User:Brews ohare/ontological pluralism

Ontological pluralism

In philosophy and in information science ontological pluralism refers to different ways or modes of being. Technically, ontological pluralism claims that an accurate description of reality uses multiple quantifiers that do not range over a single domain. A very brief outline of some technical terms is proved next to make the second description clearer.

Quantifiers
The word quantifier in the introduction refers to a variable used in a domain of discourse, a collection of objects under discussion. In daily life, the domain of discourse could be 'apples', or 'persons', or even everything. In a more technical arena, the domain of discourse could be 'integers', say. The quantifier variable x, say, in the given domain of discourse can take on the 'value' or designate any object in the domain. The presence of a particular object, say a 'unicorn' is expressed in the manner of symbolic logic as:
 * ∃ x; x is a unicorn.

Here the 'turned E ' or ∃ is read as "there exists..." and is called the symbol for existential quantification. Relations between objects also can be expressed using quantifiers. For example, in the domain of integers (denoting the quantifier by n, a customary choice for an integer) we can indirectly identify '5' by its relation with the number '25':
 * ∃ n; n × n = 25.

If we want to point out specifically that the domain of integers is meant, we could write:
 * ∃ n ∈ ℤ; n × n = 25.

Here, ∈ = is a member of... and ∈ is called the symbol for set membership; and ℤ denotes the set of integers.

Ontology
Inasmuch as ontological pluralism presupposes some idea of what is an ontology, a brief explanation follows.

The term 'ontology' refers to the assembly of objects in a domain of discourse, but more than that, to their properties, to the relations between them, and to the rules governing their use. The subject of ontology also includes its metatheory, meta-ontology. According to Hofweber: ""The larger discipline of ontology can thus be seen as having four parts:

&emsp;1. the study of ontological commitment, i.e. what we or others are committed to,

&emsp;2. the study of what there is,

&emsp;3. the study of the most general features of what there is, and how the things there are relate to each other in the metaphysically most general ways,

&emsp;4. the study of meta-ontology, i.e. saying what task it is that the discipline of ontology should aim to accomplish, if any, how the questions it aims to answer should be understood, and with what methodology they can be answered.""

- Thomas Hofweber

Comparing ontologies
Given the notion of ontological pluralism, the question of comparing ontologies arises. Such comparisons can be simple (like comparing the objects in two ontologies) or much more complicated (looking also at the relations between the objects). Such comparisons can be discussed on the basis of quantifier variance. In information science, the subject is considered under conceptualization and ontology mapping. The philosophical background is presented next.

Carnap
In a number of papers, Rudolf Carnap proposed that a variety of 'linguistic frameworks' existed, specialized to particular tasks. In his view, ontolgicial questions 'internal' to a framework were tautological and had no interest to ontology, while those 'external ' to a framework were mundane practical questions about which framework to use, and also were uninteresting to ontology. According to Eklund, Carnap holds that argument over the existence of objects involved in the 'internal' framework is nonsense: the only sensible question is whether the terminology is useful. Eli Hirsch, says that “many familiar questions about the ontology of physical objects are merely verbal. Nothing is substantively at stake in these questions beyond the correct use of language [and the claim that] quantifier expressions can have different meaning in different languages”.

These argument raise the issue, however, that some objects exist in multiple ontologies, and so perhaps they can lay claim to a more general existence than simply within one or another framework. In particular, Hirsch suggests existence within 'common sense' is a more general form of existence than existence inside any particular framework.

Another issue is raised when comparing frameworks as to which is preferable. “Ontological anti-realism is often traced to Carnap (1950), who held that there are many different ontological frameworks, holding that different sorts of entities exist, and that while some frameworks may be more useful for some purposes, there is no fact of the matter as to which framework is correct”

Quine
In a very influential series of papers and books, Willard v.O. Quine argued against the position of Carnap. In his view, the distinction between internal and external questions and objects was not sharp. Although a particular object within a conceptual framework can have properties and connections with other objects in that framework that are fundamentally decided by the rules of the framework itself, there are interactions between the framework and the 'real' world that cannot be discounted. On one hand, the objects of the framework can be suggested as abstractions from the 'real' world, which might be viewed as the 'muse' leading to the framework. (This view resembles somewhat that of Aristotle, that idealized concepts like 'circle' are abstractions from observations of real objects that approximate a circle.) A classic example is Euclidean geometry, initially thought to express the way the world worked, and later considered to be a 'model' suggested by 'reality', but that applied only approximately to reality under strict limitations. On the other hand, and more significantly, the application of the framework to the real world is very strongly colored by the framework itself; the framework suggests the direction that observations should take, what connections should be looked for, what properties are to be expected. ""Rather than being divided between contingent synthetic claims and indubitable analytic propositions, our beliefs constitute a continuous range from a periphery of sense-reports to interior concepts that are comparatively theory-laden and general.""

- Frank X. Ryan, discussing Quine's position in Of course, observations may prove surprising and suggest the application of the framework has discrepancies with reality. But the application of the framework to the real world is a continuing process, with our 'interpretation of what we see' and 'what we see' related as inseparable partners in a dance.

The key objection made by Quine was that no clear definition of a 'framework' can be found. In trying to establish the meaning of a term within a framework, its analytic or tautological meaning, one is caught up in a process that inevitably involves real objects, 'synthetic' objects. "It begins to appear, then, that Carnap’s dichotomy of questions of existence is a dichotomy between questions of the form “Are there so-and-sos?” where the so-and-sos purport to exhaust the range of a particular style of bound variables, and questions of the form “Are there so-and-sos?” where the so-and-sos do not purport to exhaust the range of a particular style of bound variables. Let me call the former questions category questions, and the latter ones subclass questions. I need this new terminology because Carnap’s terms ‘external’ and ‘internal’ draw a somewhat different distinction which is derivative from the distinction between category questions and subclass questions. The external questions are the category questions conceived as propounded before the adoption of a given language; and they are, Carnap holds, properly to be construed as questions of the desirability of a given language form. The internal questions comprise the subclass questions and, in addition, the category questions when these are construed as treated within an adopted language as questions having trivially analytic or contradictory answers."

- Willard v. O. Quine

Quine's chief objection to analyticity is with the notion of synonymy (sameness of meaning), a sentence being analytic, just in case it substitutes a synonym for one "black" in a proposition like "All black things are black" (or any other logical truth). The objection to synonymy hinges upon the problem of collateral information. We intuitively feel that there is a distinction between "All unmarried men are bachelors" and "There have been black dogs", but a competent English speaker will assent to both sentences under all conditions since such speakers also have access to collateral information bearing on the historical existence of black dogs. Quine maintains that there is no distinction between universally known collateral information and conceptual or analytic truths.

Another approach to Quine's objection to analyticity and synonymy emerges from the modal notion of logical possibility. A traditional Wittgensteinian view of meaning held that each meaningful sentence was associated with a region in the space of possible worlds. Quine finds the notion of such a space problematic, arguing that there is no distinction between those truths which are universally and confidently believed and those which are necessarily true.

Wittgenstein
Ludwig Wittgenstein is credited as the originator of the internal/external contrast. It is suggested that although Carnap acknowledged his indebtedness to Wittgenstein, in fact a closer understanding by Carnap would have provided a better foundation for Carnap's philosophy: "All that Carnap had to do was to take a good hard look at his state-descriptions and to ask: what are they supposed to be descriptions of in some realistic, down-to-earth sense? One natural answer is that they are descriptions of the different possible states of affairs or courses of events (in short 'possible worlds') in which the speaker of a language could possibly find himself and which he could in principle distinguish from each other. From this answer it is only a short step to the crucial idea that the rules for using the language will have to be shown - in principle - by the way a well-informed speaker would use it in these different circumstances according to the rules, i.e. by the extensions which the expressions of the language would have in those several 'possible worlds'. This is all we need to arrive at the basic ideas of possible worlds semantics."

- Jakko Hintikka as quoted by Bradley

RfC: New version of Ontological pluralism
This article was redirected following a discussion of its content as of 2010. I have rewritten this article in its entirety, but Snowded wishes to delete this new version based upon this prior discussion of a different version entirely. It is my view that reconsideration is in order. If it is to be deleted, let's have the discussion and let's see if the article can be improved still further. Brews ohare (talk) 22:08, 11 August 2013 (UTC)

Comments

 * The question of ontological pluralism has some new currency as indicated by the sources in this revision. This new version is provisional, and it would be helpful to have suggestions about what needs to be added to it. In particular, it should be supplemented to include its application to information science. Brews ohare (talk) 17:14, 11 August 2013 (UTC)
 * You are just finding yet another place to recycle your pet material from meta-ontology and elsewhere. All the same problems as before.  Changes should be made (and agreed) to the redirected paragraph and then we can see if it warrants its own page  Snowded  TALK 17:20, 11 August 2013 (UTC)
 * Snowded: I have placed an alert to this discussion on Talk:Pluralism (philosophy). IMO a discussion of the new version is easier if the new version actually is available for review at Ontological pluralism. If it is rejected, there is no difficulty in returning to the old redirect. Brews ohare (talk) 17:35, 11 August 2013 (UTC)
 * No Brews, you have created a mess of original research and synthesis. Two editors have reverted to you and you still persist.  Please self-revert, status quo stands per WP:BRD until and unless you get agreement  Snowded  TALK 17:39, 11 August 2013 (UTC)
 * Snowded: I don't understand why you are unwilling to allow the RfC to take place. It requires the presence of the new version so comment can be made. Brews ohare (talk) 17:51, 11 August 2013 (UTC)
 * Put it on a sandpit page Brews and link it, its disputed. You know how to do that, but I've saved you the time here.    I will give you a bit of time revert and reference that material, otherwise I am making a 3rr report as you just went over the limit and this refusal to realise you can't just determine content has gone on long enough.  I suspect any admin looking at your block record is not going to be sympathetic and it may well be time for an RfC on your behaviour overall  Snowded  TALK 17:58, 11 August 2013 (UTC)
 * Pure obstructionism Snowded. Brews ohare (talk) 18:25, 11 August 2013 (UTC)


 * I agree with Snowded that this material is much too narrow to completely replace anything. First, you don't appear to appreciate that metaphysics that deals with distinct logical realms of reality is different from ontology that examines what exists in each one of these philosophical realms. For example, for Plato, there are four basic sets of metaphysical worlds, each with further subdivisions. The Parmenidean One is logically distinct from Plato's Forms of the Many. Protagoras is very different from Heraclitus. Plato's world of objects (Plato's realism) is significantly different than Aristotle's realism.


 * Within object-relation bound absolutisms, as for example in current mainstream philosophy, these necessary distinctions collapse into a single category of metaphysics-ontology, because all other philosophy is dogmatically rejected. Even then, you cannot ignore logical differences between Aristotle's original, teleological metaphysics from reduced modern materialist versions of various people from Spinoza through Wittgenstein.


 * Incidentally, what do you think of Chalmers' Ontological Anti-Realism? BlueMist (talk) 01:57, 12 August 2013 (UTC)
 * Brews, In the long run, as soon as the topics are adequately developed, separate articles will be needed for metaphysical, ontological, and epistemic pluralism. Toward that end, what you have, possibly without the Quantifiers section, would be very informative to students of modern metaphysics-ontology. The paragraph of ancient substances should be somehow retained. If by "replace" you mean a new article on Ontological Pluralism, then I WITHDRAW my objections. My concern is with unpopular but important metaphysical and epistemic pluralisms not getting bulldozed. BlueMist (talk) 04:02, 13 August 2013 (UTC)


 * Sorry Brews, I also agree with Snowded & BlueMist but some of it would be useful for the Quantifier variance article you stated.—Machine Elf 1735  01:12, 13 August 2013 (UTC)
 * Apparently I was not clear about the objectives here. The suggestion is that the present treatment of ontological pluralism is lacking. I see no argument from any assembled here that it is in fact satisfactory. So the proposal is a draft of what might be included in a better treatment. I've got little comment about content from those here. Perhaps the best course is just to add it to the present ontological pluralism and let people see that it is better to have separate article for all this material? Brews ohare (talk) 15:01, 13 August 2013 (UTC)


 * I think you should draft a summary of the material for addition, as it stands it is too lengthy with too many quotes. Drafting here and engaging other editors would give you less grief downstream Snowded  TALK 16:48, 13 August 2013 (UTC)
 * I'll rewrite this a bit. Some help would be appreciated. It can them be placed here, or if it is too lengthy, it can be placed as a separate article ontological pluralism to replace the present redirect. Brews ohare (talk) 18:15, 13 August 2013 (UTC)