case did not grant writ of cert to so much as hear any issue of interstate commerce (the facts in both Lochner and Parrish involve intrastate commerce, not interstate commerce), it becomes that we can't read this case to affect interstate commerce by reason of the doctrines of judicial restraint and judicial abstention. Rather our current notion of the commerce clause developed out of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 98.178.191.34 (talk) 21:47, 23 January 2022 (UTC)

January 2022 Needs more discussion in the article for reasonable congruity to the constitutional text
The question is how, by any stretch of the imagination, do we get to the notion that the constitution does not restrict the states' right to impair contract without completely ignoring Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which explicitly reads that the states may not pass any law which impairs the obligation of contracts? Rather, it seems here, given the text of the constitution, that Hugues, J. opinion is plainly incorrect about the constitutional text itself, with the rest of the majority opinions' argument of sorts sliding down the drain pipe by reason of being implicitly illogical given the constitutional text, unless there's some other opinion that addresses the obvious implication there. 98.178.191.34 (talk) 21:39, 23 January 2022 (UTC)
 * Without addressing your question specifically, it should shock no one that the Supreme Court is neither consistent nor logically sound. You are sure to find law review articles making the point you raise which could be incorporated into a criticism section. Muttnik  talk 21:57, 23 January 2022 (UTC)