User:Jim101/Battle of Chosin Reservoir

Coordinates: 40°29′N 127°12′E / 40.483°N 127.200°E / 40.483; 127.200 (Chosin Reservoir)
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40°29′N 127°12′E / 40.483°N 127.200°E / 40.483; 127.200 (Chosin Reservoir)

Battle of Chosin Reservoir
Part of the Korean War

A column of the U.S. 1st Marine Division move through Chinese lines during their breakout from the Chosin Reservoir
DateNovember 26 – December 13, 1950
Location
Chosin Reservoir, in modern-day Changjin County, South Hamgyong Province, North Korea
Result Strategic Chinese victory, tactical UN victory
Successful UN withdrawal
Belligerents

 United Nations

 China China
Commanders and leaders
United States Douglas MacArthur
United States Edward Almond
United States Oliver P. Smith		 China Mao Zedong
China Peng Dehuai
China Song Shi-Lun
Strength

United States X Corps

Nominal: 103.520[1]
Committed: 30,000[2]

China 9th Army[nb 1]

Nominal: 150,000[3]
Committed: between 80,000[4] to 55,000[2]; general consense is at 60,000[5]
Casualties and losses
US sources: 1,029 killed, 4,582 wounded, 4,894 missing, 7,338 nonbattle casualties,[6][nb 2] 15 tank losses.[7]
Chinese estimation: 13,900[3]		 Chinese sources: official data state 19,202 casualties by fighting, 28,954 by hunger and frostbite;[3] unoffical estimations suggest the casualties could be higher than 60,000[4][nb 3]
US estimation: at least 29,800 killed or wounded.[8]

The Battle of Chosin Reservoir, also known as Battle of Changjin Lake (Chinese: 长津湖之战; pinyin: Cháng Jīn Hū Zhī Zhàn), was a decisive battle in the Korean War. Shortly after the People's Republic of China entered the conflict, the People's Volunteer Army 9th Army[nb 1] infiltrated the northeastern part of North Korea and surprised the US X Corps at the Chosin Reservoir area. A brutal seventeen day battle in freezing weather soon followed. In the period between November 27 and December 13, 1950, 30,000 United Nations troops (nicknamed "The Frozen Chosin" or "The Chosin Few") under the command of Major General Edward Almond were encircled by approximately 60,000 Chinese troops under the command of Song Shi-Lun. Although Chinese troops managed to surround and outnumber the UN forces, the UN forces successfully broke out of the encirclement while inflicting crippling losses to the Chinese. The evacuation of the X Corps from the port of Hungnam marked the general withdraw of UN troops from North Korea.

Background[edit]

Map of UN advances toward Yalu River.

By mid 1950, after the successful landing at Incheon by the US X Corps and the subsequent destruction of the Korean People's Army, the Korean War appeared to be all but over.[9] United Nations (UN) forces advanced rapidly into North Korea with the intention of reunite Korea before the end of 1950.[10] North Korea is cut in the middle by the impassable Taebaek Mountains, dividing the UN forces to into two groups.[11] The US Eighth Army advanced north through the west side of the Korean Peninsula, while the Republic of Korea (ROK) I Corps and the US X Corps took over responsibilities on the east side.[11]

At the same time, the People's Republic of China entered the conflict after issuing several warnings to the United Nations.[9] On 14 October 1950, large formations of Chinese troops, dubbed the People's Volunteer Army (PVA), secretly crossed the border and into North Korea.[12] One of the first Chinese units to reach the Chosin Reservoir area was the PVA 42nd Corps, and it was tasked with stopping the eastern UN advances.[4] On 25 October, the advancing ROK I Corps made contact with the Chinese and halted at Funchilin Pass, south of the Chosin Reservoir.[13] After the landing at Wonson, the US 1st Marine Division of the X Corps engaged the defending 124th Division on 2 November, and the ensuring battle caused heavy causalties among the Chinese.[14] On 6 November, the PVA 42nd Corps ordered a retreat to the north with the intention of luring the UN forces into the Chosin Reservoir.[4] By 24 November, the 1st Marine Division occupied both Sinhung-ni[nb 4] on the east side of the reservoir, and Yudami-ni on the south side of the reservoir.[15]

Faced with the sudden attacks by Chinese forces in the Eighth Army sector, General Douglas MacArthur ordered the X Corps to attack west from the Chosin Reservoir in order to cut the vital Manpojin—Kanggye—Huichon supply line.[16] As a response, General Edward M. Almond, commander of the US X Corps, formulated a plan on 21 November. It called for the US 1st Marine Division to advance west through Yudami-ni, while the US 7th Infantry Division would provide a regimental combat team to protect the right flank at Sinhung-ni. The US 3rd Infantry Division would also protect the left flank while providing securities in the rear area.[17] By then the X Corps was stretched thin along a 400 miles (640 km) front.[15]

On 31 October, in a telegraph to Song Shi-Lun, the commander of the PVA 9th Army, Mao Zedong called for the destruction of the ROK Capital Division, ROK 3rd Infantry Division, US 1st Marine Division and US 7th Infantry Division.[4] Under Mao's urgent orders, the 9th Army was rushed into North Korea on 10 November.[18] Undetected by UN intelligence,[19] the 9th Army quietly entered the Chosin Reservoir area on 17 November, with the 20th Corps of the 9th Army relieved the 42nd Corps near Yudami-ni.[4]

Location, terrain and weather[edit]

Chosin Reservoir is a man made lake located at the northeast of the Korean peninsula.[20] The name Chosin is the Japanese rendition of the Korean place name Changjin, and the name stuck due to the outdated Japanese maps used by UN forces.[21] The battle's main focus is around the 78 miles (126 km) long road that connects Hungnam and Chosin Reservoir,[22] and it served as the only retreat route for the UN forces.[23] Through this road, Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni, located at the south and east side of the reservoir respectively, are connected at Hagaru-ri. From there, the road passes through Koto-ri and eventally leads to the port of Hungnam.[24] The areas around the Chosin Reservoir were also sparsely populated.[25]

The battle was fought over one of the roughest terrain during the harshest weather of the Korean War.[2] The road was created by cutting through the hilly terrains of Korea, accompanied with steep climbs and drops. Dominant peaks, such as the Funchilin Pass and the Toktong Pass, overlook the entire length of the road. The road's quality was also poor, and in some places it was reduced to one lane gravel trails.[24] On 14 November, a cold front from Sebria descended over the Chosin Reservoir, and the temperature plunged to as low as −35 °F (−37 °C).[26] The cold weather was accompanied by icy roads, frozen grounds and frostbite casualties.

Forces and strategies[edit]

Further information: [[:Battle of Chosin Reservoir order of battle]]
Map of the Battle of the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir.

The Chinese formulated their strategy based on their experiences from the Chinese Civil War.[4] Working with the assumption that only light UN presence would be at the reservoir, the 9th Army was at first to destroy the UN garrisons at Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni, then push towards Hagaru-ri.[4] Believing that the bulk of the US X Corps would scramble to rescue the destroyed units, the 9th Army would then block and trap the main UN forces on the road between Hagaru-ri and Hungnam.[4] The 9th Army initially committed six divisions for the battle, with most of the forces concentrated at Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni.[4]

But the flaw of the Chinese plan is the lack of accurate intelligences on the UN forces. Although the US X Corps was stretched thin over northeast Korea, the bulk of the US 1st Marine Division, including the 5th, 7th and 11th Marine Regiment, was concentrated at Yudami-ni.[27] Similarly, the strategically important Hagaru-ri, which contained an airfield and a supply dump,[28] was not a priority for the Chinese despite being lightly defended by the 1st and the 7th Marine Regiment.[29] Only the RCT-31, a hastily formed regimental combat team of the US 7th Infantry Division, was understrength and spread thin along the eastern bank of the reservoir.[30] All those units would later took the brunt of the Chinese assaults.

Although the 9th Army was one of China's elite formations composed of veterans and former POWs from the Huaihai Campaign,[4] several deficiencies hampered its ability during the battle. Initially the 9th Army was intended to be outfitted at Manchuria during November, but Mao suddenly ordered the 9th Army to enter Korea before that could happen.[4] As the result, the 9th Army received almost no winter gears for the harsh Korean winter.[31] Similarly, poor logistic forced the 9th Army to abandon heavy artilleries[32] while working with little food and ammunation supply.[31] Unable to forage at the sparsely populated reservoir, mass stravations and exposures soon broke out among the Chinese units.[31] By the end of the battle, more Chinese troops died from the cold than from combats and air raids.[33]

Battle[edit]

On the night of 27 November, the PVA 20th and 27th Corps of the 9th Army launched multiple attacks and ambushes along the road between the Chosin Reservoir and Koto-ri. At Yudam-ni, the US 5th, 7th and 11th Marine Regiment was surrounded and attacked by the PVA 59th, 79th and 89th Division. Similarly, RCT-31 was isolated and ambushed at Sinhung-ni by the PVA 80th and the 81st Division. Finally, the PVA 60th Division surrounded elements of the US 1st Marine Regiment at Kotor-ri from the north.[4] Caught by complete surprise, the UN forces were cut-off at Yudam-ni, Sinhung-ni, Hagaru-ri and Kotor-ri by 28 November.[34]

Actions at Yudam-ni[edit]

Marines under cover of large boulder engaging the Chinese.

Acting on General Almond's instruction, the 1st Marine Division ordered the 5th Marine Regiment to attack west towards Mupyong-ni on the day of 27 November.[35] The attacks were soon stalled by strong Chinese resistance and forced the marines to dug in at the ridges surrounding Yudam-ni.[36] As the night came, five Chinese battalions of the 79th Division attacked the ridges on the north and northwest of Yudam-ni, hoping to annihilate the garrison in one stroke.[4] Close range fighings soon developed as the attackers infiltrated into marine positions,[37] but the 5th and 7th Marine Regiment managed to hold the line despite suffering heavy casualties.[38] As day broke on 28 November, all five Chinese battalions were rendered combat ineffective.[4]

While the battle was underway at Yudam-ni, the PVA 59th Division blocked the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri by attacking the defending C and F Company of the 7th Marine Regiment.[39] The successful assault forced the C Company to retreat into Yudam-ni while left the F Company trapped on Toktong Pass, a vital terrain that controlled the road.[40] On 29 November, several efforts by the 7th Marine Regiment had failed to rescue the F Company despite inflicting heavy casualties onto the Chinese.[41] Aided by artilleries from Hagaru-ri and air supports, the F Company managed to hold out for five days while enduring constant attacks by the PVA 59th Division.[42]

After the devastating losses suffered by the PVA 79th Division at Yudam-ni, the 9th Army headquarter realized that the bulk of the 1st Marine Division is stationed at Yudam-ni, with a garrison strength that is the double of the initial estimates.[4] Believing that any further assaults would be futile, the 9th Army switched their main attacks towards Sinhung-ni and Hagaru-ri,[4] leaving Yudam-ni alone from 28 November to 30 November.[43] At the same time, General Almond realized the grave situation of the X Corps, and ordered Major General Oliver Prince Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Division, to withdraw from Yudam-ni.[44] On 30 November, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray and Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, commander of the 5th and 7th Marine Regiment respectively, issued a joint order to breakout from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri.[45] Faced with the tough fights between the blocking Chinese divisions and the retreating marines, Smith remarked: "Retreat, hell! We're not retreating, we're just advancing in a different direction."[46]

For the breakout, the marines were formed into a convoy with a single M4A3 Sherman tank as the lead. The plan was to have the 3rd Battlion of the 5th Marine Regiment as the vanguard of the convoy, with three battalions covering the rear. At the same time, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment would attack towards the F Company in order to open the road at Toktong Pass.[47] To start the break out, the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment has to first attack south and capture Hill 1542 and Hill 1419 in order to cover the road from Chinese attacks.[48]

During a lull in the fighting, the marines taking a break by the convoy.

On the morning of 1 December, the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment engaged the PVA 175th Regiment of the 59th Division at Hill 1542 and Hill 1419. The tenacious Chinese defenders soon forced the marines to dug in at the slopes between the road and the peaks,[49] with the convoy passed 3rd Battalion's position by the afternoon.[48] With Hagaru-ri still not captured, the PVA High Command scrambled the PVA 79th Division to resume attacks on Yudam-ni while rushed the 89th Division south towards Koto-ri.[4] The Chinese struck at the night, and the ferocious fightings forced the rear covering forces to call in night fighters to suppress the attacks.[50] The fightings lasted well into the morning of 2 Decemeber until all marines managed to withdraw from Yudam-ni.[50]

At the same time, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment also tried to break the Chinese blockade at Hill 1419 on 1 December. Despite being badly reduced by combat, hunger and frostbite, the PVA 59th Division sent in its last five platoons and refused to yield.[4] As the night approches, the 1st Battalion finally captured the peak and started to march through the hills at the east of the road.[51] Relying on the element of suprise, the 1st Battalion managed to destroy several Chinese positions along the road.[52] On the morning of 2 December, a joint attacks by the F Company and the 1st Battalion secured the Toktong Pass, thus opened the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri.[53]

Although the road had been opened between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the convoy still has to fight through the numerous Chinese positions on the hills overlooking the road. On the first night of the retreat, the Chinese struck the convoy in force and inflicted heavy casualties upon the 3rd Battlion of the 5th Marine Regiment.[54] Although strong air covers suppressed most of the Chinese forces for the rest of the march, the cold weathers, harrasing fires, raiding parties, and road blocks slowed the retreat to a crawl while causing numerous casualties.[55] Despite those diffculties, the convoy reached Hagaru-ri in orderly fashion on the afternoon of 3 December, with the withdrawal completed on 4 December.[56]

East of the reservoir[edit]

Further information: [[:Task Force Faith]]
Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos Faith, Jr. RCT-31 was later known as "Task Force Faith" due to his fearless leadership.

RCT-31, later known as Task Force Faith, was a hastily formed regimental combat team from the 7th Infantry Division that guards the right flank of the marine advance towards Mupyong-ni. Before the battle, RCT-31 was spread thin with main elements seperated at the hills north of Sinhung-ni, the inlet west of Sinhung-ni, and the town of Hudong-ni south of Sinhung-ni.[57] Although the Chinese believed RCT-31 to be a reinforced regiment,[4] the task force was actually understrength with one one battalion missing, due to the scattered 7th Infantry Division over northeast Korea.[58]

On the night of 27 November, four Chinese regiments from the PVA 80th and the 81st Division attacked the northern hills and the inlets,[4] completely suprised the defenders.[59] The ensuring battle caused heavy casualties on the 1st Infantry Battalion of the US 32nd Regiment at the north of Sinhung-ni,[60] while the 57th Field Artillery Battalion and the 3rd Infantry Battalion of the the US 31st Regiment was almost overran at the inlet.[61] The Chinese also sent the remaining two regiments from the 81st Division towards Hill 1221,[4] an undefended hill that controls the road between Sinhung-ni and Hudong-ni.[62] As the night fightings ended, RCT-31 was cut into three pieces.

Believing that the US defenders was completely destroyed at the inlet, the Chinese stopped their attacks and proceed to loot the US positions for food and clothings.[4] As the morning came on 28 November, the US 3rd Battalion counterattacked the PVA 239th Regiment at the inlet, sending the suprised Chinese back in a complete rout.[63] In the afternoon, General Almond flew into the perimeter of RCT-31, convinced that RCT-31 was strong enough to begin its attack and deal with whatever "remnants" of Chinese forces that were in their way. Almond ordered the Colonel Allan D. Maclean, the commander of RCT-31, to resume the offensive north while presented three Silver Stars to Maclean's officers. In disgust, Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith, Jr., commander of the 1st Battalion of the US 32nd Regiment, threw his medal into the snow.[64]

A M19 Gun Motor Carriage. Its lethal 40 mm cannon was employed by Task Force Faith with great effects against the Chinese.

On the night of 28 December, the PVA 80th Division attacked again with three regiments.[4] At the inlet, the Chinese assault became a disaster as the communications broke down while the devastating anti-aircraft (AA) fires from the 57th Battalion swept the Chinese ranks.[65] In the aftermath of the fightings, the PVA 238th and the 239th Regiment together had less than 600 soldiers.[4] The attacks by PVA 240th Regiment, on the other hand, forced Maclean to order a retreat from the northern hills towards the inlet.[66] On 29 November, the 1st Battalion managed to break through the Chinese blockades and reached the inlet, but Maclean disappeared as he mistook some Chinese soliders as friendlies.[67][nb 5] The Chinese finally stopped their attacks on the night of 29 November while waiting for fresh reinforcements.[4]

While RCT-31 was under siege, General Almond finally instructed the 1st Marine Division to rescue RCT-31 by breaking out of Yudam-ni, an impossible order for General Smith to implement.[68] Only the 31st Tank Company tired to rescue RCT-31 by attacking Hill 1221.[69] Without infantry supports, the two armor attacks on 28 and 29 November were stalled by rough terrains and close infantry assaults.[70] On 30 November, US forces evacuated from Hudong-ni to defend Hagaru-ri, leaving the rest of RCT-31 completely stranded.[71]

On 30 November, Major General David G. Barr, the commander of the 7th Infantry Division, flew into the Sinhung-ni inlet and met with Faith, who by now assumed command of RCT-31. Faith expressed the difficulties for a breakout, particularly the 500 wounded that RCT-31 has to carry.[72] On the same day, the PVA 94th Division arrived as reinforcements for the 80th Division.[4] As the night came, four Chinese regiments renewed their attacks with Zhan Danan, the commander of the 80th Division, ordered the complete destruction of RCT-31 before dawn.[4] Again, the 57th Battalion's AA guns held the Chinese at bay,[73] but the shell supplies were running desperately low.[74] On the day of 1 December, Faith finally ordered RCT-31 to breakout from Sinhung-ni and withdraw to Hagaru-ri.[74]

The marines watch F4U Corsairs drop napalm on Chinese positions.

The breakout began as soon as the weather allowed air covers on 1 December.[75] As the soldiers formed a convoy and tried to leave the perimeter, the PVA 241st Regiment immediately swarmed over the convoy[76] with three other regiments closing in.[4] Left with no choice, the covering aircrafts dropped napalm right in front of RCT-31, causing casualties among both Chinese and US troops.[77] The resulting firestorm wiped out the blocking Chinese company,[4] allowing the convoy to advance forward.[78] As the front of RCT-31 made their way forward, heavy small arms fire caused many members of the rear guard to seek shelter below the road, instead of protecting the trucks.[78] Chinese fires also killed or wounded those already in the trucks as well as the drivers who viewed the job as a form of suicide.[79] Slowly, the convoy approached a roadblock under Hill 1221 in the late afternoon.[80] Several parties tried to clear Hill 1221, but after taking part of the hill, the leaderless soldiers continued out onto the frozen reservoir instead of returning to the column.[81] As Faith led an assault on the roadblock, he was hit by a grenade and dying from the wound.[82] The convoy managed to fight pass the first road block, but as it reached the second roadblock at Hudong-ni, RCT-31 disintegrated under Chinese attacks.[83] Some survivors managed to reach Hagaru-ri from 1 to 3 December,[84] and the remainders of RCT-31 were formed into a provisional army battalion for the rest of the battle.[85]

Actions at Hagaru-ri[edit]

A Direct Air Support Center at Hagaru-ri.

To support the marine attack towards Mupyong-ni, Hagaru-ri had became an important supply dump with an airfield under construction. General Smith and the 1st Marine Division headquarter were also located at Hagaru-ri.[34] With the bulk of the 1st Marine Division gathered at Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri was lightly defended by two battalions from the 1st and 7th Marine Regiment, and the rest of the garrison were composed of engineers and rear support units from both the army and the marine.[86]

The original Chinese plan called for the PVA 58th Division to attack Hagaru-ri on the night of 27 November, but the division were lost in the countryside due the outdated Japanese maps.[4] It wasn't until the dawn of 28 November did the 58th Division arrived at Hagaru-ri. Meanwhile, with the fightings and ambushes had already broken out on the previous night, the garrison at Hagaru-ri started to notice the Chinese forces around them. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge, the commander of the 3d Battalion of the 1st Marines Regiment, judged the Chinese attack would come on the night of 28 November.[87] The entire perimeter was on alert by 9:30 p.m.[88] Due to the manpower shortage, almost everyone within the perimeter were pressed into the frontline, including rear support units that had little combat training.[89]

On the night of of 28 November, the PVA 173th Regiment attacked the western and the southern perimeter while the 172nd Regiment struck the hills on north of the perimeter.[4] Despite the preparations, the understrength garrison was soon overwhelmed. Chinese forces opened several gaps in the defence and reached the rear areas.[90] But the chaos made the the Chinese forces to lose discipline, and the attackers started to loot for food and clothings instead of exploiting the situation.[91] The defenders destroyed the intruders in counterattacks, while the breakdown of communications between the two Chinese regiments allowed the gaps to close.[89] As the fightings stopped, the Chinese only gained the East Hill on the northen perimeter.[89] Another attack was planned for the night of 29 November, but air raids broke the Chinese formations before it could be carried out.[92]

Wounded marines evacuated by helicopter.

Given the critical manpower shortage at Hagaru-ri, Smith ordered a task force to be send north from Koto-ri and open the road south of Hagaru-ri.[93] In response, a task force was formed with the 41 Royal Commando, the G Company from the 1st Marines Regiment and the B Company from the 31st Infantry Regiment.[94] The task force was dubbed "Task Force Drysdale" after its commander Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, who also commands the 41 Royal Commando.[94] On the afternoon of 29 November, Task Force Drysdale pushed north from Koto-ri while under constant attacks from the PVA 60th Division.[4][95] The harrowing experience later earned the road the nickname "Hell Fire Valley".[96] As the Chinese attacks dragged on, the task force became disorganized.[97] A blown truck in the convoy soon split the task forces into two pieces.[98] Although the leading segment of the task force fought its way into Hagaru-ri on the night of 29 November, the rear forces were cut-off and destroyed.[99] Despite the heavy losses, the task force managed to bring in 300 badly needed infantryman for the defence at Hagaru-ri.[100]

More reinforcements arrived at Hagaru-ri on the day of 30 November,[101] and it allowed the garrisons to attempt the recapture of East Hill. All efforts failed despite the destruction of a Chinese company.[4][102] As the night came, the PVA 58th Division gathered its remaining 1,500 soldiers in a last ditch attempt to capture Hagaru-ri.[4] The reinforced defenders annihilated most of the attacking forces, with only the defences around the East Hill gave away.[103] As the Chinese tired to advance from the East Hill, they were cut down by the 31st Tank Company.[104]

By 1 December, the PVA 58th Division was virtually destroyed, with the remainders waiting for reinforcements from the 26th Corps of the 9th Army.[4][105] The 26th Corps, however, did not arrive before the marines broke out of Yudam-ni, much to the frustration of Song Shi-Lun.[3] The airfield was opened to traffic on 1 December, allowing UN forces to bring in reinforcements and to evacuate the dead and the wounded.[106] With the marines at Yudam-ni completed their withdrawal on 4 December, the trapped UN forces can finally start their breakout towards the port of Hungnam.

Breakout[edit]

Map of the Retreat from the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir.

After a short period of rest, the breakout began on 6 December with the 7th Marine Regiment as the vanguard of the retreating column while the the 5th Marine Regiment covered the rear.[107] At the same time, the belated PVA 26th Corps started to arrive at Hagaru-ri. As the 7th Marine Regiment pushed aside the PVA 60th Division at the south of Hagaru-ri, the 5th Marine Regiment took over the Hagaru-ri perimeter and recaptured the East Hill from the PVA 58th Division.[108] In a last effort to stop the breakout, the customary Chinese night attack returned with the 76th and 77th Division struck the Hagaru-ri perimeter in all directions.[4] The marines repulsed the Chinese attacks while inflicted heavy casualties.[109]

Meanwhile, the 7th Marine Regiment opened the road between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri by capturing the high grounds surrounding the road. But as soon as the marines pull out, the Chinese returned to the peaks and attacked the column.[110] Chaotic fightings broke out within the columns and the retreat was slowed to a crawl.[111] The air cover, however, returned to subdue the Chinese forces,[110] and the fightings destroyed most of the blocking troops.[4] As the day came on 7 December, the rest of the column managed to reach Koto-ri with little difficulty and the last elements arrived at Koto-ri on the night of 7 December.[112]

After the failure of the 26th Corps at Hagaru-ri, the PVA High Command ordered the 26th and the 27th Corps to chase after the escaping UN force with the 20th Corps blocking the escape route. But with the most of the 20th Corps destroyed at Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the only forces between Koto-ri and Hungnam were few remants of the PVA 58th and the 60th Division.[3] In desperation, Song Shi-Lun ordered these troops to dug in at Funchilin Pass while blowing up the vital Threadway Bridge, hoping the terrains and the obstacles would allow the 26th and the 27th Corps to catch up with the retreating UN forces.[3] The PVA 180th Regiment that occupied Hill 1080 blew up the bridge three times, believing the bridge was rendered irreparable.[113] In response, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment attacked north and Hill 1080 was captured on 9 December after the defenders fought to the last man.[114] At the same time, the 7th Marine Regiment attacked south with the remnant of RCT-31, only to encounter defenders that were already frozen in their foxholes.[115] The marine engineers built a new bridge by 9 December.[116] Outmaneuvered, the 58th and the 60th Division still tried slow the UN advances with ambushes and raids, but after weeks of non-stop fighting, the two divisions together had only 200 soldiers left.[4] The last UN forces left Fuchilin Pass by 11 December.[117]

One of the last engagment during the retreat was an ambush at Sudong by the chasing PVA 89th Division,[4] which the Task Force Dog of the 3rd Infantry Division repulsed with little difficulty.[118] On 9 p.m. of 11 December, the trapped UN forces finally reached the Hungnam perimeter.[119]

Evacuation at Hungnam[edit]

USS Begor observes the destruction of Hungnam's port facilities.

By the time the trapped UN forces arrived at Hungnam, the ROK I Corps, US 3rd Infantry Division and elements from the US 7th Infantry Division had already setup defensive positions around the port.[120] Some skirmishes broke out between the defending 3rd Infantry Division and the chasing 27th Corps, but against the strong naval fire support, the badly mauled 9th Army was in no shape to approach the Hungnam perimeter.[4][121] In the greatest evacuation movement by sea in US military history,[122] a massive 193 ship armada assembled at the port and evacuated not only the UN troops, but also their heavy equipments and the Korean refugees.[123] The last UN unit left at 2:36 p.m. on 24 December, and the port was destroyed to deny its use to the Communist.[122] The PVA 27th Corps entered Hungnam on the morning of 25 December.[4]

Aftermath[edit]

While the the X Corps was evacuated from the eastern front, Chinese attacks also forced the Eight Army to retreat on the western front. With the entire UN front collapsing, the race to Yalu was ended with the Communist recaptured much of North Korea.[9] The Korean War would drag on for another two and half years before the armistice was signed on July 27, 1953.[9]

Despite the loss of North Korea, the X Corps preserved much of its strength.[124] About 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were shipped from Hungnam to Pusan,[123] and they would later rejoin the war effort in Korea. General Smith was credited by both the Chinese and the UN for saving the X Corps from destruction,[125] and the 1st Marine Division also gained fame for its tenacity during the battle.[126]

China was also catapulted into the status of a major military power following the victory at Chosin,[127] but the victory came with a staggering cost. With the escape of the US X Corps and the ROK I Corps, Mao's vision for Chosin was never realized, and the failure made Song Shi-Lun to offer his resignation.[128] At the same time, heavy casualties caused by both combat and poor logistic destroyed much of the eight elite divisions under the 20th and the 27th Corps. Of those eight divisions, two divisions were forced to disband, and only by March of 1951 did the 9th Army returned to its normal strength.[4]

Operation Glory[edit]

During the battle, the UN casualties were buried at temporary gravesites along the road. Operation Glory occurred from July to November 1954, during which the dead of each side were exchanged. Remains of 4,167 U.S. Soldiers and Marines were exchanged for 13,528 North Korean and Chinese dead. In addition, 546 civilians who died in UN prisoner of war camps were turned over to the South Korean government.[129]. After "Operation Glory" 416 Korean War "unknowns" were buried in the Punchbowl Cemetery. According to a DPMO white paper, 1,394 names were also transmitted during "Operation Glory" from the Chinese and North Koreans, of whom 858 names proved to be correct.[130] The 4,167 returned remains were found to be 4,219 individuals, of whom 2,944 were found to be Americans, with all but 416 were identified by name. Of the 239 Korean War unaccounted for, 186 are not associated with Punchbowl unknowns.[nb 6] From 1990 to 1994 North Korea excavated and returned more than 208 sets of remains that possibly containing 200 to 400 remains of US servicemen, but very few have been identified due to the co-mingling of remains.[131] From 1996 to 2006, 220 remains were recovered near the Chinese border.[132]

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

Footnotes
  1. ^ a b In Chinese military nomenclature, the term "Army" (军) means Corps, while the term "Army Group" (兵团) means Army.
  2. ^ The casualty number is disputed between the X Corps and the 1st Marine Division, this number is the composite casualty number calculated by the source.
  3. ^ This number is the total losses suffered by the 9th Army, including units that were not involved the fighting.
  4. ^ Not to be confused with another Sinhung-ni located near Yudami-ni.
  5. ^ Maclean's final fate is disputed among Chinese and US sources. Although both sides agreed that Maclean was shot numerous times while running towards the Chinese soldiers, Chinese sources claims that Maclean was shot dead on the spot, while UN POWs states that Maclean later died from his wounds in a Chinese POW camp (Guang 2007).
  6. ^ 176 were identified and of the remaining 10 cases, 4 were non-Americans of Asiatic descent; one was British; 3 were identified and 2 cases unconfirmed.
Citations
  1. ^ Appleman 1990, p. 37
  2. ^ a b c Appleman 1990, p. 24
  3. ^ a b c d e f Xu 2000
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References[edit]

Further reading[edit]

  • Frank, Benis M. (February 24, 2003). "The Epic of Chosin". Colloquium on Contemporary History Project. U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center. Retrieved 2006-11-05.
  • Roe, Patrick C. (May 4, 2000). The Dragon Strikes. Presidio. ISBN 0891417036.
  • Simmons, BGen Edwin H. (2002) Frozen Chosin pt1 pt2 pt3, United States Marine Corps Historical Division. PCN 19000410000.
  • Crocker, H.W. (2006). Don't Tread on me: A 400-year history of America at War, from Indian Fighting to Terrorist Hunting. Crown Forum. ISBN 1-40005-363-3.
  • Drury, Bob (2009). The Last Stand of Fox Company. New York City: Atlantic Monthly Press. ISBN 978-0-87113-993-1. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Fehrenbach, T.R. (1963). This Kind of War. Dulles, Virginia: Brassey's. ISBN 1-57488-259-7.
  • Russ, Martin (1999). Breakout - The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korea 1950. Penguin Books. ISBN 0-14029-259-4.
  • Schnabel, James F. (1988). Policy and Direction: The First Year. U.S. Army in the Korean War. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U. S. Army.
  • Swatosh, Robert Beryl (2007). Wings, Wars and Life: An Autobiography. Merriam Press. ISBN 978-1576381359.
  • Wayne E. Webb(1998). Cannon and Rifle: The Story of King Battery in Korea...1950

External links[edit]

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Battle of Chosin Reservoir.
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