User:Epicgenius/sandbox/Metropolitan Transportation Authority

The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) is a public benefit corporation responsible for public transportation in the U.S. state of New York, serving 12 counties in Downstate New York, along with two counties in southwestern Connecticut under contract to the Connecticut Department of Transportation, carrying over 11 million passengers on an average weekday systemwide, and over 800,000 vehicles on its seven toll bridges and two tunnels per weekday. It was founded in 1965 as the Metropolitan Commuter Transportation Authority (MCTA) in order to take over Long Island Rail Road service from the bankrupt Pennsylvania Railroad. The MCTA grew to include the New York City Transit Authority, the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, the Staten Island Railway, Long Island Bus, and much of the present-day Metro-North Railroad. In 1968, the MCTA was rebranded as the MTA.

Soon after, the MTA experienced financial problems, and in response, increased fares multiple times across all its systems. Various loans and subsidies from the federal and state governments failed to help the MTA's financial situation. The 1975 New York City fiscal crisis resulted in a shortage of funds for the MTA. Across the system, delays rose while maintenance and ridership fell. The MTA declared a state of emergency in 1981, after a series of mishaps involving defective equipment. The agency released its first five-year capital program the same year.

Founding
During the 1960s, the Long Island Rail Road (LIRR) was operated by the Pennsylvania Railroad (PRR). It had been receiving funding from the state since 1954, and it had been expected that the LIRR would become a profitable private carrier. When the LIRR continued to lose money, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller tasked his top aide, Dr. William J. Ronan, with leading a committee to find alternatives for the LIRR. In February 1965, Ronan suggested to Rockefeller that the New York State Legislature create an authority to purchase, operate, and modernize the bankrupt LIRR. The proposed authority would also have the power to make contracts or arrangements with other commuter-railroad operators in the New York City area. Rockefeller approved of this proposal, and so on May 21, 1965, the legislature chartered the Metropolitan Commuter Transportation Authority (MCTA) to take over the operations of the LIRR. Governor Rockefeller appointed Ronan as chairman and chief executive officer of the MCTA, and nominated all five of the MCTA's board members. In June 1965, the state finalized an agreement to buy the LIRR from the PRR for $65 million. The MCTA made a down payment of $10 million for the LIRR in December 1965, and it had completed the rest of the payment by the next month.

In February 1965, Rockefeller and Connecticut Governor John N. Dempsey jointly suggested that operations of the New Haven Line, the New Haven Railroad's struggling commuter rail operation, be transferred to the New York Central Railroad as part of a plan to prevent the New Haven Railroad from going bankrupt. If the operational merger occurred, the proposed MCTA and the existing Connecticut Department of Transportation (ConnDOT) would contract with New York Central to operate the New Haven Line to Grand Central Terminal. Due to growing debts, the railroad would have to cease operating passenger trains on the New Haven Line if nothing was done. A joint report from both agencies, released in September of that year, recommended that the line be leased to New York Central for 99 years, with the MCTA and CTA acting as agents for both states. In October, the MCTA found that the New Haven Line's stations and infrastructure were even more decrepit than those of the LIRR. The New Haven Railroad's trustees initially opposed New York Central's takeover of the New Haven Line, as they felt that the $140 million offer for the New Haven Line was too low. After some discussion, the trustees decided to continue operating the New Haven Line, but only until June 1967.

In January 1966, New York City Mayor John Lindsay proposed merging the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), which operated buses and subways in New York City, and the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority (TBTA), which operated toll bridges and tunnels within the city. Rockefeller offered his "complete support" for Lindsay's proposed unified transit agency, while longtime city planner and TBTA chair Robert Moses called the proposed merger "absurd" and "grotesque" for its unwieldiness. Lindsay then proposed a bill in the state legislature that would allow the mayor to appoint a majority of the members in the new city-run transportation agency, but this was rejected. In June 1966, Rockefeller announced his plans to expand the MCTA's scope to create a new regional transit authority. The new authority would encompass the existing MCTA, as well as the NYCTA and TBTA. Lindsay disagreed, saying that the state and city should have operationally separate transit authorities that worked in tandem. In early 1967, Rockefeller officially suggested creating the New York State Department of Transportation to coordinate highway maintenance and transit operations in New York State. He also proposed merging the NYCTA and TBTA into the MCTA, as well as creating a $2.5 billion bond issue to fund transportation improvements. On May 3, 1967, Rockefeller signed a bill that allowed the MCTA to oversee the mass transit policies of New York City-area transit systems. The unification agreement would take place the following March, upon which the MCTA would take over the operations of the LIRR, NYCTA, TBTA, New Haven commuter services, New York Central commuter services, and the Staten Island Railway. (New York Central and the PRR would merge in February 1968, forming the Penn Central Transportation Company. ) In November 1967, voters approved of the bond issue.

Initially, the TBTA was resistant to the MCTA's efforts to acquire it. Moses was afraid that the enlarged MCTA would "undermine, destroy or tarnish" the integrity of the TBTA, One source of contention was Rockefeller's proposal to use TBTA tolls in order to subsidize the cheap fares of the NYCTA, since Moses strongly opposed any use of TBTA tolls for use by outside agencies. Moses agreed to merge the TBTA into the MCTA in March 1967, and he even campaigned in favor of the transit bond issue. In February 1968, the TBTA's bondholders finally acquiesced to the MCTA's merger proposal.

Expanded purview
On February 29, 1968, the MCTA published a 56-page report for Governor Rockefeller, and in it, proposed several subway and railroad improvements under the name "Metropolitan Transportation, a Program for Action"  (alternatively called the "Grand Design" ). The city had already intended to build subway extensions in all four boroughs so that most riders would need at most one transfer to get to their destination. The Program for Action, which was to cost $2.9 billion, also called for upgrades to the Penn Central railroads as well as to area airports. The Program for Action was put forward simultaneously with other development and transportation plans under the administration of Mayor Lindsay. This included Lindsay's Linear City plan for housing and educational facilities, and the projected construction of several Interstate Highways, many of which were originally proposed by Robert Moses. The plan also included constructing two bridges over the Long Island Sound. The Program for Action had over $1 billion in available funds, much of them from the 1967 bond issue.

On March 1, 1968, the day after the Program for Action was published, the MCTA dropped the word "Commuter" from its name and became the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA). The MTA took over the operations of the other New York City-area transit systems. Moses was let go from his job as chairman of the TBTA, although he was retained as a consultant. Moses stated that TBTA construction projects would reduce the MTA's budget surplus through 1970.

Chairman Ronan pushed for the MTA to pursue the Program for Action, saying, "We're making up for 30 years of do-nothingism". On September 20, 1968, the New York City Board of Estimate and Mayor Lindsay approved six of the MTA's eight recommended subway routes at the cost of $1.3 billion. Construction commenced on three lines proposed in the Program for Action. The 63rd Street Line started construction in 1969, followed by the Archer Avenue Line in summer 1972 and the Second Avenue Subway in October 1972. In the summer of 1972, ground was broken on a third line, By the time a five-year progress report on the Program for Action was published in 1973, eight subway lines were under design and three were undergoing active construction. Ronan also proposed that the MTA take over the Staten Island Railway from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and commence a $25 million modernization project on the railway, The city's Board of Estimate approved this purchase in December 1969. The MTA did not actually take ownership of the Staten Island Railway until January 1971.

The MTA also entered into a long-term lease of Penn Central's Hudson, Harlem, and New Haven Lines. The MTA contracted their subsidized operation to Penn Central. In April 1970, Rockefeller proposed that the state take over the Hudson and Harlem Lines, and the next month, he signed a bond issue that provided $44.4 million in funding to these lines. The MTA and ConnDOT took over ownership of the New Haven Line in January 1971. In May 1972, the MTA also gained ownership of the Hudson and Harlem Lines. Penn Central continued to operate all three routes. As part of its plan to modernize the commuter lines, the MTA ordered high-speed "Cosmopolitan" railcars for the New Haven Line as well as for the Hudson and Harlem Lines. After a series of delays and derailments in mid-1972, which involved Penn Central trains near Grand Central Terminal, Chairman Ronan expressed his disapproval of the way Penn Central was running its railroads. He said that the proportion of trains running on schedule had declined after Penn Central had inherited the Hudson, Harlem, and New Haven Lines in 1968.

On May 12, 1972, a Federal District Court Judge approved the transfer of the Hudson and Harlem Lines of Penn Central to the MTA, to become effective on June 1. Their transfer was delayed after a Federal Judge, who oversaw Penn Central's affairs, rejected the MTA's proposal on November 10, 1971. As part of the deal, the MTA would have leased both lines for $1 a year for 60 years and would have paid $125,000 annually plus operating expenses for Penn Central to operate the lines. To offset the expected operating deficits, Penn Central would have credit the MTA with $12.5 million over five years.

Since the MTA did not expect its take-over to be questioned, the state spent $7.5 million to build high-level platforms on the electrified portions of the Harlem Line, and purchased 70 cars through the Port Authority to be leased by Penn Central. The MTA purchased 48 additional cars for $14 million, but could not put them into service as, by law, New York could not put money or equipment into a project that it did not control. Since the issue was not resolved by the time that cars arrived in December, they were stored on the Belmont Park Branch. Bids on high level platforms on the Hudson Line had to be redone.

https://www.nytimes.com/1972/03/12/archives/dividing-line-bothers-rail-commuters.html

https://www.nytimes.com/1971/12/13/archives/penn-central-will-restore-17-offpeakhour-trains.html

https://www.nytimes.com/1971/09/16/archives/new-commuter-cars-roll.html

https://www.nytimes.com/1972/05/02/archives/2d-pact-proposed-for-harlem-line-mta-would-take-over-the-division.html

https://www.nytimes.com/1973/06/25/archives/terminals-night-closing-to-disrupt-lives-riders-are-bitter.html

The Program for Action was progressing, if slowly. By 1971, hundreds of new railway and subway cars had been ordered, as were 200 buses. The MTA partially subsidized Westchester County's bus routes. After Westchester's three private bus companies reported operating deficits, the MTA and the county government purchased the routes. In December 1972, the MTA created another subsidiary, the Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority, to take over the operations of ten private bus companies with routes in Nassau County. All of these operators had been nearing bankruptcy, and the Nassau County Board of Supervisors had taken ownership of these companies in October of that year. Old subway and railroad cars were replaced with brand-new vehicles, and air conditioning was added to existing railcars.

Financial deficits
The newly branded MTA encountered some problems in its first years. By 1969, the MTA was running an operating deficit of $20 million, and Ronan said that the city's 20-cent fare would need to be raised unless another entity subsidized the MTA. The NYCTA, in particular, had a deficit of $70 million that year, a sharp increase from the $49 million deficit in 1968. One advocate for the 20-cent fare went so far as to propose that the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey sell its then-under-construction World Trade Center to subsidize the 20-cent fare. Ronan wanted the city to subsidize the fare, but outgoing Mayor Lindsay opposed this proposal. On January 3, 1970, the transit fare was raised nearly 50 percent, to 30 cents. In addition, Ronan needed to address dueling demands from the constituencies that made up the New York City area. Counties outside New York City proper were not yet represented on the MTA board. Since the MTA had put the suburban counties in charge of maintaining their own railroad stations, this made the MTA an easy political target for politicians representing these counties. Ronan helped lobby for the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1970, which allocated federal capital funds to transit projects nationwide.

1970 — MTA officials agree with TWU ads charging years of city neglect, deferred maintenance https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09/18/archives/mta-agrees-with-union-ads-charging-years-of-city-neglect.html?searchResultPosition=5

The LIRR was also running operating deficits, having reported a loss of $37.8 million in 1970, and a further loss of $54.7 million the next year. Other companies, such as Penn Central and the Public Service Railway of New Jersey, reported similar deficits, The NYCTA was also receiving less revenue every year due to declining subway ridership. To reduce the deficit, the LIRR proposed replacing its flat rate fare with a new "fare zone" system, which calculated fares based on distance traveled and raised the average fare by 20 percent. This was implemented at the end of January 1972, as well as a corresponding rise in the Staten Island Railway's flat fare to 35 cents. Earlier in the month, the fares of the bus and subway systems had also risen to 35 cents. Additionally, the MTA raised tolls on the bridges and tunnels that it operated, marking the first-ever toll increase for any of these crossings.

On November 30, 1972, LIRR employees went on strike after failing to secure a wage increase. The nominee for the U.S. Secretary of Labor, Peter Brennan, ordered a 90-day truce on January 18, 1973. The strike had a negative impact on ridership, which suffered for years.

The MTA's proposed Long Island Sound bridge, connecting the towns of Rye and Oyster Bay, was heavily opposed by residents of these respective communities. In April 1971, the New York State Assembly voted to pass a bill that would ban the construction of such a bridge. However, Governor Rockefeller overturned the bill in June of that year, and the Assembly failed to overturn that veto. In March 1973, the federal government officially declined all proposals to build the bridge, and Rockefeller gave up pursuing the plan in June 1973. Voters declined a transportation bond issue in 1971 and again in 1973. Both bond issues, which received the most opposition from upstate voters, would have paid for MTA improvements and key parts of the Program for Action. In April 1973, Mayor Lindsay suggested creating a regional governmental agency to collect a payroll tax from people living in the MTA service area, in order to reduce the city's financial responsibility toward the MTA. This tax was not established due to opposition from politicians. By mid-1973, the MTA was struggling financially due to increased deficits and insufficient fare revenue, and Chairman Ronan warned of steep fare increases if subsidies were not provided. The TBTA did not face the same problem: its revenues had more than doubled over the past four years. However, the value of these revenues were also diminishing due to inflation, and the MTA found it increasingly difficult to fund the maintenance of the existing system, let alone fund the Program for Action expansions. The MTA lobbied for the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1973, which, among other things, allowed states to use Highway Trust Fund money for mass transit, with a federal-state fund-matching ratio of 90 percent to 10 percent.

Two members of the U.S. House of Representatives proposed a bill to raise a $200 million subsidy for the MTA from around the country. However, President Nixon's Transportation Secretary Claude S. Brinegar strongly opposed the subsidy, saying that he would convince Nixon to veto it if the bill passed the House. In July 1974, this bill was defeated in the House.

Chairman Ronan stepped down in April 1974 to become chairman of the Port Authority, and he was replaced by David L. Yunich. By the end of the year, the city, which had provided 40% of the MTA's funding up to that point, was short of funds. Mayor Abraham Beame wrote to Chairman Yunich to ask how the MTA could reduce its budget. Of the agencies being run by the MTA, only the Bridge and Tunnel Authority was making a profit, with a surplus of $97 million at the end of 1974, although much of this surplus ($74 million) was used to pay off the other agencies' debt.

In November 1974, Congress passed an $11.8 billion spending bill that, among other things, provided $170 million to transit in New York City. Governor-elect Hugh Carey promised to supplement that with state money. However, in February 1975, now-governor Carey repeatedly stated that he had never promised any transit subsidies, while his aides said otherwise. The MTA was running a $393 million deficit at this point, which it expected would grow to $629 million in 1975. Meanwhile, Carey wanted to downsize the MTA by splitting off its planning, research, and financial affairs to a new state-operated agency. Carey ultimately declined to sign a $110 million loan for the MTA.

During the second half of 1974, LIRR ridership had increased, while bus ridership had remained mostly level and subway ridership had decreased. By the first quarter of 1975, this had turned into an all-around decrease in ridership. In early February 1975, Yunich said that he believed the transit system's 35-cent fare would hold through the rest of the year. By the end of February, though, the MTA had run out of money, and Yunich was was saying that the fare would go up twice by the beginning of 1976 unless the state increased its financial support. In March 1975, the legislature voted to allocate an emergency package of $76 million to the MTA. Governor Carey proposed an aid package of $100 million, but transit advocates said that the funds would not be enough to last past the end of the year. Meanwhile, ridership was falling, and to save money, Yunich eliminated underused bus routes and reduced the frequencies of subway and railroad trains. By May, due to budget cuts, Yunich had announced that the MTA had eliminated 1,012 jobs through worker attrition since August 1974. In September, the bus and subway fare rose to 50 cents, and tolls on MTA crossing also rose. MTA officials later announced that there would not be another fare hike at the beginning of 1976.

On June 17, 1975, Yunich introduced the Uniticket, a joint monthly bus-rail ticket, to encourage commuters to use buses to get to commuter rail stations by offering savings. He announced that the plan would begin on July 1 at Scarsdale, and by the fall in Nassau, Queens and the Bronx. Bus schedules at the Scarsdale station were mdified to meet commuter trains in the morning and evening. On August 17, the six-month Uniticket connecting the LIRR's Rockville Centre and Freeport stations with the N14 and N62 buses began. In Queens, the Unitcket was set to be offered between Little Neck and the Port Washington Branch, and in the Bronx, it was to be offered between Co-op City and the Wakefield stop on the Penn Central. The initial tickets were identical to regular tickets but were specially stamped. In addition, the MTA was experimenting with subway turnstiles to allow for bus-rail-subway integration. The MTA subsidized the Scarsdale Bus Company under the Scarsdale Uniticket program. In December the Uni-Ticket pilot was extended for another six months. In May 1976, the MTA announced that it would expand the program on June 1 to all 43 LIRR stops served by the Metropolitan Suburban Bus Authority due to the program's high usage.

City's fiscal crisis
By 1976, the MTA was in poor financial shape, and this could be seen in its transit systems, which had been neglected due to a lack of maintenance. One New York Times reporter wrote of the subway: "The New York City subway system, once considered the best in the world, has become the noisiest, dirtiest and most rapidly deteriorating of them all." Yunich announced further service reductions in January of that year, and again in November. He said that unless state and federal funding was procured, the fare would almost certainly rise. The rising fares had already led to a further decrease in ridership. However, Yunich said that a fare decrease could also be enacted if New York City road pricing, a gas tax, and an income tax were implemented within the area served by the MTA. To save money, the MTA eliminated a program that provided free or reduced fares to students, but this was partially restored after several board members pointed out that this could lead to overall net losses for the MTA. That year, the amount of TBTA monies that were used to fund the MTA's other operations exceeded $100 million. Chairman Yunich resigned on December 31, 1976, citing Governor Carey's lack of communication with the MTA. Harold L. Fisher, a lawyer who had been on the MTA board since 1969, was appointed as an acting chairman.

In 1976, Congress awarded the MTA "temporary" funding so the LIRR and Penn Central commuter routes could be handed over to local private operators. The bankrupt Penn Central's commuter routes were taken over by Conrail, an entity created by the federal government, the same year. However, the handover to private owners did not happen, and President Jimmy Carter signed a bill to extend this aid in fall 1977. He was said to be unhappy that "the affected cities have not yet arranged to live within these original federal emergency payments." In November 1977, the MTA received a $280 million grant from the federal government. Losses continued through that year. The New York City blackout of July 13–14, 1977, alone caused $9 million in operational losses. At one point, the Franklin Avenue Line in Brooklyn was scheduled for demolition to fill a $30 million budget gap, but the plan was canceled after backlash from the local community. Other cost-saving measures included gliding trains in order to reduce motor use; shutting token booths to reduce payrolls; and cutting even more bus and subway service. By the end of the year, the New York City Department of City Planning was saying that the fare could increase sharply, from 50 cents to 90 cents, within the next five years.

The MTA was at a crossroads by 1978: although many improvements had been made, the Program for Action had stalled, even though fares had risen several times over the past decade. The MTA was only building two Program for Action subway lines, which were massively delayed and becoming very expensive. Yet another income tax surcharge was proposed that year. Congress proposed a $210 million aid increase, but the state called it insufficient. In April, Governor Carey provided $800 million in federal and state funding to the MTA, in exchange for Mayor Ed Koch supporting the Westway highway project in western Manhattan. Manhattan Borough President Andrew J. Stein accused the agency of investing in out-of-state and foreign ventures, which the MTA said was a move to maximize returns. Stein also said that the MTA had defined the lateness metric so that only three percent of trains were considered late, and that the percentage of late trains was far higher. LIRR riders also complained of perpetually late trains; at this point, it sometimes took longer for the LIRR to get to Manhattan than it had in 1968, despite the MTA saying the LIRR was mostly on time. By the end of the year, the MTA had redefined the definition of lateness for the LIRR, so that trains that were running more than five minutes behind schedule were considered late.

Ridership on MTA systems went up during the 1979 energy crisis, which made the price of oil more expensive. But the MTA was still facing deficits: the agency was projected to have a $200 million shortfall by 1980. Despite the passage of another transportation bond act, improvements for the MTA divisions such as the Conrail commuter lines were not expected for the near future.

In June 1979, Governor Carey authorized the expansion of the MTA board from 9 members to 13 by requiring that four members come from seven of the New York City area's suburban counties. Chairman Fisher resigned in October of that year, having had conflicts with both Carey and Koch. Carey nominated Richard Ravitch to fill Fisher's position. A government-funded study of the MTA was released at the end of the year. The study found that subway delays had risen in the past seven years as the number of workers was cut. While the buses suffered the most equipment breakdowns, with $1/4$ of the fleet out of service at any given time. LIRR and Conrail equipment was also steadily deteriorating. However, since the study's authors had examined the LIRR first, the railroad had made some improvements. The study's authors also discovered that capital projects were taking unnecessarily long to be reviewed, with the approval process stretching 3 to 4 years in some instances.

State of emergency
LIRR workers declared another strike on December 8, 1979, after trying to negotiate with the MTA. In response, in February 1980, the MTA board voted to prevent the LIRR from striking by reorganizing the LIRR into a public-benefit subsidiary corporation and invoking the Taylor Law, which prevents New York state government unions from striking. A federal court later ruled that the LIRR workers had the right to strike, thus voiding the MTA board's vote. NYCTA workers also went on strike on April 1, 1980, after negotiations with these workers' unions failed. The next day, LIRR workers again went on strike. The workers stopped striking on April 13 when an agreement was reached. However, the strike had wide ranging impact. Fares were increased from 50 cents to 60 cents in June in order to offset the heavy losses that the MTA suffered during the strike, and the workers involved were fined heavily. Bridge and tunnel tolls were also increased to as much as $1.

Adding to the MTA's problems, there were defects in buses and subway cars that were being delivered to the MTA, and rail service was declining. Cracks were found in subway undercarriages built by Rockwell International for Pullman-Standard's new R46 fleet. The MTA temporarily reactivated retired R16 cars while the R46s were being repaired. The city sued and won $72 million in damages as a result. Cracks were also discovered on a fleet of 637 new Grumman buses, which were all taken out of service in December 1980 due to the severity of the cracking. Because the affected buses comprised almost 20% of the entire bus fleet at the time, the MTA temporarily rented retired buses from the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. The Grumman buses did not return until late 1981 and early 1982. Conrail commuters also complained about declining service, while a bipartisan group of state legislators proposed splitting the LIRR into its own agency.

In December 1980, Chairman Ravitch issued a "Staff Report of Capital Revitalization for the 1980s and Beyond", which called for a fivefold increase in capital spending with five new sources of funding. On February 25, 1981, as a result of declining maintenance on the buses and subway, a 90-day transportation emergency was designated for the NYCTA for the first time in the MTA's history. This "emergency" status gave the NYCTA president wide power to approve contracts for that division. The next week, Governor Carey detailed a $5 billion emergency improvement plan for the MTA. By this time, 18% of all subway trains were delayed, costing the New York City economy $165 million to $300 million per year. To save money, it was proposed to close 25% of all subway lines, as well as end nighttime subway service. The MTA contemplated making $65 million worth of service cuts, but only a portion of these cuts was actually implemented.

In April 1981, the MTA published a report about the capital projects the MTA was supposed to focus on during the next five years. The legislature passed the Transportation System Assistance and Financing Act in June of that year. This act created a Capital Program Review Board, as well as allowed the MTA to issue bonds to finance each five-year program. The MTA also created its first five-year capital program, which involved $6.7 billion of improvements such as 900 new subway cars, 67 rehabilitated stations, and LIRR electrification. The MTA started issuing comprehensive monthly progress reports in December 1981.

The bus and subway fares were raised to 75 cents in July 1981, but this soon became a problem after the Connecticut Turnpike started issuing tokens that were the same size and a quarter of the price. This went on for three years until the turnpike abolished tokens in 1985, upon which the turnpike authority reimbursed the MTA for the cost of 1.5 million illegal tokens. Meanwhile, tolls at some MTA crossings went to $1.25 in early 1982.

July 1981 — Austerity cuts leading to accidents, poor service https://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/12/weekinreview/rocky-roadbed-for-subways.html?searchResultPosition=5

July 1981 — Deferred maintenance leads to subway accidents https://www.nytimes.com/1981/07/05/nyregion/delay-in-subway-repairs-blamed-by-transit-chief-for-fatal-crash.html?searchResultPosition=16

October 1981 NYPIRG study shows subway still declining https://www.nytimes.com/1981/10/15/nyregion/city-s-subways-still-declining-a-survey-finds.html?searchResultPosition=19

During the 1982 gubernatorial campaign, Mario Cuomo had said that he wanted to abolish the MTA so that elected officials could have direct responsibility for the New York City area's transit needs. His opponent in the primary, Mayor Ed Koch, had called it "pure demagoguery". After Cuomo won the election and took office, he announced a task force to conduct a 90-day study of the MTA. The group found that abolishing the agency would have more drawbacks than benefits. Cuomo then proposed that the governor's office be able to appoint a greater proportion of the MTA board's members, including the chairman. Cuomo wanted the governor's office to be able to appoint three more members to the existing 14-member board, where six members were gubernatorial appointees. Koch and county executives opposed this plan. Cuomo and lawmakers also set up an office of the Attorney General of New York to oversee the MTA.

Slow improvements
In March 1981, the administration of President Ronald Reagan suggested that struggling Conrail commuter operations across five states be transferred to state agencies. This was part of the administration's proposed budget cut, which included reducing annual federal aid to mass transit from $24 billion to $19 billion, but the budget cut would also affect the MTA's operations since federal aid was 8% of the agency's budget. In March 1982, the MTA announced it would take over the Harlem, Hudson, and New Haven Lines as long as there was no extra operating cost involved. On January 1, 1983, the MTA took over full operations of the three lines and combined them to form the Metro-North Commuter Railroad. However, the handover left some unresolved questions regarding the status of the railroad unions, who formerly worked for Conrail and now worked for Metro-North. On March 7, 1983, after a series of unsuccessful strikes, Metro-North workers went on strike for the first time since 1971. This came a week after a strike was announced by workers for NJ Transit Rail Operations, another company that took over Conrail lines in the New York City area. Although the NJ Transit strike was over by April 5, the Metro-North strike continued for another two weeks.

September 1981 — Fare Beater crackdown

Vehicle leasing plan for revenue (Ravitch) https://www.newspapers.com/clip/79043305/

1982 — Major retrospective piece https://www.nytimes.com/1982/12/11/opinion/more-sub-than-way.html?searchResultPosition=24

In 1983, disability-rights groups filed a lawsuit that sought to block a subway modernization project from proceeding unless elevators were installed in stations, as per a state law that required that access for handicapped riders be provided. In response, a New York State Supreme Court judge officially signed an order that barred the project from proceeding until an agreement reached regarding accessibility in the New York City transit system. A settlement was reached in June 1984, in which Mayor Koch and Governor Cuomo agreed to equip 50 stations with elevators (later changed to 54).

1983 expectation fare increase in 1984 https://www.nytimes.com/1983/10/09/nyregion/mta-expects-to-raise-fares-by-end-of-year.html?searchResultPosition=28

Labor costs factor fare increase https://www.nytimes.com/1983/12/18/nyregion/labor-costs-a-key-in-rail-fare-rise.html?searchResultPosition=16 After the cracked R46 undercarriages were repaired, the MTA turned to foreign manufacturers to build its next generation of subway cars. This became the R62 and R62A orders, made respectively by Kawasaki of Japan and Bombardier of Canada. National labor leaders wanted to put tariffs on these subway cars because the MTA had passed over American companies, such as the Budd Company, for the contracts. This was seen as a violation of the Buy America Act of 1983, under which the MTA was encouraged to buy domestic manufacturers' railcars. This trade disagreement was resolved in late 1983 when the MTA agreed to not buy any cars from foreign manufacturers for three years, in exchange for avoiding a fine. The next year, the MTA purchased 400 buses to replace the crack-plagued Grumman fleet.

Chairman Ravitch resigned in August 1983. Although his four-year tenure had been marked by transit strikes, declining transit ridership, and two fare increases, Ravitch was also credited with purchasing over a thousand new subway cars and creating the MTA's first capital plan. He was replaced two months later by Robert R. Kiley, the former head of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority.

Arrival of Kiley and Gunn
October 1983 — Kiley, riders can expect 2-3 years of frustration https://www.nytimes.com/1983/10/10/nyregion/2-troubled-years-on-subways-seen-by-mta-nominee.html?searchResultPosition=30

May 1984 Hiring non-civil service supervisors https://www.nytimes.com/1984/05/17/nyregion/transit-unit-to-hire-700-supervisors.html?searchResultPosition=35

July 1984 — Major article on subway struggles, capital program, incidents https://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/30/nyregion/greater-woes-lie-ahead-for-city-s-transit-riders.html?searchResultPosition=36

July 1984 — Costs of inefficient labor practices https://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/31/nyregion/inefficients-ways-of-the-past-still-hamper-transit-system.html?searchResultPosition=37

August 1984 MTA IG report recommending closing Rockaway Line overnight https://www.newspapers.com/clip/78614872/ https://www.newspapers.com/clip/78614872/

On November 12, 1984, the NYCTA released its Strategic Plan for 1985 to 1989 in which the agency detailed its Budget assumption of 2% raise for workers

Budget negotiations https://www.newspapers.com/clip/78612949/ https://www.newspapers.com/clip/78613271/ https://www.newspapers.com/clip/78613483/ https://www.newspapers.com/clip/78614095/ https://www.newspapers.com/clip/78614122/ https://www.newspapers.com/clip/78616378/ https://www.newspapers.com/clip/78616510/ https://www.newspapers.com/clip/78616560/ https://www.newspapers.com/clip/78616723/

On November 26, 1984, the NYCTA released its $2.3 billion capital budget for 1985. NYCTA President David Gunn, who took the job in February, changed the agency's priorities to focus on projects that needed to be done immediately to deal with major problems the agency was having at the moment, increasing focus on rehabilitating subway cars and bus and the Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Authority (SIRTOA), while cutting $1.3 billion from less urgent needs, like upgrading the signaling system and implementing an automated fare system. The changes, overall, were applauded by the New York Daily News editorial board, which said that "when push comes to shove, straphangers would prefer trains that are reliable and safe over platforms that are spotless. That, in effect, is the choice Gunn is making, and it's a wise one."

The agency said $7.7 billion would be needed through 1991, in addition to the $6.3 billion in its capital program through 1986, to get the system to be in adequate condition. More funding would be allocated to purchase new buses, overhaul subway cars, rebuild bus depots and the SIRTOA while $300 million less would go into rebuilding subway yards, and installing advanced signaling systems. More funds would be allocated to improve security measures, like television monitoring systems, chemical car washes to fight graffiti, and for air conditioning. The agency's plan to replace tokens with an automated fare system would also be pushed back.

There number of subway cars undergoing the General Overhaul Program would increase from 695 to 1,413, and a 25 percent increase in the number of subway cars set to receive less substantial overhauls to address deferred maintenance. 780 buses would be purchased in the coming two years, instead of 625, with the increase to cover the loss of the 851 Grumman Flxible buses removed from service in February for being unsafe. Due to the cost of making subway stations renovated accessible, the $315 million allocated for station renovations would only renovate 41 stations instead of 56. The MTA decided to use the $400 million for bus depots to modernize existing depots instead of building new ones. The funding would address depots in poor shape, with some depots having cracking walls, leaking roofs, broken bus lifts, and floors that sunk more than three feet. Since the automated fare system would not be installed right away, the $50 million in funding allocated for it would be reallocated. It was hoped that funding for projects eliminated in the capital program would be provided in the following capital program.

There would be a $49.2 million increase in the budget from $33.8 million for SIRTOA to repair bridges, structures, stations, and tracks "to avoid further deterioration or even possible closure of the line", and address years of deferred maintenance. The report detailed the extent of the deterioration of the railroad's facilities, noting that train cars were in need of major overhauls, that bridges shifted on their piers, that many stairways at stations had been closed for being unsafe, and that at multiple locations, water has worn away at the tracks. Originally, the funding in the capital program would have gone to the extension of station platforms to accommodate four-car trains without renovating the stations, upgrading substations, track renewal in some sections, a new interlocking at Tottenville, the installation of reverse signaling, special equipment, and fencing to secure Clifton Yard. The additional funding would cover an additional 17 projects, including the reconstruction of the roadbed south of Huguenot, new police and crew facilities, a new diesel repair shop to replace one that was 100 years old, new underground signal lines, and repairs to pedestrian overpasses and bridges to fix unsafe conditions. The capital plan for the SIRTOA in 1981 was based on funding constraints, and was not need driven. The funding for the SIRTOA was the first time the MTA has provided major attention to SIRTOA since it was acquired in 1971. Following the agency's acquisition of the rail line, the line suffered from deferred maintenance, with no bridge inspections having been performed from 1971 to 1984. As part of the revised plan, a projects would no longer be passed between departments as they went through phases, and instead would be overseen by a project manager from beginning to end.

https://www.newspapers.com/clip/30117816/daily-news/

On December 6, 1984, the New York State Assembly and Senate overwhelmingly passed legislation to extend the 17 percent surcharge on the franchise taxes paid by corporations in the MTA twelve-county tax area for two years to prevent fare increases on the NYCTA, Long Island Rail Road, and Metro-North, and to bail out the MTA. The tax provided $280 million a year for the MTA. MTA Chairman Robert Kiley sent a letter to Norman Levy, the Chairman of the State Senate Transportation Committee, saying that the new revenue would allow the MTA to go without fare hikes through the end of 1985. On the same date, President Ronald Reagan released his budget cutting plan, which would eliminate federal operating subsidies for mass transit. The cut would have eliminated $110 million a year in federal operating assistance to the MTA, of which $85 million a year went to the NYCTA, with the rest going to the MSBA, and the commuter railroads, and $420 million for the agency's capital program. It was projected that these cuts could increase the subway and bus fare by 40 cents, and commuter rail fares by 15 to 20 percent.

Resignation of MTA IG, reports ignored https://www.newspapers.com/clip/78609873/daily-news/

Proposed changes to the federal income tax were expected to cause major damage to the MTA's finances, and hinder the agency's effort to raise $4 billion over five years for the agency's capital program. The changes by the Treasury Department might have eliminated the tax-exempt status of MTA bonds. The MTA expected to raise $3 billion over five years by issuing revenue bonds, which were attractive to buyers as they offered triple tax-exempt interest. To make up for the loss of funding, the agency would have to turn to increase revenues from taxes. The tax plan also threatened to end the MTA's use of the safe harbor leasing tax provision, in which the agency sold new equipment like subway cars to companies and leased them back.

Rash of fires October https://www.newspapers.com/clip/78609420/the-daily-times/

Following the release of a report on fires in the subway by the National Transportation Safety Board, on December 20, 1984, Mayor Ed Koch demanded that the NYCTA work to eliminate fire hazards in the subway system. Koch said that the finding that was most disturbing were the reported incidents about carelessly located hazardous materials and the amount of debris in the system.

On May 17, 1985, a report by the special deputy to the State Comptroller for the city said the NYCTA's five-year capital program was 50 percent behind its goals in 1983, and 70 percent behind them in 1984. NYCTA President Gunn said that the setbacks were the result of inadequately staffed and organized engineering and operations departments.

More deficits
Fares and tolls were raised again at the beginning of 1984: the fare went to 90 cents, and tolls at six crossings rose to $1.50. Tolls rose four more times through 1992. In 1984, to raise money for the MTA, officials suggested selling the New York Coliseum, a property the city and MTA jointly owned at the southwestern edge of Central Park. A deal was struck in 1987 to sell the Coliseum and its office building to Boston Properties for $477.5 million, which would have seen the complex demolished by 1988. A plunging real-estate market and opposition to Boston Properties' proposals ultimately led Boston Properties to walk away from the project in 1994. But the MTA had more immediate fiscal issues: in December 1984, the Reagan administration announced the largest cuts to federal aid to the MTA in four years. In June 1985, it was discovered that the MTA's bookkeeping had been so grossly mismanaged, it had failed to collect $100 million in compensation from the city, state, and federal levels of government over the past several years. Bus riders who evaded fares costed the MTA another $23 million per year. The Archer Avenue and 63rd Street Lines were temporarily denied further federal funding due to a misappropriation of funds. In December 1985, Felix Rohatyn, who was leading a state government report on the MTA, concluded that the agency needed more fare and tax revenue to avoid a repeat of the 1970s transit crisis.

In 1985, the MTA created a new "director of planning" position to take control over planning for MTA's future. By 1986, there was a resurgence of plans to close parts of 11 elevated lines, as well as build new subway and surface lines. The MTA's Interborough Rapid Transit (IRT) division, consisting of numbered subway services, had improved drastically due to a general maintenance program applied to the subway system. However, a study from Governor Cuomo's office found that little had changed compared to 1983 levels, since there were still many delayed subways and buses, as well as broken-down equipment in these systems. The transit system's fare was raised again in June 1986, resulting in a new token design. Due to a continuing lack of funds and a decline in bus ridership, the MTA cut service on all of its 200 local bus routes by the end of 1987. However, ridership on the subway went up, reaching a 13-year high of 3.67 million weekday riders in 1986.

Dutchess County wanted to secede from the MTA service area due to complaints of bad service as early as 1983. Rockland, Orange, and Dutchess Counties were granted permission to leave the MTA after a law was passed in 1986 in response to their complaints. The three counties paid for their service with a .25 percent sales tax, a mortgage tax and a business tax surcharge. Rail service would continue if Orange or Rockland left the MTA, but would have to negotiated with NJ Transit. If Dutchess left, it would have to negotiate a contract with the MTA. The Rockland County Legislature voted unanimously in March 1988 to withdraw from the MTA, saying that it has paid too much for rail service. The move required the County Executive's approval and would have taken effect on January 1, 1989, but Rockland's County Executive wanted the MTA to lower the subsidy, and hoped that the vote would provide leverage.

Push for the second capital program
1986 — Request for $8.3 billion https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/12/nyregion/forget-service-cuts-it-s-subway-maintenance-that-will-suffer-former-transit.html?searchResultPosition=59

1986 - Progress https://books.google.com/books?id=w-cCAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA44&dq=robert+kiley+nyc+subway+legacy&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjSlOLnlf7wAhW2GVkFHVPcCEMQ6AEwAHoECAQQAg#v=onepage&q=robert%20kiley%20nyc%20subway%20legacy&f=false The MTA's second five-year capital funding program was temporarily denied in late 1986 and early 1987 due to a dispute over the renewal contracts for hydropower plants upstate. Governor Cuomo, a Democrat, had proposed a $8.6 billion funding plan that was blocked by the State Senate's Republican majority, who would only agree to fund the MTA if hydropower contract renewals were also included. Senate Republicans also expressed concerns that there was not enough money for improvements to commuter railroads, which served the mostly-Republican suburban constituencies in the New York City area. In April 1987, after three months of negotiations, the Senate finally approved Cuomo's plan, and the MTA immediately started spending the funds on new subway cars and buses. However, the capital plan's funding sources also had long-term drawbacks: most of the funding came from billions of dollars in bonds issued by the MTA, and President Reagan had proposed reducing federal subsidies to mass transit. The MTA's executive director, Mortimer L. Downey III, said that the agency "may want to get away from debt refinancing" by the time the next capital program was issued. Federal funding for the LIRR was nearly withheld in 1989 after it was discovered that the Hillside facility was delayed by two years and cost $100 million more than what was budgeted.

Late 1980s
The U.S. Congress passed a bill in December 1985 that mandated that the tolls on the MTA's Verrazano-Narrows Bridge, connecting Brooklyn and Staten Island, only be collected in the Staten Island-bound direction, rather than in both directions. The MTA started to charge a double toll for Staten Island-bound motorists in order to offset the loss of the Brooklyn-bound tolls. The new toll plan not only caused a drop in revenues. since drivers were going through New Jersey to avoid paying the toll, but also caused congestion in Manhattan and Brooklyn and air pollution in Manhattan. To this day, tolls on that bridge are still collected in only one direction.

In April 1986, a tentative deal was reached between the MTA and Amtrak, allowing the MTA to control and renovate specific areas of Penn Station, as well as consolidate five control centers at the station. These areas were principally used by LIRR passengers and were leased to LIRR for 99 years. This deal was formalized in August 1988, giving the LIRR joint-dispatching operations for all trains. The deal also allowed the MTA to start a $100 million project with Amtrak to build a central control center at the station. A lump sum payment of $45 million was given to Amtrak in return for the LIRR's complete control over the use of commercially leased space.

In early 1988, the LIRR and Metro-North banned smoking on trains. The MTA foresaw a resulting drop in ridership, but this did not happen, and smoking incidences decreased. In 1989, the MTA started another program to reduce the number of homeless people in the subway by directing them toward assistance. However, by the next year, this program was seen as ineffective, since the homeless kept returning to the subway. This had an effect on subway ridership, which was starting to decrease again.

$221 million cutback in revenue from Coliseum sale, Westway trade-in funds, projects pushed back into the 1990s - 1988 The late 1980s brought major changes to the bus and subway systems. In December 1988, bus routes in all boroughs except Staten Island were rerouted, and 14 of 19 subway services were modified in some form, affecting almost half of all subway riders. In addition, three subway stations on the Archer Avenue Line were opened, marking the city's first new subway stations in 20 years. The December 1988 service changes resulted in mass confusion citywide. "Skip-stop" patterns, where alternate trains made alternate stops, were implemented on two subway routes: the J/Z trains in December 1988, and the 1/9 trains in August 1989. In October 1989, less than a year after the opening of the Archer Avenue Line, three more stations on the 63rd Street Line were opened. Both lines were part of the Program for Action, which had been downscaled in the 1970s.

Capital renewals and budget shortfalls
Fares for MTA systems were raised again at the start of 1990. Notably, the $1 transit fare rose to $1.15, prompting protests from riders. After the changes were announced in December 1989, the Connecticut Governor objected to a raise in New Haven Line fares. After a brief dispute, the Connecticut government and the MTA agreed to leave the fare for the New Haven Line in place, in return for scaling back improvement plans for the line. The failure to close the sale of the New York Coliseum was having negative effects on the MTA's finances. In August 1990, the agency announced that several improvement projects worth $500 million would need to be delayed if the coliseum was not sold by the end of 1991. The downfall of the area's economy also affected the LIRR and Metro-North, which were seeing a related decline in state funds. However, the LIRR was also seeing decreasing ridership, while Metro-North had a slowly growing ridership base.

In December 1990, the MTA again proposed several budget cuts. In order to reduce the impact on service operations, the MTA suggested eliminating several non-service-related functions, including the New York Transit Museum and part of the advertising budget. In January 1991, Chairman Kiley resigned. He was replaced in March 1991 by Peter Stangl, the president of Metro-North.

By 1991, the MTA's capital programs were having clear positive effects on its subsidiaries. The vast majority of the 1982-1991 capital funds, $11.8 billion, was allotted to the NYCTA. In turn, the NYCTA's largest capital expenditure, $3.9 billion, was spent on new subway cars. Nearly 1,700 subway cars had also been overhauled by 1988 at a cost of $2 billion, which led to improved reliability. In 1990, 85% of subway trains were considered to be "on time", a 9% increase from two years before. Meanwhile, the LIRR and Metro-North had allocations of $1.8 billion and $1.5 billion, respectively, during the same time period. The LIRR spent 45% of its allotment on upgrading the Hillside Maintenance Facility, constructing high-level platforms, and upgrading Penn Station; however, rail electrification was also a large part of the LIRR capital plan. Metro-North spent 20% of its allocation on new railcars, another 20% on rehabilitating infrastructure, and the rest on such improvements as the expansion of Grand Central Terminal and electrification of the New Haven Line.

At the beginning of 1991, the MTA transit system was deemed to have improved, but it was still considered "bad". Although fires and accidents on the subway system in particular had decreased drastically, track fires were still ten times the United States' average, and MTA commuters were twice as likely to be hurt or killed than commuters in other cities. To deter crime, the MTA closed little-used passageways and mezzanines in several stations.

In the first few weeks of 1991, the size of the NYCTA's deficit tripled. In May 1991, the MTA announced that it had been able to procure $200 million in savings without having to raise fares, a possibility that had been presented for several months. The capital program was set to expire at the end of 1991, but MTA officials believed that more rebuilding was needed, and they requested another $11.5 billion to be spent over the next five years. After criticism from the state legislature, the MTA decided to eliminate $1 billion worth of these proposed improvements. In October 1991, the New York inspector general's office released a report that showed that despite the presence of a capital investment program, the MTA was still too slow in making needed repairs and upgrades to the subway and commuter rail systems; at the time the subway was in worse shape than the commuter rail lines. By January 1992, due to the state's budget crisis, there was not enough cash on hand to fund the next five-year capital program, so Governor Cuomo instead proposed a smaller one-year capital budget.



A $1.25 fare increase went into effect in January 1992. In June of that year, the MTA proposed a single fare increase over the following five years, to take effect in 1994. In January 1993, increased tolls were announced at the MTA's nine tolled crossings. Cuomo and state lawmakers passed a transportation improvement program for the MTA in April 1992. Under the plan, the city would pay $205 million per year for five years; however, city representatives said that they could only afford to pay $105 million per year. The missing $500 million was supposed to allocated to pay for renovations of dilapidated subway stations, as well as an overhaul of the Franklin Avenue Line, which was so poorly maintained that its platforms were literally crumbling.

New technology
In August 1991, a subway derailment near Union Square killed five people and injured 161, marking the subway's deadliest derailment since eighteen people died in Times Square in 1928. The crash was attributed to a drunk motorman who had been operating the train erratically in the minutes before the crash. In June 1995, a rear-end collision between a J train and an M train on the Williamsburg Bridge killed the J train's motorman. A subsequent investigation found that the Williamsburg Bridge crash had occurred because the J train operator was asleep. The two disasters led the MTA to study ways to upgrade the subway's signaling system, which was composed of fixed signal blocks. It was determined that the best replacement was a communications-based train control system.

The MTA board voted in 1991 to implement a new version of tokens, corresponding with an increase in fares. In the same vote, it approved a magnetic-farecard system, the MetroCard, which would replace the tokens within a decade. The MetroCard system debuted at six subway stations in January 1994. By 1997, the MetroCard was fully implemented, and the MTA started providing riders one free transfer between buses and subways, or other buses, for every trip made using MetroCards. Unlimited-ride MetroCards started to be sold in July 1998, and subway and bus ridership increased sharply in the first month.

Reshaping image
In June 1992, the MTA banned tobacco advertising on subways, buses and commuter rail, costing the agency $4.5 million in annual advertising revenue. The tobacco advertisements were removed once the advertising contracts expired, which occurred between 1993 and early 1997. The MTA implemented general rules for advertisements in 1994, which banned ads that were offensive or false, or displayed illegal activity.

In 1994, the MTA spent $3 million rebranding its five subsidiaries with simpler names to convey that the different agencies were part of one agency. Surveys found that a majority of riders did not know that the MTA owned the Long Island Railroad and Metro-North. The MTA logo was changed from a two-toned "M" logo was replaced with a blue circle with the MTA initials written in perspective like they were rushing by like a train. The large "M" logos on trains and buses were replaced with decals that state MTA New York City Bus, MTA New York City Subway or MTA Staten Island Railway, eliminating inconsistencies in signage.

Mid-1990s
The MTA assumed control of Grand Central Terminal at the end of 1993; previously, the MTA had rented the terminal to Metro-North, while Penn Central had owned the terminal building itself. The MTA announced a renovation of the terminal in January 1995. The $113.8 million renovation would be the most extensive rehabilitation to the terminal since its opening in 1913.

In 1994, the deal to sell the Coliseum to Mortimer Zuckerman fell through after years of bargaining. By this time, the plans for Columbus Center had been reduced three times. By October 1994, the MTA was deciding whether to keep using the Coliseum or to proceed with trying to find a buyer.

In 1995, the MTA proposed "draconian" service cuts to the bus and subway systems. The cuts included 14 bus routes; overnight service on three shuttle routes on the subway system; and the closure of one subway station. The MTA's cuts affected riders on some bus routes within areas not served by other routes. Due to public backlash against the planned cuts, the MTA held a hearing to discuss the cuts in April 1995. After continuing controversy, the MTA delayed the discontinuance of 11 express bus routes.

1995 — Fear that cuts in subway maintenance would return the subway to the 1980s https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/12/nyregion/forget-service-cuts-it-s-subway-maintenance-that-will-suffer-former-transit.html?searchResultPosition=59

On April 21, 1995, Peter Stangl resigned as chairman of the MTA to join the Bombardier Transit Corporation. Stangl was replaced by E. Virgil Conway.

Role of Pataki

In response to higher ridership, bus and subway service was increased.

Fun-pass

1999 MVMs

E-Z Pass

Access a ride

1999 Strike averted

MTA offices downtown

Major capital construction
1999 Plan