User:Mz7/sandbox/McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission

Supreme Court


Margaret McIntyre died while the case was still being litigated in the state courts. Joseph McIntyre, the executor of McIntyre's estate, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States, which the Court granted on February 22, 1994. Justice Stevens later wrote, "Even though the amount in controversy is only $100", the Court's grant of certiorari "reflects our agreement with [the executor's] appraisal of the importance of the question presented".

Opinion of the Court
Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, reversing the Ohio Supreme Court in a 7–2 decision. Stevens emphasized that the First Amendment protects a right to anonymity, referring to Talley as precedent, and stated that Ohio's interests in preventing fraud were insufficient to justify the sweeping scope of its statute. Stevens also rejected the argument that the Court's prior decisions in Belotti and Buckley compel the Court to uphold the Ohio statute.

Freedom to publish anonymously
Stevens began his First Amendment analysis by quoting Talley v. California, where the Court wrote: "Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind." Stevens noted various well-known authors throughout literary history who had opted to publish either anonymously or under a pseudonym, including Mark Twain, O. Henry, Benjamin Franklin, and Voltaire. He then stated that the "freedom to publish anonymously extends beyond the literary realm", referring to the decision in Talley, as well as The Federalist Papers, a collection of anonymous essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay to promote the ratification of what is now the U.S. Constitution.

In justifying a First Amendment right to anonymity, Stevens wrote that while curiosity might cause a reader to inquire about an author's identity, an author's "decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible". Stevens added that anonymity "provides a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge her message simply because they do not like its proponent". Stevens concluded that Talley's reasoning "embraced a respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes", stating that "this tradition is perhaps best exemplified by the secret ballot, the hard-won right to vote one's conscience without fear of retaliation".

Exacting scrutiny standard
After explaining that the First Amendment protects a right to anonymity, Justice Stevens proceeded to discuss whether Ohio's statute violates that First Amendment right. Stevens acknowledged that prior decision in Talley "does not necessarily control the disposition of this case", as in Talley the ordinance in question prohibited all anonymous handbilling, whereas in McIntyre the Ohio statute applied literature intended to influence election voters. Because Ohio's law was "a regulation of pure speech" as opposed to a regulation of merely "the mechanics of the electoral process", Stevens applied a standard of "exacting scrutiny", a more rigorous standard of scrutiny than the Ohio Supreme Court had applied. Under this standard, Ohio must demonstrate that its stated interests "in preventing fraudulent and libelous statements" and "in providing the electorate with relevant information" are sufficient to justify its law against anonymous campaign literature.

Stevens stated that the interest of "informing the electorate" is "plainly insufficient to support the constitutionality of its disclosure requirement", writing that "the identity of the speaker is no different from other components of the document's content that the author is free to include or exclude". On the other hand, Stevens acknowledged that the fraud and libel prevention interest "carries special weight during election campaigns when false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse consequences for the public at large". However, Stevens also commented that Ohio's election laws include "detailed and specific prohibitions against making or disseminating false statements during political campaigns" and that "Ohio's prohibition of anonymous leaflets plainly is not its principal weapon against fraud". Stevens concluded that while Ohio's prohibition may "serve as an aid to enforcement of the specific prohibitions and as a deterrent to the making of false statements by unscrupulous prevaricators", these "ancillary benefits" do not justify the Ohio statute's "extremely broad prohibition", particularly because it "encompasses documents that are not even arguably false or misleading".

Belotti and Buckley
Stevens concluded that neither of the Court's prior decisions in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti and Buckley v. Valeo is "controlling" in McIntyre. Stevens clarified that "although we commented in dicta on the prophylactic effect of requiring identification of the source of corporate advertising, that footnote did not necessarily apply to independent communications by an individual like Mrs. McIntyre". Additionally, while Buckley "concerned contributions to [a political] candidate or expenditures by the candidate or his responsible agent", Stevens wrote that the case "had no reference to the kind of independent activity pursued by Mrs. McIntyre".

Dissent and concurrence
Justice Antonin Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice William Rehnquist joined. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a concurring opinion, while Justice Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment.